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## DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICÆ VIII<sup>1</sup>

### SECT. 7

Whether truth is something in things which is an attribute of being (*Utrum veritas aliqua sit in rebus quae sit passio entis*)

1. This question is especially intended in this disputation, for we sent ahead the rest for explaining the truth of being. Therefore it seems that it cannot happen that some truth is an attribute of real being, first, indeed, since Aristotle towards the end of book VII of *Metaph.* says that true and false are not in things but in the mind, and in this is constituted its difference since good and bad are in things but true and false are not [in things] but only in the mind. Second, because true adds either nothing beyond being or only an extrinsic denomination. Therefore, in no way can it be a property of being. The consequence is shown, because if it adds nothing, it is nothing other than the very being itself and consequently is no more a property of it than the very being is a property of itself. If, however, it adds only an extrinsic denomination, that cannot suffice for the nature of a property of being. Besides, because other properties of this sort can be multiplied to infinity, because denominations of this sort can be to infinity. Moreover also because this denomination is not common to beings or conceptual beings. For just as gold is called true gold, so a conceptual relation can be called a true conceptual being and (as we were saying not long ago) so a negation has truth just as an affirmation. Therefore, truth cannot by reason of this denomination be a property of real being, which is what we are talking about. Finally, also, because even other falsities can be called properties of real being. For, just as being can be known true, so also false. Therefore, just as thence is denominated true, hence can be denominated false.

Haec quaestio est praecipue intenta in hac disputatione, nam ad explicandam veritatem entis reliqua praemisimus. Videtur ergo fieri non posse ut veritas aliqua sit passio entis realis, primo quidem ex Aristotele, VII Metaph., in fine, dicente verum et falsum non esse in rebus sed in mente, et in hoc constituyente differentiam quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, non autem verum et falsum, sed in mente tantum. Secundo, quia verum supra ens aut nihil addit, aut solam denominationem extrinsecam; ergo nullo modo potest esse proprietas entis. Probatur consequentia, quia si nihil addit, nihil aliud est quam ipsummet ens et consequenter non magis est proprietas eius quam ipsum ens sit proprietas

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<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from: <http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Michael.Renemann/suarez/suarez.dm8.html>

sui. Si autem addit solam denominationem extrinsecam illa non potest sufficere ad rationem proprietatis entis; tum quia alias infinitae proprietates huiusmodi possent multiplicari, quia infinitae possunt esse huiusmodi denominationes; tum etiam quia haec denominatio communis est non entibus seu entibus rationis; sicut enim aurum dicitur verum aurum, ita relatio rationis potest dici verum ens rationis et (sicut nuper dicebamus) ita negatio habet veritatem sicut affirmatio; non ergo potest veritas ratione huius denominationis esse proprietas entis realis de qua agimus. Tum denique quia alias etiam falsitas posset dici proprietas entis realis; nam, sicut potest ens vere cognosci, ita etiam false; ergo sicut inde denominatur verum, hinc potest denominari falsum.

2. But the first antecedent of this argument is declared and shown. For when some being, for example, gold is called true good, such a denomination can be or be understood in two ways. First, as it is entirely absolute and intrinsic. And in this way it can add nothing to such being, but, rather, only explains its entity and reality, because in this way true gold is nothing other than not being just apparent or fictitious [gold] but having the proper and real nature and essence of gold. This, however, adds nothing other than being gold. Therefore this denomination's being true gold adds nothing beyond being gold. And for the same reason being true real being never expresses any other concept than being real being, that is, not fictitious or chimerical [being]. For this reason we were saying above that thing adds nothing beyond real being, because it expresses nothing except having a fixed essence, which is nothing other than having a real essence. And it the same to say true essence.

And in taking up in this sense the denomination of true, Augustine seems to have said in ch. 5 of book II of *Soliloquies* that the true is that which is, but not that which seems, or that which is such as it seems to be. Because, even if a thing does not seem to not have conformity with some cognition, it is true just the same. In which it signifies that truth is not extrinsic denomination. And in the same sense the definition given by Avicenna is squared: the truth of each thing is the property of it being what is established to it. For when he says that it is a property, he does not take that word as signifying the customary attribute or some faculty, but signifying being proper, that is, not [something] extraneous or alien, which adds nothing beyond being itself but can explain in the way of a relation of [self-]identity.<sup>2</sup> For in this way a relation can be called of a property. For thus in this way some one thing has that being which is its own or is what is established to it. And it is this very thing to have the truth of such a being.

Primum vero antecedens huius rationis declaratur et probatur; nam cum ens aliquod, verbi gratia, aurum dicitur verum aurum, dupliciter potest esse aut intelligi talis denominatio. Primo, ut sit omnino absoluta et intrinseca et hoc modo nihil potest addere tali enti, sed solum magis explicare entitatem et realitatem eius, quia hoc modo esse verum aurum nihil aliud est quam non esse tantum apparens vel fictum sed habens propriam et realem naturam et essentiam auri. Hoc autem nihil aliud est quam esse aurum; ergo esse verum aurum quoad hanc

<sup>2</sup>Relations of self-identity are conceptual relations, according to Suárez.

denominationem nihil addit supra esse aurum. Et eadem ratione in universum esse verum ens reale nullum alium conceptum dicit quam esse ens reale, id est, non fictum neque chymaericum. Qua ratione supra dicebamus rem nihil addere supra ens reale, quia nihil dicit nisi habere ratam essentiam, quod nihil aliud est quam habere realem essentiam et idem est dicere veram essentiam. Et sumendo hoc sensu denominationem veri, dixisse videtur Augustinus, lib. II Soliloquiorum, c. 5, verum esse id quod est, non autem id quod videtur, aut quod tale est quale videtur; quia, etiamsi res non videatur neque conformitatem habeat cum aliqua cognitione, nihilominus vera est; in quo significat veritatem non esse denominationem extrinsecam. Et in eodem sensu quadrat definitio Avicennae dicentis: Veritas uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei. Cum enim ait esse proprietatem, non sumit illam vocem ut significare solet passionem seu facultatem aliquam, sed significat esse proprium, id est, non extraneum nec alienum, quod nihil addit supra ipsum esse sed explicari potest ad modum relationis identitatis; sic enim dici potest relatio proprietatis; nam hoc modo sic unaquaeque res habet illud esse quod suum est seu quod stabilitum est ei, et hoc ipsum est habere veritatem talis entis.

3. But in another way that denomination can be taken not as absolute and intrinsic, but as coming from elsewhere, and in this way it cannot be except an extrinsic denomination of the thing, namely, that by true such is revealed or is revealable. That seems to be what St. Thomas thought in [*ST*] Ia.16.1, saying that true names that to which intellect tends, and is in the intellect according to that which is conformed to the thing of the intellect, and from the intellect is derived for the understood thing, which is called true according to that which has some order to the intellect. It is clear, however, that the conformity of the intellect to the thing only results in an extrinsic denomination in the cognized thing. Hence, in a. 6 St. Thomas expressly says that all created things are denominated true by one and the same truth, namely, by the truth of the divine intellect from which, nevertheless, they cannot but be denominated extrinsically. And in the solution *ad* 2, he confirms this from what Anselm says in c. 11 of *De Veritate*: just as time holds itseld to temporal [things], so truth to true things. St. Thomas understands that concerning one common time, by which he agrees that temporal things are only denominated extrinsically.

Finally, for this reason it is clear, because either it is true because it conforms to the intellect or because the intellect is conformed to it. The first cannot be said, because it is rather from that which the thing is or not is that the intellect is true. We would elsewhere fall into the error of the philosophical statements that nothing is true except what is understood. If, however, the second is said, it manifestly follows that such is an extrinsic denomination, because the the intellect being conformed to the thing posits nothing in the thing except only that it is cogn

Besides those two [options], however, nothing else can be thought of, because by the general consensus of everyone every truth is taken from the conformity of intellect and thing. And this is confirmed, because falsity in things cannot exist except by an extrinsic denomination. Therefore, neither truth. For opposites have the same or proportional nature. To the contrary, however, because, by the witness of Aristotle in book II, c. 1 of *Metaph.*: insofar as

each one is, so also it is true. By these words he signified that truth accompanies being just as there is in each one the grade of truth according to ade and nature of entity. Therefore, this is a sign that truth accompanies being as an attribute of it.

Alio vero modo potest illa denominatio sumi non ut absoluta et intrinseca, sed ut aliunde proveniens, et hoc modo esse non potest nisi extrinseca rei denominatio, scilicet, quod vere talis enuntietur seu enuntiabilis sit. Quod sensisse videtur D. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1, dicens verum nominare id in quod tendit intellectus, esseque in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, et ab intellectu derivari ad rem intellectam, quae vera dicitur secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Constat autem ex conformitate intellectus ad rem solum resultare in re cognita denominationem extrinsecam. Unde a. 6 expresse dicit D. Thom. omnes res creatas denominari veras una et eadem veritate, scilicet, veritate intellectus divini a qua tamen non possunt nisi extrinsece denominari. Et in solutione ad 2 hoc confirmat ex Anselm., lib. De Verit., c. 11, dicente, sicut tempus se habet ad temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras; quod D. Thomas intelligit de uno tempore communi, a quo constat solum extrinsece res temporales denominari. Ratione denique patet, quia aut est vera quia conformatur intellectui, aut quia intellectus conformatur ad ipsam. Primum dici non potest, quia potius ex eo quod res est vel non est, intellectus est verus; alias incideremus in errorem philosophorum dicentium nihil esse verum nisi quod intelligitur. Si autem secundum dicatur, aperte sequitur illam tantum esse denominationem extrinsecam, quia intellectum conformari ad rem nihil ponit in re nisi tantum vere cognosci. Praeter illa autem duo nihil aliud excogitari potest, quia ex communi omnium consensu omnis veritas sumitur ex conformitate intellectus et rei. Et confirmatur, quia falsitas in rebus esse non potest nisi denominatio extrinseca; ergo nec veritas; nam oppositorum eadem est seu proportionalis ratio. In contrarium autem est, quia teste Aristotele, lib. II Metaph., c. 1, ut unumquodque est, ita et verum est; quibus verbis significat veritatem ita comitari ens ut iuxta gradum et rationem entitatis sit in unoquoque gradus veritatis; signum ergo est veritatem comitari ens ut passionem eius.

*Whether truth is a transcendental* (Transcendentalis veritas an sit)

4. In this matter it is evident that the denomination of true is customarily applied to things. For thus we are in the habit of saying that it is true gold in order to distinguish it from apparent [gold] and true human in order to distinguish from a picture and true God in order to separate him from false [gods]. And they speak in this way not only in sacred and profane writings but even among the masses. Hence, it is made plain that the same appellation of true can be attributed to any real being you please, either as distinct from fictitious and imaginary beings or as is it is judged to have in its own species and nature such an essence as it proper to the thing, for as long as these same two are the reason for this appellation in all beings.

And from this, on the other hand, it is manifest that true under some aspect is an attribute of being is converted with it. In order, however, that it may be shown what kind of de-

nomination this is, it is necessary before anything else to explain what this truth is which is attributed to being so that thereby it may be evident how it can be a property of it [being] and be converted with it. Therefore, various ways of explaining truth can be devised.

