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*Utrum possit aliquis simul intendere duos fines ultimos, unum simpliciter, et alterum secundum quid*

*Whether someone can at the same time intend two ultimate ends, one unqualifiedly ultimate and the other qualifiedly ultimate*

Ratio dubitandi  
pro neg. parte.

1. Hæc sola superest nobis facienda comparatio in qua ratio dubitandi est; quia finis ultimus simpliciter est ille, in quem homo dirigit se, et omnia sua: ergo impossibile est, ut cum tali fine simul intendatur alius, qui sit ultimus, etiam secundum quid tantum et negative. Patet consequentia, quia vel ille finis ordinatur ad alium finem, qui dicitur ultimus simpliciter, vel non; primum, ergo jam ille non est ultimus, etiam negative, cum ordinetur ad alium; si secundum, ergo alter non est finis ultimus simpliciter, cum non omnia ordinentur in ipsum. Confirmatur primo, quia de ratione finis ultimi simpliciter est, ut sit bonum sufficiens: ergo impossibile est appetere cum illo aliud bonum non propter ipsum, quando tunc jam non censeretur ipsum per se sufficiens. Et confirmatur secundo, quia necesse est hominem operari omnia propter ultimum finem simpliciter, ut divus Thomas hic docet, artic. 6; ergo fieri non potest ut cum tali fine intendatur alius, qui sit ultimus negative.

1. Only this comparison remains to be made by in which there is a reason for doubting. Because the unqualifiedly ultimate end is that to which a human being directs himself and all his actions. Therefore, it is impossible that with such an end another which is ultimate is intended at the same time, even [if ultimate only] qualifiedly and negatively. The consequence is clear because either that end is ordered to another end, which is called unqualifiedly ultimate or not. If the first, then that end is now not ultimate, even negatively, since it is ordered to another. If the second, then the other is not an unqualifiedly ultimate end, since not everything is ordered to it.

The reason for doubting for the negative side.

Confirm. 1.

Confirm. 2

2. In contrarium est, quia justus, qui venialiter peccat, habet Deum pro ultimo fine simpliciter, et tamen in objecto venialis constituit finem ultimum secundum quid. Propter quam difficultatem præsertim mota est hæc quæ-

It is confirmed, firstly, because it is of the nature of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that it is a sufficient good. Therefore, it is impossible to desire along with it another good that is not for its sake, since then it would not be thought itself *per se* sufficient. And it is confirmed, secondly, because it is necessary that a human being do everything for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end, as St. Thomas teaches here in art. 6.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it cannot happen that along with such an end another end is intended that is negatively ultimate.

The first confirmation.

The second confirmation.

Ratio pro affir.  
parte.

2. It is to the contrary, because the just person who sins venially holds God for the unqualifiedly ultimate end and yet constitutes his qualifiedly ultimate end in the venial object. This question is especially provoked because of this difficulty. Indeed, with this not standing in the

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Reason for the affirmative side.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>ST IaIIæ.1.6.

Quorundam resolution.	25	25R	way, many Thomists think that it is not possible that a human being at the same time intend two ultimate ends—even in the way stated—because of the reason posited in the beginning. And therefore they try to find a way in which they can defend that the person sinning venially holds God for the ultimate end even in the very act of venial sin. They say, therefore, that in that act the just person acts for the sake of God, at least habitually.	A resolution of these issues.
Improbatur hæc resolutio.	30	30R		
	35	35R	But this, as is clear from what was said above, can be understood in two ways. First, properly, such that the just person really through some act of his refers the venial sin to God, at least by that universal intention by which he refers all his actions to God. And understood in this way this view is obviously false, because a venial sin is not referable in this way to God and it would be contrary to divine honour to refer a venial sin to God in this way because it would declare the venial sin to please God. And, therefore, since that relation to God is made universal of every action, either a suitable division ought to be understood, namely, of everything which is apt to be referred to God, or, surely, if the just person sometimes held a general practice absolutely and unqualifiedly of acting for the sake of God, he (when afterwards he sins venially) changes from the part of the earlier practice and is not constant in it.	This resolution is disproven.
	40	40R		
	45	45R	Secondly, this view can be understood improperly, because, namely, with the venial sin there can be at the same time a turning of the one habitually acting to God as ultimate end and this, whatever the way of speaking is, is true by the thing itself. Nevertheless, thus is not explained that something is the ultimate end of that action of venial sin, because, as I said above in dist. 2, q. 4, n. 2, that habitual relation is not of the action but of the subject, nor does it inform in any way the action itself but only accompanies it. Therefore, through this alone is not explained which end the action itself has or which end the one acting has in such an act when it is not referred to God.	
	50	50R		
Quid alii resoluant.	55	55R	3. Medina responds that the just person refers the act of venial sin to him himself and because he himself refers habitually to God through an act of charity; consequently the very act of venial sin for that reason refers [to God]. But this is not rightly said nor does it satisfy. First, because the one acting does not refer the venial sin and its object to himself except as to a <i>finis cui</i> . Moreover, this relation does not exclude the nature of an ultimate end, as I have often said.	How others resolve it.
Impugnantur.	60	60R	Finally, because although the person is referred habitually to God,	They are opposed.
	60			

