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<368>

Qualis relatio in finem requiratur ad hanc bonitatem.

Ratio dubii est, quia solent distingui variæ <col. b> relationes, interpretativa habitualis tantum, id est, ex solo habitu procedens; habitualis procedens ex præcedenti actu solum, quia præcessit; virtualis, ex præcedenti actu media virtute relicta et durante, ac influente; et actualis, quæ est per actualem intentionem talis finis, seu actuale imperium, et de singulis sunt opinioniones.

1. Opinio
rejjicitur
multipliciter.

Primo.

Secundo.

10 1. Prima ergo affirmat sufficere intentionem interpretativam, quæ tunc esse censetur, quando homo est ita affectus et dispositus, quod si talis finis in suam cogitationem veniret, actum suum in ullum referret. Sed hunc dicendi modum apud nullum scriptum inveno, neque habet fundamentum, aut probabilitatem, quia illa conditionalis nihil ponit in esse, imo nec cognosci potest, nisi a solo Deo. Item quia similis dispositio non sufficit ad culpam, non enim, ut sæpe apud Augustinum legitur, judicabit nos Deus per ea quæ faceremus, si hæ, vel illæ occasiones occurrerent, aut si tales cogitationes in nobis excitari permetteret, sed per ea, quæ facimus, imo ad magnam Dei gratiam pertinet, quando hominem prævenit, et non permittit in eam cogitationem incidere, cum qua scit fore peccatum: ergo multo minus sufficiet illa dispositio ad boni-

5R

10R

15R

20R

*What kind of relation to the end is required for this goodness?*²

The reason for doubting is that various relations are usually distinguished: the interpretative [that is] habitual only, that is, proceeding from a habit alone; the habitual, proceeding from a previous act only because it preceded; the virtual, resulting from a preceding act by means of a remaining, enduring, and influencing strength; and the actual, which is by means of an actual intention of such an end or actual command. And there are opinions about each one.

1. The first, therefore, affirms that an interpretative intention is sufficient. Such an intention is thought to be when a human being is in such a condition and so disposed that if such an end were to come into his thought he would refer his act to it. But I do not find this way of speaking in any writing nor does it have any foundation or probability, because that conditional places nothing in being and cannot even be thought except by God alone. Also,, because a similar disposition does not suffice for blame, for, as is often read in Augustine, God will not judge us for the things which we would have done if these or those occasions had occurred or if such thoughts had been allowed to be stirred up in us. Rather, he will judge us for those things which we did. More correctly, as it pertains to the great grace of God, when he anticipates that a human being and does not permit him to fall into that thought by which, God knows, he will sin. Therefore, much less will that dispo-

The first opinion
is rejected
multiply.

First.

Second.

¹The Latin text is from the Vivès edition. Marginal notes—some of which, but not all, are reproduced in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the beginning of paragraphs—are from the 1628 edition.

²Jacques Channeville borrows heavily from this section when he deals with the question ‘Quæ relatio actus in finem requiratur, ad bonitatem’ in *Ethica seu philosophia moralis juxta principia Aristotelis* ([Parisiis: apud Edmundum Martinum, 1666], 497).

