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<277, col. b>²

Quid sit veritas cognitionis.

What the truth of cognition is.

Prima
sententia
suadetur.

1. Declarandum superest, quid sit haec conformitas, quam dicimus esse veritatem cognitionis, an scilicet in ipso actu sit aliquid absolutum, vel respectivum, reale, vel rationis. Quidam enim existimant, veritatem esse aliquid reale et absolutum in ipsomet actu cognoscendi seu iudicio intellectus. Quae opinio suaderi potest, nam, quod haec veritas aliquid reale sit in ipso actu videtur valde probabile. Primo, quia iudicium a parte rei, et sine ulla fictione intellectus denominatur verum: ergo illa denominatio provenit ab aliqua forma reali, et non a forma extrinseca: quia, ut ostendimus, veritas formaliter est in ipso actu, et non extrinsece. Secundo, quia veritas est perfectio simpliciter intellectus: ergo est aliquid reale in ipso intellectu, et non est in ipso, nisi mediante actu: agimus enim de veritate actuali: ergo est proprietas realis ipsius actus. Unde confirmatur tertio, quia in habitu scientiae est magna perfectio, quod verus sit: ergo veritas habitualis (ut sic dicam) est realis proprietas eius: ergo similiter erit in actuali cognitione.

5R

10R

15R

20R

2. Quod autem haec proprietas absoluta sit, et non respectiva, probari potest primo ex dictis, quia est perfectio simpliciter. Secundo, quia non pendet,

25R

1. What is left is to explain what this conformity that we say is the truth of cognition is: namely, whether there is something absolute in the act itself or something respective, whether something real or something of reason. For certain people think that truth is something real and absolute in the act itself of cognizing or in the judgement of the intellect.

This opinion can be recommended, for that this truth is something real in the act itself seems highly probable. First, because a judgement is denominated true on the part of reality and without any fashioning (*fictione*) of the intellect. Therefore, that denomination comes into being from some real form. And not from an extrinsic form, since, as we showed, truth is formally in the act itself and not extrinsically. Second, because truth is an unqualified perfection of the intellect. Therefore, it is something real in the intellect itself and it is not in it except by means of the act. For we are dealing with actual truth. Therefore, it is a real property of the act itself. Hence, it is confirmed, third, because there is a great perfection in the habit of science, which is the true. Therefore, habitual truth (if I may call it that) is a real property of the habit. Therefore, it will likewise be [a real property] in the case of actual cognition.

2. That this property is absolute and not respective, moreover, can be shown, first, from what was said, since it is a perfection *simpliciter*.

The first
opinion is
recommended.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

25 per se loquendo, et ex necessitate, ab aliquo termino
 reali, et existenti, nisi quando tale esse iudicatur;
 quod est per accidens, nam veritas eiusdem ratio-
 nis debet esse in omnibus, in hoc autem iudicio;
 30 chymera est ens fictum, est veritas realis absque
 relatione reali: ergo idem est in omnibus, quidquid
 sit, an in aliquibus consequatur ad veritatem relatio
 realis: sicut <278> etiam in scientia habitudo ad
 obiectum scibile non est relatio realis formaliter lo-
 quendo, quamvis interdum possit ad illam consequi.
 35 Tertio sumi potest argumentum ex veritate divina:
 nam in Deo est veritas cognitionis, quae sine dubio
 est magna perfectio illius, et tamen non potest esse
 relatio realis, quia si comparetur ad ipsam essen-
 tiam Dei non distinguitur in re ab illa, si vero ad
 40 creaturas, non potest ad illas realiter referri: erit
 ergo proprietas et perfectio absoluta. Tandem, quia
 veritas vel falsitas necessario comitatur iudicium
 intellectus, et tamen nulla relatio realis illud nec-
 essario comitatur: ergo non est aliquid relativum,
 45 sed absolutum quid. Et hanc opinionem videtur
 tenere Soncinas 6. *Metaphysicorum* q. 17. ubi, licet
 dicat veritatem dicere absolutum cum respectu, ex-
 plicans tamen hunc respectum in summa dicit, esse
 secundum dici, non secundum esse, et utitur hoc
 50 exemplo. Sicut intellectivum potest dici includere
 respectum: quia non potest concipi sine habitudine
 ad intelligibile: constat autem, huiusmodi respec-
 tum intellectivi esse tantum transcendentalem, seu
 secundum dici; et idem sentit Capreolus in I. dist.
 55 19. q. 3. concl. 3.

Secunda
 sententia.
 Durandus.
 Hervaeus.
 Iavellus.
 Flandria.
 Ammonius.

3. Aliis tamen videtur huiusmodi veritatem
 solum in relatione consistere. Quod tenent Duran-
 dus et Hervaeus, Iavellus et Flandria citati in supe-
 60 riori sectione, Ammonius 1. *Peri Hermeneias* cap. 1.
 et ibi alii expositores. Fundamentum in communi

³DM 8.1.2.

Second, because it does not depend, speaking essentially
 and of necessity on some real and existing terminus (except
 when it is judged to be such, which is accidental). For truth
 of the same *ratio* must be in all cases. Moreover, in the
 30R judgement ‘a chimaera is a fictitious being’ there is a real
 truth without a real relation. Therefore, likewise in every
 case, whatever it is, whether a real relation follows on the
 truth in some cases [or not]. This is just as in science where
 a disposition (*habitus*) to the knowable object is not a real
 35R relation formally speaking, although sometimes it can follow
 on the former.

Third, an argument can be taken from divine truth.
 There is the truth of cognition in God, which without doubt
 is a great perfection of him and yet it cannot be a real re-
 40R lation. For, if is compared to the very essence of God, it is
 not distinguished in reality from God’s essence. But if [it is
 compared] to creatures, it cannot really be referred to those.
 Therefore, it will be an absolute perfection and property.

Finally, because truth or falsity necessarily accompany a
 judgement of the intellect and yet no real relation necessarily
 accompanies it. Therefore, [truth] is not something relative,
 but something absolute. Soncinas seems to hold this opin-
 ion in *Metaphysics* VI, q. 17, where, although he says that
 truth expresses an absolute with a respect, yet in explaining
 45R this respect he ultimately says that is according to being
 said (*esse secundum dici*), not according to being (*secundum
 esse*). And he uses this example: [it is] just as something
 intellective can be said to include a respect, since it cannot
 be conceived without a disposition to the intelligible. It is
 50R clear, moreover, that an intellective respect of this sort is
 only transcendental or according to being said. Capreolus
 55R thinks likewise in I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3.

3. Nevertheless, to others it seems that truth of this sort
 consists only in a relation. Durandus, Hervaeus, Javelli, and
 60R [Dominic] of Flanders, cited in the previous section,³ hold
 this, as well as Ammonius in *Peri Hermeneias* I, ch. 1, and
 other expositors in the same place.