in Deum, non sequitur quidquid inest personæ, referri etiam habitualiter in Deum: nam quod est illicitum, nullo modo est medium tendendi ad Deum; et ideo licet persona secundum se referatur, non tamen ut est finis peccati venialis, alias posset etiam actualiter referri peccatum veniale in Deum, quia potest justus actu referre se ipsum in Deum, ut ultimum finem, et tamen venialiter actu peccare per aliquem locum, et vanam complacentiam concomitantem, et e contrario potest venialiter peccare propter alium, qui sit in peccato mortali referendo in ipsum tanquam in finem cui ipsum veniale peccatum absque alia relatione in ulteriorem finem a se, vel ab alio, propter quem operatur, intentum.

Verior resolutio,  
per conclusionem  
affirmantem.

4. Dicendum ergo existimo, nullam esse repugnantiam quod aliquis simul intendat unum finem ultimum simpliciter respectu personæ operantis, et tamen quod in aliquo opere sistet in aliquo fine; qui sit ultimus negative, seu secundum quid solum respectu talis operis. Hoc probat sufficienter exemplum adductum de homine justo peccante venialiter; imo idem fere procedit in homine existente in peccato mortali, nam ille etiam potest venialiter peccare, et per talem actum non constituit ultimum finem simpliciter in creatura, nec refert illum in finem peccati mortalis, alias in eo etiam actu mortaliter peccaret. Item, fieri potest simile argumentum de infideli idololatra, qui retulit omnia sua opera in idolum, tanquam in ultimum finem, et tamen postea absque ulla memoria illius finis, eleemosynam facit ductus honestate naturali, ille enim tunc bene moraliter operatur juxta sanam et certam doctrinam, non ergo refert illud opus in idolum tanquam in finem ultimum: sistit ergo ejus intentio in objecto illius operis per se bono et amabili, tanquam in fine ultimo, saltem negative, licet operans habitu retineat alium finem ultimum simpliciter. Ratio autem est, quia in hoc nulla est repugnantia ex parte ipsorum objectorum seu finium, et alioquin voluntas est libera ad operandum pro ut voluerit. Antecedens patet, quia non est necesse ut intentio finis ultimi simpliciter informet omnes alios actus hominis habentis

Probatur  
exemplo.

Alterum  
exemplum.

Ratio.

75  
80  
85  
90  
95

65R

70R

75R

80R

85R

90R

95R

it does not follow that whatever is in the person is also referred habitually to God. For what is unlawful in no way is a means of tending to God. And therefore although the person with respect to himself is referred [to God], yet nevertheless not so that God is the end of the venial sin. Otherwise, the venial sin could also be actually referred to God, because the just person can actually refer himself to God as ultimate end, and yet actually venially sin through some place and some vain concomitant complacency. And, contrariwise, he can venially sin for the sake of someone else who is in mortal sin by referring the venial sin itself to the other person as to a *finis cui*, apart from any other relation to a further end intended by him or the other person for whose sake he acts.

4. Therefore, I think it should be said that there is no repugnance in someone at the same time intending one unqualifiedly ultimate end with respect to the person acting and yet that in some action he will stop in some end which is ultimate negatively or qualifiedly only with respect to such an action. The example that was brought up concerning the just human who sins venially sufficiently shows this. Indeed, almost the same thing happens in the case of the human existing in mortal sin, for he can also sin venially. And through such an action he does not constitute [his] unqualifiedly ultimate end in a created thing, nor does he refer that to the end of the mortal sin. Otherwise, he would actually mortally sin in that as well.