Tertio.	tatem, quæ perfectiorem voluntatem requirit. Denique actus ille ex vi illius dispositionis operantis non habet bonitatem intrinsecam ex fine, quia non tendit in illum per se ipsum, et suam intrinsecam entitatem, neque etiam habet bonitatem extrinsecam, quia nullo modo refertur in talem finem ab aliquo extrinseco principio: ergo nullo modo.	25R	sition suffice for goodness, which requires a more perfect will. Finally, that act does not have intrinsic goodness from the end as a result of the strength of that disposition, because it does not tend to the end <i>per se</i> and through its intrinsic entity. Nor does it have extrinsic goodness, because it is in no way referred to such an end by any extrinsic principle. Therefore, [it has goodness] in no way.	Thirdly.
2. Opinio de relatione habituali.	2. Secunda sententia est: sufficere relationem habitualement, id est, quæ censetur esse in operante per solum habitum virtutis, a quo censetur intrinsece informari virtutis actus, præsertim a gratia et charitate, pro hac opinione referri potest Soto, l. 3, de Natura, et Gratia, c. 4, concl. 2, qui citat Cajetanum 1, 2, q. 106, art. 9, videtur favere, quæst. 21, art. 4, et aliqui ex scholasticis infra citandis.	30R	2. The second view is that a habitual relation suffices. That is, [the relation] which is thought to be in the one acting through the habit of virtue alone, by which the act is thought to be informed intrinsically with virtue, especially by grace and charity. For this opinion, one can be referred to Soto, <i>De Natura et Gratia</i> , l. 3, c. 4, concl. 2. He cites Cajetan, IaIIæ.106.9 and seems to favour q. 21, art. 4, and others from the scholastics to be cited below.	The second opinion concerning a habitual relation.
Probabilis est, sed non in sensu hic intento.	3. Sed oportet advertere aliud esse loqui de bonitate propria sumpta: aliud de ratione meriti. Item aliud esse loqui de circumstantia, seu dignitate personæ operantis: aliud vero de circumstantia finis, de qua nunc agimus; quod autem attinet ad meritum, probabilis sententia est habitualement dignitatem personæ operantis, præsertim illam, quæ est per gratiam et charitatem, multum conferre ad rationem, vel augmentum meriti, præsertim si ex parte actus sit sufficiens bonitas: tunc autem non concurrat habitus, ut principium dans actui bonitatem ex fine, sed ut circumstantia personæ significans illam, et consequenter conferens ad valorem moralem actus, ut supra dictum est.	35R	3. But it is necessary to note that it is one thing to speak about goodness in a strict sense and another to speak about the <i>ratio</i> of merit. Also, it is one thing to speak about the circumstance or dignity of the person who is acting, but another to speak about the circumstance of the end, which we are dealing with now. Moreover, as far as merit is concerned, the probable view is that the habitual dignity of the person who is acting, especially that which comes through grace and charity, bestows much to the <i>ratio</i> or increase of merit, especially if the goodness on the part of the act is sufficient. But a habit does not concur in that case as a principle giving goodness to the act from the end, but as a circumstance of the person signifying that and consequently adding to the moral value of the act, as was said above.	It is probable, but not in the sense intended here.
In sensu nunc intento improbatum.	4. At vero agendo proprie de bonitate, quæ ex fine operantis redundat in actum ejus, dicendum est sine dubio ad illam non sufficere habitum virtutis, ut plane docet D. Thomas, in 2, d. 38, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4, et d. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6, et idem sentit Cajetanus, 1 part, q. 63, a. 6, et idem Durandus, d. 40, q. 2, n. 11, Scotus, d. 41, Adrianus, quodlib. 10, art. 3, ad 4, et probatur, quia habitus non confert bonitatem, nisi aut eliciendo, aut imperando: ergo si neutro modo concurrat, nullam confert bonitatem: ergo sola existentia, seu concomitantia ejus in subjecto non satis est, ut det bonitatem, quia potest illi adesse, et neutro ex dictis modis concurrere. Antecedens patet, quia habitus tantum est causa extrinseca actus: ergo solum media sua causalitate potest concurrere ad bonitatem ejus: et	50R	4. But, on the other hand, when dealing strictly with the goodness which overflows from the end of the one acting to his act, it should be said that there is no doubt but that a habit of virtue is not sufficient for it, as St. Thomas plainly teaches in II, d. 38, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4, and d. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6. And Cajetan thinks the same in Ia.63.6, as well as Durandus in d. 40, q. 2, n. 11, Scotus in d. 41, and Adrian in quodlib. 10, art. 3, ad 4. And it is proven because a habit does not bestow goodness, except by eliciting or commanding. Therefore, if it does not concur in either of those ways, it does not bestow any goodness. Therefore, its existence or concomitance alone in the subject is not enough to give goodness, because it can be present to him but not concur in either of the stated ways. The antecedent is clear for a habit alone is an extrinsic cause of an act. Therefore, it can concur with the act's goodness only	In the sense intended here it is rejected.
1. Argumentum contra hanc opinionem.	60	55R	60R	First argument against this opinion.

