

Francisco Suárez, S. J.

## DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICÆ VIII<sup>1</sup>

### SECT. 2

What truth of cognition is (Quid sit veritas cognitionis)

1. *The first opinion is recommended.*—It is left to declare what this conformity is which we say is the truth of cognition. Can it be, namely, that in the very act there is something absolute or respective, real or conceptual? For certain people suppose truth to be something real and absolute in the very act itself of cognizing or the judgement of the intellect. This opinion can be recommended, for that this truth is something real in the very act seems very probable. First, because a judgement on the part of the thing and without any fashioning (*fictione*) of the intellect is denominated true. Therefore, that denomination comes into being from some real form and not from an extrinsic form. Because, as we showed, truth is formally in the act itself and not extrinsically. Second, because truth is a perfection strictly speaking of the intellect. Therefore, it is something real in the intellect itself and it is not in it except by means of the act. For we are dealing with actual truth. Therefore, it is a real property of the act itself. Hence, it is confirmed, third, because in the habit of science there is a great perfection, which is true. Therefore, habitual truth (if I may speak thus) is a real property of it. Therefore, it will be likewise in actual cognition.

*Prima sententia suadetur.*—Declarandum superest quid sit haec conformitas quam dicimus esse veritatem cognitionis, an, scilicet, in ipso actu sit aliquid absolutum vel respectivum, reale vel rationis. Quidam enim existimant veritatem esse aliquid reale et absolutum in ipsomet actu cognoscendi seu iudicio intellectus. Quae opinio suaderi potest, nam quod haec veritas aliquid reale sit in ipso actu videtur valde probabile. Primo, quia iudicium a parte rei et sine ulla fictione intellectus denominatur verum; ergo illa denominatio provenit ab aliqua forma reali et non a forma extrinseca; quia, ut ostendimus, veritas formaliter est in ipso actu et non extrinsece. Secundo, quia veritas est perfectio simpliciter intellectus; ergo est aliquid reale in ipso intellectu et non est in ipso nisi mediante actu; agimus enim de veritate actuali; ergo est proprietas realis ipsius actus. Unde confirmatur tertio, quia in habitu scientiae est magna perfectio, quod verus sit; ergo veritas habitualis (ut sic dicam) est realis proprietas eius; ergo similiter erit in actuali cognitione.

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<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from: [http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Michael.Renemann/suarez/suarez\\_dm8.html](http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Michael.Renemann/suarez/suarez_dm8.html) .

2. That, however, this property is absolute and not respective can be shown, first, from what was said, because it is perfection strictly speaking.

Second, because it does not depend, essentially speaking, and by necessity from some real and existing *terminus* except when it is judged to be such, which is *per accidens*, for truth of the same reason must be in everything. Moreover, in this judgement: ‘a chimæra is a fictitious being’ is a real truth apart from a real relation. Therefore, likewise in everything, whatever is, or in some things a real relation follows according to truth; just as also in science a disposition to the knowable object is not a real relation, formally speaking, although sometimes it can follow to that.

Third, an argument from divine truth can be taken up, for in God there is truth of cognition which without doubt is a great perfection of him and nevertheless cannot be a real relation, because, if is compared to the very essence of God, it is not distinguished in reality from it. But if [it is compared] to creature, it cannot really be referred to those. Therefore, it will be a property and absolute perfection.

Finally, because truth or falsity necessarily accompany a judgement of the intellect and yet no real relation necessarily accompanies it. Therefore, it is not something relative, but an absolute thing. And Soncinas seems to hold this opinion, VI *Metaph.*, q. 17, where, although he says that truth expresses an absolute with respect, explaining nevertheless that this respect in the end expresses being according to being said (*esse secundum dici*), not according to being (*secundum esse*). And this example is used: In the same way, intellective can be said to include respect, because it cannot be conceived without a disposition to the intelligible. It is clear, moreover, that an intellective respect of this sort is such [i.e., a respect, as] a transcendental or according to being said. And Capreolus thinks likewise, in I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3.

Quod autem haec proprietas absoluta sit et non respectiva, probari potest primo ex dictis, quia est perfectio simpliciter. Secundo, quia non pendet, per se loquendo, et ex necessitate ab aliquo termino reali et existenti, nisi quando tale esse iudicatur; quod est per accidens, nam veritas eiusdem rationis debet esse in omnibus; in hoc autem iudicio: Chymera est ens fictum, est veritas realis absque relatione reali; ergo idem est in omnibus, quidquid sit,<sup>2</sup> an in aliquibus consequatur ad veritatem relatio realis; sicut etiam in scientia habitudo ad obiectum scibile non est relatio realis formaliter loquendo,<sup>3</sup> quamvis interdum possit ad illam consequi. Tertio, sumi potest argumentum ex veritate divina, nam in Deo est veritas cognitionis quae sine dubio est magna perfectio illius et tamen non potest esse relatio realis, quia, si comparatur ad ipsam essentiam Dei, non distinguitur in re ab illa; si vero ad creaturas, non potest ad illas realiter referri; erit ergo proprietas et perfectio absoluta. andem, quia veritas vel falsitas<sup>T</sup> necessario comitatur iudicium intellectus et tamen nulla relatio realis illud necessario comitatur; ergo non est aliquid relativum, sed absolutum quid. Et hanc opinionem videtur tenere Soncin., VI *Metaph.*, q. 17, ubi, licet dicat veritatem dicere absolutum cum re-

<sup>2</sup>Adding a comma according to the Vivés edition.

<sup>3</sup>Replacing a period with a comma according to the Vivés edition.

spectu, explicans tamen hunc respectum in summa dicit esse secundum dici, non secundum esse et utitur hoc exemplo: Sicut intellectivum potest dici includere respectum, quia non potest concipi sine habitudine ad intelligibile; constat autem huiusmodi respectum intellectivi esse tantum transcendentalem seu secundum dici; et idem sentit Capreolus, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3.

3. *The second opinion.*—Nevertheless, to others it seems that truth of this sort only consists in relation. Durandus holds this, and Hervæus, Javelli,<sup>4</sup> and Flandria<sup>5</sup> cited in the above section; Amon., I *Perih.*, c. 1; and there other expositors. The foundation in general is because to be truth entirely depends on the *terminus*, so as by that having been changed truth is changed and by that having been posited [truth] is set, [while] no fact has been changed on the part of cognizing. For, by the witness of Aristotle, the same proposition is changed from true to false and conversely by the object having been changed. Therefore, [this] is a sign that truth only consists in relation, for it is proper to a relation that it rise up with the positing of a *terminus* although the foundation stands firm and that it change when it [i.e., the *terminus*] is changed.

