

<48, col. b>²

Utrum solus Deus sine consortio alicujus creaturæ sit sufficiens objectum beatitudinis.

Whether God alone without the association of any creatures is a sufficient object of happiness.

1. Ratio dubitandi.

1. Ratio dubii est, quia licet Deus sit supremum hominis bonum, non tamen est unicum ejus bonum: nam præter
5 Deum, indiget homo ut commode vivat, et bonis corporis, et aliis bonis animæ præter cognitionem Dei, quæ omnia bona naturaliter appetit: ergo non satiatur appetitus hominis Deo: ergo solus Deus non est sufficiens objectum beatitudinis ejus.

5R

1. The reason for doubt is that, although God is the supreme good for a human being, nevertheless, he is not his single good. For besides God, a human being needs both bodily goods and other goods of the soul (which naturally desires all these goods) besides cognition of God in order to live advantageously. Therefore, the desire of a human being is not satisfied with God. Therefore, God alone is not a sufficient object of his happiness. Nor will it satisfy if someone responds that all these goods are contained in God, for they are contained eminently, not formally. But a human being needs them as they formally perfect him, not only according to his eminence. For a human being will not be healthy by cognizing the health which is eminently in God, but by having formal health in himself. And likewise concerning the others.

The first reason for doubting.

Evasio præcluditur.

10 Nec satisfaciet si quis respondeat, hæc omnia bona contineri in Deo, continentur enim eminenter, non formaliter: homo autem indiget illis prout formaliter illum perficere possunt non tantum secundum eminentiam suam: nec enim erit homo
15 sanus cognoscendo sanitatem, quæ est eminenter in Deo, sed habendo in se formalem sanitatem, et sic de aliis. Secundo auget difficultatem, quia ut homo sit beatus, non satis est videre Deum: sed necesse est ut videat se videre, quia alias, nec amare poterat suam beatitudinem, nec de illa gaudere: propter quod quidam dixere, magis consistere beatitudinem nostram in cognitione reflexa, quam in directa: ergo in objecte nostræ beatitudinis non solum continetur Deus, sed visio Dei, illa vero
20 creatura est. Simile argumentum fieri potest de amore, quia, ut simus beati, non satis est videre Deum, sed etiam <49> videre illum ut summum bonum a nobis dilectum, quia non potest beatificare, nisi quod amatur, et quatenus tale esse cognoscitur, quia beatitudo est satietas amoris, et terminus ejus: ergo in illo
25 objecto includitur non solum Deus, sed etiam amor Dei, qui est quid creatum. Simile etiam est, quia ut simus beati, necesse

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Secondly, it increases the difficulty, since in order for a human being to be happy, it is not enough to see God. Rather, it is necessary that he see that he sees, because otherwise he can neither love his own happiness nor rejoice in it. For this reason some said that our happiness consists more in a reflexive cognition than in a direct [cognition]. Therefore, God is not contained alone in the object of our happiness, but the vision of God. But that is a created thing. A similar argument can be made about love, because in order for us to be happy it is not enough to see God but [we need] also to see him as the highest good loved by us. For nothing can make us happy, unless it is loved and insofar as it is cognized to be such. For happiness is the satiety of love and its *terminus*. Therefore, not God but also the love of God is included in that object. [But the love] is something created. It is also similar because in order

An evasion is blocked off.

The second reason.

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

30 est ut cognoscamus beatitudinem nostram perpetuo duratu-
ram, alias non posset excludi omnis timor et anxietas, prout
ad beatitudinem necesse est: ergo in objecto nostræ beatitu- 30R
dinis includitur non solum Deus, sed etiam perpetua duratio
ejusdem beatitudinis; illam autem duratio creatum quid est.
Tandem de beatitudine naturali potest esse difficultas, quia non
35 potest anima nostra cognoscere Deum nisi cognoscendo seip-
sam, vel aliquam aliam creaturam; imo nec in beatitudine su- 35R
pernaturali (ut multi existimant) potest videri Deus, nisi visis
in ipso aliquo modo creaturis: ergo.

Resolutio
quorundam
rejjicitur.