The second
 opinion.
 Durandus.
 Hervaeus.
 Javelli.
 Dominic of
 Flanders.
 Ammonius.

est, quia esse veritatis omnino pendet ex termino, ita ut, illo mutato, mutetur veritas, et illo posito ponatur, nulla facta mutatione ex parte cognoscentis: nam teste Aristotele eadem propositio mutatur
 65 de vera in falsam, et e converso, mutato obiecto: ergo signum est veritatem solum consistere in relatione, nam proprium est relationis, ut stante fundamento consurgat posito termino, et mutetur illo
 70 mutato. Unde confirmatur primo, quia veritas non est de essentia actus, quandoquidem mutatur, illo manente: ergo est accidens eius; et tamen non est accidens absolutum: non est enim qualitas, quia actus secundus et ultimus non est subiectum alterius
 75 accidentis absoluti, ut videtur per se notum: ergo erit relatio. Confirmatur secundo, quia veritas nihil est aliud, quam conformitas quaedam: conformitas autem non est aliud, quam convenientia vel similitudo, aut proportio: omnia autem haec relationem indicant: sicut <col. b> conformitas imaginis ad suum exemplar relatio est, et sic de aliis.

4. An vero haec sit relatio realis, vel rationis, controversum est, etiam inter praedictos auctores: nam argumenta, quibus prima sententia probabat, veritatem esse proprietatem realem, videntur
 85 consequenter probare hanc relationem debere esse realem. Argumenta vero, quibus eadem prima sententia probabat, veritatem esse proprietatem absolutam, videntur concludere, non esse relationem
 90 realem, sed rationis. Utraque vero argumenta inter se collata videntur probare, hanc relationem interdum esse realem, interdum rationis: nam interdum videntur omnia concurrere, quae ad relationem realem necessaria sunt, interdum vero aliquid deesse potest: ergo aliquando etiam erit re-

The general foundation is that truth depends entirely on the terminus, such that, if the terminus is changed, the truth is changed. And by positing the terminus, truth is posited, without any change being brought about on the part of the one cognizing. For, as Aristotle attests, the same proposition is changed from true to false and conversely by the object having been changed. This, therefore, is a sign that truth consists only in a relation. For it is proper to a relation to rise up with the positing of a *terminus* even though the foundation stands firm and that it change when [the terminus] is changed.

Hence, it is confirmed, first, because truth does not belong to the essence of the act, seeing that it is changed while the act remains. Therefore, is an accident of the act. But it is not an absolute accident. For it is not a quality, because a second and ultimate act is not the subject of other qualities. Also, it is not in some other genus of absolute accidents, as seems self-evident. Therefore, it will be a relation. It is confirmed, second, because truth is nothing other than a certain conformity. A conformity, however, is nothing other than agreeability or similitude or proportion. All these, however, indicate relation, just as the conformity of an image to its exemplar is a relation and likewise for the others.

4. But whether this is a real relation or a relation of reason is controversial even among the aforementioned authors. For the arguments by which the first view established that truth is a real property seem to show, consequently, that this relation must be real. But the arguments by which the same view established that truth is an absolute property seem to conclude that it is not a real relation but a relation of reason. But both arguments brought together with each other seem to establish that this relation is sometimes real and sometimes of reason. For sometimes it seems that all the things necessary for a real relation concur, but sometimes something can be missing. Therefore, sometimes there will be a real relation, but sometimes it will be insufficient.

The antecedent is shown: for a real relation there is

latio realis, aliquando vero minime. Antecedens
 declaratur, nam ad relationem realem primum re-
 quiritur terminus realis, et deinde fundamentum
 non solum reale, sed etiam capax relationis, seu
 100 ordinabile ad terminum: saepe autem haec duo con- 105R
 currunt in hac relatione veritatis. Nam et saepe
 respicit terminum realem, et realiter existentem;
 et ex parte ipsius iudicii saepe est fundamentum
 sufficiens, quia et iudicium quid creatum est, et
 105 ex hac parte referibile realiter ad extrinsecum ter- 110R
 minum; et praeterea tale est, ut comparetur ad
 suum obiectum tamquam mensuratum ad mensu-
 ram, quae relatio realis est ex parte mensurati, qua
 ratione relatio scientiae ad scibile realis esse cense-
 110 tur: huiusmodi autem est haec relatio veritatis. At 115R
 vero aliquando deest in hac conformitate terminus
 realis, ut quando iudicium verum est de non en-
 tibus; aliquando vero deest fundamentum aptum ad
 fundandam relationem realem, vel quia non est or-
 115 dinabile ad aliud extrinsecum, ut contingit in divina 120R
 scientia respectu creaturarum existentium, vel quia
 non est distinctum a termino, ut in eadem scientia
 Dei respectu eiusdem Dei, vel quia non compara-
 tur ut mensuratum ad mensuram, sed potius ut
 120 mensura ad mensuratum, ut eadem scientia Dei 125R
 ad omnes creaturas, et idem censetur de arte hu-
 mana respectu artificii: ergo in his casibus erit haec
 relatio rationis, et non realis.

Quaestiones resolutio.

5. Ut rem hanc explicemus, advertendum est, aliud
 esse inquirere quid addat veritas supra actum, qui
 denominatur verus; aliud <279> vero quid includat
 totum id, quod nomine veritatis significatur, ad eum
 5 modum, quo supra de unitate dicebamus, aliud 5R
 esse quod addit supra ens; aliud vero, quod nomine
 unitatis significatur.

required, first, a real terminus and, furthermore, a founda-
 tion that is not only real but also capable of a relation or
 able to be ordered to a terminus. Moreover, these two often
 concur in this relation of truth. For it often both respects
 a real and really existing terminus and on the part of the
 judgement itself there is often a sufficient foundation, since
 a judgement both is something created (and so for its part is
 really referrible to an extrinsic terminus) and furthermore is
 such as to be compared to its object as the measured to the
 measure. The relation on the part of the measured is a real
 relation, which is why the relation of science to the knowable
 is thought to be a real relation. Moreover, the relation of
 truth is of this sort.

On the other hand, sometimes a real terminus is missing
 in this conformity, as in the case of a true judgement about
 non-beings. And sometimes a foundation suitable for being
 the foundation of a real relation is missing, either because it
 is not able to be ordered to something extrinsic (as happens
 in the case of divine knowledge with respect to existing
 creatures) or because it is not distinct from the terminus (as
 in the same divine knowledge with respect to God himself) or
 because it is not related as measured to measure (as in the
 same divine knowledge with respect to all created things).
 The same is thought to be the case with a human art with
 respect to its artifacts. In these cases, therefore, there will a
 relation of reason but not a real relation.

The resolution of the question.

5. In order to explain this matter, it should be noted that
 it is one thing to look for that which truth adds to an act
 that is denominated true and another thing to look for that
 which the whole that is signified by the name 'truth' includes.
 According to the way that we were speaking about unity
 above, it is one thing to be that which adds something beyond
 a being but another to be that which is signified by the name

Veritas nihil in
re distinctum
addit
cognitioni.

