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DE FINE HOMINIS DISP. 6, SECT. 3¹

<66, col. b>

SECTIO III.

Utrum beatitudo sit una simplex operatio animæ intellectivæ, vel plurium collectio.

1. Sententia pro
collectione
plurium
operationum.

5 1. In hac re prima sententia; et valde communis theologorum
est, beatitudinem non esse unam operationem, sed plurium
collectionem. Ita tenent in 4, dist. 49, Albertus Magnus,
Thomas de Argentina, Richardus, Bonaventura, Marsilius et
Supplementum Gabrielis, quorum loca citabo particulariter in
10 principio disputationis sequentis: nam licet isti auctores con-
veniant in dicta sententia, non tamen in numero, et quali-
tate illarum operationum, quod ibidem examinandum est: et
idem revera tenet Paludanus ibid., quæst. 3, art. 2, nam licet
distinguat de beatitudine practica et speculativa, et singulas
earum in singulis operationibus constituat: tamen absolute
15 beatitudinem hominis ponit in utraque. Et hujus sententiæ fuit
Hugo Victorinus super capite septimo Dionysii, de divinis No-
minibus, et ex modernis eam secuti sunt Vega, libro septimo
in Tridentin., capite tertio, et Corduba, libro primo, quæs-
tione 42, concl. 1 et 2, et Soto, d. 49, quæstione tertia, articulo
20 quarto, in hanc sententiam incidere videtur, licet contrariam
profiteatur. Fundamentum hujus sententiæ est, quia in anima
rationali ut sic, non est tantum una potentia, sed plures, et per
omnes potest attingere Deum in se, et illi conjungi: ergo ad per-

Eius fund.

SECTION III.

Whether happiness is one simple activity of the intellective soul or a collection of multiple activities.

5R 1. In this matter the first view—and easily the most common one
among the theologians—is that happiness is not one activity but a col-
lection of multiple activities. Albertus Magnus, Thomas de Argentina,
Richard, Bonaventure, and Marsilius hold this in IV, dist. 49, Gabriel
[Biel] in *Supplementum*, of which I will particularly cite passages in
the beginning of the following disputation. For although these authors
10R agree in the stated view, they, nevertheless, do not agree in the num-
ber and quality of those activities, which is to be examined in that very
place. Paludanus really holds the same view in IV, dist. 49, q. 3, art. 2,
for although he distinguishes between practical happiness and specula-
tive happiness and places each of them in individual activities, never-
15R theless, he places human happiness absolutely in both. And Hugo Vic-
torinus was of this view in [his commentary] on chapter 7 of pseudo-
Dionysius's *On the Divine Names*. And among the moderns, Vega, in
Tridentin. VII, cap. 3, and Corduba, I, q. 42, concl. 1 and 2, follow
it. And Soto, [IV], dist. 49, q. 3, art. 4, seems to fall into this view,
20R although he declares the contrary. The foundation of this view is that
there is in the rational soul as such not just one power but multiples
ones, and it can attain God in himself and be joined to him through
all of them. Therefore, one activity of only one power does not suffice

1st view for a
collection of
multiple
activities.

Its foundation.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition. Obvious spelling errors have been corrected without note. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Some of those, though not all, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

19 d.] quæst. V.

25 *fectam hominis beatitudinem non sufficit una operatio unius tantum potentiae, sed plures requiruntur. Probatur consequentia, quia per unam solam operationem non perfecte conjungeretur homo suo fini, nec esset satiatus appetitus ejus respectu ultimi finis. Plura in particulari de singulis operationibus dicemus, disputatione sequenti.*

2. Sententia contraria præcedenti.

30 2. Secunda opinio est, formalem beatitudinem consistere in una simplici operatione quoad essentiam suam. Hæc videtur esse opinio D. Thomæ <67> 1, 2, in tota q. 3, quanquam ille potissimum hoc affirmare videtur de supernaturali perfecta beatitudine futuræ vitæ: eam vero sine ulla distinctione sequuntur discipuli ejus ibidem, et in 4, dist. 49, et Hervæus, opusc. de Beatitudine, et in re idem tenet Scotus, in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 3, nam licet distinguat de beatitudine hominis, vel potentiarum, tamen absolutam beatitudinem hominis ponit in una operatione. Idem censendum est de Durando, dist. 49, quæst. 4, qui distinguit de beatitudine pro collectione, vel pro operatione perfectissima: et hoc posteriori modo consistere in una operatione. Fundamentum esse potest, quia beatitudo in 35
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Unum eius fundamentum.

