

© Sydney Penner 2012

<384, col. a>²

SECTIO II.

Utrum sit aliqua communis ratio causae, et quaenam et qualis.

1. Ex Aristotele nullam causae in communi defini-
5 tionem habemus: posteriores vero Philosophi in ea 5R
assignanda laborarunt, ut a communi ad proprias
rationes singularum causarum explicandas melius
procedatur, simulque declaretur qualis sit conveni-
entia causarum inter se. Supponendum autem est
10 sermonem esse de causa in actu formaliter ut causa 10R
est: sicut enim supra de principio dicebamus, ita
etiam in causa tria considerari possunt, scilicet res
quae causat; causatio ipsa (ut sic dicam) et relatio
quae vel consequitur, vel cogitatur. De hoc tertio
15 membro nihil in tota materia tractandum est: habet 15R
enim inferius suum proprium locum in materia de
relatione. De aliis vero duobus dicturi sumus: primo
autem de causatione ipsa, per quam formaliter con-
stituitur causa in actu, et ex qua nobis innotescit
20 causa ipsa, seu virtus causandi. 20R

Prima causae
descriptio
reprobatur.

2. Prima igitur definitio haec tradi solet, *Causa est id per quod satisfit interrogationi, qua inquiritur propter quid aliquid sit, seu fiat.* Quae sumi potest ex Aristotele 2. *Physicorum* cap. 7. ubi sufficientiam 25R

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes: many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

SECTION II.

Whether there is some common ratio of cause, and what it is and of what kind it is.

1. We do not have any definition of cause in general from Aristotle. Philosophers after him, however, have laboured to assign one to it, so that one can better advance from the general to the *rationes* proper to the individual kinds of causes and at the same time better to show what the agreement between the causes is. The discussion, moreover, should be assumed to be about cause formally in act *qua* cause. For just as we were speaking above about principles, so also in the case of causes three things can be considered: namely, the thing that causes, causation itself (if I may speak in this way), and the relation that either follows or is thought. There is nothing to be discussed about the third member in the course of this section on causes. For it has its proper place below in the discussion of relations. But we are going to talk about the other two things. [We will talk], first, about the causation itself through which a cause is formally constituted in act and through which the cause or power of causing is made known to us.

2. First, then, the following definition is usually presented: *A cause is that through which one satisfies an inquiry in which one asks on account of what something is or comes to be.* This can be taken from Aristotle, *Physics* II, cap. 7, where the

The first
description of
cause is
rejected.

25 causarum probat ex eo quod per illas satisfit om-
nibus modis quibus quaeri solet propter quid res
sit: significat ergo causam esse id per quod satisfit
quaestioni propter quid. Unde constat dictionem
30 *propter quid* non sumi illo speciali modo quo solet
dici de causa finali, sed generalius, ut comprehen-
dat omnes causas. Haec vero definitio nihil fere rem
declarat; nam aequae obscurum est quid significet
illud verbum *propter quid*: nam si recte sumatur,
35 solum significat habitudinem causae finalis, et illam
ipsam non satis declarat, ut postea videbimus. Si
vero sumatur fusius, comprehendit varios modos
qua illis vocibus significantur, *ex quo, per quid, a*
quo aliquid est: unde solum imponitur nomen com-
40 mune, non tamen explicatur communis ratio. Addo
illam vocem in ea generalitate etiam posse com-
prehendere principia quae non sunt causae, sicut
Christus dixit Ioannis 6. *Ego vivo propter Patrem*:
ubi non habitudo causae, sed principii tantum sig-
nificatur. 45R

Secunda
causae
definitio
refutatur.

45 3. Secunda definitio, et valde communis est,
Causa est id ad quod aliud sequitur. Quae re-
ferri solet ex libro *De causis*, ubi non reperitur; et
potius videtur sumpta ex definitione principii supra
declarata ex Aristotele 5. *Metaphysicae*. Nam quod
50 Aristoteles posuit *primum* loco generis, in illa defini-
tione causae ponitur per terminum magis transcen-
dentalem, scilicet *id*: reliquae vero particulae, scilicet
ad quod aliud, manifeste aequivalent illis verbis
Aristotelis *unde aliquid*. Denique quod Aristoteles
55 sub disiunctione dixit, *est aut fit, aut cognoscitur*,
satis confuse comprehenditur sub unico verbo *se-
quitur*: in hoc enim verbo non potest significari sola
consecutio per illationem, alioqui conveniret defini-

sufficiency of the causes is shown from the fact that through them one satisfies all the ways in which it is customary to ask on account of what a thing is. This indicates, then, that a cause is that through which one satisfies the question 'on account of what?' Hence, it is obvious that the phrase 'on account of what' is not taken in that special way in which it is usually said of the final cause,³ but more generally so that it covers all the causes. But this definition explains almost nothing of the matter. For what that phrase 'on account of what' signifies is equally obscure. For if it is rightly taken, and it does not sufficiently explain that, as we will see later. But if it is taken more broadly, it covers the different ways that are signified by the terms 'from which', 'through which', and 'by which something is'. Hence, it only imposes a common name, yet no common *ratio* is explained. I add that that phrase taken so generally can also cover principles that are not causes, as Christ said in John 6: 'I live on account of the Father'. In this passage, it is not the habitudo of a cause that is signified but only that of a principle.