In hac re constat veri denominationem solere rebus attribui; sic enim dicere solemus esse verum aurum ut illud ab apparenti distinguamus, et verum hominem ut distinguamus a picto, et verum Deum ut a falsis illum separemus, et hoc modo loquuntur non solum sacrae et profanae litterae, sed etiam universi homines. Unde plane fit eadem veri appellationem posse cuilibet enti reali attribui, vel ut ab ente ficto et imaginario separetur, vel ut in sua specie et ratione propriam talis rei essentiam habere iudicetur; nam quoad haec duo eadem est huius appellationis ratio in omnibus; entibus. Atque hinc rursus manifestum etiam est verum sub aliqua ratione esse attributum entis et cum illo converti. Ut autem declaretur qualis sit haec denominatio, oportet ante omnia exponere quid sit haec veritas quae enti attribuitur ut inde constet quomodo possit esse proprietas eius, et cum illo converti. Possunt ergo varii modi explicandi veritatem excogitari.

*The first opinion which is rejected* (Prima sententia circa quid sit improbatum)

5. The first [opinion] is that transcendental truth signifies a certain real absolute property that is distinct by a reasoned reason (*ratione ratiocinata*) from being. Certain modern Thomists think this, I, q. 16, and they think that this is the view of St. Thomas in q. 1, a. 8 of *De Veritate*: Capreolus in *Sent.* I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3; Soncinas *Metaph.* VI, q. 17; and Javelli, *Tractatus de Transcendentalibus* c. 5. It is shown, because truth is a real perfection. Therefore, it expresses a real, not relative, nature. Therefore, [it expresses an] absolute [nature]. And the name is not synonymous signifying the same as ‘entity’. Therefore, it expresses perfection that is at least conceptually distinct from entity.

The first antecedent is evident, moreover because a thing being true is not some fiction. On the contrary, this itself would seem to exclude the name ‘truth’. Then also because all things are true by themselves and not in virtue of consideration by the intellect. Then also because truth in God is a great perfection and that is a measure of created truth. Then, finally, because truth cannot fail to be a real perfection, since it is a property of being. But that it is not a relative will easily be shown below.

Finally that ‘truth’ and ‘entity’ are not the same in the way of synonyms is clear from the general way that everyone conceives [of them] and from the different definitions by which their objective concepts are explained by us. Therefore, it is necessary that they be distinguished at least by reasoned reason (*ratione ratiocinata*). On the contrary, following the opinion of Scotus in the above discussion where we deal with these attributes in general, it should be said that it is distinguished formally *ex natura rei*.

Primus est veritatem transcendentalem significare quamdam proprietatem realem absolutam et ratione ratiocinata distinctam ab ente. Ita sentiunt quidam thomistae moderni, I, q. 16, et putant esse sententiam D. Thomae, q. 1 De Verit., a. 8; Capreoli, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3; Soncin., VI Metaph., q. 17; Javel., tract.

de Transcendentalib., c. 5. Probat, quia veritas est realis perfectio; ergo dicit rationem realem, non relativam; ergo absolutam; et non est nomen synonymum idem significans quod entitas; ergo dicit perfectionem saltem ratione distinctam ab entitate. Primum antecedens patet, tum quia rem esse veram non est aliquid fictum, immo hoc ipsum videtur excludi nomine veritatis; tum etiam quia res omnes ex se sunt verae et non ex intellectus consideratione; tum praeterea quia veritas in Deo est magna perfectio et illa est mensura veritatis creatae; tum denique quia cum veritas sit proprietas entis non potest non esse perfectio realis. Quod vero illa relativa non sit, facile inferius probabitur. Quod denique veritas et entitas non sint idem tamquam synonyma, constat ex communi modo concipiendi omnium et ex diversis definitionibus quibus earum conceptus obiectivi a nobis explicantur; necesse est ergo saltem ratione ratiocinata distingui. Immo, secundum sententiam Scoti supra tractatam cum de his passionibus in communi ageremus, dicendum esset distingui formaliter ex natura rei.

6. But in this opinion and in all the following it should be noted that it is one thing to speak of that whole which includes truth in being but another [to speak] of that which adds truth beyond entity or (what is the same thing) true beyond being. In the first way, we admit that the truth of a real entity expresses real perfection as the arguments that were made show, as well as the other [arguments] by which we showed above that unity does not express only negation but entity beneath the negation. For so it should now be asserted that truth does not express only a nature that is extrinsic or fashioned by the intellect, but is an entity signified under some other concept. Or by adding something, into which we now inquire. Therefore, in this sense the stated opinions are true and, in fact, St. Thomas, Capreolus and other ancient Thomists did not intend anything else. But the modern [Thomists] seem to signify something more.

Sed in hac sententia et in omnibus sequentibus observandum est aliud esse loqui de toto illo quod includit veritas in essendo, aliud vero de eo quod addit veritas supra entitatem seu (quod idem est) verum supra ens. Priori modo admitimus veritatem entium realium dicere perfectionem realem ut argumenta facta probant, et alia quibus supra ostendimus unitatem non dicere solam negationem, sed entitatem sub negatione; sic enim nunc asserendum est veritatem non dicere solam rationem extrinsecam vel intellectu fabricatam, sed esse entitatem sub aliqua alia ratione significatam, vel addendo aliquid, quod nunc inquirimus. In hoc ergo sensu vera est dicta sententia et revera D. Thomas, Capreol. et antiquiores thomistae nihil aliud intendunt, moderni vero plus significare videntur.

7. Therefore, in another way it can be understood that truth adds to being an absolute and real property beyond the nature of essence or entity. And in this sense I think the stated view is false. And first, if it is understood of perfection distinct *ex natura rei*, it can sufficiently be shown then by the arguments made above against Scotus concerning the attributes of being in general, then by what was said above concerning distinctions *ex natura rei*.

For there cannot here intervene a real distinction of thing from thing, as everyone admits,

because there is no foundation for fashioning such a distinction. There cannot even be a modal distinction, then because no indication of a distinction between such a mode and being can be thought of. For they are so entirely inseparable that they can hardly be prescinded by the intellect, as I will say at once. Then also because no thing is understood to be true through a superadded mode, but through its own entity. If it has that [entity], even if you separate every other mode, you will understand the thing to remain true either in the concept of being or in the concept of such a being, what kind of aptness it is to be constituted by such an entity.

And this reason applied with proportion also shows that truth cannot add beyond the entity some perfection that is co-distinct by a reasoned reason (*ratione ratiocinata*) from the entity. For, if they are so co-distinguished that neither extreme is included in the prescinded concept of the other (for so we say), truth may be separated by reason from being and, I argue, from either extreme. Precise being is thus intelligible insofar as it is from itself, then because it is conceived with a direct and proper concept by the intellect, then also because, to the extent that each one has something of being so it has of intelligibility, as St. Thomas taught elsewhere in [*ST*] Ia.16.3. Therefore being in that precise concept includes every real perfection which is required for the concept of truth, because this itself which is being is intelligible, is true. For in this sense true is said to be the object of the intellect, and because between every intelligible being and intellect there can be conformity.

But the argument is also taken from the other side. For either truth thus precise is understood to include real entity and is not prescinded in the stated mode, or that [real entity] is not included and so it does not express real perfection. And St. Thomas signified all of this in [*ST*] Ia.16.3 ad 3, saying that although being can be apprehended as not having been apprehended by the concept of true, that is, including that expressly and formally, nevertheless by the contrary cannot be apprehended true unless the concept of being is apprehended. Because being falls in the concept of true. Also, being cannot be apprehended except the concept of true follows that apprehension, that is, unless being itself, as precise a concept as you like, is true and can be apprehended under the concept of true, even if no absolute perfection is added to it. And he adds the example, saying: And it is similar if we compare the intelligible to being, for being cannot be understood unless being is intelligible, but yet being can be understood, so that intelligibility is not understood of it. And similarly, being having been understood is true, yet being that is not understood is understood true.

Alio ergo modo intelligi potest veritatem addere enti supra rationem essentiae vel entitatis proprietatem absolutam et realem. Et hoc sensu existimo falsam esse praedictam sententiam. Et primum, si intelligatur de perfectione ex natura rei distincta, sufficienter probari potest, tum argumentis supra factis contra Scotum de passionibus entis in genere, tum ex supra dictis de distinctionibus ex natura rei. Nam hic non potest intervenire realis distinctio rei a re ut omnes fatentur, quia nullum est fundamentum ad fingendam talem distinctionem; neque etiam potest esse distinctio modalis, tum quia nullum indicium distinctionis inter talem modum et ens excogitari potest; sunt enim omnino inseparabilia ita ut vix possint etiam intellectu praescindi, ut statim dicam. Tum etiam quia nulla res intelligitur esse vera per modum superadditum, sed per suam entitatem, quam si habeat,

etiamsi omnem alium modum separet, intelliges manere veram rem vel in ratione entis vel in ratione talis entis, quale aptum est tali entitate constitui. Atque haec ratio cum proportione applicata probat etiam non posse veritatem addere supra entitatem perfectionem aliquam ratione ratiocinata condistinctam ab entitate; nam, si ita condistinguuntur ut neutrum extremum in praeciso conceptu alterius includatur (sic enim loquimur), separetur ratione veritas ab ente et argumentor de utroque extremo. Ens sic praecisum est intelligibile quantum est ex se, tum quia directo et proprio conceptu ab intellectu concipitur, tum etiam quia, quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de intelligibilitate, ut alias dixit D. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 3; ergo ens in illo praeciso conceptu includit omnem perfectionem realem quae requiritur ad rationem veri, quia hoc ipso quod ens est intelligibile, verum est; nam hoc sensu dicitur verum esse obiectum intellectus, et quia inter omne ens intelligibile et intellectum potest esse conformitas. Ex alio vero extremo etiam sumitur argumentum; nam aut veritas sic praecisa intelligitur includere entitatem realem et sic non praescinditur dicto modo. vel illam non includit, et sic non dicet perfectionem realem. Et hoc totum significavit D. Thomas, dict. I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, dicens quamvis ens possit apprehendi non apprehensa ratione veri, id est, includendo illam expresse ac formaliter, tamen e contrario non posse apprehendi verum quin apprehendatur ratio entis: quia ens cadit in ratione veri: neque etiam posse apprehendi ens nisi ad eam apprehensionem ratio veri consequatur, id est, quin ipsum ens, quantumvis praecise conceptum, verum sit et sub ratione veri apprehendi possit, etiamsi nulla perfectio absoluta ei addatur. Et addit exemplum dicens: Et est simile si comparemus intelligibile ad ens; non enim potest intelligi ens quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas; et similiter, ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens intelligitur verum.

8. In addition I argue the second by investigating what then this absolute perfection is which true adds beyond being. For it cannot be understood as the kind of absolute that does not include a transcendental respect or a respect according to being said (as they say), as even the previously mentioned authors acknowledge as a result of the common concept of everyone. For everyone conceives of truth as a conformity between the thing and intellect or as ordered to it. Nor can such a real and entirely absolute nature that is distinct from the nature of being and in which truth consists easily be imagined or explained.