Confirm. 1.	confirmatur, quia habitibus, ut sic, nec meremur, nec demeremur, nisi influant in opus: non potest autem intelligi alius modus influxus præter dictos. Confirmatur secundo, quia alias in homine justo quilibet actus virtutis haberet bonitatem omnium virtutum, vel saltem plurimarum, quia in illo homine sunt habitualiter omnes virtutes, et quilibet actus virtutis, est referibilis in finem omnium, vel saltem plurimarum. Tandem quamvis infidelis, et peccator careat virtutibus, et habeat plures habitus vitiorum, non propterea refert actus suos etiam malos, vel indifferentes ad finem, seu objecta talium vitiorum, neque inde accipiunt opera ejus aliquam malitiam; ergo idem est a fortiori de actibus bonis.	65R	by means of its causality. And it is confirmed because we neither gain nor lose merit by habits as such, unless they influence [us] to works. Moreover, no other way of influx beyond the ones stated can be thought of. It is confirmed, secondly, because otherwise any act of virtue whatever in a just human being would have the goodness of every virtue or at least of most, since all the virtues are habitually in that human being and any act whatever of virtue is referable to the end of all [the virtues] or at least of most. Finally, although an infidel and sinner lacks virtues and has many vicious habits, he does not thereby refer his acts—even evil or indifferent acts—to the end or object of such vices, nor do all his works thereby receive some badness. Therefore, the same is true <i>a fortiori</i> concerning good acts.	65R	First confirmation.	
Confirm. 2.	65				Second confirmation.	
2. Argum.	70				Second argument.	
3. Opinio de alio modo relationis habitualis.	75	5. Tertia sententia est sufficere ad hanc bonitatem relationem habitualement relictam moraliter ex aliquo actu præterito, etiamsi postea nihil influat in actum, sed moraliter illum denominet. Quam sententiam videntur interdum insinuare scholastici, in 2, d. 41, præsertim D. Bonaventura, art. 1, quæst. 3, et Gabriel, q. unica, art. 3, dubio 2. Fundamentum esse potest, quia si prior relatio talis <col. b> fuit, quæ subsequentem actum comprehenderet, plane censetur perseverare quamdiu non datur retractatio, quod erit quotiescumque subsequens opus non repugnat priori fini, sed est illi consentaneum. Confirmatur, quia in omni bono opere ex objecte, operatur homo propter se ipsum proximo, quia operatur propter convenientiam ad rationem, seu naturam rationalem; ergo si prius per se ipsum, et omnia sua retulit in Deum, id satis erit, ut cætera opera virtute referantur in ipsum. Et idem argumentum fieri potest de actibus indifferentibus, in quibus speciale esset inconveniens hoc non admittere, quia alias quamplurimi male fierent ex defectu relationis in finem.	75R	5. The third view is that a habitual relation remaining morally from some previous act is sufficient for this goodness, even if afterwards it does not inflow anything into the act, but [only] denominates it morally. Scholastics sometimes seem to suggest this view in II, d. 41, especially St. Bonaventure in art. 1, q. 3, and Gabriel in the first question, art. 3, dubio 2. The foundation can be that if the prior relation was of such a kind that it would include the subsequent act, it is clearly thought to persist as long as no retraction is given (which will be whenever the subsequent action is not repugnant to the former end but is in harmony with it). It is confirmed since in every good action from the object, the human being acts for the sake of himself proximately, since he acts for the sake of the agreeability to reason or rational nature. Therefore, if he first referred it to God through himself and all his [actions], that will be sufficient for all his remaining actions to be referred virtually to God. And the same argument can be made concerning indifferent acts, in which this particular disagreeability is not admitted because otherwise very many acts would be made badly as a result of a defect of the relation to the end.	75R	The third opinion concerning another mode of habitual relation.
Eius fundam.	80				Its foundation.	
Confirm.	85				Confirmation.	
Displicet dicta opinio.	90				The stated opinion is displeasing.	
Impugnatur.	95	6. Sed nihilominus hæc sententia mihi non probatur, sicut neque aliis theologis, dicta d. 41, præsertim Ægidio, q. 1, art. 2, et Scoto, q. 1, et quodlibeto 17, art. 2, nec Bonaventura et Gabriel aperte contradicunt, sed confuse loquuntur de relatione virtuali, quod in Cajetano et aliis auctoribus notandum est. Probatur autem illam relationem non sufficere, quia aliud est relationem in finem objective cadere in aliqua opera, aliud effective, seu imperative; illa autem relatio, quæ præces-	95R	6. But, nevertheless, this view is not accepted by me, just as it is also not accepted by other theologians in the mentioned d. 41, especially Ægidius, q. 1, art. 2, and Scotus, q. 1 and quodlibet 17, art. 2. Nor do Bonaventure and Gabriel clearly contradict it, but they speak confusedly about a virtual relation, which should be noted in Cajetan and other authors. But it is shown that that relation does not suffice since it is one thing for a relation to an end to fall objectively on some action but another to fall effectively or imperatively. But that relation which	95R	It is attacked.

