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<849, col. b>²

De comparatione causarum inter se.

5 Duae tantum comparationes faciendae supersunt inter causas
ipsas, una in perfectione, altera in causalitate: ex quibus simul
etiam constabit quomodo in prioritare comparentur, seu quae
illarum prior censenda sit. In his autem comparationibus
observandum est, generatim esse intelligendas, conferendo
nimirum unum genus causae cum alio: nam speciatim descen-
dere ad singulas causas singulorum generum, res esset infinita,
et praeter scientiam.

10 SECTIO I.

Quaenam ex quatuor causis perfectior sit.

5 1. Possunt hae causae comparari vel in ratione et perfec-
tione entis, vel in ratione causandi, et perfectione quam in illa
habent: estque haec posterior comparatio formalis (ut <950>
ita dicam) et per se ad praesens pertinens: tamen, quia causal-
itas consequitur rationem entis, et est proprietas seu attribu-
tum eius, ideo maior perfectio in causando consequi solet ex
maiori perfectione in essendo: et ideo non possumus ita pos-
terioriorem comparationem facere, ut priorem omnino omitta-
mus.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes: many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³For the moment I have decided to translate ‘*comparatio*’ and its relatives consistently with ‘comparison’ and its relatives; it should be noted, however, that in various places in this disputation one might well prefer ‘relation’, since the point is often one about how one cause relates to another rather than an exercise in comparing and contrasting.

On the comparison of the causes with each other.

5R Only two comparisons³ remain to be made between the causes them-
selves: one concerning perfection and one concerning causality. From
these it will also be clear at the same time how they compare with re-
spect to priority or which of them should be deemed prior. It should be
noted that these comparisons should be understood generically—that is,
by comparing one genus of cause with another genus—for if we were to
descend particularly to individual causes of individual genera, the matter
would be infinite and beyond science.

10R SECTION I.

Which of the four causes is more perfect.

5R 1. These causes can be compared either in the *ratio* and perfection of
being or in *ratio* of causing and the perfection they have in that. It is this
latter formal (if I may call it that) and *per se* comparison that is relevant
at present. Nevertheless, since causality follows the *ratio* of being and is
a property or attribute of it, greater perfection in causing usually follows
from greater perfection in being. For this reason we cannot make the
latter comparison in such a way as to omit the prior comparison entirely.

10 *Comparantur intrinsecae ad extrinsecas.*

2. Primo igitur certum est, comparando materiam et formam ad efficiens et finem, illas esse causas minus perfectas ex suo genere tam in esse quam in causalitate. Probat, quia cum fit comparatio inter genera, illud est praefendum alteri in quo forma et perfectissima species excedit perfectissimam alterius generis, ut colligitur ex doctrina Aristotelis lib. 1. *De caelo* cap. 11. text. 115. et 116. ubi docet metiri perfectiones potentiarum ex eo, quod in unaquaque maximum est: sed supremum efficiens et supremus finis superant quamcumque materiam vel formam, ut per se notum est: ergo. Item in genere entis materia et forma sunt entia incompleta, et aliquo modo imperfecta, et hoc intrinsece includunt ex vi suarum rationum, et in tota sua latitudine, efficiens autem et finis, minime, sed quo ens fuerit magis completum, actualius, et perfectius, eo per se loquendo aptius erit ad perfectam rationem efficientis vel finis exercendam. Item materia et forma in ipso modo causandi imperfectionem includunt, quia non causant nisi componendo: efficiens autem et finis, quae sunt causae extrinsecae, per se loquendo nullam involvunt imperfectionem in causalitate sua.

Comparantur inter se forma et materia.

3. Secundo comparando materiam ad formam dicendum est, formam praestare materiae tam in ratione entis, quam in ratione causae. Haec assertio praecipue habet locum in materia et forma substantiali: de quibus satis tractata est supra cum de his causis ageremus, ubi utramque partem ostendimus ex eo, quod forma plus actualitatis habet quam materia: unde ipsa est quae complet rei essentiam, et quae est principium omnium operationum et perfectionum compositi. Ex quo intelligitur, comparisonem hanc in ratione causae debere intelligi respectu compositi, nimirum quatenus hae duae sunt

⁴*DM XIII and XV.*

35 tractata] tractatum V.

Intrinsic and extrinsic causes are compared.

