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DE FINE HOMINIS DISP. 3, SECT. 2¹

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<28, col. a>²

Utrum possit homo intendere in suis operationibus duos ultimos fines particulares tantum.

Whether one can intend in his actions two particular ultimate ends as such.

Arguitur primo
pro parte neg.

1. Ratio dubii est primo, quia fieri non potest ut ejusdem effectus dentur duæ causæ totales ejusdem rationis et ordinis: ergo neque fieri potest, ut in voluntate dentur duo fines ultimi, et inter se non subordinati, qui voluntatem moveant. Probatur consequentia, quia alias uterque finis esset causa totalis in suo ordine: nam si essent tantum particulares, jam non essent duo, sed ex utroque conflaretur unus finis: nos autem agimus de finibus totalibus, ita ut unusquisque sit sufficiens ad movendam voluntatem. Unde argumentor secundo, quia ultimis finis est primum motivum voluntatis, nam est primum in intentione: sed non potest voluntas simul, et æque primo moveri a duobus, tum quia sicut repugnat esse duo prima principia, ita etiam duo prima motiva: tum etiam, quia motivum voluntatis est illud, quo posito movetur voluntas, et sine quo non moveretur: nam, ut diximus, agimus de motivo totali: ergo repugnat hujusmodi motiva simul multiplicari. Tertio, non potest idem motus simul terminari ad duos terminos inter se non subordinatos: ergo nec motio voluntatis ad duos fines; nam finis etiam est terminus hujus motionis, et sicut motus specificatur a termino, ita motio voluntatis a fine, repugnat autem simul concurrere duo specificativa ejusdem motus. Quarto, fieri non potest ut ad eundem finem simul eligantur, vel applicentur duo media æque proxima, seu prima in executione,

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1. The reason for doubting is, first, because it is not able to happen that two complete causes of his reason and order are given for his effects. Therefore, it also cannot happen that two ultimate ends are given in the will, with no subordination between them, which move the will. The consequence is proven: because otherwise each end is the complete cause in accordance with its own order. For if they were such particulars, they would no longer be two but one end would be composed out of each. We, however, are discussing about complete ends, so that each one is sufficient to move the will. From which I argue secondly, because an ultimate end is the first stimulus³ of the will, for it is first in intention. But the will cannot be moved at the same time and equally firstly by two things. [This is] both because, just as there being two first principles is repugnant, so also there being two first stimuli [is repugnant], and also because the stimulus of the will is that by the positing of which the will is moved and without which it would not be moved. For, as we said, we are discussing about complete stimuli.⁴ Therefore, it is repugnant to multiply motives in this way. Thirdly, the same movement cannot at the same time be determined by two limits that are not subordinated between themselves. Therefore, neither is the motion of the will determined by two ends, for an end is also the goal of its motion and just as movement is specified by a limit, so motion of the will [is specified] by an end. It is repugnant, however, to run together at the same time two specifications of the same movement. Fourthly, it

It is argued,
firstly, for the
negative side.

Secondly.

Thirdly.

Fourthly.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³On 'primum motivum', see 'motivus' in *LSTA*.

⁴Note that before he said *de finibus totalibus* rather than *de motivo totali*.