Hence, it is confirmed, first, because truth is not about the essence of an act, seeing that it is changed with that remaining. Therefore, is an accident of it. And yet it is not an absolute accident. For it is not a quality, because a second and ultimate act is not the subject of other qualities. Also, it is not in some other genus of absolute accidents, as seems self-evident. Therefore, it will be a relation. It is confirmed, second, because truth is nothing other than a certain conformity. A conformity, however, is not something other than agreeability or similitude or proportion. All these, however, indicate relation, just as the conformity of an image to its exemplar is a relation, and likewise for the others.

*Secunda sententia.*—Aliis tamen videtur huiusmodi veritatem solum in relatione consistere. Quod tenet Durandus, et Hervæus, Javell. et Flandria citati in superiori sectione; Amon., I *Perih.*, c. 1; et ibi alii expositores. Fundamentum in communi est quia esse veritatis omnino pendet ex termino, ita ut illo mutato mutetur veritas et illo posito ponatur, nulla facta mutatione ex parte cognoscentis; nam teste Aristotele, eadem propositio mutatur de vera in falsam et e converso, mutato obiecto; ergo signum est veritatem solum consistere in relatione, nam proprium est relationis ut, stante fundamento, consurgat posito termino, et mutetur illo mutato. Unde confirmatur primo, quia veritas non est de essentia actus, quandoquidem mutatur illo manente; ergo est accidens eius; et tamen non est accidens absolutum; non est enim qualitas, quia actus secundus et ultimus non est subiectum alterius qualitatis; neque etiam est in aliquo alio genere accidentis absoluti, ut videtur per se notum; ergo erit relatio. Confirmatur secundo, quia veritas nihil est aliud quam conformitas quaedam; conformitas autem non est aliud quam convenientia vel similitudo aut proportio; omnia autem haec relationem indicant; sicut conformitas imaginis ad suum exemplar relatio est, et sic de aliis.

<sup>4</sup>Chrysostomus Javelli O.P. (1470-1538)?

<sup>5</sup>Dominicus de Flandria?

4. But whether this is a real relation or a conceptual [relation] is controversial even among the mentioned authors. For the arguments by which the first opinion was shown that that truth is a real property seem consequently to show that this relation must be real. But the arguments by which the same first opinion was shown that truth is an absolute property seem to conclude that it is not a real relation but a conceptual one. But both arguments brought together between them seem to show that this relation is sometimes real, sometimes conceptual. For sometimes we seem to concur all things which are necessary to a real relation, but sometimes something seems to be lacking. Therefore, at some times there will actually be a real relation, but at some times there will not be enough.

The antecedent is shown, for to a real relation is first required a real *terminus* and next a foundation that is not only real but also is capable of a relation or can be ordered to a *terminus*. Moreover, these two often concur in this relation of truth. For it both often respects a real and really existing *terminus* and on the part of the judgement itself is often a sufficient foundation, because a judgement both is a created thing and from this part really referrible to an extrinsic *terminus*. And in addition it is such as is compared to its object as the measured to the measure, which is a real relation on the part of the measured, by which reason a relation of science to the known is thought to be real. Moreover, this relation of truth is of this sort.

An vero haec sit relatio realis vel rationis controversum est, etiam inter praedictos auctores; nam argumenta quibus prima sententia probabat veritatem esse proprietatem realem, videntur consequenter probare hanc relationem debere esse realem. Argumenta vero quibus eadem prima sententia probabat veritatem esse proprietatem absolutam, videntur concludere non esse relationem realem sed rationis. Utraque vero argumenta inter se collata videntur probare hanc relationem interdum esse realem, interdum rationis; nam interdum videmur omnia concurrere quae ad relationem realem necessaria sunt, interdum vero aliquid deesse potest; ergo aliquando etiam erit relatio realis, aliquando vero minime. Antecedens declaratur, nam ad relationem realem primum requiritur terminus realis et deinde fundamentum non solum reale, sed etiam capax relationis seu ordinabile ad terminum; saepe autem haec duo concurrunt in hac relatione veritatis. Nam et saepe respicit terminum realem et realiter existentem; et ex parte ipsius iudicii saepe est fundamentum sufficiens, quia et iudicium quid creatum est et ex hac parte referibile realiter ad extrinsecum terminum, et praeterea tale est ut comparetur ad suum obiectum tamquam mensuratum ad mensuram, quae relatio realis est ex parte mensurati, qua ratione relatio scientiae ad scibile realis esse censetur; huiusmodi autem est haec relatio veritatis. At vero aliquando deest in hac conformitate terminus realis, ut quando iudicium verum est de non entibus; aliquando vero deest fundamentum aptum ad fundandam relationem realem, vel quia non est ordinabile ad aliud extrinsecum, ut contingit in divina scientia respectu creaturarum existentium; vel quia non est distinctum a termino, ut in eadem scientia Dei respectu eiusdem Dei; vel quia non comparatur ut mensuratum ad mensuram, sed potius ut mensura ad mensuratum, ut eadem scientia Dei ad omnes creaturas; et idem censetur de arte humana respectu artificii; ergo in

his casibus erit haec relatio rationis, et non realis.

*Resolution of the question* (Quaestionis resolutio)

5. As we might explain this thing, it should be noted that something is to be sought which adds truth beyond an act which is denominated true, but another which includes all that is signified by the name ‘truth’. According to this way by which above concerning unity we were saying that another being which adds beyond being, but another that is signified by the name ‘unity’.

Ut rem hanc explicemus, advertendum est aliud esse inquirere quid addat veritas supra actum qui denominatur verus, aliud vero, quid includat totum id quod nomine veritatis significatur; ad eum modum quo supra de unitate dicebamus aliud esse quod addit supra ens, aliud vero quod nomine unitatis significatur.

6. *Truth adds nothing distinct in reality to cognition.*—First, therefore, I think certain that truth does not add to a true act another thing or absolute mode distinct *ex natura rei* from the thing or from its essence and entity. In this all the authors seem to agree. Nor do I find someone who clearly taught the opposite. And is shown by the adequate arguments made in the second opinion. Likewise, because it can neither be understood or explained what or what kind of thing this absolute is nor to what it applies.

