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1. Ut Theologica disputatio, et iucundior sit, et facilior, operae pretium duxi eam in testimonio Pauli fundare ad Ephesios 1, ubi de Deo dicit operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae. In duas igitur principales disputationes praesentem relectionem distribuam. In priori litteralem sensum verborum Pauli attingere conabor, simulque nonnulla principia fidei, et Theologicas conclusiones, quae in eis fundari possunt, breviter indicabo. In posteriori autem parte de re proposita disputabo, veram eius decisionem ex verbis Pauli eliciendo.

DISPUTATIO I.

De vero sensu illius sententiae Pauli; Deus operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae.

In hac Apostoli sententia plura in Theologia fundari possunt, si eius singula verba exacte expendantur, et verus illius sensus percipiatur. Et ideo prius litteralem eius sensum inquiremus: deinde veritates ibi contentas indicabimus.

SECTIO I.

Quid significaverit Paulus dicens, Deum operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1600 Mainz edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Madrid, 1599). For recorded variants, B = 1600 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1600 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 11 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

15 expendantur] pendantur V.

16 inquiremus] inquirimus V.

1. So that this theological disputation is both more pleasing and easier, I considered it worthwhile to start it with the testimony of Paul in Ephesians 1[:11], where he says of God that he works all things “according to the counsel of his will.” Therefore, I divide the present relection into two principal disputations. In the first I will attempt to arrive at the literal sense of Paul’s words, while at the same time indicating briefly some of the principles of the faith and theological conclusions that can be grounded in them. But in the second part I will dispute about the proposed matter, by drawing out a true resolution from the words of Paul.

DISPUTATION I.

On the true sense of Paul’s statement that God works all things according to the counsel of his will.

Many things in theology can be grounded in this statement from the Apostle if each of its words is accurately considered and if its true sense is perceived. For that reason we will first inquire into its literal sense and then we will point out the truths contained there.

SECTION I.

What Paul signified in saying that God works all things according to the counsel of his will.

2. Ad priorem igitur partem deveniendo, <col. b> cum Paulus ad Ephesios 1 gratias Deo ageret pro beneficiis generi humano collatis, per Christum, et in Christo Domino nostro; inter ea beneficia primo loco numerat electionem, et praedestinationem hominum. *Elegit (inquit) nos in ipso, et praedestinavit nos secundum propositum voluntatis suae.* Deinde vero ponit generalem modum et executionem huius praedestinationis, dicens. *In quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem eius, ut notum faceret nobis sacramentum voluntatis suae.* Ac tandem hanc generalem Dei beneficentiam ad suam singularem vocationem, et praedestinationem accommodat, dicens: *In quo et nos sorte vocati sumus, praedestinati secundum propositum eius, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae.* Non possumus autem nunc digredi ad explicanda omnia mysteria, quae in hoc discursu Pauli continentur; tum quia impossibile esset brevi tempore omnia complecti; tum quia etiam esset a praesenti instituto alienum, solum enim explicare intendimus libertatem, quam divina voluntas habet in operando eiusque radicem, quam Paulus etiam ait esse originem electionis, praedestinationis, et salutis omnium nostrum, iuxta consilium tamen voluntatis suae. Atque ideo solum explicabo, quid sit Deum operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae: quidve D. Paulus his verbis ad litteram intellectis nos docere voluerit. <394>

45 *Ratio difficultatis.*

3. Quamvis autem interpretes omnes nullam de hac re dubitationem proponant, non caret tamen difficultate, nec expositionum varietate. Est autem difficultatis ratio, quia consilium non est actus voluntatis, sed rationis, ut D. Thomas tradidit 1. 2. q. 14. art. 1. ex Aristotele 3 *Ethicorum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 3. et Gregorio Nisseno lib. 5. *De philosophia* cap. 4. et 5. Unde etiam Cicero, lib. *De inventione* dixit: *Consilium est aliquid faciendi, non faciendive excogitata ratio.* Quomodo ergo Paulus consilium voluntati attribuit? Aut quid est Deum operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae? Praeterea duplex respectus vel habitudo indicari potest,

2. Turning to the first part, then, Paul in Ephesians 1 gives thanks to God for the benefits bestowed on humankind through Christ and in Christ our Lord. Among these benefits, he numbers in the first place the election and predestination of human beings. He says: “He elects us in him [...] and predestines us [...] according to the plan of his will” [Eph. 1:4–5]. And he then states the general mode and execution of this predestination, saying: “In whom we have redemption through his blood [...] that he might make known to us the mystery of his will” [Eph. 1:7, 9]. And finally he applies this general beneficence of God to his individual calling and predestination, saying: “In whom we also were called, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will” [Eph. 1:11]. We cannot digress to explain every mystery that is contained in this discussion from Paul, both because it would be impossible to cover everything in a short time and because it would be irrelevant to our present intention. For we intend only to explain the freedom that the divine will has in acting and to explain its root, which Paul also says is the origin of the election, predestination, and salvation of all of us and yet according to the counsel of his will. And for this reason I will only explain what it is for God to act according to the counsel of his will, or what St. Paul wished to teach us once these words are understood exactly (*ad litteram*).

The reason for the difficulty.

3. But even though all interpreters expound concerning this passage without any doubt, it, nevertheless, does not lack difficulty or variety in exposition. The reason for the difficulty is that counsel is not an act of will but an act of reason, as St. Thomas teaches in *ST IaIIae.14.1*, following Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, Gregory of Nyssa, *On Philosophy* 5.4–5. From where Cicero also says in *De inventione* [1.36]: “Counsel is a reasoned plan for doing or not doing something.” So why does Paul attribute counsel to the will? Or what is it for God to act according to the counsel of his will? Furthermore, two respects or relations can be indicated when someone is said to act in accordance with the counsel of his mind: namely, the respect of giving counsel

cum dicitur quispiam operari secundum consilium animi sui: scilicet respectus dantis vel accipientis consilium: sic ergo, cum Deus dicitur operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae, dubium est quis horum respectuum denotetur: nam, si indicatur respectus dantis, difficile est ad explicandum quomodo ad voluntatem pertineat dare consilium, secundum quod Deus operatur: si vero notetur respectus accipientis, seu eius cui consilium datur, sic non divina voluntas, sed divinum consilium erit prima radix, et origo divinorum operum, ac beneficiorum quae nobis confert. Hoc autem neque est consentaneum Paulo ibidem dicenti; divinum propositum et electionem esse huiusmodi radicalem originem bonorum omnium: haec autem ad voluntatem pertinent: neque etiam divinae voluntatis libertas alia ratione videtur posse consistere.

Prima expositio.

4. Tres igitur in hac re excogitari possunt interpretationes. Prima est, ut Deus dicatur operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae, id est, a nullo alio consilium accipiendo, vel nullum alium consulendo ad hoc vel illud operandum, nisi voluntatem suam. Iuxta quem sensum explicatur illis verbis summa libertas, et supremum dominium divinae voluntatis, quae nullam habet superiorem regulam, quam respiciat, ut recte operetur, sed ipsa per seipsam est prima regula, et prima ratio operandi. Potestque haec expositio ex communi, et vulgari loquendi modo declarari: <col. b> nam ad significandum aliquem hominem in suis actionibus sequi appetitum suum, dicimus eum operari secundum consilium sui appetitus; scilicet quia ad illum tantum respicit, ut quidquid expetierit, ei concedat. Sic ergo Deus dicitur omnia operari, secundum consilium voluntatis suae, quia semper exequitur quod voluntas appetit, neque aliunde consilium accipit. Et hanc interpretationem indicat Anselmus super locum Pauli dicens: *Consilium, quo Deus facit omnia, est voluntatis suae, id est, non extraneum: quia non ab alio accepit consilium, nisi*

Anselmus.

³The commentary on Ephesians is ascribed to Herveus of Bordeaux in *Patrologia latina* 181:1213.

or the respect of receiving counsel. Thus, then, when God is said to act in accordance with the counsel of his will, it is not clear which of these respects is being indicated. For if the respect of giving [counsel] is indicated, the difficulty is to explain in what way it pertains to the will to give the counsel according to which God acts. But if what is being noted is the respect of receiving [counsel] or the counsel of that to which it is given, then the primary root and source of all the divine works and benefits bestowed on us will be not the divine will but the divine counsel. But that is not consistent with what Paul says in that very passage: the divine plan and election are in this way the original source of every good. But these belong to the will. Nor does it seem that the freedom of the divine will could consist in any other notion.

The first exposition.

4. Three interpretations, then, can be devised in this matter. The first is that when God is said to act according to the counsel of his will this means that he is not accepting counsel from anyone else and is not counseling anything other than his will to do this or that. This is the sense in which these words “the highest freedom and the supreme dominion of the divine will,” which has no superior rule that it respects in order to act rightly but is itself its first rule and first reason for acting, are explained. This exposition can be shown by the usual and common way of speaking, for in order to signify that some human being follows his desire in his actions, we say that he acts according to the counsel of his appetite, namely, because he respects it so much that he would grant whatever it asked for. In this way, therefore, God is said to do all things according to the counsel of his will because he always pursues what his will desires nor does he accept counsel from anywhere else. Anselm indicates this interpretation of the passage from Paul, saying: “The counsel by which God does all things is his will, that is, not something external, for he does not accept counsel from anything other than his will.”³ Augustine also indicates the same thing in the second book of *Hypognosticon*, ch. 6: “Can it be that

Anselm.

Augustine.

Augustinus. *a sua voluntate.* Eam etiam indicat Augustinus lib. 6. *Hypognosticon* cap. 6. *Numquid (ait) voluntatis meae, vel tuae, aut alterius, ut meritis constet? Absit sed suae; quia nimirum suam tantum consulit voluntatem.* Itaque verba Pauli secundum hanc expositionem, intransitive (ut sic dicam) erunt interpretanda; nimirum: *Secundum consilium voluntatis suae*, id est, secundum consilium, quod est voluntas sua. Favet etiam Anselmus in *Prosologio* cap. 11. quatenus ad Deum loquens, ait: *Id solum iustum est quod vis.* Favet etiam Iustinus in q. 3. a Christianis gentibus proposita, ubi nihil distinguendum censet inter consilium et voluntatem divinam; et videtur loqui etiam secundum rationem nostram. Neque id mirum videri debet: nam, teste Damasceno lib. 2. *De fide* cap. 22. consilium proprie dictum, non est in Deo, nam consilium ex ignorantia nascitur. Deus igitur (inquit) omnia simpliciter sciens, non consultat. Necesse est ergo, ut Paulus voce *Consilii*, non proprie, sed secundum metaphoram utatur. Ac propterea recte secundum eam metaphoram significata intelligitur voluntas Dei, quam divina operatio subsequitur; sicut in prudente homine, ut alibi dixit Cicero; consilia primum praecedunt; deinde acta postea eventus.

Reiicitur.

D. Thomas. 5. Sed nihilominus expositio haec probanda non est: imprimis enim nimis metaphorice consilii nomen interpretatur: ut enim recte notavit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 14. art. 1. ad secundum: quamvis consilium, quatenus in nobis supponit, vel indicat motum quemdam inquisitionis, Deo attribui non possit, quia supponit ignorantiam, et includit mutationem et discursum; tamen <395> id, quod praecipuum est in consilio, id est, iudicium certum de agendis, in Deo perfectissime reperitur, sine ulla inquisitione, vel consultatione praevia, sed simpliciter intuendo omnia, et iudicando de omnibus, quatenus operabilia sunt. Cum ergo Paulus utatur nomine consilii,

he establishes as meritorious [according to the counsel] of my will or your will or the will of someone else? Surely nothing but according to his will. For without doubt he takes counsel only from his own will.” So therefore according to this exposition the words of Paul should be interpreted intransitively (if I may call it that), namely: “according to the counsel of his will,” that is, according to counsel, which is his will. Anselm also favours the same interpretation in *Proslogion* ch. 11, insofar as when he is speaking to God he says: “That alone which you will is just.” Justin also favours this view in the third question proposed by the Christians, where he thinks that there is nothing to distinguish between counsel and will in the divine case and seems to say the same thing about our reason. Nor should that seem surprising, for as John of Damascus testifies in the second book of *On Faith*, ch. 22, properly speaking there is no counsel in God, for counsel arises in cases of ignorance. God therefore, he says, since he knows everything without qualification does not ask for counsel. It is necessary, therefore, that Paul uses the word ‘counsel’ not strictly but metaphorically. And for this reason the significate is, according to that metaphor, rightly understood to be the will of God, which is immediately followed by divine activity. This is just as in the case of a prudent human being, as Cicero says in [*On Oratory* 2.15]: “counsels come first, then the actions, and afterwards the results.”

It is rejected.

5. But this exposition, nevertheless, is not established, for, in the first place, the word ‘counsel’ is interpreted far too metaphorically. As St. Thomas rightly notes in *ST IaIIae.14.1 ad 2*: although counsel insofar as it is in us presupposes or indicates a certain motion of inquiry, that cannot be attributed to God since it presupposes ignorance and includes change and a discursus. Nevertheless, that which is primary in counsel, that is, a certain judgement about what to do, is found most perfectly in God, without any prior inquiry or consultation, but simply by intuiting everything and judging about everything insofar as they are producible. Therefore, when Paul uses the name ‘counsel’, he does not want to signify something belonging to the will but some-

21 Augustinus] D. Augustinus V.
21 6] 2 B V.

Justin.

John of
Damascus.Cicero, *On
Oratory*.

St. Thomas.

15 aliquid pertinens ad divinum intellectum, non ad voluntatem
 significare vult: retinenda enim est vocis proprietates, quan-
 tum circumstantiae, et materia loci patiuntur. Deinde est 15R
 hoc magis consentaneum contextui, et intentioni Pauli: cum
 enim dixisset nos sorte vocatos esse secundum propositum
 eius; ne quis putaret in hoc negotio esse casum et contingen-
 20 esse a ratione alienum; subdit Deum omnia operari secundum
 consilium; id est, non casu aut temere, sed summa quadam 20R
 ratione, et prudentia: ergo consilium non voluntatem, sed
 Hieronymus. aliquid ad rationem pertinens significat. Unde Hieronymus
 exponens eundem locum. *Universa* (inquit) *quae Deus facit,*
 25 *consilio facit, et voluntate; quia et ratione plena sunt, et potes-*
tate facientis. Et apertius D. Thomas in eundem locum, quasi
 30 *excludens illam expositionem, ait: Non dicit secundum volun-*
tatem, ne credas quod sit irrationabilis, sed secundum consil-
ium voluntatis, id est, secundum voluntatem, quae est ex ra-
tione, non secundum quod ratio importat discursum, sed secun-
 35 *dum quod designat certum et deliberatum iudicium.* Tandem
 cavenda est illa expositio, nam aliquibus errandi occasio fuisse
 videtur. Dixerunt enim aliqui divinae voluntati licitum esse,
 velle, et facere, quidquid humana voluntas velle potest, quan-
 40 tumvis respectu voluntatis humanae turpe esse videatur: quia
 hoc ipso quod divina voluntas id velit, ipsi turpe non erit,
 eo quod sola sit sibi regula omnis rectitudinis, et honestatis.
 Ex quo principio male intellecto nonnulli Theologi in quem-
 45 dam errorem gravissimum inciderunt; dicentes Deum posse
 mentiri: quia divina voluntas pro sua libertate summa potest
 velle mendacium absque alio consilio, sed solum quia vult:
 et quia ad rectitudinem satis est ut ipsa id velit. Hinc etiam
 huius temporis haeretici in divinam voluntatem referunt om-
 50 nia hominum peccata; dicentes; velle Deum, ut nos peccemus;
 imo sua voluntate nostram compellere, ut huiusmodi
 actiones, etiam turpissimas, velimus: quia Deus in volendo
 nullo alio consilio regitur, nisi usu libero suae voluntatis, qui
 semper illi honestus est, quidquid in <col. b> obiectis di-
 versum esse appareat. Sed haec et similia haeretica sunt, et
 divina voluntate plane indigna, quae ita libera est, ut tamen

thing belong to the divine intellect. For what is proper to the word
 should be retained to the extent that the circumstances and subject
 matter of the passage allow.

This is also more consistent with the context and intention of
 Paul, for when he says that we are called by lot according to his pur-
 pose [(Eph. 1:11)], no one would think that in this business there is
 the chance and contingency that are usually found in the lot and no
 one would think that the divine purpose is unconnected to reason.
 He adds that God works all things according to counsel, that is, not
 by chance and blindly but according to the highest reason and pru-
 dence. Counsel, therefore, signifies not something belonging to the
 will but something belonging to reason. Hence, Jerome says when ex-
 50R plaining the same passage: “Everything that God makes, he makes by
 his counsel and by his will, since they are both filled with reason and
 with the power of making.” And St. Thomas says even more clearly
 about the same passage, as if excluding that interpretation: “He does
 not say ‘according to his will,’ lest you should think it irrational, but
 he says ‘according to the counsel of his will,’ that is, according to the
 will which arises from reason (not insofar as reason implies a discursus,
 but insofar as reason indicates a certain and deliberate judgement.”

Jerome.

Finally, one should be wary of that interpretation, for it seems to
 have been the occasion for some to err. For some have said that the
 divine will is permitted to will and to do whatever the human will can
 will, even though with respect to a human will it seems to be wicked.
 This is because the very fact that the divine will wills it means that it
 will not be wicked, as a result of the will alone being the rule for itself
 of all rectitude and fineness (*honestatis*). From misunderstanding this
 principle, some theologians have fallen into a certain very grave error,
 saying that God can deceive, on grounds that the divine will as a result
 of its highest freedom can will a lie apart from any counsel but simply
 because it wants to and because it is sufficient for rectitude that it wills
 that.

