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CAPUT I.

De nominibus naturae, et liberi arbitrii.

1. Quia libera natura gratiae fundamentum est, et
5 gratia perfectio, et sanitas est naturae, ideo dispu-
tatio de gratia cognitionem aliquam talis naturae
supponit, propter quod solent gratia, et natura, seu
liberum arbitrium, non tantum in disputatione ipsa,
sed etiam in titulo totius operis coniungi, sicut Au-
10 gustinus librum unum de *Natura, et gratia*, et alium
de *Gratia, et libero arbitrio* scripsit. Propter hanc
ergo causam necessarium est in ingressu huius ma-
teriae supponere quid nomine naturae, et liberi arbi-
trii intelligamus. Nam philosophi in libris de Physico
15 auditu de natura disputant, prout principium est
motus, et quietis; in praesenti vero non in ea latitu-
dine sumitur, sed prout dicitur per antonomasiam
de intellectuali, seu rationali natura, quae prin-
cipium est moralium operationum, quibus aeterna
beatitudo comparatur, vel amittitur, ad quem finem

Augustinus.

CHAPTER I.

On the names 'nature' and 'freewill'.³

1. Since free nature is the foundation of grace and grace is
the perfection and health of nature, a discussion of grace
presupposes some knowledge of such a nature. This is the
reason why grace and nature or freewill⁴ are usually con-
joined not just in the same disputation but in the title of
the whole work. Augustine, for example, wrote one book
[entitled] *On Nature and Grace* and another one *On Grace
and Freewill*. For this reason, therefore, it is necessary that
in taking up this subject we first set out what we understand
by the names 'nature' and 'freewill'. For philosophers dis-
cuss nature in books examining [Aristotle's] *Physics* insofar
as it is the principle of motion and rest. But at present we
are not taking 'nature' that broadly but are taking it as it
is said through antonomasia of intellectual or rational nature,
which is the principle of the moral operations by which eter-
nal happiness is secured or lost. Only intellectual nature is
ordered to this end through grace. For this reason, Augus-

Augustine.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1620 Lyon edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. I have not yet been able to check the first edition (Coimbra, 1619). For recorded variants, B = 1620 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1620 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

My thanks to Shane Duarte, who generously commented on my translation and spared me from a number of errors and infelicities.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in volume 7 of the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³Merely three years after the first publication of this work, the Spanish Franciscan Jeronimo Tamarit de Tavaría copies the bulk of the present chapter in the identically titled chapter in his *Flores theologiae* (Valencia, 1622), tom. 1, pp. 491–92.

⁴I take '*liberum arbitrii*' as a technical term naming the item under dispute. The equivalent term in contemporary philosophy might be 'freedom of the will', though it has the disadvantage of already suggesting a theory as to which faculty would provide us with this freedom. I will translate '*liberum arbitrii*' with 'freewill' as a single word and reserve 'freedom of the will' for '*libertas voluntatis*' where it is clear that it is the *will's* freedom that is being considered.

20 sola intellectualis natura per gratiam ordinatur. 20R
 Augustinus. Et ideo dixit Augustinus lib. IV. contra Iulianum
 cap. 3. solam rationalem naturam esse gratiae ca-
 pacem. Loquitur autem de rationali prout intellec-
 tualem complectitur, quia tam Angelica, quam hu-
 25 mana natura capax est divinae gratiae, quia utraque
 Bernardus. libera est. *Gratiam autem* (ut ait Bernardus de Gra-
 tia et libero arbitrio) *nec dare potest nisi Deus, nec*
capere nisi liberum arbitrium, id est, natura libera,
 illa enim indiget, ut supernaturalem finem asse-
 30 quatur. Quia vero humana natura et nobis est
 magis familiaris, et pluribus titulis, ac modis indi-
 get gratia, <col. b> quam Angelica, ideo de rationali
 natura sermonem semper faciemus, doctrina vero
 facile poterit ad Angelicam cum proportione appli-
 35 cari: nam ubi ratio diversitatis intervenerit non dif-
 ficile intelligetur, eamque indicare curabimus. Non
 loquimur autem nunc de natura humana prout a
 supposito distinguitur, nec de statu illo plus quam
 humano, quem in divino Verbo per hypostaticam
 40 unionem obtinuit: nam prior naturae speculatio
 metaphysica est, nihilque ad praesentem causam
 spectat, alterius vero mysterii consideratio altior
 est, quam suo loco pro viribus prosecuti sumus. In
 praesenti ergo natura humana quatenus in persona
 45 creata capax est gratiae, illaque ad bene operandum,
 et ad suum finem consequendum indiget, consider-
 atur.