3. The second, and much more common, definition is that *a cause is that on which something else follows*. This is usually referred to the book *On causes*, where it is not found. It seems that it is rather taken from the definition of principle from Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, explained above.⁴ For where Aristotle put 'first thing' in the genus position, in this definition of cause it is picked out through a more transcendental term, namely, 'that'. But the remaining phrase—namely, 'on which something else'—is obviously equivalent to Aristotle's words 'from which something'. Finally, what Aristotle said with the disjunction 'is or comes to be or is cognized' is rather vaguely covered through the single word 'follows'. For with this word cannot be signified only consequence through logical inference. Otherwise, the definition would also apply to

The second
definition of
cause is
refuted.

³In discussions of final causality, I would usually translate the Latin phrase with 'for the sake of which'.

⁴See DM 12.1.27–28.

60 tio etiam effectibus, ex quibus inferuntur causae: 60R
 oportet ergo, ut generatim quamcumque connexionem vel consecutionem significet. Atque ex hac ipsa expositione sumitur potissimum argumentum contra ipsam definitionem: quia illa definitio non tam est causae, quam principii: unde etiam con- 65R
 65 venit privationi: nam ex illa sequitur mutatio, nisi forte dicatur, verbum *sequitur* intelligendum esse per influxum et dependentiam: quo sensu constabit quidem definitio, erit tamen valde obscura.

Quaestionis resolutio.

Causae
 germana
 adaequataque
 descriptio.

4. Tertia definitio est, quam potissime afferunt aliqui moderni, *Causa est id a quo aliquid per se pendet*. Quae quidem, quod ad rem spectat, mihi probatur: libentius tamen eam sic describerem: 5R
 5 Causa est *Principium per se influens esse in aliud*. Nam loco generis existimo convenientius poni illud nomen commune, quod propinquius, et immediatius convenit definito: hoc autem modo comparatur principium ad causam: nam ens, et illud rel- 10R
 10 ativum *id*, quod absolute positum illi aequivalet, remotissimum est. Per illam autem particulam, *per se influens*, excluditur privatio, et omnis causa per accidens; quae per se non conferunt, aut influunt esse in aliud. Sumendum est autem verbum il- 15R
 15 lud *influit*, non stricte, ut attribui specialiter solet causae efficienti, sed generalius, prout aequivalet verbo dandi, vel communicandi esse alteri. Obiiciunt autem quidam contra hanc partem quod causa materialis non dat esse, sed formalis; inter extrinsecas vero finalis non dat esse, sed efficiens. Sed, licet speciali modo attribuaturs illis duabus causas dare esse, formae ut complenti proprium et specificum 20R
 20

⁵Compare with the stricter account of principle in *DM 12.2.25*.

effects, from which causes are inferred. It must, therefore, generally signify any connection or consequence whatever. And from this exposition is taken the most powerful argument against the definition: for that definition is no more a definition of cause than of principle. Hence, it also applies to privations. For change follows from a privation, unless perhaps it is said that the word ‘follows’ should be understood in terms of influx and dependency. In that sense the definition will indeed stand, but it will be most obscure.

Resolution of the question.

4. The third definition, which some moderns especially assert, is that *a cause is that on which something else per se depends*. This definition, as far as concerns the content, indeed seems proven to me. Nevertheless, I would prefer to describe it as follows: a cause is *a principle per se inflowing being to something else*.⁵ For I think that it is more agreeable to place in the genus position that common name that more nearly and immediately applies to the defined thing. In this way, moreover, principle and cause are compared to each other. For being, and that relative ‘that’ which taken absolutely is equivalent to being, is very remote. Moreover, with that phrase ‘*per se inflowing*’ privations and all *per accidens* causes that are not related *per se* or do not inflow being into something else are excluded. That verb ‘inflowing’, however, should not be taken strictly in the way that it is usually attributed in a special way to efficient causes, but more generally so that it is the equivalent of ‘giving or communicating being to something else’. But some object to this part that a formal cause, but not a material cause, gives being, and, with respect to extrinsic causes, an efficient cause, but not a final cause, gives being. But, even though giving being is attributed to those two causes in a special way (form as completing proper

The genuine
 and adequate
 description of
 cause.

esse, efficienti vero ut realiter influenti, tamen absolute, et sub communi ratione, etiam materia in suo genere dat esse, quia ab illa dependet esse effectus; et ipsa dat suam entitatem, qua constituatur esse effectus: causa etiam finalis eo modo quo movet, influit etiam in esse, ut postea declarabitur.