Henceforth, too, the heretics of this age refer all human sins to
 the divine will, saying that God wills that we sin, indeed, that by his
 will he compels us so that we want to perform actions of this sort,
 even the most wicked ones. For God wills he is not guided by any
 other counsel than the free use of his will, which is always fine (*honestus*)
 regardless how different it may appear in the objects. But this and

rectissima sit, et prudentissima: ideoque velle non potest ea, quae per se considerata intrinsecam includunt turpitudinem, et rectae rationi repugnant, ad quamcumque voluntatem, vel intellectum comparentur. Unde tantum abest, ut huiusmodi errores ex hac sententia Pauli colligantur, ut potius ex illa possent sufficienter confundi: quia, cum Deus omnia operetur secundum consilium suae voluntatis, quod consilium est infinita eius sapientia, fieri non potest, ut quidquam velit, nisi quod honestissimum est, et summae prudentiae consentaneum. Quam doctrinam etiam in D. Thoma reperio, 1. p. q. 21. art. 1 ubi cum docuisset ita Deum operari omnia suo arbitrio, ut tamen in omnibus operibus suis rationem iustitiae servet; obiicit sibi haec verba Pauli. *In quibus* (inquit) *Apostolus significare videtur, Deum operari omnia pro libito voluntatis suae: non ergo in operando legibus iustitiae astringitur?* Respondet autem Doctor sanctus his verbis. *Cum bonum intellectum sit obiectum voluntatis, impossibile est Deum velle, nisi quod ratio suae sapientiae habet, quae quidem est sicut lex iustitiae, secundum quam eius voluntas iusta et recta est. Unde quod secundum suam voluntatem facit, iuste facit, sicut et nos quod iuxta legem facimus, iuste facimus: sed nos quidem secundum legem alicuius superioris, Deus autem sibi est lex.* Dicitur ergo divina voluntas sibi regula suarum actionum, non quia sapientia, et prudentia non regatur, sed quia ipsa essentialiter est sua sapientia, et prudentia infinita. Dum autem nos de divinis humano modo loquimur, et illam secundum rationem distinguimus, dicimus divinam voluntatem sequi intellectum in operationibus suis.

Secunda expositio.

6. Ex his vero, quae contra primam hanc interpretationem

⁴This is more of a loose paraphrase of arg. 2 than a quotation.

63 (inquit)] (inquit Apostolus) B.

71 *iuste facimus*] *om.* V.

similar views are heretical and plainly unworthy of the divine will, which is free in such a way that it is also most right and most prudent. For this reason it cannot will those things which considered in themselves include intrinsic wickedness and are repugnant to right reason when related to any will or intellect. Hence, it is so far from being the case that errors of this sort can be gathered from this sentence from Paul that rather they can be sufficiently confuted by it. For, when God does all things according to the counsel of his will, that counsel is his infinite wisdom. So it cannot happen that he will anything except it be fine in the highest degree (*honestissimum*) and fitting with the highest prudence.

I find this teaching also in St. Thomas in *ST* Ia.21.1, where when he teaches that God does everything by his choice (*arbitrio*) in such a way that he still in all his works preserves the character of justice, he objects to himself with these words from Paul: “In these words the Apostle seems to indicate that God does all things as it is pleasing to his will. Is he not, therefore, bound to the laws of justice when he acts?”⁴ But the holy doctor responds with these words: “Since understood good is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything except that which has the character of his wisdom, which in fact is as it were the law of justice, according to which his will is right and just. Hence, what he does in accordance with his will, he does justly, just as what we do according to the law, we do justly (but we of course according to a law from someone superior whereas God is his own law).” Therefore, the divine will is said to be the rule of its own actions not because it is not guided by wisdom and prudence but because it itself essentially is its infinite wisdom and prudence. But as long as we are speaking about divine things in a human way and we make distinctions accordingly, we say that the divine will in its actions follows the divine will.

St. Thomas.

The second exposition.

6. But from the things we have said against this first interpretation,

diximus, potest quis in aliam extreme oppositam declinare, dicens, Deum operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae; quia, sicut omnia opera Dei voluntatem eius supponunt, 5 ita voluntas Dei consilium eius supponit; id est, sententiam, et iudicium definitum ac determinatum intellectus, cui voluntas necessario conformatur, vel (ut ita dicam) ei naturaliter obedit. Quam expositio- <396> nem non invenio expresse in sanctis Patribus, neque in expositoribus epistolarum Pauli. 10 Videri autem potest consentanea proprietati dictorum verborum. Ille enim verissime dicitur operari secundum consilium alicuius, qui tam in operando, quam in volendo sese accommodat, et conformatur consilio eius. Sic ergo Deus dicitur operari secundum consilium voluntatis, quia ita operatur ex voluntate, ut tamen ipsa voluntas semper intellectui, et iudicio eius obsequatur. Atque huic expositioni favent D. Hieronymus, D. Thomas; et alii dicentes, Paulum usum fuisse illo modo loquendi, ut significaret voluntatem Dei semper esse 20 ex certa ratione profectam. Et praesertim, cum D. Thomas ait; sicut nos operamur secundum legem superioris, ita Deum operari secundum suam sapientiam, quae ipsi est veluti lex. Intercedit namque in hoc considerata differentia; quia voluntas nostra ita conformatur legi, ut possit ab ea discordare, 25 quia non est per se essentialiter recta: at vero divina voluntas, quia essentialiter recta est, non potest a ratione suae sapientiae deflectere: et ideo ab illa determinari videtur in omnibus quae vult. Recte ergo dicitur Deus operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae, quia omnia operatur secundum dictamen suae rationis, quo eius voluntas determinatur, 30 ut hoc potius velit operari, quam aliud. Atque iuxta hunc sensum videntur locuti aliqui antiqui Patres, quando dixerunt Deum semper operari quod melius est, ut Clemens Alexandria, 6. *Stromaton*; Augustinus, lib. 3. *De libero arbitrio* cap. 5. dicens. *Quidquid tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit, hoc scias fecisse Deum, tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem.* Huius enim sententiae nulla alia ratio reddi potest, nisi quia divinam sapientiam latere non potest quid melius, ac optimum

Clemens
Alexandria.
Augustinus.

8 (ut ita dicam)] (vel ut ita dicam) B.
34 5] 1 B V.

one might swerve into the opposite extreme, saying that God works all things according to the counsel of his will because just as every work of God presupposes his will so also the will of God presupposes his counsel, that is, the defined and determinate view and judgement of the intellect to which the will necessarily is conformed or which (if I may speak in this way) it naturally obeys. I do not find this exposition explicitly expressed in the holy Fathers or in the expositors of Paul's letters. It can, however, seem consistent with the characteristics of the spoken words. For one who in acting as well as in willing accommodates and conforms himself to someone's counsel is most truly said to act according to their counsel. In this way, then, God is said to act according to the counsel of his will because he always acts from his will in such a way that the will still always yields to his intellect and judgement. St. Jerome, St. Thomas, and others favour this exposition, saying that Paul was using this way of speaking in order to indicate that the will of God always proceeds from a certain reason. St. Thomas especially seems to favour it when he says that just as we act according to the law of a superior so also God acts according to his wisdom which is as law to him [(*ST* Ia.21.1 ad 2)].

A difference comes up here, however, that should be noted, for our will is conformed to the law in such a way that it can depart from it since it is not in itself essentially right, but the divine will cannot be turned from the nature of its wisdom because it is essentially right. For this reason it seems to be determined by its wisdom in everything that it wills. Therefore, God is rightly said to do all thing according to the counsel of his will, since he does all things according to the dictate of his reason. His will is determined by this dictate so that it wills to do one thing rather than another.

The ancient Fathers seem to have spoken according to this view when they said that God always does what is better, as Clement of Alexandria does in *Stromaton* VI and Augustine does in *De libero arbitrio* III.5, saying: "Whatever might occur to you by true reason as being better, you may be sure that God has made it as the Creator of all good things." No other reason can be given for this view than that what is better and best in everything that can be done cannot be hidden from divine wisdom. His will, moreover, which is the highest

Clement of
Alexandria.
Augustine.

40 sit, in omnibus quae fieri possunt. Voluntas autem eius, quae
 ut optimum proponit: nam, si posset, non esset necessarium
 operari semper in omnibus, quod melius est. Quam rationem
 indicavit idem Augustinus, lib. 1. *Contra adversarium legis et*
prophetarum cap. 14 dicens. *Usque adeo desipiendum est, ut*
 45 *videat homo melius aliquid fieri debuisse, et hoc Deum vidisse*
non putet, aut putet vidisse, et credat facere noluisse, aut non po-
tuisse? Denique iuxta hanc interpretationem videntur sensisse
 illi Scholastici, qui dixerunt; divinam voluntatem determinari
 ab intellectu; quia, cum per se sit indifferens ad volenda om-
 50 nia, quae extra Deum sunt, nihil eorum velle <col. b> pos-
 set, nisi ab aliquo determinaretur: non potest autem determi-
 nari Deus ab aliquo extra ipsum existente: esset enim magna
 imperfectio: ergo determinatur a consilio suo, et intellectu:
 quod docuisse videtur D. Thomas, lib. 1. *Summae contra gen-*
 55 *tiles* cap. 82.

Refellitur.

7. Haec vero expositio, licet sensum aliquem verum habere
 possit, videlicet quoad aliquam determinationem quoad spec-
 5 ificationem, ut infra declarabimus: intellecta tamen, ut non-
 nulli Moderni significant, de omnimoda determinatione vol-
 untatis divinae quoad volendum, vel nolendum quodcumque
 opus et secundum speciem, et secundum exercitium actus
 falsa est, et a mente Pauli aliena, eiusque intentioni contraria.
 Primum ita declaro, quia sententia illa sic exposita, repugnat
 10 divinae libertati, ut inter Scholasticos melius docuit Henri-
 cus, *Quodlibet* 8. q. 1. et in *Summae quaestionum ordinarium*
 art. 36. q. 4. Et declaratur breviter: quia in intellectu, vel
 scientia Dei, prout nostro modo intelligendi antecedit vol-
 untatem nulla est indifferentia, vel libertas ex se, sed natu-
 15 rali necessitate omnia scit eo modo, quo sunt, et ita etiam de
 omnibus iudicat; unde semper, et ex necessitate idem iudicat:
 ergo si voluntas eius naturaliter determinaretur ab eius iudi-

Henricus.

41 esset] esest V.

46–47 aut non potuisse] om. V.

good, cannot depart from that which the intellect proposes as best.
 For if it could, it would not necessarily always in everything do what
 is better. The same Augustine indicates this reason in *Contra adver-*
sarium legis et prophetarum I.14, saying: “How utterly foolish would
 it be to think that a human being sees that something better ought to
 have been done and that God does not see this? Or to think that he
 does see this and to believe that he does not wish to do it or that he
 cannot do it?”

Finally, those scholastics seem to have thought in accordance with
 this interpretation who said that the divine will is determined by the
 intellect, because, since of itself it is indifferent with respect to willing
 anything external to God, it could not will anything external except
 it be determined by something else. But God cannot be determined
 by anything existing beyond himself, for that would be a great imper-
 fection. Therefore, it is determined by his counsel and his intellect.
 St. Thomas seems to teach this in *Summa contra gentiles* I.82.

It is rebutted.

7. But this exposition, although it might have some true sense—
 namely, with respect to a certain determination with respect to spec-
 5 ification, as we will show below—nevertheless, it is false when under-
 stood, as some moderns indicate, of every sort of determination of
 the divine will with respect to willing or nilling of any work whatso-
 ever both with respect to the species and exercise of the act. It is also
 foreign to the mind of Paul and contrary to his intention.

I first show this as follows: when that view is explained in that
 way it is repugnant to divine freedom. Henry of Ghent explains this
 10 better among the scholastics in *Quodlibet* 8.1 and in *Summae quaes-*
tionum ordinarium art. 36, q. 4. It is explained briefly: for in the
 intellect or knowledge of God, insofar as according to our way of un-
 derstanding it precedes the will, there is no indifference or a freedom
 from itself. Rather, it knows by natural necessity all things in the way
 that they are and it judges concerning all things in that way. Hence, it
 15 judges them the same always and by necessity. Therefore, if God’s will

Henry of Ghent.

cio, seu consilio, nulla esset in Deo libertas, seu indifferentia; quia neque est in iudicio, neque in voluntate obsequente et
 20 pedissequa iudicii (ut sic dicam) ergo nullibi. Scio vulgarem esse responsionem indifferentiam esse in voluntate secundum
 se spectata, non vero ut iam supponente intellectus iudicium, et ut mota ab illo, quem vocat aliqui sensum compositum,
 25 et divisum. Sed fuga haec, mea sententia; nulla est; tum quia voluntas secundum se spectata nihil velle potest, donec sit
 mota a iudicio rationis; quia nihil potest esse volitum, nisi sit praecognitum: ergo ad usum libertatis parum refert, quod
 30 ipsa secundum se sit indifferentens, si ut mota ab intellectu iam non est indifferentens, sed determinata, cum determinatio intel-
 lectus naturalis etiam sit, ut ostendimus; tum etiam quia illa indeterminatio, quae dicitur esse in voluntate divina secun-
 dum se spectata, erit magis per modum indifferentiae passivae, quam activae, quae iuxta sanam doctrinam ad libertatem
 non sufficit. Exemplo breviter declaratur: nam oculus, (verbi
 35 gratia) per se ac nude sumptus indif- <397> ferens dici potest ad videndum, et non videndum: quia utrumque exercere
 potest: id tamen satis non est, ut libere videat; quia posita determinatione obiecti omnino naturaliter ad videndum deter-
 minatur. Sic ergo erit plane in voluntate, si per intellectum
 40 omnino determinatur ad unum: nam quod modus determinationis diversus sit, parum refert, nam quilibet sufficit ad
 indifferentiam tollendam. Possetque similis exemplum esse in appetitu, qui ex apprehensione obiecti determinatur, sine
 qua appetere non posset: et ita etiam potest dici ex se indiffer-
 45 ens, non tamen supposita tali apprehensione, et adhuc erit similis exemplum in voluntate nostra, quae secundum se,
 et nude spectata dici potest indifferentens ad amandum, et non amandum Deum; tamen supposita tali scientia de Deo, scilicet
 50 visione eius clara, iam non est indifferentens, quia per eam scientiam ita determinatur, ut non possit non velle: et ideo
 in illo amore non est libertas. Sic ergo se habebit divina vol-
 untas quoad determinationem: (verbi gratia) volendi creare
 mundum: nam ex se, et absque iudicio rationis non potest ad
 55 eum actum determinari: si ergo stante scientia et iudicio, quo Deus statuit optimum esse, et consentaneum suae bonitati

were naturally determined by his judgement or counsel, there would be no freedom or indifference in God. For it is neither in the judgement nor in a will that is compliant and attends to the judgement (if I may speak in this way). Therefore, it is nowhere.

I know that the common response is that the indifference is in the will regarded in itself, but not as already assuming the judgement of the intellect and as assuming it moved by the intellect. Some call this the composed sense and the divided sense. But this escape, in my view, is nothing. This is, first, because the will considered in itself can will nothing until it is moved by a judgement of reason, since nothing can be willed unless it is first cognized. Therefore, it matters little for the use of freedom that it is indifferent in itself if it is not indifferent but determined once moved by the intellect, since the determination of the intellect is also natural, as we will show.

Second, because the indeterminatio that is said to be in the divine will considered in itself would in its mode of indifference be more passive than active, which does not suffice for freedom according to a sound doctrine of freedom. This is explained briefly by example: for an eye, for example, taken bare and by itself can be called indifferent to seeing and not seeing, since it can exercise either. Yet that is not enough for it to seem free, since once the determination of an object is posited it is entirely determined naturally to seeing. It will obviously be likewise in the case of the will if it is entirely determined by the intellect to one thing. That the mode of determination is different hardly matters, for it suffices for removing indifference for anything. A more similar example might be the case of appetite, which is determined by the apprehension of an object, without which apprehension it cannot desire it. And so it also can be said to be indifferent of itself, but not once such an apprehension is supposed. To this point the example will be more similar to our will, which considered in itself apart from other things can be called indifferent to loving and not loving God, yet once such knowledge of God is supposed, namely, a clear vision of God, it no longer is indifferent. For through that knowledge it is determined in such a way that it cannot not will, and so in that love it is not free.

Therefore, the divine will stands in that way with respect to determination, for example, in willing to create the world. For of itself and apart from the judgement of reason it cannot be determined to

60 D. Thomas. creare mundum, ab hoc iudicio determinatur omnino vol-
untas ut velit, nulla relinquitur indifferentia, vel libertas in
illo actu; quia iudicium illud naturale est, et necessarium, et
voluntas pari necessitate, et naturali habitudine conformis est
65 illi iudicio: ergo nulla est ibi indifferentia, sed quasi fatalis se-
ries, ac necessitas. Propter quod merito dixit D. Thomas, 1 p.
q. 14. art. 8. scientiam Dei secundum se esse indifferentem in
ordine ad operationem extra se: determinari autem per vol-
untatem, et q. 19. art. 3. ad quartum et quintum, ait volun-
tatem divinam sese determinare ad obiecta creata: nam illa
65R per sese non sufficiunt illam determinare ob imperfectionem
suam, quod verum est de illis obiectis, ut cognitis per scien-
tiam Dei. Igitur non dicitur Deus omnia operari secundum
consilium voluntatis suae, quia consilium ipsum sit tota ratio
70 divinae determinationis in omnibus operibus eius. 70R

Impugnatur ex
contextu.

S. Thomas. 1. p.
q. 25. art. 5. ad 3.

8. Neque iuxta mentem Pauli interpretatio habere potest
locum: ipse enim illa verba interposuit, ut tacite rationem
indicaret, ob quam Deus homines veluti sorte quadam vocat,
praedestinat, et ordinat in vitam aeternam secundum pro-
75 <col. b> positum voluntatis suae. Cuius ratio ex parte ipsius
scientiae divinae, aut consilii, reddi potest nulla. Quia, ut
alibi dixit D. Thomas, si praecise spectemus divinam scien-
tiam ut antecedentem ad voluntatem eius, nulla est ratio, ob
quam dictet potius hos homines esse creandos quam illos, aut
80R hos esse eligendos potius, quam alios. Sicut etiam in naturalibus
ex parte solius intellectus divini nulla potest reddi ratio,
cur haec pars materiae creata sit sub forma ignis, et illa sub
forma terrae, magis quam e converso, cum ipsa materia ex se
uniformis sit. Propterea ergo Paulus semper adiungit volun-
tatem Dei, dicens: *Secundum consilium voluntatis eius*: quia
85 non potest ratio talium operum Dei aliunde sumi, quam a
voluntate eius: ergo in talibus operibus non ita operatur Dei
voluntas secundum consilium eius, ut omnino a consilio de-
terminetur, sed potius (si ita loqui licet) ut ipsa determinet
90R consilium. Nam interdum ea, quae per consilium repraesent-

that act. If, therefore, once the knowledge and judgement stand by
which God decides that to create the world is best and in harmony
with his goodness, the will is wholly determined to will by this judge-
ment, then no indifference or freedom remains in that act. For that
judgement is natural and necessary, and the will is conformed to that
judgement by an equal necessity and natural disposition. Therefore,
there is no indifference there, but there is as it were a fated ordering
and necessity. This is why St. Thomas rightly said in *ST* Ia.14.8 that
God's knowledge in itself is indifferent in relation to works beyond
itself, but is determined through the will. And in *ST* Ia.19.3 ad 4
and 5, he says that the divine will determines itself to created objects.
For they are not sufficient in themselves to determine the will on ac-
count of their imperfection, which is true of those objects as cognized
through God's knowledge. Therefore, God is not said to work all
things according to the counsel of his will because that counsel itself
is the whole reason for the divine determination in all its works.

