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DE FINE HOMINIS DISP. 2, SECT. 4¹

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Quot modis contingat voluntatem hominis operari propter finem.

In how many ways it happens that the will of a human being acts for the sake of an end.

Modus
quadruplex
operandi propter
finem.

1. Absolvimus priorem partem earum duarum quas initio Disputationis proposuimus, superest, ut expeditamus hanc posteriorem, quæ visa est hoc loco necessaria, ut expeditior sit via ad ea, quæ postea tractanda sunt, et, ut sæpe dixi, non est sermo de operatione propter finem communem agentibus naturalibus, sed de modo proprio hominis, qui in plures alios distinguui solet: et potest ad quatuor tantum revocari. Dicitur enim homo operari propter finem, vel habitualiter, vel actualiter, vel virtualiter, vel tantum interpretative, quæ oportet breviter explicare. Actualiter dicitur voluntas operari propter finem quando actu movetur a fine, unde ad hunc modum operandi imprimis requiritur actualis cognitio, et cogitatio de ipso fine, quia nisi sit actualiter apprehensus, non potest actualiter movere. Deinde requiritur actualis motio voluntatis, vel in ipsum finem, vel in alium propter ipsum, quia hoc significat actualis operatio propter finem. Posset tamen hoc loco quæri an in hoc modo operandi requiratur actualis intentio finis propter se ipsum, vel sufficiat actualis electio, vel usus propter finem actu et distincte cognitum: sed hæc quæstio infra tractanda est cum dicetur de intentione et electione, et statim aliquid attingam agendo de tertio modo operandi.

Primus modus
per relationem
actualem.

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1. We have taken care of the first part of those two which we proposed at the beginning of the disputation.³ Resolving the latter [part], which seemed necessary in this place so that the way to those matters which are to be discussed afterwards is less encumbered, remains. And, as I have often pointed out, the discussion is not about action for the sake of the end generally by natural agents, but about human beings' proper way [of acting for the sake of an end], which is usually divided into several different ways. Only four ways can be recalled. For it is said that a human being acts for the sake of the end either habitually, actually, virtually, or only interpretatively, which must be explained briefly. The will is said to act actually for the sake of the end when it is actually moved by the end. Hence, for this way of acting, actual cognition and thought about the end itself is especially required, because [the end] cannot actually move [the will] unless it is actually apprehended. Next, an actual motion of the will, either to the end itself or to something else for the sake of it, is required, because this signifies an actual action for the sake of the end. Nevertheless, one may ask here whether in this way of acting an actual intention for the end for the sake of it itself is required or whether an actual choice or a use for the sake of the end actually and distinctly cognized suffices. But this question should be discussed below when intention and choice are discussed; I will say something [about it] shortly in dealing with the third way of acting.⁴

Four ways of
acting for the
sake of the end.

The first way is
through an actual
relation.

¹Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³1.2.proem.

⁴Cf. 1.3.5. Or is Suárez referring to the material in *De Voluntario et Involuntario* disp. 6 and 8? He Also makes extensive references to these relations in *De Bonitate* disp. 6, sect. 5.

2. modus per
relationem
habitualement
quo
pacto ab
aliquibus
explicetur.

25 2. Quid vero sit operari habitualiter, non omnes eodem modo exponunt: aliqui hoc explicant ratione cuiusdam concomitantiae habitus concomitantis operationem in eadem voluntate seu subjecto, ita ut dicatur homo operari habitualiter propter aliquem finem, quando operatur propter aliquod objectum retinendo habitum inclinantem ad alium finem, quamvis relatio hujus habitus nullo modo cadat in hujusmodi operationem, nec referat illam in horum finem, sed solum ipsum <col. b> hominem seu voluntatem operantem. Hunc modum significat D. Thomas 2, 2, quæst. 24, art. 10, et 1, 2, quæst. 88, art. 1, ad 2, et quæst. 3, de Malo; quod exemplo explicatur: nam hoc modo dici solet justus, etiam dum venialiter peccat, habitualiter operari propter Deum, non quia ipsum opus peccati ab eo referatur in Deum, sed quia simul cum illo opere retinet habitualement relationem ipsius personæ, vel voluntatis in Deum ut finem ultimum, et quia opus ex se non excludit hanc relationem, atque eodem modo infidelis, qui habitualiter habet idolum pro fine, etiam dum facit opus honestum justitiæ et misericordiæ, dicitur habitualiter operari propter idolum. Ex quibus exemplis et ex re ipsa constat hunc modum esse valde improprium, quia, ut dixi, et Cajetanus notat, loco citato in 2, 2, hæc habitualis relatio non cadit in ipsum opus, quia nec per actum præsentem, nec per aliquem præcedentem refertur hujusmodi actus in illum finem, nec ab illo sumit aliquam entitatem, vel proprietatem physicam, vel moralem; imo nullo modo interdum referibilis est in illum finem, ut constat de veniali: ergo tota illa relatio habitualis solius subjecti, unde potius potest dici operari cum relatione habituali ad talem finem, quam operari proprie propter talem finem.

