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DE FINE HOMINIS DISP. 3, SECT. 6¹

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<37>²

Utrum omnes actiones hominis sint propter ultimum finem simpliciter, saltem ex inclinatione.

Arguitur pro
parte neg.

1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia vel est sermo de fine ultimo formalis, aut de fine ultimo materiali, seu de re illa, ad quam homo natura sua tendit ut ad ultimum finem, neutro autem modo videotur homo operari semper propter <col. b> ultimum finem. De primo patet, quia, ut supra dixi, sectio 1, num. 6, intentio finis ultimi formalis non sufficit ad electiones faciendas: atque adeo nec ad operandum propter finem ex propria intentione ipsius hominis operantis: ergo nec etiam naturalis proportio ad hunc finem formalem sufficit ut homo in omni actu suo dicatur operari propter ultimum finem hunc, ex inclinatione naturae, quia non omnia, quae amat, sunt media ad hunc finem. Altera pars probatur, quia finis ultimus, ad quem homo natura sua tendit, est Deus; sed non omnia, quae homo operatur, tendunt in Deum, ut patet maxime de actibus malis, seu peccatis: ergo.

2. Hæc quæstio facillime expediri potest, suppositis his, quæ supra dicta sunt, in disp. 2, sect. 4, de variis modis operandi propter finem: nam hic modus, de quo nunc agimus, non requirit propriam intentionem ipsius operantis vel præsentem, vel præteritam, sed solum interpretativam, quæ censemur contineri in ipso objecto proximo humanæ operationis, seu voluntatis quatenus illud natura sua tendit in aliud, vel tanquam medium ad finem, vel tanquam pars ad totum. Unde dicendum est primo, hominem in omnibus actibus suis, tam bonis, quam malis, operari aliquo modo propter ultimum finem formalem ex naturali

1. Assertio
affirm. de fine
formali probatur
auctorit.

Whether all the actions of a human being are for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end, at least by inclination.

1. The reason for doubting is that the discussion is either about the formal ultimate end or about the material ultimate end or that thing to which a human being tends by his nature as to an ultimate end, but a human being does not seem always to act for the sake of an ultimate end in either case. It is clear concerning the first, because, as I said above in sect. 1, n. 6, an intention for a formal ultimate end is not enough to choose what needs to be done. And therefore it is also not enough for acting for the sake of the end by a proper intention of the acting human being. Nor, therefore, is a natural proportion to this formal end enough for a human being to be said in all his acts to act for the sake of this ultimate end from an inclination of nature, because not everything that he loves is a means to this end. The other part is shown, because the ultimate end to which a human being tends by his nature is God, but not all acts which a human being performs tend to God, as is most clear concerning bad acts or sins. Therefore.

2. This question can be resolved most easily by first considering those things which I said above in disp. 2, sect. 4, concerning the various ways of acting for the sake of an end. For the way with which we are concerned now does not require the agent to have a proper intention, either present or past, but only an interpretative intention. An interpretative intention is thought to be contained in the proximate object itself of human action or will insofar as the object by its nature tends to another [object], either as a means to an end or as a part to a whole.

Hence, it should be said, firstly, that a human being in all his actions, good as well as bad, acts in some way for the sake of a formal ul-

It is argued for
the negative side.

The first
assertion
affirmative about
the formal end is
proven by
authority.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Item ratione.