2. First, therefore, it is certain that when comparing matter and form to efficient cause and end, the former causes are less perfect according to their own genera, in being as much as in causality. It is proven, for when a comparison is made between genera, that genus should be preferred in which the form and most perfect species surpasses the most perfect species of the other genus, as is gathered from the teaching of Aristotle in *De caelo* I, cap. 11, text. 115 and 116, where he says to measure the perfections of powers according to that which is the greatest in each one. But the supreme efficient cause and the supreme end surpass any matter or form, as is known *per se*. Therefore. Likewise, in the genus of being, matter and form are incomplete beings and imperfect in some way, and they include this intrinsically from the meaning of their concepts and in their entire extensions. But efficient cause and end not at all. But by whatever a being will have become more complete, more actual and perfect, by that, speaking *per se*, it will be more apt for exercising the perfect *ratio* of an efficient cause or an end. Likewise, matter and form include imperfection in their very mode of causing, since they cannot cause except by composing. But efficient cause and end, which are extrinsic causes, speaking *per se*, involve no imperfection in their causality.

Formal and material causes are compared with each other.

3. Secondly, in comparing matter to form it should be said that the form excels matter in the *ratio* of being just as in the *ratio* of cause. This assertion is especially on the mark in the case of matter and substantial form, which we dealt with satisfactorily above when we discussed these causes,⁴ where we showed both parts from the fact that form has more actuality than matter, whence it is that which completes the essence of a thing and which is the principle of every activity and perfection of a composite. From this it is understood that this comparison in the *ratio* of cause ought to be understood with respect to the composite, namely, insofar as these two are causes of it. For if the comparison were made between

causae illius: nam si comparatio fiat inter materiam, <col. b>
 et formam praesertim materialem, ad invicem, sic magis pro-
 45 priè videtur causalitas materiae in formam, quam formae in
 materiam, quia dependentia talis formae a materia est magis
 a priori, ut a proprio sustentante: dependentia vero materiae
 a forma magis est a posteriori, ut a conditione seu actualitate
 45R requisita ad connaturalem et debitum statum materiae, ut in
 superioribus dictum est. Neque hoc obstat quominus materia
 50 in genere entis simpliciter sit minus perfecta, licet secundum
 quid in aliqua conditione excedat.

Accidentalise
 forma perfectior
 sit suo subiecto,
 an imperfectior.

4. Quocirca si haec comparatio extendatur ad formam ac-
 cidentalem, et subiectum eius, intelligenda proportionaliter
 50R est respectu concreti ut formaliter constituti in tali ratione:
 sic enim perfectius causatur a forma accidentali, quam a
 subiecto, et sub eadem consideratione forma accidentalis ex-
 cedit subiectum quatenus comparatur ad illam ut actus ad po-
 tentiam: tamen ille excessus tantum est secundum quid, nam
 55R absolute in perfectione entis subiectum primum accidentis
 60 est substantia, quae simpliciter perfectior est. Et in ratione
 etiam causandi, subiectum magis est causa accidentis, quam e
 converso, quia subiectum simpliciter sustentat accidens in suo
 esse, accidens vero ut sic solum accidentaliter perficit subiec-
 65 tum, et ad summum aliquando est conditio vel dispositio nec-
 essaria ad sui subiecti conservationem. Atque ex his duabus
 comparationibus colligere licet, absolute loquendo de generi-
 bus causarum, materiam esse in primo et infimo gradu; in
 secundo esse formam, solum ergo superest ut finem et effi-
 ciens inter se comparemus.

Finis et efficiens inter se comparantur.

Finis et efficiens
 in perfectione
 entitativa non
 necessario se
 excedunt.

5. Dico tertio, Si finis et efficiens in perfectione entitativa
 5R comparentur, neutrum est perfectius alio, sed eiusdem sunt
 perfectionis, quamvis in ratione finis formaliter illa perfectio
 exprimat, quam in ratione efficientis. Probatur prior pars,
 quia finis et efficiens sumpta in tota latitudine sua, non nec-
 essario distinguuntur in ratione entis, saepe enim in idem
 coincidunt, quod maxime contingit in perfectissimo effici-

40R matter and form—especially material—to each other, then it would more
 properly seem to be the causality of matter to form than the causality of
 form to matter, since the dependency of such a form on matter is more
 a priori, as enduring on its own; but the dependency of matter on form
 is more a posteriori as a condition or actuality required for the connat-
 45R ural and appropriate (*debitum*) state of matter, as was said in the earlier
 sections. Nor does it stand in the way that matter in the genus of being
 strictly speaking is less perfect, although it excels *secundum quid* in some
 condition.

4. Wherefore if this comparison is extended to accidental form and
 its subject, they should be understood proportionately with respect to
 50R the concrete object as it is formally constituted in such a *ratio*. For in this
 way something more perfect is caused by an accidental form than by the
 subject, and under the same consideration an accidental form excels the
 subject insofar as it is compared to that as an act to power. Nevertheless,
 that excelling is only *secundum quid*, for absolutely in the perfection of
 55R being the subject of the primary accident is the substance, which is more
 perfect, strictly speaking. And even with respect to the *ratio* of causing,
 the subject is more a cause of the accident than conversely, since the sub-
 ject strictly speaking sustains the accident in its being, but the accident
 as such only accidentally perfects the subject and at most is sometimes
 60R a condition or disposition necessary for the conservation of its subject.
 It can be gathered from these two comparisons that speaking absolutely
 about the genera of causes matter is in the first and deepest level and form
 is in the second level. What is left, then, is to compare end and efficient
 cause with each other.

