

<6><sup>2</sup>

*Utrum finis exerceat causalitatem suam sub ratione boni cogniti.*

*Whether an end exercises its causality under the aspect of cognized good.*

Explicuimus causalitatem finis et effectum ejus: sequitur ut dicamus de ratione causandi, seu de virtute, per quam causat. De qua duo sunt certa, circa quæ alia erunt dubitanda et explicanda.

We explicated the causality of the end and its effect. The next thing to talk about is its nature of causing or the force through which it causes. Two things are certain concerning this, around which there are other matters that are doubtful and should be explained.

Finis ratio, seu  
virtus per quam  
causat, est  
bonitas.  
Ostenditur  
auctoritate  
D. Thom. et  
aliorum.

5 1. Primo igitur certum est, finem in suo genere causare, quatenus quoddam bonum, et conveniens est. Hæc est sententia D. Thomæ 1, 2, quæst. 1, a. 1, in fine corporis, quam late tractat 3, cont. Gentes, cap. 2 et 3, ubi probat, idem esse operari propter finem, et propter bonum: et 1 p., q. 5, a. 4, similiter probat bonum habere rationem finis, ubi in solutione ad 2, in hunc modum explicat illud Dionysii 4, c. de Divinis nominibus: *Bonum est diffusivum sui*. Eandem doctrinam habet Alensis, 1 p., q. 17, memb. 3. et 34, memb. 1, et colligitur ex Aristotele, 1 Ethicor., cap. 7, dicente: *Id esse unicuique bonum, cujus gratia cætera operantur*. Idem lib. I Ethic., in fine, et 2, Phys., cap. 3, ubi dicit, *finem et bonum idem esse*. Ratio vero constat ex dictis, quia causalitas finis in hoc consistit, quod trahit voluntatem ad se propter se amandum, vel alia propter ipsum: sed nihil potest trahere voluntatem nisi bonum, quatenus bonum est: ergo bonitas est a qua habet finis virtutem causandi finaliter; est ergo illi ratio causandi.

Item ratione.

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Exponitur  
Cajetanus circa  
rationem  
causandi finaliter.

25 2. Hanc autem veritatem per se claram, obscuriorem reddit Cajetanus, 1 p., art. 4, q. 5, dicens, bonitatem formalem esse ipsam rationem causæ finalis in actu exercito, non vero in actu

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1. The first thing, then, that is certain is that the end causes in its genus insofar as it is a kind of good and agreeable thing. This is St. Thomas's view in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1, co. (towards the end). He discusses it more thoroughly in SCG III, c. 2 and 3, where he shows that to act for the sake of the end is the same thing as to act for the sake of the good. In [ST] Ia.5.4 he similarly shows that good has the nature of an end, where in his solution ad 2 he in this way explains Dionysius's statement from *On the Divine Names*, c. 4: 'Goodness is self-diffusive'. [Alexander] of Hales holds the same doctrine in [Sent.] I, q. 17, memb. 3 and q. 34, memb. 1, and it is gathered from Aristotle, who says in EN I, c. 7: 'That is the good of each for whose sake everything else is done' [1097a17–18]. Likewise at the end of book I and in *Phys.* II, c. 3, where he says: 'the end and the good are the same'.<sup>3</sup> And the reason is clear from what was said, for the causality of the end consists in drawing the will to itself for the sake of being loved in itself or other things for its sake. But nothing can draw the will except something good insofar as it is good. Therefore, goodness is that by which an end has the power of final-causing. Therefore, this is nature of causing for it.

2. This truth which is clear in itself is rendered more obscure by Cajetanus, who says in [his commentary on ST] Ia.4.5 that formal goodness is the very nature of the final cause in the exercised act but not in

The nature of the end or the force through which it causes is goodness. It is shown by the authority of St. Thomas and others.

And by reason.

Cajetan on the nature of final-causing is explained.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from the Vivès edition; in some cases I have followed the 1628 edition. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>195a22–25?

signato, nisi tantum fundamentaliter. Quorum verborum sensus in idem redit. Nam per hoc nomen *bonum* non explicatur res sub habitudine ad effectum, seu actum finaliter causandi, et hoc vocavit Cajetanus finem in actu signato, quam rationem non <col. b> significat formaliter ratio *boni*, sed tantum explicat perfectionem objecti, seu convenientiam quam habet cum voluntate, ex qua habet quod finalisare possit, quam habitudinem formaliter explicat nomen, seu ratio finis: et ideo dicitur fundari in bonitate. Et hoc modo dixit Cajetanus *bonum* significare rationem finis in actu exercito fundamentaliter, ac si in causa efficiente diceremus calorem, verbi gratia, esse finem agentis fundamentaliter, tamen ut sic non significare formaliter ipsam habitudinem efficientis.