2. Est autem ulterius advertendum gratiam
 perficere naturam, praecipue quatenus humano-
 50 rum, ac liberorum actuum principium est. Unde
 fit, ut liberum arbitrium, et gratia tam sint habi-
 tudine, et officio coniuncta, ut non possint dis-
 putatione seiungi, ut satis indicavit Augustinus,
 Augustinus, epistola 47. dicens: *Si non est Dei gratia, quomodo Christus*
 55 *salvat mundum? Et si non est liberum arbitrium,*

20R tine said in *Against Julian* IV, ch. 3, that only rational nature
 has the capacity for grace. But he is speaking about ratio-
 nal nature insofar as it includes intellectual nature, since
 angelic nature as well as human nature has the capacity for
 divine grace, since each is free.

25R 'But grace', as Bernard says in *On Grace and Freewill*,
 'cannot be given except by God and cannot be received except
 by freewill', that is, by a free nature. For a free nature is
 required in order to achieve a supernatural end. But since
 human nature both is more familiar to us than angelic na-
 30R ture and is in need of grace under more headings and ways,
 we will always make our discussion about rational nature.
 But the doctrine could easily be applied proportionately to
 angelic nature. For it will not be difficult to realize where the
 basis of difference comes up and we will take care to indicate
 35R it. Moreover, we are not now talking about human nature as
 distinguished from the supposit nor about that more-than-
 human state that it obtains in the divine Word through the
 hypostatic union. For the former consideration of nature is
 metaphysical and in no way pertains to the present subject,
 40R whereas the consideration of the latter mystery is loftier and
 we have pursued it in its proper place to the extent we are
 able. In the present place, then, we are considering human
 nature insofar as it is capable of grace in a created person,
 and insofar as grace is necessary for it to operate well and
 45R attain its end.

2. It should further be noted that grace perfects nature,
 especially insofar as it is the principle of human and free
 acts. Hence, the result is that freewill and grace are so joined
 together in disposition and function that they cannot be
 50R separated in discussion, as Augustine indicated well enough
 in saying: 'If there is not the grace of God, how does Christ
 save the world? And if there is not freewill, how does he
 judge the world?' And in *Hypognosticon* III, ch. 11, he says:

Augustine.

Augustine,
Letter 47.