5. Ad declarandum vero amplius hanc partem definitionis, advertendum est si Philosophice ageremus de solis causis et principiis naturalibus, seu quae naturali lumine cognosci possunt, sufficienter videri causam definitam illis verbis, et distinctam ab omnibus principiis, quae verae causae non sunt: quia tamen nostra Physica et Metaphysica deservire debet Theologiae, talem oportet causae definitionem tradere, quae Patri aeterno ut est principium Filii, vel Patri et Filio ut sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, non conveniat: et hoc est quod facessit nobis negotium, nam persona producens videtur principium per se influens esse in aliam personam, atque ita videtur illi convenire tota definitio causae, cum tamen causa non sit, ut ex recepta sententia Theologorum constat.

Difficultas ex mysterio Trinitatis sumpta.

6. Ad excludendum ergo huiusmodi principium per se dans esse sine causalitate: usi sunt auctores moderni verbo, *dependendi*, quia una persona divina ita recipit esse ab alia, ut ab illa non pendeat, quia id quod ab alio pendet, oportet ut habeat essentiam saltem numero diversam ab eo a quo pendet. Sed imprimis explicare oportet quid sit proprie unum pendere ab alio, aut cur ad dependendum

and specific being and efficient cause as really inflowing), nevertheless, absolutely and under a common *ratio*, even matter gives being in its genus, since the being of the effect depends on it and it gives its own entity from which the being of the effect is constituted. A final cause also inflows into being by that way in which it moves, as will be shown later.⁶

5. But in order to explain this part of the definition more fully, it should be noted that if we were dealing philosophically only with causes and principles that are natural or that can be cognized by the natural light, cause would seem to be sufficiently defined by those words and would be distinguished from all principles that are not true causes. Nevertheless, since our physics and metaphysics ought to be in the service of theology, a definition of cause needs to be presented that does not apply to the eternal Father as principle of the Son or to the Father and Son as one principle of the Holy Spirit. This is what creates trouble for us: for the producing person seems to be a principle *per se* inflowing being into another person and thus the entire definition of cause seems to apply. Yet the producing person is not a cause, as is clear from the received view among theologians.

A difficulty taken from the mystery of the Trinity.

6. In order to exclude a principle of this kind that *per se* gives being without causality, then, modern authors use the word 'depending', since one divine person receives being from another in such a way as not to depend on the other person. For that which depends on another thing must have an essence that is at least numerically distinct from that on which it depends. But one must first explain what it is for one thing properly to depend on another thing, or why diverse

⁶For more on the 'to something else' part of the definition, see n. 7 and *DM* 18.7.56. Note, in particular, that Suárez is not claiming that there needs to be a real distinction between the agent and the patient. As *DM* 18.7 makes clear, Suárez thinks there are immanent actions where what is acting and what is being acted on are identical. Nonetheless, even in those cases, he thinks the effect is distinct from acting principle.

30 5] 4 A.

2 6] 5 A.

10 requiratur diversitas essentiae, et non sufficiat distinc- 10R
 tio rerum, quae necessario intercedit inter rem
 producentem et productam; quia non apparet ratio
 cur maiorem distinctionem requirat verbum depen-
 15 dendi, quam producendi. Item unum relativum pro- 15R
 prie dicitur pendere ab alio, quia illo posito ponitur,
 et ablato aufertur: et tamen non est de necessitate
 relativorum ut sic habere distinctam numero essen-
 20 tiam: nam personae divinae sunt correlativae, cum 20R
 tamen sint eiusdem essentiae. Quod si dicantur
 esse eiusdem essentiae absolutae, distinguere tamen
 in rationibus respectivis, idque satis esse ad cor-
 relativam dependentiam: cur non idem sufficiet ad
 dependentiam producti a producente? Non enim
 25 quatenus ab eo distinguitur: ut sic autem habet 25R
 distinctam entitatem respectivam receptam ab alio:
 ergo secundum illam vere pendet ab alio. Adde
 quod secundum propriam rationem respectivam ha-
 bet persona producta distinctum esse personale ac
 30 respectivum a persona producente: et illud habere 30R
 non potest nisi ab alio datum: ergo in illo vere pen-
 det ab alio. Quid est enim pendere ab alio in aliquo
 esse, nisi non habere illud a se, sed datum et com-
 35 municatum ab alio, a quo semper dari debeat ut
 semper haberi possit? 35R

Quid sit
 proprie ab alio
 pendere.

7. Ad hoc ergo explicandum dixi, causam esse
 quae influit esse in aliud: his enim verbis eadem res
 declaratur quae importatur in verbo *dependendi*:
 significatur autem per illa, ad causalitatem neces-
 40 sarium esse ut illud esse quod causa per se primo 40R
 influit in effectum, sit causatum ab ipsa causa; et
 consequenter quod sit esse distinctum a proprio
 esse quod causa in se habet. Unde hoc est proprie
 pendere in suo esse ab alio, habere scilicet esse