Ends and efficient causes are compared with each other.

5. I say, third, that if end and efficient cause are compared with
 5R respect to entitative perfection, neither is more perfect than the other.
 Rather, both are the same in perfection, although that perfection is ex-
 pressed more in the *ratio* of end than in the *ratio* of efficient cause. The
 former part is proven by the fact that end and efficient cause taken in
 their whole latitude are not necessarily distinguished in the *ratio* of be-
 ing, but often coincide in the same thing. This happens especially in

Whether
 accidental form is
 more perfect
 than its subject or
 less perfect.

End and efficient
 cause do not
 necessarily
 surpass each
 other in
 entitative
 perfection.

10 enti, et in perfectissimo fine: hae namque duae rationes in
 una et eadem re coniunguntur, nempe in Deo: ergo com-
 parando has duas causas in suo genere, et in <951> summo
 utriusque, neutra excedit alteram. Et ratio propria esse vide-
 tur, quia utraque harum causarum ex suo genere dicit per-
 15 fectionem sine imperfectione, et utraque, ut habeat summam
 perfectionem possibilem in suo genere, requirit infinitam per-
 fectionem simpliciter in genere entis, et ideo neutra ex suo
 genere alteram necessario excedit.

20 6. Posterior vero pars declaratur, nam in fine propria et
 formalis ratio causandi est bonitas et perfectio eius, ut supra
 dictum est: efficiens vero causat per suam formam seu natu-
 ram ut sic: et ideo dicitur causa finalis formaliter exprimere
 perfectionem et bonitatem quam causa efficiens, quod magis
 pertinet ad distinctionem ex conceptibus nostris, quam ex
 ipsa re. Hinc vero proportionaliter intelligitur, in aliis agen-
 25 tibus et finibus saepe etiam has duas causas esse eiusdem per-
 fectionis, quatenus quodlibet agens aliquo modo propter seip-
 sum operatur, vel quatenus operatur propter finem univocum
 seu sibi similem vel aequalem: aliquando vero causam ef-
 ficientem superare in perfectione finalem, quando finis est
 30 proximus, et non ultimus, saepius vero et connaturalius finem
 excedere in perfectione causam agentem, nam quando causa
 agens non est summe perfecta, ut optimo modo operetur,
 propter aliquod excellentius bonum operatur.

35 7. Dico quarto. Si finis et efficiens comparentur in
 ratione causandi, in multis etiam habent aequalitatem, in
 aliis vero se mutuo excedunt secundum proprias ac prae-
 cisas rationes formales, simpliciter autem causa finalis cense-
 tur prima ac praecipua in causando. Ut brevius agamus, to-
 tam conclusionem hanc in Deo, qui suprema causa finalis et
 40 efficiens est, declaremus. Quamquam enim omnia quae in
 Deo sunt, prout in eo sunt, sint aequae perfecta, vel potius
 una perfectio, tamen prout a nobis varia attributa secun-
 dum proprias ac praecisas rationes concipiuntur, intelligimus
 unum ex suo genere esse eminentius alio, vel munus aut opus
 45 unius, munere alterius, quomodo dicunt Theologi misericor-
 diam esse maximam virtutem in Deo. Sic ergo compara-

10R the case of the most perfect efficient cause and the most perfect end. For
 these two *rationes* are conjoined in one and the same thing, namely, God.
 Therefore, if we compare these two causes in their genera and in the high-
 est instance of each, neither exceeds the other. The proper reason seems
 to be that each of these causes according to its genus expresses perfection
 without imperfection, and each, insofar as it has the highest perfection
 15R possible in its genus, requires infinite perfection without qualification
 in its genus. For this reason neither necessarily exceeds the other in its
 genus.

20R 6. The latter part is shown: for in an end the proper and formal *ra-
 tio* of causing is its goodness and perfection, as was shown above. But an
 efficient cause causes through its form or nature as such. And for this rea-
 son final cause more formally expresses its perfection and goodness than
 efficient cause. This pertains more to a distinction arising from our concep-
 25R tions than from the reality itself. From here it should be proportionately
 understood that in other agents and ends these two causes are also often
 of the same perfection, insofar as any agent whatever in some way acts
 for its own sake or insofar as it acts for the sake of a univocal end or an
 end similar or equal to itself. But sometimes an efficient cause surpasses
 a final cause in perfection, when the end is proximate and not ultimate.
 But more often and more connaturally the end exceeds the agent cause in
 30R perfection, for when an agent cause is not perfect in the highest degree,
 it acts for the sake of some more excellent good in order to act in the best
 way.

