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<45, col. b>²

DE OBJECTO HUMANÆ BEATITUDINIS.

5 Expedita quæstione, an sit beatitudo; sequitur explicanda quæ-
stio, quid sit: et quoniam formalis beatitudo, ut infra dicam, in
operatione consistit, quæ speciem et rationem suam sumere so-
let ab objecto, ideo primum omnium de objecto dicendum est;
10 quod præcipue tractat D. Thomas, 1, 2, in tota quæst. 2, et at-
tingit etiam in sequenti, partim in art. 1, partim <46> in 6 et
7, et late 3, contr. Gent., a cap. 27 usque ad 63. Reliqui doc-
tores in 4, dist. 49. Solum est in hoc principio advertendum,
15 hanc disputationem de objecto, communem esse omni beatitu-
dini tam naturali quam supernaturali vitæ præsentis et futuræ,
conveniunt enim omnes in illa re, in qua beatitudo consistit,
quamvis de modo attingendi, vel consequendi illam sit diversi-
tas, ut postea videbimus.

15 SECTIO I.

*Utrum omnes creatura sine Deo possint esse sufficiens objectum
humanæ beatitudinis.*

De hominis
beatitudine
scriptores varii.

20 1. Hæc quæstio celebris fuit inter antiquos philosophos, in-
ter quos fuit magna opinionum varietas in explicanda hominis
beatitudine, de quibus, quia prolixum esset illas referre, legi
possunt ex philosophis Aristoteles, lib. 1, Ethic. et 10, Cicero,
lib. de Finibus, et in Paradoxis; ex Patribus vero Augustinus

¹Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

ON THE OBJECT OF HUMAN HAPPINESS.

5R Having gone through the question whether happiness exists, it follows
that one should explain the question what it is. And since formal hap-
piness, as I will discuss below, consists in activity, what its species and
character is is usually taken up from the object. And for that reason the
discussion should first of all be about the object. St. Thomas discusses
this especially in IaIIæ.2, but also touches on it in the following ques-
tion, partly in art. 1 and partly in art. 6 and 7, and more thoroughly
10R in SCG III, from cap. 27 all the way to cap. 63. The remaining doctors
[discuss it] in IV, dist. 49. It only remains to be noted in this begin-
ning that this disputation is about the common object of all happiness,
natural and supernatural, of the present life and of the future life. For
they all agree in this matter (in what happiness consists), although there
are differences about the way of attaining or achieving it, as we will see
15R later.

SECTION I.

*Whether all created things without God could be a sufficient object of hu-
man happiness.*

20R 1. This question was renowned among the ancient philosophers,
among whom there was a great diversity of opinions in explaining hu-
man happiness. Because relating [all of those opinions] would be pro-
lix, one can read, of the philosophers, Aristotle, EN I and X, and Ci-
cero, *de finibus* and *Paradoxa*. And, of the Fathers, Augustine, *DCD*,

Different writers
on human
happiness.