essences are required for depending, and why a distinction of
 things (which necessarily comes between a producing thing
 and produced thing) is not sufficient. For the reason why the
 word 'depending' requires a greater distinction than the word
 'producing' is not obvious. Likewise, one relative is said prop-
 15 erly to depend on another relative, since it is posited by the 15R
 latter having been posited and is removed by the latter being
 removed, and yet it is not of the necessity of relatives as such
 to have essences distinct in number. For the divine persons
 are correlatives even though they are of the same essence.
 20 But if they are said to be of the same absolute essence yet dis- 20R
 tinguished in their respective *rationes* and that this is enough
 for correlative dependence, then why not say that the same
 thing is enough for the dependence of a product on the pro-
 25 ducer? For it is not produced insofar as it is identical with 25R
 the producer, but insofar as it is distinct from it. But as such
 it has a distinct respective entity from the other. Therefore,
 it will truly depend on the other with respect to that. Add
 that according to the proper respective *ratio* the produced
 person has distinct personal and respective being from the
 30 producing person. And it cannot have the former except it is 30R
 given by another. In that, therefore, it will truly depend on the
 other. For what is it to depend on another thing in some being
 except not to have that being *a se* but to have it given and
 35 communicated by another thing, from which it must always
 be given so that it can always be had? 35R

7. Therefore, in order to explain this I said that a cause
 is that which inflows being into another. For these words
 declare the same thing that is implied in the word 'depending'.
 It is, moreover, signified through those words that it is neces-
 sary for causality that the being that the cause *per se* and
 primarily inflows into the effect is caused by the cause itself
 and, consequently, that it is distinct from the proper being
 that the cause has in itself. Hence, this is properly to depend
 in its being on another, namely, to have being that is distinct

What it is
 properly to
 depend on
 another.

14 producendi] procedendi V.

23 ?] : A.

36 7] 6 A.

45 distinctum ab illo, et participatum seu aliquo modo 45R
 fluens ab esse illius. Hunc autem modum dependen-
 tia inveniri in omnibus causis, quas nos experimur,
 ostendi breviter potest in omni causarum genere.
 Nam materia et forma influunt esse in composito,
 50 communicando quidem seipsas, et suas entitates: 50R
 esse tamen compositi quod inde consurgit, distinc-
 tum est ab esse, tum materiae, tum formae: et ideo
 ab illis proprie pendet, quia ad illud constituendum
 unaquaque confert suum esse: et inde consurgit
 55 esse a qualibet earum distinctum, quod sine illis 55R
 esse non potest. Idem constat in causa efficiente
 (omissa pro nunc finali, quae obscuriorem habet
 influxum, de quo infra videbimus) omnis enim res,
 quae influit esse in aliud per modum principii per se
 60 et extrinseci, extra mysterium Trinitatis, dat illud ef- 60R
 ficiendo ipsummet esse, quod communicat: et ideo
 semper dat esse distinctum ab esse proprio quod
 in se habet: et hoc est proprie causare et efficere:
 Et e converso tunc proprie res producta pendet in
 65 eo genere efficientis causae, quando ipsum esse, 65R
 quod ab alio habet per se primo receptum, manat
 ab esse alterius, et sine tali influxu esse non potest.
 In processibus autem divinarum personarum,
 non ita contingit, quia illud esse quod per se primo
 70 per illas productiones communicatur, non est aliud 70R
 ab ipso esse personae producentis, sed est ipsum-
 met numero quod est in persona producente: et
 hoc est singulare et admirabile in illis divinis pro-
 cessionibus: et ideo ita una persona procedit ab
 75 alia, ut tamen ab illa recipiat esse omnino indepen- 75R
 dens, quia recipit ipsummet esse numero quod est
 in persona producente.

Divinae
 personae
 productae
 quare a
 producente
 non pendeant.

Occurritur
 obiectioni.

8. Neque obstat quod relationes ipsae distinctae
 sunt, et habent proprium esse relativum distinctum:
 80 quia non esse relativum ut sic, sed esse absolutum,

49 in] *om. V.*
 78 8] 7 A.

from it but that participates in it or in some way flows from its being. This mode of dependency, moreover, can be found in all the causes that we experience; it can quickly be shown for every genus of cause. For matter and form inflow being to the composite by communicating even themselves and their own entity, yet the being of the composite that comes to be thereby is distinct both from the being of the matter and the being of the form. And for this reason it properly depends on them, since both confer their being in order to constitute it. As a result, being arises that is distinct from either of those and that cannot exist without those. The same is obvious in the case of the efficient cause. We omit for now the final cause, which has a more obscure influx, as we will see below. For every thing that inflows being into something else through the mode of a *per se* and extrinsic principle, outside of the mystery of the Trinity, gives that by effecting the very being that it communicates. And for this reason it always gives being that is distinct from the proper being that it has in itself. And this is properly to cause and to effect. Conversely, then, a produced thing properly depends in that genus of efficient cause when the being that it has *per se* and primarily received from another thing flows from the being of the other thing and cannot exist without such an influx. But it does not happen this way in the case of the processions of the divine persons, since the being that is *per se* and primarily communicated through those productions is not something different from the being of the producing persons, but is numerically the same as that in the producing person. And this is unique and admirable in those divine processions. For this reason one person proceeds from another in such a way that it still receives wholly independent being, since it receives being that is numerically identical to the being of the producing person.