8. Nor can this interpretation have a place according to the mind
of Paul, for he interposes those words in order to indicate tacitly the
reason why God calls, predestines, and ordains human beings to eter-
nal life as if by a kind of lot. No reason for this can be given on the
part of divine knowledge or counsel. For, as St. Thomas said else-
where, if we consider divine knowledge precisely as preceding God's
will, there is no reason why it would order these human beings to be
created rather than those or why these should be elected rather than
those.⁵ This is the same as in the case of natural things where no rea-
son can be given on the part of the divine intellect alone for why this
created part of matter is under the form of fire and that part under the
form of earth rather than the other way around, since matter of itself
is uniform.

For this reason, therefore, Paul always adds the will of God, say-
ing "according to the counsel of his will," since a reason for such works
of God cannot be taken from anywhere other than his will. There-
fore, in such works God's will does not act according to his counsel
in such a way that it is entirely determined by his counsel, but rather
(if one may speak in this way) as it itself determines the counsel. For
sometimes those things that are represented or judged through coun-

St. Thomas.

It is challenged
from the context.

St. Thomas, *ST*
Ia.25.5 ad 3.

⁵I am not persuaded that the marginal reference is the right one.

tantur, seu iudicantur, sunt ita aequalia, ut consilium nihil aliud de eis possit iudicare, nisi utrumque esset amabile, vel eligibile. Quod ergo voluntas unum eligat, altero praetermisso, non potest tribui determinationi consilii, sed soli efficacitati, dominioque ipsius voluntatis. Quin potius saepissime accidit, et in divina voluntate fere semper, ut licet consilium proponat aliquid ut excellentius, et ex se melius, nihilominus pro sua libertate non illud eligat, sed aliud quod minus bonum, vel perfectum est. Sic enim dicunt Theologi; quamvis optimum medium ad redimendos homines fuerit Incarnationis mysterium, et hoc ipsum necessario dictaverit aeternum Dei consilium, nihilominus potuisse Deum non eligere medium illud, sed alio modo homines salvare, vel etiam non salvare, sed continuo supplicio afficere. Et in rebus naturalibus certum est cognovisse Deum alias perfectiones, et species angelorum, vel coelorum quibus pulchrior esset mundus: et tamen voluntatem divinam pro libertate sua eas creare noluisse, sed alias minus perfectas. Estque hoc fere necessarium in operibus Dei, quia cum tanta sit potestas eius, ut quacumque re data possit facere meliorem, vix unquam potest eligere, quod optimum est, cum quidquid eligat, semper aliud ab eo melius cognoscatur, quod velle et facere potest: alioqui nihil velle aut facere potuisset, nisi quod fecit, quod est in Wicleffo damnatum. Quando ergo dicunt Sancti Deum semper <398> velle quod est optimum et convenientissimum, intelligitur non ex parte rerum, quas vult, sed ex parte ipsius Dei, quia semper prudentissime ac decentissime operatur.

Vera expositio.

9. Superest ut concludamus sensum verborum Pauli esse, Deum operari omnia secundum consilium voluntatis, id est, secundum consilium sibi beneplacitum, seu voluntate sua ac-

sel are equal such that counsel can judge nothing else of them other than that either is lovable or choiceworthy. Therefore, that the will elects one thing while passing over another cannot be attributed to the determination of counsel but only to the efficacy and dominion of the will itself.

On the contrary, it often happens—and almost always in the case of the divine will—that, although counsel proposes something as more excellent and as better in itself, the will, nevertheless, through its freedom does not elect that but elects something else that is less good and less perfect. For in this way the theologians say that although the best means for redeeming human beings was the mystery of the Incarnation and that the eternal counsel of God necessarily dictated this, God could, nevertheless, have elected not that means but saved human beings by some other means or not saved them but continuously afflicted them with punishment. And in natural matters it is certain that God cognized other perfections and other species of angels and heavens by which the world would have been more beautiful, and yet the divine will through its freedom willed not to create them but willed to create others that were less perfect. And this is almost necessary in the case of God's actions, since when his power is so great that for any given thing he can make something better, he can hardly ever elect what is best.⁶ Whatever he elects, there is always something better cognized by him that he could will or make. Otherwise, he could have willed or made nothing other than what he made, [a view] that was condemned in John Wycliffe. Therefore, when the saints say that God always wants what is best and most agreeable, this should not be understood on the part of the things that are willed but on the part of God himself, since he always acts most prudently and appropriately.

The true exposition.

9. What is left is for us to conclude that the sense of Paul's words is that God works all things according to the counsel of his will, that is, according to the counsel pleasing to him or accepted by his will. For

See Thomas Netter of Walden in *Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei ecclesiae catholicae* I, ch. 21; Hugh of St. Victor in *De sacramentis* I, p. 2, ch. 22; the Master in *Sentences* I, dist. 44, and other doctors in the same place; and St. Thomas in *ST* Ia.23.

⁶Note the textual emendation.

110–111 optimus] melius B V.

113 quod fecit,] om. B.

Vide Waldensius, lib. 1. *Doctrinae* cap. 21. Hugo Victorinus, lib. 1. *De sacramentis* p. 2. cap. 22. Magister in 1. dist. 44. et ibi Doctores. D. Thomas, 1 p. q. 23.

5 ceptatum. Est enim frequens modus loquendi Scripturae
iuxta phrasim Hebraicam, ut loco adiectivi addatur aliud sub-
stantivum in genitivo casu, ut ad Colossenses 1. *Et transtulit*
in regnum Filii dilectionis suae, id est, sibi dilectissimi. Sic
ergo opinor in praesenti dixisse: *Secundum consilium volun-*
10 *tatis*: id est, secundum consilium sibi voluntarium, seu vol-
untate sua ad beneplacitum acceptatum. Et iuxta hanc inter-
pretationem optime declarat Paulus in eo, quod dixerat,
sorte nos esse vocatos, non indicari imperfectionem casus,
et contingentiae: quia summo consilio factum est; sed ex-
15 cludi rationem et causam ex parte nostra, ob quam sic vocati
simus, quia consilium illud solo Dei arbitrio consummatum
est: ac propterea semper in eo capite, et aliis similibus coni-
ungit Paulus cum divina scientia, et praedestinatione proposi-
tum voluntatis; quia ex hoc pendet omnis determinatio divi-
20 norum operum. Idemque constituit quodam modo divinam
scientiam in ratione scientiae practicae, seu approbationis, ut
Theologi loquuntur. Atque hoc modo a consilio et volun-
tate divina operationes Dei proficiscuntur. Atque haec expo-
sitio, licet sub hac verborum forma ab expositoribus non tra-
25 datur, est consentanea Hieronymo, et D. Thomae, quos supra
citavi, et Chrysostomo, homilia 2. ad Ephesios, et aliis expo-
sitoribus, quatenus his verbis significari aiunt rationabilem ac
liberam esse in suis operibus divinam voluntatem.

Hieronimus.
Chrysostomus.
D. Thomas.
Glossa.
Primas.
Adamus.

SECTIO II.

*Quae fidei veritates aut Theologicae conclusiones ex praedicta
sententia eliciantur.*

1. Quanquam, ut dixi, in praedictis verbis Pauli, sic intel-
5 lectis, multa principia fidei fun- <col. b> dari possint:
et variae quaestiones et conclusiones Theologicae ex eisdem
possint sufficiente certitudine definiri, quae ad divinam sci-
entiam, voluntatem ac potentiam pertinent: quia vero omnia
nunc persequi non possumus, et praecipua intentio nostra est

5R the way of speaking in Scripture is often according to Hebrew phras-
ing so that in the place of an adjective there is added another substan-
tive in the genitive case. This is the case, for example, in Colossians
1[:13]: “And he has brought [us] into the kingdom of the Son of his
love,” that is, the one most beloved to him. I think the same is true
in the present case: “according to the counsel of his will,” that is, ac-
10R cording to the counsel voluntary to himself or accepted by his will
according to its pleasure. According to this interpretation, Paul best
explains it in the fact that he says that we are called by lot, not indi-
cating the imperfection of chance and contingency (since it was done
according to the highest counsel) but excluding a reason and cause on
15R our part on account of which we were thus called (since that counsel
was brought about by the God’s choice (*arbitrio*) alone.

Furthermore, in that and other similar chapters Paul always joins
the plan of the will together with divine knowledge and predestina-
20R tion, for every determination of divine works depends on this. Like-
wise, he in a certain way sets up divine knowledge in the nature of
practical knowledge or of approbation, as the theologians say. In this
way the actions of God proceed from divine counsel and will. And
this exposition, although it is not related by the expositors in this form
of words, is consistent with Jerome and St. Thomas, whom we cited
25R above,⁷ and with Chrysostom in the second sermon on Ephesians,
and with other expositors, insofar as by these words is signified [what
they mean when] they say that the divine will is rational and free in
its works.

SECTION II.

*What truths of the faith or theological conclusions are drawn out of the
aforementioned statement.*

1. Nevertheless, as I said, when the aforementioned words of Paul are
5R understood in this way, many principles of the faith can be grounded
in them and various theological questions and conclusions pertaining
to divine knowledge, will, and power can be determined with suffi-
cient certitude from them. But since we cannot pursue all of them
now and since our particular intention is to talk about the freedom of

Colossians 1.

Jerome.
Chrysostom.
St. Thomas.
Glossa.
Primas.
Adamus.⁷In n. 5 of this section.

10	dicere de libertate divinae voluntatis; ideo caetera omnia in sectione hac breviter indicabimus.	10R	the divine will, we will briefly indicate all the remaining ones in this section.	
Deum per intellectum operari.	2. Itaque ex his verbis habemus primo, quidquid Deos extra se operatur, per intellectum et rationem operari. Ita colligunt ex his verbis Chrysostomus, Hieronymus, D. Thomas, et caeteri omnes expositores, quia verbum illud: <i>Secundum consilium</i> ; hanc vim habet; scilicet, quod divina opera plena sunt ratione, et sapientia; quam, ut Sapiens dixit: <i>Effudit Deus super omnia opera sua</i> . Ecclesiasticus 1. Haec tamen veritas, nimirum quod Deus omnia per intellectum operetur, non solum fide constat, sed etiam ratione naturali cognosci potest: eamque fere omnes Philosophi cognoverunt. Est tamen quaedam notanda differentia, quod illi ad summum cognoverunt Deum operantem per intellectum, ut artificem praecogitantem in se rationes omnes, quae per suam facultatem operatur. De consilio autem divino vix quidpiam locuti sunt, quia consilium proprium est eius, qui sua potestate aut arte libere utitur. Hunc autem usum liberum vix potuerunt Philosophi coniungere cum divina immutabilitate. Et ideo potius de illa loquuntur ut ex necessitate, aut naturae impetu operante, quam ex consilio, voluntate, et deliberatione. In quo errore multi putant versatum fuisse Aristotelem. Sed de hoc alibi. Paulus autem supponens id, quod notissimum erat, nimirum divinam sapientiam omnium rerum esse artificem, ut etiam dicitur Sapientiae 7. id, quod occultius erat, et ad causam maxime pertinebat, de qua tractabat, docuit; scilicet Deum in suis operibus non naturali necessitate, sed certo consilio et ratione duci: non quatenus consilium mutationem vel inquisitionem in nobis includit, sed quatenus claro et certo iudicio proponit id, quod agendum est, aut agere oporteat.	15R 20R 25R 30R 35R	2. And we first hold from these words that whatever God works beyond himself, he does through intellect and reason. Chrysostom, Jerome, St. Thomas, and all the other expositors gather this from these words, because the phrase “according to his counsel” has this meaning, namely, that full divine works are by reason and wisdom. As the wise one said, “God poured [wisdom] out upon all his works” (Sirach [1:1]). Yet this truth, namely, that God does all things through intellect, is not only clear by faith but can also be cognized through natural reason and almost all the philosophers were aware of it. There is, however, a certain difference that should be noted: those [philosophers] at best were aware of God acting through intellect as an artisan preconceiving all the ideas in himself which he makes through his faculty. But hardly anyone spoke about divine counsel, since counsel is proper to one who uses his power or art freely. But the philosophers could scarcely conjoin this free use with divine immutability. And for this reason they talked about him more as acting by necessity or by the impetus of nature rather than by counsel, will, and deliberation. Many thought that Aristotle had strayed into this error. But about this elsewhere. But Paul, however, assuming what was best known—namely, that divine wisdom is the artisan of all things, as was also said in Wisdom 7[:21]—taught what was more hidden and what most pertained to the cause that he was discussing, namely, that God in his works is not led by natural necessity but by certain counsel and reason, not insofar as counsel in us includes change and inquiry, but insofar as it proposes by a clear and certain judgements what is to be done or what must be done.	God acts through intellect. Sirach. Wisdom 7.
Deum esse omnipotentem. Hieronymus.	3. Secundo colligitur ex dictis verbis Pauli, Deum in suis operibus summa uti potestate, quam omnipotentiam appellamus. Sic colligit D. Hieronymus in eundem locum dicens. <i>Qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae, quod scilicet et ratione plena sint, et potestate <399> facientis. Nos homines plerumque volumus facere consilio, sed nequaquam</i>	40R	3. Second, it is gathered from the words said by Paul that God in his works uses the highest power, which we call omnipotence. St. Jerome gathers this in the same place, saying: “He works all things according to the counsel of his will, since, namely, they are both filled with reason and the power of making. We human beings commonly wish to make something by counsel but the effect by no means follows	God is omnipotent. Jerome.

voluntatem sequitur effectus: illi autem nullus resistere potest, quia omnia quaecumque voluit fecit. Psalmus 134. Hoc ipsum significavit ibi Theodoretus dicens: *Cum nos ab initio praedestinasset, ad hanc sortem elegit, qui, quaecumque vult facit.* Clarius vero D. Thomas in eum locum adducens illud Isaiam 46. Consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet. Iuxta quam interpretationem illa distributio Pauli: *Qui operatur omnia*, non tantum accommoda, ut Dialectico more loquar, sed est absoluta, ita ut non tantum sit sensus: Omnia, quae operatur, ex consilio operatur, quod etiam facit homo prudens, vel perfectiori modo angelus; sed sensus sit, Deum omnia, quae secundum consilium voluntatis suae statuit, et decernit, efficaciter ac potenter operari. Et sine dubio hic est sensus Pauli, tum propter rationem insinuatam, quod hanc proprietatem tribuit Deo, ut singularem excellentiam eius; tum etiam quia contextus, et intentio Pauli hoc requirit; cum illa verba interponat ad reddendam rationem, ob quam Deus pro sua voluntate praedestinat, quem vult, et pro sua potestate efficaciter vocat, et auxiliatur in laudem gloriae, et gratiae suae.

Potentia, et operatio, quomodo a consilio, et voluntate distincta.

4. Hic vero statim occurrebat Theologica quaestio, quomodo in Deo distinguantur illa tria, quae in his verbis Paulus numerat, operatio, consilium, et voluntas? Et maior quaestio est de potentia operandi: nam operatio ipsa rerum ad extra, sententia mea, in rebus factis est, non in ipso Deo: unde non tantum ratione, sed re ipsa differt a consilio, et voluntate, tanquam res quaedam, vel modus creatus ab increata re, et tanquam quid temporale ab aeternis: operatio enim temporalis est: consilium autem, et voluntas aeterna. Unde (quod notandum est) haec tria respondent illis tribus, quae in verbis proxime praecedentibus Paulus posuerat dicens: *In quo et sorte vocati sumus praedestinati secundum propositum eius, etc.* Nam vocatio respondet operationi, praedestinatio consilio, propositum voluntati. Unde praedestinatio et propositum aeterna sunt, vocatio autem temporalis est, et in no-

the will. But nothing can resist him, since he does everything that he wills.” ([See] Psalm 134[:6].) Theodoretus indicated this here, saying: “Since we were predestined from the beginning, he elected according to this lot, he who brings about whatever he wishes.” But St. Thomas is clearer in that place, bringing up Isaiah 46[:10]: “My counsel stands and all my will shall be done.” According to this interpretation Paul’s phrase “he who does all things” is not only accommodated, to speak in the manner of logicians, but also absolute, such that the sense is not only that everything that is done is done according to counsel, which a prudent human being does or an angel in a more perfect way, but the sense is that God does everything effectively and with power that he establishes and resolves according to the counsel of his will. Without a doubt, this is the sense of Paul’s [words], both [i] because of the suggested reason that this property is attributed to God as his singular excellence and also [ii] because the context and intention of Paul require this, since those words are inserted in order to give the reason why God predestines whom he wills according to his will and why he efficaciously calls and aids them according to his power in praise of his glory and grace.

In what way potency and activity are distinct from counsel and will.