Item ratione.	60 dicimus hominem simul intendere et scientiam, et temporale commodum, et non simul de utroque cogitet. Ratio vero conclusionis est, quia hujusmodi duo fines non habent inter se repugnantiam, quia uterque simul potest esse conveniens homini: ergo neque intentiones eorum inter se repugnant. Neque		moral and virtual simultaneity. In this way we say that a human at the same time intends both science and temporal advantage and does not think (<i>cogitet</i>) of either. But the reason for the conclusion is, because in this way the two ends are not repugnant to each other, because each can	And by reason.
Argumenta in n. 1 hui assertioni nec repugnant.	65 in eos procedunt argumenta facta, quia illæ intentiones sunt effectus diversi, et consequenter diversæ motiones: unde nihil repugnat quod a diversis principiis simul procedant, et ad diversos terminos tendant. Atque eadem est ratio de variis electionibus, seu operationibus propter hos fines, quia etiam illæ inter se non semper repugnant, et ad diversos terminos tendunt.	65R 70R	be agreeable to a human at the same time. Therefore, neither are intentions of them repugnant to each other. Neither do the arguments that were made proceed against them, because these intentions are different effects and consequently different motions. Hence, nothing is repugnant that proceeds at the same time from different principles and tends to different <i>termini</i> . And the same is the reason for various choices or actions on account of these ends, because even these are not always repugnant to each other, and tend to different <i>termini</i> .	The arguments in n. 1 are not repugnant to this assertion.
Quorundam Evasio præcluditur.	75 4. Sed dicunt alii utrumque istorum finium ordinari ad ipsum operantem, et ita illum esse finem ultimum utriusque. Sed hoc imprimis non est ad rem, quia operans non est finis <29> <i>cujus gratia</i> , sed <i>cui</i> ; finis autem <i>cui</i> non tollit, quin <i>finis cuius</i> sit ultimus in suo ordine, si ad aliud in eodem ordine non referatur, et hoc modo nunc agimus de fine ultimo, quandoquidem etiam finis ultimus simpliciter potest appeti amanti tanquam <i>finem cui</i> . Deinde non est in universum verum, nam potest homo simul intendere finem aliquem sibi acquirendum, et alium acquirendum amico in illo sistendo tanquam in fine <i>cui</i> .	75R 80R	4. But others say that each of these ends is ordered to the agent himself and thus he is the ultimate end for each. But this, in the first place, is not to the point, because the agent is not the <i>finis cuius</i> but the <i>finis cui</i> . The <i>finis cui</i> , moreover, does not do anything, unless the <i>finis cuius</i> is ultimate in its order, if it is not directed towards something in the same order. And in this way now we are dealing with the ultimate end, seeing that the unqualifiedly ultimate end can also be desired by a lover as a <i>finis cui</i> . Next, it is not universally true, for a human can at the same time intend some end to be acquired by him and another to be acquired by a friend, stopping in him as in a <i>finis cui</i> .	The evasion of certain people is avoided.
Aliorum Evasio removetur.	85 5. Alii autem dicunt, quodcumque homo intendit hujusmodi duos fines particulares, semper eos intendere sub ratione unius aliquo modo, ut, verbi gratia, quatenus integrant absolutam perfectionem, seu hominis commoditatem, vel aliquid hujusmodi: et hoc insinuat D. Thomas, in illa quæst. 12, art. 3, ad 2. Respondetur, quod licet fortasse in re ipsa semper intercedat aliqua convenientia, vel unitas, quæ inter hujusmodi fines considerari potest, non est tamen necesse ut homo formaliter consideret, et intendat hanc unitatem, sed potest absolute velle hoc, et illud bonum propter se amabile, non con-	85R 90R	5. Others, however, say that whenever a human being intends two particular ends in this way, he always intends them under the concept of one in some way: for example, to the extent that they integrate absolute perfection or the advantage of the agent, or something of this sort. And St. Thomas suggests this in [ST] IaIIae.12.3 ad 2. ⁶ I respond that although perhaps in the thing itself there always intervenes some agreeability or unity which can be considered between ends of this sort, it is not, nevertheless, necessary that a human being formally consider and intend this unity. Rather, he can absolutely will this and that good lovable in itself, not by bringing them together nor between them nor	The evasion of others is removed.

⁶Ad secundum dicendum quod unius motus possunt ex una parte esse plures termini, si unus ad alium ordinetur, sed duo termini ad invicem non ordinati, ex una parte, unius motus esse non possunt. Sed tamen considerandum est quod id quod non est unum secundum rem, potest accipi ut unum secundum rationem. Intentio autem est motus voluntatis in aliquid præordinatum in ratione, sicut dictum est. Et ideo ea quæ sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum, sicut ad sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata; vel quia aliqua duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum. Puta acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul hæc duo intendat.

ferendo illa nec inter se, nec secundum aliquam rationem, in qua conveniunt. Unde licet interpretative possit dici homo intendere in singulis finibus integrum commodum, seu bonum, non tamen proprie et formali intentione, ut latius sectione ultima hujus Disputationis. Quæ responsio applicanda etiam est ad ultimum argumentum supra factum, quod maxime posset procedere contra hanc assertionem.

6. Dicendum secundo: Etiam potest homo ordinare simul eadem media ad distinctos fines particulares ultimos negative, et inter se non subordinatos. Ita sumo ex D. Thoma, dicta quæst. 12, articulo 3, ubi optimum signum adducit, quia in eligendis mediis, cæteris paribus, illud medium anteponitur cæteris, quod ad plures fines utilius esse potest: si quis enim intendens sanitatem possit uti medicina, quo simul capiat delectationem, hanc eligit: intendit ergo simul sanitatem, et voluptatem per idem medium, quia utramque simul potest per illud comparare, et non est necesse ut unam ad alteram ordinet, cum utraque sit per se, et absque altera amabilis. Et hinc sumitur propria ratio conclusionis, nam voluntas potest simul intendere duos fines inter se non subordinatos, neque in ordine ad unum tertium, et idem medium potest reipsa esse utile ad utrumque consequendum: ergo potest voluntas propter utrumque finem idem medium <col. b> eligere. Probatur consequentia, quia neque ex parte voluntatis, neque ex parte ipsius objecti, est in homine aliqua repugnantia, quia objectum sub utraque ratione simul sumpta apparet convenientius et amabilius, et voluntas potest in utramque moveri et excitari. Quod evidentius fiet, solvendo argumenta initio facta post sequentem assertionem.