40 2. In hac quæstione philosophi omnes sensisse videntur in-
digere hominem præter Deum aliis bonis creatis ad felicitatem
suam: non tamen accurate distinxerunt, aut intellexerunt, an
illa bona sint essentialia, ut particularia objecta essentialis beat- 40R
itudinis, vel solum ut dispositiones quædam vel proprietates,
seu accidentariæ perfectiones ejus: quinimo etiam inter theol-
ogos, Durandus, Olcotus, et alii, quos citavi, disput. præced.,
45 sect. 1, contenti illa distinctione beatitudinis quatenus signifi-
cat aut perfectissimam operationem, aut collectionem omnium
bonorum, respondent, solum Deum esse objectum beatitudi- 45R
nis priori modo sumptæ, non tamen posteriori modo. Sed hu-
jusmodi distinctio non deservit ad rem explicandam, sed potius
confundit illam: nam juxta illam responsionem videtur sequi,
50 Deum nullo modo esse adæquatum objectum nostræ beatitu-
dinis, sed parziale, quamvis præcipuum. Supponendo ergo ser-
monem esse de propria, et essentiali beatitudine, advertendum
est aliud esse loqui de proprio objecto bono, cujus consecu-
55 tionem beati sumus, alia vero de his, quæ vel cum illo objecto
conjuncta sunt, vel ex parte nostra sunt necessaria ad conse-
quendum illud objectum perfecte, et ut in nobis efficiat illos ef-
fectus omnes, quos perfecta beatitudo requirit: non enim om-
nia, quæ hoc modo requiruntur, oportet ut sint proprie objecta
60 beatitudinis essentialis, sicut non omnia quæ sunt necessaria ad
introductionem, vel conservationem formæ, nec etiam quæ illa
consequuntur, pertinent ad essentialia compositum. <col. b> 60R

Notatio pro vera
resolutione.

65 3. Dicendum ergo est absolute et simpliciter, solum Deum
esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis essentialis, atque hoc modo
illum sine consortio creaturæ sufficere ad nostram beatitudi-

Assertio affirmat.

that we be happy it is necessary that we cognize our happiness as last-
ing perpetually. Otherwise, it could not exclude all fear and anxiety, as
is necessary for happiness. Therefore, not only is God included in the
object of our happiness, but also the perpetual duration of that happi-
ness. Finally, there can be a difficulty concerning natural happiness, for
our soul cannot cognize God except in cognizing itself or some other
creature. Indeed, neither can God be seen in supernatural happiness (as
35R many think), except by having seen creatures in some way. Therefore.

2. In this question all the philosophers seem to think that a hu-
man being requires for his felicity other created goods in addition to
God. Nevertheless, they have not accurately distinguished or under-
stood whether these goods are essential as particular objects of essential
happiness or only as dispositions of a certain sort or properties or acci- 40R
dental perfections of happiness. In fact, even among the theologians—
Durandus, Holcot, and others whom I cited in the preceding disputa-
tion, sect. 1—after having secured that distinction of happiness insofar
as it indicates either the most perfect activity or the collection of all
goods, they respond that God alone is the object of happiness taken
45R in the former way, but yet not in the latter way. But a distinction of
this sort does not serve to explain the matter, but rather confuses it.
For according to that response it seems to follow that God is in no way
an adequate object of our happiness, but a partial [object], although
the principal one. Therefore, in supposing the discussion to be about
50R proper and essential happiness, it should be noted that it is one thing
to talk about the proper good object by the attainment of which we are
happy but another thing [to talk] about those things which either are
conjoined with that object or are necessary on our part for attaining
that object perfectly and as it effects in us all those effects which perfect
55R happiness requires. For it is not necessary that all those things which
are required in this way are properly objects of essential happiness, just
as not all those things which are necessary for the introduction or con-
servation of a form—nor also those things which follow it—pertain to
the essential composite. 60R

The resolution of
some is rejected.

A note towards a
true resolution.

3. Therefore, it should be said that absolutely and strictly speak-
ing that God alone is the object of our essential happiness and in this
way he suffices for our happiness without the association of creatures. I

An affirmative
assertion.