connexione cujuscumque objecti voluntatis cum tali fine. Ita est intelligendus D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 1, art. 6, ut clarius idem explicuit in 4, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, quæstiunc. 4, ubi cæteri theologi idem sentiunt præter eos, qui existimant voluntatem posse ferri in malum sub ratione mali, quod improbabile est, ut nunc suppono. Et colligitur eadem conclusio ex Aristotele 1, Ethicorum, cap. 4 et 7, et 1, Rhetor., cap. 5, et est frequens apud Augustinum 10, Confess., cap. 20 et 21, et lib. 11, de Trinit., cap. 6, lib. 19, de Civit., cap. 1, et lib. de Epicureis et Stoicis. *Nam qui et bonus est, inquit, ideo bonus est, ut beatus sit: et qui malus est, malus non esset, nisi inde beatum se posse esse speraret.* Secundo, ratio est clara, quia homo naturaliter appetit complementum omnis boni; in omni autem voluntate sua appetit saltem partem, seu inchoationem aliquam hujus boni: ergo implicite et interpretative appetit quidquid appetit, quatenus confert aliquo modo ad suum completum bonum; et hoc est amare illud interpretative propter ultimum finem formalem. Confirmatur et explicatur, quia licet non præcedat in <38> homine intentio elicita hujus finis, præcedit tamen naturalis propensio in illum, et ab hoc procedunt omnes actus circa particularia bona: ergo saltem impetu naturæ omnes tendunt in hujusmodi finem. In quibus rationibus intelligitur hoc non solum procedere in actionibus liberis, sed etiam in naturalibus, et in omni appetitu cujuscumque boni. Intelligitur etiam hanc habitudinem particularium finium, seu objectorum ad ultimum finem formalem, non tam esse medii ad finem proprie loquendo, quam partis ad totum secundum veritatem, aut saltem secundum apparentiam et similitudinem, ut recte D. Thomas explicuit: nam quando homo appetit, verbi gratia, voluptatem, aliquo modo eam existimat partem sui completi boni, quia licet talis voluptas non semper sit illa, quæ vere pertinet ad perfectionem felicitatis humanæ, habet tamen quamdam similitudinem cum illa.

Obiectio Scoti
diluitur.

3. Sed objicit Scotus, nam si homo in omni actu suo appeteret hoc modo finem ultimum formalem postquam consti-

30R timate end by a natural connection between any object of the will whatever and such an end. This is how St. Thomas should be understood in [ST] IaIIæ.1.6, as he has more clearly explained in [Sent.] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, quæstiunc. 4, where other theologians think the same (besides those who think that the will can be brought to bad under the aspect of bad, which is improbable, as I currently assume). And the same conclusion is gathered from Aristotle, EN I, c. 4 and 7, and *Rhetor.* I, c. 5, and is frequently in Augustine in *Conf.* 10, c. 20 and 21, and *De Trin.* XI, c. 6, and *De Civ.* XIX, c. 1, and the book concerning the Epicureans and Stoics. ‘For also he who is good’, he says, ‘is good in order to be happy; and he who is bad would not be bad except that he hopes he can thereby be happy.’³

40R Secondly, the reason is clear: a human being naturally desires a complement of all good. In his every willing, moreover, he desires at least a part of or some beginning of this good. Therefore, whatever he desires, he desires implicitly and interpretatively insofar as it contributes in some way to his complete good. And this is to love the former interpretatively for the sake of the formal ultimate end. It is confirmed and explained: because although an elicited intention for this end does not precede in the human being, yet a natural propensity to it does precede. And all acts concerning particular goods proceed from this propensity. Therefore, all [actions] tend to an end of this kind at least by an impetus of nature.

45R 50R 55R In these arguments it is understood that not only does this proceed in free actions, but also in natural actions and in every desire for whatever good. It is also understood that this relation (*habitudinem*) of particular ends or objects to the formal ultimate end is not so much of a means to an end, properly speaking, as of a part to a whole, according to truth or at least according to appearance and similitude, as St. Thomas rightly explained:⁴ for when a human being desires, for example, pleasure, in some way he thinks of it as a part of his complete good, because although such pleasure is not always that which truly pertains to the perfect happiness of a human, nevertheless, it has a certain similitude to that.

60R 3. But Scotus objects: for if a human being in all his acts desired the formal ultimate end in this way after he establishes that end in some

The same
assertion proven
by reason.

It is confirmed.

It is explained.

Scotus's
objection refuted.

³Sermon 150, n. 4: *Nam et qui bonus est, ideo bonus est ut beatus sit; et qui malus est, malus non esset, nisi inde se beatum esse posse speraret.*

⁴Sent. IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, ad 1.

49 naturalibus, et in] om. V.

tuit finem illum in aliqua re determinata, non posset non operari propter illam beatitudinem in particulari, consequens autem constat esse falsum, nam fidelis cognoscens et credens suam beatitudinem consistere in visione Dei, non omnia operatur propter illam, imo potius multa contra illam. Respondetur negando maiorem, quia in hoc modo operandi propter finem non est attendenda particularis intentio hominis, ut terminatur ad particularem finem, quia non semper operatur ex illa, semper tamen operatur ex intentione alicujus boni.

2. Assertio affir. 70
de fine materiali.

75 Dubium circa proximam assert. discutitur.

80 3. Assertio decisiva proximi dubii.