Why the
 produced
 divine persons
 do not
 depend on
 the producing
 person.

8. Nor is it a problem that the relations themselves are distinct and have proper distinct relative being. For it is not relative being as such but absolute and essential being

An objection
 comes up.

et essentielle, per se primo communicatur per illas processionones. Procedit enim Deus de Deo, et Pater, generando Filium, primario communicat ipsi suam naturam, relatio vero requiritur tamquam proprietas necessaria ad constituendam distinctam personam; quod est quasi materiale (ut sic dicam) in omni productione. Sicut in generatione humana quod per se primo ac formaliter intenditur, est communicatio humane nature, et humani esse: consequenter vero est requisita personalitas. Ratio ergo productionis principaliter pensanda est ex formali esse per se primo communicato. Unde generatio Christi ut hominis fuit vere humana propter verum esse humane nature, etiamsi personalitas fuerit alterius rationis. Sic igitur, quia generatio divina talis est, ut esse quod per se primo per illam communicatur, non sit manans ab alio esse, et ideo nec pendens nec causatum, sed communicatum tantum a persona producente, ideo generatio illa non est effectio neque causatio (ut sic dicam) sed productio longe superioris rationis. Accedit quod ipsummet esse relativum illarum personarum tale est, ut essentialiter includat totum esse divinum, quod essentialiter est independens: et ideo neque ipsum esse relativum potest dici dependens.

Unum relativum etiam creatum, proprie ab alio non pendet.

9. In relationibus vero creatis dicitur interdum una relatio pendere ab alia, quatenus sine illa esse non potest: Sed est impropria et lata locutio: quia ubi est dependentia prout nunc proprie loquimur, est prioritas nature: relationes autem mutue sunt omnino similes: minusque improprie diceretur relatio creata pendere a suo termino, si supponatur esse aliquid absolutum: quia posito fundamento et termino resultat relatio. Ex quo fit ut in creatis multo minus dici possit una relatio influere in aliam: quoniam una non est causa, immo nec principium

106 9] 8 A.

111 diceretur] dicitur V.

that is *per se* and primarily communicated through those processions. For God proceeds from God and the Father in generating the Son primarily communicates his own nature, but the relation is required as a necessary property for constituting a distinct person, which is, as it were, the material (if I may speak in this way) in every production. Just as in the case of human generation what is *per se* and primarily and formally intended is the communication of human nature and of human being, but consequently personality is a requisite. The *ratio* of production, therefore, should be gathered principally from the formal being that is *per se* and primarily communicated. Hence, the generation of Christ as a human being was truly human on account of the true being of human nature, even if the personality was of another *ratio*. In this way, therefore, since divine generation is such that the being that is *per se* and primarily communicated through it does not flow from another being and for that reason does not depend on and is not caused by another being but is only communicated by the producing person, this generation, therefore, is not an effecting nor a causation (if I may speak in this way) but is a production of a far superior nature. Add to this that the very relative being of those persons is such that it essentially includes the whole divine being which is essentially independent. For this reason the relative being itself also cannot be called dependent.

9. But in the case of created relations one relation is sometimes said to depend on another insofar as it cannot be without the other one. But this is an improper and extended locution. For where there is a dependency as we are now properly using the term there is a priority of nature. But mutual relations are entirely similar. Much less improperly it would be said that a created relation depends on its terminus, if it is supposed to be something absolute, since the relation results once foundation and terminus are posited. The result is that one can much less say in the case of created relations that one relation inflows into another, since the one is not the

Even a created relative cannot properly depend on another one.

alterius, sed solum habent necessariam simultatem seu concomitantiam. In divinis vero licet unum relativum procedat ab alio, non tamen per dependentiam, nec per influxum diversi esse essentialis, quod per se primo per talem productionem communice-^{120R} tur.

10. Ad declarandam ergo hanc proprietatem causae, diximus esse *principium quod influit esse*: quia oportet ut ipsummet esse causatum, et consequenter essentialiter distinctum ab esse ipsius^{125R} causae. Ad quod etiam indicandum consulto addidi particula *in aliud*, et non, in aliquem vel in alium: nam *aliud* absolute et proprie non dicitur nisi de eo quod est in essentia diversum. Quod autem causa includat hanc proprietatem et requirat talem^{130R} modum influxus, non aliter probari potest, quam ex communi notione et usu huius vocis, maxime apud Latinos. Item ex correlativo, quod communiter censetur esse effectus: quae vox aperte indicat imperfectionem et dependentiam in eo rigore^{135R} quem declaravimus; quare certum est personam divinam productam non posse dici effectum: alioqui diceretur etiam facta, quod est contra fidem, ut constat ex Symbolo. Tandem, quia ex re ipsa prout declarata est, constat, illum modum influxus, vel^{140R} emanationis qui convenit effectibus creatis respectu omnium suarum causarum, esse longe diversae rationis ab emanatione unius personae divinae ab alia; et habere illum modum dependentiae quem nos declaravimus: ergo potest una communi voce^{145R} significari, quae comprehendat causas rerum creatarum, et non principia divinarum personarum: huiusmodi autem est haec vox *causa*, et conceptus qui illi respondet, quem per dictam causae definitionem explicamus. Sic igitur verum est de ratione^{150R} causae esse ut sit essentialiter diversa a suo effectu:

cause, indeed, not even a principle, of the other, but only has a necessary simultaneity or concomitance. But with the divine relations, although one relative proceeds from another, yet it is not through dependency nor through an influx of different essential being that is *per se* and primarily communicated through such production.