Alterum fundam.

Refelluntur.

3. Fundam. probabilius.

60 3. Probabilius ergo hujusmodi sententiæ fundamentum est, quia plures operationes omnino similes, et ejusdem ratio-

25R for perfect human happiness, but multiple activities are required. The consequence is proven, since a human being is not perfectly united to his end through only one activity, nor would his desire be satisfied with respect to the ultimate end. We will say more in particular about each activity in the following disputation.

30R 2. The second opinion is that formal happiness consists in one, simple activity insofar as its essence is concerned. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas in IaIIæ.3, although he seems chiefly to affirm it here of the supernatural, perfect happiness of the future life. But his disciples follow it without any distinction in the same place and in IV, dist. 49, q. 3 ...

The 2nd view, contrary to the first one.

35R 3.

nis non possunt ad beatitudinem requiri, id est, plures visiones Dei: nam hæc pluralitas, et est accidentaria et superflua: si ergo plures concurrunt, necesse est illas esse diversarum rationum: ergo necessarium etiam est esse perfectiones inæquales: ergo debent inter se ordinem servare, ita ut illa, quæ minus perfecta est, sit propter perfectiorem: ergo illa sola, quæ fuerit perfectissima, habebit rationem finis ultimi et essentialis beatitudinis: perfectissima autem operatio tantum est una: ergo formalis beatitudo tantum esse potest unica operatio. Confirmatur et explicatur hæc ratio, quia beatitudo esse debet actus nobilissimæ potentiæ, et in ea debet etiam esse nobilissimus actus: ergo absolute, et simpliciter ille actus, qui in homine fuerit nobilissimus erit beatitudo: ille autem tantum unus esse potest. Antecedens communiter est receptum ab omnibus et expresse illud docet D. Thomas, in 1, dist. 5, quæst. 1, art. 1, et tam Thomistæ, quam Scotus, quamvis contendat, an beatitudo sit in voluntate, vel in intellectu, tamen in hoc conveniunt quod est in nobilissima potentia, et ideo inter se disputant, quæ sit nobilior, intellectus, aut voluntas. Et ratione declaratur; quia beatitudo est summum hominis bonum, et ideo constituitur in summo gradu, in quo est humana natura, scilicet in gradu rationali: ergo eadem ratione constituenda est in suprema facultate illius gradus; est enim eadem proportionalis ratio, nam secundum illam potentiam homo est magis capax perfectionis: necesse est enim ut talis potentia vel nobiliter attingat objectum, vel nobiliori modo beatitudo autem replere debet supremam hominis capacitatem, et attingere nobilissimum objectum optimo modo. Atque eisdem rationibus probari potest minor propositio, videlicet in hujusmodi nobilissima potentia beatitudinem constitui debere seu in nobilissima operatione: quia perfectio operationis ex objecto et modo attingendi illud desumitur: sed ostensum est, beatitudinem versari debere circa nobilissimum objectum optimo modo: ergo ipsa esse debet perfectissima operatio. Atque ita supponere videtur D. Thomas, art. 4 et 5 dictæ quæstionis tertiæ.

4. Tertia opinio dicit, quæstionem hanc solum esse de modo loquendi. Ita opinantur Ockham, in 4, quæst. ultim., art. 1, dub. 3, et Major, distinct. 49, quæst. 3 et 5, qui fun-

4. The third opinion states that this question only concerns a manner of speaking. Ockham, IV, last q. , art. 1, dub. 3, and Major, [IV], dist. 49, qq. 3 and 5, think this. They ground it in equivocation over

The 3rd view. One of its foundations is rejected.

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3. Sententia. Eius unum fundamentum reiicitur.