Secundo certum est ut bonum causet finaliter necessarium esse ut cognitum sit; quia appetitus vitalis sequitur formam apprehensam, et ideo ferri non potest nisi in objectum cognitum ut constat ex philosophia, et ex 1 p., quæst. 80 et sequentib., et ex quæst. 8 et 9, 1, 2, viderique possunt quæ scripsi in disp. 23, *Metaphysicæ*, sect. 7, et libr. 2, de *Orat. mentali*, cap. 13. Hinc vero oriebatur occasio disputandi quomodo se habebat esse cognitum ad rationem causandi finalem, an scilicet sit tantum conditio necessaria, vel etiam ratio causandi, et consequenter an bonum cognitum causet finaliter secundum esse cognitum, vel secundum esse reale. Quam quæstionem late tractat 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, Medina, et Cajetanus *ibid.*, et antea in 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 4, et Ferrarius 1, cont. *Gent.*, cap. 44, et aliqui theologi in 2, dist. 1, præsertim Gabriel, part. 5, alii in 2, dist. 25, præsertim Scotus et Capreolus. Sed quoniam hæc res in disput. 23 *Metaphysicæ*, sect., 8, a me late traditur, et, ut existimo, nihil difficultatis habet, dicam breviter quæ sentio, et quod ad Quæstiones Theologicas postea tractandas est necessarium.

3. Advertendum est ergo, interdum appetere voluntatem objectum cognitum solum in ordine ad cognitionem, ut, verbi gratia, quando contemplando rosam non appetit illam habere, sed tantum considerare et cognoscere, et tunc esse cognitum non solum est conditio, sed est ratio, movendi voluntatem,

43 23 ] 13 V.

48 cognitum causet ] causet cognitum V.

the signified act, unless merely fundamentally. The sense of those words comes to the same thing. For through this word ‘good’ one does not unfold a thing under a relation to an effect effect or to an act of final-causing (and Cajetan calls this the end in the signified act). The *ratio* of ‘good’ does not formally signify this *ratio*. Rather, it only unfolds the perfection of the object or the agreeability which it has to the will, as a result of which it has that which allows it to final-cause. The name or *ratio* of the end unfolds this relation. And for this reason it is said to be founded in goodness. And in this way Cajetan said that ‘good’ signifies the nature of the end in the exercised act fundamentally, as if we were to say that heat, for example, is in an efficient cause the end of acting fundamentally, yet as such it does not formally signify the relation itself of an efficient cause.

Secondly, it is certain that in order for good to final-cause it is necessary that it have been cognized, because the vital appetite follows an apprehended form and therefore cannot be brought to anything other than a cognized object. This is clear from the philosophers and from [*Sent.*] p. 1, q. 80 and following and from [*ST*] IaIIæ.8–9. And what I wrote can be seen in *DM XXIII*, sect. 7 and *de Orat. mentali* lib. 2, c. 13. But from here has arisen an occasion for disputing how being cognized is related to the nature of final-causing, whether, namely, it is only a necessary condition or also the nature of causing, and consequently whether cognized good final-causes according to cognized being or according to real being. This question is discussed more thoroughly in Medina’s and Cajetan’s [commentaries on *ST*] IaIIæ.1.1 and before that in Ia.5.4, and by Ferrara in [his commentary on *SCG*] I, c. 44, and by other theologians in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 1, especially Gabriel in part. 5, and others in II, dist. 25, especially Scotus and Capreolus. But since I discuss this matter more thoroughly in *DM XXIII*, sect. 8, and, as I think, has no difficulty, I will briefly say what I think and what is necessary for discussing the theological questions afterwards.

3. It should, therefore, be noted that sometimes the will desires a cognized object only in relation to cognition, as, for example, when in contemplating a rose it does not desire to possess it but only to consider and cognize it. In that case to be cognized is not only a condition but also the reason for moving the will, because not only is the cognition

The cognition of the final-causing object does not pertain to the nature of final-causing but is only a condition.

