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<432, col. b>WHETHER THE HUMAN WILL, IN ORDER TO BE RIGHT, MUST BE CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL THAT ORDERS THE ACTIONS OF THE HUMAN WILL ITSELF (Utrum voluntas humana, ut recta sit, debeat conformari divinæ et disponenti de actibus ipsius voluntatis humanæ)

1. *Prima assertio.*—Hæc quæstio est facilis, suppositis, quæ diximus, et ideo omissis opinionibus quas referam, sectione sequenti, dicendum primo. Voluntas humana, ut sit recta, debet conformari divinæ, ut præcipienti: hoc est per se notum, quia voluntas divina natura sua est superior, et habet jus et virtutem inducendi obligationem, si eam velit efficaciter imponere, nam sicut in aliis rebus voluntas Dei est omnipotens et efficax, ita et in homine: sed voluntas divina præcipiens est illa, qua vult absolute imponere homini hujusmodi obligationem: ergo non potest humana voluntas esse bona, nisi¹ conformis huic voluntati divinæ, et hoc est, quod aliis verbis dicunt theologi, voluntatem humanam debere conformari divinæ quoad voluntatem signi, nam unum signum voluntatis divinæ est præceptum.

1 Changed from 'nisi'.

2. *Quæstiuncula suborta.*—Sed quæres unde oriatur prædicta obligatio, solet enim dici non oriri ex speciali aliquo præcepto, sed in singulis materiis oriri ex præceptis ad illas pertinentibus, quia alias quotiescumque homo peccaret in aliqua materia, transgrederetur duo præcepta. Unum proprium et particulare talis materiæ, ut non furandi; alterum non discordandi a divina voluntate, seu obediendi Deo; sed quamvis verum sit hæc duo comparari, ut generale quid ex parte obsectorum materialium: nihilominus tamen negari non potest quin speciali titulo, et ratione teneatur homo subjicere hoc modo voluntatem suam divinæ, quia et Deus habet proprium jus exigendi ab homine hanc conformitatem, ut quia hæc est sufficiens ratio specialis virtutis si sit per se intenta, et e contrario constituet etiam specialem malitiam, si directe, et speciali contemptu

1. *First assertion.*—This question is easy once we assume what we said and therefore with the opinions to which I refer in the following section omitted, it should be said first: the human will must be conformed to what the divine will instructs in order to be right. This is known *per se*, since the divine will is superior by its nature and has the right and the strength to introduce obligation, if it wishes to effectively impose it. For just as with other things the will of God is omnipotent and effective, so also with human beings. But the divine will instructing is that by which it wishes absolutely to impose on a human being an obligation of this kind. Therefore, the human will cannot be good except it is conformed to this divine will. This is what the theologians say in other words: the human will must be conformed to the divine will as to the will of a sign, for one sign of the divine will is a precept.

2. *A small question that comes up.*—But you may ask where the mentioned obligation comes from, for it is usually said that it does not arise from some special precept but that in individual occasions it arises from the precepts pertaining to them. Otherwise, whenever a human being sins on some occasion he transgresses two precepts: one proper and particular to the occasion (for example, that one should not steal) and another that he should not go against the divine will or that he should obey God. But, although it is true that these two are compared as something general on the part of the material objects, nevertheless it cannot be denied but that a human being is obliged by a special title and reason in this way to subject his will to the divine [will], because God also has a proper right for driving out this conformity from a human being, so that because this is a

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition.

velit homo discordare ab hac divina voluntate, juxta superius dicta de circumstantiis generalibus: intercedit ergo hic proprium quoddam præceptum, quamvis ex parte materiæ generale sit, et quodammodo censeatur in aliis inclusum, quasi materialiter et generice.