10 6. Primo ergo certum existimo, veritatem non
addere actui vero aliquam rem, vel modum absolu-
tum ex natura rei distinctum ab ipso, seu ab essen-
tia et entitate eius. In hoc videntur omnes auctores
convenire: neque aliquem invenio, qui oppositum
expresse docuerit. Et probatur satis argumentis fac-
tis in secunda sententia. Item, quia neque intelligi,
15 neque explicari potest quid, aut quale sit hoc ab-
solutum neque ad quid ponatur. Quod ita declaro,
quia vel illud est aliquid separabile ab actu vero, vel
est omnino inseparabile: si dicatur hoc secundum,
20 si vero dicatur primum, illud non erit absolutum,
sed respectivum, ut argumentum factum probat:
quia separatur per mutationem solam obiecti, sine
alia absoluta mutatione ex parte actus: nam actus
25 mutatur eius veritas: quia res non eodem modo
se habet. Dices, veritatem addere quid absolutum
inseparabile ab actu; non tamen re, sed ratione dis-
tinctum ab illo. Sed contra, quia vel hoc absolutum
complet actum tamquam ultima differentia specifica,
30 vel individualis eius; vel non complet sed supponit
perfecte completum. Si primum dicatur; ergo tale
absolutum non additur actui constituto, sed consti-
tuit illum: ergo non recte dicitur veritatem addere
hoc absolutum supra actum; secundum autem dici
35 non potest, quia impossibile est intelligere actui
plene constituto addi aliquid reale absolutum sola
ratione distinctum. Ac deinde contra hoc procedit
argumentum de mutatione eiusdem actus de vero
in falsum.

Non addit
veritas
relationem
praedicamen-
talem.

40 7. Secundo dicendum est, veritatem non addere
supra actum relationem realem propriam et praedica-

⁴*DM* 4.1?

⁵*DM* 8.2.2.

'unity'.⁴

6. First, therefore, I think it certain that truth does not
add to a true act some absolute mode or thing distinct *ex*
10R *natura rei* from the act itself or from its essence and entity.
In this all the authors seem to agree. I do not find anyone
who explicitly taught the opposite. And it is sufficiently
established by the arguments made for the second view.⁵
15R Also, because it can neither be understood or explained what
or what kind of thing this absolute [thing or mode] would be
or for what reason it would be posited.

I explain this as follows: either it is something separable
from the true act or it is entirely inseparable. If the second is
20R said, then a distinction *ex natura rei* from the act is posited
without reason. But if the first is said, then it will not
be something absolute but something respective, as the
argument made shows. For it is separated through a change
only in the object, without any absolute change on the part
of the act. For the act of itself is the same and represents in
25R the same way. Only its truth is changed, since the thing is
no holds itself in the same way.

You may say that truth adds something absolute that
is inseparable from the act, yet conceptually, although not
30R really, distinct from it. But to the contrary, because either
this absolute thing completes the act as an ultimate specific
difference or individual of it or it does not complete it but
presupposes it as perfectly completed. If the first is said, then
such an absolute is not added to an already constituted act
but constitutes it. Therefore, it is not rightly said that truth
adds this absolute thing to the act. Moreover, the second
35R cannot be said, because to add something real and absolute
only conceptually distinct to a completely constituted act is
impossible to understand. And, furthermore, the argument
concerning the change of the same act from true to false
40R stands against this.

7. Second, it should be said that truth does not add to
the act a proper and categorial real relation of the act to the

Truth adds
nothing
distinct in
reality to
cognition.

Truth does not
add a
categorial
relation.

mentalem actus ad obiectum. Hoc etiam sufficienter
 probatur argumentis factis, nam in multis impossi- 45R
 bilis est talis relatio; et ab eis sumitur argumentum,
 45 nunquam esse necessariam talem relationem ad
 rationem veritatis ut sic. Tum quia conceptus et
 modus veritatis eiusdem rationis seu proportionis
 est in omnibus. Tum etiam, quia, licet gratis con- 50R
 cedamus interdum con- <col. b> currere omnia
 50 necessaria, ut inter actum et obiectum consurgat
 relatio realis, tamen prius natura intelligitur actus
 verus, quam intelligatur consurgere relatio realis.
 Nam haec dicitur consurgere posito fundamento, et 55R
 termino: actus autem formalissime verus est hoc
 55 ipso, quod ponitur tale fundamentum et terminus:
 ita ut, si per impossibile impediretur resultantia re-
 lationis, adhuc actus esset verus ex vi talis actus et
 obiecti in rerum natura positorum: ergo in formali 60R
 conceptu veritatis non intrat relatio, quidquid sit,
 60 an inde interdum consequatur.

Neque
 relationem
 rationis stricte
 sumptam.

8. Tertio dicendum est, veritatem ut sic non
 addere actui vero relationem rationis actualem pro-
 prie et in rigore sumptam. Hoc etiam mihi sufficien- 65R
 ter persuadet argumentum illud, quod denominatio
 65 veritatis non pendet ex huiusmodi relatione: nam
 haec eo modo, quo esse potest, non est actu, nisi
 intellectu actu cogitante vel comparante unum ad
 aliud: sed absque huiusmodi comparatione actus
 est simpliciter verus, ergo. Praeterea argumentum 70R
 factum de relatione reali a fortiori probat de rela-
 tione rationis: nam, sicut illa consurgit posito fun-
 damento et termino, ita haec fingitur per intellec-
 tum, supposito eo, quod per modum fundamenti
 et termini intervenire potest: sed ex vi eius, quod 75R
 75 supponitur ad talem relationem, vel fictionem, ac-
 tus est verus: ergo talis relatio non intrat formaliter
 conceptum veritatis: ergo nec veritas habet talem
 relationem supra ipsum actum.

80R

object. This also is sufficiently shown by the arguments that
 have been made, for such a relation is impossible in many
 cases. From them is taken the argument that such a relation
 is never necessary for the *ratio* of truth as such.

Also, the concept and mode of truth is of the same *ratio*
 and proportion in all cases. And, also, although we freely
 grant that sometimes all the things necessary concur so
 that a real relation arises between the act and its object,
 nevertheless, the true act is understood to be prior in nature
 to the real relation that arises. For the latter is said to arise
 from the positing of the foundation and the terminus. An
 act, however, is most formally true from this very fact, that
 such a foundation and terminus are posited, such that if,
per impossibile, the resulting of the relation were impeded,
 the act would still be true from the force of such an act and
 object posited in the nature of things. Therefore, no relation
 enters into the formal concept of truth, whatever the relation
 may be or whether it sometimes follows on truth.

8. Third, it should be said that truth as such does not
 add to a true act an actual relation of reason, taken properly
 and rigorously. This also I deem sufficiently established
 by the argument that the denomination of truth does not
 depend on a relation of this sort. For the latter, given the way
 in which it can be, cannot be by an act other than an intel-
 lectual act cognizing or comparing one thing to another. But
 the act is true without qualification apart from a comparison
 of this sort. Therefore. 70R

Furthermore, the argument made about real relations *a*
fortiori works for relations of reason. For just as the former
 arises from the positing of the foundation and terminus,
 so also the latter is fashioned through the intellect on the
 presupposition of that which can be found in the way of
 foundation and terminus. But from the force of that which
 is presupposed for such a relation or fashioning (*fictionem*),
 the act is true. Therefore, such a relation does not enter
 formally into the concept of truth. Neither, therefore, does
 truth have such a relation beyond the act itself. 80R

Nor is a
 relation of
 reason taken
 strictly.