Cognitio objecti finalizantis non pertinet ad rationem causandi finaliter, sed est sola conditio.

quia non solum est quid prærequisitum ut voluntas moveatur, sed etiam est terminus appetitionis, cujusmodi est quæcumque alia res quæ judicatur esse conveniens, et hoc modo quando homo delectatur tantum in cognitione non vero in re cognita secundum se, esse cognitum est id, a quo actus accipit suam rationem et bonitatem vel <7> malitiam: sicut est quando homo appetit videre Deum, illud esse visum pertinet ad formale objectum, quod est causa finalisandi. Aliquando vero voluntas appetit objectum cognitum ut re ipsa illud habeat et consequatur, ut quando appetit sanitatem, et tunc plane ratio finalisandi est bonitas, quam in re ipsa objectum habet, vel habere apprehendit, quia illud est finis voluntatis, in quod tendit impetus agentis, sed non tendit nisi in esse reale ipsius finis, ut illud habeat et obtineat: ergo. Item, illud habet propriam rationem finis, quo consecuto, quiescit voluntas, et quo deficiente frustratur ab intentione sua, sed non quiescit in sola apprehensione, nisi re ipsa finem consequatur, et nisi hoc obtineat, frustrari dicitur: ergo signum est moveri a fine secundum suum esse reale. Non est autem intelligendum requiri ad causalitatem finis quod res illa, quæ est finis a parte rei præexistat, quia cum solum moveat metaphorice per cognitionem, satis est quod animo apprehendatur, et quasi in imagine repræsentetur; sensus ergo est rem illam secundum esse reale, quod objicitur, et in ea apprehenditur, movere voluntatem, et habere causalitatem finis, quia secundum illud esse judicatur conveniens: movet autem, ut diximus, quatenus conveniens judicatur; cognitio igitur hujus convenientiæ et bonitatis, non est propria ratio movendi, quia tunc voluntas non appetit cognoscere, sed dicitur esse cognitio necessaria per modum approximationis, non quidem secundum locum, sed tantum subordinationem potentiarum animæ; et quia sine illa non habet finis illum modum quo indiget ad suam causalitatem. Et hoc modo explicata hæc sententia clarior est, ut patet ex Scoto, Gabriele, Cajetano et Ferrario, locis supra citatis, et nullam habet difficultatem alicujus momenti.

4. Ut tamen facile dissolvantur multa argumenta, quæ hic

72 habere ] *om.* V.

78 consequatur ] consequantur V.

a prerequisite for the will to be moved but it is also the *terminus* of the desire just like any other thing that is judged to be agreeable. And in this way when a human being is delighted in the cognition alone but not in the cognized thing according to itself, to be cognized is that from which the act takes its nature and goodness or badness, just as when a human being desires to see God, that being seen pertains to the formal object that is the cause of final-causing.

But sometimes the will desires the cognized object so that it has and obtains that thing itself, as when it desires health and then clearly the reason of final-causing is the goodness that it has or apprehends to have in the very object itself. For that is the end of the will to which the impetus of the agent tends, but it does not tend except to the real being of the end itself, in order to have and obtain it. Therefore. Likewise, that has the proper nature of an end by the achievement of which the will is at rest and by the deficiency of which it is frustrated from its intention, but the will is not at rest in the apprehension alone (unless that attains the end in reality) and it is said to be frustrated unless this is obtained. Therefore, this is a sign that the will is moved by the end according to its real being.

But that that thing which is the end pre-exist in reality should not be understood as required for the causality of the end. For it is sufficient that it be apprehended by the soul and be represented as an image, as it were, since it only moves metaphorically through cognition. The sense, therefore, is that that thing moves the will according to the real being which is presented and apprehended in it and has the causality of the end, because according to that it is judged agreeable. Moreover, it moves, as we said, insofar as it is judged agreeable. Therefore, the cognition of this agreeability and goodness is not properly the nature of moving, because in this case the will does not desire to cognize. But the cognition is said to be necessary in the mode of approximation, not, indeed, according to place, but only according to a subordination of the soul's powers, and because without that the end does not have that mode which it needs for its causality. And this view is clearer when explained in this way, as is clear from Scotus, Gabriel, Cajetan, and Ferrara in the places cited above, and it has no difficulty of any importance.

4. Nevertheless, so that the many arguments which Medina multi-

It is shown firstly.

It is shown secondly.

Real existence does not also enter for the nature of final-causing.

A note concerning the preceding doctrine.

Ostenditur 1.

Ostenditur 2.

Existencia realis non ingreditur etiam rationem causandi finaliter.