With respect to which I thus declare, because either it is something separable from the true act or it is entirely inseparable. If the second is said, without cause is placed a distinction from the act *ex natura rei*. But if the first is said, that will not be an absolute but a respect, as the argument made shows. Because it is separated through changes alone from the object, without other absolute changes on the part of the act. For the act in itself represents the same [thing] and in the same way, and only the truth of it is changed, because the thing does not hold itself in the same manner. You may say that truth adds what [is] absolute inseparable from the act, yet not really but conceptually distinct from it. But on the contrary, because either this absolute completes the act as an ultimate specific difference or individual of it or it does not complete but supposes it perfectly completed. If the first is said, therefore such an absolute is not added to the act having been constituted but constitutes it. Therefore, it is not rightly said that truth adds this absolute beyond the act. Moreover, the second cannot be said, because to add some real absolute only conceptually distinct to a completely constituted act is impossible to understand. And, then, against this proceeds the argument concerning the change of the same act from true to false.

Veritas nihil in re distinctum addit cognitioni. Primo ergo certum existimo veritatem non addere actui vero aliquam rem, vel modum absolutum ex natura rei distinctum ab ipso seu ab essentia et entitate eius. In hoc videntur omnes auctores convenire; neque aliquem invenio qui oppositum expresse docuerit. Et probatur satis argumentis factis in secunda sententia. Item, quia neque intelligi, neque explicari potest quid aut quale sit hoc absolutum, neque ad quid ponatur. Quod ita declaro, quia vel illud est aliquid separabile ab actu vero, vel est omnino

inseparabile; si dicatur hoc secundum, sine causa ponitur distinctum ab actu ex natura rei; si vero dicatur primum, illud non erit absolutum sed respectivum, ut argumentum factum probat; quia separatur per mutationem solam obiecti, sine alia absoluta mutatione ex parte actus; nam actus ex se idem et eodem modo repraesentat, solumque mutatur eius veritas, quia res non eodem modo se habet. Dices veritatem addere quid absolutum inseparabile ab actu, non tamen re sed ratione distinctum ab illo. Sed contra, quia vel hoc absolutum complet actum tamquam ultima differentia specifica vel individualis eius, vel non complet sed supponit perfecte completum. Si primum dicatur, ergo tale absolutum non additur actui constituto sed constituit illum; ergo non recte dicitur veritatem addere hoc absolutum supra actum; secundum autem dici non potest, quia impossibile est intelligere actui plene constituto addi aliquid reale absolutum sola ratione distinctum. Ac deinde contra hoc procedit argumentum de mutatione eiusdem actus de vero in falsum.

7. *Truth does not add a categorical relation.*—Second, it should be said that truth does not beyond the act a proper and categorical real relation of the act to the object. This also is sufficiently shown by the arguments that have been made, for in many impossibilities is such a relation and from these is taken up an argument that such a relation is never necessary to the nature of truth as such. Then because the concept and mode of truth is of the same nature or proportion in all things. Then also because, although we freely concede that sometimes all necessary things concur as would sometimes give rise to a real relation between an act and object, nevertheless by nature a true act is understood earlier than it is understood to give rise to a real relation. For this is said to give rise when a foundation and a *terminus* have been posited. An act, however, most formally true is this itself that such a foundation and *terminus* is posited. Thus if *per impossibile* the resulting relation were impeded, the act as yet would be true from the indispensable act and of the object in the nature of the posited things. Therefore, in the formal concept of truth no relation enters, whatever may be or may thereupon sometimes follow.

*Non addit veritas relationem praedicamentalem.*—Secundo dicendum est veritatem non addere supra actum relationem realem propriam et praedicamentalem actus ad obiectum. Hoc etiam sufficienter probatur argumentis factis, nam in multis impossibilis est talis relatio et ab eis sumitur argumentum nunquam esse necessariam talem relationem ad rationem veritatis ut sic. Tum quia conceptus et modus veritatis eiusdem rationis seu proportionis est in omnibus. Tum etiam quia, licet gratis concedamus interdum concurrere omnia necessaria ut inter actum et obiectum consurgat relatio realis, tamen prius natura intelligitur actus verus, quam intelligatur consurgere relatio realis. Nam haec dicitur consurgere posito fundamento et termino; actus autem formalissime verus est hoc ipso quod ponitur tale fundamentum et terminus; ita ut si per impossibile impediretur resultantia relationis, adhuc actus esset verus ex vi talis actus et obiecti in rerum natura positorum; ergo in formali conceptu veritatis non intrat relatio, quidquid sit an inde interdum consequatur.

8. *Nor is a conceptual relation taken strictly.*—Third, it should be said that truth as such does not add to a true act an actual conceptual relation, taken properly and rigourously. This also to me is sufficiently persuaded [by] that argument that the denomination of truth does not depend on relations of this kind. For this, in that way by which it can be, is not by an act except by an intellectual act cognizing or comparing one to another. But an act is true strictly speaking apart from a comparison of this sort. Therefore. In addition, the argument made concerning real relations *a fortiori* shows concerning conceptual relations. For, just as the former arises when the foundation and *terminus* have been posited, so the latter is fashioned through the intellect having supposed that which can occur in the manner of foundation and *terminus*. But from the strength of that which is supposed to such a relation or fiction, an act is true. Therefore, such a relation does not enter formally into the concept of truth. Therefore, truth does not have such a relation beyond the act itself.

*Neque relationem rationis stricte sumptam.*—Tertio dicendum est veritatem ut sic non addere actui vero relationem rationis actualem proprie et in rigore sumptam. Hoc etiam mihi sufficienter persuadet argumentum illud quod denominatio veritatis non pendet ex huiusmodi relatione; nam haec, eo modo quo esse potest, non est actu nisi intellectu actu cogitante vel comparante unum ad aliud; sed absque huiusmodi comparatione actus est simpliciter verus; ergo. Praeterea argumentum factum de relatione reali a fortiori probat de relatione rationis; nam, sicut illa consurgit posito fundamento et termino, ita haec fingitur per intellectum supposito eo quod per modum fundamenti et termini intervenire potest; sed ex vi eius quod supponitur ad talem relationem vel fictionem, actus est verus; ergo talis relatio non intrat formaliter conceptum veritatis; ergo nec veritas habet talem relationem supra ipsum actum.