4. But here a theological question comes up: how are these three things that Paul lists in these words—activity, counsel, and will—distinguished in God? The greater question is about the power of acting, for in my view the action of things beyond himself comes to be in the things and not in God himself. Hence, it not only differs in reason but is really different from counsel and will as a certain thing or created mode from an uncreated thing and as something temporal from the eternal. For action is temporal, but [God’s] counsel and will are eternal. Hence—and this should be noted—these three respond to the three divisions that Paul posited in the immediately preceding words when he said: “In which we were also called, having been predestined according to his plan . . .” For the calling answers to action, predestination to counsel, and the plan to the will. Hence predestination and the plan are eternal, but the calling is temporal and exists in us. For this reason, just as the calling is really distinguished from pre-

bis existens. Quapropter, sicut vocatio re ipsa distinguitur a
 praedestina- <col. b> tione, et proposito, ita operatio a con- 80R
 silio et scientia. Scio multos distinguere de operatione div-
 85 ina active et passive sumpta; et posteriori modo fateri esse
 in creatura; priori autem esse in Deo: nihilque aliud esse nisi
 eius voluntatem seu volitionem. Tamen, quod dixi, est verum 85R
 in philosophico rigore; et est etiam magis consentaneum illis
 verbis Pauli, qui de operatione Dei activa loquitur, et a con-
 90 silio et voluntate procedere significat. Itaque de hac re nulla
 est difficultas, neque etiam de distinctione inter consilium et
 voluntatem: nam ex dictis in priori expositione constat haec 90R
 aliquo modo distingui. Ex generali autem doctrina de divi-
 nis attributis constat non distingui re, aut actu in re ipsa, sed
 95 ratione, ut aiunt, ratiocinata; id est, cum aliquo fundamento
 in re. De potentia item operandi eadem ratione constat non
 distingui actu in re a scientia et voluntate. An vero ratione 95R
 ab illis distinguatur inter Theologos controversum est. Sed,
 quoniam ad alia properamus, id nunc omitemus.

D. Thomas. 100 Breviter tamen mea sententia est quam etiam D. Thomae
 Hugo Victorinus. esse opinor in 1. p. q. 19. art. 4. ad 4. et q. 25. art. 1. ad 4. et
 Hugonis Victorini, lib. 1. *De sacramentis* p. 2. per totam, 100R
 potentiam ratione distingui a scientia et voluntate, non minus,
 quam scientiam et voluntatem inter se: esseque immediatius
 105 principium externae actionis, sive executionis, quam sit scien-
 tia, vel voluntas; quia in ordine ad diversum actum illam con-
 cipimus, et nos potentias per ordinem ad actus distinguere 105R
 solemus. Nec vero hoc quidquam obest omnipotentiae vol-
 untatis divinae; tum quia, si secundum rem loquamur, ideo
 110 est omnipotens, quia secundum rem est ipsa omnipotentia:
 secundum rationem autem, et modo nostro loquendi, ideo
 est omnipotens, quia potentiam habet, qua quidquid vult, 110R
 efficaciter exequatur. Atque ita etiam loquitur Scriptura Sapi-
 entiae 12. dicens: *Subest tibi, cum volueris, posse.*

Deum voluntarie omnia operari.

5. Tertio colligitur ex verbis Pauli, Deum omnino voluntarie
 facere, quidquid extra se operatur: hoc enim verba ipsa prae-

destination and plan, so also action is distinguished from counsel and
 knowledge. I know that many distinguish between action taken ac-
 tively and passively, and admit that it is in creatures in the latter mode
 but say that it is in God in the former mode. And it cannot be any-
 thing other than his will or volition. Nevertheless, what I say is true
 in philosophical rigour and is also more in keeping with the words
 of Paul, who speaks of the active action of God and indicates that it
 proceeds from counsel and will. And so there is no further difficulty
 concerning this matter nor concerning the distinction between coun-
 sel and will. For it is clear from what was said in the prior exposition
 that these are distinguished in some way. Moreover from the general
 doctrine of divine attributes it is clear that they are not distinguished
 really or actually in the thing itself but in reasoned reason, as they say,
 that is, with some foundation in the thing. Likewise, it is clear con-
 cerning the power of acting that it is not actually distinguished in the
 thing from knowledge and will. But whether it is distinguished from
 them in reason is a matter of controversy among the theologians. But
 because we are hurrying to other matters, we will omit that for now.

Nevertheless, my view, briefly, is the one that I think St. Thomas
 also has in *ST* Ia.19.4 ad 4 and Ia.25.1 ad 4, as well as Hugh of St. Vic-
 tor in *De sacramentis* I.2. The power is distinguished in reason from
 knowledge and the will no less than knowledge and will are distin-
 guished from each other, and it is a more immediate principle of exter-
 nal action or execution than knowledge or will are. For we conceive
 of it in relation to different acts and it is customary to distinguish pow-
 ers through their relation to acts. But this cannot tell against anything
 of the omnipotence of the divine will, because, first, if we speak in
 accordance with reality, it is omnipotent for the reason that it is om-
 nipotent according to reality. But according to reason and our way
 of speaking, it is omnipotent for the reason that it has the power to
 execute efficaciously whatever it wishes. And thus also Scripture says
 in Wisdom 12[:18], saying: “Your power is present to do when you
 will.”

That God does everything voluntarily.

5. Third, it is gathered from the words of Paul that whatever God does
 outside himself he does wholly voluntarily, for the very words make

St. Thomas.
 Hugh of
 St. Victor.

Aristoteles.
D. Thomas, 1. 2.
q. 6. ubi alios
Patres refert.

5 se ferunt. Et constat etiam ex ratione voluntarii ab Aristotele
tradita 3. *Ethnicorum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 1. et a D. Thoma, 5R
Damasceno, Gregorio Nisseno, et omnibus; scilicet volun-
tarium esse, quod est ab <400> interno principio, seu ap-
petitu, media cognitione; quod voluntarium tunc perfectum
est, quando cognitio est perfecta; id est, rationalis seu intellec-
tualis. Cum ergo Deus secundum consilium voluntatis omnia 10R
operetur, sine dubio perfecte voluntarie omnia operatur.

An Deus omnino
voluntarie
infligat poenas.

15 6. Hic vero occurrebant statim duae difficultates, quae
brevis tempore pro dignitate tractari non possunt: earum
tamen resolutionem breviter indicare, neque erit iniucun- 15R
dum, neque ab instituto alienum. Una est de malis poe-
nae: nam licet verum sit Deum simpliciter velle haec mala,
et facere, iuxta illud Amos 3. *Si erit malum in civitate, quod*
Dominus non fecerit. Et consequenter etiam constat Deum
haec facere voluntarie, nihilominus adhuc difficultatem habet,
quomodo perfecte voluntarie ea efficiat. Illud enim per- 20R
fecte voluntarium est, quod non habet involuntarium admis-
tum: sicut est perfecte calidum, quod nihil frigoris permis-
tum habet. Deus autem ita vult haec mala, ut secundum
aliam quamdam voluntatem sint ei involuntaria: non ergo
perfecte voluntarie illa operatur: sicut qui potionem amaram 25R
sumit, licet volens sumat, eo quod aliter non possit salutem
comparare; tamen imperfecte voluntarie sumit, quia displicet
illi; et nollet sumere. Ita vero se habet Deus cum punit seu
damnat peccatorem: nam displicet illi illa damnatio, et vellet,
si ratio iustitiae id pateretur, illum non damnare, iuxta illud 30R
1. ad Timotheum 2. *Vult omnes homines salvos fieri:* non ergo
perfecte voluntarie Deus haec vult, sed quasi coactus et invi-
tus. Atque hoc modo se habere Deum in huiusmodi operibus
significari videtur in illis modis loquendi Scripturae Genesis
Gen. 35
Isaiae. 6. *Tactus dolore cordis intrinsecus: delebo, inquit, hominem*
quem formavi. Isaiae 1. *Heu, consolabor super hostibus meis.*
Ubi Hieronymus optime exponit, dicens significare Deum
his loquendi modis, quasi coactum et invitum punire peccato-
tores.

18 constat] constet V.
31 2] 1 B V.

this obvious. It is also clear from the notion of voluntariness related by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1 and by St. Thomas, John of Damascus, Gregory of Nyssa, and everyone else, namely, that that is voluntary which comes from an internal principle or desire by means of cognition. That voluntariness is then perfect when the cognition is perfect, that is, rational or intellectual. Since, therefore, God works all things according to the counsel of his will, he without doubt does everything perfectly voluntarily.

6. But here two difficulties come at once, which cannot be discussed properly in a short time. Nevertheless, briefly pointing to their resolution will neither be unpleasant nor be unconnected to the project. One is about the evil of punishment. For although it is true that God wills and brings about this evil (as Amos 3[:6] says: “Will there be evil in the city that God has not brought about?”) and consequently it is also clear that God brings it about voluntarily, nevertheless, there is still this difficulty about how he effects it with perfect voluntariness. For that is perfectly voluntary which is not mixed with involuntariness, just as that is perfectly hot which has nothing of cold mixed in. But God wills these evils in such a way that according to another kind of willing they are involuntary. Therefore, it is not done with perfect voluntariness. Although someone who takes a bitter potion does so voluntarily given the fact that he cannot acquire good health otherwise, nevertheless, he takes it with imperfect voluntariness since it is unpleasant to him and he wishes not to take it. The situation is the same when God punishes or damns sinners, since that damnation is displeasing to him and if the nature of justice allowed it he would will not to damn them. 1 Timothy 2[:4] says that “he wishes all people to be saved.” Therefore, God does not will perfectly voluntarily [to damn them] but does so as if compelled and reluctant. That God holds himself in this way in works of this sort seems to be signified in those ways of speaking found in Scripture. Genesis 6[:6–7]: “Being touched inwardly with sorrow, he said: ‘I will destroy the human race that I have created.’” Isaiah 1[:24]: “Ah! I will comfort myself over my enemies.” Jerome best explains this passage, saying that these ways of speaking indicate that God is, as it were, compelled and reluctant to punish sinners.

Aristotle.
St. Thomas, *ST*
IaIIae.6 (where he
refers to other
Fathers).

Whether God
inflicts
punishments
wholly
voluntarily.

1 Timothy.

Genesis.
Isaiah.

An Deus operetur malum culpae secundum consilium voluntatis suae.

40 7. Altera difficultas est de malo culpae, seu de actu malo, 40R
quem suo etiam modo Deus operatur, cum nihil esse possit
absque influxu Dei, et tamen dicere non possumus Deum vol-
untarie, et praesertim perfecte, illum operari, quia illum odio
habet, et desiderat ut non fiat. Unde absolute dici solet esse
45 contra voluntatem Dei. <col. b> Quapropter etiam videtur 45R
hoc opus non esse secundum consilium voluntatis Dei, cum
maxime repugnet et consiliis, et praeceptis eius.

Sitne in divina voluntate actus inefficax.

August. in *Ench.*
cap. 79. et 103. et
De corrept. et grat.
cap. 15. Prosp. *ad*
cap. Gall. cap. 8.
Fulg. *De Incarn.*
et grat. cap. 31.
Bed. Ansel. et
Caiet. in Paul.
Alens. 1. p. q. 36.
memb. 2.
Bonavent. in 1.
d. 46. art. 1. q. 1.
ibi Scot. et Mag.
q. un. Marsil. in
1. q. 45. art. 1.
Dried. lib. *De*
concord. praesc.
lib. arb. 1. p.
cap. 4. ad 2.

5 8. Prior difficultas expediri facile potest, si vera esset aliquo- 5R
rum Theologorum opinio, qui negant esse in divina vol-
untate aliquem verum et proprium actum, qui sit inefficax;
quem in voluntate nostra velleitatem, vel simplicem compla-
centiam appellamus, quia talis actus videtur quamdam imper-
fectionem involvere, scilicet inefficaciam et repugnantiam
cum absoluta voluntate, et desiderium quoddam rei non obti-
nendae, quod ex se contristat, et affligit animum. Atque hanc
10 sententiam habuisse videtur Augustinus, quem imitati sunt 10R
Prosper, Fulgentius, Beda, et Anselmus, qui non agnoscentes
hunc actum in voluntate Dei, generalem illam locutionem
Pauli. *Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri*, per distribu-
tionem accommodam, vel incompletam (quam vocant pro
15 generibus singulorum) ad solos praedestinos restringunt: 15R
quam etiam sententiam nonnulli ex Scholasticis secuti sunt.
Quo supposito facile respondemus, Deum quidquid operatur,
ita perfecte voluntarie operari, ut nihil involuntarii admistum
habeat; quia in voluntate sua nullum habet actum vel simp-
20 liciter, vel secundum quid repugnantem tali operi. Atque 20R
ita, cum vult infligere malum poenae, simpliciter id vult, et
nullo modo non vult, neque nollet. Quando autem hoc at-
tribuitur Deo, quod nolens, aut dolens faciat, sicut verbum
dolendi absque ulla controversia metaphoricum est, ita in-
25 telligi debet verbum nolendi: significatur autem per illam 25R
metaphoram Deum, quod in se est, paratum esse ad id nolen-
dum, tantumque id velle, quia peccata hominum ita exigunt:
illis tamen suppositis absolute, et omni ratione id vult.

7. The other difficulty concerns the evil of guilt or of evil ac-
tion, which God in some way performs since nothing whatever can
be without influx from God. And yet we do not say that God vol-
untarily does these things, certainly not perfectly voluntarily. For he
hates that evil and desires that it not exist. Hence it is usually said
absolutely to be against the will of God. For this reason it seems that
this work cannot be according to the counsel of the will of God, since
it is especially repugnant both to his counsels and his precepts.

Whether there is an inefficacious act in the divine will.

8. The former difficulty can be resolved easily, if the opinion of those
theologians is true who deny that in the divine will there is any true
and proper act that is inefficacious, the kind of act that in our will
we call a velleity or a simple contented quiescence (*complacentia*). For
such an act seems to involve a certain imperfection, namely, an ineffi-
cacy and repugnance to an absolute willing and a certain desire for a
thing not obtained which of itself saddens and afflicts the soul. And
this is the view that Augustine seems to have, and he was followed
by Prosper of Aquitaine, Fulgentius, Bede, and Anselm, who do not
recognize this act in the will of God. They restrict Paul's general lo-
cution "God wishes all people to be saved" to only the predestined
through an accommodated or incomplete distribution (what they call
distribution "*pro generibus singulorum*"). Some scholastics also follow
this view. Once we assume this we easily respond [to the difficulty]
that whatever God does, he does in such a perfectly voluntary way
that nothing involuntary is mixed in, since in his will there is no act
that is either unconditionally or in a qualified way repugnant to such
an action. And thus when he wills to inflict the evil of punishment,
he wills that unconditionally and in no way does not will it or will
not to inflict it.

Moreover when it is attributed to God that he does something
while nilling or grieving, just as the word 'grieving' is uncontroversi-
ally metaphorical, so also should one understand the word 'nilling'.
What is signified through that metaphor is that God insofar as what
is in himself is concerned was just as prepared to nill that as to will
it. Yet since the sins of human beings are driven out in that way, once
those are supposed, he wills it absolutely and by every reason.

Whether God performs the evil of guilt according to the counsel of his will.

Augustine, *Ench.*,
chs. 79 and 103,
and *De corrept. et*
grat.; Prosper,
Resp. ad cap. Gal.,
ch. 8; Fulgentius,
De Incarn. et
grat., ch. 31;
Bede, Anselm,
and Cajetan on
Paul; Alexander
of Hales, I, q. 36,
memb. 2;
Bonaventure, I,
dist. 46, art. 1,
q. 1; Scotus and
the Master in the
same place,
q. un.; Marsilius,
I, q. 45, art. 1;
and Driedo, *De*
concord. praesc.
lib. arb., p. 1,
ch. 4, ad 2.

Reiicitur
praedicta opinio
et locus Pauli 1.
ad Timotheum 2.
elucidatur.

9. At enim dicta sententia, in qua haec responsio fundatur, firma <401> non est; neque admodum consentanea illis verbis Pauli, 1. ad Timotheum 2. *Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri.* In quibus certe non de metaphorica, sed de propria voluntate Apostolus loquitur, ut etiam Augustinus, et reliqui, qui eum sequuntur supponunt. Et merito tum propter rationem generalem; quia non est metaphorico sensu utendum, ubi necessarium non est: tum etiam propter specialem circumstantiam loci, qui illam non patitur, cum Paulus illam Dei voluntatem erga omnes homines nobis proponat, ut eam imitemur, et pro omnibus oremus. Et hinc etiam constat distributionem illam non recte restringi ad praedestinos, vel ad status seu genera hominum; quia altera distributio, qua Paulus ait. *Obsecro fieri obsecrationes, orationes, etc. pro omnibus hominibus*, nullam similem restrictionem patitur: et manifeste Paulus eas aequiparat. Igitur iuxta sententiam Pauli habet Deus veram et propriam aliquam voluntatem, qua vult omnes homines salvos fieri; quae, cum talis non sit, ut in omnibus habeat effectum, non potest esse efficax: est ergo simplex complacentia. Atque ita locum illum intellexisse videtur Chrysostomus ibi homil. 7. dicens. *Imitare Deum tuum, si omnes ille vult salvos fieri, merito pro omnibus oportet orare; si omnes ille salvos fieri cupit, illius et tu concorda voluntati:* subditque inferius hoc modo induxisse nos Paulum ad orandum pro gentilibus, et pro haereticis, et pro omnibus hominibus, et illorum salutem desiderare. *Quia per hoc illi evadimus similes, dum quae ipse vult, eadem volumus.* Qui propterea homil. 1. ad Ephesios ait. *Deum valde cupere, et valde desiderare nostram salutem, etiam eorum hominum, quos propter peccatum damnat.* Circa quos distinguit in Deo duplicem voluntatem; unam vocat primam, aliam secundam; et per priorem ait velle illorum salutem propter suam bonitatem; per posteriorem autem velle eos damnare propter eorum peccata. Quam distinctionem imitatur Damascenus lib. 2. *De fide* cap. 29. dicens, Deum primaria voluntate velle omnes salvare; secundaria vero, quae ex nostra causa est, velle malos punire. Cui etiam sententiae consonant illa verba Pauli 1. ad Thessalonicenses 4. *Haec est enim voluntas*

Chrysostomus.

1. ad Thess.

9. The aforementioned view in which this response is founded is not secure. Nor is it entirely harmonious with those words of Paul in 1 Timothy 2[:4]: “He wishes all people to be saved.” In these words the apostle is certainly not talking about a metaphorical will but about a proper will, as Augustine and the rest who follow him also suppose. And this is warranted both for a general reason (one ought not to use a metaphorical sense where it is not needed) and because of the special circumstances of the passage, which does not allow it, since Paul places that will of God in front of all of us human beings so that we may imitate it and pray for everyone.