Bernardus.	60	<p><i>quomodo iudicat mundum?</i> Et lib. 3. Hypognosticon cap. 11. <i>Neque gratia sine libero arbitrio facit hominem habere beatam vitam, nec liberum arbitrium sine gratia</i>, et Bernardus de Gratia et libero arbitrio: <i>Tolle liberum arbitrium, non erit quod salvetur, tolle gratiam, non erit unde salvetur</i>. Unde praecipua huius materiae difficultas in concilianda gratiae necessitate, ac efficacia cum libertate arbitrii posita est, et ignorantia huius concordiae fere omnium errorum, qui in <2> hac materia fuerunt, radix et origo fuit. Oportet ergo ante significationem gratiae, quid nomine libertatis, et liberi arbitrii significetur praemittere.</p>	55R	<p>'Grace without freewill does not make a human being have a happy life and neither does freewill without grace'. Bernard says in <i>On Grace and Freewill</i>: 'Take away freewill and there is nothing to be saved; take away grace and there is nothing by which to be saved'. Hence, the primary difficulty in this matter is situated in reconciling the necessity and efficacy of grace with freewill. Ignorance of this concordance has been the root and origin of almost all the errors that have been made in this matter. It is necessary, therefore, first to deal with what is signified by the names 'freedom' and 'freewill' before discussing the signification of 'grace'.</p>	Bernard.
Hugo Victorinus. Triplex libertas, sed illa, quae est a necessitate, est propria libertas moralis.	70	<p>3. Et imprimis praemittenda est distinctio triplicis libertatis, quam sic tradit Hugo Victorinus in <i>Summa sententiarum</i> tract. 3. cap. 9. <i>Est namque (ait) triplex libertas, a necessitate, a peccato, a miseria</i>. Nos vero aliter illa membra numeramus, est enim libertas a servitute, a coactione, et a necessitate; ex quibus sola haec tertia est propria libertas moralis ad humanos actus laude, et reprehensione; praemio, aut poena dignos necessaria: unde illa sola simpliciter nomen libertatis meretur; reliquae enim eatenus libertates appellantur, quatenus alicui necessitati opponuntur. Servitus enim quamdam parendi necessitatem inducit, et ideo carentia servitutis libertas appellatur Rom. 8. <i>Liberabitur a servitute corruptionis</i>. Potest autem servitus esse vel peccati, vel poenae: sicque carentia culpa, et remissio poenae dici potest libertas quaedam a peccato, seu peccati servitute, iuxta illud Rom. 6. <i>Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae: nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum in sanctificationem</i>. Et 2. Cor. 3. <i>Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas</i>. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. <i>Bonus (inquit) homo, etiamsi</i></p>	65R	<p>3. In the first place, a distinction needs to be made between three kinds of freedom. Hugh of Saint Victor makes the distinction this way in <i>Summa sententiarum</i> tr. 3, ch. 9: 'For freedom is threefold: from necessity, from sin, and from suffering'. But we number the members differently, for there is freedom from servitude, from coercion, and from necessity. Of these, only the third kind is the proper moral freedom necessary for human acts to deserve praise and reprimand, rewards and punishments. Hence, it alone deserves the name 'freedom' strictly speaking.</p>	Hugh of Saint Victor. Three kinds of freedom, but only freedom from necessity is proper moral freedom.
Rom. 8.	80	<p><i>Liberabitur a servitute corruptionis</i>. Potest autem servitus esse vel peccati, vel poenae: sicque carentia culpa, et remissio poenae dici potest libertas quaedam a peccato, seu peccati servitute, iuxta illud Rom. 6. <i>Cum servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae: nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum in sanctificationem</i>. Et 2. Cor. 3. <i>Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas</i>. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. <i>Bonus (inquit) homo, etiamsi</i></p>	75R	<p>For the others are called freedoms only insofar as they are opposed to some kind of necessity. For servitude brings in a kind of necessity of obeying, and for this reason the absence of servitude is called freedom in Rom. 8[21]: '[the creature itself] shall be freed from the servitude of corruption'. Servitude, moreover, can be to sin or to punishment, and so the absence of guilt and the remission of punishments can be called a kind of freedom from sin or from servitude to sin, as in Rom. 6[20–22]: 'For when you were servants of sin, you were free of justice . . . but now having been freed from sin and having been made servants of God, you have your fruit unto sanctification'. And in 2 Cor. 3[17]: 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom'. Hence, Augustine also said in</p>	Rom. 8.
2. Cor. 3. Augustinus.	90	<p><i>Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas</i>. Unde etiam Augustinus 4. de Civitate cap. 3. <i>Bonus (inquit) homo, etiamsi</i></p>	85R	<p>2 Cor. 3. Augustine.</p>	2 Cor. 3. Augustine.

86 6] 7 V.

91 3] 2 V.

serviat, utique homini, liber est, scilicet a peccato; malus autem etiamsi regnet, servus est, nimirum peccati. Et ad eundem modum lib. 14. de Civitate 90R
 95 *cap. 15. dixit, primum hominem peccando amisisse libertatem, quam concupivit. Non enim libertatem a necessitate concupierat, nam illam a principio habuit, et ita neque illam amisit, sed libertatem a subiectione appetiit, et hanc amisit, quia et peccati,* 95R
 100 *et poenae, et miseriae servus factus est, et contraxit concupiscentiae inordinationem, et pugnam fomitis, quae servitus quaedam poenalis est. Atque ad hanc significationem reducitur omnis carentia obligationis, seu debiti, sive a lege, sive a quacumque alia* 100R
 105 *causa proveniat: sic enim dispensatio, vel exemptio a lege, libertas quaedam censetur; unde etiam privilegium nomine libertatis vocari solet; et cui aliquod debitum remittitur, liberari ab illo dicitur. Si quis autem recte consideret, tota haec libertas supponit* 105R
 110 *propriam libertatem a necessitate, quia non est capax propriae servitutis, culpa, aut poenae, praeccepti, <col. b> aut obligationis, nisi persona libera in agendo, ideoque sicut propria privatio supponit aptitudinem, ita servitus, et obligatio supponunt* 110R
 115 *personam aptam ad operandum cum indifferentia, et absque necessitate. Quia vero operationes a necessitate liberae possunt esse sub iure alterius, vel sub aliquo onere, et obligatione, ideo cum libertate a necessitate potest esse in operibus necessitas* 115R
 120 *servitutis, et obligationis, seu (quod idem est) potest quis per legem, vel servitutem privari libertate illis contraria, et nihilominus retinere propriam operum libertatem.*

Coactum idem
fere quod
violentum.