3. *Objectio.*—Dices: omne præceptum manat primo a divina voluntate, hoc autem præceptum parendi, seu conformandi se huic divinæ voluntati, non potest ex ipsa divina voluntate oriri, quia de hac voluntate redibit quæstio, et sic procedemus in infinitum. Respondetur imprimis hoc argumento declarari, quod superius dicebamus, aliquam obligationem naturalem honeste operandi intrinsece oriri ex rebus ipsis præcisa divina voluntate, atque ita in præsentī ex ipsa naturali subjectione hominis ad Deum, et naturali dominio Dei in hominem per se est intrinsece necessaria ad honestatem morum, ut si Deus habeat hanc voluntatem præcipientem, ut homo se illi conformet; unde hæc ratio præcepti non oritur primo ex voluntate divina, sed ex natura objectorum: ad hanc autem obligationem accedit etiam ipsa divina voluntas, quæ cum simplicissima sit, includit omnem reflexionem, quæ a nobis excogitari potest: unde simul vult, et teneri hominem ad aliquid faciendum, et consequenter etiam teneri ad se conformandum huic divinæ voluntati.

4. *Corollarium.*—Ex his autem intelligitur talem debere esse hanc conformitatem, qualis fuerit divinæ voluntatis dispositio: interdum enim intelligi potest Deum velle obligare hominem ad volendum aliquem specialem actum vel effectum materialem, ut sic dicam, non tamen ad formale, seu speciale motivum ejus, ut fortasse voluit Christum velle mortem suam, et tunc satis est conformari huic divinæ voluntati, volendo materiale objectum, quamvis in formali, seu ratione volendi possit esse magna varietas: si autem Deus tali voluntate sua præscriberet etiam rationem volendi, oporteret etiam in illa conformari: atque idem dicendum est quando voluntas divina vult me teneri ad efficaciter volendum aliquid, tunc enim debeo conformari habendo talem actum efficacem voluntatis meæ: non autem repugnat huic conformitati, quod habeam inefficacem actum repugnantem per displicentiam, seu simplicem effectum, quo vellem ne Deus id præciperet, seu

sufficient reason of special virtue if it is intended *per se* and, conversely, it will also constitute a special badness if a human being directly and with a special contempt wishes to go against this divine will, as was said earlier concerning general circumstances. Therefore, here a certain proper precept, although it is general on the part of the occasion, is also thought in a certain way to be confined to others, as if materially and generically.

3. *An objection.*—You may say: every precept flows first from the divine will, but this precept to obey or conform oneself to this divine will cannot arise from the divine will itself, because the question will return about this will and we will thus proceed into infinity. It is responded first to this argument that this shows what we were saying earlier, [namely], that some natural obligation to act honestly arises intrinsically from the things themselves apart from the divine will and thus in the present case from the natural subjection itself of a human being to God and the natural dominion of God with respect to a human being is *per se* and intrinsically necessary for the honesty of [his] behaviour, so that if God has this will to instruct the human conforms himself to it. Hence, this nature of the precept does not arise first from the divine will, but from the nature of the objects. Moreover, the divine will itself also approaches this obligation, which, although it is most simple, includes every reflection that can be contrived by us. Hence, it wills at the same time both that a human being be obliged to doing something and, consequently, also be obliged to conform himself to this divine will.

4. *Corollary.*—But from these it is understood that this conformity ought to be such as will be the disposition of the divine will. For sometimes it can be understood that God wishes to oblige a human being to willing some special act or material effect, if I may speak this way, but not to a formal or special motive for it. For example, perhaps he wishes Christ to wish his death and then it is sufficient to be conformed to this divine will by wishing the material object, although there can be great variety in the formal [object] or in the reason for willing. But if God were by such a will of his also to prescribe the reason for willing, then it is necessary to also be conformed in that. And the same should be said when the divine will wishes that I be obliged to efficaciously willing something, for then I ought to be conformed by having such an efficacious act of my will. Moreover, it is not repugnant to this conformity that I have an inefficacious opposing act through dis-