Veritas addit
cognitioni
connotationem
obiecti, sicut
iudicatur, se
habentis.

80 9. Quarto dicendum est, veritatem cognitionis
ultra ipsum actum nihil addere reale, et intrinse-
cum ipsi actui, sed connotare solum obiectum ita
se habens sicut per actum repraesentatur. Haec as-
sertio sequitur ex praecedentibus, nam actum esse
85 verum plus aliquid dicit, quam actum esse, et non
dicit aliquid reale absolutum, vel relativum ultra
ipsum actum, nec etiam dicit propriam et rigorosam
relationem rationis: ergo nihil aliud addere potest
90 praeter dictam connotationem, seu denominationem
consurgentem ex connexionem seu coniunctionem talis
actus, et obiecti. Praeterea hoc confirmat argumen-
tum, quo posterior opinio probat veritatem non esse
aliquid omnino absolutum, scilicet, quia mutato
obiecto, mutatur veritas cognitionis, et tamen non
95 mutatur ibi aliquid intrinsecum actui, sed tollitur
concomitantia obiecti: ergo signum est, veri- <280>
tatem includere, vel saltem connotare praedictam
concomitantiam obiecti.

Eadem
enuntiatio per
extrinsecam
mutationem ex
falsa vera fit.

100 10. Respondent aliqui negando posse eandem
mentalem propositionem transferri de vera in falsam
sine intrinseca mutatione eius, loquendo de propria
cognitione, seu iudicio ipsius rei: quia propositio,
quae pro aliquo tempore vera fuit, non potest esse
falsa pro eodem tempore, et ut fiat falsa, necesse est,
105 ut mens coniungat extrema pro alio tempore, quod
facere non potest, nisi in ipsa sit aliqua mutatio.
Sed hoc simpliciter repugnat Aristoteli, in *Praedica-
mentis* cap. de substantia, et D. Thoma, 1. q. 14.
art. 15. ad 3. Et primo sumi potest argumentum
110 a propositionibus vocalibus, seu mentalibus, quae
dicuntur esse in mente non ultimata: nam in eis
dubitari non potest, quin sit eadem omnino propo-
sitione, quae antea erat vera, et nunc est falsa per
115 mutationem rei significatae absque ulla mutatione
signi vel significationis eius, ergo veritas illa in sig-
nificando, quae convenit his propositionibus praeter

85R

90R

95R

100R

105R

110R

115R

9. Fourth, it should be said that the truth of a cognition
beyond the act adds nothing real and intrinsic to the act
itself, but only connotes an object holding itself just as it is
represented through the act.⁶ This assertion follows from
the preceding [assertions]. For that an act is true implies
something more than that the act exists and does not imply
something real, whether absolute or relative, that is beyond
the act itself. Nor does it even express a proper and strict
relation of reason. It can, therefore, add nothing other than
the aforementioned connotation or denomination arising
from the connection or conjunction of such an act and object.
This is further confirmed by the argument by which the
latter opinion showed that truth is not something entirely
absolute, namely, because the truth of a cognition changes
with a changed object even though nothing intrinsic to the
act is changed. Rather, the concomitance of the object is
removed. This is a sign, therefore, that truth includes or
at least connotes the aforementioned concomitance of the
object.

10. Some respond by denying that the same mental
proposition can be shifted from true to false without it in-
trinsically changing, by speaking of the proper cognition or
judgement of the thing itself. For a proposition that was true
during some time cannot be false during the same time, and
in order to become false it is necessary that the mind con-
join the extremes during another time. This cannot happen
without there being some change in it.

But this directly contradicts Aristotle in the chapter on
substance in *Categories* and St. Thomas in *ST Ia.15.15 ad 3*.
First, an argument can be taken from spoken propositions
or the mental propositions that are said to be in the mind
non-ultimately. For in their case there can be no doubt but
that it is entirely the same proposition that was true before
and that now is false through a change in the signified
thing without any change in the sign or its signification.
Therefore, in addition to all that holds on the part of the
signifying proposition, the truth in signifying that applies

Truth adds to
cognition a
connotation of
the object
holding itself
as it is judged.

The same
proposition
goes from false
to true
through an
extrinsic
change.

⁶Cf. *DM 47.2.22*.

120 totum id, quod se tenet ex parte propositionis significantis connotat talem concomitantiam obiecti. Sic ergo intelligi potest in veritate ipsius iudicii, seu veritatis existentis in mente ultimata saltem imperfecta et abstractiva. Quod idcirco addo quia in cognitione intuitiva perfecta, qua exacte videtur res in particulari secundum omnes conditiones existentiae omnino determinatas, non potest esse mutatio conformitatis inter cognitionem, et obiectum, manente immutata cognitione: tunc enim recte procedit argumentum factum, quod semper terminatur actus ad rem prout in tali tempore et momento existentem; pro quo tempore et momento mutari non potest veritas, quamvis pro aliis temporibus mutetur. Propter quam rationem divina scientia semper est conformis obiectis cognitis, quantumvis haec pro suis diversis temporibus mutantur. Et idem fortasse est in cognitione angelica, quando est perfecte intuitiva, quamvis differat a divina, quod haec simpliciter immutabilis est; illa vero mutari potest. Nihilominus tamen in cognitione imperfecta, et abstractiva, qualis est nostra cognitio, non repugnat idem omnino iudicium mutari de vero in falsum absque intrinseca mutatione: quia illa duratio, quam concipimus, et per copulam significamus, non est indivisibilis, nec omnino determinata, sed aliquo modo indifferens et <col. b> confusa; et consequenter latitudinem habens, ratione cuius potest in una parte illius successionis obiectum se habere uno modo, et diverso modo in alia. Et hac ratione fieri potest, ut eadem cognitio mutetur de vera in falsam ex mutatione obiecti, ipsa cognitione in se manente invariata. Sicut cognitio seu propositio indefinita ex parte obiecti eadem manens potest nunc esse vera ratione unius singularis, postea ratione alterius, quamvis ipsa in se non mutetur: quia in conceptu illo confuso rei communis et indefinite conceptae includit aliquo modo plura singularia,

to these propositions connotes such a concomitance of the object. The same thing, then, can be understood in the case of the truth of the judgement itself or in the case of the truth existing ultimately in the mind at least imperfectly and abstractively.

To which I add that, since in the perfect intuitive cognition by which one accurately sees a thing in particular according to every wholly determinate condition of existence, there cannot be a change of conformity between the cognition and the object with the cognition remaining unchanged. In that case the argument that was made proceeds rightly, since the act is always terminated in the thing as it exists in that time and moment. In that time and moment the truth cannot be changed, although it can be changed during other times. This is the reason why divine knowledge is always in conformity with the cognized objects, regardless how much these are changed during their different times. Perhaps the same is true in the case of angelic cognition when it is perfect intuitive cognition, even though it differs from divine cognition. (The latter is strictly unchangeable, while the former can be changed.)