Also, a similar argument can be made concerning the infidel idolater, who referring all his actions to the idol as to an ultimate end, and yet afterwards without any memory of that end gives alms, having been led by natural moral goodness (*honestate*). For he in that case he acts morally well according to sound and reliable doctrine. Therefore, that action does not refer to the idol as to an ultimate end. Therefore, his intention stops in the *per se* good and lovable object of that action as in an ultimate end, at least negatively, although the one acting habitually retains another unqualifiedly ultimate end.

The reason, moreover, is because there is no repugnance in this on the part of the objects themselves or of the ends and, besides, the will is free to act as it wills. The antecedent is clear, because it is not necessary that the intention of an unqualifiedly ultimate end inform every other act

A better  
resolution,  
through  
affirming the  
conclusion.  
It is proved by  
example.

Another  
example.

By reason.

72 relatione ] ratione V.

84 peccaret ] peccare V.

		talem intentionem; quod facilius patebit respondendo rationi dubitandi positæ in principio.		of the human being having such an intention, which will be more clear in responding to the argument for doubting posited in the beginning.	
Ad rationem dubitandi in num. 1.	100	5. Ad quam sic respondetur, non esse de ratione ultimi finis simpliciter, ut qui illum intendit, omnia opera sua actu referat in ipsum, sed satis est quod hoc sit debitum ipsi ultimo fini; si verum sit, et cum dignitate et proportionem appetatur: nam alioqui ut operans dicatur intendere	100R	5. To this I respond that it is not of the nature of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that he who intends it actually refers all his actions to it; it is enough that this is owed to the ultimate end itself, if it is true and is desired with dignity and proportion. For otherwise it is enough so that the one acting is said to intend such an end that he loves nothing that	To the reason for doubting in n. 1.
	105	talem finem, satis est, ut nihil amet, quod illi repugnet simpliciter, et quod absolute intendat adhibere media necessaria ad <col. b> consequendum illum, cum qua intentione stare potest ut in tali opere habeat levem inordinationem respectu	105R	opposes it and that he absolutely intends to employ all necessary means for its attainment, since with that intention he can stand so that in such an action he has a fickle inordination with respect to such an end to the extent that he does not tend to it through such an action.	
Discrimen inter mortale et veniale.	110	talis finis, quatenus per tale opus in illum non tendit. Unde obiter notari potest differentia quædam inter mortale et veniale, quod per mortale simpliciter deserit homo ultimum finem suum, quia aliquod bonum illi absolute præfert: per veniale autem non deserit ipsum finem, sed solum non quærit illum per talem actum. Unde ad primam confirmationem respondetur, finem ultimum simpliciter intendi ut bonum sufficiens, postquam sit consecutus: tamen quamdiu non est comparatus, potest homo aliquid aliud bonum amare extra illum finem: quod quidem licet sit inordinatum, quando ille ultimus finis est verus et debitus, non tamen est impossibile, quia non est necesse, ut qui intendit aliquod bonum, ut sufficiens in omni actu suo, illud inquiret. Secunda confirmatio petit sequentem quæstionem, ubi expeditur.	110R	Whence, by the way, a certain difference between mortal and venial can be noted: through a mortal [sin] a human being unqualifiedly deserts his ultimate end, because he absolutely prefers some good to it. But through a venial [sin] he does not desert the end itself, but only does not seek it through such an act.	A distinction between mortal and venial.
Ad 1. confir. <i>ibid.</i>	115		115R	Whence is responded to the first confirmation that the unqualifiedly ultimate end is intended as a sufficient good after it has been achieved. Nevertheless, as long as it has not been gotten hold of, a human being can love some other good more than the end. This indeed—although it is inordinate, since that ultimate end is true and owed—is, nevertheless, not impossible, because it is not necessary that someone who intends some good as sufficient in all his actions inquire into it. The second confirmation aims at the following question, where it will be cleared up.	To the 1st confirmation in n. 1.
Ad 2. quid?	120		120R		How to respond to the 2nd confirmation?