100	sit, quamvis cadat objective in sequentia opera, non sufficit, quia fieri potest, ut omnia illa respiciat, ut materiale objectum, ut cum aliquis in principio dici, ³ aut vitæ opera illius temporis refert in Deum; tamen hoc non est satis, ut talia opera sint effective, seu imperative ab illa relatione, quia ad priorem respectum sufficit, quod illa opera aliquo modo repræsententur objective in intellectu, quando fit illa relatio, ad posteriorem autem oportet, ut quando fit ipsum opus, ad illud excitetur operans aliquo modo ex vi illius relationis, quia efficientia, neque potest intelligi sine aliquo influxu: hic autem totus influxus consistit in hac excitatione, seu applicatione ad opus: ut autem intentio det operi bonitatem aliquam, non sufficit habitudo ad aliud, ut ad objectum, ut per se notum est, quia actus nec physice, nec moraliter informat objectum, ut objectum, sed potius e contrario; unde etiam alienos actus possumus, ut objectum respicere, et referre in Deum, et non inde accipiunt bonitatem; requiritur ergo causalis relatio, quæ aliquo modo sit per modum imperii: actus autem, qui præcessit omnino, et neque in actu, neque in memoria, neque alio simili modo manet, nullo modo concurrat causaliter, ad præsentem actum, sed ita operatur homo, ac si nullo modo illum habuisset; ergo <370> ex illa relatione præterita nullam bonitatem habet præsens actio. Atque hoc confirmat vulgatum exemplum de eo, qui retulit omnia opera sua in pravum aliquem finem, ut in dolum, quia non est necesse malitiam illius relationis redundare in omnia opera sequentia, etiamsi retractata non sit.	100R	preceded, although it falls objectively on subsequent actions, does not suffice because it can happen that it respects all things as material object, as when someone in the beginning is said to refer all the actions of life or of that time to God. ⁶ Nevertheless, this is not enough so that such actions are effectively or imperatively from that relation, because for the former respect it is enough that those actions in some way are represented objectively in the intellect when that relation happened. But for the latter it is necessary that when the action itself takes place the one acting is in some way excited to it by the strength of that relation because by efficiency. ⁷ Nor can it be understood without some influx. But this entire influx consists in this excitation or application to action. But in order for the intention to give some goodness to the action, a habitudo to something else as to an object does not suffice, as is known <i>per se</i> , since an act neither physically nor morally informs an object as object, but rather conversely. Hence, we can refer even alien acts to God and have them respect him as an object and they do not thereby receive goodness. Therefore, a causal relation is required which is in some way in the mode of a command. But an act which entirely precedes and remains neither in act nor in memory nor in some other similar way in no way concurs causally with the present act; rather, the human being acts just as if he in no way had had it. Therefore, the present action has no goodness from that previous relation. And this is confirmed by the common example of him who referred all his actions to some corrupt end, e.g., to treachery, since it is not necessarily the case that the badness of that relation overflows to all his subsequent actions, even if it was not retracted.	100R	
105		105R			
110		110R			
115		115R			
120	Confirm.	120R		Confirmation.	
125	4. Opinio de relatione actuali.	125R	7. Propter hæc, est quarta sententia, quæ requirit actualem relationem ad hanc bonitatem per formalem intentionem, vel actum imperatum, quam significat Durandus, in 2, d. 40, quæst. 2, n. 7 et 11, quanquam non satis rem explicet: probatur autem, quia, secluso actu, et relatione præterita, ac ipso habitu, nihil remanet, quod possit sufficere. Dices sat esse virtutem aliquam ex priori actu relictam, sed inquiri, quid sit illa virtus, aut enim est aliquid in voluntate, vel in intellectu;	The fourth opinion concerning an actual relation. Its proof.	
130	Eius probatio. Enervatur hæc probatio.	130R	7. On account of this, there is a fourth view which requires an actual relation for this goodness through a formal intention or commanded act. Durandus indicates this view in II, d. 40, q. 2, n. 7 and 11, although he does not explain the matter sufficiently. But it is proven since, having set aside the act, past relation, and the habit itself, nothing remains that can suffice. You may say that some strength remaining from a previous act is enough, but I ask what this strength is. For either it is something in the will or something in the intellect. It is not the first	This proof is weakened.	