If, however, this nature is called an absolute with a transcendental respect or explained in the mode of a respect, that cannot be except by being ordered to some intellect. But truth as explained through such a respect cannot be something other than the entity itself with the same respect. Nor can a real nature that is absolute even if conceptually distinct be added beyond it. Therefore. The major is shown from the given definition of truth, which declared just as the first conception of it. For truth signifies a certain adequation and conformity. But not every conformity has the nature of truth, for equality between two things is a certain conformity, as is similitude, and it is not called truth. Therefore, truth expresses a special nature of conformity, which cannot be something other than that which is taken or explained as being ordered to intellect.

Hence, the minor is shown because this conformity to intellect can be understood in two ways, namely, as actual and as aptitudinal. Actual [conformity] can only consist in this that such a thing is as it is understood by the act. But aptitudinal [conformity] in this that the thing is such as by a true and proper concept of the thing can be understood. But by neither of these ways is added beyond the entity some real absolute perfection, because to understand with the act adds nothing to the understood act as such. Therefore, neither can the thing being the way it is understood add to it an absolute real nature.

On the other hand, this itself that being is being or such a being, if in another is the power for understanding, is apt to be adequated to a true concept. Therefore, it is not only superfluous but also impossible that this actual or aptitudinal conformity add some absolute perfection to being, even conceptually distinct. Just as it is impossible that in whiteness being apt to become similar to another expresses an absolute perfection added to the concept of whiteness, and it is much more impossible that actual similitude add an intrinsic absolute nature to the whiteness itself.

Praeterea argumentor secundo,<sup>3</sup> inquirendo quaenam sit haec perfectio absoluta quam verum addit supra ens; non enim potest intelligi ita absoluta ut nec respectum transcendentalem aut secundum dici (ut vocant) includat, ut etiam praedicti auctores fatentur ex communi omnium conceptu; nam omnes concipiunt veritatem per conformitatem inter rem et intellectum vel in ordine ad illam; nec facile fingi posset aut explicari talis ratio realis omnino absoluta et distincta a ratione entis, in qua veritas consistat. Si autem dicatur haec ratio absoluta cum respectu transcendentali vel explicata per modum respectus, ille esse non potest nisi in ordine ad aliquem intellectum; sed veritas ut explicata per talem respectum non potest esse aliud quam entitas ipsa cum eodem respectu; neque supra eam addere potest rationem realem absolutam etiam ratione distinctam; ergo. Maior probatur ex dicta veritatis definitione, quae declarat veluti primam conceptionem eius. Nam veritas adaequationem quamdam et conformitatem significat; sed non omnis conformitas rationem veritatis habet, aequalitas enim inter duas res, et similitudo, est conformitas quaedam, et non dicitur veritas; ergo veritas dicit specialem rationem conformitatis, quae non potest esse alia nisi quae in ordine ad intellectum sumitur seu explicatur. Unde probatur minor quia haec conformitas ad intellectum duplex intelligi potest, scilicet, actualis et aptitudinalis. Actualis in hoc tantum consistere potest, quod res talis sit qualis actu intelligitur; aptitudinalis vero in hoc quod res sit talis ut vero ac proprio conceptu talis rei intelligi possit. Sed neutro ex his modis additur supra entitatem rei aliqua realis perfectio absoluta, quia actu intelligi nihil addit entitati intellectae ut sic; ergo neque rem esse talem qualis intelligitur potest illi addere rationem realem absolutam. Rursus, hoc ipso quod ens est ens vel tale ens, si in alio sit vis ad intelligendum, aptum est adaequari vero conceptui; ergo non solum superfluum, sed etiam impossibile est quod haec actualis vel aptitudinalis conformitas addat enti aliquam perfectionem absolutam, etiam ratione distinctam. Sicut impossibile est quod in albedine esse aptam assimilari alteri dicat perfec-

<sup>3</sup>Replacing a period with a comma in accordance with the Vivés edition.

tionem absolutam additam rationi albedinis, et multo magis impossibile est quod actualis similitudo addat rationem absolutam intrinsecam ipsi albedini.

*The second opinion is examined under various interpretations* (Secunda opinio cum variis interpretationibus examinatur)

9. On account of this, therefore, there can be a second opinion which says that truth adds to being a relation of conformity to the intellect. For this seems to follow from the last argument made against the preceding opinion. However, various ways of explaining this opinion can be thought of. One is as understood of an actual relation of conformity. For truth seems to signify an actual conformity.

Another is as understood of an aptitudinal conformity. And in this way they say that transcendental truth is nothing other than the intelligibility of being, which intelligibility not only expresses an extrinsic denomination from the faculty which has the intellectual thing for understanding every being, but on the part of the very thing intelligibility expresses a certain aptitude as having the power to be understood, which adds a relation to the intellect, to which, insofar as it is in and of itself, it can be conformed.

On the other hand, certain people understand this relation to have to be taken only as being ordered to the divine intellect, because all things depend essentially on that, but not on others. Rather, they are compared to others *per accidens*.

Others think it should be taken as ordered to any intellect, because a thing of itself is intelligible by whatever and this is of itself apt to conform to everything. Hence, the mentioned relation can be said to be to every thing, just as colour insofar as it is visible expresses a relation to all vision, even if it does not depend on that.

Finally, certain people think that this relation is real, because truth is a real thing and exists in things.

Others want it to be a conceptual relation, because it does require the existence or distinction of the extremes. This is what Durandus, Capreolus, and Cajetan thing in the places cited and to be cited. And St. Thomas favours it in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1.

Others, finally think that that relation is sometimes real, but often conceptual on account of the capacity of the extremes. For example, Soncinas and Javelli, above; and Ferrara, *Contra Gentiles* I, c. 60. And St. Thomas favours it in *De Veritate* q. 1, a. 2 and in *De Interpretatione* book I, lect. 5.

Propter haec ergo esse potest secunda sententia dicens veritatem addere enti relationem conformitatis ad intellectum; hoc enim concludi videtur ratione proxime facta contra praecedentem sententiam. In hac autem opinione explicanda possunt varii modi excogitari. Unus est ut intelligatur de relatione conformitatis actualis; nam veritas actualem conformitatem significare videtur. Alius est ut intelligatur de aptitudinali conformitate, et hoc modo dicunt aliqui nihil aliud esse veritatem transcendentalem quam intelligibilitatem entis, quae intelligibilitas non solum dicit denominationem extrinsecam a facultate quam res intellectiva

habet ad intelligendum omne ens, sed ex parte ipsius rei intelligibilis dicit aptitudinem quamdam ut intelligi valeat, quae addit relationem ad intellectum, cui, quantum est ex se, potest conformari. Rursus quidam intelligunt hanc relationem sumendam esse tantum in ordine ad divinum intellectum, quia ab illo res omnes pendent per se, non vero ab aliis; immo ad illos per accidens comparantur. Alii existimant sumendam esse in ordine ad quemcumque intellectum, quia res de se est intelligibilis a quocumque et ita est de se apta conformari omnibus, unde ad omnes dicere potest praedictam relationem, sicut color in quantum visibilis dicit relationem ad omnem visum, etiamsi ab illo non pendeat. Denique quidam existimant hanc relationem esse realem, quoniam veritas reale quid est et in rebus existit. Alii volunt esse relationem rationis, quia non requirit existentiam nec distinctionem extremorum, quod sentiunt Dur., Capr., Caiet., locis citatis et citandis; et favet D. Thomas, In I, dist. 19 q. 5, a. 1. Alii tandem putant illam relationem interdum esse realem, saepe vero rationis iuxta capacitatem extremorum, ut Soncin. et Iavel., supra; Ferrar., I cont. Gent., c. 60; favetque D. Thomas, q. 1 De Veritate, a. 2, et lib. I De Interpretat., lect. 5.

10. But, in order that we understand what truth and falsity can be in this way of speaking, it should be supposed that this opinion (as it is distinct from others) should be understood to be of proper relations which are called categorical, if it is real or similar to it, if it is conceptual. For, if relation is taken more broadly through every transcendental disposition or through whatever denomination you please which arises from the association of multiple things, then this opinion in one sense coincides with the previous one, but in another with that which we will discuss afterwards.

Sed, ut intelligamus quid veritatis vel falsitatis esse possit in his dicendi modis, supponendum est hanc sententiam (ut sit ab aliis distincta) intelligendam esse de propria relatione quam praedicamentalem vocant, si sit realis, vel similem illi, si sit rationis. Nam, si late sumatur relatio pro omni transcendentali habitudine vel pro qualibet denominatione quae ex consortio plurium rerum consurgit, sic sententia haec in uno sensu coincidet cum praecedenti, in alio vero cum ea quam postea tractabimus.

11. *A strict conceptual relation is not required for transcendental truth.*—First, therefore, I think a denomination is not taken up from some conceptual relation in the stated property having been taken up, because truth does not express a relation of this sort, nor an entity under such a relation. This is shown by the oft-repeated argument, because an attribute of real being cannot consist in the just-mentioned relation nor formally include it. Finally, because such a relation does not exist except as long as it is considered or fashioned (*fingitur*). The truth of things, however, does not require a fashioning (*fictionem*) of this sort. In fact even more, as I was saying above, when by that it has a certain repugnance to the name of truth. Likewise, God is transcendently true from eternity in accordance with the complete and accurate nature of truth, and yet he neither fashions conceptual relations nor can he require these in order to be and to be called the true God. Finally, this relation does not

exist except through the reflection and comparison of the intellect, before which even this being is true gold, for example, and is cognized to be such.

*Ad transcendentalem veritatem stricta rationis relatio non requiritur.*—Primo igitur existimo denominationem non esse sumptam ex aliqua relatione rationis in dicta proprietate sumpta, quia veritas nec huiusmodi relationem dicit, nec entitatem sub tali relatione. Probatur ratione saepe repetita, quia passio entis realis non potest consistere in praedicta relatione, neque illam formaliter includere. Deinde, quia talis relatio non est, nisi dum consideratur aut fingitur: veritas autem rerum non requirit huiusmodi fictionem; quin potius, ut supra dicebam, cum ipso veritatis nomine quamdam habet repugnantiam. Item Deus ab aeterno est verus transcendentaliter secundum completam et exactam rationem veritatis, et tamen nec fingit relationes rationis, nec illas requirere potest ut verus Deus sit et dicatur. Denique haec relatio non est nisi per reflexionem et comparisonem intellectus, ante quam et hoc ens est verum aurum, verbi gratia, et tale esse cognoscitur.

12. *A real relation is not necessary for transcendental truth.*—*This is shown in God.*—In the second it seems certain (speaking in general concerning the transcendental true, as it abstracts from created and uncreated being) that it cannot consist in or require formally a real relation to another, from being ordered to which the denomination of true would be taken. It is clear, because transcendental truth in God cannot include a relation of this sort, because either that truth is considered in God as God is, just as we say that there are three persons in one true God, or it is considered in each individual person in accordance with the proper relations, so that we may give this to the theologians.