9. *Truth adds to cognition a connotation of the object, just as it is judged that it has.*—Fourth it should be said that the truth of a cognition beyond the act itself adds nothing real or intrinsic to the very act, but connotes only an object having itself such as it is represented through the act. This assertion follows from the preceding [assertions]. For that an act is true expresses something more than that an act is. And it does not express some real absolute or relative beyond the act itself, nor does it even express a proper and rigourous conceptual relation. Therefore, it can add nothing other except the stated connotation or denomination arising from the connection or conjunction of such an act and object. In addition, this confirms the argument by which the latter opinion showed that truth is not something entirely absolute, namely, because by a changed object is changed the truth of a cognition, and yet there is not changed something intrinsic to the act but some association of an object is removed. Therefore, it is a sign that truth includes or at least connotes the just-mentioned association of an object.

*Veritas addit cognitioni connotationem obiecti, sicut iudicatur se habere.*—Quarto dicendum est veritatem cognitionis ultra ipsum actum nihil addere reale et intrinsecum ipsi actui, sed connotare solum obiectum ita se habens sicut per actum repraesentatur. Haec assertio sequitur ex praecedentibus; nam actum esse

verum plus aliquid dicit quam actum esse; et non dicit aliquid reale absolutum vel relativum ultra ipsum actum, nec etiam dicit propriam et rigorosam relationem rationis; ergo nihil aliud addere potest praeter dictam connotationem seu denominationem consurgentem ex connexionem seu coniunctionem talis actus et obiecti. Praeterea hoc confirmat argumentum quo posterior opinio probat veritatem non esse aliquid omnino absolutum, scilicet, quia mutato obiecto, mutatur veritas cognitionis, et tamen non mutatur ibi aliquid intrinsecum actui sed tollitur concomitantia obiecti; ergo signum est veritatem includere vel saltem connotare praedictam concomitantiam obiecti.

10. *The same assertion goes from false to true through an extrinsic change.*—Some respond by denying that the same mental proposition can be shifted from true to false without it intrinsically changing, by speaking of the proper cognition or judgement of the thing itself. Because a proposition which through according to some time becomes true cannot be false according to the same time. And in order to be made false it is necessary that the mind conjoins the extremes according to another time, which cannot be done except there is some change in it. But this simply opposes Aristotle, in the chapter on substance in *Cat.*, and St. Thomas, [*ST*] Ia.14.15 ad 3.

And first can be taken up an argument from verbal and mental propositions, which are said to be in the mind non-ultimately. For with regard to these it cannot be doubted but that it is entirely the same proposition which before was true and now is false through a change in the signified thing apart from any change in the sign or its signification. Therefore, that truth in signifying which agrees with these propositions, before the entire thing that holds itself on the part of the signifying proposition, connotes such an association of the object. Therefore, in this way can be understood in truth of the judgment itself or of truth existing ultimately (at least imperfectly and abstractively) in the mind. What on that account I add, because in perfect intuitive cognition, in exactly which case the thing in particular seems wholly determined in accordance with every existing condition, there cannot be a change in conformity between the cognition and the object remaining unchanged by the cognition. For then the argument that was made proceeds rightly, that an act is always terminated to a thing as in such a time and moment exists. Through which time and moment truth cannot be changed, although through other times it might be changed. On account of which reason divine science is always conformed to the cognized object, even though these are changing through their diverse times. And perhaps the same is true in the case of the cognition of angels, insofar as it is perfect intuitive [cognition], although it differs from divine [cognition], in that the latter are simply immutable, but the former can be changed.

Yet nonetheless in imperfect and abstractive cognition, such as our cognition is, it is not repugnant that entirely the same judgement be changed from true to false apart from intrinsic change, because that duration which we conceive and through the copulation which we signify is not indivisible nor entirely determinate, but [is] in some way indifferent and confused and consequently having latitude, by reason of which it can in one part of its succession hold itself to an object in one way and in a different way in another [part]. And by this reason it can happen that the same cognition is changed from true to false from a change in the object, while the cognition itself remains unchanged in itself. Just as a cognition

or indefinite proposition remaining the same on the part of the object can now be true by reason of one singular, afterwards by reason of another, although itself not changed in itself, because in that confused concept of the general and indefinite thing the concept includes in some way multiple singulars of which a single ones suffice for its truth. And therefore, although themselves changed, truth can remain in the same confused concept. If, however, every singular were missing, truth would entirely die away. Therefore, the same is true with respect to time or duration for a confused concept. For also in respect of that the proposition or cognition is as it were indefinite and therefore remaining the same, and to diverse instances or times can be compared. And in these it is now found true, now, however, false, without change in it [but] through change in the object alone. Therefore, this is a sign that this truth of cognition connotes at least the association of an object in such a state as it is represented in the cognition.

*Eadem enuntiatio per extrinsecam mutationem ex falsa vera fit.*—Respondent aliqui negando posse eandem mentalem propositionem transferri de vera in falsam sine intrinseca mutatione eius, loquendo de propria cognitione seu iudicio ipsius rei; quia propositio quae pro aliquo tempore vera fuit, non potest esse falsa pro eodem tempore, et ut fiat falsa necesse est ut mens coniungat extrema pro alio tempore, quod facere non potest nisi in ipsa sit aliqua mutatio. Sed hoc simpliciter repugnat Aristoteli, in Praedicam., c. de Substantia, et D. Thom., I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3. Et primo sumi potest argumentum a propositionibus vocalibus seu mentalibus, quae dicuntur esse in mente non ultimata; nam in eis dubitari non potest quin sit eadem omnino propositio quae antea erat vera et nunc est falsa per mutationem rei significatae absque ulla mutatione signi vel significationis eius; ergo veritas illa in significando quae convenit his propositionibus, praeter totum id quod se tenet ex parte propositionis significantis, connotat talem concomitantiam obiecti. Sic ergo intelligi potest in veritate ipsius iudicii seu veritatis existentis in mente ultimata saltem imperfecta et abstractiva. Quod idcirco addo, quia in cognitione intuitiva perfecta, qua exacte videtur res in particulari secundum omnes conditiones existentiae omnino determinatas, non potest esse mutatio conformitatis inter cognitionem et obiectum manente immutata cognitione; tunc enim recte procedit argumentum factum, quod semper terminatur actus ad rem prout in tali tempore et momento existentem; pro quo tempore et momento mutari non potest veritas, quamvis pro aliis temporibus mutetur. Propter quam rationem divina scientia semper est conformis obiectis cognitis, quantumvis haec pro suis diversis temporibus mutantur. Et idem fortasse est in cognitione angelica, quando est perfecte intuitiva, quamvis differat a divina, quod haec simpliciter immutabilis est, illa vero mutari potest. Nihilominus tamen in cognitione imperfecta et abstractiva, qualis est nostra cognitio, non repugnat idem omnino iudicium mutari de vero in falsum absque intrinseca mutatione, quia illa duratio quam concipimus et per copulam significamus, non est indivisibilis nec omnino determinata, sed aliquo modo indifferens et confusa et consequenter latitudinem habens, ratione cuius potest in una parte illius successionis obiectum se habere uno modo et diverso modo in alia. Et hac ratione fieri potest ut eadem cognitio mutetur de vera in falsam ex mutatione obiecti, ipsa cognitione in se