10. Therefore, in order to explain this property of cause, we said that it is ‘a principle that inflows being’, since it is necessary for that being itself to be caused and, consequently, to be essentially distinct from the being of the cause itself. To indicate that I also advisedly added the phrase ‘to something else’ (*in aliud*) and not ‘to something’ (*in aliquem*) or ‘to another’ (*in alium*). For ‘to something else’ is not absolutely and properly said except of that which is different in essence. But that a cause includes this property and requires such a mode of influx cannot be proven otherwise than from the common notion and use of this word, especially among the Latins. Likewise, from the correlative, which is generally thought to be the effect, which word clearly indicates imperfection and dependency in that effect in the strict sense which we showed. Wherefore it is certain that a produced divine person cannot be said to be an effect. Otherwise, it would also be said to be made, which is contrary to the faith as is clear from the Apostles’ Creed. Finally, because from the thing itself as it was explained, it is clear that that mode of influx or emanation that applies to created effects with respect to all their causes is very different in nature from the emanation of one divine person from another and has that mode of dependency which we explained. Therefore, it can be signified with one common word which comprehends the causes of created things but not the principles of divine persons. Of this sort, moreover, is the word ‘cause’ the concept answering to it, which we explicated through the stated definition of cause. Thus, then, it is true of the *ratio* of the being of a cause that it is essentially different from its effect and that the effect properly depends on the cause. Moreover, each is indicated in that phrase as it was

et quod effectus proprie pendeat a causa: utrumque
autem in illa particula, prout a nobis declarata est,
155 indicatur, et per illam excluditur principium in divi-
nis a ratione causae.

Difficultas ex mysterio Incarnationis.

11. Alia vero difficultas nobis oritur ex alio mysterio
fidei, scilicet incarnatione: nam Verbo divino ut per-
sonaliter terminanti humanitatem, convenit tota illa
5 definitio causae: et tamen ut sic non est causa iuxta 5R
sanam doctrinam: cum neque possit esse causa
formalis, quia imperfecta est, neque efficiens, quia
alias haberet Verbum efficientiam ad extra, non com-
munem Patri, et Spiritui sancto. Maior propositio
10 probatur, quia iuxta communem modum loquendi 10R
Theologorum, Verbum divinum terminat dependen-
tiam humanitatis: ergo Verbum est id a quo pendet
illa humanitas. Quod si dicas pendere quidem ab
illo ut a termino, non ut a causa: primo non solvitur
15 difficultas, immo potius inde concluditur non omne 15R
id a quo aliud pendet, esse causam: et deinde valde
obscurum est quid sit dependere ut a termino. Sed
hoc posterius mirum non est, quia res est valde
supernaturalis, quam explicant Theologi, prout pos-
sunt. Illud vero prius convincit plane definitionem 20R
causae melius explicari per principium influens per
se esse in aliud, quam per dependentiam, nisi haec
25 influens esse in illam, neque humanitas hoc modo 25R
pendet a Verbo ut a principio influente esse in il-
lam: sed solum in ratione termini, qui est proprietas
quaedam necessaria, sine qua humanitas illa non
potest existere.

Vide dicta in
1. tom. 3. p. 20
disp. 8. sect. 3.

2 11] 10 A.

3 incarnatione] Incarnationis V.

explained by us and through it the *ratio* of cause is excluded
from applying to the principle in the divine cases.

A difficulty from the mystery of the Incarnation.

11. But another difficulty arises for us from another mystery
of the faith, namely, the Incarnation. For the divine Word as
personally terminating humanity fits that whole definition of
cause and yet as such it is not a cause according to sound
doctrine, because it can neither be a formal cause (since
a formal cause is imperfect) nor an efficient cause (since
otherwise the Word would have efficiency with respect to
something external not in common with the Father and Holy
Spirit). The major proposition is proven, since according to
the common way of speaking among theologians, the divine
Word terminates the dependency of humanity. Therefore,
the Word is that on which that humanity depends. But you
may say that to depend on that as a terminus but not as
on a cause, does not, in the first place, resolve the difficulty
(indeed, from that one concludes instead that not everything
on which something else depends is a cause) and, furthermore,
what it is to depend on something as on a terminus is most
obscure. But this latter point is hardly surprising, since the
matter is very much supernatural, which the theologians
explicate insofar as they can. But the former point establishes
clearly that the definition of cause is better explicated through
a principle inflowing being *per se* into something else than
through dependency, unless this latter phrase is explained
through the former. The Word as terminating humanity, then,
is not a principle *per se* inflowing being into the humanity
nor does the humanity depend in this way on the Word as
on a principle inflowing being into it but only in the *ratio* of
a terminus, which is a kind of necessary property without
which that humanity cannot exist.