In the first way, God has no real relation, because he neither as toward something (*ad aliquid*) without himself, as is agreed, or toward something (*ad aliquid*) within himself, because true divinity has no distinctions in reality from all these which are within God. Likewise, because that relation, if it is, ought to be to intellect. Therefore, either it is to the intellect as causing—and this has no place in true divinity, because it has no cause—or it is to the intellect as understanding, and this cannot be a real relation to something within, since it is of the same to him himself.

In the other way, it can also not be a real relation. First, because in God there are no other real relations besides those relations which accompany the origins, in which no others can be founded. Next, because in the Father, for example, that relation of truth cannot be to the intellect as producing, because the person of the Father is not produced, nor as understanding, because the relation is of the same to him himself.

In the Son likewise, although the person is produced, the truth of filiation cannot consist in a relation of conformity to the intellect as producing, or, what is the same, as having the idea or exemplar by which such a thing is produced, because the divine Word is not produced through the idea, but is himself the image or exemplar by the Father naturally produced. Also, neither can it express a real relation of conformity to the intellect as understanding, because so also in the Word such a relation is of the same to him himself. For, although

the Word is understood also by the Father and he himself also understands the Father, nevertheless as they mutually understand each other, they are not distinguished by intellect and by the act by which they understand themselves. And the same reason applied in proportion holds true for the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in God there is no real relation of conformity in which truth could consist. And consequently the truth of being as it abstracts from the created and uncreated cannot require this real relation.

*Relatio realis ad veritatem transcendentalem non necessaria. — In Deo id probatur. —*

Secundo videtur certum loquendo in communi de vero transcendentali, ut abstrahit ab ente creato et increato, non posse consistere aut requirere formaliter relationem realem ad alterum, in ordine ad quod veri denominatio sumatur. Patet, quia in Deo non potest veritas transcendentalis huiusmodi relationem includere, quia vel illa veritas consideratur in Deo ut Deus est, quomodo dicimus tres personas esse unum verum Deum; vel consideratur in singulis personis secundum proprias relationes, ut hoc theologis demus. Priori modo Deus nullam habet relationem realem, quia neque ad aliquid extra se, ut constat, neque ad aliquid intra se, quia vera divinitas nullam in re distinctionem habet ab his omnibus quae intra Deum sunt. Item, quia illa relatio, si quae est, debet esse ad intellectum; vel ergo est ad intellectum ut causantem, et haec non habet locum in vera divinitate, quae causam non habet; vel est ad intellectum ut intelligentem, et haec non potest esse relatio realis ad intra, cum sit eiusdem ad seipsum. Posteriori etiam modo non potest esse realis relatio. Primo, quia in Deo non sunt aliae relationes reales praeter relationes quae comitantur origines, in quibus nullae aliae fundari possunt. Deinde, quia in Patre, verbi gratia, non potest illa relatio veritatis esse ad intellectum ut producentem, quia persona Patris non est producta, neque ut intelligentem, quia est relatio eiusdem ad seipsum. In Filio item, quamvis sit persona producta non potest veritas filiationis consistere in relatione conformitatis ad intellectum ut producentem, seu, quod idem est, ut habentem ideam vel exemplar quo talis res producitur, quia Verbum divinum non producitur per ideam, sed est ipsa imago vel exemplar a Patre naturaliter productum. Neque etiam potest dicere relationem realem conformitatis ad intellectum ut intelligentem, quia sic etiam in Verbo talis relatio est eiusdem ad seipsum. Nam, licet Verbum intelligatur etiam a Patre et ipsum etiam intelligat Patrem, tamen ut sese mutuo intelligunt, non distinguuntur ab intellectu et ab actu quo se intelligunt. Et eadem ratio cum proportionem applicata locum habet in Spiritu Sancto. In Deo ergo nulla est relatio realis conformitatis, in qua veritas possit consistere; et consequenter nec veritas entis ut abstrahit a creato et increato potest hanc relationem realem requirere.

13. Third, even if we speak more restrictedly concerning created being and its transcendental truth, as those seem to talk who say that the truth of this being consists in conformity to the divine intellect as in itself it maintains the exemplars or ideas of created beings, although (I say) we speak concerning this being, I do not think that this truth consists in some proper and categorical real relation of this sort of being to a divine idea. Some show this, because this relation of conformity which is required for truth is common to these entities whether

they exist or not. Therefore, it cannot be a real relation. But this argument is not of much importance.

In the first place, indeed, because perhaps it assumed falsehood. For, as I was saying above, creatures considered only according to the being of essence do not have the truth of essence from a conformity to the divine mind or idea. For a human is not such an essence because he is cognized as such by God, but rather such an essence is cognized because he is such essentially. Next, that posited relation may be said to be real with the proportion taken up. For in created being existing only in potency truth is also only in potency. Therefore, in the same way the real relation will be able to be only in potency. Moreover, in the same being by an existing act just as real truth is in the act, so also the real relation will be able to be in the act.

Otherwise, therefore, it can be shown that that relation is not real, because otherwise an advance into infinity is given in such a relation. For that relation also has an idea to which it is conformed and that through another relation and so on into infinity. But this reason is common to almost all relations, especially these which are founded in unity, as are similitude, equality, and similar ones.

*Tertio, etiamsi contractius loquamur de ente creato eiusque veritate transcendentali, ut videntur loqui qui dicunt veritatem huius entis consistere in conformitate ad intellectum divinum ut in se continet exemplaria seu ideas creatorum entium, quamvis (inquam) de hoc ente loquamur, non existimo veritatem hanc consistere in aliqua relatione reali propria et praedicamentali huiusmodi entis ad ideam divinam. Quod aliqui probant, quia illa relatio conformitatis quae ad veritatem requiritur, communis est in his entibus sive existant sive non existant; ergo non potest esse relatio realis. Sed haec ratio non est magni momenti. Primo quidem, quia fortasse assumit falsum; nam, ut supra dicebam, creaturae consideratae tantum secundum esse essentiae non habent veritatem essentiae ex conformitate ad divinam mentem seu ideam; non enim homo est talis essentiae quia talis cognoscitur a Deo, sed potius ideo talis essentiae cognoscitur quia talis est essentialiter. Deinde, posita illa relatione, dicitur esse realis cum proportione sumpta; nam in ente creato in potentia tantum existente est veritas etiam tantum in potentia; eodem ergo modo esse poterit relatio realis in potentia; in eodem autem ente actu existente sicut est veritas realis in actu, ita et esse poterit relatio realis in actu. Aliter ergo probari potest illam relationem non esse realem, quia alias daretur processus in infinitum in tali relatione, nam etiam illa relatio haberet ideam, cui esset conformis et illa per aliam relationem et sic in infinitum; sed haec ratio omnibus fere relationibus communis est, praesertim his quae in unitate fundantur, ut sunt similitudo, aequalitas et similes.*

14. Therefore, it is shown otherwise, because it is either a relation of similitude or a relation of effect to cause, which by another name is customarily called the measured to the measure. Not the first, because a relation of similitude does not properly exist unless it is founded in unity or formal agreement. However, between a creature and an idea which it has in God is not such a formal agreement, but only intentional or ideal, just as there is not a proper

relation of similitude between an intentional appearance and a visible object, although it is an intentional representation.

Nor can the second be said, because an idea or exemplar of a craftsman does not have another immediate influx into an effect, besides that which the craftsman has so that he a complete efficient cause, nor through another action unless it is efficient. Because an exemplar as such does not have another causality than to direct the action of an agent. Therefore, another relation does not result in the effect except that which follows from the strength of the agent's action, so that he is the agent. Therefore, it does not have another real relation of conformity or dependency to the exemplar.

If you say that the effect depends on the exemplar as to a specification but from an efficient [cause] as such as to an exercise, this itself establishes that a special relation to the exemplar does not result in the effect, but only that which is to the efficient cause, because it is a single causality and action by which the thing becomes and becomes such an appearance. And that distinction as to exercise and specification in the present case is only according to reason and adaptation, not according to the thing. Rather, the exemplar is not compared to the efficient [cause] as a distinct cause, but as constituting that in its own way in the first act of effecting. Therefore, neither does a multitudinous relation result in the effect, but only that which is the effect to its own efficient cause.

Probatur ergo aliter, quia vel est relatio similitudinis vel relatio effectus ad causam, quae alio nomine dici solet mensurati ad mensuram. Non primum, quia relatio similitudinis proprie non est nisi quae fundatur in unitate vel convenientia formali; inter creaturam autem et ideam quam habet in Deo non est talis convenientia formalis, sed solum intentionalis seu idealis, sicut inter speciem intentionalem et obiectum visibile non est propria relatio similitudinis, quamvis sit intentionalis repraesentatio. Nec secundum dici potest, quia idea vel exemplar artificis non habet alium influxum immediatum in effectum, praeter eum quem habet artifex ut causa perfecta efficiens est, neque per aliam actionem nisi qua efficiens est, quia exemplar, ut sic, non habet aliam causalitatem quam dirigere actionem agentis; ergo in effectum non resultat alia relatio, nisi quae consequitur ex vi actionis agentis, ut agens est; ergo non habet aliam relationem realem conformitatis vel dependentiae ad exemplar. Quod si dicas effectum pendere ab exemplari quoad specificationem, ab efficiente vero ut sic quoad exercitium, hoc ipsum convincit in effectum non resultare specialem relationem ad exemplar, sed solum eam quae est ad causam efficientem, quia unica est causalitas et actio qua res fit et in tali specie fit, et illa distinctio quoad exercitium et specificationem in praesenti solum est secundum rationem et accommodationem, non secundum rem. Immo exemplar non comparatur ad efficiens ut causa distincta, sed ut constituens illud suo modo in actu primo ad efficiendum; ergo neque in effectum resultat multiplex relatio, sed sola illa quae est effectus ad suam causam efficientem.

15. Perhaps it will be said that the argument indeed shows that these relations are not distinct, yet for all that a true being includes a relation of a creature in its own essence so

that there is a relation of conformity to an idea of the creator, just as the action itself of the creator in its own essence includes what is from the idea. But whatever the case may be concerning such a real relation or whether it is distinct or not, I show further on that the nature of the truth of created being cannot consist in that.

First, that general argument stated above that the attributes of being cannot add to being any real positive mode, neither absolute nor respective. Second, because it is one thing for a relation to follow from another, but another thing formally to constitute it. That relation, moreover, if it is, supposes the nature of truth in the created being and follows that. Therefore, truth is not formally constituted by such a relation.

The consequence is evident, because that which is formally constituted through some form cannot itself be supposed of the form. But the antecedent is clear, first, by the perceptible examples of artificial things. For a thing made by art according to the idea and rule of the art is not therefore rightly made and conforming to the art because it has in itself some categorical relation to the art, but precisely because it has a certain figure, proportion, and so on, which sort of qualities the art demands. And from there afterwards follows a relation, if it truly results. Hence, if in the mind we prescind such a relation, or if perhaps it is a true opinion which denies resulting relations of this sort, nevertheless an artificial thing will be understood as true in the genus of artificial [things]. Therefore, the same is true in the case of a creature with respect to divine ideas. For it is compared to them just as to a craftsman.