manente invariata; sicut cognitio seu propositio indefinita ex parte obiecti eadem manens potest nunc esse vera ratione unius singularis, postea ratione alterius, quamvis ipsa in se non mutetur, quia in conceptu illo confuso rei communis et indefinite conceptae includit aliquo modo plura singularia quorum singula sufficiunt ad eius veritatem; et ideo, licet ipsa mutantur, veritas manere potest in eodem conceptu confuso; si autem omnia singularia deessent, omnino periret veritas. Idem ergo est respectu temporis seu durationis confuse conceptae; nam etiam respectu illius propositio seu cognitio est quasi indefinita et ideo eadem manens, et ad diversa instantia seu tempora comparari potest, et in eis nunc vera, nunc autem falsa reperiri, sine mutatione sui per solam obiecti mutationem. Ergo signum est, hanc veritatem cognitionis connotare saltem concomitantiam obiecti in tali statu, qualis per cognitionem repraesentatur.

11. Last, it is confirmed from similarity with goodness. For, just as true express conformity, so good [expresses] agreeability. But good as agreeable only adds a denomination or association to another extreme having such a nature or aptitude to such perfection, as we will show below. Therefore, in the same way should be philosophized about truth.

Ultimo confirmatur a simili de bonitate; nam, sicut verum dicit conformitatem, ita bonum convenientiam; sed bonum ut conveniens solum addit denominationem seu concomitantiam alterius extremi habentis talem naturam, vel aptitudinem ad talem perfectionem, ut infra ostendemus; ergo eodem modo de veritate philosophandum est.

12. *Truth requires an intentional representation of the object as it is.*—Fifth, from what has been said I conclude that the truth of cognition includes the kind of representation of cognition which has a conjoined association of the object as holding itself just as it is represented by the cognition. It is shown from what has been said, because for truth a representation only does not suffice, if the object does not hold itself in the way it is represented. Nor can the association of the object suffice for the denomination of truth, except by the presupposed just-mentioned representation or, rather, by including that. Because truth is not only that extrinsic denomination, but includes an intrinsic disposition of the act terminating in the object holding itself in that way.

*Veritas requirit intentionalem repraesentationem obiecti sicut est.*—Quinto, ex dictis concludo veritatem cognitionis includere talem repraesentationem cognitionis quae habeat coniunctam concomitantiam obiecti ita se habentis, sicut per cognitionem repraesentatur. Probatur ex dictis, quia ad veritatem nec sola repraesentatio sufficit, si obiectum non ita se habeat sicut repraesentatur: neque concomitantia obiecti potest sufficere ad denominationem veritatis, nisi praesupposita praedicta repraesentatione vel potius includendo illam; quia veritas non est sola illa denominatio extrinseca, sed includit intrinsecam habitudinem actus terminatam ad obiectum taliter se habens.

Censure of the first opinion and solutions to its arguments (*Censura primae opinionis et solutiones argumentorum eius*)

13. And hence it is understood, first, what of truth the first opinion has and what is to be said about its arguments. For, if through an absolute it understands only an entity of the act with a real or transcendental disposition to an object, which it has entirely inseparably and immutably, thus it is false that truth consists in this absolute alone, because it would be other wholly immutable [thing] by remaining the same act. If, however, it says [that truth] consists in an absolute, because it is not necessary to add any intrinsic relation but only an association of an object, thus we admit that truth is something absolute or, rather, that it consists in an absolute with respect according to being said. For that denomination having been taken up from an association of an object can not unsuitably be named a respect according to being said. Nevertheless, because the arguments of this opinion seem to proceed in the first sense and can by these which we said to oppose, by these must be given satisfaction.

Atque hinc intelligitur primo quid veritatis habeat prima opinio et quid dicendum sit ad rationes eius. Nam, si per absolutum intelligat solam entitatem actus cum reali et transcendentali habitudine ad obiectum, quam habet omnino inseparabiliter et immutabiliter, sic falsum est veritatem consistere in hoc solo absoluto, quia alias esset omnino immutabilis manente eodem actu. Si autem dicat consistere in absoluto, quia nullam intrinsecam relationem addi necesse est sed solam concomitantiam obiecti, sic fatemur veritatem esse aliquid absolutum vel potius consistere in absoluto cum respectu secundum dici; nam illa denominatio sumpta ex concomitantia obiecti non incongrue potest respectus secundum dici appellari. Tamen, quia rationes illius opinionis videntur in priori sensu procedere et possunt his quae diximus obstare, eis satisfaciendum est.

14. *What formal truth is, what radical truth is.*—Therefore to the first argument, but which is shown that truth of cognition is a real and intrinsic property of an act, it is responded by drawing attention [to the fact] that denomination of true can be divided in two ways to an act of cognition. In one way formally, in the other radically. The formal denomination of true I call that which hitherto I have explained, which consists in actual conformity to an object; the radical, however, I call that perfection of the act by which it has conformity of that sort with the object, as is the case in evident science or in certain faith, by reason of which it holds so that it is infallible and consequently it cannot exist without having conformity with its material object.