35R 7. I say, fourth, that if end and efficient cause are compared with
 respect to the *ratio* of causing, they also have equality in many cases.
 But in other cases they mutually exceed each other according to proper
 and precise formal *rationes*. Strictly speaking, however, the final cause
 is thought to be first and foremost in causing. In order to deal with
 this matter briefly, I will explain this whole conclusion in the case of
 God, who is the supreme final cause and the supreme efficient cause. For
 40R although everything that is in God is equally perfect insofar as it is in
 him—or, better, they are one perfection—nevertheless, insofar as various
 attributes are conceived by us according to proper and precise *rationes*,
 we understand one attribute to be more eminent than another according
 to its genus or the function or work of one to be more eminent than
 45R the function of another, just as theologians say that mercy is the greatest

50 ndo rationem causae efficientis et finalis, invenientur aequales
 primo in effectibus, quia non potest causa efficiens perfectis-
 55 sima habere plures vel nobiliores effectus, quam possit finalis
 causa etiam summe perfecta, et e converso: nullus enim effe-
 ctus est a Deo ut efficiente, qui non sit propter eum ut ultimum
 60 finem, et e contra- <col. b> rio. Immo ulterius addi
 potest in hoc etiam esse aequalitatem, quod sicut omnes effec-
 tus omnium causarum efficientium sunt a primo efficienti, ita
 65 omnes effectus omnium causarum finalium sunt a supremo fine:
 et mutata proportione sicut omnes effectus omnium causarum
 finalium sunt in suo genere a primo efficienti, ita omnes effectus
 omnium causarum efficientium sunt in suo genere a supremo fine.
 Tertio est in hoc etiam quaedam aequalitas, quod utraque ex
 70 his causis ex suo genere dicit perfectionem simpliciter, unde
 neutra includit imperfectionem, ut limitationem, aut dependentiam,
 vel aliquid simile, et sicut una est connexa (ut ita dicam) cum
 altera in causando, ita etiam vicissim altera cum illa, neutra
 75 tamen dici potest proprie dependens ab altera, sed effectus ipsi
 sunt dependentes necessario ab utraque, seu a Deo sub utraque
 ratione. Et ita patet prima pars assertionis.

Efficiens in quo
excedat finem.

8. Secunda declaratur, quia ratio causae efficientis in hoc
 70 multum videtur excedere, quod influxus eius est maxime pro-
 prius et realis per essentialem dependentiam et emanationem
 effectus ab illa, unde efficiens propriissime dicitur dare esse
 effectui, et Aristoteles illud definivit esse principium *unde*
incipit motus, seu productio vel factio rei. Et hinc etiam
 75 ortum habuit ut effectus, cum sit adaequatum correlativum
 causae, per antonomasiam ab efficiendo nominetur, propter
 quod Stoici solam causam efficientem nomine causae dignam
 censuerunt, ut patet ex Seneca epistola 66. et Laertio in vita
 Zenonis. Finis autem excedit primum in hoc, quod est ve-
 80 luti ultimus terminus in quem omnis actio efficientis dirig-
 tur, ita ut, si ita fas est loqui, dicere possimus efficiens fini
 deservire, et Deum ipsum sibi quodammodo ministrare, dum
 quidquid agit, propter se operatur. Et ob hanc rationem,
 cum effectus aliquo modo sit propter suam causam (particula
 enim *propter* generatim potest causalitatem indicare) tamen

Seneca.
Laertius.

50R virtue in God. In the same way, therefore, if we compare *rationes* of
 efficient and final cause, they will in the first place be found equal in
 effects, since the most perfect efficient cause cannot have more or more
 noble effects than the final cause can that is also perfect to the highest
 degree, nor the other way around. For there is no effect that comes from
 God as from an efficient cause that is not for the sake of him as for the
 sake of the ultimate end, and the other way around.

55R Indeed, it can be further be added that there is also equality in this,
 namely, that just as all effects of all efficient causes are from the first effi-
 cient cause, so also all effects of all final causes are from the highest end.
 And, changing proportionately, just as all effects of all final causes are in
 its genus from the first efficient cause, so also all effects of all efficient
 causes are in its genus from the highest end.

60R Third, there is also a certain equality in that each of these causes
 expresses an unqualified perfection in its genus; hence, neither includes
 imperfection, whether limitation, dependence, or something like that.
 And just as one is connected (if I may speak in this way) with another in
 causing, so also in turn the latter with the former (although neither can
 properly be called dependent on the other; rather, the effects themselves
 65R are necessarily dependent on both or dependent on God under each *ra-
 tio*). And so the first part of the assertion is clear.