See what was
said in
*Comm. ac
disp. in tertiam
partem
D. Thomae*
tom. 1, disp. 8,
sect. 3.

30 12. Quae responsio recte satisfacit, quantum ad
 dependentiam humanitatis a Verbo: adhuc tamen
 manet difficultas de dependentia Christi, ut est per-
 sona composita. Suppono enim ex vera Theolo-
 gorum doctrina, immo et Conciliorum, et Patrum, 35R
 35 ex Verbo ut terminante humanitatem, et humani-
 tate ipsa, consurgere Christi ut Dei hominis per-
 sonam per se unam, ac mirabiliter compositum. Il-
 lud ergo compositum vere pendet a Verbo, tamquam 40R
 40 a quodam principio intrinseco ex quo constat: unde
 necesse est ut in illud influat esse, communicando
 illi suum esse personale: ex quo cum humanitate
 resultat haec persona composita, quae ut sic aliquo
 modo distinguitur a Verbo nude sumpto. Sed ad 45R
 45 hoc eadem responsio applicanda est, nam Verbum
 non aliter concurret ad constituendum illud com-
 positum, quam terminando humanitatem: unde si
 in hoc non exercet aliquod causalitatis genus,
 neque etiam constituendo illam personam composi-
 tum habet aliquam rationem causae respectu illius. 50R
 50 Argumentum autem factum non tantum procedit in
 dicto mysterio, sed accommodari potest ad omnia
 extrema componentia aliquod compositum, ut est
 punctum respectu lineae, et subsistentia creata re-
 spectu suppositi, etc. De quibus omnibus dicendum 55R
 55 est recte probare reduci quidem ad aliquod genus
 causae intrinsecae, id est formalis vel materialis:
 quo modo autem, et in quo, aliquando deficient a
 proprietate talium causarum, et praesertim in dicto
 mysterio, pendet ex his quae de his causis in partic- 60R
 60 ulari dicenda sunt.

Causalitas quid.

13. Ex his quae de ratione causae in communi
 diximus, colligitur primo, quid sit id quo causa

12. This response rightly satisfies, as far as the depen-
 dency of the humanity on the Word is concerned. Nevertheless,
 a difficulty about the dependency of Christ as a composite
 person still remains. For I assume according to the true doc-
 trine of the theologians, indeed both of the Councils and of
 the Fathers, that out of the Word as terminating the humanity
 and out of the humanity itself there arises the person of Christ
 as of God and of man *per se* one and miraculously composed.
 That composite, therefore, truly depends on the Word as on a
 kind of intrinsic principle from which it is composed. Hence,
 it is necessary that that it inflow being into that by commu-
 nicating its own personal being, from which together with
 the humanity this composite person results, which is such
 is in some way distinguishe from the Word taken alone. But
 to this same response should be added that the Word does
 not concur for the constitution of that composite in any other
 way than by terminating the humanity. Hence, if it does not
 exercise some genus of causality in this, then it also does
 not have some *ratio* of cause with respect to the composite
 person as a result of constituting that person. Moreover, the
 argument that was made not only applies to the mentioned
 mystery, but can also be adapted to all extremes composing
 some composite, for example, a point with respect to a line, a
 created subsistence with respect to the supposit, etc. About
 all of these one should rightly say that they indeed prove to
 be reduced to some genus of intrinsic cause, i.e., formal or
 material. But in what way and in what they sometimes fall
 short of the property of such causes, especially in the case of
 the aforementioned mystery, depends on the things that are
 to be said about these causes in particular.

What causality is.

13. From what we have said about the *ratio* of cause in
 general, one can gather, first, what it is by which a cause in act

Read what we
 said in
*Comm. ac
 disp. in tertiam
 partem
 D. Thomae,*
 tom. 1, disp. 8,
 sect. 1.

In what way
 the divine
 Word concurs
 with humanity
 for the
 constitution of
 Christ.

How the
 terminating
 modes
 exercise
 causality with
 respect to the
 termini.

30 12] 11 A.

2 13] 11 A.