Unum genus bonorum.	<p>10, de Civit., a principio, et cap. 56, et tractatu de Epicureis et Stoicis: obiter Ambrosius, lib. 2, de Officiis, cap. 2, et Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 2, Stromat., circa finem, Lactantius, lib. 3, de falsa Sapientia, præsertim a cap. 7, et Boetius, lib. 2 et 3, de Consolatione. Breviter omnia creata bona possunt ad tria capita revocari; in primo sunt bona externa, quæ dicuntur bona fortunæ, et intrinsece non afficiunt ipsum hominem, ut sunt quatuor illa, de quibus D. Thomas, disp. 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 4, divitiæ, honor, fama, potestas, de quibus non invenio philosophum aliquem asseruisse in illis solis consistere beatitudinem, licet aliqui ea conjunxerint cum aliis bonis. In secundo capite sunt bona corporis, ut sunt sanitas, robur; et ad hoc caput etiam spectat voluptas corporis et indolentia, et in his bonis multi beatitudinem constituunt, ut Carneades apud Ciceronem, lib. 5, de Finib., qui hæc vocabant prima bona naturæ: et Aristippus apud Lactantium supra. Et multi in hunc modum interpretantur sententiam Epicuri, ut Augustinus supra, et D. Thomas 3, contra Gent., et Lactantius, et alii dicant esse locutum de animæ voluptate. In tertio ordine sunt bona animæ, per quæ intelligere possumus, aut animam ipsam, et perfectiones illi inhærentes, aut etiam extrinsecum aliquod bonum per modum principii vel objecti. Et hoc modo etiam Deus inter bona animæ comprehenditur: <col. b> hic igitur de omnibus bonis agimus, excepto Deo.</p>	<p>from the beginning and cap. 56, and <i>de Epicureis et Stoicis</i>; Ambrosius, <i>de officiis</i> II, cap. 2, in passing; Clement of Alexandria, <i>Stromata</i> II, about the end; Lactantius, <i>de falsa sapientia</i> III, especially from cap. 7; and Boetius, <i>de consolatione</i> II and III. Briefly, all created goods can be grouped into three principal divisions. In the first division are external goods, which are called the goods of fortune. And these do not intrinsically affect a human being himself. The four goods which St. Thomas [discusses] in [IaIIæ.2.1–4]³ are examples: wealth, honour, fame, and power. I do not find any philosopher who asserts that happiness consists in these goods alone, although some [assert that it consists] in these conjoined with other goods. In the second division are goods of the body such as health and strength. Pleasure of the body and freedom from pain also belong in this division. Many constitute happiness in these goods, as Carneades—who calls these the first goods of nature—does according to Cicero in <i>de finibus</i> V. Aristippus also does according to Lactantius (cited above). And many also interpret the view of Epicurus in this way, as Augustine (cited above), St. Thomas in <i>SCG</i> III, and Lactantius. But others say that he was speaking about the pleasure of the soul. In the third order are the goods of the soul. Here we can understand either the soul itself and the perfection inhering in it or also any extrinsic good in the mode of a principle or object. And in this way God is also included among the goods of the soul. Here, therefore, we deal with all goods with the exception of God.</p>	<p>One genus of goods.</p> <p>The second genus.</p> <p>The third genus.</p>
Alterum genus.	<p>2. Dico ergo primo, bona fortunæ per se sola non possunt hominem beatificare. Hanc conclusionem tractat bene ex scholasticis Major dist. 49, quæst. 1, et est non solum certa, se etiam evidens. Et probatur primo generatim quia omnia hæc bona imprimis sunt inferioris ordinis; deinde sunt extrinseca et nec perficiunt hominem in se ipso, neque possunt esse objecta perfectorum actuum: tertio, non sunt bona stabilia, sed facillime amittuntur, etiam nobis invitis et sine ulla culpa: quarto, his bonis etiam iniqui abundant, imo facilius illa consequuntur: quinto, unum sine alio non satiat appetitum, nec omnia simul sine salute.</p>	<p>2. Therefore, I say, firstly, that goods of fortune cannot in themselves alone make a human being happy. Of the scholastics, Major treats this conclusion well in [IV], dist. 49, q. 1. Not only is it certain, it is also self-evident. And it is proven generally, firstly, because all these goods are of an especially inferior order. Also, they are extrinsic and do not perfect a human being in himself nor can they be objects of perfect acts. Thirdly, they are not stable goods, but they are very easily lost, even against our will and without any fault [on our part]. Fourthly, these goods also abound in unfairness—indeed, that follows more easily. Fifthly, one without another does not satisfy desire nor all of them together without health.</p>	<p>1st negative assertion about goods of fortune.</p> <p>1st general proof.</p>
1. Assert. neg. de bonis fortunæ.			
1. Probatio generalis.			

³The reference in the Latin text does not make sense. But Aquinas does discuss these four goods in turn as candidate ultimate ends in articles 1–4 of q. 2 of the *prima secundæ*.