7. Dicendum tertio, quando voluntas eligit medium propter multos fines formaliter diversos in ea ratione boni sub qua movent, et inter se non subordinatos, sed proximos respectu electionis, tunc quamvis externum medium electum possit esse unum et idem, tamen interiores actus sunt diversi. Hæc conclusio potissimum probatur illa ratione, quam attigit divus

following some concept in which they agree. Hence, although one can be said interpretatively to intend in individual ends an integrated advantage or good, [this is] not, nevertheless, by a proper and formal intention, as [is discussed] more extensively in the last section of this disputation. This response is also applied to the last argument given above, which could especially proceed against this assertion.

6. A human being can also order at the same time the same means to distinct negatively ultimate particular ends that are not subordinated to each other. Thus I take up from St. Thomas, in the previously mentioned [*ST IaIIae*].12.3, where the best evidence is adduced, because in choosing means that means is preferred to others, *ceteris paribus*, which can be useful for more ends.⁷ For if anyone intending health could make use of medicine by which he could at the same time receive delight, he would choose this. Therefore, he intends at the same time health and pleasure through the same means, because each can be established at the same time through it. And it is not necessary that one be ordered to another, since either is lovable in itself and apart from the other. And from here is taken the proper reason for the conclusion, for the will can at the same time intend two ends which are not subordinated to each other and are not ordered to one third thing, and the same means can in itself be useful for each end to be achieved. Therefore, the will can choose the same means for the sake of each end. The consequence is shown, because neither on the part of the will nor on the part of the object itself is there something repugnant in the human, because the object under each concept taken at the same time appears agreeable and lovable, and the will can be moved and stimulated by each. This will become more evident when the arguments made in the beginning after the following assertion are solved.

7. Third, it should be said, when the will chooses a means on account of multiple ends formally different in that aspect of the good under which they move and not subordinated between themselves but proximate with respect to being chosen, then although the external means chosen can be one and the same, nevertheless the interior acts are different. This conclusion is especially shown by that reason which

The second assertion, concerning ends through the same means. It is taken from St. Thomas.

Reason is added.

The third assertion.

Its proof.

⁷IaIIae.12.3 co.: *Si autem accipiantur duo ad invicem non ordinata, sic etiam simul homo potest plura intendere. Quod patet ex hoc, quod homo unum alteri praeeligit, quia melius est altero, inter alias autem condiciones quibus aliquid est melius altero, una est quod ad plura valet, unde potest aliquid praeeligi alteri, ex hoc quod ad plura valet. Et sic manifeste homo simul plura intendit.*

2. Assertio, de finibus per idem medium. Sumitur ex D. Thoma.

Accedit ratio.

3. Assertio.

Eius probatio.

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130 Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, articulo 3, argumento 3, quia finis dat
speciem actui interiori: non potest autem idem actus æque
primo et immediate constitui in duplici specie: ergo si est du-
plex finis, et motivum proprium, non erit idem actus, sed du-
plex, qui ex illius motione causatur. De qua re hic plura non
dicam, quia latius tractanda est infra tractatu 3.

Ad 1. argum. in
num. 1.

135 8. Argumenta igitur in principio facta, potissimum probant
hanc ultimam conclusionem, non vero procedunt contra alias.
Ad primum respondetur, quando voluntas movetur a duplici
fine duobus actibus internis intentionum vel electionum, jam
ibi reperiri duas causalitates seu motiones finis, et duos prox-
imos terminos, seu effectus earum, atque ita non dantur duæ
causæ totales unius effectus, sed plurium. Quin potius obiter
140 adnota respectu talium actuum magis repugnare dari duas
causas totales finales, quam duas efficientes, quia licet repugnet
dari duas efficientes totales respectu ejusdem actionis, non
tamen respectu ejusdem termini, quia causa efficiens est extrin-
seca, et non specificat terminum: at vero causæ finales repug-
nant tam respectu motionis, quam respectu actus, qui est veluti
145 terminus causalitatis voluntatis, quia dant speciem actui, et non
potest idem actus habere duas species æque primas: at vero re-
spectu actus, seu medii externi nulla est repugnantia, quod duo
fines simul concurrant, et moveant, quia, ut supra dixi, non
150 habent immediatum influxum in actum externum, sed in inter-
num, nec dant illi propriam speciem immediate, sed solum me-
diatè quasi per denominationem extrinsecam ab actu interno,
quoniam nihil repugnat constitui in duplici specie accidentaria
et extrinseca. <30>

Instantia ex nunc
dictis.