Non placet hæc
explicatio
relationis
habitualement.

Altera explicatio
accommodatur.

3. Alio ergo modo explicatur hæc relatio habitualis, quando censetur relicta ex aliquo actu præcedenti, per quem illud opus vel in particulari, vel saltem sub generalitate relatum est in talem finem, licet quando fit illud opus præcedens actus, seu relatio, nullo modo sit nec actualiter, nec in aliqua virtute, quam reliquerit, ut per eam influat in opus, sed mere habitualiter, quia illa intentio semel habita, retractata non fuit,

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2. But not everyone explains in the same way what acting habitually is. Some explain it by reason of a certain attendance of a habit attending the action to the same things by the will or subject, so that it is said that a human acts habitually for the sake of some end when he acts for the sake of some object while retaining a habit inclining to another end, although the relation of this habit in no way ends in action of this kind nor refers it to the end of these, but only [refers] the human or acting will itself. St. Thomas signifies this way in [ST] IIaIIæ.24.10 and IaIIæ.88.1 ad 2 and in *De Malo*, q. 3. It is explained by example: for in this way it is commonly said that the just person, even while he sins venially, habitually acts for the sake of God, not because the work of sin itself is referred by that to God, but because at the same time with that work he retains a habitual relation of the person himself or the will to God as ultimate end and because the work by itself does not exclude this relation. And in the same way the infidel who habitually has an idol for the end, even while he performs an honest work of justice and mercy, is said to act habitually for the sake of the idol. From these examples and from the matter itself it is clear that this way is very improper, because, as I said and as Cajetan observes in the cited place in IIaIIæ, this habitual relation does not end in the work itself, because neither through the present act nor through some preceding [act] is an action of this kind referred to that end, nor does it take some entity, either a physical or moral property, from that. Indeed, in no way is it sometimes referable to that end, as is clear concerning the venial [sin]. Therefore, that entire habitual relation [is] of the subject alone. Hence, it is better to say that he acts with a habitual relation to such an end than that he acts, strictly speaking, for the sake of such an end.

The second way is through a habitual relation where it is explained by composition from others.

This explanation of the habitual relation is not satisfying.

The other explanation is more suitable.

⁵Cf. 3.5.4.

60 ut, verbi gratia, retulit quis summo mane omnia opera Dei
 in Deum, postea vero in discursu Dei operatur aliquid referibile
 65 de se in Deum, tamen sine illa memoria prioris intentionis,
 et sine ullo influxu actuali, vel virtuali, tunc dicitur ille
 homo habitualiter operari propter Deum, propter relationem
 habitu relictam ex priori intentione habita, et non retractata.
 70 Quem modum insinuare videtur D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1,
 art. 6 ad 3, et quæst. 2, disputata de virtutibus, art. 11, ad 2,
 quamvis hæc loca possunt intelligi de relatione virtuali statim
 explicanda: nam D. Thomas sæpe relationem virtualem vocat
 habitualem, et nunquam satis distinguit; inter has tamen ex dic-
 75 tis constabit esse aliquam distinctionem: nam in hoc modo, de
 quo nunc agimus, finis nec actu influit, quia, <25> ut supponimus,
 nec actu cogitatur, nec actu movetur; nec etiam virtualiter
 influit, quia etiam supponimus ex priori intentione nihil esse
 80 in homine relictum, quod nunc conferat ad præsentem operationem,
 sed ita se habere hominem in modo operandi, ac si prior actus
 non præcessisset: est ergo huiusmodi relatio mere habitua-
 lis, de qua non parva quæstio est, an conferat operi aliquam
 moralem conditionem, aut valorem, aut in ordine ad meritum,
 vel ad satisfactionem, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quæ in locis
 propriis tractanda sunt.

3. Modus per relationem virtua-
 lelem.

Vna conditio ad relationem
 virtua-
 lelem.

Alter.

Tertia.