2. Probatio
singulatim ac
primo de divitiis.

60 3. Ratio breviter de singulis, nam primo divitiæ non sunt
propter se appetibiles, sed solum ut instrumenta vitæ: deinde
difficillimi acquiruntur et difficilius conservantur; et si inor-
65 dinate, ac propter se amentur, nunquam satiant appetitum:
avarus enim nunquam implebitur pecuniis, Eccl. 15. Et propter
hanc causam Christiana religio non solum non constituit beat-
itudinem in divitiis, sed etiam constituit eas despiciere, ut beati
65 esse possimus. De qua re legi potest Augustinus, sermon. 4
ad fratres in Erem., et 28, de verbis Apostoli, Gregorius, 3
part. *Pastoralis*, admonit. 27, Chrysostom. homil. 69 et 70, in
Matth. 20. De honore ait Aristoteles, *Ethicor.* 1, cap. 5, esse
70 in honorante, non in honorato, et pendere ex arbitrio ejus,
et ideo non posse consistere in illo beatitudinem, ut probant
etiam rationes factæ divitiis: potius ergo est quid consequens
beatitudinem, quia honor debetur virtuti, et testimonium ex-
75 cellens; beatitudo autem debet potius consistere in aliqua ex-
cellentia, quam in testimonio ejus: et hoc modo dicitur Deus
interdum honorare Sanctos suos in præmium virtutis, quia ita
illos perficit, et excellentes facit, ut reddat honore dignissimos,
et hoc modo dicitur in psalm. 138: *Nimis honorati sunt am-
80 ici tui, Deus*; et Sapient. 5: *Existimabamus vitam illorum in-
saniam, et finem illorum sine honore; ecce quomodo computati
sunt inter filios Dei*. Tertio, eadem est ratio de fama, quæ etiam
80R est bonum extrinsecum, et consistit in aliorum opinione, quæ
sæpe non est in potestate nostra: hoc autem præcipue intelli-
gendum est de fama, seu gloria, quæ potest esse in mente crea-
85 turæ: nam illa bona fama, quam habere possumus in mente
Dei, ut Cajetan notat 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 3, conferre potest
<47> nostram beatitudinem, saltem causaliter, quia Deus il-
lis confert beatitudinem, quos bonos et justos cognoscit, et hæc
ipsa scientia, quatenus est ipsemet Deus, potest pertinere ad ob-
jectum nostræ beatitudinis, quamvis non proprie nos beatificet
90 ea ratione, qua terminantur ad nos per modum scientiæ visio-
nis: sed quatenus in se est infinitum bonum, ut postea latius
declarabimus. Hic vero inquiri poterat, an hæc bona honoris,
et famæ, quamvis non sint ultimum bonum, sint saltem per

60R

65R

70R

75R

80R

85R

90R

3. An argument, briefly, for each one, for, firstly, wealth is not desir-
able for its own sake but only as an instrument to life. Also, it is very
difficult to acquire and more difficult to keep. And if it is loved inordi-
nately and for its own sake, it never satisfies desire, for ‘the miser will
never have enough money’ (Eccl. 15). And for this reason the Christian
religion does not only not place happiness in wealth but decrees to de-
spise it so that we can be happy. Concerning this matter, one can read
Augustine, *ad fratres in Erem.*, sermon 4, and *De verbis Apostoli* 28; Gre-
gory, *Pastoralis*, part. 3, admonit. 27; and Chrysostom, homil. 69 and
70 on Matthew 20. Concerning honour, Aristotle says in *EN* I, cap. 5,
that it is in honouring, not in having been honoured. And it depends
on his choice and therefore cannot consist in that happiness, as those
arguments made about wealth also prove. Therefore, it is rather what
follows on happiness, because honour and an excellent report is owed
to virtue. But happiness ought rather to consist in some excellence than
in a report of it. And in this way God is sometimes said to honour his
saints according to the reward of virtue, because he perfects those and
makes them excellent in such a way that he returns the most worthy
with honour. And it is said in this way in Psalm 139[:17], ‘your friends,
O Lord, are made exceedingly honourable’, and Wisdom 5[:4-5], ‘we
esteemed their life madness and their end without honour; behold, how
they are numbered among the children of God’. Thirdly, there is the
same argument concerning fame, which is also an extrinsic good and
consists in the opinion of others which is often not in our power. More-
over, this should especially be understood of fame or glory, which can
be in the mind of a creature. For that good fame which we can have
in the mind of God, as Cajetan notes in *IaIIæ.2.3*, can confer our hap-
piness, at least causally, because God confers happiness to those whom
he cognizes as good and just. And this very knowledge, insofar as it is
God himself, can belong to the object of our happiness, although it does
not properly make us happy for the reason that they are terminated at
us through the mode of the knowledge of vision, but rather in that he
himself is an infinite good, as we will discuss more thoroughly later. But
here might be asked whether these goods of honour and fame, although
they are not the ultimate good, might at least be desirable for their own
sake as a proximate end. But this matter belongs to *IIaIIæ.131*. Finally,