And for this reason it is also clear that that distribution is not rightly restricted to the predestined or to the state or genus of human beings. For whichever distribution Paul uses when says that “I desire that supplications, prayers, . . . be made for all people” ([1 Timothy 2:1]), no similar restriction is permitted, but it is clear that Paul uses them equivalently. Therefore, according to Paul’s view, God has some true and proper willing by which he wills all people to be saved. Since that willing is not such that it has an effect in every case, it cannot be an efficacious one. Therefore, it is a simple *complacentia*. And Chrysostom seems to have understood that passage in this way in his 7th sermon, saying: “Imitate your God. If he wishes to save everyone, then rightly you must pray for everyone. If he is eager to save everyone, then you must harmonize your will to that.” And he applies it later to say that Paul in this way was leading us to pray for gentiles, for heretics, and for all people, and to desire their salvation. “For through this we avoid being similar to them as long as we will the same thing that he wills.” For this reason he says in his first sermon on Ephesians: “God eagerly longs and desires for our salvation, even for those people whom he damns on account of sin.” He distinguishes two willings in God concerning these people: one he calls the first, the other the second. Through the former, he says, God wills their salvation on account of his goodness; but through the latter he wills to damn them on account of their sins. John of Damascus copies this distinction in *De fide* II, ch. 29, saying that God primarily wills to save everyone but secondarily—which is because of us—he wills to punish the wicked. The following words from Paul in 1 Thessalonians 4[:3] is consistent with this view: “For this is the will of God, your sanctification.” This was written not only to the predestined but to the whole

The
aforementioned
opinion is
rejected and the
words of Paul in
1 Timothy 2 are
elucidated.

Chrysostom.

1 Thessalonians.

<p>Damascenus. Prosper.</p>	70	<p><i>Dei sanctificatio vestra</i>, quae non ad praedestinos sed ad totum populum Christianum scribebat. Idem Damascenus lib. <i>Dialogus contra Manichaeos</i>; Prosper lib. 2. <i>De vocatione omnium gentium</i> cap. 19. et 25. alias 7. et 8. praedicta verba Pauli 1. ad Timotheum <col. b> 2. de omnibus hominibus simpliciter intelligit, dicens; ex universalibus Dei beneficiis constare Deum velle, semperque voluisse omnes salvare. Idem habet in resp. 2. ad obiectionem Vincentianam. Denique haec etiam est communis expositio Ambrosii, Theophylacti, Oecumenii, et aliorum 1. ad Timotheum 2. Chrysostomi, Theophylacti, et aliorum in illud Ioannem 1. <i>Qui illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>. Tandem D. Thomas 1. p. q. 19. art. 6. ad 1. expositionem Damasceni et Chrysostomi circa verba Pauli 1. ad Timotheum 2. magis probare videtur: quam etiam alii Theologi sequuntur.</p>	70R	<p>Christian population. [See also] the <i>Dialogus contra Manichaeos</i> by the same John of Damascus. In <i>De vocatione omnium gentium</i> book 2, chs. 19 and 25 and elsewhere in 7 and 8, Prosper of Aquitaine understands the aforementioned words of Paul in 1 Timothy 2 as simply being about all human beings, saying that God, according to the benefactions he [bestows] universally, unchangingly wills and always has willed to save everyone. He says the same thing in his second response to the objection from Vincent [in <i>Ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum responsiones</i>]. Finally, this is also the common exposition of 1 Timothy 2[:4] by Ambrose, Theophylact, Oecumenius and others, as well as by Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others of that passage in John 1[:9]: “He who gave light to everyone coming into this world.” Finally, St. Thomas in <i>ST Ia.19.6 ad 1</i> seems to approve more of the exposition of 1 Timothy 2[:4] by John of Damascus and Chrysostom. The other theologians also follow this exposition.</p>	<p>John of Damascus. Prosper.</p>
<p>Ambrosius. Theophylact. Oecumenius. Chrysostomus. Theophylact. D. Thomas.</p>	75	75R	75R	<p>10. Est igitur in Deo non metaphorice, sed vere et proprie voluntas salvandi eos, quos in aeternum vult punire: ergo, cum haec posterior voluntas habeat effectum, et non illa, necesse est, ut posterior sit absoluta et efficax, prior vero conditionata, seu per simplicem tantum affectum. Neque hoc est ullum inconueniens, quandoquidem utrumque obiectum bonum est in ordine ad diversas virtutes. Nam salus et beatitudo hominum per se amabilis est, et in Dei gloriam cedens; et ad charitatem et misericordiam pertinet, ut Deus velit illam, quantum est ex se, ut loquitur Chrysostomus homil. 7. in Ioannem punire autem peccata pertinet ad iustitiam; et ideo etiam amabile est, non tamen per se, et absolute, sed ex suppositione peccati: ergo utrumque affectum simul habet Deus eo modo quo simul haberi potest: non potest autem uterque esse efficax in ordine ad idem obiectum, quia involvitur repugnantia: ergo quando voluntas inferendi poenam aeternam est efficax, manet nihilominus in Deo simplex affectus dandi gloriam eidem cui vult dare poenam. Quod etiam effectus ipsi manifestant. Nam Deus praebet tali homini sufficientia auxilia, quibus, si velit, poenam evadat, et salutem consequatur: ergo signum est habere Deum verum et pro-</p>	<p>Ambrose. Theophylact. Oecumenius. Chrysostom. Theophylact. St. Thomas.</p>
<p>Durandus in 1. dist. 47. q. 1. Carthusius dist. 46. q. 1. Soto ad Romanos 9. Cordubensis lib. 1. <i>Quaestionarium theologicum</i> q. 56. Cameraco <i>In dialogo catholico</i> cap. 6. §1. Chrysostomus.</p>	85	85R	85R	<p>10. Therefore, the will to save those whom he wills to punish eternally is not metaphorical but true and proper. Since, therefore, the will to punish them is effectual rather than the other one, it is necessary that the former one be absolute and efficacious while the latter one is conditional or through a simple disposition (<i>affectum</i>) only. Nor is this in any way problematic, seeing that each object is good in relation to different virtues. For the salvation and happiness of human beings are lovable in themselves and yielding to the glory of God, and they belong to charity and mercy, so that God wills them insofar as they are from himself, as Chrysostom says in the seventh sermon on [the Gospel] of John. But to punish sins belongs to justice and therefore is also lovable, although not in itself and absolutely but only on the supposition of sin. Therefore, God has each disposition at the same time in the way that they can be held at the same time. But they cannot both be efficacious in relation to the same object, since that involves a repugnancy. Therefore, when the will is efficacious in inflicting eternal punishment, there nevertheless remains in God a simple disposition to give glory to the same ones to whom he wishes to give punishment. The very effects themselves make that evident. For God offers sufficient aid to such a human being to be able to avoid the punishment and attain salvation if he wants to. That is a sign that</p>	<p>Durandus, I, dist. 47, q. 1; Denys the Carthusian, I, dist. 46, q. 1; Soto, <i>ad Romanos</i> 9; Córdoba, <i>Quaestionarium theologicum</i> I, q. 56; and Cameraco, <i>In dialogo catholico</i> ch. 6, §1. Chrysostom.</p>
<p>90</p>	90R	90R	90R	<p>90R</p>	<p>90R</p>
<p>95</p>	95R	95R	95R	<p>95R</p>	<p>95R</p>
<p>100</p>	100R	100R	100R	<p>100R</p>	<p>100R</p>

prium affectum, et, ut more nostro loquamur, desiderium, ut talis homo non damnetur. Dicunt aliqui Deum quidem velle illum finem in mediis, et non in seipso. Sed contra. Nam vere Deus vult dare illa media propter illum finem in se, alioqui nec vellet media, ut media, neque ex propria intentione ordinaret ea in talem finem. Sicut etiam vult dare Deo homini voluntatem et concursum sufficientem ad actum peccati; et tamen <402> non vult dare illa propter actum peccati ut certissimum est: cum enim vult Deus dare possibilitatem peccandi, nullo modo habet pro fine proximo ipsum peccatum, seu actum peccaminosum, sed potius habet pro fine meritum, quod esse potest in victoria peccati, non committendo illud, licet quis posset: ergo, ut Deus det potestatem aliquid agendi propter aliquem effectum, non satis est ut velit dare ipsam potestatem, nisi id velit ex proprio affectu ad talem effectum, ordinando ad illum potestatem, et auxilia: sicut ad finem: ergo hoc modo vult Deus dare sufficientia auxilia ad salutem, etiam iis, qui non salvantur: ergo habet aliquam propriam voluntatem circa eorum salutem.

An Deus aliquid operetur voluntarie simpliciter, et involuntarie secundum quid.

11. Ad difficultatem ergo positam concedo, circa malum poenae, praesertim circa id, quod medicina non est, sed pura vindicta, et poena inimici, ut Scriptura loquitur, ita se gerere Deum, ut licet absolute et efficaciter velit tale malum inferre alicui, nihilominus simul habeat affectum simplicem dandi bonum illi malo contrarium. Sicut iustus iudex efficaciter vult punire hominem, cui, quantum est in se vellet potius benefacere. Neque enim talis affectus simplex ullam includit imperfectionem: nam in obiecto et ordine suo est perfectissimus; et, quod non sit efficax, non est ex impotentia Dei, sed ex libertate, et summa sapientia: et ideo, cum illi non sit debita maior efficacitas, licet illam non habeat, non propterea imperfectus est. Neque etiam est superfluum; tum quia est per se bonus; et hoc satis est; tum etiam, quia expedit ut divina voluntas circa nullum obiectum per se amabile sit quasi sus-

God has a true and proper disposition and, to speak according to our custom, desire not to damn such a human being.

Some say that God indeed wills that end in the means but not in itself. To the contrary. For God truly wills to give those means for the sake of that end in itself. Otherwise he would not will the means as means nor would he order them to such an end through a proper intention, just as God wills to give to a human being a sufficient willing and concursus for an act of sin and yet does not will to give that for the sake of the act of sin, as is most certain. For when God wishes to give the possibility of sinning, he in no way has the sin itself or the sinful act as a proximate end. He rather has for his end the merit that there can be in the victory over sin by not committing it even though one is able to. Therefore, in order for God to give some power to act for the sake of some effect, it is not enough that he will to give that power except he will that from a proper disposition to that effect by ordering it to that power and assistance as to an end. In this way God wills to give sufficient assistance for salvation, even to those who are not saved. He has, therefore, some proper willing concerning their salvation.

Whether God does anything voluntarily strictly speaking but involuntarily in some respect.

11. In response to the first posited difficulty, then, I concede that with respect to the evil of punishment, especially that which is not remedial but is purely retributive and harmful punishment, as Scripture teaches, God conducts himself such that although he wills absolutely and efficaciously to inflict such a punishment on someone, he nevertheless at the same time has a simple disposition to give a good contrary to that evil. This is the same as a just judge who efficaciously wills to punish a person to whom he would as far as he himself is concerned rather confer a benefit. Nor does such a simple disposition include any imperfection, for it is most perfect in the object and in its order, and the fact that it is not efficacious is not a result of powerlessness on the part of God but is a result of freedom and the highest wisdom. And therefore, since a greater efficacy is not owed, not having it is for that reason not an imperfection. The [disposition] is also not superfluous, first because it is good in itself (and this is sufficient)

pensa, et absque ullo affectu: et ideo ubi non vult habere efficacem affectum, habet saltem simplicem; tum denique, quia est necessarius, ut vere ac proprie Deus dicatur intendere talem finem, et habere beneplacitum, quantum est ex ipso, et propter illum velle media, quae ad illum ordinantur. Neque illa veluti repugnantia affectuum divinae perfectioni repugnat; tum quia illa non est vere repugnantia: quia licet versentur circa eandem rem, tamen sub diversis rationibus; tum etiam quia uterque actus est ex perfectissimo consilio, et deliberatione voluntatis, unde uterque est <col. b> infinitus in suo ordine, et neuter alterum ullo modo impedit. Quod etiam in simili docere solent Theologi de voluntate humana Christi, quatenus, ut ratio, efficaciter volebat mortem, quam ut natura ineffaciter refugiebat absque ulla propria repugnantia actuum: quia non nisi cum perfecto dominio et ordine utrumque exercebat; multo ergo magis id dicendum est de divina voluntate.

Quid tenendum sit quoad modum loquendi.

12. Quod vero spectat ad illum modum loquendi, an dicendum sit Deum habere in huiusmodi opere affectum voluntarium simpliciter, admisto involuntario secundum quid, ad modum loquendi spectat. Et quidem locutiones Scripturae in priori difficultate adductae ita indicare videntur: nam licet, simpliciter sint metaphoricae, quatenus dolorem vel poenitentiam Deo attribuunt, tamen per eam metaphoram indicant Deo aliquo modo esse involuntarios huiusmodi affectus. Item mors Christi fuit illi involuntaria secundum quid propter simplicem affectum, quo illam fugiebat. Item peccatum, quod est causa illius poenae, simpliciter est involuntarium Deo, non solum quia est contrarium voluntati signi, ut quidam putant, sed etiam, quia vero ac proprio odio Deus abominatur peccatum, quod illi maxime displicet. Item, quia hoc involuntarium secundum quid non est in Deo ex impotentia, sicut solet esse in hominibus, in quibus propterea im-

and, second, because it makes it so that concerning no object that is lovable in itself is the divine will suspended, as it were, and without any disposition [corresponding to that lovable object]. For this reason in cases where God does not have an efficacious disposition he at least has a simple disposition. And, third, because it is necessary that God be truly and properly said to intend such an end and to have pleasure in it to the extent that it is pleasing, and to will the means that are ordered to it for its sake. Nor is that repugnancy, as it were, among the dispositions repugnant to divine perfection. First, there is no true repugnancy, since, although they concern the same thing, they are nevertheless under different conceptions (*rationes*). Second, each act is from the most perfect counsel and the deliberation of the will. Hence, each is infinite in its order and neither impedes the other in any way. The theologians usually teach something similar about the human will of Christ, which qua reason efficaciously willed death but qua nature ineffaciously fled that death, but without any proper repugnancy of acts. For he did not exercise either except with perfect dominion and order. Much more, therefore, should that be said about the divine will.

12. But as far as that way of speaking is concerned, whether it should be said that God has in work of this sort a disposition unqualifiedly voluntary mixed with one conditionally qualifiedly, merely concerns ways of speaking. Indeed, the expressions in Scripture brought up in the former difficulty seem to indicate this.⁸ Although strictly speaking they are metaphorical insofar as they attribute sorrow and regret to God, nevertheless, they indicate through that metaphor that there are involuntary dispositions of this sort in God in some way. Likewise, the death of Christ was qualifiedly involuntary for him on account of the simple disposition by which he fled it. Likewise, the sin that is the cause of that punishment is unqualifiedly involuntary to God, not only because it is contrary to his revealed will, as certain people think, but also because God detests sin with a true and proper hatred and it is most displeasing to him. Also, because this qualified involuntariness is not present in God as a result of powerlessness—as it usually is in the case of human beings

What should be held concerning the way of speaking.

⁸See n. 6 of this section.

perfectionem dicit; sed est ex summa sapientia, et perfecta libertate. Denique tale involuntarium secundum quid, non excludit voluntarium simpliciter, et ita non repugnat praesenti testimonio Pauli, quod nunc tractamus: nam etiam in hominibus non excluditur voluntarium simpliciter, ob admisionem involuntarii secundum quid per simplicem affectum circa obiectum materialiter diversum, ut constat ex D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 6. art. 5. et 6. sic exponente Philosophum lib. 3. *Ethicorum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 3. Quo fit ut huiusmodi voluntarium in hominibus sufficiat, et ad peccandum mortaliter, et ad praestandum simpliciter absolutum et efficacem consensum. Unde est etiam probabilis illa sententia, quae generatim affirmat, huiusmodi voluntarium ex natura rei sufficere ad valorem cuiuscumque contractus, vel actionis humanae; nisi aliunde, scilicet vel humano iure, vel ex alia peculiari ratione impediatur: sed de hoc alias. Itaque, licet Deus, dum peccatorem punit privando illum <403> aeterna beatitudine, affectum habeat, et, si ita loqui licet, desiderium beatificandi illum, nihilominus secundum consilium voluntatis suae voluntarie illud operatur, tum simpliciter, tum etiam perfectissime intensive, licet non extensive; quia actus, quo id vult, perfectissimus est in omnibus conditionibus ad voluntarium requisitis: nam est ex perfectissima cognitione, et omnino ab intrinseco absque ulla extrinseca vi. Non est autem omnibus modis ille effectus voluntarius, id est comparatus ad omnem voluntatem Dei, tam antecedentem, quam consequentem: et ideo dico non esse perfectissime extensive voluntarium: quod nihil repugnat perfectioni divinae, quia opposita perfectio non est debita tali operi, imo neque illi proportionata.

13. Hinc vero dici tandem potest (et fortasse est aptior loquendi modus) tale opus non esse ullo modo involuntarium Deo cum proprietate loquendo, sed solum secundum metaphoram et analogiam ad nostras operationes vel actus. Quia, ut opus dicatur involuntarium etiam secundum quid, non satis est simplex affectus voluntatis ad obiectum oppositum, sed necesse est ut intercedat aliqua extrinseca vis, quae impellat, vel aliquam necessitatem inferat ad

(in whom it for this reason expresses an imperfection)—but as a result of the highest wisdom and perfect freedom. Finally, a qualified involuntariness of this sort does not exclude unqualified voluntariness and so is not repugnant to the present testimony from Paul, which we are now discussing.

For even in human cases unqualified voluntariness is not excluded on account of the presence of qualified involuntariness through a simple disposition concerning an object materially distinct, as is clear from St. Thomas in *ST IaIIae.6.5–6* explaining *Nicomachean Ethics* III.3 in this way. And so it happens that voluntariness of this kind in human cases is sufficient both for sinning mortally and for giving unqualifiedly absolute and efficacious consent. Hence, also probable is the view, which is generally affirmed, that voluntariness of this kind is *ex natura rei* sufficient for value of any contract or human action, unless it is impeded from elsewhere, namely, by human law or by some other special reason. But more about that in another place. And so, although God has this disposition as long as he punishes a sinner by depriving him of eternal happiness, and, if it is permissible to speak in this way, has a desire to make him happy, nevertheless, he voluntarily does the former according to the counsel of his will, both unqualifiedly and also most perfectly intensively (although not extensively). For the act by which he wills that is most perfect in every condition that is required for voluntariness. It comes from a most perfect cognition and entirely from within without any force from without. But that effect is not voluntary in every way, that is, in relation to every of God's willings, both antecedent and consequent. For this reason I do not say that it is most perfectly voluntary extensively. This is in no way repugnant to divine perfection, since the opposite perfection is not something such a work ought to have nor indeed would it be proportionate to such a work.