Therefore with this having been supposed, to the first I respond that the denomination of true radically taken from the intrinsic perfection of the act or habit is real and absolute. We, however, are not now speaking concerning that, because that is not the denomination of true which certainly and evidently has been agreed with. Hence, that perfection by which this denomination is taken up is not something distinct *ex natura rei* from the judgement itself, but is the very specific difference which is taken up from such a formal object or by reason of assenting.

But the formal and actual denomination of true is indeed in the thing itself apart from a fiction of the intellect, as the argument rightly shows. Nevertheless it is not wholly an intrinsic denomination but partly is from an intrinsic form, partly connotes objective co-existence or an association of the object holding itself such as it is judged through the cognition. Hence, we said that truth of this sort concerning which we discuss agrees with the formal judgement or cognition itself and not with such an object of it. It should be understood that by this conformity the judgement itself principally and essentially is denominated true, although the form by which it is denominated is not entirely intrinsic but includes an association of something extrinsic.

*Verum formale quid, quid verum radicale.*—Ad priora ergo argumenta, quibus probatur veritatem cognitionis esse realem et intrinsecam proprietatem actus, respondetur advertendo denominationem veri dupliciter posse tribui actui cognitionis. Uno modo formaliter, alio modo radicaliter; formalem veri denominationem appello eam quam hactenus explicui, quae consistit in actuali conformitate ad obiectum; radicalem autem voco illam perfectionem actus a qua habet huiusmodi conformitatem cum obiecto, ut est in scientia evidentiali, vel in fide certitudo, ratione cuius habet ut infallibilis sit et consequenter ut existere non possit quin conformitatem habeat cum materiali obiecto suo. Hoc ergo supposito, ad primum respondeo denominationem veri radicaliter sumptam ex intrinseca perfectione actus vel habitus esse realem et absolutam; nos tamen nunc non loquimur de illa, quia illa non tam est denominatio veri quam certi vel evidentialis assensus. Unde perfectio illa a qua sumitur haec denominatio non est aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ab ipso iudicio, sed est ipsamet specifica differentia quae sumitur ex tali obiecto formali seu ratione assentiendi. Denominatio autem veri formalis et actualis est quidem in re ipsa absque fictione<sup>6</sup> intellectus, ut recte probat argumentum, non tamen est omnino intrinseca denominatio sed partim est a forma intrinseca, partim connotat coexistentiam obiectivam seu concomitantiam obiecti ita se habentis, sicut per cognitionem iudicatur. Unde, quod diximus, huiusmodi veritatem de qua agimus convenire ipsi formali iudicio seu cognitioni et non tantum obiecto eius, intelligendum est ab hac conformitate ipsum iudicium primo ac per se denominari verum, quamvis forma a qua denominatur, non sit omnino intrinseca, sed concomitantiam alicuius extrinseci includat.

15. To the second [argument] the same distinction should suffice. For radical truth which is taken from the formal nature of such a cognition is a perfection strictly speaking of the intellect, because it pertains to the nature of intellectual virtue strictly speaking. However, the actual truth concerning which we speak through itself is not a perfection strictly speaking. On the contrary, it does not add perfection beyond the nature or species of the act of cognizing itself. For this actual truth by which according to a part connotes or includes an association or agreeability with an extrinsic object adds nothing real to an act and consequently no perfection can be brought to it; but by which according to a part supposes

<sup>6</sup>Cf. editionem Bibliotheca Hispanica de Filosofía, Madrid 1960, Bd. II, S. 90, Fussnote: “En vez de ‘fictione’ en otras ediciones se lee ‘actione’, con lo que el sentido vara ligeramente (N. de los EE.)”

or requires in the act itself a representation or real disposition to the object, expresses some real perfection of it. That perfection, however, at some time can be a perfection strictly speaking, but sometimes is such loosely speaking. For sometimes this actual truth is infallibly and necessarily conjoined with essential and real perfection of such an act and by its strength. And then the perfection which it essentially supposes in the act is perfection strictly speaking. Indeed, it pertains to the nature of intellectual virtue strictly speaking.

But sometimes this actual truth is not necessarily conjoined with the act or not by its formal and essential nature. And then the perfection which is supposed in the act is not [perfection] strictly speaking but loosely speaking, because it does not pertain to the nature of intellectual virtue strictly speaking. And it always and intrinsically has mixed in the imperfection of an obscure or confused cognition, as is the case in human faith and opinion, etc.

To the third is the same response, for in the habit of science what true is radically is its perfection beyond which actual truth adds no perfection to it.

Ad secundum eadem distinctione satisfaciendum est; nam veritas radicalis quae sumitur ex formali ratione talis cognitionis, est perfectio simpliciter intellectus, quia pertinet ad rationem virtutis intellectualis simpliciter; veritas autem actualis de qua loquimur, per se non est perfectio simpliciter; immo neque addit perfectionem supra naturam vel speciem ipsius actus cognoscendi. Nam haec veritas actualis qua ex parte connotat vel includit concomitantiam seu convenientiam extrinseci obiecti, nihil reale addit actui et consequenter nec perfectionem ullam ei afferre potest; qua vero ex parte supponit vel requirit in ipso actu repraesentationem seu habitudinem realem ad obiectum, dicit realem aliquam perfectionem eius; illa autem perfectio aliquando esse potest perfectio simpliciter, interdum vero est tantum secundum quid. Nam interdum haec veritas actualis est infallibiliter ac necessario coniuncta cum essentiali ac reali perfectione talis actus et ex vi illius; et tunc perfectio quam per se supponit in actu, est perfectio simpliciter; pertinet enim ad rationem intellectualis virtutis simpliciter. Interdum vero non est haec veritas actualis necessario coniuncta cum actu, aut non ex vi rationis formalis et essentialis eius; et tunc perfectio quae supponitur in actu, non est simpliciter sed secundum quid, quia non pertinet ad rationem virtutis intellectualis simpliciter, et semper ac intrinsece habet admixtam imperfectionem obscurae vel confusae cognitionis, ut est in humana fide et opinione, etc. Ad tertium eadem est responsio, nam in habitu scientiae quod verus sit radicaliter est perfectio eius, ultra quam actualis veritas nihil perfectionis ei addit.

16. But the other arguments by which it is shown that truth is a wholly absolute property can indeed be admitted, so far as they show that a real relation is not necessary for truth of this sort. But so far as they can exclude every extrinsic connotation they do not conclude rightly. Hence, to the first is now declared when and in what way truth is perfection strictly speaking, not indeed formally and in itself but in its root (*radice*), when that is such as is necessary to have truth conjoined with itself.