2nd proof for
each individually
and, firstly, about
wealth.

About honour.

About fame.

About power.

67 Chrysostom.] *om.* V.

De potestate. 95 se appetibilia, ut finis proximus: sed hæc res pertinet ad 2, 2, quæst. 131. Tandem rationes factæ eodem modo procedunt de potestate dominandi; nam etiam hoc bonum est valde extrinsecum, et inferioris ordinis: non est autem bonum stabile, et auferri potest nobis invitis, et in eo sæpe excellunt homines iniqui. Ac denique non magis potest satiari hominem adeptio famæ et honorum, quam divitiarum. Denique de insufficientia horum bonorum, et moderatione in eis adhibenda, legi potest Chrysostomus, homil. 25, et quæst. 3, ad populum, Augustinus in psalm. sexagesimum tertium, Gregorius 18, Moralium, et Bernardus, serm. 13, in Cant.

2. Assert. neg. de bonis corporis. 105 4. Dico secundo: nullum corporis bonum, etiam voluptas, potest esse objectum humanæ beatitudinis. Hæc assertio etiam est evidens, et ita probata semper fuit a melioribus philosophis et contraria rejecta ut absurda et indigna hominibus, adeo ut Stoici dicerent, hæc inferiora commoda non esse appellanda bona præter unum, nempe honestum bonum: in quo tamen non recte dixerunt; habent enim hæc aliquam bonitatem et conjunctionem cum natura: ea tamen ab homine expetenda non est, nisi cum honestate sit conjuncta. Et hinc facile probatur conclusio, quia hæc bona corporis sunt infima, et quodammodo aliis animalibus communia; homo autem ut supra ex Aristotele dicebamus, non est capax beatitudinis secundum id, quod commune habet cum brutis, sed secundum id, quod in eo divinum est. Deinde, quamvis homo habeat bona corporis, verbi gratia, salutem, robur, indolentiam, etc., si tamen careat aliis bonis, etiam extrinsecis, ut honore et fama, etc., non est contentus, nec satius: ergo non sunt hæc sufficiens bonum hominis, cum nec per se sola sufficient, nec secum afferant alia, quæ necessaria sunt. Quæ omnia eodem modo procedunt de voluptate, de qua possent aliæ rationes fieri: nam hæc sæpe est rectæ rationi contraria, et <col. b> impedit spiritualia bona: imo si sit nimia, ipsi etiam corpori nocet, et dolores atque ægritudines affert; si autem sit temperata, majus bonum est virtus, quæ illam moderator: et hæc ipsa moderatio est signum, voluptatem non esse propter se expetendam, sed solum quoad nec-

105 Dico] Dices A V
124 de] om. V.

95R the arguments made proceed in the same way concerning the power of lordship. For this good is also very much extrinsic and of an inferior order. Moreover, it is not a stable good and can be snatched from us unwillingly and unjust humans often excel in that. And, finally, the achievement of fame and honour can no more satisfy a human being than wealth. Finally, regarding the insufficiency of these goods and regarding moderation in making use of them, one can read Chrysostom, homil. 25 and *ad pop.*, q. 3; Augustine, *in psalm.* 63; Gregory, *Moralium* 18; and Bernard, *in Cant.*, serm. 13.