13. But, finally, from this one can also say (and perhaps this is a more suitable way of talking) that such a work is not in any way involuntary for God when speaking properly, but only according to metaphor and according to an analogy with our activities and acts. For in order to call a work involuntary even only qualifiedly, a simple disposition of the will for the opposite object is not sufficient. Rather it is necessary that some extrinsic force be involved which compels it or inflicts some necessity for one of the dispositions that seem to be

D. Thomas.

St. Thomas.

90 aliquem ex illis affectibus, qui inter se pugnare videntur; et ex
 parte voluntatis intercedat impotentia evitandi seu evadendi
 alio modo vim illam; ut constat ex huiusmodi voluntario,
 quoties in nobis contingit. Item, quia sicut voluntarium
 esse debet ab intrinseco, ita involuntarium postulat ut sit 95R
 aliquo modo ab extrinseco. In Deo autem illa duo locum
 non habent; quia neque ab extrinseco vis ei inferri potest,
 95 proprie loquendo, nec ex impotentia provenit quod huius-
 modi voluntates habeat, sed ex se, et intrinseca perfectione
 utrumque habet effectum, et ideo dici non debet operari in- 100R
 voluntarie, etiam secundum quid. Loquimur autem semper
 100 more nostro de illis actibus, ac si essent plures, quia secundum
 rationem nostram illos distinguimus, ut eos explicare pos-
 simus: cum tamen actus divinae voluntatis propter eminentiam
 suam utramque rationem uniter et simplicissime com- 105R
 plectatur.

Opereturne Deus secundum consilium voluntatis suae etiam in operibus liberi arbitrii humani.

Explicatio prima.
 Hieronymus.

14. Ad alteram difficultatem responderi posset, Pau- <col. b>
 lum loqui de iis, quae per seipsum operatur: non vero de iis
 5 etiam, quae operatur per alios praesertim per voluntatem hu-
 manam. Possetque hoc confirmari ex verbis Hieronymi in
 Commentario illius loci dicentis. *Non quod omnia, quae in*
mundo fiunt, Dei voluntate et consilio peragantur: alioquin
et mala Deo poterunt imputari: sed quod universa, quae facit,
 10 *consilio faciat, et voluntate.* Sed nec verba Pauli, nec univer-
 salis efficacia divinae voluntatis illam limitationem admit-
 tit: Deus enim vere ac proprie operatur, non solum ea, quae
 per seipsum facit, sed etiam ea omnia, quae operantur crea-
 turas, et humanae voluntates, quatenus vera et realia opera
 15 sunt: quia in ea verius ac perfectius influit, quam ipsae causae 15R
 secundae: et ideo de illo dicitur. *Omnia opera nostra oper-*
atus es in nobis Domine, et illud. Qui producit in montibus

fighting with each other and that on the part of the will there must
 be a powerlessness to avoid or escape that force in any way, as is clear
 from the voluntary things of this sort that is an ordinary occurrence in
 us. Also, since just as the voluntary must be from an intrinsic power,
 so also the involuntary requires that it be in some way from something
 extrinsic. But in God those two have no place, since an extrinsic force
 cannot be imposed on him, properly speaking, and the fact that he
 has willings of this sort does not arise from a powerlessness but from
 himself and he has each effect by intrinsic perfection. For this reason
 it should not be said that he acts involuntarily even if only qualifiedly.
 We, however, always speak according to our customs about those acts,
 as if they were plural, since we distinguish them according to our rea-
 son, so that we can explain them. Nevertheless, in the case of the acts
 of the divine will each aspect (*ratio*) is included in a united and most
 simple way on account of the will's eminence.

Whether God works according to the counsel of his will even in works of a human free will.

14. One can respond to the second difficulty that Paul is talking about
 those things that are done through themselves but not about those
 things that are done through other things, especially not those done
 through human will. And this can be confirmed from Jerome's words
 in his commentary on that passage where he says: "Not all things
 that are done in the world are completed by God's will and counsel.
 Otherwise, the evils could also be attributed to God. But everything
 that God does, he does by his counsel and will."

But neither the words of Paul nor the universal efficacy of the di-
 vine will admit that limitation. For God truly and properly does not
 only those things that he does by himself but also all those things that
 are done by creatures and human wills, insofar as they are true and
 real works. For he inflows being into those more truly and more per-
 fectly than the secondary causes themselves, and for that reason they
 are said to be by him: "you performed all our works in us, O Lord"

The first
 explanation.
 Jerome.

It is rejected.

90 impotentia] in potentia B.

98 effectum] affectum V.

103 uniter] unite B.

foenum, et similia. Cum igitur verba Pauli generalia sint, etiam haec opera Dei comprehendunt; et ratio est evidens, quia haec etiam opera non fiunt nisi Deo volente: neque ipse influit in illa nisi voluntarie. Et ad hunc ipsum voluntarium influxum non nisi summa sapientia, et consilio determinatur. Quod etiam verum est de operibus peccatorum, quatenus a Deo fiunt, vel in ea Deus influit: nam quatenus est universalis provisor, sapienter iudicat expedire tales actus permittere, et ad illos concurrere: et iustissime hoc ipsum vult. Oportet tamen in peccando distinguere aliquid, quod a Deo fit, et aliquid, quod ab ipso non fit: operatur enim Deus actum peccati, non malitiam eius; et hoc est quod docuit Hieronymus, et ideo non dixit: Aliquid facit Deus in mundo, et non secundum suum consilium et voluntatem; sed, aliquid fit in mundo, quod tamen Deus non facit, scilicet peccatum: si tamen peccatum aliquid esse dicendum est, cum potius sit nihil, teste Augustino: vocatur tamen aliquid ad modum privationis, prout etiam dicitur fieri et esse. Et tamen etiam sub ea ratione, licet peccatum non fiat ex consilio et voluntate Dei, non tamen fit sine eius consilio, et voluntate permittente ut hoc malum fiat. Sed de hac re, et in universum de consilio et voluntate disponente, et operante in humanas voluntates, et actus liberos earum, multa difficilia tractari possent, ad quae nunc digredi non est necesse.

Deum velle omnia extra se ut media.

15. Quarto, principaliter infertur ex prae- <404> dictis verbis Pauli, quidquid Deus extra se vult, velle ut medium ordinatum ad aliquem finem, nempe ad seipsum, propter quem omnia operatur, ut Sapiens etiam dixit. Haec autem consecutio fundata est in proprietate illius verbi, *consilium*: quae, seclusa imperfectione inquisitionis, vel ignorantiae, quam in nobis includit, vel potius supponit, secundum omnia alia, quae ad perfectionem spectant, cum proprietate intelligenda est, cum Deo attribuitur iuxta superius dicta. At vero consil-

[(Isaiah 26:12–13)]. And the passage, “he produces hay in the mountains” [(Psalm 146:8)], and other similar passages. Since, therefore, Paul’s words are general, they also include God’s works. The reason is obvious, since even these works do not happen unless by God willing them nor does he inflow being into them except voluntarily.

His will is not determined to this voluntary inflow except by the highest wisdom and counsel. This is also true concerning the works of sin insofar as they are made by God or insofar as God inflows being into them. For to the extent that he is the universal provider, he wisely judges to permit producing such acts and to concur with them. He wills this most justly. Nevertheless, in the case of sinning one ought to distinguish that which God does and that which he does not do. For God makes the act of sin but not its evil. This is what Jerome teaches, which is why he does not say that God makes something in the world but not according to his counsel and will; rather, he says that something is made in the world that is, however, not made by God, namely, sin. If, nevertheless, it should be said that sin is something since it is more than nothing, by Augustine’s witness, it is called something in the mode of privation insofar as it is said to become and to be. And yet for that reason, even though sin is not made according to the counsel and will of God, it is not, however, made without his counsel and will permitting this evil to be made. But concerning this matter—and in general concerning counsel and God’s will disposing and working in human wills and in their free acts—many difficulties could be discussed which it is not necessary to get into at present.

That God wills everything beyond himself as a means.

15. Fourth, it is principally inferred from the aforementioned words of Paul that whatever God wills beyond himself, he wills as a means ordered to some end—namely, to himself—for the sake of which he does all things, as Wisdom also teaches.⁹ This consequence, moreover, is founded in a property of that word ‘counsel’, which, excluding the imperfection of inquiry or ignorance which it includes or rather presupposes in us, should be understood with propriety according to all the other things that belong to perfection when it is attributed to God as was said earlier. But counsel concerns not the end but the means,

⁹In *De fine hominis* 4.pr. Suárez says that God does not properly have an ultimate end.

Aristoteles.
D. Gregorius
Nissenus.
D. Thomas.

55 ium non est de fine, sed de mediis, teste Aristotele 3. *Ethico-
rum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 3. et Gregorio Nissenus lib. 5. *De
philosophia* cap. 5. Et rationem reddit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 14. 55R
art. 2. quia consilium est de iis, quae eligenda sunt: et conse-
quenter est etiam de iis, quae non sese offerunt ut necessario
amanda: nam circa necessaria nemo consilium capit: electio
autem et indifferentia proprie est in mediis: de iis ergo est
proprie consilium. Et praeterea, quamvis Deus se perfectis-
60 sime voluntarie amet, non dicitur se amare secundum con-
siliium voluntatis suae, sed potius ex naturali (ut sic dicam)
necessitate voluntatis suae: quia non se amat ut medium, sed
potius ut ultimum terminum sui amoris, si tamen hoc modo
nobis loqui licet. Nam, ut hoc obiter advertam, Deus cum
65 se amat necessario, non se amat ut finem proprie ac positive,
sed negative; quia, sicut Deus non est a se positive, sed nega-
tive tantum, quatenus non est ab alio, ita non est propter se
positive, sed tantum negative: quia non est propter aliud: est
enim sibi ipsi summum bonum simpliciter; et hoc modo se
70 amat necessario. Quatenus vero eius amor se extendit ad crea-
turas, amat se ut finem earum, quatenus eas amat propter seip-
sum, in quo amore iam operatur secundum consilium volun-
tatis suae, quia iam versatur circa media in ordine ad finem.
Et pari ratione Pater aeternus non generat Filium secundum
75 consilium voluntatis suae, nec Pater et Filius produ-
cunt Spiritum sanctum secundum consilium voluntatis, etiamsi volun-
tate illum producant, quia neque illum amant ut medium,
neque ex amore mediorum illum producant, sed ex amore
sui, vel ex amore totius Trinitatis, quatenus unum summum
80 bonum est: unde non libere, sed naturali necessitate produ-
cunt. Neque propterea aliquid excipimus a generali locutione
Pauli. <col. b> *Qui operantur omnia*, etc. Nam emanationes
divinae ad intra iuxta sincerum et proprium loquendi modum
Scripturae et Patrum, non computantur inter opera Dei: quia
85 revera operationes non sunt, imo neque actiones in toto etiam
metaphysico rigore: quia nullam includunt veram dependen-
tiam, quae est de ratione actionis, et operationis propriae:

as Aristotle testifies in *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 3, and Gregory of Nyssa in *De philosophia* V, ch. 5. And St. Thomas gives the following argument in *ST IaIIae.14.2*: since counsel is about those things that are elected, it consequently is about those things that are not presented as to be loved necessarily. For no one takes counsel concerning what is necessary. But election and indifference are properly about means and therefore counsel is properly about them.

Furthermore, although God loves himself with most perfect vol-
untariness, he is not said to love himself according to the counsel of his will but rather from the natural (if I may call it that) necessity of his will. For he does not love himself as a means but rather as the ultimate terminus of his love, if we can speak in this way. For, as I noted in passing, although God loves himself necessarily, he does not love himself as an end properly and positively but negatively. For just as God does not exist *a se* positively but only negatively (insofar as he is not from something else), so also he is not for his own sake positively but only negatively (since he is not for the sake of something else). For he is the unqualifiedly highest good for himself, and in this way he necessarily loves himself. But insofar as his love extends itself to created things, he loves himself as their end, insofar as he loves them for the sake of himself. In this love he already acts according to the counsel of his will, since it already concerns means in relation to an end.

And for a parallel reason the eternal Father does not beget the Son according to the counsel of his will nor do the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit according to the counsel of their will, even though they produce him by their will, because they do not love him as a means nor do they produce him from a love for means but from a love for himself or from a love for the whole Trinity insofar as it is one highest good. Hence they produce him not freely but by a natural necessity. For this reason we cannot take anything else from Paul's general phrase "he who does all things . . ." For the divine emanations internal [to the Trinity] cannot be counted among God's works according to the pure and proper way of speaking in Scripture and the Fathers. For they are not real operations; indeed, they are not actions at all when speaking with metaphysical rigour, since they

Aristotle.
St. Gregory of
Nyssa.
St. Thomas.

The internal
processions are
not according to
the counsel of
God's will.

Processiones ad
intra non sunt
secundum
consilium
voluntatis Dei.

82 *operantur*] operatur V.

sunt ergo simplices emanationes, seu processiones altioris ordinis; voluntariae quidem, non tamen liberae: et ideo non ex consilio, sed (ut sic dicam) ex foecunditate divinae naturae, eiusque intellectus, ac voluntatis profectae.

Ametne Deus aliquid amore amicitiae.

16. Occurrunt autem hoc loco duae aliae difficultates graves circa corollarium hoc; quarum resolutionem brevissime insinuabo. Prima est, quia ex dicta illatione sequitur Deum nullam creaturam amare proprio amore amicitiae seu etiam benevolentiae; quod admittendum nullo modo est; nam repugnat rationi charitatis, quam Deus ad omnes habere dicitur. Repugnat etiam illis verbis Christi. *Iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos.* Repugnat etiam innumeris Scripturae locis, in quibus hic Dei amor erga homines mirum in modum exaggeratur. Sequela vero probatur; quia de ratione amoris amicitiae est velle bonum alteri propter seipsum; et ideo repugnat amorem medii, ut sic, esse amorem amicitiae. Nam id, quod est medium, non amatur propter se, sed propter finem. Quod si aliquod bonum amatur medio ut medium est, non tam amatur illi, quam fini, propter quem totum amatur. Unde D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 26. art. 4. duplicem respectum in amore distinguit, quia per amorem volumus bonum alicui: nam amare est velle bonum amato, ut dixit Aristoteles 2. *Rhetoricorum* cap. 4. respectu ergo boni, quod amatur, dicitur amor concupiscentiae: respectu vero eius, cui amatur, dicitur amor amicitiae; ergo quoties bonum aliquod amatur alteri, non potest esse amor amicitiae: cum ergo medium ametur fini, nunquam amatur ex amicitia. Imo neque ex benevolentia, si proprie loquamur. Nam amor benevolentia hoc solum differt ab amore amicitiae, quod hic includit seu connotat mutuum amorem in altero, seu redamationem,

include no true dependency, which belongs to the nature of action and of proper operations.¹⁰ They are, therefore, simple emanations or processions of another order, voluntary, to be sure, yet not free. And for this reason they are not brought about from counsel, but, if I may speak in this way, from the fecundity of the divine nature and from his intellect and will.

Whether God loves anything with friendship love.

16. But two grave difficulties come up in this place concerning this corollary, the resolution of which I will suggest in a very brief way. The first is that from the stated conclusion it follows that God does not love any creature with a proper friendship love or even benevolence love. But that cannot in any way be admitted, for it is repugnant to the nature of charity, which God is said to have towards all. It is also repugnant to the words of Christ: “I no longer call you servants [...] but friends” [(John 15:15)]. It is also repugnant to innumerable passages from Scripture in which this love from God towards human beings is magnified in an amazing way.

But the inference is proven: for it belongs to the nature of friendship love to will good to another for the sake of that other person. For that reason it is repugnant that the mere love of a means be friendship love. For that which is a means is not loved for its own sake but for the sake of an end. But if some good is loved for a means insofar as it is a means, it is not so much loved for that as for the end for the sake of which the whole is loved. Hence St. Thomas in *ST IaIIae.26.4* distinguishes two respects in love, since through love we wish good to someone. For to love is to will the good to the beloved, as Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* II, ch. 4. Therefore, with respect to the good that is loved, it is called concupiscent love, but with respect to him for whom it is loved, it is called friendship love. Therefore, whenever some good is loved for another, it cannot be friendship love. Therefore, when a means is loved for an end, it is never loved from friendship. Indeed, it is not loved out of benevolence, if we are speaking properly. For benevolence love differs from friendship love only in this, that the lat-

¹⁰cf. *DM* 12.2.6–10

ut aiunt; amor autem benevolentiae dicitur, cum alteri volumus bonum propter seipsum, sive ab alio vicissim amemur, sive <405> non. Hunc ergo amorem non habemus ad has res, quas propter nos amamus: tunc enim benevolentia ad nos terminatur: nam respectu earum rerum, quas nobis amamus potius est concupiscentia: unde fit, ut, licet interdum rebus inanimatis, vel ratione carentibus bonum velimus, ut equo salutem, vel quid simile; nihilominus ad eas non dicamur habere benevolentiae amorem; quia etiamsi bonum illud eis velimus, non tamen in eis sistimus, sed ideo eis volumus tale bonum, ut nobis sint utiliores: ita ut unamquamque tali bonitate affectam nobis cupiamus. Si ergo Deus, quidquid creatum est, amat ut medium, et si quoties ei vult aliquod bonum, totum illud refert ad seipsum, nihil vere et proprie amat ex benevolentia; ergo neque ex amicitia, cum amicitia benevolentiam supponat.