Confirm. 1.	105 iud est; talis autem est felicitas: sed solus Deus est perfectus finis, propter se amandus, et reliqua omnia propter ipsum: ergo solus ipse est objectiva beatitudo simpliciter humanæ naturæ.	105R	else. But such a thing is felicity. But God alone is the perfect end who should be loved for his own sake and all other things for his sake. Therefore, he alone is the objective happiness, strictly speaking, of human nature. This is confirmed and explained in this way: for although with regard to happiness many goods are required for its complete state, nevertheless, as Augustine rightly said in the cited book of <i>De civ. Dei</i> , all things ought to be ordered to the glory of God and to respect him as the ultimate end. That, moreover, which is the end and the ultimate of all goods is the proper and <i>per se</i> object of happiness. It is confirmed in addition from Aristotle in the same book I of <i>EN</i> , c. 7: a perfect good is that which is <i>per se</i> sufficient. But we consider that <i>per se</i> sufficient which alone and removed from all the other [goods] makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. But we think felicity to be something of this kind. Moreover, in <i>EN</i> X, c. 2, he adds with Plato that the highest good is such <i>per se</i> and with nothing added to it and does not become more desirable on account of adding another good. For ‘by that fact’, he says, ‘it would not be the highest good’. Whence the argument is concluded: for God alone is <i>per se</i> the highest good, strictly speaking, and a perfect union with him or an attainment of him is <i>per se</i> most desirable and sufficient for the perfection of a human being, not only because every good is eminently contained in God but also because he brings along with himself whatever can be necessary for the happiness of a human being. And it is confirmed, finally, because God alone is the first principle of a human being. Therefore, he alone is also the human being’s ultimate end. Therefore, the happiness of a human being remains in returning to him and in the attainment of him. Read Augustine, <i>Conf.</i> V, c. 4, and <i>De Trin.</i> XIII, c. 7, and letter 57 and St. Thomas, <i>SCG</i> c. 37.	It is confirmed, first.
Confirm. 2.	110 Quod in hunc modum confirmatur et explicatur. Nam licet in beatitudine multa requirantur bona ad completum statum ejus, tamen, ut recte Augustinus dixit, dicto libro de Civitate, omnia debent in laudem Dei ordinari, illumque tanquam finem ultimum respicere; id autem, quod est finis, et ultimum bonorum omnium, illud est proprium et per se objectum beatitudinis. Confirmatur præterea ex Aristotele eodem 1, Ethicorum, capite septimo: perfectum bonum est, quod per se est sufficiens; sufficiens autem per se, illud esse ponimus, quod solum a cæteris segregatum expetibilem vitam facit, reique nullius indigentem: hujusmodi autem felicitatem existimamus esse, libro autem 10, Ethicorum, capite secundo, addit cum Platone, summum bonum per se, et nullo addito tale esse, et non fieri expetibilius propter additum alterius boni; nam <i>hoc ipso</i> , inquit, <i>non esse summum bonum</i> . Unde concluditur ratio: nam Deus per se solus est summum bonum simpliciter, et perfecta cum ipso conjunctio, seu illius adeptio est per se maxime expetibilis et sufficiens ad perfectionem hominis, non solum quia in Deo continetur omne bonum eminenter, sed etiam quia secum affert quidquid ad beatitudinem hominis necessarium esse potest: ergo solus Deus est essentielle objectum nostræ beatitudinis. Et confirmatur tandem, quia solus Deus est primum hominis principium: ergo solus etiam est ultimus finis ejus; ergo in reditu ad ipsum et in consecutione ejus stat hominis beatitudo. Lege Augustinum 5, Confession., capite quarto, et decimotertio de Trinitate, capite septimo, et epistola 57, et D. Thomam, contra Gent., cap. 37.	110R		It is confirmed, secondly.
Confirm. 3.	120 summum bonum per se, et nullo addito tale esse, et non fieri expetibilius propter additum alterius boni; nam <i>hoc ipso</i> , inquit, <i>non esse summum bonum</i> . Unde concluditur ratio: nam Deus per se solus est summum bonum simpliciter, et perfecta cum ipso conjunctio, seu illius adeptio est per se maxime expetibilis et sufficiens ad perfectionem hominis, non solum quia in Deo continetur omne bonum eminenter, sed etiam quia secum affert quidquid ad beatitudinem hominis necessarium esse potest: ergo solus Deus est essentielle objectum nostræ beatitudinis. Et confirmatur tandem, quia solus Deus est primum hominis principium: ergo solus etiam est ultimus finis ejus; ergo in reditu ad ipsum et in consecutione ejus stat hominis beatitudo. Lege Augustinum 5, Confession., capite quarto, et decimotertio de Trinitate, capite septimo, et epistola 57, et D. Thomam, contra Gent., cap. 37.	115R		It is confirmed, thirdly.
Proximæ probationes, in omni vera beatitudine locum habent.	130 5. Atque ex rationibus factis colligitur, assertionem positam veram esse, tum in beatitudine supernaturali perfecta vitæ futuræ, de qua maxime procedunt omnia dicta, et potest de illa peculiaris ratio reddi, quia illa beatitudo proprie respondet gratiæ, tanquam sibi connaturalis: gratia autem est quædam propria participatio divinæ naturæ: et ideo sicut divina	120R		
	135 5. And from the arguments that have been made it is gathered that the posited assertion is true: [i] in the case of the perfect supernatural happiness of the future life, concerning which all the things that were said are especially forceful. And a special argument can be delivered concerning it: for that happiness properly answers to grace as it is connatural to it. But grace is a certain proper participation of the divine	130R		The proofs just made have a place in every true happiness.