105R 4. I say, secondly, that no good of the body, even pleasure, can be the object of human happiness. This assertion is also evident and so was always proven by the better philosophers and the contrary rejected as absurd and unworthy of humans, to such an extent that the Stoics said that these inferior goods should not be labelled goods except one, namely, honest good. Nevertheless, they did not speak rightly with respect to these, for these have a certain goodness and conjunction with nature, yet they are not to be sought by a human being unless conjoined with honesty. And from here the conclusion is easily proven, because these goods of the body are the most inferior and common in a certain way to other animals. But, as we were saying above according to Aristotle, a human being does not have a capacity for happiness according to that which he has in common with brute animals but according to that which in him is divine. Next, although a human being has the goods of the body (for example: health, strength, freedom from pain, etc.), if, nevertheless, he lacks other goods, even extrinsic ones such as honour, fame, and so on, he is neither content nor satisfied. Therefore, these are not a sufficient good for human beings, since they are neither sufficient by themselves nor bring along other things which are necessary. All these in a certain way also proceed in the case of pleasure, concerning which other arguments can be made. For pleasure is often contrary to right reason and impedes spiritual goods. In fact, if it is excessive, it even harms the body itself and brings along grief and sorrows. But if it is temperate, virtue, which is the moderator, is the greater good. And this very moderation is a sign that pleasure should not be sought for its

2nd negative assertion about bodily goods.

The last, especially about pleasure.

	130	essarium fuerit, vel ad conservandam naturam, vel ad rectas operationes exercendas. Aliæ rationes videri possunt iu divo Thoma 3, contra Gentes.	130R	own sake, but only to the extent that it is necessary either for preserving nature or for exercising the right activities. Other arguments can be seen in St. Thomas, <i>SCG</i> III.	
3. Assertio neg. de bonis spiritualibus creatis. De anima.	135	5. Dico tertio: etiam bona animi creata per se sola non sufficere ad hominis beatitudinem. Probatur, quia inter hæc bona primum est ipsa anima, quæ quidem est subjectum suæ beatitudinis, non tamen esse potest objectum, quia non potest esse finis ultimus sui ipsius, et ideo non potest in se conquiescere: nam sicut non est a se, ita non potest esse seipsa beata, sed quærit aliud melius se et optimum, in quo quiescat. Secundo sunt inter hæc bona illa, quæ formaliter inhærent ipsi animæ, ut sunt potentiæ suæ et actus, et in his consistere quidem potest formalis beatitudo, non tamen objectiva, quia hæc minus perfecta bona sunt, quam ipsamet anima, saltem quoad entitatem substantialem. Dices: visio beata numeratur in his bonis, et tamen illa posset esse sufficiens objectum beatitudinis: nam si quis videret in alio homine huiusmodi visionem, esset beatus, quia necessario videret Deum. Respondetur, etiamsi concedatur totum, non esse contra conclusionem, quia, si videndo illam visionem, videtur Deus, non ideo erit aliquis beatus, quia videt visionem, sed quia videt Deum: visio autem ipsa erit veluti medium cognitum ducens in Deum, si autem viso illo actu non necessario videtur Deus, quod fortasse verius est, cessat etiam argumentum, quia tunc illa visio ut objectum, non esset sufficiens ad beatificandum.	135R	5. I say, thirdly, that even created goods of the soul do not suffice in and by themselves for human happiness. It is proven, since among these goods the first is the soul itself, which indeed is the subject of its happiness, yet cannot be the object because it cannot be the ultimate end for itself and therefore cannot take rest in itself. For just as it does not exist from itself, so also it cannot be happy in itself, but seeks something better than itself and best, in which it may rest. Secondly, there are among these goods those which formally inhere in the soul itself (for example, the soul's powers and acts). And formal happiness does in fact consist in these, yet not objective happiness, since these are less perfect goods than the soul itself, at least with respect to substantial entity. You may say: the beatific vision is numbered among these goods and yet it can be a sufficient object of happiness. For if anyone were to see in another human being a vision of this sort, he would be happy because he would necessarily see God. It is responded that even if the whole were conceded, it would not be contrary to my conclusion, since, if in seeing that vision God is seen, then that person would not be happy because he saw the vision but because he saw God. But the vision itself will be, as it were, a cognized means leading to God. But if by that act having been seen, God is not necessarily seen, which perhaps is more true, then the argument also fails, because then that vision as object would not be sufficient to make one happy.	3rd negative assertion about created spiritual goods. About the soul.
De inhærentibus animæ.	140		140R		About goods inhering in the soul.
Instantia diluitur.	145		145R		An example is resolved.
	150		150R		
De Angelis.	155	6. Ultimo connumerari possunt inter hæc bona Angeli, quatenus sunt objecta, quorum cognitione multum perficitur mens hominis: et hoc etiam non potest sufficere ad beatitudinem hominis, qui est capax majoris boni, ut jam dicam: et quia Angeli non sunt per se principium et causa animæ hominis, et ita nec sunt finis hominis: item, nec sunt, nec continent omne bonum, sed sunt quoddam bonum participatum: non ergo possunt satiari hominem. Unde cum D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 7, dicit, in speculatione substantiarum separatarum positam esse quamdam hominis imperfectam beatitudinem, <48> non est intelligendus de beatitudine essentiali, etiam naturali et huius vitæ: sed de quadam accidentali perfectione: lege eumdem 3, contra Gent., capit. docimo-septimo et	155R	6. Lastly, angels can be reckoned among these goods, insofar as they are objects the cognition of which greatly perfects the mind of human beings. And this also cannot suffice for the happiness of a human being, who is capable of a greater good, as I already said, and because angels are not <i>per se</i> principles and causes of the human soul and thus are not the ends for human beings. Nor are they nor do they contain every good, but rather they are a certain participated good. Therefore, they cannot satisfy a human being. Hence, when St. Thomas says in <i>IaIIæ</i> .3.7 that a certain imperfect human happiness is placed in the speculation about separate substances, he should not be understood [to be referring to] essential happiness, even natural and of this life. But concerning a certain accidental happiness, read his <i>SCG</i> III, cap. 17 and 25, and IV, cap. 54. Someone may say that angelic nature has a greater per-	About angels.
	160		160R		
	165		165R		Objection.