90 Ostenditur assertio ex convenientia actus turpis & honesti. Primo.

95 4. Secundo dicendum est, hominem in omnibus suis actionibus virtutis interpretative operari propter ultimum finem particularem, seu realem propter quem est conditus, id est, propter Deum. In hoc etiam omnes convenient, quia omne bonum honestum habet proportionem cum ultimo fine vero, et ex se tendit in Deum, et potest esse aptum medium ut referatur in Deum et veram felicitatem, atque hoc modo quicumque honeste operatur, dici potest operari propter Deum. Sed difficultas est de quibusdam malis etiam peccati, an in his etiam possit homo dici aliquo modo operari propter finem, atque adeo propter rem illam, quæ est verus ultimus finis humanæ naturæ: quibusdam enim videtur non posse hoc affirmari ullo modo cum peccatum sit aversio vel deordinatio a Deo, alii vero <col. b> contrarium probant, quia homo etiam in his actionibus querit quamdam similitudinem cum Deo.

5. Breviter tamen dico tertio, hominem, dum peccat, per ipsummet actum peccati, aliquo modo operari propter Deum, non tamen eo quo per actum honestum. Intelligitur conclusio de peccato ratione actus positivi, nam malitia nullo modo est propter finem ultimum, imo nec propter finem, quia ipsa non est intenta, sed per accidens consecuta. Probatur ergo utraque pars conclusionis, explicando convenientiam et differentiam, quæ in hoc convenire potest inter actum turpem et honestum: nam primo si uterque comparetur ad Deum, uterque est ex causalitate et efficientia Dei. Unde ex hac parte necesse est, ut uterque aliquo modo ordinetur in Deum, nam sicut Deus propter seipsum omnia creavit, ita etiam propter seipsum concurrit ad actum peccati,

65R determinate thing, he would not be able not to act for the sake of that happiness in a particular [case]. The consequence, however, is clearly false, for the faithful person, cognizing and believing that his happiness consists in the vision of God, does not do everything for the sake of that vision but rather does many things against it. I respond by denying the major, because in this way of acting for the sake of the end there is no particular intention of the human being to be noticed, so that it is terminated in a particular end. For one does not always act from that; nevertheless, one always acts from an intention for some good or other.

70R 4. Secondly, it should be said, that a human being in all his actions of virtue interpretatively acts for the sake of a particular or real ultimate end on account of which he is preserved, that is, on account of God. In this also everyone agrees, because every moral good⁵ has proportion with the true ultimate end, from itself tends to God, and can be a suitable means [to God] so that it is referred to God and true felicity. And in this way whatever is done in a morally good way can be said to be done for the sake of God. But the difficulty concerns certain bad [actions], even sins. Can a human being in these also be said in some way to act for the sake of the end and even for the sake of that which is the true ultimate end of human nature? For with certain [actions] it seems impossible to affirm this in any way since sin is an aversion or directing away from God. But others show the contrary, because a human being seeks a certain similitude to God even in these actions.

85R 5. Nevertheless, I briefly say, thirdly, that a human being, while he sins, through the very act itself of sin, in some way acts for the sake of God, yet not in that [way] in which [he does] through a morally good act. The conclusion is understood concerning sin by reason of a positive act, for malice is in no way for the sake of the ultimate end. Indeed, it is not for the sake of any end, because it itself was not intended but was attained *per accidens*. Therefore, each part of the conclusion is shown, by explaining the agreement and difference which can come together in this between shameful and morally good actions. For, firstly, if each is compared to God, each exists by the causality and efficacy of God. Hence, from this part it is necessary that each in some way is ordered to God, for just as God created everything for the sake of himself, so also he con-

The second assertion affirmative about the material end.

A doubt concerning the last assertion is discussed.

The third assertion that decides the last doubt.

The assertion is shown by the agreement between shameful and virtuous acts. First.

⁵In this text I will translate ‘*honestum*’ and cognates with ‘moral good’ and cognates. I am not sure that would always be a good translation but it is close enough in the present context.