4. Coactum idem fere est quod violentum, 125
 125 *utrumque enim est contra internum appetitum patientis, vel operantis, sed violentum generalius dicitur de quocumque motu contrario appetitui, sive elicito, sive innato: coactum vero proprie dicitur, quando appetitui elicito, et vitali repugnat, licet interdum* 120R

The City of God IV, ch. 3: ‘the good man, even if he serves, at least if he serves another man, is free’, namely, from sin; ‘but an evil man is a servant even if he reigns’, namely, of sin. And in the same way he says in *The City of God* XIV, ch. 15, that the first man by sinning lost the freedom that he craved. For it was not freedom from necessity that he had craved, for he had that from the beginning and he had not lost it. But he desired freedom from subjection and this he lost, since he was made a servant of sin, punishment, and suffering, and he contracted a disordering of concupiscence and a battle of lust, which is a kind of penal servitude. Every absence of obligation or of debt—whether it arises from a law or from any other cause—is traced back to this signification. For thus a dispensation or exemption from a law is thought to be a kind of freedom. Hence, a privilege is also usually given the name ‘freedom’, and someone for whom some debt is remitted is said to be freed from that debt.

But if someone were to consider the matter rightly, this entire freedom presupposes a proper freedom from necessity. For only a person who is free in acting has the capacity for proper servitude, guilt, punishment, command, or obligation. For this reason, just as a proper privation presupposes an aptitude, so also servitude and obligation presuppose a person apt for operating with indifference and without necessity. But since operations free from necessity can be under the right of another or under some burden and obligation, therefore the necessity of servitude and of obligation can exist in works along with freedom from necessity. Or, what comes to the same thing, someone can be deprived through law or servitude of the freedom that is contrary to them, and yet retain the proper freedom of works.

4. What is coerced is almost the same thing as what is subject to the violent, for each goes against the internal appetite of the patient or of the one operating. But violent is said more generally of any motion contrary to appetite, whether elicited or innate, whereas [a motion] is properly called coerced when it is in conflict with an elicited and vi-

The coerced
almost the
same as the
violent.

130 soleant voces illae confundi. Duo ergo ad coac- 125R
 tum requiruntur, scilicet, ut ex necessitate fiat, vel
 sustineatur, et quod sit contra internum affectum;
 Aristoteles. et ita coactio est quaedam necessitas, et aliquid ul-
 135 *ab extrinseco, passo non conferente vim*, id est, re- 130R
 sistente aliquo modo, ut omnes exponunt ex eodem
 Aristotele 2. Ethicorum ad Eudemum cap. 8. quia
 140 si passum non resistat, motio non erit violenta, eti- 135R
 amsi ab extrinseco proveniat. Coactum ergo, ut tale
 est, non potest esse ab intrinseco, alioqui non es-
 set contra propriam inclinationem, si autem est ab
 extrinseco, eo ipso necessarium est, quia libertas
 145 a necessitate non est in patiando, sed in agendo, 140R
 ut infra probabo: ob hanc ergo causam et coactum
 includit necessarium, et quod non est a coactione
 liberum, ut tale est, non potest esse a necessitate
 150 immune. Propter alias vero conditiones non conver- 145R
 titur coactum cum necessario, multa enim neces-
 saria sunt, quae contra internum appetitum non
 sunt, imo ex illo saepe nascuntur. Et ob eandem rati-
 onem libertas necessitatem excludens universalior
 est libertate soli coactioni opposita: nam omnis lib-
 155 ertas a necessitate est etiam a coactione exempta, 150R
 non vero e contrario, ut per se notum est; dilectio
 enim Dei in patria a coactione libera est, non tamen
 a necessitate.

160 5. Libertas ergo a sola coactione tantum requirit 155R
 carentiam violentiae, ita ut motio, quae sic libera dic-
 itur, contra internum appetitum <3> non sit, sive
 ex necessitate fiat, sive non. Talis autem motio, si
 sit voluntatis, dicenda est potius voluntaria, quam
 libera. Hae namque duae proprietates in actibus
 voluntatis distinctae sunt, et ideo nominibus etiam 160R