To the second, I concede that truth as such never formally consists in a real relation. However,

I deny that it thereby follows that it does not include an association of an object to which the cognition is conformed. Nor does it mean that truth of cognition of this sort does not always require an existing object with the act, because we do not say that the real existence of an object is included in the concept of truth, but only that it hold itself such as it is represented or judged through the cognition, or that it has such being as is cognized. Which being is not always in existence, but such suffices for the truth of an assertion, as Aristotle mentioned in *Metaph.* V, c. 7 and in the last chapter of book VI and the last chapter of book IX.

Alia vero argumenta quibus probatur veritatem esse proprietatem omnino absolutam admitti quidem possunt, quatenus probant non esse necessariam relationem realem ad huiusmodi veritatem; quatenus vero excludere possunt omnem extrinsecam connotationem non recte concludunt; unde ad primum iam declaratum est quando et quomodo veritas sit perfectio simpliciter, non quidem formaliter et in se sed in radice, quando illa talis est ut necessario secum habeat veritatem coniunctam. Ad secundum, concedo veritatem ut sic nunquam consistere formaliter in relatione reali, nego tamen inde sequi non includere concomitantiam obiecti cui cognitio conformetur. Nec refert quod huiusmodi veritas cognitionis non semper requirat obiectum actu existens, quia non dicimus realem existentiam obiecti includi in conceptu veritatis, sed solum quod ita se habeat sicut per cognitionem repraesentatur seu iudicatur; seu quod habeat tale esse quale cognoscitur. Quod esse non semper est existentiae, sed quale sufficit ad veritatem enuntiationis, ut tetigit Aristotel., V *Metaph.*, c. 7, et lib. VI, c. ult., et lib. IX, c. ultimo.

17. *In what ways truth is in God and whether it is a perfection strictly speaking.*—To the third, the same should be said about divine truth that was said about the truth of science and of whatever intellectual virtue, [namely,] that it expresses perfection in God insofar as radical truth is concerned for as long as actual conformity with an object adds no new perfection nor even a real relation, as the argument rightly shows. In order that this is better understood and every equivocation is destroyed, it should be observed that the highest perfection of truth is divided in three ways in God, namely, by reason of essence or being, by reason of intellect, and by reason of will, by which ways God is called the first truth in being, in understanding, and in speaking. Concerning the first reason of truth in being we will speak below, because that is nothing other than transcendental truth, which is in God in the highest and first degree of perfection.

Next, the nature of truth indeed brings nothing to the present, because the name of truth under that signification is very equivocal and signifies a certain moral virtue existing in the will which inclines to the true always speaking and talking according to the mind, which virtue is in God in the most lofty degree and it is so natural to him that he can in no way anything but the true and in this way truth is perfection, strictly speaking, but moral [perfection].

Therefore, second truth, namely, intellectual, can be signified in two ways in God. First, such a perfect strength of understanding as never to stray from observing nor able to stray. And this is a great perfection, strictly speaking, which God has from himself in the loftiest

degree. And for this reason he is called the first truth in cognizing. Finally, it can express an actual conformity between the cognition of God and the thing cognized. And this supposes indeed the stated perfection, but does not add [something] new but connotes such an object as it holds itself just as it is cognized.

*Veritas in Deo quot modis, et an sit perfectio simpliciter.*—Ad tertium idem dicendum est de veritate divina quod dictum est de veritate scientiae et cuiuscumque virtutis intellectualis, quod in Deo dicit perfectionem quantum ad radicalem veritatem; quoad actualem vero conformitatem cum obiecto nullam novam perfectionem addit neque etiam realem relationem, ut recte argumentum probat. Quod ut magis intelligatur omnisque aequivocatio tollatur advertendum est perfectionem summam veritatis triplici modo tribui Deo, scilicet ratione essentiae seu esse, ratione intellectus, et ratione voluntatis; quibus modis dicitur Deus prima veritas in essendo, in intelligendo et in dicendo. De prima ratione veritatis in essendo dicemus inferius quia illa nihil aliud est quam veritas transcendentalis, quae in Deo est in summo ac primo perfectionis gradu. Postrema veritatis ratio nihil etiam ad praesens refert, quia nomen veritatis sub illa significatione valde aequivocum est significatque virtutem quamdam moralem in voluntate existentem quae inclinatur ad verum semper loquendum et dicendum iuxta mentem; quae virtus est in Deo in gradu eminentissimo, tamque naturalis est illi ut nullo modo possit aliud quam verum loqui et hoc modo veritas est perfectio simpliciter, sed moralis. Secunda ergo veritas, scilicet, intellectualis duo significare potest in Deo: primum, vim intelligendi adeo perfectam ut nunquam ab scopo aberret neque aberrare possit, et hoc est magna perfectio simpliciter quam ex se habet Deus in eminentissimo gradu; et hac ratione dicitur prima veritas in cognoscendo. Deinde dicere potest actualem conformitatem inter cognitionem Dei et rem cognitam; et hoc supponit quidem praedictam perfectionem, non vero addit novam sed connotat tantum obiectum ita se habere in se sicut cognoscitur.

Responses to the argument of the latter opinion (*Responsiones ad argumenta posterioris opinionis*)

18. To the foundation of the contrary opinion is responded with that argument that rightly shows that truth in addition to the complete real and intrinsic perfection of a cognition connotes and co-signifies an association of an object, yet not a proper relation arising from the co-existence of the cognition and object, as was declared sufficiently.

You may say: if this argument in the present case is not effective for inferring a relation, nothing sufficient remains for showing real relations, especially those which are said to be founded in unity like relations of similitude, equality, and others like that. For, although similitude is said to be changed by a change in the other extreme, it cannot be said for that reason to vary some relation, but only the denomination arisen from the co-existence of both extremes.

It is responded that this argument pertains to the categorical ‘towards something’, concerning which we will speak later. Now two things seem to need to be said. One is that such a manner

of arguing is not sufficient for inferring a real relation which is a mode distinct *ex natura rei* from its foundation and *terminus* and, as it were, some medium between them, as the argument (in my opinion) demonstrates. Hence, whatever is the case with such relations, it cannot be denied that the natures rise up before those. There is understood at the same time the existing foundation and *terminus*, in which is the foundational unity or agreeability.