Obiectio.	vigesimo-quinto, et lib. quarto, capit. 54. Dicit aliquis, majorem perfectionem, atque proportionem habet natura Angelica cum humana, quam ipse Deus, quia habet majorem similitudinem et propinquitatem: ergo magis consistit beatitudo humana in cognitione Angelorum, quam Dei. Respondetur	170	170R	fection and proportion to human nature than God himself, since it has a greater similarity and nearness. Therefore, human happiness consists more in the cognition of angels than of God. It is responded by denying the consequence, since although they have a greater proportion in the perfection of being, yet not in the aspects of cause and effect and in the aspect of an end and of a thing ordered to an end, nor also in necessary dependence and connection. Hence it happens so that just as the soul can exist without angels but not without God, so also it can be happy without angels but not without God. Hence, it also happens as a result that a human being can naturally attain a more perfect cognition of God in this life than of angels.	It is resolved.
Dissoluitur.	negando consequentiam, quia licet habeant majorem proportionem in perfectione entis, non tamen in ratione causæ et effectus, et in ratione finis, et rei ordinatæ ad finem, nec etiam in dependentia et connexione necessaria. Unde fit ut sicut potest esse anima sine Angelis non tamen sine Deo, ita potest esse beata sine Angelis, non tamen sine Deo: fit etiam inde, ut perfectiorem cognitionem Dei possit homo naturaliter assequi in hac vita, quam Angelorum.	175	175R		
Ultima assertio adæquata titulo quæstionis et de fide. Ratio D. Thomæ.	7. Ultimo ex his concluditur, omnia bona creata simul sumpta non posse sufficere ad beatificandum hominem sine Deo, est de fide, ut a fortiori patebit ex his quæ dicemus, sectione sequenti. Ratione probat D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 8, ex capacitate potentiarum animæ nostræ, sunt enim universales potentiæ: quia habent universalissima objecta: voluntatis objectum est bonum universale, sub quo omne bonum comprehenditur: bona autem creata sine Deo non complectuntur omne bonum: sed solus Deus est universale bonum: ergo non possunt omnia sine Deo explere capacitatem hominis. Circa quam rationem multa notat Cajetanus, quia videtur in ea committi æquivocatio: nam Deus est bonum universale non in prædicando, sed in causando, et secundum quamdam continentiam eminentialem: objectum autem voluntatis est universale in prædicando: nulla tamen est æquivocatio, sed ex una universalitate fit optimum argumentum ad aliam: nam cum voluntatis objectum sit bonum, et intellectus sit ens, plane comprehendunt Deum sub suis objectis, et ita sunt aliquo modo capaces Dei. Rursus Deus cum sit summum bonum, et summum ens, est præcipua pars, et præcipuum objectum harum potentiarum; ergo fieri non potest, ut homo secundum has potentias fiat beatus in solis creaturis sine Deo, quia deest illi id, quod est supremum, et optimum in capacitate sua.	180	180R	7. Lastly, from these it is concluded that all created goods taken together cannot suffice to make a human being happy without God. This is of the faith, as will be clear <i>a fortiori</i> from the things we will say in the following section. St. Thomas shows it by reason in IaIIæ.2.8 by appealing to the capacity of the powers of our soul, for they are universal powers, because they have most universal objects. The object of the will is universal good, under which every good is comprehended. But created good without God does not include every good. But only God is universal good. Therefore, all these goods without God cannot satisfy the capacity of a human being. Cajetan writes much about this argument, because he seems to commit an equivocation in it. For God is a universal good not in predication but in causation and according to a certain eminential content. But the object of the will is universal in predication. Nevertheless, there is no equivocation, but from one universality is made the best argument for the other. For since the object of the will is the good and of the intellect being, they clearly comprehend God under their objects and thus are in some way capable of God. In turn, God, since he is the highest good and highest being, is the primary part for and primary object of these powers. Therefore, it cannot happen that a human being is made happy according to these powers in creatures alone without God, since that would be lacking which is supreme and best in his capacity.	The last assertion adequate to the title of the question and of the faith. An argument from St. Thomas.
Vindicatur a Caiet.	8. Unde confirmatur, nam in homine operante secundum rationem duplex facultas considerari potest; altera est specu-	185	185R	8. Hence, it is confirmed, for in a human being acting according to reason, two faculties can be considered. One is the speculative faculty	It is upheld against Cajetan.
Confirmat. quoad objecta intellectus.		190	190R		
		195	195R		
		200	200R		
		205	205R		It is confirmed with respect to the object of the intellect.