Yet, nevertheless, in the case of imperfect and abstractive cognition, of the sort that our cognition is, it is not repugnant for entirely the same judgement to be changed from true to false apart from any intrinsic change. For the duration that we conceive and that we signify through the copula is neither indivisible nor wholly determinate, but is in some way indifferent and confused. Consequently, it has the latitude by reason of which it can be related in one way in one part of that succession to the object and in a different way in another part. And for this reason it can happen that the same cognition is changed from true to false as a result of a change in the object, while the cognition itself remains unchanged. It is just like a cognition or proposition indefinite on the part of the object that while remaining the same can now be true by reason of one singular and later by reason of another singular although it is not changed in itself. For that confused concept of the thing generally and

155 quorum singula sufficiunt ad eius veritatem; et ideo,
 licet ipsa mutentur, veritas manere potest in eo-
 dem conceptu confuso, si autem omnia singularia
 deessent, omnino periret veritas. Idem ergo est re-
 spectu temporis seu durationis confuse conceptae: 160R
 nam etiam respectu illius propositio seu cognitio
 160 est quasi indefinita; et ideo eadem manens, et ad
 diversa instantia seu tempora comparari potest, et
 in eis nunc vera, nunc autem falsa reperiri, sine
 mutatione sui, per solam obiecti mutationem. Ergo 165R
 165 signum est, hanc veritatem cognitionis connotare
 saltem concomitantiam obiecti in tali statu, qualis
 per cognitionem repraesentatur.

11. Ultimo confirmatur a simili de bonitate: 170R
 nam, sicut verum dicit conformitatem, ita bonum
 convenientiam: sed bonum ut conveniens solum
 170 addit denominationem, seu concomitantiam alterius
 extremi habentis talem naturam, vel aptitudinem
 ad talem perfectionem, ut infra ostendemus: ergo 175R
 eodem modo de veritate philosophandum est.

Veritas requirit
 intentionalem 175
 repraesentationem
 obiecti
 sicut est.

12. Quinto ex dictis concludo, veritatem cog-
 180 nitionis includere talem repraesentationem cog-
 nitionis, quae habeat coniunctam concomitantiam
 obiecti, ita se habentis, sicut per cognitionem reprae-
 sentatur. Probat ex dictis, quia ad veritatem nec
 sola repraesentatio sufficit, si obiectum non ita se
 185 habeat, sicut repraesentatur; neque concomitantia
 obiecti potest sufficere ad denominationem veritatis,
 nisi praesupposita praedicta repraesentatione, vel
 potius includendo illam: quia veritas non est sola
 illa denominatio extrinseca, sed includit intrinse-
 cam habitudinem actus terminatam ad obiectum
 taliter se habens. <281>

Censura primae opinionis, et solutiones argumentorum

⁷DM 10.1.

indefinitely conceived includes multiple singulars in some way, each of which is sufficient for its truth. For that reason, although they are changed, the truth can remain in the same confused concept. If, however, all the singulars are missing, the truth perishes entirely. It is, then, the same with respect to time or duration that is confusedly conceived. For the proposition or cognition is as it were indefinite also with respect to that. And for this reason while remaining the same it can be related to different instances or times, and can now be found true in them and now be found false, without any change in it but merely through a change in the object. This is a sign, therefore, that this truth of cognition connotes at least the concomitance of the object in the same state in which it is represented through the cognition.

11. Last, [that the truth of cognition connotes the concomitance of the object] is confirmed from similarity with goodness. For, just as the true expresses conformity, so good expresses agreeability. But good as agreeable only adds a denomination or concomitance to another extreme having such a nature or an aptitude to such perfection, as we will show below.⁷ Therefore, one should philosophize in the same way about truth.

12. Fifth, I conclude from what was said that the truth of cognition includes the kind of representation by cognition that has the concomitance of the object holding itself just as it is represented by the cognition. It is shown by what has been said, since representation alone does not suffice for truth, if the object does not hold itself as it is represented. Nor can the concomitance of the object suffice for the denomination of truth without the aforementioned representation being presupposed or, rather, without including it. For truth is not only that extrinsic denomination, but includes the intrinsic disposition of the act terminating in the object holding itself in that way.

Truth requires
 an intentional
 representation
 of the object
 as it is.

Censure of the first opinion and resolutions of its arguments.

rum eius.

13. Atque hinc intelligitur primo, quid veritatis habeat prima opinio, et quid dicendum sit ad rationes eius. Nam, si per absolutum intelligat solam entitatem actus cum reali et transcendentali
 5 habitudine ad obiectum, quam habet omnino inseparabiliter, et immutabiliter: sic falsum est, veritatem consistere in hoc solo absoluto: quia alias esset omnino immutabilis manente eodem actu. Si autem dicat consistere in absoluto, quia nullam
 10 intrinsecam relationem addi necesse est, sed solam concomitantiam obiecti, sic fatemur veritatem esse aliquid absolutum, vel potius consistere in absoluto cum respectu secundum dici: nam illa denominatio sumpta ex concomitantia obiecti non incongrue
 15 potest respectus secundum dici appellari. Tamen, quia rationes illius opinionis videntur in priori sensu procedere, et possunt his quae diximus, obstare, eis satisfaciendum est.

5R

10R

15R

14. Ad priora ergo argumenta, quibus probatur
 20 veritatem cognitionis esse realem et intrinsecam proprietatem actus, respondetur, advertendo, denominationem veri dupliciter posse tribui actui cognitionis. Uno modo formaliter; alio modo radicaliter; formalem veri denominationem appello eam, quam
 25 hactenus explicui; quae consistit in actuali conformitate ad obiectum; radicalem autem voco illam perfectionem actus, a qua habet huiusmodi conformitatem cum obiecto, ut est in scientia evidentiali, vel in fide certitudo ratione cuius habet, ut infallibilis
 30 sit, et consequenter, ut existere non possit, quin conformitatem habeat cum materiali obiecto suo. Hoc ergo supposito ad primum respondeo, denominationem veri radicaliter sumptam ex intrinseca perfectione actus, vel habitus esse realem, et abso-

20R

25R

30R

35R

Verum formale
quid, quid
verum
radicale.

13. From this one can understand, first, what degree of truth the first opinion has and what should be said in response to its arguments. For if through ‘something absolute’ it understands merely the entity of the act with a real and transcendental disposition to the object, which it has entirely inseparably and unchangeably, then it will be false to say that truth consists in this absolute thing alone. For otherwise it would be entirely unchangeable with the same act remaining. If, however, truth is said to consist in something absolute because it is not necessary to add any intrinsic relation [to the act] but only the concomitance of the object, then we confess that truth is something absolute, or, rather, that it consists in something absolute with a respect according to being said. For that denomination taken from the concomitance of the object not unsuitably can be named a respect according to being said.⁸ Nevertheless, since the arguments for the first opinion seem to proceed in the former sense and can oppose the things that we said, it is necessary to satisfy them.

