CONCERNING THE DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS.

St. Thomas, in the question concerning the attainment of happiness in the *Prima Secundae*, adds this part concerning desire. Of course, it could seem that one ought to discuss this doubt before the other articles, since a tendency to happiness starts from a natural desire. And perhaps for this reason Soto changes the order in dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1. Nevertheless, it is not without merit that St. Thomas reserves this disputation for the last spot in the question, because the desirable object must first be cognized, then desired. And therefore by the ratio of happiness having been cognized, the desire for it will be explained more easily. The common distinction between innate and elicited desire should, therefore, be assumed. The former of these only consists in the weight of nature and is therefore common with other living and inanimate things. And in which it belongs, it forever belongs. But the latter consists in a vital act coming forth from cognition. Hence, it is proper to things living by an animal or rational life and is present only when a living thing actually acts and cognizes. Concerning either it should be said as much in respect to supernatural happiness as to natural, either in general or in particular.

Sectio I.

Whether a human being desires with an innate desire natural happiness in particular and in general

1Latin text is from Vivès edition. In some cases I have followed the 1628 edition, though I have not compared the two texts exhaustively. Marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. Most of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition.

2Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

3Q. 5, art. 8.

5 Soto ] Scotus V.
Suárez, De Fine Hominis disp. 16, sect. 1

1. Assertio affirmat, de beatitudine in particulari.  

Probatur primo.

1. Primo de beatitudine naturali in particulari res est sine controversia, hominem illam appetere appetitu innato: sic omnes, in 4, dist. 49, Scotus, quæst. 6, Durandus, quæst. 8, Paludanus, quæst. 7, Major, question. 6. Rationes sunt clarae: primo, quia in homine est capacitis naturalis ad hanc beatitudinem tam passiva, quam etiam facultas activa: omnis autem potentia naturaliter inclinatur ad actum sibi connaturalem; presupserimtum: omne enim perfectibile appetit suam perfectionem: beatitudo autem, ut sepe dictum est, est maxima perfectio, et si naturalis sit, est etiam proportionata. Tandem appetitus scientiæ maxime naturalis est, beatitudine autem est perfectissima quaedam pars hujus scientiæ. Et idem fieri potest de amore: atque hinc scilicet, quæ est hic appetitus, non distinguitur a capacitate naturali, quam unaqueque potentia habet ad actum suum. Alii distinctiones sunt eædem quæ supra factæ.

Secundo.

2. Solent vero inquirere scholastici, in qua facultate hominis sit hic appetitus. Paludanus, quem sequitur Soto, existimat esse in voluntate, quia est appetitus tutius suppositus, videntur tamen in suo discurso æquivocationem committere, et ab appetitu innato transferre sermonem ad elicitum. Durandus collocat in intellectu, in quo etiam existimat esse naturalem appetitum scientiæ, quia hic appetitus non distinguuntur a capacitatem naturalis, quam unaqueque potentia habet ad actum suum. Alii distinctiones sunt eædem quæ supra factæ. 

In qua potentia insit innatus appetitus ad beatitudinem?

1. Opinio.

2. Opinio.

Decisio autoris; et assertio 1.

3. Mihi videtur fere distinctio, et quæstio de modo loquendi. Supponendo ergo formaliter beatitudinem includere ac-
Suárez, De Fine Hominis disp. 16, sect. 1

60 tum intellectus et voluntatis, est non dubium, quin ex ea parte, qua includit amorem, appetitus ejus omnino sit in voluntate, ut recte Scotus, non solum quia voluntas est appetitus universalis, sed quia est proprium perfectibile per illum actum: at vero qua parte consistit in actu intellectus proximus appetitus ejus naturalis est in intellectu, ut recte probat fundamentum Durandi: sicut etiam appetitus formae est immediate in materia prima, et in universum omnis potentia inclinatur in suum actum; et quamvis forte tota hae appellatio appetitus metaphorica sit in eo modo, quod est, non est cur dicatur improprius, quia licet intellectus inclinetur ad operandum circa suum objectum sub ratione veri, tamen, ut habet appetitum innatum, inclinatur in suum actum sub ratio-<col. b> ne boni, et perfectionis sibi convenientis: at vero quodammodo mediate etiam voluntas pondere naturae inclinatur in actum intellectus, quia inclinatur ad appetendum per actum elicitem omnem hominis perfectionem, quarum una ex praecipuis est hae cognitionis intellectus: inclinatur ergo voluntas in actum intellectus, non ut actum suum, sed ut objectum. Addi potest, si verum est, hos actus etiam manere immediate ab ipsa substantia animae, hunc appetitum innatum etiam in ipsa substantia inesse tanquam in radicali, et principali principio illo-rum, ex illo generali principio, quod omnis vis activa naturaliter est propensa ad actum suum.