³Vivès: Dei.⁶Difficult to see how to make sense of the sentence exactly as written.⁷Not sure what to make of the 'quia efficientia'.

135 non primum, quia in voluntate tantum sunt aut habitus, aut
 erit actualis, et non virtualis relatio, atque eodem argumento
 140 probari potest non esse in intellectu, quia neque potest esse
 habitus, neque actus, præsertim, quia hæc virtus debet movere
 voluntatem quoad exercitium ex parte ipsius potentiæ: intel-
 lectus autem nunquam movet nisi ex parte objecti quoad spec-
 ificationem.

5. Opinio
 auctoris de
 relatione virtuali.

145 8. Nihilominus dicendum est sufficere relationem vir-
 tualem ex vi intensionis, seu imperii relictæ, et virtute perman-
 entis, ut ex fine habeat operatio humana aliquam moralitatem
 et laudabilitatem: est enim hæc expressa sententia D. Thomæ
 150 3, contra Gentes, cap. 138, ratione 3 [i.e., 8], ubi dicit: *Voluntas
 præcedens actum virtute manet in tota consecutione actus, et ip-
 sum laudabilem reddit etiam cum de proposito voluntatis propter
 quod, actus incepit in executione operis non cogitatur*: idem, q. 2,
 155 de Malo, art. 8, argumento 11, cum solutione, et quæst. 2, de
 Virtut., art. 11, ad 2, et sumitur etiam ex 2, 2, quæst. 83, art. 13,
 ubi agens de oratione⁴ dicit posse imperatoriam⁵ esse, et revera
 Bonaventura, Gabriel, Ægidius, et fere alii antiqui scholastici
 hoc in sensu loquuntur.

Probatur hanc
 relationem esse
 frequentem.

160 9. Ratio autem est, quia imprimis negari non potest, quin
 hic modus operandi non solum sit homini possibilis, etiam
 165 valde frequens, sic enim mercenarius tota die dicitur operari
 pro mercede, et si non semper cogitet de mer- <col. b> cede:
 et qui iter agit, vere dicitur deambulare, ut ad terminum viæ
 perveniat. Similiter in materia de Sacramentis nihil est certius,
 quam intentionem virtuales sufficere ad conficiendum
 160 Sacramentum, etiamsi formalis non adsit. Item quia quando
 unus homo per alium operatur, præbendo illi suum consen-
 sum, et mandatum, quamdiu non retractat dicitur virtute operari,
 165 quidquid alius operatur, quia virtus prioris consensus
 censetur manere in scriptura, vel mandato: sic ergo fieri potest
 in his, quæ homo per seipsum operatur ex vi prioris consen-

135R since anything in the will is either a habit or an act. But it is not a habit,
 as was said. But if it is an act, it will be an actual relation rather than
 a virtual relation. And by the same argument it can be proven that it
 140R is not in the intellect, since it cannot be either a habit or an act, espe-
 cially since this strength must move the will with respect to exercise on
 the part of its own power. But the intellect never moves [something]
 except on the part of the object with respect to specification.