14. To the former arguments, therefore, by which it was shown that the truth of cognition is a real and intrinsic property of the act, it is responded by noting that the denomination ‘true’ can be attributed to an act of cognition in two ways: in one way formally, in the other radically. That which I have been explaining so far I call the formal denomination of ‘true’. This consists in actual conformity to an object. But I call radical that perfection of the act by which it has this sort of conformity with the object, for example, evidentness in the case of science or certitude in the case of faith, by reason of which it is such as to be infallible and, consequently, such that it cannot exist except it have conformity with its material object.

Presupposing this [distinction], therefore, I respond to the first argument that the denomination ‘true’ taken radically according to the intrinsic perfection of the act or habit

What formal truth is and what radical truth is.

⁸For the distinction between relations according to being said and relations according to being, see *DM* 47.3.6–9.

35 lutam; nos tamen nunc non loquimur de illa: quia
 illa non tam est denominatio veri, quam certi, vel
 evidentis assensus. Unde perfectio illa, a qua sumi-
 tur haec denominatio non est aliquid ex natura rei
 distinctum ab ipso iudicio, sed est ipsamet speci- 40R
 40 fica differentia, quae sumitur ex tali obiecto formali,
 seu ratione assentiendi. Denominatio autem veri
 formalis, et actualis, est quidem in re ipsa absque
 fictione intellectus, ut recte probat argumentum,
 non tamen est omnino intrinseca denominatio, sed 45R
 45 partim est a forma intrinseca, partim connotat co-
 existentiam ob- <col. b> iectivam, seu concomitan-
 tiam obiecti ita se habentis sicut per cognitionem
 iudicatur. Unde, quod diximus, huiusmodi veri-
 tatem de qua agimus, convenire ipsi formali iudicio 50R
 50 seu cognitioni, et non tantum obiecto eius, intelli-
 gendum est ab hac conformitate ipsum iudicium
 primo ac per se denominari verum, quamvis forma
 a qua denominatur, non sit omnino intrinseca, sed
 concomitantiam alicuius extrinseci includat. 55R

55 15. Ad secundum eadem distinctione satisfac-
 ciendum est: nam veritas radicalis, quae sumitur
 ex formali ratione talis cognitionis, est perfectio
 simpliciter intellectus: quia pertinet ad rationem
 virtutis intellectualis simpliciter: veritas autem ac- 60R
 60 tualis, de qua loquimur, per se non est perfectio sim-
 pliciter: immo neque addit perfectionem supra nat-
 uram, vel speciem ipsius actus cognoscendi. Nam
 haec veritas actualis, qua ex parte connotat, vel
 includit concomitantiam, seu convenientiam extrin- 65R
 65 seci obiecti, nihil reale addit actui, et consequenter
 nec perfectionem ullam ei afferre potest; qua vero
 ex parte supponit, vel requirit in ipso actu reprae-
 sentationem, seu habitudinem realem ad obiectum
 dicit realem aliquam perfectionem eius: illa autem 70R
 70 perfectio aliquando esse potest perfectio simpliciter;
 interdum vero est tantum secundum quid. Nam
 interdum haec veritas actualis est infallibiliter ac

is real and absolute. But we are not talking about that. For
 that is not so much a denomination of ‘true’ as of ‘certain’
 or of ‘evident assent’. Hence, the perfection from which this
 denomination is taken is not something *ex natura rei* dis-
 tinct from the judgement itself but is the specific difference
 itself, which is taken from such a formal object or such a
 reason for assenting. The formal and actual denomination
 ‘true’, moreover, is indeed in the thing itself apart from any
 fashioning by the intellect, as the argument rightly shows,
 yet it is not an entirely intrinsic denomination. Rather, it
 is partly an intrinsic form and partly connotes the objective
 coexistence or the concomitance of the object holding itself
 just as it is judged through the cognition. Hence, with re-
 spect to what we said—that truth of the sort we are talking
 about applies to the formal judgement or cognition and not
 only to its object—one should understand by this conformity
 that the judgement itself is first and directly denominated
 true, although the form by which it is denominated is not
 wholly intrinsic but includes the concomitance of something
 extrinsic.

15. The same distinction suffices for the second argu-
 ment. For radical truth, which is taken from the formal *ratio*
 of such a cognition, is an unqualified perfection of the intel-
 lect, since it belongs to the unqualified *ratio* of intellectual
 virtue.

But actual truth, which is what we are talking about, is
 not *per se* an unqualified perfection. In fact, it does not add
 perfection to the nature or species of the act itself of cogniz-
 ing. For with respect to the part that connotes or includes
 the concomitance or agreement of an extrinsic object, this
 actual truth adds nothing real to the act and consequently
 cannot bestow any perfection on the act either. But with
 respect to the part that presupposes or requires a represen-
 tation or disposition in the act itself to the object, it implies
 some real perfection in it. That perfection, moreover, can
 sometimes be an unqualified perfection but sometimes only
 a qualified perfection. For sometimes this actual truth is
 infallibly and necessarily conjoined with an essential and

necessario coniuncta cum essentiali ac reali perfectione talis actus, et ex vi illius: et tunc perfectio, 75R
 75 quam per se supponit in actu, est perfectio simpliciter: pertinet enim ad rationem intellectualis virtutis simpliciter. Interdum vero non est haec veritas actualis necessario coniuncta cum actu, aut non ex vi rationis formalis, et essentialis eius; et tunc 80R
 80 perfectio, quae supponitur in actu, non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quia non pertinet ad rationem virtutis intellectualis simpliciter; et semper ac intrinsece habet admixtam imperfectionem obscurae, vel confusae cognitionis, ut est in humana fide et opinione, etc. Ad tertium eadem est 85R
 85 responsio, nam in habitu scientiae: quod verus sit radicaliter, est perfectio eius, ultra quam actualis veritas nihil perfectionis ei addit.

16. Alia vero argumenta, quibus probatur, veritatem esse proprietatem omnino absolutam, admitti quidem possunt, quatenus probant, non esse necessariam relationem realem ad huiusmodi veritatem, quatenus vero excludere possunt omnem extrinsecam connotationem, non recte concludunt. Unde ad 95R
 95 <282> primum iam declaratum est, quando et quomodo veritas sit perfectio simpliciter non quidem formaliter et in se, sed in radice, quando illa talis est, ut necessario secum habeat veritatem coniunctam. Ad secundum concedo veritatem ut sic nunquam consistere formaliter in relatione reali, nego 100R
 100 tamen inde sequi non includere concomitantiam obiecti, cui cognitio conformetur. Nec refert, quod huiusmodi veritas cognitionis non semper requirat obiectum actu existens, quia non dicimus realem 105R
 105 existentiam obiecti includi in conceptu veritatis, sed solum quod ita se habeat, sicut per cognitionem repraesentatur, seu iudicatur: seu quod habeat tale esse quale cognoscitur. Quod esse non semper est existentiae, sed quale sufficit ad veritatem enuntiationis, ut tetigit Aristoteles, 5. *Metaphysicorum* cap. 110R
 110

real perfection of such an act and from its force. In that case the perfection that it *per se* presupposes in the act is an unqualified perfection. For it belongs to the unqualified *ratio* of intellectual virtue. But sometimes this actual truth is not necessarily conjoined with the act or does not arise from the force of its formal and essential *ratio*. In this case the perfection that is presupposed in the act is not an unqualified perfection but only a qualified perfection, since it does not belong to the unqualified *ratio* of intellectual virtue and it always and intrinsically has an imperfect admixture of obscure or confused cognition, as in the case of human faith, opinion, and so on.