tal appetite, although sometimes those terms are confused.
 Two things, therefore, are required for coerced motion: that
 it comes to be or be endured of necessity, and that it be
 contrary to an internal affect. And thus coercion is a kind
 of necessity and adds something to it. Both are gathered
 from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 1, where he says:
 ‘the violent is from something extrinsic, without the patient
 contributing force’, that is, without resisting in some way,
 as everyone explains it in accordance with what the same
 Aristotle says in *Eudemian Ethics* II, ch. 8. For if what is
 suffered is not resisted, the motion will not be violent even
 if it arises from something extrinsic. The coerced, therefore,
 insofar as it is such cannot be from something intrinsic. Oth-
 erwise, it would not be contrary to one’s own inclination. But
 if it is from something extrinsic, it is by that fact necessary.
 For freedom from necessity is not found in undergoing but
 in acting, as I will prove below. For this reason, therefore,
 the coerced includes necessity, and what is not free of coer-
 cion, insofar as it is such, cannot be exempt from necessity.
 But on account of other conditions the coerced is not inter-
 changeable with the necessary. For there are many things
 that are necessary that are not contrary to internal appetite.
 In fact, necessary things often arise from internal appetite.
 For the same reason freedom that excludes necessity is more
 universal than freedom that is opposed to coercion alone.
 For every freedom from necessity is also exempt from coer-
 cion, but not the other way around, as is known *per se*. For
 the love for God in the afterlife is free from coercion, yet not
 free from necessity.

5. Therefore, freedom from coercion alone only requires
 the absence of violence in such a way that a motion that is
 called free in this way is not contrary to internal appetite,
 whether or not it happens by necessity. But such a motion,
 assuming it is of the will, should be called voluntary rather
 than free. For these two properties in acts of the will are
 distinct and so they should also be distinguished by names,

Aristotle.

165 sunt distinguendae, ne verborum ambiguitas dispu-
 tationem reddat incertam. Potest ergo esse actus
 hominis voluntarius, ac subinde a coactione liber,
 qui tamen simpliciter liber a necessitate non sit,
 ut in amore, quo Deus se amat, et quo Spiritum
 170 Sanctum producit, et quo beati diligunt Deum, et in
 actibus indeliberatis voluntatis, et in affectibus ap-
 petitus sentientis videre licet. Ratioque satis constat
 ex dictis; his adiunctis, quae de ratione voluntarii
 Aristoteles et D. Thomas tradiderunt. Voluntarium
 175 enim dicitur, quod est ab interno principio cum
 cognitione, quae ratio tota potest in actu reperiri,
 quamvis ex necessitate fiat, quia sola necessitas non
 excludit cognitionem, nec conformitatem cum ap-
 petitu innato, vel elicito. Unde etiam ortum habuit
 180 communis illa Theologorum doctrina, voluntati in
 actibus elicitis non posse vim, aut coactionem in-
 ferri, etiamsi necessitatem pati possit. Nam coactio
 excludit voluntarium, illi enim directe opponitur,
 non potest autem actus esse a voluntate, et non
 185 esse voluntarius, quia non potest non esse a prin-
 cipio intrinseco cum cognitione, nec potest simul
 esse voluntarius, et coactus, quia haec duo oppo-
 nuntur, et immediatam contradictionem involvunt;
 necessitas autem non involvit illam oppositionem
 190 cum voluntario, quia necessitas ipsa potest esse vol-
 untaria, seu interno appetitui conformis, ut dictum
 est.

Duo
 advertenda
 quoad modum
 loquendi
 necessaria ad
 intelligendos
 Patres.
 Primum.

195 6. Duo autem in hoc sunt, quoad modum lo-
 quendi, advertenda, quoniam ad intelligendas sen-
 tentias Patrum erunt necessaria. Unum est coac-
 tionem duplicem esse, unam simpliciter, quae ab-
 solutam, et inevitabilem necessitatem contra inter-
 num affectum infert: alia secundum quid, qualis
 est, quae per poenas, vel timores fit, quae non ab-
 200 solutam necessitatem, sed secundum quid, scilicet,

165R lest an ambiguity in words render the discussion uncertain.
 It is possible, therefore, for an act of a human being to be
 voluntary and thereby free from coercion that, nevertheless,
 is strictly speaking not free of necessity. One can see this
 in the love by which God loves himself and by which he
 produces the Holy Spirit and in the love with which the
 blessed love God, as well as in undeliberated acts of the will
 and in the affects of an appetite of someone who is sensing.
 The reason is sufficiently clear from what has been said,
 along with these additional points made by Aristotle and
 St. Thomas about the *ratio* of the voluntary. For something
 is called voluntary that comes from an internal principle
 together with cognition. That whole *ratio* can be found in an
 act even though it comes to be by necessity, since necessity
 alone excludes neither cognition nor conformity to an innate
 or elicited appetite. Here, also, is the source for that doctrine
 common among the theologians that force or coercion cannot
 be inflicted on the will in the case of elicited acts even if it
 can suffer necessity. For coercion excludes the voluntary,
 since it is directly opposed to that, but an act cannot be
 from the will and not be voluntary, since it cannot fail to
 be from an intrinsic principle together with cognition. Nor
 can it simultaneously be voluntary and coerced, since these
 two are opposed and involve an immediate contradiction.
 Necessity, however, does not involve that opposition to the
 voluntary, since necessity itself can be voluntary or conform
 to an internal appetite, as was said.