70R 8. Second, it is shown—since the *ratio* of efficient cause seems to
 surpass greatly in this respect—that its influx is more proper and real espe-
 cially through the effect’s essential dependence on and emanation from
 the efficient cause. Hence, an efficient cause is most properly said to give
 being to the effect. Aristotle defines it as the principle ‘whence motion
 begins’ or whence the production or making of a thing begins. And this
 is where it comes from that effects, since they are adequate correlatives of
 causes, are named through antonomasia from effecting. This is the rea-
 75R son why the Stoics suppose that only efficient causes are worthy of the
 name ‘cause’, as is clear from Seneca, Letter 66, and Diogenes Laërtius,
Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, the life of Zeno in Book VII.

80R But end exceeds efficient cause first in this, namely, that it is as if
 were the ultimate terminus to which every action of an efficient cause is
 directed in such a way that—if one may speak in this way—we can say
 that efficient cause serves end. God himself serves himself in a certain
 way, while whatever he does, he does for his own sake. And for this rea-
 son, although an effect is in some way on account of (*propter*) its cause

In what way
efficient cause
exceeds end.

Seneca.
Diogenes
Laërtius.

85 per antonomasiam de solo fine dicitur, *esse propter quem res*
fit, et hinc etiam Socrates solam causam finalem, causam ap- 85R
 Pellavit apud Platonem in Phaedone. Deinde ac praecipue
 videtur superare finis in hoc, quod ipse est primum initium
 et principium omnis actionis, quia ipsummet efficiens excitat
 90 et allicit ad efficiendum: quod, quamvis in primo efficiens
 inveniatur absque causalitate finis in ipsum efficiens, sed tan- 90R
 tum in <952> externam actionem eius, nihilominus secun-
 dum eam rationem intelligimus primum motorem, vel (ut ita
 dicam) primum procuratorem omnis causalitatis esse finem.
 95 Qui propterea appellari solet *Prima, et Causa causarum*, ut
 notavit Albertus lib. 2. *Physicorum* tract. 2. cap. 5. ubi quos- 95R
 dam alios ordines inter has causas considerat: sed quos ex-
 plicuimus, videntur esse praecipui.

Causa dicitur
 analogice de
 quatuor
 generibus.

9. Sed quaeri tandem hic potest, quod supra huc remisimus,
 100 an haec inaequalitas causarum tanta sit, ut analogiam inter
 eas constituat in ratione causae. Ad quod breviter dicendum
 est cum communi sententia, rationem causae non esse uni-
 vocam, sed analogam, primo quidem propter rationem supra
 tractatam, quod causa accidentium et substantiarum non est
 105 univoce causa. Secundo quia ratio causae dicta de Deo, et
 de materia et forma non potest esse univoca propter eandem
 rationem, qua nec ratio entis aut cuiusvis alterius praedicati
 realis communis Deo et creaturis potest esse univoca. Quae
 duae rationes non solum probant rationem causae in com-
 110 muni, sed etiam rationem causae efficientis (et idem est de
 fine) non esse univocam, sive ut communis est causae effi-
 cienti accidentium et substantiae, sive ut communis est primae
 causae et secundis, propter essentialem dependentiam secun-
 115 darum a prima. Quod maxime verum est, si comparentur in
 virtute causandi: nam si comparentur in actione ipsa, non est
 tam propria analogia, eo quod et actio ipsa quid creatum sit,
 et saepe unamet actio sit ab utraque causa, quod in superi-
 oribus tactum est.

10. Praeterea, comparando materiam et formam inter
 120 se, nulla apparet inter eas analogia in ratione causae, tamen
 si conferantur cum fine, videtur sane alia ratio analogiae hic

(for the phrase ‘on account of’ [*propter*] generally can indicate causal-
 ity), nevertheless, through antonomasia it can be said that it belongs only
 to an end ‘to be that for the sake of which a thing comes to be’. This is
 why in Plato’s *Phaedo* Socrates designates only the final cause a cause.

End also seems especially to exceed in this, namely, that it itself is the
 first beginning and principle of every action, since it excites and attracts
 the efficient cause to effecting. Although in the case of the first efficient
 cause it is found without any causality of the end in the efficient cause
 itself but the causality is only found in the cause’s external action, never-
 90R theless according to this argument we understand that the first motor or
 (if I may speak in this way) first procurator of every causality is an end.
 For this reason the end is usually called the ‘first cause’ or the ‘cause of
 95R causes’, as Albert the Great notes in *Physics* II, tract. 2, cap. 5, where he
 considers certain other relationships between these causes. But the ones
 we have explained seem to be especially significant.