Notatio pro præcedente doctrina.

multiplicat Medina; oportet ultimo advertere, quod sicut in  
 100 causa efficiente approximatio non est ratio agendi, sed conditio, potest tamen ratione illius variari actio, si diversum agens  
 applicetur, ita et in hac apprehensione, seu cognitione intel- 100R  
 lectus, contingere potest, ut ratione illius varietur actio voluntatis, si in objecte aliud esse, seu aliam rationem apprehendat  
 105 boni, vel mali: quo sensu dici solet finem specificare actum voluntatis, non ut in re est, sed ut apprehenditur: nam licet  
 eleemosyna, verbi gratia, in re sit bona, si quis illam existimat 105R  
 malam, actio voluntatis non est bona, sed mala. Propter quam  
 rationem videtur dixisse divus Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 31, artic. 3,  
 110 ad 1, cum objectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, diversitatem apprehensionis pertinere ad diversitatem objecti, atque  
 idem sentit Cajetanus, q. 30, art. 3. Sed hæc non sunt contra- 110R  
 raria, quia tunc apprehensio boni tantum variat objectum in  
 quantum in illo apprehendit et applicat diversum esse objecti,  
 atque adeo distinctam bonitatem, vel convenientiam, quæ, ut 115R  
 115 dixi, est ratio movendi voluntatem. Quocirca quando dicitur  
 objectum movere *ut apprehensum*, cavenda est æquivocatio in  
 illa particula reduplicante: nam si reduplicet solam denomina-  
 tionem provenientem ab apprehensione ita ut ipsa apprehensio  
 sit forma, per quam finis movet, falsum est, ut dixi, si autem 120R  
 120 reduplicet ipsum esse objectivum, quod apprehendit, sic vera  
 est locutio, atque eodem modo diversitas cognitionis, quæ se  
 tenet tantum ex parte potentiæ, aut cognitionis, seu in prop-  
 riis qualitatibus ipsius actus intelligendi, ut sunt, verbi gratia,  
 quod sit clara, vel obscura, et similis, hæc, inquam, diversi- 125R  
 125 tas non variat rationem finis, et consequenter nec motionem  
 voluntatis: at vero diversitas cognitionis, quæ redundat in ob-  
 jecto, scilicet quia aliud est quod cognoscitur, vel alia propri-  
 etas in eo apprehenditur, hæc variat finem et motionem, quia  
 proponit, et appropinquat subjectum secundum aliud esse 130R  
 130 objectivum: unde quasi diversificat illud, et sic reddit diversam  
 cognitionem non ex parte esse cogniti absoluti, sed ex parte  
 objecti quod cognoscitur. Et hæc de causalitate, effectu et prin-  
 cipio, seu forma, quæ est principium finis.

plies in this place are easily resolved, it is necessary at last to notice that  
 just as with an efficient cause coming close together is not the nature of  
 acting but a condition for it, yet the action can be varied by reason of  
 that, if a different agent is applied, so also it can happen with this appre-  
 hension or cognition by the intellect that by reason of it the action of  
 the will is varied, if some other being or another aspect of good or bad  
 is apprehended in the object. The end is usually said to specify the act  
 of the will in this sense, not as it is in reality but as it is apprehended.  
 For although giving alms, for example, is good in reality, if someone  
 thinks it bad, the action of the will is not good but bad. For this reason  
 St. Thomas seems to have said in [ST] IaIIæ.31.3 ad 1 that when the  
 object of the will is apprehended good, difference of apprehension per-  
 tains to difference of the object. And Cajetan thinks the same in q. 30,  
 art. 3. But these are not contraries, because apprehension of the good  
 now varies the object only insofar as different being of the object is ap-  
 prehended and applied in it and for that reason the distinct goodness  
 or agreeability, which, as I said, is the nature of moving the will.

Wherefore, when it is said that the object moves ‘as apprehended’,  
 one should avoid equivocation in that reduplicated particule. For if only  
 the denomination coming forth is reduplicated by the apprehension  
 such that the apprehension itself is the form through which the end  
 moves, it is false, as I said. But if the objective being itself (which is  
 apprehended) is reduplicated, the locution is true. In the same way  
 the diversity of cognition, which holds only on the part of the power,  
 either in cognition or in the proper qualities of the act of understanding  
 itself (some examples are that it is clear, or obscure, and so on), this  
 diversity, I say, does not vary the nature of the end and consequently  
 also not the motion of the will.

But, on the other hand, the diversity of cognition which overflows  
 in the object, namely, because something else is cognized or other prop-  
 erties are apprehended in it, this varies the end and motion, because it  
 proposes and approaches the subject according to other objective being.  
 Whence it diversifies it, as it were, and so delivers different cognition  
 not on the part of the being cognized absolutely, but on the part of  
 the object that is cognized. And this about the causality, effect, and  
 principle or form, which is the principle of an end.