130 in] *om.* A.132 et] *om.* V.

140 natura seipsa est beata, ita propria beatitudo respondens huic
 gratiæ, consistit in conjunctione ad eandem divinam natu- 135R
 ram per altissimam participationem illius visionis, qua ipsa se
 fruitur: tum etiam de beatitudine supernaturali, qualis in hac
 145 supra omnia diligendus, omniaque ad hunc amorem, et ad ip- 140R
 sium Dei consecutionem referenda sunt, ut vere pertineant ad
 nostram perfectionem: tum denique de felicitate, seu beati-
 tudine naturali, quæ habere posset vel in hac vita, vel in ani-
 150 ma separata propter eandem rationem, nam etiamsi homo es- 145R
 set conditus in puris naturalibus, deberet Deum supra omnia
 diligere, et in eum ut in ultimum finem omnia referre.

An realis
 existentia
 pertineat ad
 objectum
 beatitudinis.
 Quorundam
 placitum negans.

155 6. Sed dubitabit hic aliquis, an Deus sit objectum nostræ
 beatitudinis ut realiter existens a parte rei, vel solum ut objec-
 tive existens in mente humana. Quidam enim asserunt, quod
 licet de ratione Dei, ut Deus est, sit existere, tamen si præcise 150R
 consideretur id quod necessarium est in illo, sic non necessario
 includi existentiam rei in seipso, sed solum esse objective in
 mente. Quod per hanc conditionalem explicatur: nam si in-
 telligamus beatitudinem hominis consistere in visione pulchræ
 160 imaginis, si Deus conservaret in oculo illam visionem destru- 155R
 endo objectum in esse existentis, tam beatus maneret homo si-
 cut antea; quia ex parte sua eodem modo attingeret illud objec-
 tum, atque ita realis existentia illius objecti non esset necessaria
 ad talem beatitudinem, sed solum objective: ergo si per impos-
 sibile fingeremus, cognitionem, aut visionem Dei manere in
 165 intellectu nostro, etiamsi Deus non existeret eodem modo, es- 160R
 semus beati, quia haberemus eandem formam beatificantem:
 ergo ex præcisa ratione beatitudinis non requiritur existentia
 realis in illo objecto, sed solum esse objective. Cui modo di-
 170 cendi videtur favere Durandus, in quarta, distinctione quadra- 165R
 gesima sexta, quæstione prima, numero octavo.

Oppositum
 convincitur.

175 7. Sed hæc opinio videtur mihi valde falsa, et apertam re- 170R
 pugnantiam involvens, quia Deus est objectum nostræ beati-
 tudinis, quatenus est primum ens ac purissimus actus et per-
 fectissimus: ergo necesse est ut in ejus ratione, etiam ut objec-

nature. And therefore just as divine nature itself is happy, so a proper
 happiness responding to this grace consists in union with that same di-
 vine nature through the highest participation of that vision by which
 he enjoys himself. [ii] In the case of the kind of supernatural happiness
 that can be had imperfectly in this life. For God alone is to be loved
 beyond all other things and all things should be referred to this love
 and to the attainment of God himself in order for them to truly belong
 to our perfection. Finally, [iii] in the case of the felicity or natural hap-
 piness which can be had either in this life or in the separated soul on
 account of the same reason. For even if a human being had been made
 in accordance to purely natural [states], he ought to love God beyond
 all other things and to refer all things to him as to an ultimate end.