vellet; cujus rei exemplum fortasse habemus in Christo Domino, et potest etiam exponi, nam si quis habeat præceptum matrimonii, etiam per expressam revelationem divinæ voluntatis, satisfacit volendo efficaciter matrimonium, quamvis simul habeat simplicem effectum ad castitatem, desiderans quantum est in se illam servare, si Deus voluisset; et ratio est clara, quia posterior hæc voluntas non contradicit primæ, et potest habere honestum objectum, quo fit, ut si Deus velit hominem ad utrumque obligare, id est, ad volendum aliquid simpliciter: et nullo modo nolendum etiam per actum simplicem, tunc teneatur homo neutro modo discordare a divina voluntate, sicut in universum quodcumque dicimus hominem teneri ad non volendum aliquid, tenetur conformari divina voluntati, saltem per carentiam actus.

1 What is this 'simple effect'? Note the 'simple affect' of n. 6.

5. *Secunda assertio bimembris.*—Dicendum secundo. Quando Deus vult absolute et efficaciter hominem aliquid velle, non potest voluntas humana discordare a divina, potest tamen habere simplicem effectum circa contrarium actum, seu circa carentiam illius actus. Prior pars intelligenda est de potestate in sensu composito, et ita ratio est clara, quia voluntas divina efficax, et absoluta simpliciter frustrari non potest cum sit infinita. Unde si homini constet Deum hoc modo statuisset ipsum aliquid velle, fieri non potest, ut per contrarium actum efficacem renitatur huic divinæ voluntati, quia jam illi proponitur ut impossibile illud objectum: non potest autem voluntas ferri actu efficaci in objectum repræsentatum, ut impossibile. Sed tunc occurrit objectio communis, voluntatem scilicet necessitari, de quo alibi latius: nunc negatur simpliciter sequela, necessitatur tunc quidem voluntas, ut habere non possit inefficacem actum contrarium propter repugnantiam objecti, non tamen necessitatur ad habendum actum quem Deus vult illam velle, quia nulla causa est, quæ hanc necessitatem imponat.

6. Altera vero pars conclusionis est clara ratione supra facta, quia simplex displicentia non est contraria huic divinæ voluntati, nec Deus vult me non habere hanc displicentiam, quamvis efficaciter velit me velle aliquid,

pleasure or simple effect, by which I wish that God had not instructed or willed it. Perhaps we have an example of this in our Lord Christ. And it can also be explained [in this way]: for if anyone has the precept of matrimony, even through an express revelation of the divine will, he satisfies [it] by efficaciously willing matrimony, even though he has at the same time a simple effect for chastity, desiring to preserve it insofar as it is in him if God would have willed it.¹ And the reason is clear, since this latter will does not contradict the first and it can have an honest object by which it happens that if God wills to oblige a human being to either, that is, to willing something strictly speaking and in no way also to will through a simple act, then the human is obliged to disagree in neither way with the divine will, just as in general whenever we say that a human being is obliged to not willing something, he is obliged to be conformed to the divine will at least through the absence of the act.

5. *The second assertion in two parts.*—It should be said, secondly, that when God wishes absolutely and efficaciously that a human being will something, the human will cannot disagree with the divine will, yet it can still have a simple effect concerning the contrary act or concerning the absence of the former act. The former part should be understood of power in the composite sense and then the reason is clear. For the efficacious and strictly speaking absolute divine will cannot be frustrated, since it is infinite. Hence, if it were evident to a human being that God had decided in this way that he willed something, it cannot happen that he struggle against this divine will through a contrary efficacious act, since now that object is now proposed to him as impossible. But the will cannot be brought by an efficacious act to an object represented as impossible. But then a common objection occurs, namely, that the will is necessitated. [I will say] more about this elsewhere. For now, the sequel is simply denied. The will indeed is then necessitated so that it cannot have an inefficacious contrary act on account of the repugnance of the object. Yet it is not necessitated to having an act which God wills it to have, since there is no cause which imposes this necessity.