4. Circa tertium modum operandi, scilicet virtualiter propter finem, notandum esse veluti medium inter præcedentes, quia nec requirit actualiter influxum propter finem ut primus, nec omnino nullum ut secundus: sed requirit aliquem influxum per aliquam virtutem relictam ex priori intentione: difficile vero est circa hunc modum dicere, quid sit hæc virtus, et imprimis sumo ad hunc modum necessarium esse ut præcesserit actualis cognitio et intentio talis finis, quia alias nihil esset, unde illa virtus fuisset relictæ. Deinde oportet ut talis intentio non sit retractata per contrariam intentionem, quia
 90 alias hæc contraria intentio destruxisset virtutem relictam per priorem intentionem. Tertio, necessarium est ut duret effectus

60R not retracted, as, for example, someone who had referred at the end of the morning every work of God to God, but afterwards in thinking of God he does something referable of itself to God, yet without that memory of his prior intention and without any actual or virtual influence, then that human being is said to act habitually for the sake of God, on account of a remaining relation of habit resulting from an intention that was held previously and has not been retracted. St. Thomas seems to suggest this way in [ST] IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3 and in DQV q. 2, art. 11, ad 2, although these places can be understood as concerning the virtual relations that will be explained shortly. For St. Thomas often calls a virtual relation ‘habitual’ and never makes a satisfactory distinction. Yet from what has been said it will be clear that there is some distinction between these. For in this way of which we are talking now the end does not actually influence, because, as we suppose, it is neither actually cognized nor does it actually move. Nor does it virtually influence, because we also suppose that nothing remains in the human from the prior intention that now directs to the present action, but he holds himself thus and [would even] if the prior act had not preceded. Therefore, a relation of this sort is merely habitual, concerning which it is not a trivial question, whether it directs on the act some moral condition or value or in order for merit or for satisfaction or something of this sort, which should be discussed in the proper places.

4. About the third way of acting, namely, virtually for the sake of the end, it should be noted that it is, as it were, a middle between the preceding [two], because it neither requires an actual influx for the sake of the end as the first way does nor entirely nothing as the second one does. Rather, it requires some influx through some remaining force (*virtus*) from a prior intention.⁶ But it is difficult to say concerning this way what this force is. In the first place, I assume that it is necessary for this way of acting that there have been actual cognition and intention for such an end. Otherwise, there would not be anything from which that force could remain. Next, it is necessary that such an intention not be retracted through a contrary intention. Otherwise, this contrary intention would destroy the force remaining from the prior intention.

The third way is through a virtual relation.

One condition for a virtual relation.

A second condition.

⁶Cf. DM XIX.8.20: ‘And for this reason it is commonly said that every intention of a particular end is a virtual choice of happiness, a choice that does not always have to be preceded by an elicited intention of happiness itself; rather, a natural and necessary propensity [for happiness] suffices’ (*Atque hac ratione dici solet omnem intentionem finis particularis esse virtualem electionem felicitatis, ad quam non semper est necesse ut præcedat intentio elicita ipsius felicitatis, sed sufficit naturalis ac necessaria propensio*). Also cf. DM XXIV.2.15.

95 aliquis relictus ex priori intentione, ut ab illo procedat aliquo
modo opus, quod dicitur postea fieri virtualiter propter talem
finem. Quis autem sit hic effectus aliter videtur explicandum
100 respectu actuum externorum, aliter respectu actus interni ip-
sius voluntatis: potest enim actus exterior fieri propter finem
absque actuali cogitatione, et intentione finis. Exemplum vul-
gare est quando quis iter agit, quod incipit propter aliquem
105 finem, in ipso vero actuali progressu non semper recordatur
ipsius finis: imo nec interdum recordatur ipsius incessus, vel
motus: et idem contingit in celebratione Missæ ex priori in-
tentione: tunc ergo virtus relicta ex priori intentione nihil
aliud esse videtur, quam applicatio ipsius potentiæ executivæ
110 ad actualem operationem externam, quæ durat et continuat in
ipso effectu quamdiu non cessat omnino ab actione, nec per
contrariam voluntatem suspenditur actus, et licet contingat ac-
tiones externas variari, tamen quia uni in mente succedit altera,
una etiam excitat ad alteram, et hoc modo virtus interior cense-
115 tur durare in ipso effectu. At vero, quando actio <col. b> ex-
terna omnino interrupta fuit, verbi gratia, per somnum, vel
quid huiusmodi, tunc necesse est actum voluntatis quasi de
novo inchoari; et quoniam voluntatis actus esse non potest sine
cognitione intellectus, ideo ex parte illius videtur commode
120 exponi hæc virtus relicta ex priori intentione, quia nimirum
ex præcedenti intentione, apprehensione, consultatione, et alii
similibus actibus factum est ut potentia, proposito tali objecto,
verbi gratia, quod iter sit agendum, statim repræsentatur ut ex-
equendum absque alta motione, seu speciali consideratione il-
lius, seu finis, ad quem ordinatur: hoc modo statim voluntas
125 exequitur id, quod proponitur, et incipit illo medio uti, quod
proximum est, seu quod tunc occurrit primo exequendum, et
sic recte dicitur virtualiter operari propter finem.