6. But someone will doubt here whether God is the object of our
 happiness as really existing on the part of the thing or only as objec-
 tively existing in a human mind. For some assert that although it is of
 the nature of God as he is God to exist, still, if that which is necessary
 for that [happiness] were precisely considered, it would not in that way
 necessary include the existence of the thing in itself but only objective
 being in the mind. This is explained through this conditional: for if we
 understand the happiness of a human being to consist in the vision of
 a beautiful image, if God were to conserve that vision in the eye while
 destroying the object with regard to the being of existence, then the hu-
 man being would remain just as happy as before, because for his part he
 achieves that object in the same way. And thus the real existence of that
 object would not be necessary for such happiness, but only objective
 [existence]. Therefore, if, *per impossibile*, we imagined that the cogni-
 tion or vision of God to remain in our intellect, even if God were not to
 exist in that way, we would be happy because we would have the same
 form that makes us happy. Therefore, real existence is not required in
 that object according to the precise nature of happiness, but only objec-
 tive being. Durandus seems to favour this way of talking in IV, dist. 46,
 q. 1, n. 8.

Whether real
 existence pertains
 to the object of
 happiness.
 Denying pleases
 certain people.

7. But this opinion seems to me very false and involving an obvious
 repugnance, because God is the object of our happiness, insofar as the
 is the first being and most pure and perfect act. Therefore, it is neces-
 sary that in his nature—also as he is the object of such happiness—there

The opposite is
 demonstrated.

180 tum est talis beatitudinis, includatur quod sit ens necessarium
per essentiam, atque adeo quod includat, non solum objecti-
vam, sed realem, et veram essentiam: quin potius in hoc ob-
jecto non sunt hæc duo separabilia, quia illud, quod maxime
de illo cognoscitur, aut in ipso videtur, est quod existat, et 175R
sit suum esse: et ideo etsi fortasse in aliis rebus, et præsertim
in objectis sensibilibus posset fieri a Deo ut maneat intuitiva
<51> visio sine reali existentia objecti, tamen in hac Dei vi-
sione manifestam contradictionem involvit, non solum quia ex
185 parte Dei repugnat non esse, sed etiam, quia ex parte visionis
repugnat manere, et non terminari ad ens necessario existens
ut sic: imo etiam in cognitione abstractiva Dei, quæ vera sit et
scientifica, repugnat esse, et non fieri circa ens quoddam neces-
sarium, quod a se essentialiter existat.

Ad 1. rationem 190 8. Ad rationes dubii in principio positas. Ad primam fate-
dubitandi in 190 mur, ad completum statum beatitudinis requiri alia bona: illa
num. 1. tamen non sunt proprie objecta essentialis beatitudinis, quia
nec sunt finis ultimus, nec pars ejus, sed ad aliud ut finem
ultimum ordinantur, et ab illo quasi a primo fonte originem
ducunt. Ad alteram vero rationem dubii similiter respondetur, 190R
ad summum probare aliquid creatum requiri ex parte nostra, ut
ipso Deo perfecti efficiamur beati, quid autem illud sit, et quæ
alia bona in beatitudine requirantur ad completum statum ejus,
postea est latius explicandum in singulis beatitudinis statibus.

is included that he is a necessary being through essence and for that
reason that he includes not only objective but real and true essence.
Indeed, rather, these two are not separable in this object, because that
which is especially cognized concerning him or is seen in him is that
he exists and that this is his being. And therefore although perhaps in
other things and especially in sensible objects God can bring it about
that the intuitive vision remain without the real existence of the object,
nevertheless, in this vision of God it involves a manifest contradiction.
Not only because it is repugnant on the part of God not to be, but also
because on the part of vision it is repugnant to remain and not to be ter-
minated in a being necessarily existing as such. Indeed, also in the case
of abstractive cognition of God, which is true and scientific, it is repug-
nant for it to be and not to take place concerning a certain necessary
being which essentially exists from itself.

185R 8. To the reasons for doubting posited in the beginning. In re-
sponse to the first we admit that other goods are required for the com-
plete state of happiness. Nevertheless, they are not properly objects of
essential happiness, because they are not the ultimate end nor parts of
it, but are ordered to something else as to an ultimate end and from
that, as it were, they draw out the origin from the first font. But it is re-
sponded similarly to the other reason for doubt: at most it proves that
something created is required on our part so that we can be made per-
fectly happy by God himself. Moreover, what that is and what other
goods are required with respect to happiness for its complete state needs
to be explained more thoroughly afterwards with regard to each indi-
vidual state of happiness.

To the first
reason for
doubting in n. 1.

To the second.