155 9. Dices, saltem hinc necessario sequi, quod in genere
causæ efficientis dentur duæ causæ totales ejusdem effectus,
quia actus interior voluntatis effective movet facultates interi-
ores ad actus externos: ergo si in voluntate est duplex actus, et
160 uterque eorum sufficit per se ad motionem externam efficien-
dam, et actu influit suo modo, jam actus externus procedit a

130R St. Thomas mentions in [*ST*] IaIIae.1.3 arg. 3,⁸ because the end gives
the species to the interior act. However, it cannot constitute the same
act equally primarily and immediately into two species. Therefore, if it
is a double end and proper motive, it will not be the same act, but dou-
ble, which is caused from the motion of that. Concerning this matter
I will not say more here because it is discussed more extensively below
in the third treatise.

135R 8. Therefore, the arguments made in the beginning chiefly prove
this last conclusion, but do not proceed against the others. I respond to
the first: when the will is moved by a double end to two internal acts
of intention or choice, two causalities or motions of the end are now
found there and two proximate *termini* or effects of them. Thus, two
complete causes of one effect are not given, but of more than one ef-
fect. In fact, rather, notice, by the way, that with respect to such acts it
is more repugnant to be given two entire final causes than two efficient
[causes], because although it is repugnant to be given two entire effi-
cient [causes] with respect to the same action, [it is] not [repugnant]
with respect to the same *terminus*, because an efficient cause is extrinsic
and does not specify the *terminus*. But final causes, on the other hand,
are not repugnant so much with respect to motion as with respect to
an act, which is just as a *terminus* of the causality of the will, because
they give species to the act and the same act cannot have two species
equally primarily. But with respect to the act or the external means,
on the other hand, there is no repugnance in two ends concurring and
moving at the same time, because, as I said above, they do not have an
immediate influx into an external act but into an internal [act], nor do
those give proper species immediately but only mediately, as it were,
through extrinsic denomination from the internal act, because there is
140R nothing repugnant in its constituting a double accidental and extrinsic
species.

145R 9. You may say that this at least follows: that two entire causes of
the same effect may be given in the genus of efficient causes, because
the interior act of the will effectively moves the interior faculty to ex-
ternal acts. Therefore, if in there are two acts and each of them suffices
in itself for an efficient external motion and actually gives influx in this
way, the external act now proceeds from two natural commanding or

Response to the
first argument in
n. 1.

Notice.

An objection
from what was
just said.

⁸*Praeterea, idem non potest esse nisi in una specie. Sed eundem numero actum contingit ordinari ad diversos fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem actibus humanis.*