140R 8. Nevertheless, it should be said that a virtual relation resulting
 from the force of an aiming or of a remaining command and from the
 strength of something remaining is enough so that a human action has
 some morality and praiseworthiness from an end. For this is the express
 view of St. Thomas in SCG III, cap. 138, rat. 8, where he says: 'The
 willing preceding the act remains virtually in the entire performance
 of the act and the same praiseworthiness is rendered even when the
 proposed thing of the will for the sake of which the action was begun
 is not thought about in the execution of the action.' The same in *De
 Malo*, q. 2, art. 8, arg. 11, with the solution; *De Virtut.*, q. 2, art. 11, ad 2;
 145R and it is also taken from IIaIIæ.83.13, where in talking about prayer he
 says that there can be entreaty and merit without an actual intention
 when it happens without sin. And, in reality, Bonaventure, Gabriel,
 Ægidius, and most of the other old scholastics speak in this sense.

The fifth, and the
 author's, opinion
 concerning the
 virtual relation.

155R 9. Moreover, the reason is that, first of all, it cannot be denied but
 that this mode of acting not only is possible for a human being but that
 it occurs very frequently. For in this way a labourer is said to work all
 day for his wages even if he does not always think about his wages and
 he who goes on a journey is truly said to walk in order to arrive at the
 end of the way. Similarly, in the case of the sacraments nothing is more
 certain than that a virtual intention suffices for consecrating the sacra-
 160R ment even if no formal intention is present. Also, because when one
 human being acts through another by having given a consent and man-
 date to him, as long as he does not retract it, he is said to do virtually
 whatever the other one does, because the strength of the former con-
 165R sent is thought to remain in the writing or mandate. The same thing
 can be true in those cases where a human being acts through himself

It is shown that
 this relation is
 frequent.

⁴Changed from 'ratione'.

⁵Misspelled? Given what Aquinas says in the cited article, whatever the word here is supposed to be is presumably derived from 'impetro'.

170 sus. Præterea est hujus rei argumentum quod homo operetur
ex vi prioris intentionis, quia statim, ac illam mutat, cessat ab
operando: ergo signum est operari ex aliquo influxu præceden-
tis voluntatis: quo modo autem hoc sit possibile, statim expli-
cabo. 170R

Deinde probatur
sufficere.
Primo.

175 10. Quod autem hic modus operandi sufficiat ad dictam
moralitatem patet imprimis ex communi sentiendi modo om-
nium hominum, et quia plus ab homine exigere est plusquam
humanum. Item quia longe diverso modo moraliter operatur,
quia ex intentione honesta se applicuit ad opus de se indiffer-
ens, et postea in illo perseverat, cessante actuali cogitatione
180 illius finis, quam alius, qui per voluntatem omnino indiffer-
entem ad idem opus se applicuit, nam hic sæpe censebitur
otiose loqui, et operari, ille autem studiose, ut homo. Denique
ad hanc denominationem sufficit dependentia moralis, et cau-
salitas unius actus ab alio, ut dictum est: hæc autem tunc in-
tercedit mediate, vel immediate, quia operatio vere procedit
185 aliquo modo ex influxu prioris intentionis; unde refertur ali-
qualiter in finem ejus, et ex hac parte habet aliquam bonam cir-
cumstantiam, scilicet *finis*, quæ sufficit ad prædictam denomi-
nationem, si aliunde nulla sit malitia. 185R

Tertio.