Finally, I explain in this way, because nature is a creature produced by God before to it itself is referred by a categorical relation of createdness. Therefore, it is both a true creature or true being prior to the nature which is referred to by the just-mentioned relation and similarly the nature is true human or true lion prior [to that]. Therefore, that relation is not formally and intrinsically included in the nature of truth.

The antecedent is clear, because the nature is a foundation prior to being a relation. This relation, however, is founded in the entity of an existing creature and therefore it supposes that having been created and having come from God. But the first consequence is clear, because created being by the strength of that entity which it has from God before the nature which results in that categorical relation not only is intelligible by a true concept of being but also is truly constituted in such and such a species of created being. Therefore, precisely such a relation, can be foreknown to be a true being and such a being. Therefore, it does not add true as a true categorical relation beyond being.

Dicetur fortasse argumentum quidem probare has relationes non esse distinctas, nihilominus tamen verum esse relationem creaturae in sua essentia includere ut sit relatio conformitatis ad ideam creatoris, sicut actio ipsa creatoris in sua essentia includit quod sit ab idea. Sed quidquid sit de tali relatione reali et sive distincta sit sive non, probo ulterius non posse in illa consistere rationem veritatis entis creati. Primo, illa ratione generali supra dicta quod passiones entis non possunt addere enti modum realem positivum, neque absolutum neque respectivum. Secundo, quia aliud est relationem consequi ex alio, aliud vero formaliter illud constituere; illa autem relatio, si est, supponit rationem veritatis in ente creato

et illam consequitur; ergo non constituitur formaliter veritas tali relatione.<sup>4</sup> Consequentia est evidens, quia id quod constituitur formaliter per aliquam formam, non potest ipsi formae supponi. Antecedens vero patet primo, exemplo sensibili rerum artificialium; nam res arte facta secundum ideam et regulas artis non ideo est recte facta et conformis arti quia in se habet relationem aliquam praedicamentalem ad artem, sed praecise quia habet talem figuram, proportionem, etc., qualem ars postulat, et inde postea sequitur relatio, si vere resultat. Unde si mente praescindamus talem relationem, vel si fortasse vera est opinio quae negat huiusmodi relationes resultantes, nihilominus intelligitur res artificialis vera in genere artificii; ergo idem est in creatura respectu divinarum idearum; nam comparatur ad illas sicut ad artificem. Deinde explico in hunc modum, quia prius natura est creatura producta a Deo quam ad ipsum referatur relatione praedicamentali creaturae; ergo et est vera creatura seu verum ens creatum prius natura quam referatur praedicta relatione; et similiter prius natura est verus homo aut verus leo; non ergo includitur illa relatio formaliter et intrinsece in ratione veritatis. Antecedens patet, quia prius natura est fundamentum quam relatio; haec autem relatio fundatur in entitate creaturae existentis, et ideo supponit illam creatam et manantem a Deo. Prima vero consequentia patet, quia ens creatum ex vi illius entitatis quam a Deo habet prius natura quam in illo resultet relatio praedicamentalis, non solum est intelligibile vero conceptu entis sed etiam est vere constitutum in tali vel tali specie entis creati; ergo, praecisa tali relatione, praesentelligi potest esse verum ens et tale ens; non ergo addit verum ut verum praedictam relationem supra ens.

16. This reason not only proceeds against those who say that this relation is real, but also against those who say that it is a conceptual relation, if they speak about formal and actual relations. Otherwise, if [they speak] about fundamental, which is not so much a relation as an association of multiple thing or formal natures or a denomination is taken from such an association, as was declared above about the truth of cognition. But the just-mentioned reason chiefly proceeds concerning actual conformity to a divine idea. *A fortiori*, nevertheless, it shows concerning the similar actual conformity to whatever other cognition, because all other relations are posterior and more extrinsic.

And it can also be applied to aptitudinal relations by which it is said that a thing is apt to be understood or to conform to the intellect having a proper or true concept of it. For this denomination really does not add a real relation in the thing which is called intelligible, because it is only an aptitude for a certain extrinsic denomination, to which the object is compared, as a *terminus* or matter to which the cognition is turned.

Likewise, because, as the arguments made show, a thing is intelligible through it itself and not through a superadded relation, insofar as that which is required on the part of it. For on the part of another is required a faculty of understanding.

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<sup>4</sup>The digitized text reads as follows: ‘Secundo, quia aliud est relatio illud constituere; illa autem relatio, si est, nem consequi ex alio, aliud vero formaliter supponit rationem veritatis in ente creato et illam consequitur; ergo non constituitur formaliter veritas tali relatione’. Obviously part of the sentence was inserted into a different part. The Vivés edition has it correctly.

Likewise, because the knowable as such does not express a real relation to science, as everyone teaches. And the same is true concerning the visible with respect to vision.

Finally, even if you imagine that nothing is understood by an act, the thing will be intelligible and true in and of itself. Therefore, no matter what way truth may be explained, either through actual conformity or through aptitudinal [conformity], it cannot consist in a formal and proper relation.

Quae ratio non solum procedit contra eos qui dicunt hanc relationem esse realem, sed etiam contra eos qui dicunt illam esse relationem rationis, si de formali et actuali relatione loquantur; secus si de fundamentali, quae non tam est relatio quam concomitantia plurium rerum vel rationum formalium, seu denominatio ex tali concomitantia sumpta, ut supra declaratum est in veritate cognitionis. Sed praedicta ratio praecipue procedit de conformitate actuali ad ideam divinam; a fortiori tamen probat de simili actuali conformitate ad quamcumque aliam cognitionem, quia omnis alia relatio posterior est magisque extrinseca. Et applicari etiam potest ad relationem aptitudinalem qua dicitur res apta intelligi vel conformari intellectui habenti proprium seu verum conceptum eius; haec enim denominatio revera non addit relationem realem in re quae intelligibilis dicitur, quia solum est aptitudo ad quamdam extrinsecam denominationem, ad quam comparatur obiectum, ut terminus seu materia circa quam versatur cognitio. Item, quia, ut argumenta facta probant, res est intelligibilis per seipsam et non per relationem superadditam, quantum ad id quod ex parte eius requiritur; nam ex parte alterius requiritur facultas ad intelligendum. Item, quia scibile ut sic non dicit relationem realem ad scientiam, ut omnes docent; et idem est de visibili respectu visus. Denique etiamsi fingas nullum actu esse intellectum, res erit intelligibilis ex se et vera. Quomodocumque ergo veritas explicetur, sive per actualem conformitatem, sive per aptitudinalem, non potest in formali et propria relatione consistere.

*The third opinion is rejected (Tertia opinio improbat)*

17. Tertia sententia excogitari potest, quod veritas transcendentalis supra ens solum addat negationem aliquam. Quae sane opinio videri potest singularis, quia omnes auctores supponunt verum dicere positivam denominationem; tamen, si considerentur supra dicta, videbitur apparens, quia ostensum est non addere veritatem supra ens positivam rationem absolutam, neque etiam relativam rei aut rationis; ergo nihil relinquitur quod addere possit praeter negationem. Confirmatur ex communi modo declarandi hanc veritatem; ut enim argumentatur Aureol., apud Capreol., In I, dist. 13, q. 3, ut concipiamus et explicemus veritatem alicuius rei, verbi gratia, hoc esse verum aurum, non recurrimus ad exemplaria divina, neque ad aliquem alium intellectum, ut ex ipso usu concipiendi et loquendi constat, sed per negationem id declaramus; dicimus enim esse verum aurum quod non est fictum vel apparens tantum, sed quod habet propriam auri naturam, quam ex proprietatibus et effectibus colligimus. Unde haec veritas magis videtur explicanda per principia intrinseca rei, ut verus homo dicatur quia essentialibus principiis hominis constat; hoc autem nihil addit supra entitatem rei nisi negationem fictionis seu apparentiae. Praeterea declaratur a simili; nam, sicut

esse idem (ut supra dicebamus), quamvis per modum positivi significetur, tamen in re nihil addit supra ens nisi negationem, ita in vero contingere videtur; dicitur enim res aliqua vera in tali ratione entis, quia veram naturam aut propria principia essentialia illius rei habet; dicitur autem habere veram naturam, quia non habet fictam, nec extraneam et apparentem, sed eam quae est propria talis rei; sicque dicitur verus Deus ut a falsis distinguatur, et vera divinitas ut indicetur non esse fictam, sed quae ex se talis est. Denique ad hunc modum alia transcendentia a multis explicantur; nam res, quod significat essentiam ut realem et ratam, dicitur importare negationem imaginariae aut fictae essentiae, et aliquid negationem nihili aut negationem identitatis. Quid ergo mirum quod verum etiam per negationem declaretur, quamvis speciem habeat positivae proprietatis?

18. Videtur ergo hic modus dicendi non omnino improbabilis; tamen, quia novus apparet, probandus nobis non est; nam ratio et definitio veritatis iuxta communem modum concipiendi omnium qui de veritate loquuntur, includit vel connotat aliquo modo habitudinem ad intellectum seu ad potentiam cognoscentem; et non per modum negationis, ut per se constat; ergo per modum conformitatis, quae ut positivum aliquid concipitur. Deinde quia potius falsitas rei in negatione posita est, ut infra dicitur, quia dicit carentiam perfectionis debitae ad veritatem rei; ergo veritas non addit de formali negationem illius carentias perfectionis debitae neque negationem fictae naturae, sed propriam et positivam rei perfectionem. Denique, quamvis haec simplicia saepe explicentur a nobis per negationem (quod solum probant coniecturae adductae) non tamen propterea significant formaliter talem negationem.

#### Quarta opinio

19. Est ergo quarta sententia, hanc veritatem solum esse denominationem extrinsecam. Ita sentit Caiet., I, q. 16, a. 6, in fine, ubi solum agit de rebus creatis, quas dicit esse veras denominatione extrinseca vel a veritate divina, quatenus sunt signa eius eamque imitantur, vel a veritate creata speculative intellecta, quatenus sunt vel esse possunt causa eius. Ratio eius est, quia ita se habet verum ad cognitionem et res, sicut sanum ad animal habens sanitatem et ad medicinam, etc.; nam sicut, ablata sanitate, quae formaliter est in animali, reliqua non denominarentur sana, ita ablata veritate cognitionis, reliqua non denominarentur vera; ergo, sicut animal dicitur sanum intrinseca denominatione, reliqua vero tantum extrinseca, ita intellectus est qui formaliter et intrinsece denominatur verus, alia vero tantum extrinseca denominatione, quatenus sunt signa vel causae veritatis intellectus. Non declarat autem Caietan. quid dicendum sit de veritate qua Deus dicitur verus; fortasse tamen diceret etiam in eo significare denominationem extrinsecam, non signi seu causae, ut scilicet Deus dicatur verus quia potest veram sui cognitionem causare, vel proprie in alienis intellectibus vel improprie et secundum rationem tantum respectu sui intellectus, in quantum potest per modum obiecti esse suo intellectui ratio formandi de seipso verum conceptum Dei.