17. Altera difficultas est, quia sequitur, Deum in operationibus suis non moveri ad operandum ab intrinseca bonitate seu decentia in rebus ipsis inventa, sed solum ab extrinseca bonitate finis: consequens autem videtur aperte falsum. Sequela probatur, quia media non amantur propter intrinsecam bonitatem, sed propter extrinsecam bonitatem finis, ut ex Metaphysica suppono: si ergo Deus omnia, quae operatur vult ut media, non vult illa propter internam bonitatem, sed solum propter extrinsecam bonitatem finis. Minor autem seu falsitas consequentis facile ostendi potest, tum exemplis, tum ratione: amat enim Deus hominem iustum propter internam iustitiam, vel sanctitatem, quam habet; et propter bona opera, quae exercet; et vult dare illi gloriam propter merita; et voluit assumere potius naturam hominis, quam equi, quia rationalis est, atque ita propter internam eius proportionem. Ratio vero est, quia Deus cum sit perfectissimus, unumquodque amat prout amabile est: sed multae res creatae

ter includes or connotes a mutual love for each other or redamation, as they say. It is called benevolence love, however, when we will a good to someone for his own sake, whether or not we are loved in return. So we do not have this love for those things that we love for the sake of ourselves, for benevolence is then terminated in us. With respect to those things which we love for us it is, rather, concupiscentia.

Hence it happens that, although sometimes we will good to things that are inanimate or to things that lack reason—health for a horse, for example, or something similar—nevertheless we are not said to have benevolence love for them. Even though we will that good for them, we do not stop in them. Rather, we wish such a good for them in order for them to be more useful to us, so that we eagerly desire everything affected by such a good for ourselves. If, therefore, God loves whatever is created as a means and if he ordinarily wishes some good for a created thing, he refers that whole to himself, and he loves nothing truly and properly from benevolence. Therefore, he also does not love it from friendship, since friendship presupposes benevolence.

17. The other difficulty is that it follows that God in all of his works is moved to acting not by the intrinsic goodness or fittingness found in the things themselves but only the extrinsic goodness of the end. But the consequent seems plainly false.

The consequence is proven: means are not loved for the sake of intrinsic goodness but for the sake of the extrinsic goodness of the end, as I suppose from metaphysics.¹¹ If, therefore, God wills all the things he does as means, he does not will them for the sake of internal goodness but only for the sake of the extrinsic goodness of the end. The minor or the falsity of the consequent can be shown easily, both by example and by reason. For God loves a just human being for the sake of the internal justice or sanctity that the person has and for the sake of the good works that he performs. God wishes to give glory to him for the sake of his merits. God also willed to assume the nature of a human being rather than that of a horse, because human nature is rational and thus for the sake of its internal proportion. The reason, moreover, is that since God is most perfect, he loves any thing

¹¹See *DM* 23.6.

28 benevolentiae] amicitiae B.
40 quoties] om. B.

sunt amabiles propter intrinsecam bonitatem: et praesertim res intellectuales sunt amabiles propter se: ergo.

Intellectuales
creaturas Deus
amat amore
amicitiae.
Ephesios 2.
1. Ioannis 4.
D. Thomas.
Aristoteles.

18. Ad priorem difficultatem, absolute loquendo, neganda est consequentia: nam sine ulla dubitatione dicendum est, Deum amare aliquas creaturas amore amicitiae, et benevolentiae; scilicet creaturas intellectuales, quas ex vera charitate diligit, iuxta id. *Propter nimiam charitatem, qua dilexit nos Deus*: et illud, *Deus charitas est*: at charitas amicitia est, ut optime docuit D. Thomas 2. 2. q. 23. art. <col. b> 1. Advertendum est autem, quod licet vera et propria amicitia non fundetur in utilitate, vel voluptate, ut sumitur ex Aristotele 8. *Ethicorum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 3. non tamen excludit ullum respectum vel habitudinem ad alterum, quem intrinseca ratio honestatis postulat, et potius est de ratione amicitiae ut in honestate fundetur, sicut ibidem Philosophus dixit. Et hac ratione, licet homines inter se se ament amore amicitiae, non tamen debent ab illa excludere respectum ad Dei gloriam et honorem: nam hoc ipso in seipsis constituerent ultimum finem suae amicitiae, quod est contra rectitudinem rationis, et honestatis. Imo, si amicitia sit perfecta et supernaturalis, qualis per charitatem inter iustos constituitur, intrinsece in ratione sua includit respectum ad Deum, cuius singularis participatio est ipsa charitas. Sic igitur, quamvis Deus amet omnem creaturam, etiam rationalem, ut medium ad suam gloriam, et ad suam sapientiam, et alia attributa manifestanda, hoc nihil obstat, quominus creaturas intellectuales amet amore benevolentiae et amicitiae: nullam enim ex eis utilitatem sibi quaerit, nam bonorum nostrorum non indiget. Propter quod dicebat Christus. *Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite, Servi inutiles sumus*. Itaque sistendo intra rationem utilis seu commodi, vult Deus creaturae intellectuali bonum propter ipsam, id est propter eius salutem, beatitudinem, etc. quae omnia in alterius rei utilitatem, et commodum non refert: et ideo illa est propria et perfecta benevolentia. Quod si ex parte creaturae respondeat debitus ac proportionatus amor, erit etiam amicitiae. Cui nihil obstat, quod Deus ad se referat totum illud bonum in-

Lucam 17.

whatsoever to the extent that it is worthy of love. But many created things are lovable for the sake of their intrinsic goodness. Intellectual things especially are lovable for their own sake. Therefore.

18. In response to the former difficulty, the conclusion should be denied, absolutely speaking. Without any doubt it should be said that God loves some created things with friendship love and with benevolence love, namely, intellectual creatures which he loves from true charity, according to the passages “on account of the exceeding charity by which God loved us” [Ephesians 2:4] and “God is charity” [(1 John 4:8)]. And charity is friendship, as St. Thomas well teaches in *ST IIaIIae.23.1*. It should be noted, however, that although true and proper friendship is not founded in utility or pleasure (as is taken from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII, ch. 3), it does not, however, exclude any respect or relation to a second thing that the intrinsic nature of fineness (*honestatis*) requires. Rather, it is of the nature of friendship to be founded in fineness, just as the same Philosopher said. And for this reason, although human beings love each other with friendship love, they must not, however, exclude from that a respect for the glory and honour of God. For by doing so they would set up the ultimate end of their friendship in themselves, which is contrary to the rightness of reason and fineness. In fact, if friendship is perfect and supernatural, of the sort that is built up through charity among the just, it intrinsically includes in its nature a respect to God, whose singular participation is charity itself.

In this way, therefore, even though God loves all creatures, even rational ones, as means to his glory and to his wisdom and to other manifested attributes, nothing stands in the way for him to love intellectual creatures with benevolence love and friendship love. He does not seek any utility for himself from them, since he does not lack any of our goods. For this reason, Christ said: “When you have done all the things that are commanded you, say: we are useless servants” [(Luke 17:10)]. And so by stopping short of the nature of utility or advantage, God wills the good of an intellectual creature for its own sake, that is, for the sake of its health, happiness, etc. He does not refer any of these to the utility or advantage of a further thing. And so that is a proper and perfect benevolence. And if the creature responds with the due and proportionate love, it will also be friendship love. Nothing stands in the way of this from the fact that God refers that

God loves
intellectual
creatures with
friendship love.
Ephesians 2.
1 John 4.
St. Thomas.
Aristotle.

Luke 17.

	tellectualis creaturae, etiam aeternam beatitudinem eius, quia non refert ad se, id est ad suum commodum et utilitatem, sed ad gloriam et honorem sibi debitum ut supremo auctori, et fini ultimo talis creaturae, quo non potuit seipsum privare, cum respectus ille ad perfectionem, et honestatem talis amicitiae necessarius sit.	100R 105R	whole good of the intellectual creature, even its eternal happiness, to himself, since he does not refer to himself, that is, to his advantage and utility, but to the glory and honour owed to him as the supreme author and as the ultimate end of such a creature. He could not remove himself, since that respect to perfection and fineness is necessary to such friendship.	
Amicitia Dei ad creaturas quanta, et qualis. Aristoteles.	Quocirca, licet Deus ex infinita benignitate voluerit huiusmodi amicitiam cum creaturis intellectualibus contrahere, non tamen esse potuit cum aequalitate, ut etiam Aristoteles agnovit 9. <i>Ethicorum ad Nicomacheam</i> cap. 10. quia illa aequalitas maiestati divinae repugnat; sed necessario esse debuit, amicitia excellentior ex parte extremi: nam ad Deum ut ad finem ultimum, <406> et in eius gloriam et honorem debet totus hic amor, totumque bonum creaturae ordinari, quamvis e converso in ratione commodi et utilis sistat in ipsa creatura: quod commodum Deus illi amat, et vult; et ideo vere ac proprie amat illam amicitiae amore divinae maiestati et excellentiae proportionato. Recte vero probat ratio facta Deum nullam aliam creaturam praeter intellectualem amare proprio amore amicitiae: quia nulla alia est amabilis huiusmodi amore, ut recte docuit D. Thomas in 2. 2. loc. cit. et communiter alii Theologi.	105R 110R 115R 120R	Therefore, although God from his infinite kindness wishes to enter into a friendship of this kind with intellectual creatures, it cannot, however, be with equality, as Aristotle also recognizes in <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> IX, ch. 10, since that equality is repugnant to the divine majesty. It is necessary that the friendship must be more excellent on the part of the extreme. For this entire love and the whole good of the creature ought to be ordered to God and to his glory and honour as to the ultimate end, although conversely in the aspect of advantage and utility it stops in the creature itself. God loves and wishes that advantage to him. And for that reason he truly and properly loves that creature with a friendship love proportionate to the divine majesty and excellence. The reason given rightly shows that God loves no creature with a proper friendship love beyond intellectual creatures. For no other creature is lovable with a love of this kind, as St. Thomas rightly teaches in the cited place in <i>ST</i> IIaIIae and as other theologians commonly teach.	How strong and of what kind God's friendship to creatures is. Aristotle.
D. Thomas.				St. Thomas.
Quo amore Deus amet creaturas ratione carentes.	19. Nec vero amat Deus alias creaturas amore commodi seu concupiscentiae respectu sui, sed respectu creaturarum rationalium; quia omnes inferiores creaturas vult propter rationalium commodum et utilitatem; atque ita talis amor, licet respectu creaturarum irrationalium sit concupiscentiae, tamen respectu intellectualium est benevolentiae vel amicitiae, ut significavit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 21. art. 2. ad 3. Et hoc modo intelligendus est 1. <i>Summae contra gentiles</i> cap. 91. Qui etiam cap. 93. rat. 6. hinc optime concludit Deum velle aliis bonum summa liberalitate. Nam, licet velit aliis se communicare propter seipsum, id est, quia talis actio sibi competit ut fonti bonitatis, non tamen se communicat, ut inde aliquid commodi sibi accrescat; eadem enim est ratio quoad hoc, servata proportione de amicitia, et liberalitate: nam sicut amici-	125R 130R 135R	19. Nor does God love other creatures with a love of advantage or concupiscence with respect to himself, but with respect to rational creatures. For he loves all lower creatures for the sake of their advantage and utility for rational creatures. Thus although such love with respect to the irrational creatures is concupiscence love, with respect to intellectual creatures it is benevolence love or friendship love, as St. Thomas indicates in <i>ST</i> Ia.21.2 ad 3. This is the way that <i>Summa contra gentiles</i> I, ch. 91, should be understood. In ch. 93, rat. 6, he also rightly concludes from this that God wills good to others with the highest liberality. For, although he wishes to communicate himself to others for his own sake, that is, because such an action comes together with himself as the fount of goodness, he does not, however, communicate himself as thereby adding some advantage to himself. And the reason is the same with respect to this, preserving proportion	By what love God loves creatures lacking in reason.
D. Thomas.				St. Thomas.

Aristoteles. 135 tia non respicit commodum amantis, ita nec liberalitas dantis, ut etiam Aristoteles dixit 4. *Ethicorum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 6. Sicut autem liberalitas non excludit, imo includit bonitatem seu convenientiam actionis, et consequenter habitudinem eius ad ultimum finem; ita et amicitia. Ac denique si liberalitas sit ipsius Dei, qui est finis ultimus, necessario fieri debet cum respectu ad gloriam et honorem ipsiusmet dantis, quod non est praeiudicium liberalitatis, quia id pertinet ad honestatem actionis. Et idem prorsus dicendum est de vero amicitiae amore. 140R 145R

An voluntas divina propter propriam solum vel etiam ob aliarum rerum bonitatem operetur.

Aliquorum hac super re sententia. 5 20. Ad alteram partem sunt multi Theologi, qui facile admittant consequens quod in illa inferitur; nimirum Deum in omnibus operibus suis nullam aliam rationem operandi habere praeter suam bonitatem. Et praecipue ita videtur sentire D. Thomas 1. p. q. 19. art. 2. et art. 1. ad 3. ubi ait; divinam voluntatem non moveri ab alio, sed a sua bonitate, quae est ipsamet, sibi que sufficiens. Unde, inquit, non fit ut nihil aliud velit, sed ut nihil velit, nisi ratione suae bonitatis. Et idem sentiunt Alensis, Henricus, Gabriel, et alii. Ratio vero tacta est in difficultate proposita; quia in amore mediorum voluntas non movetur nisi a fine. Unde iuxta hunc modum dicendi, ad rationem in contrarium, responditur; Deum quidem amare bonitatem seu perfectionem uniuscuiusque creaturas per modum obiecti materialis: totam autem rationem volendi esse bonitatem solam ipsius Dei, et ita illam solam habere rationem finis: caetera vero omnia, rationem mediorum. Alii vero Theologi aliter loquuntur, dicentes; Deum in multis operibus suis respicere ad congruentiam, et decentiam ipsorum: quod maxime videtur docere D. Thomas 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 86. et 87. ubi ait; quamvis non detur vera causa divinae voluntatis, aut actus eius; tum quia eius velle non est a sua voluntate distinctum; tum etiam quia eodem simplicissimo actu vult quiddam vult, 15R 20R 25R

Alensis 1. p. q. 28. membr. 3. art. 3. et q. 25. membr. 3.
Henricus *Quodlibet* 4. q. 19. Ferrariensis 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 86.
Driedo *De concordia* 1. p. cap. 4. ad 4. Gabriel in 1. dist. 41. q. unica art. 2. in fine.
Aliorum opinio. D. Thomas.

concerning friendship and liberality. For just as friendship does not consider the good of the lover, so also liberality does not consider the good of the giver, as Aristotle also said in *Nicomachean Ethics* IV, ch. 6. Moreover, just as liberality does not exclude but in fact includes the goodness or agreeability of the action and consequently its relation to the ultimate end, so also friendship. Finally, if liberality belongs to God himself, who is the ultimate end, it necessarily ought to happen with respect to the glory and honour of the giver himself. That is not a precedent (*praeiudicium*) of liberality, since it belongs to the fineness of the action. And the same should certainly be said about friendship love.

Aristotle.

Whether the divine will acts only for its own sake or also on account of the goodness of other things.

20. With respect to the other part, there are many theologians who readily admit the consequent inferred in it, namely, that God in all his works has no other reason for acting than his own goodness. St. Thomas especially seems to think this in *ST* Ia.19.2 and Ia.19.1 ad 3, where he says that the divine will is not moved by anything else than by its goodness, which is it itself and which is sufficient for it. "From this," he says, "it does not follow that the divine will wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reasons of its goodness" [*ST* Ia.19.2 ad 3)]. Alexander of Hales, Henry of Ghent, and Gabriel, and others think the same thing. The reason is touched on in the proposed difficulty, since the will is not moved to a love of means except by an end. Hence according to this way of speaking one responds to the argument for the contrary that God indeed loves the goodness or perfection of any creature through the mode of a material object, but the whole reason for willing is the goodness of God alone and so that alone has the nature of an end. But all the other things have the nature of means.

The view of some concerning this matter.

St. Thomas.

But other theologians speak otherwise, saying that God in all his works considers their congruency and fittingness. St. Thomas seems to teach this especially in *Summa contra gentiles* I, chs. 86 and 87, where he says that although there is no true cause for the divine will or one of its acts (because it is not distinct from its willing and also because whatever it wills it wills by the same most simple act, as he

Alexander of Hales, I, q. 28, membr. 3, art. 3, and q. 25, membr. 3; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 4, q. 19; Ferrariensis, *Summa contra gentiles* Ia.86; Driedo, *De concordia* I, ch. 4, ad 4; and Gabriel, I, dist. 41, q. unica, at the end of art. 2. The opinion of others. St. Thomas.

ut latius ipse exponit 1. p. q. 19. art. 5. nihilominus tamen dari ex parte obiectorum creatorum rationes aliquas, ob quas divina voluntas ad talia obiecta libere terminatur. Quod etiam Durandus, Caietanus, et alii Theologi docuerunt. Et videtur efficaciter probari ratione facta in proposita difficultate. Et consonant satis verba Pauli, quae nunc tractamus; scilicet, operari Deum omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae: in illo enim aeterno consilio non tantum considerat Deus bonitatem suam, sed etiam pulchritudinem et decentiam inventam in ipsis rebus, et ideo per voluntatem suam illas acceptat aut amat. Neque hoc repugnat cum ratione mediorum, ut obiiciebatur; tum quia, etiamsi id quod est pure medium non alliciat ad sui amorem, proprie loquendo, sed finis tantum alliciat ad amorem medii, tamen quando medium ita medium est, ut sit etiam per se amabile, potest simul cum fine ad sui dilectionem allicere: hoc autem modo possunt multae creaturae ad divinam voluntatem comparari; tum etiam, quia, quod est medium respectu unius, est finis in ordine ad aliud: atque ita, licet omnia opera Dei sint media respectu ipsius Dei, tamen in- <407> ter se habent ordinem finis et mediorum, sub qua etiam ratione a Deo amantur; et ideo simul illa respicit, prout sunt per se amabilia, licet omnia velit, ut media ad seipsum.

Praemissae sententiae in concordiam rediguntur.

21. Sed fortasse possunt hae sententiae in concordiam reduci. Nam D. Thomas in hoc semper idem docuit, neque fuit sibi contrarius. Aliud est enim loqui de prima et formalissima ratione volendi, aliud de proxima, quae comparatione alterius se habet ut materiale ad formale. Priori modo sola Dei bonitas est Deo ratio volendi omnia, quae vult; et hoc probat difficultas tacta; quia revera sola bonitas Dei comparatur ad Deum, ut per se amabilis: perfectiones autem creaturarum, quantumvis in se magnae videantur, solum sunt amabiles Deo per respectum decentiae, aut convenientiae ad eius bonitatem. Posteriori autem modo perfectiones consideratae ex parte rerum creaturarum conferunt ad consilium et determinationem divinae voluntatis, quia pro ipsarum rerum diversitate habent maiorem, vel minorem convenientiam vel decentiam respectu divinae voluntatis; ut mysterium Incarnationis,

himself explains more fully in *ST* Ia.19.5), nevertheless some reasons are given on the part of created objects on account of which the divine will is freely terminated in such objects. Durandus, Cajetan, and other theologians also teach this. And it seems to be effectively proven by the argument made for the proposed difficulty.