Aristotle, *EN*
 V, ch. 1.
 St. Thomas,
ST IaIIae.6.1.

190R 6. But two things should be noticed in this regarding
 the way of speaking, since they will be necessary for under-
 standing the views of the Fathers. One is that coercion is
 of two kinds. One is coercion *simpliciter*, which imposes an
 absolute and inevitable necessity against an internal affec-
 tion. The other is coercion *secundum quid*, which is the kind
 that comes from punishments and fears. They do not in-
 195R troduce an absolute necessity but only a qualified necessity

Two things
 necessary for
 understanding
 the Fathers
 with respect to
 the way of
 speaking.
 First.

ad vitandum tale incommodum, inducit. Prior ergo
 coactio est, quae omnino repugnat actui elicito vol-
 untatis, quia eo ipso quod est elicitus, iam non
 est coactus, posterior autem coactio esse potest
 205 cum absoluta voluntate, imo et cum libertate, cum 200R
 absolutam necessitatem non inducat, et ideo licet
 interdum coactio, aut violentia vocetur, ut patet
 Augustinus. ex Augustino lib. 1. contra Gau- <col. b> den-
 tium cap. 25. et epistola 48. simpliciter, et abso-
 210 lute coactio non est, sed alicuius mali prohibitio, ut 205R
 dixit idem Augustinus lib. 2. contra litteras Petilianus
 cap. 83.

7. Aliud animadvertendum est, interdum volun-
 tarium actum ita esse necessarium simpliciter, ut
 ipsa necessitas ab intrinseco sit, ac subinde con-
 formis sit inclinationi, et perfectioni naturali ipsius
 voluntatis, et tunc actus licet sit necessarius ita
 est voluntarius, ut nullo modo dici possit violentus,
 vel coactus, quia nullo modo repugnat interno
 220 appetitui, neque elicito, quia actus, ut supponitur, 215R
 voluntarius est, nec innato, quia ipsa necessitas
 non est etiam voluntati, eiusve innatae inclinationi
 contraria, ut supponitur. Et hoc modo amor Dei
 in beatis est necessarius sine ullo genere coactio-
 nis, aut violentiae, et affectus appetitus sentientis
 225 possunt in eodem ordine poni propter eandem rationem. 220R
 Aliquando vero actus voluntarius potest
 esse necessarius tantum ab extrinseco efficiente,
 seu quasi impellente, et tunc licet actus sit vol-
 untarius, et ideo non possit dici absolute coactus,
 230 nihilominus cum necessitas ipsa non sit conformis 225R
 naturali conditioni, et inclinationi voluntatis, eo
 quod sit tantum ab extrinseco, actus sic necessarius
 interdum solet aliquo modo violentus dici, saltem
 235 secundum quid, quia est contra modum connatu- 230R
 ralem, et contra quemdam innatum appetitum. Et

(*secundum quid*), namely, in order to avoid some disadvantage. The former, therefore, is the coercion that is entirely repugnant to an elicited act of the will, since the very fact that it is elicited makes it not coerced. But the latter kind of coercion is compatible with an absolute willing, in fact, even with freedom, since it does not introduce an absolute necessity. For this reason, although it is sometimes called coercion or violence, as is clear from Augustine, *Against Gaudentius* I, ch. 25, and Letter 48, it is not, strictly speaking and absolutely, coercion. Rather, it is a prohibition of [doing] some evil, as Augustine also said in *Against the Letters of Petilianus* II, ch. 83.

Augustine.

7. The other thing that should be noted is that sometimes a voluntary act is necessary *simpliciter* in such a way that the necessity itself is from something intrinsic and so it is conformed to the inclination and to the natural perfection of the will itself. In this case the act, although it is necessary, is voluntary in such a way that it can in no way be called coerced or violent, since it is in no way repugnant to an internal appetite. It is not repugnant either to an elicited appetite because the act, as it is being imagined, is voluntary, or to an innate appetite because the necessity itself is also not contrary to the will or to its innate inclination as it is being imagined. In this way the love for God in the blessed is necessary without any kind of coercion or violence. The affected appetites of someone sensing can also be placed in the same order for the same reason.

The second point that should be observed.