4. Modus
operandi propter
finem
interpretative.

5. Circa quartum modum, quem vocavimus interpretative
operari propter finem, advertendum est, interdum voluntatem
intendere aliquod objectum, in quo sistit ex vi consideratio-
nis et hujus actualis motionis; tamen illa res intenta natura sua

95R Thirdly, it is necessary that some effect remain from the prior inten-
tion, so that the work which is said afterwards to come to be virtually
for the sake of such an end proceeds from it in some way.⁷ What this ef-
fect is, however, seems to need to be explained differently in the case of
external acts than in the case of internal acts of the will itself. For an ex-
ternal act can happen for the sake of the end apart from actual thought
and intention of the end. A common example is when someone goes on
a journey that he begins for the sake of some end but which end he does
not constantly think of during the actual progress. Indeed, not even the
walking or motion itself is always in mind. The same thing happens in
the celebration of the Mass by a prior intention. Therefore, in this case
the force remaining from a prior intention seems to be nothing other
100R than the application of the executive power itself to an actual external
action, which endures and continues to the same effect as long as it does
not entirely cease from action and the action is not suspended through
a contrary will. And although the external actions happen to vary, nev-
ertheless because one succeeds another in the mind, one also incites to
another, and in this way the interior force is thought to endure in the
effect itself. But, on the other hand, when an external action has been
entirely interrupted, for example, through sleep or something of this
sort, then it is necessary that the act of will start anew, as it were. And
because there cannot be an act of the will without cognition of the in-
tellect, therefore for its part this force seems to be explained agreeably
105R through a prior intention. For without doubt it was made from a pre-
ceding intention, apprehension, deliberation, and other similar acts as
a power, so that once such an object (e.g., that one should go on a jour-
ney) has been proposed, it is immediately represented as needing to be
done without any deep motion or special consideration of it or the end
to which it is ordered. In this way the will immediately carries out that
which is proposed and begins to use the means which are proximate or
which then occur first in the carrying out. And thus he is rightly said
to act virtually for the sake of the end.

5. About the fourth way, which we call interpretatively acting for
the sake of the end, it should be noted that sometimes the will intends
some object in which the force of one's consideration and actual mo-
tion ceases. Yet that intended thing by its nature is carried along and

A third
condition.

The fourth way
of acting for the
sake of an end is
interpretative.

⁷Cf. 3.5.4.

130 fertur, et ordinatur in alium finem: tunc ergo voluntas dicitur
 proprie, et quasi explicitè intendere finem sibi propositum: in-
 135 terpretative vero dicitur intendere ulteriorem finem, ad quem
 finis priori modo intentus natura sua fertur: et ad hunc modum
 is, qui operatur honeste propter bonitatem misericordiæ aut
 justitiæ, nihil de Deo cogitans, aut de alio fine, dicitur operari
 propter Deum, vel propter beatitudinem, et implere illud 135R
 Pauli, 1 Corin. 10: *Omnia, in gloriam Dei facite*, quia videlicet
 ipsum bonum honestum quod intenditur, natura sua fertur in
 Deum, et est medium, quo tenditur ad beatitudinem. Et ideo
 licet homo actu suo non intendat illum finem ulteriorem, dic-
 140 itur operari propter illud interpretative, quod alii vocant operari
 propter finem ex natura ipsius operis potius quam ex intentione
 operantis, de quo modo operandi occurrent plura in
 sequenti disputatione.

ordered to another end.⁸ Therefore, in this case the will is said properly and explicitly, as it were, to intend the end proposed to it. But it is said to intend interpretatively the more ultimate end to which the end intended in the former way by its nature is brought. And in this way he who acts honestly for the sake of the goodness of mercy or justice, thinking nothing of God or of another end, is said to act for the sake of God or for the sake of happiness and to satisfy that [statement] of Paul in 1 Cor. 10[:31], ‘Do all things for the glory of God’, because, that is to say, the *bonum honestum* itself that is intended is brought by its nature to God and is a means by which one is directed to happiness. And for this reason even though a human being does not intend that more ultimate end by his own act, he is said to act for its sake interpretatively. Others call this acting for the sake of the end by the nature of the act itself rather than by the intention of the one acting. Numerous [references] to this way of acting will occur in the following disputation.⁹

⁸Cf. Aquinas’s use of ‘interpretative’ in *ST* IIaIIæ.97.1 co.

⁹E.g., 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.2.5, 3.3.12–13, 3.6.2, and 3.6.4.