It is also consistent with the words of Paul that we are now discussing, namely, that God works all things according to the counsel of his will. For in that eternal counsel God not only considers his goodness but also the beauty and fittingness found in the things themselves, and for that reason accepts or loves them through his will. Nor is this repugnant with the nature of means, as was objected. First, because even if that which is a pure means entices [the will] to a love for it, properly speaking, but only an end entices [the will] to loving the means, nevertheless, when a means is a means of the kind that is also lovable in itself, it can be entice [the will] to loving it along with the end at the same time. In this way, moreover, many created things can be related to the divine will. Second, because that which is a means with respect to one thing is an end in relation to another. And thus, although all of God's works are means with respect to God, nevertheless they are related to each other as end and means, under which conception (*ratione*) they are also loved by God. Therefore, at the same time he respects them insofar as they are lovable in themselves and wills all of them as means to himself.

21. But perhaps these views can be brought into harmony. For St. Thomas always teaches the same thing in this matter and did not contradict himself. For it is one thing to speak about the first and more formal reason for willing, and another thing to speak about the proximate reason, which are related to each other as the material to the formal. In the former way, only the goodness of God is for God the reason for willing all the things that he wills. The presented difficulty shows this. For in reality only the goodness of God is related to God as lovable in itself. But all the perfections of created things, even though they seem great in themselves, are only lovable to God through a relation of fittingness or agreeability with his goodness.

But in the latter way, the considered perfections on the part of created things relate to the counsel and determination of the will, since according to the difference between those things themselves they have greater or lesser agreeability or fittingness with respect to the divine

The aforementioned views are brought into harmony.

65 quia in se est altius, et in eo magis communicatur Deus, ideo
 in se est magis consentaneum divinae bonitati. Et eodem 65R
 modo voluit potius dare gloriam propter merita, quam sine il-
 lis: quia in hoc magis eius iustitia ostenditur: et voluit potius
 perfectum condere universum, quam imperfectum: quia in
 70 hoc magis eius sapientia manifestatur. Hoc igitur modo rati-
 ones sumptae ex creaturis conferunt ad complendum (ut sic
 dicam) rationem divini consilii et voluntatis; semper tamen
 sub respectu ad divinam bonitatem, ad quam veluti materi-
 aliter comparantur; quod satis est, ut rationem mediorum
 semper obtineant, quia non amantur nisi ex amore divinae
 75 bonitatis, ac propter ipsam. 75R

22. Unde obiter intelligitur, quoties in duobus operibus
 Dei comparatis ad divinam bonitatem non invenitur ex parte
 eorum maior convenientia, vel decentia ad ipsam Dei boni-
 tatem in uno, quam in alio, et aliunde voluntas Dei inae-
 80 qualiter ad illa se habet; tunc neque ex rebus ipsis, nec ex
 sola divina bonitate, sed ex sola libertate divinae voluntatis
 posse reddi rationem illius inaequalitatis, ut <col. b> egregie
 docuit D. Thomas 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. ad 3. exempla ponens
 in electione huius hominis ad gloriam, potius quam illius;
 85 in electione huius partis materiae, ut sit sub forma ignis
 potius, quam sub forma terrae; et similia sunt; quod voluerit
 creare hos angelos, potius quam alios; vel animam Christi ad
 unionem hypostaticam potius, quam aliam possibilem. Nam,
 cum haec, et alia huiusmodi ex se aequaliter ad divinam boni-
 tatem comparentur, non est unde oriatur illa diversitas, nisi
 90 ex libertate voluntatis Dei. Et hoc est etiam profundum consi-
 lium voluntatis divinae, de quo potissime loquitur Paulus
 in verbis nostri thematis: non quod in omnibus suis operibus
 Deus hoc consilio utatur, sed quod cum omnia oportet ex
 95 consilio voluntatis, aliquando utitur illo peculiari, et pro-
 fundo consilio, veluti sorte vocando, quos ex mera liberalitate
 prae aliis dilexit. 95R

Deum extra se libere omnia velle.

23. Ex quo tandem pervenimus ad quintam et catholicam

will, as the mystery of the Incarnation is in itself more fitting with
 the divine goodness because it is in itself higher and God is communi-
 cated more in it. In the same way God wills to give glory for the sake
 of merits rather than without them, since his justice is displayed more
 in the former. And he wills to make a perfect universe rather than an
 imperfect one, since in that way his wisdom is manifested more. In
 this way, therefore, the reasons taken from created things help com-
 plete (if I may speak in this way) the reason of divine counsel and will,
 yet always with respect to divine goodness, to which they are related
 as if material. This is sufficient for the nature of means always to ob-
 tain, since they are not loved except from a love for divine goodness
 and for the sake of that.

22. In passing, it is understood from this that inasmuch as in two
 works of God that are compared to the divine goodness there is not
 found on their part a greater agreeability or fittingness to God's good-
 ness in one than in the other and the will of God does not for some
 other reason hold itself equally to both of them, then a reason for that
 inequality cannot be found in those things or in the divine goodness
 alone but only in the freedom of the divine will. St. Thomas teaches
 this admirably in *ST* Ia.23.5 ad 3, giving examples of the election of
 this human being to glory rather than another, of the election of this
 part of matter to be under the form of fire rather than under the form
 of earth and other similar ones, of God wishing to create these angels
 rather than other ones, and of the soul of Christ in the hypostatic
 union rather than some other possibility. For since these and other
 things of this kind in themselves compare equally to divine goodness,
 that difference does not come from anywhere else than the freedom of
 God's will. And this, too, is the profound counsel of the divine will,
 concerning which Paul is most especially speaking in the words of our
 theme. It is not that God uses this counsel in all his works, but rather
 that since he works all things according to the counsel of his will, he
 sometimes uses that special and profound counsel, as if calling by lot
 those whom he loves in preference to others from sheer liberality.

That God wills everything beyond himself freely.

23. From which we arrive, finally, at the fifth catholic truth that is

D. Thomas.

St. Thomas.

Voluntarium a
 libero diligenter
 distinguendum.

The voluntary
 should be
 distinguished
 from the free.

Quomodo
differant liberum
et voluntarium.

veritatem, quae in praedictis verbis Pauli fundata est, scilicet
Deum operari omnia extra se, non solum perfecte voluntarie,
5 sed etiam libere. Sunt enim haec duo valde diversa; quan- 5R
quam interdum a Doctoribus, etiam Catholicis, confundan-
tur: oportet tamen ea diligenter distinguere ad vitandos er-
rores infidelium et haeticorum. Nullus enim eorum negat,
Deum et nos voluntarie operari: et tamen ethnici negat
10 Deum operari libere; quod etiam de hominibus haetici hoc 10R
tempore sentiunt, licet aliquando ad occultandum errorem
dicant nos operari libere, id est, non coacte. Quo sensu
nonnulli etiam Catholicorum dixerunt, Deum Patrem et Fil-
ium, libere producere Spiritum sanctum: libertate scilicet,
15 quae excludit coactionem, non necessitatem. Verumtamen 15R
illa libertas impropria est, et ad voluntarii rationem spectat,
potius quam liberi. Itaque ad voluntarium solum requiri-
tur, quod sit ex interno appetitu vitae cum cognitione: hoc
autem voluntarium tunc est perfectum, quando est ex per-
20 perfecta, et intellectuali cognitione, et commensuratum seu pro- 20R
portionatum obiecto. Quapropter si obiectum sit summum,
ac necessarium bonum, perfectio voluntarii in eo amando
consistit in interno ac necessario affectu, seu benevolentia il-
lius: et hac ratione, quamvis Deus se <408> perfectissime,
25 et summe voluntarie amet, non tamen libere; id est, cum 25R
indifferentia, sed necessario se amat. At vero si obiectum
non sit summe bonum, nec necessarium, perfectio volun-
tarii consistit in hoc, quod non necessario, sed indifferenter
ametur; id est, cum facultate volendi, et non volendi illud.
30 Et haec est propria ratio libertatis, de qua hic agimus, quae 30R
non solum coactionem, sed etiam necessitatem, et determi-
nationem ad unum excludit. Hanc ergo libertatem divinae
voluntatis fundari dicimus in praedictis verbis Pauli. Primo
quidem, quia consilium non est de necessariis, ut Philoso-
35 phus dixit. Deinde, quia propriissima libertas est in elec- 35R
tione mediorum: ostendimus autem ex his verbis, Deum om-
nia extra se velle et operari ut media: ergo ex eisdem mani-
feste habemus Deum omnia haec cum libertate operari. Item
quia ostensum est Deum operari ex consilio voluntate accep-
40 tato. Denique, quia hoc Paulus adducit, ut declaret, quomodo 40R

founded in these words from Paul, namely, that God does all things
beyond himself not only with perfect voluntariness but also freely.
For those two notions are very different, even though sometimes they
are confused by the doctors, even Catholic ones. It is, however, nec-
essary diligently to distinguish them in order to avoid the errors of
the faithless and the heretics. For no one denies that we and God act
voluntarily, yet some pagans deny that God acts freely. In our time,
heretics think this even about human beings, although sometimes in
order to hide the error they say that we act freely, that is, without co-
ercion. This is the sense in which some Catholics also say that God
the Father and Son freely produce the Holy Spirit, namely, by a free-
dom that excludes coercion but not necessity.

But that is an improper freedom and pertains more to the nature
of voluntariness than of the free. For something to be voluntary it is
only required that it come from an internal appetite qua living thing
along with cognition. Such voluntariness, moreover, is perfect when
it comes from a perfect and intellectual cognition and is commensu-
rate or proportional to the object. Therefore, if the object is the high-
est and necessary good, then the perfection of voluntariness in loving
it consists in an internal and necessary disposition or benevolence for
it. For this reason, although God loves himself most perfectly and
with the highest voluntariness, he does not, however, love himself
freely, that is, with indifference. Rather, he loves himself necessarily.
But if the object is not the highest good and not a necessary good, then
the perfection of voluntariness consists in its being loved not necessar-
ily but indifferently, that is, with the ability (*facultate*) to will and not
to will it. And this is the proper nature of freedom, which is what we
are dealing with now. It excludes not only coercion but also necessity
and determination to one thing.

This freedom of the divine will, therefore, can be founded in the
aforementioned words of Paul. First, indeed, because counsel is not
about necessary things, as the Philosopher said. Next, because the
most proper freedom is found in the election of means. Moreover,
we showed from these words that God wills and works all things be-
yond himself as means. Therefore, from the same words we obviously
hold that God does all these things with freedom. Also because it was
shown that God does all things according to the counsel accepted by
the will. Finally, because Paul brings this up to show how the pre-

How the free and
the voluntary
differ.

Explicatur Dei
indifferentia in
volendo.

45 praedestinati veluti sorte vocentur ex solo proposito divinae
voluntatis, in quo maxime ostenditur libertas eius.

24. Statim vero oriebatur difficultas nunquam satis a
Theologis exaggerata, vel declarata ob suam obscuritatem,
quomodo scilicet divina voluntas possit esse indifferens in 45R
volendo, cum purissimus actus sit, et illi neque addi aliq-
uid, neque detrahi possit, neque in tempore, neque in aeterni-
tate. Quam difficultatem superiori anno tractavi: nunc autem
consulto eam praetermittendam duxi; tum ne illa repeterem,
50 quae in manibus omnium iam versantur; tum etiam ne nimia
eius subtilitate, et speculatione vos defatigarem. Summa vero
totius rei est; esse in Deo voluntatem non per modum po-
tentiae activae vel receptivae alicuius actus intra seipsam, vel
modi alicuius realis: nam hic modus voluntatis imperfectus
55 est, et non per essentiam, sed per participationem: est ergo in
Deo voluntas per modum actus purissimi: nam, sicut Deus
est ipsum esse per essentiam, et suum intelligere, ita etiam est
suum velle. Unde, sicut absoluta necessitate Deus est, et ea-
dem necessitate intelligit, ita etiam simili necessitate vult, et
60 habet suum velle secundum se, et absolute spectatum, quod
in se, nec minui, nec augeri potest, cum sit purus et infinitus
actus. Nihilominus tamen tanta est eminentia illius actus, ut
illo possit Deus unumquodque obiectum amabile iuxta men-
suram, et dignita- <col. b> tem eius, vel necessario vel libere
65 diligere, aut etiam odio habere. Nam seipsum suamque natu-
ram et personas, cum sit infinitum bonum, sibi que sufficiens
absoluta necessitate diligit; tum quoad speciem actus, quia
non potest seipsum odio habere, sed solum amare; tum etiam
quoad exercitium, quia non magis potest Deus a sui amore de-
70 sistere, quam esse desinere. Nihilominus tamen quoad termi-
nationem seu ad volendum res alias extra se, necessitati non
est subiectus. *Non enim*, ut eleganter dixit Gregorius Nis-
senus lib. *De fato* cap. ultimo *sub necessitate est Deus; neque
voluntatem eius necessitati servire fas est dicere*. Est igitur liber
75 actus ille quoad hoc ut sit ratio actualiter volendi, et operandi
aliquid extra ipsum Deum. Dico autem, *volendi et operandi*,
quia non solum operatio ipsa, quae est extra Deum, libera est
Deo, sed etiam voluntas ipsa quatenus est amor talis operatio-

Gregorius
Nissenus.

destined are called as if by lot by the plan of the divine will alone, in which its freedom is especially manifested.

24. But at once a difficulty arises that is never sufficiently magnified or revealed by the theologians on account of its darkness: namely, how the divine will can be indifferent in willing when it is most pure act and can have nothing added to or subtracted from it, neither in time nor in eternity. We treated this difficulty last year. At present, however, I think it should be passed over, both so that I not repeat things that have already been considered in the hands of everyone and also so that I not exhaust readers by its excessive subtlety and speculation.

But the main point of the matter is that willing in God is not through the mode of a power that is active or receptive to some act internal to itself or to some real mode. For that mode of the will is imperfect and not through essence but through participation. Willing in God, therefore, is through the mode of a most pure act. For just as God is being itself through essence and his understanding is through essence, so also is his willing. Hence, just as God exists by absolute necessity and understands by that same necessity, so also he wills by a similar necessity and he has his willing according to himself. Considered absolutely, what is in him can neither be diminished nor increased, since he is pure and infinite act. Nevertheless, the eminence of that act is so great that by that act God can love, necessarily or freely, any lovable object according to its measure and worth, or even have hatred for it. For he loves himself and his nature and persons with absolute necessity, since he is infinite good and sufficient for himself. [This is so] both with respect to the species of the act—since he cannot have hatred towards himself, but only love—and with respect to exercise—since God can no more stop loving himself than he can stop existing.

But with respect to termination or with respect to willing things external to himself, nevertheless, he is not subject to necessity. For, as Gregory of Nyssa elegantly says in the last chapter of *On Fate*, “God is not subject to necessity nor is it right to say that his will serves necessity.” Therefore, that act is free insofar as the reason for actually willing and operating is something external to God himself. I say “willing and operating” because not only is the operation itself that is external to God free for God, but also the willing itself insofar as it is love or

The indifference
in the will of
God is explained.

Gregory of
Nyssa.

D. Thomas.
 80 nis, seu affectus eius. Nam Deus ideo operatur ad extra, quia
 vult; et ideo benefacit, quia amat, iuxta verba nostri thematis. 80R
Qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae; et illa
 1. ad Corinthios 12. *Haec autem omnia operatur unus et idem*
 12. *spiritus dividens singulis, prout vult, id est, pro libera voluntatis*
arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio, ut Ambrosius exposuit
 85 *lib. 2. De fide ad Gratianum cap. 3. Idem ergomet actus, qui* 85R
secundum suum esse necessarius est, in Deo habet perfectissi-
mam rationem liberi arbitri, non quia per ulteriorem actum,
aut realem modum superadditum, vel carentiam eius possit
 90 *terminari, sed quia per se ipsum potest Deus, aut velle, aut* 90R
non velle talia obiecta pro sua eminenti virtute, aut libertate.
Quod quidem difficile est ad intelligendum, et difficilius ad
explicandum, quomodo sit: nobis autem satis esse debet, si ex
 95 *principiis fidei, imo etiam ex evidentibus ostendamus ita esse:* 95R
nam de rebus divinis raro, aut nunquam percipere possumus,
quomodo in se sint: quanquam ostendere possimus nullam
in eis repugnantiam involvi. Quod etiam hic praestare posse-
mus, nisi ob rationes prius insinuatatas ad alia foret properan-
dum. Haec ergo sufficiant de disputatione priori supra posita.

100R

disposition for such an operation. For God operates beyond himself
 for this reason: because he wills to. He confers benefits for this reason:
 because he loves. [This is] according to the words of our theme: “He
 does all things according to the counsel of his will.” Also according
 to 1 Corinthians 12[:11]: “But all these things are done by one and
 the same Spirit, distributing to each one as he wills,” that is, “accord-
 ing to the free choice of his will and not in servility to necessity,” as
 Ambrose explains in *De fide ad Gratianum* II, ch. 3. Therefore, the
 very same act that is necessary according to its being has in God the
 most perfect *ratio* of freewill, not because it can be either terminated
 or not terminated to this or that secondary object through a further
 act or real mode that is superadded or lacking, but because God can
 through himself either will or not will such objects on account of his
 eminent power or freedom. It is indeed difficult to understand and
 even more difficult to explain how this works. But we must be satis-
 fied if we show it to be the case from the principles of the faith, indeed
 also from that which is evident. For in divine matters we can rarely
 or never see how they are in themselves, although we may be able to
 show that they involve no repugnancy in themselves. We could also
 supply that here, except we should hurry on to other matters for the
 reasons given earlier. This, therefore, suffices concerning the former
 disputation posited above.

St. Thomas.

1 Cor. 12.