But sometimes a voluntary act can be necessary only from an extrinsic [principle] effecting or, as it were, impelling [the will to act]. In this case, although the act is voluntary and for that reason cannot be called absolutely coerced, nevertheless, since the necessity itself is not conformed to the natural condition and inclination of the will as a result of the fact that the necessity is only from an extrinsic [principle], an act necessary in this way is sometimes wont to be called violent in some way, at least *secundum quid*. For it is con-

hoc modo necessitas immissa voluntati in actibus de se liberis vocari solet a Patribus coactio quaedam, et e converso actus simpliciter liber vocari solet spontaneus, et voluntarius, utique perfecte, et extrinsecam necessitatem interno appetitui, seu inclinationi voluntatis repugnantem excludens.

Liberum a necessitate dici solet et de facultate operandi absque necessitate, et de ipsa actione. Augustinus.

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8. Liberum ergo in praesenti vocatur, quod a necessitate liberum est: dici autem solet et de facultate operandi absque necessitate, et de ipsa actione. Priori modo denominatur arbitrium liberum, quod dicitur esse *facultas voluntatis, et rationis*, utique ad operandum cum indifferentia, et dominio actionis, ita ut in manu eius sit velle, aut nolle exercere, vel sustinere actionem. De quo dixit Augustinus lib. 2. de Peccatorum meritis et remissione cap. 18. *Esse voluntatis arbitrium, quod huc, atque illuc liberum flectitur, atque in eis naturalibus bonis est, quibus homo bene, et male uti potest.* Atque in hoc sensu de fide certum est, hominem esse hoc modo natura sua liberum, seu habere aliquam facultatem a necessitate liberam in operibus suis, non solum naturalibus, sed etiam supernaturalibus, ut aperte definit Concilium Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 5. et can. 5. et 9. et Scripturis, et rationibus probat late Augustinus lib. de Gratia et libero arbitrio, et latius moderni de hac materia scribentes, et nos brevius in lib. 1. de Auxilio a principio. Praecipue vero videri possunt eruditae disputationes Cardinalis Bellarmini in tota controversia de Gratia et libero arbitrio cum Praefatione.

Concilium Tridentinum.

Bellarmini.

Unde liber actus denominetur.

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9. Hinc etiam actus, qui ab hac facultate libera procedit, liber denominatur: oportet autem, ut ab illa, ut indifferens est, procedat. Non enim defuerunt aliqui moderni Catholici, qui negaverint ad

trary to a connatural mode and contrary to a certain innate appetite. And in this way the necessity put into the will in the case of acts that are free of themselves is customarily called a kind of coercion by the Fathers. Conversely, an act that is free *simpliciter* is usually called spontaneous and voluntary, at any rate perfectly so, and excluding the extrinsic necessity repugnant to the internal appetite or inclination of the will.

8. Therefore, at present that is called free which is free from necessity. Moreover, it is customarily said both of the faculty operating apart from necessity and of the action itself. In the former way freewill is denominated, which is said to be *a faculty of the will and of reason*, at least when operating with indifference and with dominion over the action so that it is in one's hands either to will or not to will to exercise or to undergo the action. In *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins II*, ch. 18, Augustine said about this: 'It is the decision of the will, which is freely turned to this or to that, and has its place among those natural goods which a human being can use well or badly'. In this sense it is certain in the faith that human beings by their nature are free in this way or have some faculty free from necessity in their works, not only in their natural works but also their supernatural works. The Council of Trent clearly settles this in the Sixth Session (ch. 5 and canons 5 and 9). Augustine proves it thoroughly from Scripture and by arguments in *On Grace and Freewill*, and the moderns even more thoroughly when writing about this subject. We dealt with it more briefly in the beginning of Book I of *De auxilio*. But the erudite *Disputations* of Cardinal Bellarmine may especially be consulted in the whole controversy about grace and freewill along with the preface.

Free from necessity is customarily said both of a faculty acting without necessity and of the action itself. Augustine.

Council of Trent.

Bellarmino.

Whence a free act is denominated.