4. Jam de beatitudine in communi est nonnulla diversitas inter auctores. Scotus, loco citato, et quæst. 1 Prologi negat habere hominem appetitum innatum ad beatitudinem in communi: quia natura, inquit, ad determinatam et particularam perfectionem tendit: unde tendere in universalem, proprium vide-tur actus elici. Quod fundamentum adeo universale non vide-tur verum, quia etiam appetitus naturalis potest esse ad objectum commune, sicut est appetitus materie ad formam: imo hoc ipso quod potestia potest per actum elici appetitum appere-ctum commune, videtur necessario supponi appetitus innatus ad bonum illud: posset tamen in particulari urgeri argumento Scoti, quia appetitus innatus solum est ad veram beatitudinem, non ad falsam, hae autem beatudo tantum est una in particu-

includes an act of intellect and will, there is no doubt but that by that part by which it includes love its desire is entirely in the will, as Scotus rightly [says], not only because the will is the universal appetite, but because it is properly perfectible through its act. But on the other hand by that part which consists in an act of intellect its proximate desire is naturally in the intellect, as the foundation of Durandus rightly shows. Just as also the appetite for form is immediately in first matter and in general every power is inclined to its act. And although perhaps this complete appellation of desire is metaphorical in that way, by which it is why it is not called improper, because although the intellect is inclined to act on account of its object under the aspect of true, yet, so that it has an innate desire, it is inclined to its act under the aspect of good and the perfection agreeable to it. But in a certain way the will also mediately by a weight of nature is inclined to the act of intellect, because it is inclined to desiring through an elicited act every human perfection, among which one in particular is this cognition of the intellect. Therefore the will is inclined to an act of the intellect not as its act but as object. It can be added, if it is true, that these acts also remain immediately by the substance itself of the soul, this innate desire also belongs in the substance itself as in a radical and primary principle of them, by that general principle that all active strength naturally is disposed to its act.

4. Now concerning happiness in general there is some diversity among the authors. Scotus, in the cited passage and in q. 1 of the prologue, denies that humans have an innate desire for happiness in general. Because nature, he says, tends to determinate and particular perfection. Hence, to tend to universal [perfection] seems proper to an elicited act. This foundation thus far does not seem universally true, because a natural desire can also be to an object in general, just as is the appetite of matter to form. Indeed, the very fact that a power can through an elicited act desire a general object seems necessarily to assume an innate desire for that good. Yet it can in particular be urged by the argument of Scotus, because an innate desire is only for true happiness, not for false. But this happiness is only one thing in particular, namely God and the attainment of him. Therefore, this desire is
lari, scilicet Deus et consecutio ejus: ergo hic appetitus non est in beatitudinem in communi, quia solum videtur esse communis prout abstrahit a vera et falsa beatitudine.

**Assertio 2.**

5. Nihilominus dicendum est secundo cum communi sententia, esse in homine naturalium appetitum ab beatitudinem etiam in communi. Sic reliqui theologi citati: videri potest Cajetanus, 1 p., quæst. 82, art. 1; explicatur primo, quia actus ille elicitus, quo potest homo amare beatitudinem in communi, est valde connotaturalis et proportionatus naturæ: ergo est in homine appetitus innatus ad amorem illum: ergo et ad beatitudinem in communi, saltem ut est objectum ejus, quia etiam ipsum objectum totum est proportionatum naturæ. Secundo, quia licet beatitudine rigorose sumpta pro essentia beatitudinis dicat determinatos actus, tamen absolute pro statu, includit collectionem omnium nihil aliud est, quam perfectio, seu congregatio bonorum omnium: sed homo naturaliter appetit hoc appetitum innato, abundare omnibus bonis sibi convenientibus: ergo hoc etiam modo appetit naturaliter beatitudinem in communi. Tertio, quamvis naturalis beatitudo objectiva sit tantum una numero in particula, tamen beatitudo formalis in variis actibus reperiri potest: ergo ex hoc capite appetitus hic non limitatur ad unum actum, sed tendit in ipsam rationem beatitudinis, quam communis est Omnibus illis: ergo ex hoc etiam modo appetit naturaliter beatitudinem in communi, licet appetitus naturæ tendat in rem determinatam, tamen in illa includitur ratio communis, et ratione illius potissime appetitur. Et hac etiam ratione recte dicitur appetitus innatus tendere in communem rationem vel beatitudinis, vel alterius boni: nam revera naturalem appetitum inclinari ad commune bonum nihil aliud est, quam inclinari veluti sub disjunctione ad hunc, vel illum actum, in quo inventur illa communis perfectionis, nam hac ratione ille appetitus est quasi indifferentis ad multa, et erit contentus quolibet illorum dummodo in se continet rationem illam communem. Atque sic patet responsio ad fundamentum Scoti, in numero quarto.

5. Nevertheless, it should be said, second, with the common view, that there is in a human being a natural desire also for happiness in general. Thus the rest of the cited theologians [say] and, it can seem, Cajetan, p. 1, q. 82, art. 1. It is explained, firstly, because that elicited act, by which a human being can love happiness in general is very con-notatural and proportionate to nature. Therefore, there is in a human being an innate desire for that love. Therefore, also for happiness in general, at least as an object of it, because that whole object is also proportionate to nature.

Secondly, because although happiness rigorously taken through the essence of happiness expresses a determinate act, yet in that state is absolutely included the collection of all goods. Hence, in this way happiness in general is nothing other than perfection or the congregation of all goods. But a human being naturally desires this with an innate desire, [namely] that all goods agreeable to him abound. Therefore, in this way also he naturally desires happiness in general.

Thirdly, although objective natural happiness is only one in number in particular things, nevertheless, formal happiness can be found in various actions. Therefore, from this source, this desire is not limited to one action, but tends to the aspect itself of happiness, which is common to many actions. Therefore, from this source also it tends to happiness in general, although a desire of nature tends to a determinate things, yet in that it is included in a common nature and by that nature of it is especially desired. And by this reason it is also rightly said that an innate desire tends to a common nature, either of happiness or some other good. For in fact for a natural desire to be inclined to common good is nothing other than for it to be inclined just as under a disjunction to this or that act, in which is found that common perfection. For by this reason, that desire is as if indifferent to many and it will be content by whatever of those provided it contains in itself that common nature. And thus the response to the foundation of Scotus given in n. 4 is clear.