100 dantur in æquivocatione nominis *beatitudo*: nam interdum,
 inquit, est nomen collectivum, et hoc modo consistit in
 multis operationibus; interdum est divisum, et hoc modo, in-
 105 quiunt esse operationem unam, tamen non solum unam, sed
 quamcumque immediate attingentem Deum dicunt posse vo-
 cari *beatitudinem*, sive sit cognitio, sive amor, sive alia hujus-
 modi, quia per quamcumque illarum anima conjungitur Deo;
 sed hoc est abuti nominibus, nam imprimis jam supra, disp. 4,
 initio, exclusimus primam illam vocem æquivocationem, et
 110 deinde non quilibet actus quo attingitur Deus potest dici beat-
 itudo; alias etiam desiderium Dei haberet rationem beatitu-
 dinis. Apparentius potest explicari hæc sententia in hunc
 modum, quia in re constat de facto, et ex natura rei, plures
 actus requiri <68> ad beatitudinem, sine quibus nullus bea-
 tus esse potest, præsertim in perfecta, et supernaturali beati-
 tudine, scilicet cognitionem, seu visionem, sine qua nec amor
 115 esse potest, nec gaudium. Deinde amor, vel necessario sequitur
 ex visione, vel necessarius existimatur, ut ipsa visio sit posses-
 sio summi boni amati, ac tandem delectatio consequitur cog-
 nitionem et amorem, et est ultima animi quies: unde si aliquid
 horum deficiat, nemo negabit hominem esse valde imperfec-
 120 tum in sua beatitudine: ergo cum hæc, omnia sint necessaria
 disputare, an omnia sint dicenda de essentia, necne: quæstio
 de nomine videtur: præsertim cum pbilosophice loquendo, illa
 non componant unum quid, nec sint diversi actus, quorum sin-
 125 guli necessarij sunt propter suam propriam perfectionem.

Apparentius
fundamentum.

Auctoris
sententia in hac
controversia.

1. Eius illatum
quod operatio
sensitiva non
spectet ad
essentiam
beatitudinis.

5. Et hæc sententia sic, explicata non multum aberrat, ab
 scopo veritatis: ut autem quoad fieri possit rem explicemus,
 supponendum est quod supra attigimus, ad complementum, et
 45R perfectionem status beatifici multas operationes requiri, quæ
 non omnes possunt dici ulla ratione pertinere ad essentiam
 130 beatitudinis, sed illæ solæ quæ formaliter spectant ad conse-
 quendum finem ultimum: nam, ut ostendimus, formalis beat-
 itudo quoad essentiam suam in consecutione finis ultimi po-
 nenda est.

6. Atque hinc primo colligitur (ne oporteat de hac re spe-
 cialem movere quæstionem) nullam operationem sensus exte-
 rioris, vel interioris, vel appetitus sensitivi posse ad essentiam

the name ‘happiness’. For sometimes, they say, it is a collective name,
 40R and in this way it consists in multiple activities. But sometimes it is a
 distributed name (*nomen divisum*), and in this way they say it is one
 activity ...

5. And this way explicated in this way does not stray far from
 the scope of truth. But in order to explain the matter as far as pos-
 sible, what we mentioned above should be assumed: namely, that for
 the completed and perfect happy state multiple activities are required,
 not all of which can be said by any reason to belong to the essence of
 happiness. But only those which formally belong to achieving the ul-
 timate end [can be said to belong to the essence of happiness]. For, as
 50R we showed, formal happiness with respect to its essence is placed in the
 attainment of the ultimate end.

6. And from here it can, firstly, be gathered (it is not necessary to
 raise a special question about this matter) that no activity of the exte-
 rior sense, interior sense, or sensitive appetite can belong to the essence

The view of the
author regarding
this controversy.

The first
consequence:
that sensitive
activity does not
belong to the
essence of
happiness.

140 beatitudinis pertinere, ut docuit D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 3, et consentiunt theologi omnes, et philosophi cum Aristotele 1, et 10, Eth. Ratio est, quia finis ultimus hominis et objectum beatitudinis ejus, est solus Deus; per potentias autem sensitivas, et operationes earum non possumus attingere Deum secundum se, et ideo consequenter nec illum consequi, et ideo in anima separata vere reperitur tota essentia humanæ beatitudinis, quamvis in ea esse non possint sensuum operationes.

Obiectio una
contra proximum
illatum.