Hence, to the second is said, it will be finally that some relation rises up between the cognition and the object, when in the one there is a sufficient foundation and in the other a sufficient reason for terminating. Nevertheless, it is not formally necessary for the nature of truth, but that which in either extreme is understood to precede such a relation suffices. Just as it also suffices whenever such extremes are such that they cannot found or terminate real relations. And it is reasonably most probable that this relation is never real, as I will now say.

Ad fundamentum contrariae sententiae respondetur illo argumento recte probari veritatem praeter totam perfectionem realem et intrinsecam cognitionis connotare et consignificare concomitantiam obiecti, non tamen propriam relationem consurgentem ex coexistentia cognitionis et obiecti, ut satis declaratum est. Dices, si hoc argumentum in praesenti non est efficax ad inferendam relationem, nullum relinqui sufficiens ad probandas relationes reales, praesertim quae in unitate fundari dicuntur ut relationes similitudinis, aequalitatis, et similes; nam, licet mutato alio extremo, dicatur mutari similitudo, dici potest non inde variari relationem aliquam, sed solam denominationem ortam ex coexistentia utriusque extremi. Respondetur argumentum hoc pertinere ad praedicamentum ad aliquid, de quo postea dicturi sumus; nunc duo dicenda videntur: unum est talem argumentandi modum non esse sufficientem ad inferendam relationem realem quae sit modus ex natura rei distinctus a fundamento et termino eius et quasi medium quid inter illa, ut argumentum (sententia mea) convincit; unde, quidquid sit de talibus relationibus, negari non potest quin prius natura quam illae insurgant, intelligantur simul existentia fundamentum et terminus, in quibus est fundamentalis unitas seu convenientia. Unde secundo dicitur, esto demus insurgere relationem aliquam inter cognitionem et obiectum, quando in altero est sufficiens fundamentum et in altero sufficiens ratio terminandi, tamen ad rationem veritatis formaliter non esse necessariam, sed sufficere id quod in utroque extremo antecedere intelligitur ad talem relationem; sicut etiam sufficit, quandocumque extrema talia sunt ut non possint fundare nec terminare relationem realem; et sane probabilissimum est hanc relationem nunquam esse realem, ut iam dicam.

19. Hence, to the first confirmation I concede, generally said, that truth, concerning which we deal, according to that whole which does not include the being of the essence of the cognitive act. Yet from that it does not result that it is some accident that is intrinsic and inhering in the act itself, but only that beyond the entity and intrinsic perfection of the act it connotes some other extrinsic thing without which the nature of truth does not stand. For this reason the truth of the act can sometimes vary, although the act itself in itself does not intrinsically change. And then truth holds itself in the manner of a separable accident or fifth predicable by reason of the connoted extrinsic variable. But in these acts which have

inseparable and infallible truth, that perfection whence is arisen a necessary conjunction of this sort with truth (which by us is called a radical truth), in no way is an accident or essential property of such an act. Formal truth, however, holds itself in these in the manner of an inseparable property.

Unde ad primam confirmationem concedo, generatim loquendo, veritatem de qua agimus, secundum id totum quod includit non esse de essentia actus cognitionis; non tamen inde fit esse aliquod accidens intrinsecum et inhaerens ipsi actui, sed solum praeter entitatem et intrinsecam perfectionem actus connotare aliquid aliud extrinsecum sine quo veritatis ratio non subsistit, ratione cuius potest interdum veritas actus variari, quamvis actus ipse in se intrinsece non mutetur; et tunc se habet veritas ad modum accidentis separabilis seu quinti praedicabilis ratione extrinseci connotati variabilis. In his vero actibus qui habent inseparabilem et indefectibilem veritatem, perfectio illa unde oritur huiusmodi necessaria coniunctio cum veritate quae a nobis radicalis veritas dicta est, nullo modo est accidens sed essentialis proprietas talis actus; veritas autem formalis se habet in his ad modum proprietatis inseparabilis.

20. To the second confirmation, first now is responded that, although conformity can be most formally taken up through a relation, nevertheless it can also be received through an association of those extremes between which that relation is fashioned, just as by the order of nature it precedes such a relation and we show that a conformity of this sort suffices for the nature of truth. On account of this nothing essential for explaining truth refers to the controversy concerning that relation, whether it is always real or always conceptual, or sometimes real, but sometimes conceptual. For, whatever the case may be, truth itself precedes such a relation. And without doubt it is true that such a relation is not always real as the argument concerning the truth of divine science and concerning the truth of cognition about non-existing objects rightly showed. And this is enough so that we may understand that a proper relation is not necessary for the nature of truth, because neither a real [relation] is necessary, as is clear from what was said, nor a conceptual [relation], because this does not exist properly speaking except when it is cognized or fashioned.

I add further, moreover, that no real relation follows in the act of cognition apart from that conformity which is necessary for truth, because that conformity does not consist in true and proper formal similitude, but only in a certain proportion and intentional representation, by which reason the thing is perceived such as it is, which will be made more manifest in the following [sections].

Ad secundam confirmationem primo iam responsum est quod, licet conformitas possit formalissime pro relatione sumi, tamen etiam potest accipi pro concomitantia illorum extremorum inter quae fingitur illa relatio, prout ordine naturae antecedit talem relationem et huiusmodi conformitatem ostendimus sufficere ad rationem veritatis. Quocirca nihil ad explicandam veritatis essentiam refert controversia de illa relatione, an sit semper realis vel semper rationis, vel interdum realis, interdum autem rationis; nam, quidquid de hoc sit, veritas ipsa antecedit

talem relationem. Et sine dubio verum est talem relationem non semper esse realem ut recte probat argumentum de veritate scientiae divinae et de veritate cognitionis circa obiecta non existentia; et hoc satis est ut intelligamus propriam relationem non esse necessariam ad rationem veritatis; quia nec realis necessaria est, ut patet ex dictis, nec rationis, quia haec non est proprie, nisi dum cogitatur seu fingitur. Adde autem ulterius, nunquam consequi relationem realem in actu cognitionis praecise ex illa conformitate quae ad veritatem necessaria est; quia illa conformitas non consistit in vera ac propria similitudine formali, sed solum in quadam proportione et intentionali repraesentatione, ratione cuius ita res percipitur sicut est, quod magis ex sequentibus fiet manifestum.