lative ad contemplandum, et hæc non potest esse contenta si non perveniat ad Deum, qui est supremum intelligibile. Unde recte Gregorius Nazianzenus, orat. 21, de Laudibus Athanasii: *Intelligibilem omnium* (inquit de Deo) *summus est vertex, in quo desiderium omne consistit, ac defigitur, nec supra eum usque fertur, nec enim quippiam sublimius habet, aut habebit unquam mens ulla, quamvis philosophica, et altissima tendens, ac summe curiosa: hoc enim rerum omnium expetendarum extremum est, quo cum pervenerimus, conquiescit omnis speculatio.* Altera facultas humanæ mentis est ad operandum secundum rationem: hæc autem multo minus potest esse perfecta sine Deo, sed solum quando honestissima operatione fungitur, quæ est amor Dei. Propter quod dicit Eccles. ult.: *Deum time, et mandata ejus observa, hoc est enim omnis homo.* Nec contra hoc occurrit difficultas alicujus momenti.

for contemplation. And this cannot be content if it does not reach God, who is the supreme intelligible. Hence, Gregory of Nazianzus rightly says of God in *de laudibus Athanasii*: ‘Of all intelligibles the highest, he is the peak in which every desire consists and to which it is focused, nor is it brought all the way beyond him, for no mind has anything more sublime nor will it ever have, although philosophical, tending to the deepest things, and most diligent. For this is the farthest limit of all things to be sought, by which all speculation is brought to rest when we arrive at it.’ The other faculty of the human mind is for acting according to reason. But this even less can be perfect without God, but [can be perfect] only when most honest activity is performed, which is love of God. For this reason, it says at the end of Ecclesiastes [12:13]: ‘Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man.’ Nor does any difficulty of any importance occur against this.

212 *tendens*] tenens V.