9. Finally, one can ask here what we above left for later discussion:
 whether this inequality of the causes so great that an analogy between
 them is set up in the *ratio* of cause. In response to this one should briefly
 say in accordance with the common view that the *ratio* of cause is not
 univocal but analogical. This is so, first of all, on account of the reason
 discussed earlier: the cause of accidents is not univocally a cause with
 the cause of substances. Second, because the *ratio* of cause is said of God
 and it cannot be univocal with respect to matter and form for the same
 reason on account of which the *ratio* of being or of any other predicate
 that is real and common to both God and creatures cannot be univocal.
 These two reasons not only prove that the *ratio* of cause in general is not
 univocal but also that the *ratio* of efficient cause (and likewise in the case
 of ends) is not univocal, whether as it is common to the efficient cause
 of accidents and of substance or as it is common to the first cause and
 secondary causes on account of the essential dependence of secondary
 causes on the first. This is especially true if they are compared with
 respect to the power of causing. For if they are compared with respect
 to the action itself, there is not so proper an analogy by the fact both the
 action itself is what is created and often one and the same action comes
 from both causes (which was touched on in previous sections).

10. In addition, when comparing matter and form to each other,
 no analogy between them appears in the *ratio* of cause; nevertheless, if
 they are compared to end, it seems reasonable that another *ratio* of anal-

Plato.

‘Cause’ is said
 analogically of
 the four genera.

intercedere. Nam efficiens propriissime influit esse: materia
autem et forma non tam proprie influunt esse, quam compo-
nunt illud per seipsas, et ideo secundum hanc rationem vide-
125 tur nomen causae primo dictum de efficiente: ad materiam 125R
autem vel formam esse translatum per quamdam proportion-
alitatem. Unde licet illae duae causae sint proprie partes es-
senciales, et principia intrinseca rei naturalis, causae vero dic-
tae videntur per dictam analogiam, licet iam secundum com-
130 munem usum simpliciter sit illis tribuendum nomen causae. 130R

11. At vero comparando inter se causam <col. b> effi-
cientem et finalem, mihi quidem videtur, si nominis imposi-
tionem et vim attendamus, primo et maxime dictum esse de
causa efficiente, cuius influxus et notior est, et maxime realis,
135 et propriissime attingens ipsum esse, quod communicat effec- 135R
tui. Quoad rem tamen significatam, iam dictum est proprie
et aliquo modo primario convenire causae finali. Non video
autem quae sit necessitas constituendi propriam analogiam
inter has duas causas modo a nobis propositas, finem scilicet
140 ac efficientem, si per se comparentur, et caeteris paribus 140R
ex parte effectus et secundum totam perfectionem quam un-
aqueque potest habere in suo ordine, quod est comparare
rationem finis et efficientis prout in Deo sunt. Nam utrique
convenit proprie et intrinsece ratio causae, et in ea possunt
145 concipi ut habentes aliquam convenientiam veram ac pro- 145R
priam, et non habent inter se dependentiam essentialem in
ea ratione, quamvis habeant connexionem, ut declaravimus:
nulla est ergo ratio analogiae inter ipsas: erit ergo sub ea ra-
tione nomen univocum. Nec enim repugnat nomen alioqui
150 analogum ad plura, univoce aliquibus convenire, ut inferius 150R
dicemus tractando de analogia entis et accidentis. Et haec de
hac comparatione sint satis.

SECTIO II.

Utrum causae possint esse sibi invicem causae.

1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia causa, ut supra est dictum, est
prior effectui et consequenter effectus posterior causa: ergo

Dubitandi ratio
pro parte
negativa.

ogy comes up here. For efficient causes most properly inflows being.
Matter and form, however, do not as properly inflow being as compose
it through themselves. And therefore for this reason it seems that the
name ‘cause’ is said in the first place of efficient causes. But the name
is carried over to matter and form through a certain proportionality.
Hence, although these two causes are properly essential parts and intrin-
sic principles of a natural thing, they seem to be called causes through the
mentioned analogy, although now the name ‘cause’ is simply attributed
to them through common usage.

11. But when comparing efficient cause and final cause to each other,
it indeed seems to me that if we pay attention to the imposition and
meaning of the name, it was said first and foremost of efficient causes
whose influx is both better known and especially real. And the being that
communicates to the effect most properly belongs to it. Nevertheless,
with respect to the signified thing, it was already said that it properly and
in some way primarily applies to final causes. Moreover, I do not see
what the necessity is in constituting a proper analogy between these two
causes in the way proposed by us, namely, if end and efficient cause are
compared *per se* and *ceteris paribus* on the part of the effect and according
to the whole perfection which each can have in its order, which is to
compare the *ratio* of end and of efficient cause as they are in God. For
the *ratio* of cause applies properly and intrinsically to each and they can
be conceived in God as having some true and proper agreement and they
do not have an essential dependence between them in that *ratio* (although
they have a connection, as we showed). There is, therefore, no *ratio*
of analogy between them. There will, therefore, be a univocal name
under that *ratio*. For it is not repugnant for a name to apply analogically
to multiple things but univocally to some, as we will say below when
discussing the analogy of being and accident. And this is enough for this
comparison.