1. Modus
explicandi
relationem
virtualem.

190 11. Ut autem ad difficultatem propositam in n. 7, respon-
deatur, addendum est tribus modis posse accidere, et applicari
hanc relationem. Primus est si duret idem numero actus im-
peratus, et actus interior imperans interruptus sit, verbi gra-
tia, in oratione vocali, si quis cœpit orare intentione implendi
195 præceptum, et in discursu orationis naturaliter distrahitur; ni-
hilominus implet præceptum, et tota illa oratio dicitur esse vir-
tute a priori intentione, cujus virtus manet in ipso opere: et
potentia exequens semper manet applicata ex vi illius prioris
intentionis, sive hæc applicatio consistat in sola actione exteri-
oris po- <371> tentiæ, sive etiam in aliquo interiori usu vol-
200 untatis, et consequenter in aliqua etiam attentione intellectus,
quamvis adeo simplici, et remissa, ut sit interceptibilis, sic enim
sæpe homo attendit, et tamen si postea reflectatur, non potest
judicare, nec cognoscere se attendisse. 200R

2. Modus.

205 12. Secundus modus est, quando est varietas in ipsis ac-

by the strength of a former consent. In addition, there is the argument
about this matter that a human being acts by the strength of a former
intention because [otherwise] he immediately ceases from acting and
changes it. Therefore, this is evidence that he acts from some influx
from the preceding willing. Moreover, I will explain at once how this
is possible. 170R

10. Moreover, that this way of acting is sufficient for the morality
under consideration is clear, first of all, from everyone's common way
of thinking and because to demand more from a human being is more
than human. Also, since someone who from an honest intention ap-
plied himself to an action of itself indifferent and afterwards perseveres
in it although ceasing from actual thought about that end acts morally
by far in a different way, than someone else who applies himself to the
same work through a willing that is wholly indifferent. For the latter
will often be thought to speak and act idly, but the former ardently, as
a human being. Finally, moral dependence and the causality of one act
from another suffices for this denomination, as was said. But this then
intercedes mediate or immediately, since the action truly proceeds in
some way from the influx of the prior intention. Hence, it is referred in
some way to its end and has some good circumstance from this side—
namely, from the end—which is sufficient for the denomination under
discussion if there is no badness from another source. 175R

11. But with respect to the difficulty proposed in n. 7, it is re-
sponded that it should be added that this relation can occur and be
applied in three ways. First: if numerically the same commanded act
endures and the commanding interior act is interrupted. For example,
in a case of vocal prayer, if someone begins to pray with the intention
of satisfying a precept and in the course of the prayer is naturally dis-
tracted, he, nevertheless, satisfies the precept and that whole prayer is
said to be virtually by the prior intention whose strength remains in
the work itself. And an executing power always remains applied by the
strength of that former intention, whether this application consists in
act of an exterior power alone or also in some interior use of the will
and consequently also with some attention of the intellect although so
plain and diminished that it is imperceptible. For a human being often
attends in such a way and yet afterwards if he reflects he cannot judge
or recognize that he did attend. 180R

12. The second way is when there is variety in the actions them-

Next, it is proven of
to suffice. First.

Second.

Third.

The first way of
explaining the
virtual relation.

Second way.

tionibus, et in voluntatibus etiam, seu electionibus, tamen sine
 210 totali cessatione, sed immediate transeundo ab una electione,
 seu intentione ad aliam, ut quando aliquis intentione dicendi
 sacrum, se pręparat, domo exit, incipit indui, etc. Et tunc
 etiam est facile intelligere quomodo maneat virtus prioris in-
 215 tentionis; manet enim in proxima voluntate, seu electione, et
 per illam imperat aliam, et sic consequenter, et hos duos modos
 explicui latius in materia de Sacramentis.