The response to the third argument is the same. For in the case of a habit of science that is true radically, it has a perfection. Actual truth adds nothing further of perfection to it.

16. But in response to the other arguments, by which it is shown that truth is a wholly absolute property, they can in fact be admitted to the extent they show that a real relation is not necessary for a truth of this sort. But insofar as they can exclude every extrinsic connotation, they do not conclude rightly. Hence, with respect to the first argument, it was already shown when and how truth is an unqualified perfection, not, indeed, formally and in itself but in root, [i.e., radically]. When it is like that, it necessarily has truth conjoined with it.

In response to the second, I concede that truth as such never formally consists in a real relation, yet I deny that it thereby follows that it does not include the concomitance of the object to which the cognition is conformed. Nor does it matter that this sort of truth of cognition does not always require an actually existing object, since we are not saying that the real existence of an object is included in the concept of truth, but only that the object holds itself just as it is represented or judged to be through the cognition, or that it hold the being with which it is cognized. Such being is not always the being of existence, but whatever kind is sufficient for the truth of the proposition, as Aristotle attests

7. et lib. 6. cap. ultimo et lib. 9. cap. ultimo.

Veritas in Deo
quot modis, et
an sit perfectio
simpliciter.

115 17. Ad tertium idem dicendum est de veritate
divina, quod dictum est de veritate scientiae, et
115R cuiuscumque virtutis intellectualis, quod in Deo
dicit perfectionem quantum ad radicalem veritatem,
quoad actualem vero conformitatem cum obiecto
nullam novam perfectionem addit, neque etiam
120R realem relationem, ut recte argumentum probat.
Quod, ut magis intelligatur, omnisque aequivocatio
120 tollatur, advertendum est, Perfectionem summam
veritatis triplici modo tribui Deo, scilicet ratione
essentiae seu esse; ratione intellectus; et ratione
125R voluntatis: quibus modis dicitur Deus prima veritas
in essendo, in intelligendo, et in dicendo. De prima
125 ratione veritatis in essendo dicemus inferius, quia
illa nihil aliud est, quam veritas transcendentalis,
quae in Deo est in summo ac primo perfectionis
gradu. Postrema veritatis ratio nihil etiam ad prae-
130R sents refert, quia nomen veritatis sub illa significa-
tione valde aequivocum est, significatque virtutem
130 quamdam moralem in voluntate existentem, quae
inclinat ad verum semper loquendum, et dicendum
iuxta mentem; quae virtus est in Deo in gradu emi-
135R nentissimo, tamque naturalis est illi ut nullo modo
possit aliud, quam verum loqui; et hoc modo veritas
135 est perfectio simpliciter, sed moralis. Secunda ergo
veritas, scilicet intellectualis duo significare potest
in Deo. Primum, vim intelligendi adeo perfectam, ut
140R nunquam ab scopo aberret, neque aberrare possit;
140 et hoc est magna perfectio simpliciter, quam ex se
habet Deus in emi- <col. b> nentissimo gradu; et
hac ratione dicitur prima veritas in cognoscendo.
Deinde dicere potest actualem conformitatem inter
145R cognitionem Dei, et rem cognitam; et hoc supponit
145 quidem praedictam perfectionem, non vero addit
novam, sed connotat tantum obiectum ita se habere
in se, sicut cognoscitur.

in *Metaphysics* chapter 7 of book V, the last chapter of book VI, and the last chapter of book IX.

17. In response to the third argument, the same thing should be said about divine truth that was said about the truth of science and of any intellectual virtue. In God truth implies perfection with respect to radical truth, but with respect to actual conformity with the object it adds no new perfection, not even a real relation, as the argument rightly shows.

In order to better understand that claim and to remove any equivocation, it should be noted that the perfection of the highest truth is attribute to God in three ways, namely, by reason essence or being, by reason of intellect, and by reason of will. According to these ways, God is said to be the first truth in being, in understanding, and in saying. Concerning the first *ratio* of truth in being, we will speak below, since it is nothing other than transcendental truth, which in God is in its highest and foremost level of perfection. The last *ratio* of truth is of no relevance at present, since the name 'truth' in that signification is very equivocal and signifies a kind of moral virtue existing in the will that inclines one always to say the truth and to speak according to one's mind. This virtue is in God in the highest degree and is so natural to him that he can in no way do other than speak the truth. In this mode, truth is an unqualified perfection but a moral one.

The second truth, then, namely, intellectual truth, can signify two things in God. First, a power for understanding that is so perfect that it never strays from its target and never can stray. This is a great unqualified perfection, which God has from himself in the most eminent degree. For this reason he is called the first truth in cognizing. Second, it can express the actual conformity between God's cognition and the thing cognized. This indeed presupposes the just-mentioned perfection, but it does not add something new. Rather, it merely connotes the object holding itself in itself as it is cognized.

In what ways
truth is in God
and whether it
is an
unqualified
perfection.

Responsiones ad argumenta posterioris opinionis.

18. Ad fundamentum contrariae sententiae respondetur, illo argumento recte probari, veritatem praeter totam perfectionem realem et intrinsicam cognitionis, connotare, et consignificare concomitantiam obiecti, non tamen propriam relationem consurgentem ex coexistentia cognitionis et obiecti, ut satis declaratum est. Dices, si hoc argumentum in praesenti non est efficax ad inferendam relationem, nullum relinqui sufficiens ad probandas relationes reales praesertim, quae in unitate fundari dicuntur, ut relationes similitudinis, aequalitatis, et similes: nam licet mutato alio extremo dicatur mutari similitudo, dici potest, non inde variari relationem aliquam, sed solam denominationem ortam ex coexistentia utriusque extremi. Respondetur argumentum hoc pertinere ad praedicamentum *Ad aliquid*, de quo postea dicturi sumus; nunc duo dicenda videntur, unum est talem argumentandi modum non esse sufficientem ad inferendam relationem realem, quae sit modus ex natura rei distinctus a fundamento et termino eius, et quasi medium quid inter illa, ut argumentum (sententia mea) convincit: unde, quidquid sit de talibus relationibus, negari non potest, quin prius natura, quam illae insurgant, intelligentur simul existentia fundamentum et terminus, in quibus est fundamentalis unitas, seu convenientia. Unde secundo dicitur, esto demus insurgere relationem aliquam inter cognitionem et obiectum, quando in altero est sufficiens fundamentum, et in altero sufficiens ratio terminandi, tamen ad rationem veritatis formaliter non esse necessariam, sed sufficere id, quod in utroque extremo antecedere intelligitur ad talem relationem;

Responses to the arguments for the latter opinion.