6. But the other part of the conclusion is clear from the argument given above, since a simple displeasure is not contrary to this divine will nor does God will me not to have this displeasure, although he may efficaciously

quia illa duo non repugnant: ergo ex vi illius voluntatis divinæ non repugnat me habere hanc simplicem displicentiam, et alioqui hoc non est per se malum, quia non repugnat divinæ voluntati, et in objecte potest habere aliquod motivum honestum. Sed advertendum est hanc displicentiam non debere esse de efficacia divinæ voluntatis, hæc enim displicentia esset intrinsece mala ex objecto, ut si quis desideraret resistere efficaci voluntati Dei, et illa displiceret, quia non possent huiusmodi effectus liberi non esse contra rationem, quia objectum eorum est desiderare aliquid contra voluntatem Dei, versari ergo debet hic effectus circa rem ipsam nude consideratam, aut circa ipsam voluntatem Dei, quatenus libere posset Deus velle hoc non esse, ut si homo desideret simplici affectu Deum aliquid non velle, aut, se non habere talem actum sub intellecta conditione, si Deus ita vellet, atque hoc modo nulla est in hoc actu difficultas.

1 How does this sentence work?

7. *Tertia assertio.*—Dicendum tertio. Ut voluntas humana sit recta, non est necesse ut sit conformis divinæ voluntati ineffaciter volenti, seu consulenti actum voluntatis humanæ. Hæc conclusio est per se clara, ut patet in voluntate consiliorum, nam sine dubio hoc modo Deus vult homines velle suam perfectionem, vel castitatem, etc. Et tamen homo non peccat efficaciter volendo aliud ab hisce consiliis diversum: et ratio est quia nec Deus per hanc voluntatem inducit positivam obligationem, quia non vult efficaciter hominem ad hoc obligare, neque etiam objectum ipsum talis per se, et natura sua inducit illam, cum non sit per se necessarium ad bonos mores.

8. *Quarta assertio.*—Ultimo dicendum, voluntatem humanam non debere conformari voluntati divinæ sibi aliquid permittenti; sed advertendum est quod dixi, aliud esse loqui de permissione, aliud de permissio; permissio enim non est actus voluntatis humanæ, sed est objectum aliud voluntatis divinæ efficaci duo includens, scilicet concursus necessarium ad actum positivum peccati, quem Deus vult dare quantum est de se, et negationem alterius auxilii, vel providentiæ, qua Deus posset talem actum impedire, et non vult: et quoad hanc permissionem potest, et fortasse debet voluntas humana conformari divinæ, si homini con-

will me to will something, since those two are not repugnant. Therefore, it is not repugnant for me to have this simple displeasure by reason of the strength of that divine will. And, in any case, this is not evil in itself, since it is not repugnant to the divine will and it can have some honest motive in the object. But it should be noted that this displeasure ought not to be concerning the efficacy of the divine will for this displeasure would be intrinsically evil from the object, so that if anyone were to desire to resist the efficacious will of God and to displease it, therefore—since free effects of this kind could not but be against reason, since their object is to desire something against the will of God—this effect must be directed to the bare matter considered in itself or to the will itself of God. Insofar as God can freely will this not to be, as if the human being desires by a simple affect that God not will something or that he not hold such an act under the understood condition ‘if God wills thus’ and in this way there is no difficulty in this act.¹

7. *Third assertion.*—It should be said, thirdly, that in order for the human will to be right, it is not necessary that it be conformed to the divine will ineffaciously willing or counselling an act of the human will. This conclusion is clear *per se*, as is clear with the will of counsels, for without doubt God in this way wants humans to will their perfection or chastity, etc. And yet a human being does not sin by efficaciously willing something else that is opposed to these counsels. And the reason is because God neither introduces positive obligation through this will (since he does not will efficaciously to oblige a human being to this) nor does such an object itself introduce it through itself and by its nature, since it is not in itself necessary for good morals.