20. Quod si obiicias, quia haec ipsa virtus causandi vel essendi sufficiens ratio obiectiva talis cognitionis est intrinseca ipsi enti; item, quod, cum cognitio Dei sit ei maxime intrinseca, non potest ab illa extrinseca denominatio sumi, responderi potest ad priorem partem virtutem quidem seu perfectionem illam esse intrinsecam, denominari tamen veram seu veritatem ab extrinseco; sicut etiam in medicina virtus causandi sanitatem intrinseca est, tamen ratio

sanitatis in illa est extrinseca. Ad alteram partem dicitur, quod, licet cognitio qua Deus se cognoscit, sit illi maxime intrinseca et ideo intrinsece denominet illum cognoscentem, tamen denominatio cogniti, ut sic, per se ac formaliter est extrinseca acciditque illi ut forma, a qua sumitur, sit intra rem quae cognita denominatur.

21. Quae videantur obstare praecedenti opinioni.—Haec sententia quantum ad aliquid clara est, nimirum, quod verum supra ens non addit nisi concomitantiam alicuius extrinseci, ut infra ostendemus; quatenus vero dicit res solum per denominationem extrinsecam denominari veras, videtur haec sententia difficilis. Primo, quia Aristoteles dicto loco II *Metaph.*, text. 4, sentit aliquam veritatem consequi ad omnia entia, quod etiam docet D. Thomas, I cont. *Gent.*, c. 60, ratione ultima, distinguens duplicem veritatem, scilicet intellectus et rei et de posteriori exponens definitionem Avicen., tract. I suae *Metaph.*, c. 6, et tract. VIII, c. 6: Veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei, quod stabilitum est ei. Et I, q. 16, a. 1, de eadem veritate exponit definitionem August., lib. De Vera religione, c. 36, dicentis: Veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est; et definitionem Anselmi, dialog. De Verit. c. 12: Veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. In quibus omnibus significatur veritatem rei esse aliquam intrinsecam formam et perfectionem eius. Unde Augustinus supra: Vera (inquit) in tantum vera sunt, in quantum sunt; in tantum autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt. Unde addit veritatem esse formam verorum sicut similitudo est forma similium. Praeterea D. Thomas, q. 1 De Verit., a. 4, quamvis multum videatur favere opinioni Caietani, tandem tamen dicit: quamvis veritas, secundum quam omnes res dicuntur verae, minus proprie veritas dicitur, tamen ab illa denominari rem veram, sicut a forma inhaerente, nihilque aliud esse quam entitatem intellectui adaequatam. Et idem sentit *ibid.*, a. 5 et 6. Est ergo haec veritas aliquid intrinsecum rebus et non tantum denominatio extrinseca. Ratione hoc confirmari potest, primo, quia sola extrinseca denominatio non potest proprie inter rei proprietates numerari; veritas autem dicitur ab omnibus proprietas entis; ergo non est tantum externa denominatio. Maior patet, quia proprietas debet ab intrinseco convenire; denominatio autem extrinseca accidentarie et ab extrinseco convenit. Quod maxime verum est de denominatione illa quae solum per analogiam sumi dicitur ex proportionem vel habitudine ad aliud; nemo enim dixerit sanitatem ut sic esse proprietatem cibi aut urinae, vel risibilitatem esse proprietatem prati florentis, quia haec praedicata solum quasi metaphorice conveniunt illis subiectis.

22. Dices: quamvis haec praedicata quoad impositionem vocum sint metaphorica, tamen revera significant quasdam proprietates earum rerum quibus attribuuntur; et hoc modo sanitas dici potest proprietas talis cibi non quoad ipsam formalem sanitatem, sed quoad id quod per talem denominationem sani declarari intenditur. Sed contra, nam hinc saltem recte colligimus sanitatem non esse proprietatem cibi distinctam ab illa quae per talem metaphoram declaratur; quod si illa non esset proprietas sed essentia ipsius cibi, certe sanum non significaret proprietatem sed essentiam cibi. Sic ergo in praesenti, si verum tantum dicitur de rebus per analogiam et extrinsecam denominationem a veritate intellectus, interrogo quid indicetur vel significetur in ipso ente per hanc metaphoram vel habitudinem. Aut enim indicatur sola rei entitas, et sic verum non est proprietas entis sed solum differt ab illo quod verum metaphorice significat id quod ens significat cum proprietate; sicut ridere non est in prato alia perfectio ab ea quae est esse viride vel floridum, sed est eadem metaphorice significata.

Aut per illam veri appellationem analogam indicatur in ente aliquid ab entitate diversum; et de hoc inquirimus quid sit et an sit sola denominatio extrinseca; nam, si ita est, non poterit esse proprietas entis; si autem est aliquid ultra denominationem extrinsecam, quoad id ratio veri intrinseca erit, quidquid sit de impositione vocis, an ab extrinseco desumpta sit.

23. Et confirmatur, quia si veritas esset sola denominatio extrinseca, tam posset convenire entibus rationis sicut realibus, quia huiusmodi denominationes sumptae ex cognitione tam possunt convenire entibus rationis sicut realibus, ut esse genera, species, vere cognosci, significari, et similia. Quod si dicatur formaliter ita esse, fundamenta autem harum denominationum aliter convenire entibus realibus, contra hoc urgeo semper rationem factam, quia hoc fundamentum in hac denominatione veri vel est aliquid praeter ens, vel non; si est aliquid, quaero quid illud sit, an extrinsecum vel intrinsecum, et redeunt argumenta facta; si non est aliquid, ergo verum prout est in rebus non est proprietas entis sed ipsum ens. Simile argumentum fieri potest, quia sequitur id quod est perfectius ens non esse perfectius verum veritate rei, quod est aperte contra Aristot. et D. Thomam supra, et contra communem sensum omnium; quis enim dicat non esse verius ens in ratione entis angelum quam hominem, vel etiam Deum quam angelum? Sequela vero patet, quia in denominatione illa quae sumitur ex veritate intellectus, non possunt habere inaequalitatem, quia tam vera est idea quam Deus habet de homine, sicut idea quam habet de angelo tantaque est conformitas inter illa extrema sicut inter haec; et tam vera est cognitio quam Deus habet de angelo sicut quam habet de se ipso.

*Resolution of the question* (Quaestionis resolutio)

24. *What transcendental truth intrinsically expresses.*—In this variety of opinions it is difficult to make a true judgement concerning truth and perhaps the difficulty originates from the fact that we do not distinguish satisfactorily in our use of these words that from their imposition is taken or transferred and to which are imposed for signifying. Indeed, it can happen and likely has that every appellation of true led the origin from the truth of cognition, as I say more fully in the following sections. But all the same by the name of true is not signified in things only a denomination taken up from the truth of cognition, but something else to which that name is imposed for signifying [it].

Therefore, in order that I may declare this, I say first that transcendental truth intrinsically expresses the real entity itself of the thing which is denominated true, and besides that it adds to it nothing intrinsic, neither absolute nor relative, neither distinct *ex natura rei* or conceptually. This conclusion was satisfactorily shown by what was said in the first opinion and is clearly taken up from St. Thomas in the cited passages and in *De Veritate* q. 1, a. 1, ad 6 and a. 8, as well as Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrara and others cited in the first opinion.

*Quid intrinsece dicat veritas transcendentalis.*—In hac opinionum varietate difficile est verum iudicium de veritate ferre, et fortasse difficultas inde orta est quod non satis in usu harum vocum distinguimus id a quo earum impositio sumpta vel translata est et ad quod significandum imponuntur; fieri enim potuit et verisimile est omnem veri appellationem ex veritate cognitionis duxisse originem, ut sectione sequenti commodius dicam; nihilominus tamen nomine veri non significari

in rebus solum denominationem sumptam ex veritate cognitionis, sed aliquid aliud ad quod significandum nomen illud impositum est. Ut ergo hoc declarem, dico primo veritatem transcendentalem intrinsece dicere entitatem realem ipsius rei quae vera denominatur, et praeter illam nihil ei intrinsecum, neque absolutum, neque relativum, neque ex natura rei, nec sola ratione distinctum addere. Haec conclusio satis probata est ex dictis in prima sententia et sumitur clare ex D. Thoma, cit. locis, et q. 1 De Verit., a. 1. ad 6. et a. 8; Capreol., Caiet., Ferrar. et aliis supra in prima opinione citatis.

25. *What transcendental truth connotes.*—Second, I say that transcendental truth signifies the entity of the thing while connoting the cognition of concept of the understanding to which such an entity is conformed or in which such a thing is represented or can be represented as it is. This conclusion is also shown from what was said by a sufficient enumeration of the parts. And I think, although the authors speak in diverse ways, almost everyone wishes to teach the same thing and I explain it in this way.

For I think that this concept of true being is virtually comparative of one thing or nature to a proper concept of that thing which is said to be true. As, for example, in the professed mystery of the Eucharist we are accustomed to saying that the consecrated host is the true body of the Lord Christ, where through ‘true body’ we express nothing other than that that same body which through a proper and true concept of the body of Christ is represented.

And, similarly, in the confessed mystery of the Incarnation, we say that God is true man, that is, that he has that nature which we truly conceive in the essential species of human. And, henceforth, Hervæus says, *Quodlibet* III, q. 1, a. 2 and 3, that this truth is a conformity of the thing, just as it is in itself, to it itself as objective concept. But Durandus, in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 19, q. 5, says on the contrary that this truth is a conformity of the thing according to objective being to it itself according to real being. For either understood that truth adds nothing to being besides a denomination arising from a conjunction and proportion or conformity between understanding and the thing. But the same declare through the objective concept what we [declare] through the formal. Nevertheless, because an objective concept adds nothing besides the thing except a denomination with a *terminus* in the formal concept, therefore the conformity is not rightly explained as between the thing and an objective concept, but rather between the thing and the formal concept or idea.

And I think those who say that true adds beyond being a conceptual relation of conformity of the being to the understanding think the same, as St. Thomas signifies in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1. For this, as is true, should not be understood concerning a proper and actual relation, but concerning that mutual connection of the thing and concept and the connotation of one as corresponding to another, which, because it is conceived by us through the mode of relation, is customarily called a conceptual relation. Finally, in this sense that vulgar definition of truth, that it is a conformity between understanding and the thing, is easily applied to this truth. For that conformity is not understood to be some relation, as was explained above in [the section on] truth in cognition, but the denomination is taken up from the conjunction of multiple [things] having themselves such as one is such as it is represented by another.