Secundo. et in hoc ipso ostendit bonitatem suam. Et hoc generaliter docet D. Thomas 3, contra Gentes, cap. 17. Secundo convenient, quod uterque actus habet necessariam connexionem et dependentiam cum Deo: unde fit ut peccator dum appetit aliquod bonum, quod sine Deo habere non potest, implicite appetat Deum esse: quamquam in hoc non tam respiciat Deum ut finem, quam ut principium, et quasi medium necessarium ad suum appetitum impletum. Tertio vero convenient, quod in utroque reperitur quædam participatio divinæ bonitatis et felicitatis, nam peccator dum peccat appetit etiam aliquo modo felicitatem, et in hoc ipso appetit assimilari Deo, quod commune est omnibus creaturis, ut divus Thomas dixit 1, 2, quæst. 1, articulis 7 et 8. Et ita exponit divus Thomas hanc locutionem in 4, distinct. 49, quæst. 1, articulo 3, quæstiunc. 4, ad 2 et 3, et etiam est sententia Augustini, lib. 2, Conf., cap. 4 et 6.

Explicatur eadem assertio ex disconvenientia eorumdem actuuum.
Primo. 6. Differunt tamen inter se actus pravus et honestus, quod actus peccati revera nullo modo pertinet ad veram hominis beatitudinem, quæ in Deo consistit, nec tanquam pars ejus, nec tanquam perfectio accidentalis illius; actus autem honestas, secundum suam honestatem et speciem consideratus, pertinet aliquo modo ad decorum et perfectionem beatitudinis. Unde fit secundo, ut actus malus ex natura sua non sit medium ad consequendum Deum, quatenus est finis <39> ultimus hominis: actus autem honestus de se sit accommodatus ad consequendum hunc finem: atque hinc tandem actus honestus simpliciter dici potest natura sua tendere in Deum tanquam in finem sibi proportionatum, et quia ex se placet Deo, et ad ipsum est referibilis: actus autem pravus non dici potest proprie, et simpliciter esse propter Deum, cum prædicta omnia in illum non conveniant, sed tantum secundum quid ac remote dicetur esse propter imitationem quamdam divinas perfectionis, quam suo modo intendunt omnia naturalia agentia, in quo est quodammodo peccator inferior illis, quoniam debito modo, et juxta ordinem divinæ providentiae intendunt omnia naturalia agentia assimilari Deo: peccator vero ut sic, indebito modo, ut præter ordinem querit assimilari Deo, et ideo impropriissime dicitur operari propter Deum.

110 2] 1 V.

124 autem] *om. V.*

100R curs with an act of sin for the sake of himself. And in this very thing he reveals his goodness. St. Thomas teaches this in general in *SCG* III, c. 17. Secondly, they agree in that each act has a necessary connection with and dependency on God. Hence it happens that when the sinner desires some good—which he cannot have without God—he implicitly desires for God to exist. Nevertheless, in this he does not so much respect God as end than as principle and as a necessary means, as it were, to satisfying his desire. And, thirdly, they agree in that in each is found a certain participation in divine goodness and felicity, for when the sinner sins he also desires felicity in some way. And in this very thing he desires to imitate God, which is common to all creatures, as St. Thomas said in [*ST*] IaIIæ.1.7 and 8. And in this way St. Thomas explains that locution in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, ad 2 and 3. It is also Augustine's view in *Conf.* II, c. 4 and 6.

105R 6. Yet corrupt and morally good acts differ from each other in that the acts of sin in no way really pertain to the true happiness of a human being, which consists in God, nor to so much as a part of it nor to an accidental perfection of it. But a morally good act, considered according to its moral goodness and its species, pertains in some way to the beauty (*decorum*) and perfection of happiness. Hence it happens, secondly, that a bad act by its nature is not a means to following God, insofar as he is the ultimate end for a human being. But a morally good act of itself is suitable for following this end. And, hence, finally, [it happens] that an morally good act can be said without qualification by its nature to tend to God as to an end proportionate to itself, both because it pleases God by itself and is referrible to him. A corrupt act, however, cannot be said properly and without qualification to be for the sake of God, when all the just-mentioned things do not agree with him. Rather, it may be said to be only with qualification and remotely for the sake of a certain imitation of divine perfection, which all natural agents intend in their way—in this the sinner is in a certain way inferior to the natural agents, because of the way he ought [to be]—and according to the order of divine providence all natural agents intend to imitate God. But the sinner as such [intends] it in an undue way, so that he seeks to imitate God in a way contrary to the order. And so he is said most improperly to act for the sake of God.

Second.

Third.

The same assertion is explained from the disagreement of the same acts.

First.

Second.

Third.