Una dilutio.	<p>duplici principio naturali imperante, seu sufficiente. Respondetur primo, illos duos actus internos raro concurrere omnino simul physice, et in instanti, jam enim num. 3 notavi hanc simultatem non esse nobis necessariam ad ea, quæ tractamus,</p>	165R	<p>efficient principles. I respond, first, that those two internal acts seldom concur entirely at the same time physically and in an instant, for I already noted in n. 3 that this simultaneity is with us not necessary to that which we are discussing but suffices [to be] moral. Furthermore, if it may happen to be had at the same time, the same thing can be said that is customarily said concerning other physical causes: that, although each is sufficient in itself, nevertheless, when they are equally applied at the same time, neither acts by its complete strength and is necessary for the effect. Finally, in an effect of this sort nothing else is disagreeable, because this efficiency by which the will moves some lower power to its act does not exist except through a natural consensus of powers, by which it comes about that, such an act or willing having been placed in the appetite, the soul, in which all powers are rooted, is applied immediately to acting through another power. This can bring about equally well through one act or through more than one that the will is brought to such an object of external action.</p>	One solution.
Alter.	<p>165 sed sufficere moralem. Deinde, si contingat simul haberi, dici potest, quod de aliis causis physicis responderi solet, quod licet utraque per se sit sufficiens, tamen quando simul æque applicantur, neutram agere tota virtute sua, et necessaria ad effectum.</p>	170R	<p>170R applied at the same time, neither acts by its complete strength and is necessary for the effect. Finally, in an effect of this sort nothing else is disagreeable, because this efficiency by which the will moves some lower power to its act does not exist except through a natural consensus of powers, by which it comes about that, such an act or willing having been placed in the appetite, the soul, in which all powers are rooted, is applied immediately to acting through another power. This can bring about equally well through one act or through more than one that the will is brought to such an object of external action.</p>	Another.
Tertia.	<p>170 Denique in hujusmodi effectu nullum aliud est inconveniens, quia hæc efficientia, qua movet voluntas inferiorem aliquam potentiam ad suum actum non est nisi per naturalem consensum potentiarum, qua fit, ut posito in appetitu tali actu, seu voluntate, statim anima, in qua omnes potentiæ radican- 175 tur, applicetur ad operandum per aliam potentiam, quod facere potest æque bene, sive per unum, sive per plures actus feratur voluntas in tale objectum, seu actionem externam.</p>	175R	<p>10. And from here the solution to the second argument is easier: for there is nothing repugnant in giving two motives with respect to the same means or willed objects, provided that the internal motions of the will are different. Hence, in the divine will, whose act does not take up the species from an external object, not only can the thing be willed on account of two ends, but the same act can also be brought to such an object on account of each reason, because it comprehends everything in the most profound and eminent way. The third argument is also easily resolved from what has been said, for that proportion taken up from the motion and <i>terminus</i> of it, proceeds at most with respect to the internal act on account of the agreeability in the specification, but not with respect to external means, as was said. To the fourth argument, I respond that on the contrary it often happens that two means are chosen for the same end equally immediately and without subordination between them, so that if one will not have the effect, at least another may, or, if either will have it, they are thought so much the better. Wherefore if sometimes some two cannot be chosen at the same time, it can only be because they cannot be judged useful at the same time. And then the argument made analogous is not similar, because we are discussing [the case] when one means is judged at the same time useful for more than one end. The last argument was solved at the end of n. 5.</p>	A third.
Ad 2. ibid.	<p>10. Et hinc facilius est solutio ad secundum: nihil enim repugnat dari duo motiva respectu ejusdem medii, seu objecti voliti, dummodo motiones internæ voluntatis diversæ sint. Unde in voluntate divina, cujus actus non sumit speciem ex objecto externo, non solum res potest esse volita propter duplicem finem, sed etiam idem actus potest propter utramque rationem ferri ad tale objectum, quia altiori, et eminentiori modo omnia comprehendit. Tertium etiam ex dictis est facile, nam illa proportio sumpta ex moti et termino ejus, ad summum procedit respectu actus interni propter convenientiam in specificatione, non vero respectu medii externi, ut dictum est.</p>	180R	<p>10. And from here the solution to the second argument is easier: for there is nothing repugnant in giving two motives with respect to the same means or willed objects, provided that the internal motions of the will are different. Hence, in the divine will, whose act does not take up the species from an external object, not only can the thing be willed on account of two ends, but the same act can also be brought to such an object on account of each reason, because it comprehends everything in the most profound and eminent way. The third argument is also easily resolved from what has been said, for that proportion taken up from the motion and <i>terminus</i> of it, proceeds at most with respect to the internal act on account of the agreeability in the specification, but not with respect to external means, as was said. To the fourth argument, I respond that on the contrary it often happens that two means are chosen for the same end equally immediately and without subordination between them, so that if one will not have the effect, at least another may, or, if either will have it, they are thought so much the better. Wherefore if sometimes some two cannot be chosen at the same time, it can only be because they cannot be judged useful at the same time. And then the argument made analogous is not similar, because we are discussing [the case] when one means is judged at the same time useful for more than one end. The last argument was solved at the end of n. 5.</p>	[Response] to the 2nd [argument from n. 1.]
Ad 3.	<p>185 Ad quartum respondetur imo sæpe accidere ut duo media eligantur ad eundem finem æque immediate, et sine subordinatione inter se, ut si unum non habuerit effectum, saltem aliud habeat, vel si utrumque habuerit, tanto existimantur melius. Quare si interdum aliqua duo non possunt simul eligi, solum esse potest, quia non possunt judicari simul utilia; et tunc argumentum proportionale factum non est <col. b> simile, quia nos tractamus quando unum medium simul judicatur utile ad plures fines. Ultimum argumentum solutum est in fine, num. 5.</p>	185R	<p>To the 3rd.</p>	To the 3rd.
Ad 4.	<p>190 Quare si interdum aliqua duo non possunt simul eligi, solum esse potest, quia non possunt judicari simul utilia; et tunc argumentum proportionale factum non est <col. b> simile, quia nos tractamus quando unum medium simul judicatur utile ad plures fines. Ultimum argumentum solutum est in fine, num. 5.</p>	190R	<p>To the 4th.</p>	To the 4th.
Ad 5.	<p>195</p>	195R	<p>To the 5th.</p>	To the 5th.
		200R		