*Quid connotet veritas transcendentalis.*—Dico secundo veritatem transcendentalem significare entitatem rei connotando cognitionem seu conceptum intellectus cui talis entitas conformatur vel in quo talis res repraesentatur, vel repraesentari potest prout est. Haec conclusio probatur etiam ex dictis a sufficienti<sup>5</sup> partium enumeratione. Et existimo, quamvis auctores diversimode loquantur, omnes fere hanc eandem rem docere voluisse eamque in hunc modum explico. Existimo enim hunc veri entis conceptum esse virtualiter comparativum unius rei vel naturae ad proprium conceptum eius rei quae vera esse dicitur; ut, verbi gratia, ad profitendum Eucharistiae mysterium dicere solemus hostiam consecratam esse verum corpus Christi Domini, ubi per verum corpus nihil aliud significamus quam illud idem corpus quod per proprium ac verum conceptum corporis Christi repraesentatur. Et similiter, ad confitendum mysterium Incarnationis, dicimus Deum esse verum hominem, id est, habere illam naturam quam in essentiali specie hominis vere concipimus. Et hinc dixit Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 2 et 3, hanc veritatem esse conformitatem rei, prout est in se, ad seipsam ut obiective conceptam; Durandus vero, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, e contrario dixit hanc veritatem esse conformitatem rei secundum esse obiectivum ad seipsam secundum esse reale; uterque enim intellexit hanc veritatem nihil rei addere praeter denominationem ortam ex coniunctione et proportionem seu conformitate inter intellectum et rem. Sed ipsi declarant per conceptum obiectivum quod nos per formalem; tamen, quia conceptus obiectivus nihil praeter rem addit nisi denominationem termini conceptus formalis, ideo non recte explicatur conformitas inter rem et conceptum obiectivum, sed inter rem potius et conceptum formalem seu ideam. Atque idem existimo sensisse eos qui dicunt verum addere supra ens relationem rationis conformitatis entis ad intellectum, ut significat S. Thomas, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1; hoc enim, ut verum sit, non est intelligendum de relatione propria et actuali, sed de illa mutua connexionem rei et conceptus et connotationem unius, ut correspondentis alteri, quae quia per modum relationis a nobis concipitur, relatio rationis dici solet. Denique in hoc sensu facile applicatur ad hanc veritatem illa vulgaris veritatis definitio, quod sit conformitas inter intellectum et rem; illa enim conformitas non intelligitur esse relatio aliqua, ut supra in veritate cognitionis explicatum est, sed denominatio sumpta ex consortio plurium ita se habentium ut tale unum sit, quale ab alio repraesentatur.

26. *Augustine's statement is explained.*—Third, I say that transcendental truth can be explained both by way of aptitudinal conformity and by way of actual conformity, both in being ordered to the divine understanding and to created [understanding], and in the concept of cognized and cognizer if we are speaking universally of true being, or in the concept of caused and cause or measured and measure, if the discussion is about created or artificial being.

I declare [them] one at a time, for in the first place, everyone admits that this truth can express actual conformity and by the very name of truth seems to stand a conformity to it. For it more signifies an act than an aptitude. Likewise, the truth of cognition expresses

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<sup>5</sup>Vivés: suficiente.

actual conformity and symmetry. Therefore, the same is the case proportionately concerning the truth of a thing.

If you object that Augustine, *Soliloquies* II, c. 5 says that true is not rightly called that which holds itself in the way it seems to be cognized, because following this nothing would be true if nothing were cognized, we respond that in accordance with this denomination that definition should not be absolutely and simply rejects, if it is understood, as it should be understood, concerning a cognizer truly arriving at the thing itself. Hence, we also admit that that conditional is true. Nevertheless, just as the antecedent is impossible, at least with respect to divine understanding, so also the consequent. Hence, St. Thomas in [ST] Ia.16.1 ad 1, discussing this passage from Augustine, says that it only excludes comparison to created intellect.

*Augustini dictum explicatur.*—Dico tertio hanc veritatem transcendentalem posse et per modum aptitudinalis et per modum actualis conformitatis explicari, et in ordine ad intellectum divinum et ad creatum, et in ratione cogniti et cognoscentis si universaliter de ente vero loquamur, vel in ratione causati et causae vel mensurati et mensurae, si de ente creato seu artificiali sermo sit. Declaro singula, nam imprimis, quod haec veritas dicere possit conformitatem actualem omnes fatentur et ex ipso nomine veritatis ei conformitatis constare videtur; magis enim significat actum quam aptitudinem. Item veritas cognitionis dicit actualem conformitatem et commensurationem; ergo idem est proportionaliter de veritate rei. Quod si obiicias Augustinum, lib. II Soliloquiorum, c. 5, dicentem verum non recte dici esse id quod ita se habet, ut videtur cognitori, quia secundum hoc nihil esset verum, si nullus cognosceret; respondebimus secundum hanc denominationem non esse illam definitionem reiiciendam absolute et simpliciter, si intelligatur, ut intelligi debet, de cognitore vere attingente rem ipsam. Unde etiam admittimus illam conditionalem esse veram; tamen sicut antecedens est impossibile, saltem respectu intellectus divini, ita et consequens. Unde D. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1, tractans hunc locum Augustini, dicit solum excludere comparisonem ad intellectum creatum.

27. Praeterea, quod haec veritas possit etiam per aptitudinalem conformitatem declarari, sumitur ex illo eodem loco Augustini, ubi post illa verba: Verum est quod ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, additur: Si velit et possit cognoscere. Quae verba aptitudinem significant. Clarius Anselmus, dialog. De Verit., c. 9, dicit veritatem esse rectitudinem sola mente perceptibilem. Et D. Thomas, dicta q. 16, a. 5, dicit veritatem inveniri in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui; et I cont. Gent., c. 60, declarans definitionem Avicennae: Veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei, quod stabilitum est ei, addit: In quantum talis res nata est facere de se veram aestimationem. Et probatur quia omne ens reale natum est facere de se veram aestimationem, quomodo omne ens intelligibile dicitur, sive sit principium cognitionis, sive tantum terminus; haec enim aptitudo de se abstrahit ab his modis; ergo nihil impedit quominus haec possit nomine veri seu veritatis significari. Et confirmatur; nam, licet sit impossibile esse aliquod ens quod actu non vere concipiatur ab aliquo intellectu saltem divino, nihilominus tamen etiamsi intellectus apprehendat illam hy-

pothesim impossibilem in re positam, nimirum quod omnis intellectus etiam divinus cessaret ab actuali rerum conceptione, nihilominus adhuc esset in rebus veritas, nam et compositum ex corpore et anima rationali esset verus homo et aurum esset verum aurum, etc., vel secundum veritatem essentiae si intelligamus non manere res existentes, vel etiam secundum existentiam, si fingamus cessante actuali cognitione adhuc conservari res existentes a Deo operante per suam potentiam exsequentem; ergo haec veritas intelligi potest sufficienter per illam aptitudinalem conformitatem, etiamsi actualis non sit. Dices, simili argumento posse probari conformitatem aptitudinalem non esse necessariam, nam etiamsi fingatur alia hypothesis impossibilis, scilicet, quod res nec intelligatur nec possit ab aliquo intelligi, et quod maneat in sua essentia vel existentia, nihilominus unaquaeque res in sua essentia vera esset; et tamen tunc non intelligeretur ut apta ad faciendam veram de se aestimationem, quia non esset apud quem posset illam facere; ergo etiam illa aptitudo non est de ratione veritatis. Respondetur primum illam posteriorem hypothesim involvere magis directam et formalem repugnantiam cum propria ratione entitatis realis, saltem secundum essentiam; nam de ratione eius est ut sit possibilis, et consequenter ac multo magis ut sit intelligibilis. Deinde, facta illa hypothesi, posset res dici vera fundamentaliter seu non repugnanter, non tamen positive ac formaliter; quia tunc non esset possibilis veritas cognitionis, et consequenter omnis veri denominatio cessaret.

28. *Veritas rei maxime spectanda in ordine ad divinum intellectum.*—Praeterea ex his facile constat hanc appellationem seu conformitatem potissime ac per se esse sumendam in ordine ad intellectum divinum, ut D. Thomas docet, dict. q. 16, a. 1, et aliis locis. Primo quia conformitas ad hunc intellectum est maxime per se in omnibus rebus, in creatis quidem propter dependentiam quam ab illo habent; in ipso vero ente increato propter intrinsecam et essentialem identitatem cum suo intellectu et actuali intellectione. Deinde quia in divino intellectu est summa et infallibilis veritas et perfectissima rerum omnium ratio seu repraesentatio; ergo tunc res maxime dicitur vera quando conformari potest conceptui quem de tali re Deus habet.

29. *Secundario in ordine ad creatum.*—Quod autem etiam sumi possit in ordine ad intellectum creatum, quamvis secundario, docet expresse D. Thomas, q. 1 de Verit., loc. cit. Et potest facile declarari ex dictis; quia haec conformitas quam dicit veritas potest non solum de actuali, sed etiam de aptitudinali intelligi; at vero secundum aptitudinem omne ens natum est habere veram sui aestimationem in omni intellectu non solum divino, sed etiam creato. Unde, si velimus hanc denominationem per modum relationis concipere, intelligemus quodlibet ens habere hanc relationem intelligibilitatis non solum ad intellectum divinum, sed etiam ad quemcumque creatum. Item, quia intellectus creatus est quaedam participatio divini intellectus, cui natus est conformari in intelligendo, si vere intelligit; ergo, hoc ipso quod ens dicitur verum quia est conformabile intellectui divino, poterit etiam dici verum, quia est conformabile intellectui creato vere intelligenti. Tandem hoc probat argumentum illud, quod nos non semper cognoscimus veritatem rerum per conformitatem ad ideam divinam sed per conceptionem quam de tali re nos habemus. Atque hoc modo uti solemus definitione talis rei seu naturae ad probandum aliquid vere esse tale; definitio enim nihil aliud est quam explicatio talis naturae, ut a nobis concipitur; potest ergo haec veritas sumi non solum ex conformitate ad intellectum divinum, sed etiam ad creatum.

30. *Conformitas veritatis in communi est conformitas cognoscentis et cogniti.*—Hoc autem maxime verum habet si conformitas haec sumatur solum in ratione cognoscentis et cogniti, quomodo necesse est sumi si de transcendentali veritate in tota sua latitudine sermo sit. Quia in Deo non potest aliud genus conformitatis intelligi, cum non sit ens dependens neque causatum, ut per se constat; neque etiam proprie dici possit mensuratum in ratione veri per aliquam scientiam, non solum quia propter summam identitatem non potest ibi esse ratio mensurae, sed etiam quia eo modo quo possunt ratione distingui et commensurari, potius essentia Dei vera est mensura suae scientiae quam e converso; non enim Deus ideo verus Deus est quia talem se esse cognoscit, sed potius, quia est verus Deus, ideo vere se talem esse cognoscit. Ergo verum transcendentalis in tota sua latitudine sumptum non potest dicere conformitatem ad intellectum ut ad causam vel ad mensuram, sed tantum ut ad repraesentantem seu cognoscentem, vel actu vel aptitudine. Hoc ergo modo talis conformitas praesertim aptitudinalis, in ordine ad quemcumque intellectum sumi potest ita ut Deus dicatur verus, quia in quocumque intellectu gignere potest verum conceptum Dei, vel quia reipsa in se habet illam naturam quam in Deo concipit quilibet intellectus vere Deum concipiens. Et idem eadem ratione est de entibus creatis; nam idem conceptus veritatis potest ad omnia proportionaliter applicari; et quod in Deo sufficit ad veritatem, si in aliis potest per participationem reperiri, ut revera potest, sufficiet etiam ad veritatem eorum per participationem.