145 7. Objicies primo, quamvis per sensus non possimus perfecto modo attingere Deum, tamen per interiorum sensum possumus aliquo modo, et sub ratione aliqua materiali formare idolum quoddam, seu imperfectum conceptum Dei, verbi gratia, sub ratione primi motoris, vel supremi benefactoris, ratione cujus possumus etiam per appetitum sensitivum illum aliquo modo diligere, et in eo delectari, juxta illud ps. 83: *Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum*: ergo potest hæc opo- <col. b> ratio pertinere ad essentiam beatitudinis totius hominis, et potest dici aliqualis consecutio, seu possessio Dei, eo modo, quo per inferiores potentias obtineri potest. Respondetur, hujusmodi actus potius pertinere ad effectus secundarios redundantes in homine ex beatitudine essentiali, si anima sit corpori conjuncta, non tamen dici possunt pertinere ad essentiam beatitudinis; nam sine illis homo esset semper beatus, etiam perfecte, quantum ad Dei consecutionem et conjunctionem cum illo, ut est ultimus finis, nam per sensus nec attingimus Deum ut ultimus finis est, nec proprie ut Deus est, nam illa materialis ratio, sub qua apprehenditur, non constituit proprium conceptum Dei. Denique omnes illi actus sunt valde imperfecti, et possunt esse in homine apprehendente falsum Deum, et ideo non spectant ad essentialem beatitudinem.

Diluitur.

Altera obiectio.

170 8. Sed aliter objici secundo potest, quia licet naturaliter non possit sensus attingere Deum in se, tamen supernaturaliter potest ad hoc elevari ut visus corporeus, verbi gratia, ad videndum ipsum: sic enim interpretatur Hieronymus, epistola 61, ad Pamachum, illud Job: *Quem oculi mei conspexerunt*. De qua re disputat late Augustinus, Epistol, 111 et 112, quæ sunt

55R of happiness, as St. Thomas teaches in IaIIæ.3.3. All the theologians and the philosophers with Aristotle, *EN* I and X, agree. The reason is that the ultimate end of a human being and the object of his happiness is God alone. But we cannot attain God as he is in himself through sensitive powers and their activities. And for that reason, consequently, we cannot attain him. And for that reason the complete essence of human happiness is truly found in the separated soul, even though there are no activities of the senses in it.

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151 appetitum] appositum A.