libertatem actus esse necessariam indifferentiam, seu carentiam necessitatis, sed satis esse carentiam coactionis: sed haec sententia reprobata est inter assertiones Michaelis Baii assert. 39. et 41. et
 275 in lib. 3. ex professo refutabitur. Ut ergo actus sit vere liber, non satis est, quod sit voluntarius, seu non coactus, sed etiam ut non sit necessarius simpliciter, ac proinde, ut procedat a potentia libera, ut indifferentiam, et libertatem retineat, ut
 280 in ipso usu, et exercitio libera, et integra potestate sua sinatur operari, ita ut in manu eius sit inter contraria, vel contradictoria eligere, vel operari, aut non operari. Quia ut actus sit liber, necessarium est, ut procedat a facultate libera, ut libera est; non
 285 procedet autem a potentia libera, ut talis est, nisi expeditam habeat suam facultatem quoad utramque partem, utique operandi, et non operandi. Quid enim proderit ad libertatem talis actus, quod potentia innatam habeat indifferentiam, si in ipso usu
 290 impediatur? Quapropter supposita distinctione data de duplici necessitate, altera ab intrinseco per naturalem determinationem potentiae ad unum; alia ab extrinseco per impulsum alicuius extrinseci agentis: prior repugnat non solum actui, sed etiam facultati liberi arbitrii, et ideo fieri non potest, ut potentia libera tali necessitati subdita sit respectu eiusdem obiecti, quia contradictionem involvit, ut per se notum est. Posterior autem necessitas non repugnat facultati liberae, ut nunc suppono, ut paulo post probabo, repugnat autem actui libero, quia, ut talis sit, oportet, ut procedat a potentia, ut libera, vel quoad specificationem, vel saltem quoad exercitium, iuxta modum, quo actus liber fuerit, quia non habet, quod sit liber, nisi per denominationem a suo proximo principio. At vero si actus procedat <col. b> a potentia necessitatem patiente, sive per intrinse-

of necessity is necessary for freedom of action, but say that the absence of coercion is enough. But this view was among Michael Baius's condemned assertions (assertions 39 and 41) and will be refuted *ex professo* in Book III. Therefore, in order for an act to be truly free, it is not enough that it is voluntary or not coerced, but it must also not be strictly necessary, and, accordingly, it must proceed from a free power that retains its indifference and freedom and that in its very use and exercise it be allowed to operate with its free and undiminished power, so that it is in its hands to choose between contraries or contradictories, either to act or not to act. For in order for an act to be free it is necessary that it proceed from a free faculty insofar as it is free. But an act will not proceed from a free power insofar as it is such unless it has its faculty unencumbered with respect to either part, at least with respect to acting and to not acting. For of what advantage to the freedom of such an act is a power that has an innate indifference if that indifference is impeded in that use?

Therefore, assuming the distinction given between two kinds of necessity—one from an intrinsic [principle] through a natural determination of the power to one object, the other from an extrinsic [principle] through the impulse of some extrinsic agent—the former is repugnant not only to the act but also to the faculty of freewill. Therefore, it cannot happen that a power subjected to such necessity is free with respect to the same object, since that involves a contradiction, as is known *per se*. But the latter necessity is not repugnant to a free faculty, as I assume for now and as I will prove a little later, but it is repugnant to free acts. For in order for an act to be free, it is necessary that it proceed from a power insofar as it is free, either with respect to specification or at least with respect to exercise, according to the mode by which the act will be free. For an act does not have what it takes to be free except through denomination from its proximate principle. On the other hand, if the act proceeds

Which necessity is repugnant to an act of freewill and its faculty and which one is not.

Quae necessitas repugnet actui liberi arbitrii eiusque facultati: quaeve non.

310 cam necessitatem potentiae determinatae ad unum,
 sive per extrinsecam necessitatem immissam poten- 305R
 tia de se liberae, iam impeditur, et tollitur libertas
 actus; ita ut liber dici non possit, nec laude, vel vitu-
 perio dignus, quia non procedit a potentia, ut libera
 est, nam ipsa non valet necessitatem illam auferre,
 vel praevenire, et ideo non potest illi imputari, quod 310R
 tali modo, et non alio operetur. Quam doctrinam
 Tridentinum. 315 satis clare docuit Concilium Tridentinum loco citato,
 et necessaria omnino est ad salvanda omnia, quae
 de humanis actionibus, earumque libertate Scrip-
 tura docet. Ideoque censeo in hoc puncto non esse 315R
 320 dissensionem inter Catholicos, licet in modo expli-
 candi, et defendendi hanc libertatem possit esse
 aliqua diversitas.

from a power suffering necessity, either through the intrinsic
 necessity of a power determined to one object or through
 an extrinsic necessity imposed on a power free of itself, the
 freedom of the act is already prevented or removed. Thus
 the act cannot be called free and does not merit praise or
 blame. For it does not proceed from a power insofar as it
 is free, since it does not prevail to remove or forestall that
 necessity. And for this reason it cannot be held responsible
 for acting in that way and not in another way. This doctrine
 is taught clearly enough by the Council of Trent in the cited
 place. Furthermore, it is entirely necessary to preserve all
 the things that Scripture teaches about human actions and
 their freedom. Therefore, I think that there is no dissension
 about this point among Catholics, although there can be
 some diversity in the way this freedom is explained and
 defended.

Council of
Trent.