SECTION II.

Whether causes can be causes of each other in turn.

1. The reason for doubting is that causes, as was said above, are prior
to effects and, consequently, effects are posterior to causes. Therefore,

The reason for
doubting on
behalf of the
negative side.

5 non potest id quod est effectus, esse causa suae causae: alio-
 qui vel esset simul prius et posterius, vel non omnis causa
 esset prior suo effectui. Nec satisfaciet si quis respondeat, non
 repugnare idem esse prius et posterius altero natura tantum,
 et secundum diversas rationes: nam prioritas naturae, quae
 10 in causa requiritur respectu effectus, non est tantum prioritas se-
 cundum unam vel alteram considerationem, sed est absoluta
 prioritas, quae dici potest praesuppositionis, quatenus, abso-
 lute loquendo, in causa debet praesupponi esse, ut causare
 possit. Unde sic concludi potest: in causa absolute supponit-
 15 ur esse ad esse effectus, nam effectus non habet esse nisi me-
 dia causalitate, et ad causalitatem simpliciter supponitur esse
 in causa: ergo ad esse effectus simpliciter supponitur esse in
 causa: ergo causa simpliciter et omni ratione debet <953>
 esse prior natura effectui: nam prioritas naturae non videtur
 20 esse aliud quam quaedam prioritas praesuppositionis: ergo
 fieri non potest ut causa sit effectus suae causae.

5R it cannot be that that which is an effect is the cause of its causes. Oth-
 erwise, it would either be both prior and posterior at once or not every
 cause would be prior to its effect. Nor will it be satisfactory if someone
 responds that it is not repugnant for the same thing to be prior and pos-
 terior to another nature alone and according to different *rationes*. For
 10R the priority of nature that is required in a cause with respect to its effect
 is not merely priority according to one or another consideration, but is
 absolute priority, which can be called priority of presupposition insofar
 as, absolutely speaking, being must be presupposed in a cause in order
 for it to be able to cause. Hence, one can conclude as follows: being is
 15R absolutely assumed in a cause for the being of the effect, for an effect
 does not have being except by means of causality, and for causality being
 is assumed without qualification in the cause. Therefore, for the being
 of the effect being is assumed without qualification in the cause. There-
 fore, a cause must without qualification and according to every *ratio* be
 20R a nature prior to the effect. For the priority of nature does not seem to
 be anything other than a certain priority of presupposition. Therefore,
 it cannot happen that a cause is the effect of its own cause.

2. But the contrary is the case since Aristotle, when dealing with the
 causes, teaches that axiom, which is received by the remaining philoso-
 25R phers. For this reason we are not so much investigating whether this
 is true as in what sense it should be understood. We will accomplish
 this better by comparing individual causes with each other. For speaking
 generally it is neither necessary nor possible for all causes to be causes of
 each other in turn, whether they are compared according to the different
 30R genera or within the same genus. In the first place, after all, not all causes
 have a cause, as is obvious in the case of the first efficient cause and the
 ultimate end. Furthermore, although some cause—and efficient cause,
 for example—has a cause, it, nevertheless, does not have a cause caused
 by itself nor does it always have a material cause or a formal cause. That
 35R axiom, therefore, should not be understood universally, but indefinitely
 or not repugnantly, because, namely, it is not repugnant for some causes
 to be causes of each other in turn and in some cases it is even necessary.
 And for this reason what remains to be seen is in which cases it is not
 repugnant or in which cases it is necessary.

The sense of the question is explained.

Rationes
 affirmativae
 partis.

2. In contrarium autem est, quia Aristoteles agens de cau-
 sis, illud docuit axioma, quod a caeteris Philosophis recep-
 tum est. Quapropter non tam investigamus an hoc verum sit,
 25 quam quo sensu intelligendum sit: quod praestabimus melius
 conferendo singulas causas inter se: nam in generali loquendo
 non est necessarium neque possibile omnes causas esse sibi in-
 vicem causas, sive secundum diversa genera, sive intra idem
 genus conferantur. Quia imprimis non omnes causae habent
 causam, ut constat de prima causa efficiente et ultimo fine.
 30 Deinde, quamvis aliqua causa, efficiens verbi gratia, habeat
 causam, non tamen habet causam a se causatam, neque etiam
 semper habet causam materialem vel formalem. Non ergo
 debet illud axioma universe intelligi, sed indefinite seu non
 35 repugnanter, quia nimirum non repugnat aliquas causas esse
 sibi invicem causas, vel certe quod in aliquibus etiam neces-
 sarium sit, et ideo videndum superest in quibus non repugnet,
 vel necessarium sit.

Sensus quaestionis exponitur.