Dissoluitur.	175	de videndo Deum, et 22, de Civitate, cap. 29. Respondetur esse impossibile sensum corporeum elevari ad videndum, seu cognoscendum Deum prout in se est, quia nullo modo comprehenditur Deus sub objecto ejus, hac enim ratione non potest visus elevari ad percipiendum sonum, nec auditus ad percipiendum colorem, et sic de aliis potentiis, in quo differt multum intellectus a sensu, nam intellectus absolute continet Deum sub objecto suo, et ideo elevari potest ad percipiendum illum perfectius quam naturaliter posset, quia tota illa elevatio est intra latitudinem objecti intellectus. Secus vero est de sensu, qui habet objectum limitatum ad rem materialem.			
2. Illatum quod actus intellectus, et voluntatis in proprio genere non sunt de essentia beatitudinis.	185	9. Secundo colligitur, omnes operationes intellectus, vel voluntatis, quas beatus habet extra Deum ipsum, id est, quæ non habent Deum pro objecto, non esse de essentia beatitudinis, ut sunt, verbi gratia, cognitio Angelorum et mysteriorum Dei, quæ sunt effectus creati, item amor proximorum etiamsi sit ex charitate, et similia, etc. Ratio est, quia per hos actus non consequitur formaliter loquendo, beatus Deum, cum non attingat ipsum immediate: possunt igitur hæc opera pertinere ad perfectionem status beatifici, non tamen ad essentiam beatitudinis: atque idem erit de cognitione Dei abstractiva: seu per creaturas respectu beatitudinis supernaturalis perfectæ vitæ futuræ, nam si talis cognitio naturalis sit, est inferioris: unde non potest pertinere ad essentiam supernaturalis beatitudinis: si vero sit supernaturalis, est imperfecta in illo ordine, et ideo nec de essentia, nec simpliciter necessaria esse potest ad essentialem beatitudinem illius ordinis. Unde fit solum posse manere quæstionem de visione Dei, et de amare et gaudio, quæ illam consequuntur, ac proportione servata de similibus actibus beatitudinis naturalis, seu beatitudinis imperfectæ hujus vitæ.	65R	9. It is gathered, secondly, that all activities of the intellect or of the will which a happy person has beyond God himself, that is, activities which do not have God for their object, are not of the essence of happiness. Cognition of the angels and of the mysteries of God, which are created effects, are examples. Love of one's neighbours is another example, even if it comes from charity. And so on for other similar cases. The reason is that the happy person does not attain God, formally speaking, through these acts. Therefore, these actions can pertain to the perfection of the happy state, yet they cannot pertain to the essence of happiness. And the case will be the same with abstractive cognition of God or [cognition] through creatures with respect to the perfect, supernatural happiness of the future life. For if such cognition is natural, it is inferior and hence it cannot pertain to the essence of supernatural happiness. But if it is supernatural, it is imperfect in its order and hence is not of the essence [of supernatural happiness] nor can it be strictly speaking necessary for the essential happiness of that order. Hence, it happens that only the question concerning the vision of God and of the love and joy that follow on it can remain and of the proportion kept with regard to similar acts of natural happiness can remain.	The second consequence: that acts of the intellect and the will in their own genera are not of the essence of happiness.
3. Illatum quod beatitudo absolute abstrahit ab uno, vel pluribus actibus.	205	10. Tertio igitur atque ultimo colligo et addo ex ratione formali beatitudinis ut sic non necessario sequi quod in una tantum, vel pluribus operationibus consistat, sed in singulis statibus beatitudinis ex natura, et proprietate singularum operationum, et conditionibus talis status colligendum esse. Exacta probatio, ac declaratio hujus assertionis pendet ex his, quæ in particulari de naturali et supernaturali beatitudine di-	85R	10. Thirdly and lastly, therefore, I gather and add that from the formal nature of happiness as such it does not necessarily follow that it consist in only one activity or in multiple activities. Rather, it must be gathered in each state of happiness from the nature and quality of each activity and from such conditions of the state. The exact proof and declaration of this assertion depends on those things which need to be said in particular concerning natural and supernatural happiness.	The 3rd consequence: that happiness, taken absolutely, is separate from the question of one or multiple acts.
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Suadetur.	<p>cenda sunt: nunc breviter sic ostenditur ex illo principio posito quod beatitudo formalis consistit in consecutione ultimi finis: sed ex hac ratione formali præcise sumpta, non sequitur necessario hanc consecutionem sufficienter, vel necessario debere fieri per unam tantum operationem, vel per plures: ergo ex vi hujus rationis neutrum affirmari potest, sed hoc solum, illam operationem, vel operationes pertinere ad essentiam beatitudinis, quæ sunt necessaria ad consecutionem ultimi finis. Minor propositio declaratur, quia si consideratur objectum hujus beatitudinis, cum illud sit summe simplex, et unum, quantum est ex se videtur posse per unam operationem sufficienter obtineri: si vero consideremus subjectum, fortasse non potest propter imperfectionem suam una facultate, et actione illud possideri sic sufficienter, quia diversis modis, et sub diversis rationibus illud potest per varias operationes attingere, et fortasse omnes illi modi, vel plures illorum necessarij sunt ad consecutionem talis objecti; pendet igitur hoc ex natura et consideratione talium operationum.</p>	<p>For now it is briefly shown thus from that posited principle, namely, that formal happiness consists in the attainment of the ultimate end. But from this formal concept precisely taken, it does not necessarily follow that this attainment sufficiently or necessarily ought to happen through only one activity or through multiple ones. Therefore, from the meaning of this concept neither can be affirmed, but only this: that activity or those activities which are necessary for the attainment of the ultimate end belong to the essence of happiness. A minor proposition is shown, since if the object of this happiness is considered, since it is most simple and one, it seems that insofar as it itself is considered it could sufficiently be obtained through one activity. But if we consider the subject, perhaps it cannot sufficiently take hold of it by one faculty and one action on account of its own imperfection, because it can attain it in diverse ways and under diverse aspects through different activities. And perhaps all these ways or multiple ones of them are necessary in order to attain such an object. Therefore, this depends on the nature and consideration of such activities.</p>	It is urged.
<p>Ad fundam. 1. sententiæ in num. 1.</p>	<p>230 11. Et hoc tandem confirmatur ex responsionibus ad fundamenta duarum primarum opinionum: fundamentum ergo primæ opinionis quamvis probet, ad complementum, seu perfectum statum beatitudinis requiri plures operationes, quæ immediate versentur circa Deum ipsum, non tamen inde intrinsece <col. b> sequitur omnes illas operationes esse de essentia, quia non sequitur omnes pertinere ad formalem consecutionem ultimi finis; possunt enim aliquæ esse veluti proprietates dimanantes ex perfecta consecutione, vel dispositiones præviæ, seu necessariæ ad illam. Unde quamvis homo habeat plures potentias, quibus attingat Deum, non est tamen necesse omnes perfici per essentiam beatitudinis, sed satis erit quod perficiantur, vel per essentiam, vel per aliquid concomitans essentiam. Rursus ad fundamentum secundæ opinionis, primo fortasse in rigore non probat ex vi formalis beatitudinis intrinsece sequi quod esse debeat perfectissima operatio: nam si per possibile, vel impossibile aliqua operatio, quæ in entitate sua non est perfectissima, esset consecutio ultimis finis, illa esset formalis beatitudo: quia ut supra dicebamus, ratio beatitudinis non est consideranda ex perfectione entitativa, sed ex vin-</p>	<p>110R 115R 120R 125R</p> <p>11. And this, finally, is confirmed from the responses to the foundations of the former two opinions. Therefore, although the foundation of the first opinion shows that multiple activities that immediately concern God himself are required for the completed or perfect state of happiness, yet it does not thereby intrinsically follow that all those activities are of the essence [of happiness], because it does not follow that they all pertain to the formal attainment of the ultimate end. For some can, as it were, be properties flowing out of a perfect attainment or dispositions leading the way or necessary for the attainment. Hence, although a human being has multiple powers by which he can reach God, nevertheless it is not necessary that all these be perfected through the essence of happiness. Rather, it will be enough that they are perfected either through the essence or through something concomitant to the essence. In response to the foundation of the second opinion in turn, firstly, it perhaps does not in strictness prove that it follows intrinsically from the strength of formal happiness that there has to be a most perfect activity. For if <i>per possibile</i> or <i>impossibile</i> some activity which is not most perfect in its entity were the attainment of the ultimate end, that would be formal happiness. Since, as we said above, the nature of happiness should not be considered according to entitive perfection but</p>	<p>To the foundation of the 1st view in n. 1.</p> <p>To the foundation of the 2nd view in n. 3.</p>