5 in actu formaliter et proxime constituitur in esse
 causae: quod solet vocari *causatio*, vel *causalitas* in 5R
 communi: hoc autem nil aliud est quam influxus
 ille, seu concursus, quo unaquaeque causa in suo
 genere actu influit esse in effectum: hic vero con-
 10 concursus necessario oportet ut sit aliquid distinctum
 in re seu ex natura rei a relatione ipsius causae, 10R
 cum possit res illa quae causa denominatur, in re
 manere sine hoc actuali influxu: quod est certum
 signum distinctionis ex natura rei, ut in superi-
 oribus visum est. Non potest autem hic influxus
 15 esse sola [*relatio*] praedicamentalis causae ad ef- 15R
 fectum: nam haec, qualiscumque illa sit, resultat
 ex ipso influxu causae ut terminato ad effectum,
 eo scilicet modo qua dici solet, posito fundamento
 et termino, consurgere relationem; est ergo ille in-
 20 fluxus aliquid prius relatione: et secundum illum 20R
 etiam causa est prior natura suo effectui, cum tamen
 secundum relationem sint simul natura. Est igitur
 ille influxus aliquid medium inter entitatem, et
 relationem causae: quid autem illud sit et an sit
 25 aliquid in ipsa causa vel in effectui, et an sit aliquis 25R
 modus distinctus ab illis, vel tantum denominatio ex
 utroque desumpta, non potest hic distinctius expli-
 cari, donec ad singula causarum genera declaranda
 veniamus. Et idem est de quibusdam proprietati-
 30 bus vel conditionibus, quae communem rationem 30R
 causae comitari videntur, et in diversis causis diver-
 simode reperiuntur, ut esse prius natura, distingui
 realiter, vel essentialiter ab effectui, etc.

Causae unicus obiectivus conceptus.

35 14. Secundo colligi potest ex dictis, nomen causae
 non esse mere aequivocum, cum non tantum nomen,
 sed etiam aliqua ratio nominis communis sit. An 35R

15 *relatio*] ratio A V.

35 14] 12 A.

is formally and proximately constituted in the being of cause,
 which is usually called 'causation' or 'causality' in general.
 For this is nothing other than that influx or concursus by
 which each cause in act in its genus inflows being into the
 effect. But this concursus must necessarily be something
 distinct *in re* or *ex natura rei* from the relation of the cause
 itself, since that thing which is denominated a cause can
 remain *in re* without this actual influx. This is a certain sign
 of a distinction *ex natura rei*, as was seen in earlier sections.
 Moreover, this influx cannot merely be the categorical relation
 of a cause to its effect. For this, whatever exactly it is, results
 from that influx of the cause as terminated in the effect:
 namely, in that way by which it is usually said that a relation
 arises by positing a foundation and terminus. That influx,
 therefore, is something prior to the relation. And according
 to that influx, also, a cause is prior in nature to its effect,
 yet according to the relation they are simultaneous in nature.
 That influx, therefore, is some medium between the entity
 and the relation of the cause. But what that is or whether it
 is something in the cause itself or in the effect and whether
 it is some mode distinct from the cause and effect or merely
 a denomination taken from both cannot be explained more
 clearly here, before we have gotten around to explaining the
 individual genera of causes. The same is the case with certain
 kinds of properties or conditions that seem to attend the
 general *ratio* of cause and that are found in different ways in
 the different kinds of causes, such as being prior in nature,
 being really or essentially distinguished from effects, etc.

The unique objective concept of cause.

14. One can gather from what was said, second, that the
 name 'cause' is not merely equivocal, since it is not only a
 name but there is also a certain *ratio* common to the name.

40 vero huic nomini secundum illam definitionem cor-
respondeat unus conceptus tam formalis quam
obiectivus causae in communi, in controversia est:
nam quidam existimant non correspondere huius-
modi conceptum unum, quia modi quibus effectus 40R
pendent a causas in diversis generibus causarum,
ita sunt primo diversi, ut ab eis una communis ratio
45 dependentiae abstrahi non possit. Sed hoc neque
ab ipsis probatur, neque mihi videtur admodum
verisimile, nam ex omni reali convenientia potest 45R
abstrahi conceptus communis, inter causas autem
non solum est proportionalitas aliqua metaphorica,
50 alioqui non de omnibus illis causa cum proprietate
diceretur, sed est vera et realis convenientia, ut
ex definitione data, et expositione eius confirmari 50R
etiam potest; et ex his quae de conceptu entis dix-
imus, multa hic applicari possunt. Non est ergo cur
55 negetur unus communis conceptus causae. An vero
secundum illum sit univocatio vel aliqua analogia,
constabit melius post traditam divisionem causae, 55R
et explicata singula membra, ac modos causandi: et
ideo illud omitemus, donec causas ipsas inter se
60 conferamus.

But it is controversial whether there is one concept, formal as much as objective, of cause in general that corresponds to that name in accordance with this definition. For some think there is no one concept of this sort that corresponds to the name, because the modes in which effects depend on causes in the different genera of causes are so diverse that no one common *ratio* of dependence can be abstracted from them. But this is not proven from those things nor does it seem very likely to be true to me. For a common concept can be abstracted from all real agreements. Between causes, moreover, there is not only a certain metaphorical proportionality. Otherwise, it could not be said of all those causes with propriety. Rather, there is a true and real agreement between causes, as can be confirmed from the given definition and its exposition. And many of the things we said concerning the concept of being can be applied here. There is, therefore, no reason to deny that there is one common concept of cause. But whether according to it there is univocity or a certain analogy will be clearer after treating the division of cause and explaining the individual kinds and their modes of causing. For this reason we will leave aside this matter until we have compared the different kinds of causes to each other.