8. *Fourth assertion.*—Lastly, it should be said that the human will need not be conformed to the divine will permitting something to it. But it should be noticed what was said, [namely], that it is one thing to speak of permission and another to speak of having been permitted. For permission is not an act of the human will, but is another object of the efficacious divine will including two things, namely, the necessary concursus for a positive act of sin, which God wills to give insofar as it is of him, and the negation of other assistance or providence, by which God could impede such an act but does not wish to. Both as long as this permis-

stet Deum efficaciter velle talem permissionem, sed hoc non spectat ad præsentem, sed ad sequentem sectionem: nam eadem est ratio de hac permissione, quæ est de aliis objectis, quæ non sunt actus voluntatis nostræ: nam hæc permissio, ut dixi, non est humanæ voluntatis. Conclusio ergo intelligitur de actu permissio, et sic est manifesta, quia Deus volendo permittere talem actum ex vi hujus voluntatis, non vult actum ipsum, non solum actu efficaci, imo nec inefficaci, quia fieri potest ut nullo modo talis actus illi placeat: ergo talis voluntas nullam potest inducere obligationem conformitatis ad ipsam, quin potius si actus permissus ex se malus sit, male faciet voluntas se conformando huic permissioni quoad actum permissum, imo omnis malitia voluntatis humanæ in hoc consistit.

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9. *Objectio.*—Sed contra. Nam hæc voluntas permissiva Dei includit voluntatem efficacem ipsius actus permissi, imo multi putant necessariam esse voluntatem Dei efficacem prædefinientem talem actum pro materiali: ergo si homini constet de hac divina voluntate <col. b> permittente; non potest non conformari illi saltem quoad materiale actum. Respondetur assumptum esse falsum, et contrarium, ut existimo divinæ bonitati, nam id quod dicitur materiale in actu peccati est voluntas mentiendi, furandi, etc. Quod plane repugnat voluntati divinæ, et revera si Deus id ita vellet, et homini de hoc constaret, non video quo modo peccaret in hoc se conformando tali voluntati Dei. Respondetur ergo negando assumptum: nam voluntas permittendi tantum includit illa duo supra explicata, quæ potest Deus velle etiamsi efficaciter non velit actum permissum in seipso maxime prius ratione, quam præficiat hominem illum operaturum, sed de hac re latius alibi.

sion can [be] and the human will perhaps ought to be conformed to the divine [will], if it were evident to a human being that God efficaciously wills such a permission.¹ But this does not appear at present but in the following section. For the argument is the same concerning this permission as it is concerning other objects which are not acts of our will. For this permission, as I said, is not of the human will. Therefore, the conclusion is understood concerning an act having been permitted and then it is obvious, since God in willing to permit such an act by the strength of this will does not will the act itself, not only by an efficacious act nor, indeed, by an inefficacious [act], since it can happen that such an act is not pleasing to him in either way. Therefore, such a will cannot introduce any obligation to conform to it, without rather if the act having been permitted is evil in itself, the will will act badly in conforming itself to this permission with respect to the act having been permitted. Indeed, all evil of the human will consists in this.

9. *An objection.*—But to the contrary: for this permissive will of God includes the will efficacious of the act having been permitted. Indeed, many think that it necessary that the efficacious will of God preordains such an act through material. Therefore, if it is evident to the human being that the divine will is permitting, it cannot not be conformed to it, at least with respect to the material act. It is responded that the assumption is false and contrary to how I view divine goodness. For that which is called material in the act of sin is the will deceiving, stealing, and so on. This is plainly repugnant to the divine will. And, in reality, if God were thus to wish that and this were evident to a human, I do not see in what way he would sin in this by conforming himself to such a will of God. Therefore, it is responded by denying the assumption. For the permitting will only includes the two things explained above, which God can will even if he does not efficaciously will the act having been permitted in itself especially for the earlier reason, which places the human being in charge of doing that. But more about this matter elsewhere.