18. To the foundation of the contrary view, it is responded that that argument rightly shows that truth in addition to the complete real and intrinsic perfection of the cognition connotes and co-signifies the concomitance of the object, yet not a proper relation arising from the co-existence of the cognition and object, as was sufficiently explained.

You may say: if this argument is not effective in the present case for inferring a relation, nothing remains that will be sufficient for showing real relations, especially those which are said to be founded in unity such as relations of similarity, equality, and others like that. For, although similarity is said to be changed by a change in the other extreme, what can be said is not that some relation is changed thereby but only the denomination that arose from the co-existence of both extremes.

It is responded that this argument pertains to the category '*ad aliquid*', concerning which we will speak later.⁹ For now it seems that two things should be said. One is that such a way of arguing is not sufficient for inferring a real relation, which is a mode that is *ex natura rei* distinct from the foundation and its terminus and is, as it were, a medium between them, as the argument (in my view) convincingly shows.¹⁰ Hence, whatever may be the case concerning such relations, it cannot be denied that the simultaneous existence of the foundation and terminus (in which the fundamental unity or agreement is) should be understood as prior in nature to the relations arising.

Hence, second, it is said that even if finally some relation arises between the cognition and the object when there is a sufficient foundation in each and a sufficient *ratio* of terminating in each, nevertheless, it is not necessary formally for the *ratio* of truth. What was understood in each extreme to be antecedent to such a relation is sufficient [for the *ratio*

⁹*DM 47.*

¹⁰Suárez appears here still to be endorsing a view of relations that he held earlier in his career, e.g., in *De Incarnatione*, but that he rejects by the time he gives an extended treatment of relations in *DM 47*. See, in particular, *DM 47.2.24*.

35 sicut etiam sufficit, quodcumque extrema talia
sunt, ut non possint fundare, nec terminare rela- 35R
tionem realem: et sane probabilissimum est, hanc
relationem nunquam esse realem, ut iam dicam.

19. Unde ad primam confirmationem concedo,
generatim loquendo, veritatem de qua <283> ag- 40R
imus, secundum id totum quod includit, non esse
de essentia actus cognitionis; Non tamen inde fit,
esse aliquod accidens intrinsecum, et inhaerens
ipsi actui, sed solum praeter entitatem et intrin-
secam perfectionem actus connotare aliquid aliud 45R
extrinsecum, sine quo veritatis ratio non subsistit;
ratione cuius potest interdum veritas actus variari,
quamvis actus ipse in se intrinsece non mutetur;
et tunc se habet veritas ad modum accidentis sep-
arabilis seu quinti praedicabilis, ratione extrinseci 50R
connotati variabilis. In his vero actibus, qui habent
inseparabilem, et indefectibilem veritatem, perfectio
illa, unde oritur huiusmodi necessaria coniunctio
cum veritate, quae a nobis radicalis veritas dicta est,
nullo modo est accidens, sed essentialis proprietas 55R
talis actus: veritas autem formalis, se habet in his
ad modum proprietatis inseparabilis.

20. Ad secundam confirmationem primo iam
responsum est, quod, licet conformitas possit for-
malissime pro relatione sumi, tamen etiam potest 60R
accipi pro concomitantia illorum extremorum, in-
ter quae fingitur illa relatio, prout ordine naturae
antecedit talem relationem; et huiusmodi conformi-
tatem ostendimus sufficere ad rationem veritatis.
Quocirca nihil ad explicandam veritatis essentiam 65R
refert controversia de illa relatione, an sit semper
realis, vel semper rationis, vel interdum realis; in-
terdum autem rationis: nam, quidquid de hoc sit,
veritas ipsa antecedit talem relationem. Et sine du-
bio verum est, talem relationem non semper esse 70R
realem, ut recte probat argumentum de veritate
scientiae divinae; et de veritate cognitionis circa

of truth], just as that also suffices whenever the extremes
are such that they cannot found or terminate a real relation.
And it is reasonably most probable that this relation is never
real, as I will explain shortly.

19. Hence, in response to the first confirmation, I con-
cede that, speaking generally, the truth we are discussing
does not belong to the essence of the act of cognition accord-
ing to the whole that it includes. It does not, however, result
from that that there is some intrinsic accident inhering in the
act itself. Rather, beyond the entity and intrinsic perfection
of the act it only connotes some other extrinsic thing without
which the *ratio* of truth does not subsist. For this reason
the truth of the act can sometimes vary even though the act
itself does not change intrinsically in itself. In that case it
has truth in the mode of a separable accident or of a fifth
predicable, by reason of the variable extrinsic connotation.
But in those act that have inseparable and infallible truth,
the perfection from which the necessary conjunction with
truth arises (which we call radical truth) is in no way an
accident but is an essential property of such an act. Formal
truth, however, holds itself in these cases in the mode of an
inseparable property.

20. In response to the second confirmation, the first
response already given was that, although conformity can be
most formally taken for a relation, nevertheless, it can also
be taken for the concomitance of those extremes between
which that relation is fashioned, just as in the order of nature
it precedes such a relation. We showed that conformity of
this sort suffices for the *ratio* of truth. For this reason,
the controversy about that relation—whether it is always
real, always of reason, or sometimes real but sometimes of
reason—is of no relevance for explaining the essence of truth.
For whatever may be the case about that controversy, truth
itself always precedes such a relation. It is also without
doubt true that such a relation is not always real, as is
rightly shown by the argument from the truth of divine
science and by the argument from the truth of cognition

75 obiecta non existentia: et hoc satis est, ut intelligamus, propriam relationem non esse necessariam ad rationem veritatis: quia nec realis necessaria est, ut patet ex dictis, nec rationis, quia haec non est proprie, nisi dum cogitatur, seu fingitur. Addo autem 75R ulterius, nunquam consequi relationem realem in actu cognitionis praecise ex illa conformitate, quae ad veritatem necessaria est: quia illa conformitas 80 non consistit in vera ac propria similitudine formali, sed solum in quadam proportione, et intentionali repraesentatione, ratione cuius ita res percipitur, sicut est, quod magis ex sequentibus fiet manifestum.

about non-existent objects. This is sufficient so that we may understand that a proper relation is not necessary for the *ratio* of truth, since neither a real relation is necessary (as is clear from what was said) nor a relation of reason (since the latter does not properly exist unless while it is thought or fashioned).

I add further, moreover, that no real relation follows in the act of cognition apart from the conformity that is necessary for truth, since that conformity does not consist in a true and proper formal similarity but only in a certain proportion and intentional representation, by reason of which the thing is perceived as it is. This will be made clearer in the following [sections].