250 culo, et conjunctione cum ultimo fine. Quo sensu dixit divus
 Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 1, ad 2, beatitudinem dici summum
 bonum, quia est adeptio summi boni, et propter hanc rationem
 255 possunt reliqua omnia ad illam ordinari, ut ad finem: tamen ul-
 terius dicitur ex illo fundamento, et rationibus ibi factis recte
 probari, perfectissimam operationem pertinere ad essentiam
 beatitudinis, non tamen quod illa sola sit tota essentia beati-
 tudinis, quia fieri potest ut alia operatio quamvis minus per-
 260 fecta conferat et juvet ad integram consecutionem ultimi finis.
 Unde fieri etiam potest ut duæ operationes, quamvis inæquales
 in perfectione, ordinentur ad constituendum ultimum finem
 formalem, et consequenter, quod inter se habeant mutuam ali-
 265 quam habitudinem, quæ non sit contra rationem talis finis,
 quia non est extra illum. Ex his ergo principiis generalibus et
 communibus concludi non potest beatitudinem esse unam, vel
 plures operationes essentialiter: quid igitur in singulis dicen-
 dum sit explicando naturam uniuscujusque definiemus.

130R according to its bond or union with the ultimate end. St. Thomas says
 in this sense in IaIIæ.3.1 ad 2 that happiness is called the highest good,
 because it is the attainment of the highest good, and for this reason all
 remaining things can be ordered to it as to an end. Still, later it is said
 from that foundation and it is rightly proven by the arguments made
 here that the most perfect activity pertains to the essence of happiness,
 135R because it can happen that some activity, although less perfect, conveys
 and serves for the integrated attainment of the ultimate end. Hence, it
 can also happen that two activities, although not equal in perfection, are
 ordered to the setting up of the formal ultimate end and, consequently,
 that they have some mutual habitude to each other, which is not con-
 140R trary to the nature of such an end since it is not beyond it. Therefore,
 from these general and common principles it cannot be concluded that
 happiness is essentially either one activity or multiple activities, which,
 therefore, should be stated in each case individually when we define the
 nature of each.