31. *Entia creata intellectui divino ut opifici conformantur.*—Additur vero in ultima parte conclusionis reperiri in entibus creatis conformitatem ad intellectum divinum ut ad causam et exemplar, ratione cuius possunt talia entia vera denominari, quia etiam illa est vera conformitas ad intellectum practice cognoscentem et suo modo operantem. Et eadem ratione entia artificialia quae ab intellectu humano procedunt, respectu illius habent eandem conformitatem ut ad suum exemplar vel ideam, et secundum eam vera etiam dici possunt. Immo sentit D. Thomas ab hac conformitate potissimum denominari vera entia creata, quia illa per se eis convenit; conformitas autem ad alios intellectus speculative cognoscentes est magis extrinseca et per accidens. Quod maxime habet locum in rebus existentibus et actu creatis; nam res secundum esse essentiae non habent actu causam exemplarem sicut neque efficientem; habent tamen in potentia, et ideo si considerentur ut possibles sunt, per se requirunt exemplaria et ideas in primo artifice quae unumquodque tale esse repraesentent quale esse potest aut natura fieri postulat. Et hoc modo res omnes creatae etiam secundum esse essentiae, per se primario postulant esse in divino intellectu et habere conformitatem cum illo, tamquam cum primo artifice a quo solo possunt ad esse perducere. Deus autem cum increatum ens sit, ad nullum intellectum potest habere hanc habitudinem; nihilominus tamen alia ratione potest dici per se habere conformitatem respectu proprii intellectus potius quam aliorum; quia per se et essentialiter postulat ut seipsum actu intelligat sitque non solum intelligibilis sed etiam actu intellectus a seipso et suamet intellectio. Atque ita probata est conclusio quoad omnes partes eius.

32. Sed obiicies: ergo ratio veritatis transcendentalis non est una sed multiplex, quia aptitudinalis vel actualis conformitas et speculativa vel practica valde diversae sunt. Secundo specialiter obiici potest quia veritas dicit relationem mensurati ad mensuram saltem fundamentaliter; ergo non potest veritas rerum sumi in ordine ad intellectum creatum, cuius

cognitio non est mensura veritatis rerum, sed per illas potius mensuratur. Unde argumentor tertio, nam cognitio est vera quia conformatur rebus cognitis; ergo non possunt e converso res dici verae per conformitatem ad talem cognitionem; quia inter haec non est relatio mutuae seu similis comparationis, qualis est inter duo similia, sed dissimilis seu non mutuae comparationis, qualis est inter mensuram et mensuratum.

33. Ad primum aliqui non existimant inconveniens totum id concedere quod in argumento infertur; quia, cum hae tantum sint quaedam denominationes quae ad modum relationum desumuntur seu explicantur, non est inconveniens ex variis capitibus et diversis considerationibus multiplicari. Immo, quidam etiam addunt sub una ratione esse respectus reales, sub alia vero rationis. Quod saltem concomitanter probabile est, quamvis non sit verum formaliter. Melius tamen fortasse dicitur illos omnes respectus sub uno adaequato contineri, seu ad unum revocari, nimirum ad illam aptitudinem qua unaquaeque res nata est veram sui aestimationem conferre; nam illam habet respectu cuiuscumque intellectus vel cognitionis et supra illam nihil addit actualis conformitas praeter denominationem seu coexistentiam cognitionis. Quod si inde resultet relatio, quando illa cognitio est practica et causa rerum, illa supponit potius veritatem quam constituat, ut circa secundam opinionem ostensum est. Ad secundum respondetur in rigore non esse necessarium ut ens dicatur verum in ratione mensurati per cognitionem cui conformatur; alias non posset Deus verum ens dici, ut supra argumentabar, quia in ratione entis nullam habet mensuram nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem; et ideo, ut I, q. 14, latius dictum est, divina scientia non comparatur ad suam essentiam suumque ens ut practica, sed ut speculativa tantum. Solum ergo in veritate cognitionis speculativae verum habet quod ratio veri sumitur in ratione mensurati; nam divina etiam scientia practica, ut practica est, vera est, quamvis ut sic non habeat rationem mensurati, sed potius mensurae. Unde ad tertium respondetur negando consequentiam; quia ipsamet ratio veritatis non eodem modo dicitur de cognitione et de rebus; et ideo non est inconveniens ut secundum diversas habitudines conveniat cognitioni per conformitatem ad res in quantum illas ut sunt repraesentat, et rebus in ordine ad cognitionem in quantum aptae sunt ut in ratione obiecti veram sui existimationem inducant.

34. *Transcendental truth is not merely an extrinsic denomination.*—Lastly, I say that this transcendental truth is not merely an extrinsic denomination, although it includes some mode or connotes a conjunction of another thing from which it results. In this conclusion I differ from the opinion of Cajetan, although perhaps it is not so much different as the explanation of his view.

Therefore, it is shown from what was said, because the truth of a thing intrinsically includes its entity. Therefore, it is not a mere extrinsic denomination. The antecedent is clear from the definitions of truth which Augustine, Anselm, Avicenna, and others mentioned above passed down. Likewise, because on account of this cause fictitious beings are not true being and the intelligibles are very different than true beings. For these from their own origins are apprehended and cognized just as they are. That, in truth, minimally, but it must be that they are clothed by the craft and strength of the intellect with appearance or shadow of some reality.

Likewise, for the same reason by which the thing has more of entity, it also has more of this

truth. And what more perfectly is being, it from itself is called more intelligible. Hence, we can argue farther. Because being intelligible is not a mere extrinsic denomination. Therefore, it is not true objectively but really. The antecedent is clear from what has been said, because intelligibility follows from the entity of the thing. Next also, because the object is a prior natural potency and the reason for it. Therefore, some aptitude is supposed in the object, by reason of which it is apt for terminating an act of potency, like, for example, in colour and sound with respect to vision and hearing. Therefore, similarly, in being to the extent that it is intelligible is understood not only an extrinsic faculty which has the strength for understanding, although this is necessary, but also on the part of the being itself is supposed an intrinsic aptitude, by reason of which it can terminate an act of this sort. In addition, those [arguments] confirm this that were mentioned favourably in the first opinion and others that we added in subsequent section.

*Veritas transcendentalis non est mera denominatio extrinseca.*—Dico ultimo hanc veritatem transcendentalem non esse meram denominationem extrinsecam, quamvis includat aliquo modo seu connotet coniunctionem alterius rei unde illa resultat. In hac conclusione differo ab opinione Caietani, quamvis fortasse non tam sit differentia quam explicatio sententiae eius. Probatur ergo ex dictis, quia veritas rei intrinsece includit entitatem eius; ergo non est mera denominatio extrinseca. Antecedens patet ex definitionibus veritatis quas tradunt August., Anselm. et Avicenna, et ex aliis supra adductis. Item, quia propter hanc causam entia fictitia non sunt vera entia et longe aliter sunt intelligibilia quam vera entia; nam haec ex se nata sunt apprehendi et cognosci prout sunt; illa vero minime, sed oportet ut artificio et vi intellectus aliqua realitatis specie seu umbra induantur. Item hac ratione, quo res magis habet de entitate, magis etiam habet de hac veritate; et quod perfectius est ens, id ex se magis intelligibile dicitur. Unde ulterius argumentari possumus; quia esse intelligibile non est mera denominatio extrinseca; ergo neque esse verum obiective seu realiter. Antecedens patet tum ex dictis, quod intelligibilitas sequitur entitatem rei; tum etiam quia obiectum est natura prius potentia, et ratio illius; ergo supponitur in obiecto aptitudo aliqua, ratione cuius aptum sit terminare actum potentiae ut, verbi gratia, in colore et sono respectu visus et auditus; ergo similiter in ente quatenus intelligibile est non solum intelligitur facultas extrinseca quae vim habet intelligendi, quamvis haec necessaria sit, sed etiam ex parte ipsius entis supponitur aptitudo intrinseca, ratione cuius potest actum huiusmodi terminare. Praeterea hoc confirmant quae in favorem primae opinionis adducta sunt et alia addemus sectione sequenti.

Corollaria ex superiori resolutione

35. *Increatum et creata entia quomodo vera.*—Atque ex his intelligitur primo quomodo esse verum conveniat omni enti reali, sive creato sive increato; quia omne ens de se est aptum conformari intellectui; immo nullum est ens quod non sit actu conforme alicui intellectui, saltem divino. Quo fit ut haec ratio veri primario conveniat primo enti, quod est Deus; quia per se et essentialiter includit cognitionem et cum illa summam ac necessariam conformitatem habet; et quia per se (ut ita dicam) est ratio suae veritatis et est origo et mensura omnis

veritatis quae in creaturis reperitur.

36. *Verum qualiter passio entis.*—Secundo intelligitur ex dictis quomodo veram sit passio entis. Dicitur enim passio non quasi sit realis proprietas distincta ex natura rei ab ente, sed latiori modo, solum quia est quoddam attributum quod reciprocatur cum ente et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur, saltem secundum rationem seu connotationem. Primum constat, quia ostensum est omne ens esse verum. Constat item ex dictis omne verum, eo modo quo a nobis explicatum est, esse ens reale; quia, licet entia rationis, eo modo quo cognoscuntur, dici possint habere conformitatem cum intellectu, tamen, quia ex se non habent intelligibilitatem neque entitatem in qua fundetur illa conformitas, ideo neque veritatem habent quae est passio entis. Maxime cum ostensum sit hanc veritatem dicere entitatem ipsam ut conformem. Altera vero pars de distinctione satis etiam est ex dictis explicata. Neque contra illam procedunt quae circa tertiam opinionem Caietani obiiciebamus, quia non asserimus solam denominationem esse proprietatem, sed ipsam entitatem sub tali ratione conceptam. Quo fit ut per hoc veri attributum nulla nova perfectio aut realis ratio in ipso ente explicetur, sed solum declaretur amplius ipsamet ratio entis per habitudinem ad cognitionem, eo modo quo a nobis explicata est. Et, quia haec habitudo accidit quodammodo ipsi enti ut sic et est aliquo modo saltem secundum rationem posterior illo (quamvis semper sit cum illo coniuncta), ideo verum quod per hanc habitudinem declarat naturam entis, attributum seu proprietas eius dicitur.

37. *Aristotelis dictum explicatur.*—Tertio intelligitur ex dictis quo sensu dictum sit ab Aristotele, in fine lib. VI *Metaph.*, verum non esse in rebus sed in mente; loquitur enim de veritate complexa quae est in compositione mentis, et de alio esse vel non esse quod per huiusmodi complexionem significatur et ad eius veritatem requiritur. Nam quia veritas est speciali modo in compositione et divisione intellectus ut supra dixi, ideo veritas quasi per antonomasiam vel analogiam specialiter dici solet de illa veritate quae est in compositione et divisione, quae in negationibus et affirmationibus aequae reperitur et per se non requirit reale esse, sed quale per complexionem significatur.