3. Modus.

13. Tertius videtur difficilior, quando omnino interrump-
 215 itur formalis intentio, et omnis actus, vel voluntas ab illo
 manans, ut quando intercedit somnus, et postea incipit de-
 nuo operari, ut est vulgatum exemplum in eo, qui intentione
 implendi votum, multis diebus peregrinatur; qui tamen non
 quotiescumque evigilat, recordatur voti sui, nec repetit inten-
 220 tionem implendi illud, et in hoc casu, et similibus existimo
 virtutem prioris intentionis applicari media apprehensione, et
 iudicio intellectus, nam in prędicto casu statim, ac homo evig-
 ilat, apprehendit, et iudicat sibi esse inter agendum, neque in-
 225 quirat rationem bonitatis, aut convenientię, sed ex vi prioris
 deliberationis iudicat hoc sibi expedire; et esse agendum, et
 inde statim movetur ad electiones, vel actiones, quę statim
 230 occurrunt, et tunc merito dicitur operari virtute prioris in-
 tentionis, quia tota efficacia inde oritur: nam licet intellectus
 ex se non possit voluntatem movere nisi objective, et quoad
 specificationem; tamen virtute prioris voluntatis potest mo-
 235 vere efficaciter, et quoad exercitium: hęc autem motio tanto
 erit melior, et moraliter laudabilior, quanto in objecto, seu
 actu proposito considerata, vel iudicata fuerit aliqua ratio boni
 magis accidens ad bonitatem prioris intentionis; fieri enim in-
 240 terdum potest, ut illa prima apprehensio, per quam incipit pro-
 gredi in opere interrupto, sit tantum de aliquo objecto agendo
 sub communi ratione convenientis, aut expedientis, seu jam
 deliberati, vel simpliciter agendi, et tunc formalis intentio est
 valde indifferens intrinsece, solumque per <col. b> denomi-
 nationem extrinsecam potest ita bona denominari, ut neque
 censeatur otiosa, interdum vero potest illud primum objectum
 240R repręsentari saltem, ut honestum, vel prudenter deliberatum,
 aut sub alia ratione magis speciali, scilicet, ut pertinens ad cul-

205R selves and even in the willings or elections, yet without a complete ces-
 sation but immediately passing from one election or intention to an-
 other, as when someone with the intention of speaking the sacred rites
 prepares himself, leaves the house, begins to dress, etc. And in this case,
 also, it is easy to understand how the strength of the prior intention re-
 210R mains. For it remains in the proximate willing or election and through
 that commands another and so on further on. And I explained these
 two ways in more detail in the material on the sacraments.

13. The third way seems more difficult, when the formal intention
 is entirely interrupted, as well as every act or willing that remains from
 215R it, as when sleep intervenes and afterwards one begins to work anew.
 [This is the case] in the standard example of him who with the inten-
 tion of fulfilling a vow travels for many days. Nevertheless, he does not
 stay awake at every moment, nor call to mind his vow, nor repeat the
 intention to fulfill it. And in this case and other similar cases, I think
 220R that the strength from the prior intention is applied by means of an
 apprehension and judgement of the intellect. For in the case under dis-
 cussion, he immediately as soon as he is awake apprehends and judges
 to himself that he is in the middle of something to be done. Nor does
 he inquire into the nature of the goodness or agreeability, but from the
 225R strength of the prior deliberation he decides to accomplish the thing
 to be done. And thereupon he immediately is moved to elections or
 actions, which occur at once. And then he is rightly said to act by the
 strength of the former intention, because all the efficacy stems from it.
 For although the intellect of itself cannot move the will except objec-
 230R tively and with respect to specification, nevertheless, by the strength of
 a prior willing it can move efficaciously and with respect to exercise.
 But this motion will be so much the better and morally more praise-
 worthy, as there was considered or judged to be some greater aspect of
 good falling upon the goodness of the prior intention in the proposed
 235R object or action. For sometimes it can happen that that first apprehen-
 sion through which he begins to proceed to some interrupted work is
 only about some object in acting under a general *ratio* of agreeability or
 procurability or of already having been deliberated or simply of some-
 thing to be done, and then the formal intention is entirely indifferent
 240R intrinsically and it can thus be denominated good only through an ex-
 trinsic denomination so that it is not thought idle. But sometimes that
 first object can be represented at least as honest or prudently deliber-

Third way.

245 tum Dei, vel quid simile, et tunc intrinsece habebit aliquam bonitatem non ex fine, sed ex objecto, quod actu proponitur: per denominationem autem ex fine habebit speciem ad illum pertinentem, quale est implere votum, vel quid simile, et ita satis responsum est ad difficultatem positam in n. 7. 245R

ated or under another more particular aspect, namely, as belonging to the worship of God or something similar. And then it will intrinsically have some goodness not from the end but from the object which actually is proposed. But through the denomination from the end it will have the species belonging to it (what sort of vow to fulfill or something similar). And in this way there is a sufficient response to the difficulty posed in n. 7.