Reasons for the
 affirmative side.

3. Est autem advertendum duobus modis posse intelligi causas esse sibi invicem causas: primo formaliter tantum (ut sic dicam) seu secundum generales rationes causarum: secundo in particulari, et secundum easdem res causantes et causatas. Prior sensus est facilis et sine difficultate, sed non est in praesenti praecipue intentus, quia in eo solum asseritur, efficientem causam verbi gratia posse habere causam materialem: et e converso causam materialem posse habere causam efficientem, et sic de aliis, quod in omnibus generibus manifestum est, nam et materia est effecta, et multae causae efficientes sunt res causatae a materia, et quatenus actu causae sunt, earum causalitas etiam causatur a materia. Neque in hoc sensu procedit difficultas supra tacta, quia non comparatur eadem res in ratione causae et causati, sed una res comparatur ad alteram ut ad effectum suum in quodam genere causae, ad aliam vero ut ad causam suam in alio genere, quod genus causae participatur ab effectu alterius, sic autem nullum est inconveniens ut aliqua causa materialis, sit posterior aliqua causa efficiente a qua fit, et <col. b> prior alia quam ipsa materialiter causat. Comparari ergo debent causae in individuo, et in eisdem rebus. Rursus autem inter istas res potest intelligi comparatio vel secundum idem, vel secundum diversa: secundum idem, ut si una sit causa esse alterius, et vicissim ab illa causetur quantum ad suum esse, nam cum unaquaeque causa per suum esse causet, si secundum illud etiam causatur a suo effectu, tales res, et eadem, et secundum idem erunt sibi invicem causae. Secundum diversa autem erunt, si una sit causa alterius secundum esse eius, alia vero sit causa alterius solum secundum causalitatem ad aliquam aliam superadditam perfectionem, quae omnia exemplis clarius patebunt ex sequentibus.

Quomodo materia et forma sint sibi invicem causae.

4. Dico ergo primo. Materia et forma sunt sibi invicem causae, et aliquo modo secundum idem, non tamen omnino. Haec assertio primo declaratur in materia prima, et substan-

3. It should, moreover, be noticed that there are two ways to understand the claim that causes can be causes of each other in turn: first, formally alone (if I may speak in this way) or according to the general *rationes* of causes, or, second, in particular and according to the same things causing and caused. In the former sense, the matter is simple and without difficulty, but it is not what is primarily intended at present, since understood in that way the claim only asserts that efficient causes, for example, can have material causes and that, conversely, material causes can have efficient causes, and so on for the other causes. This is obvious for all the genera. For it is the case both that matter is an effect and that many efficient causes are things caused by matter, and, insofar, as they are actually caused, their causality is also caused by matter. Nor do the difficulties mentioned earlier apply when the claim is taken in this sense, since it is not the very same thing that is compared in the *ratio* of cause and of the caused, but one thing is compared to a second thing as to its effect in a certain genus of cause but to another thing as to its cause in another genus, which genus of cause is participated in by the effect of another. In this way there is no disagreeability in some material cause being posterior to some efficient cause by which it comes to be and being prior to another that materially causes it. The causes should, therefore, be compared individually and with respect to the things themselves.

In turn, the comparison between the things themselves can be understood *secundum idem* or *secundum diversa*. *Secundum idem*: if one thing is the cause of the being of another thing and in turn is caused with respect to its own being by the second thing. For when each cause causes through its own being, if with respect to that it is also caused by its effect, such things will both be the same and will be mutual causes of each other *secundum idem*. But they will be causes of each other *secundum diversa* if one thing is the cause of the other with respect to its being, but the second thing is the cause of the other only according to the causality with respect to some other superadded perfection. All this will be made clearer by the examples in the following paragraphs.

In what way matter and form are causes of each other in turn.

4. Therefore, I say first: matter and form are causes in turn of each other, and *secundum idem* in a certain way though not entirely. This assertion is first shown in the case of prime matter and with material

40 tialibus formis materialibus, de quibus certum est causari a
 materia, et quoad esse suum, quia ex ea fiunt, et in ea sus-
 tentantur, et quoad suam causalitatem, quia earum informa-
 45 tio eodem modo pendet a materia. E converso vero etiam
 forma est causa materiae in suo genere, quia illam informat et
 actuat, et quia sine illa informatione non potest materia nat-
 50 uraliter esse. In quo est considerandum duo contineri in hac
 causalitate formae circa materiam: unum est, quod forma per-
 45 ficit materiam ipsam informando illam, aliud est, quod media
 hac informatione materia suum esse retinet. Quantum ad pri-
 mum forma et materia sunt sibi invicem causae, non tamen
 secundum idem, quia illa perfectio quam forma formaliter
 praebet materiae, distinctum quid est ab ipso esse materiae,
 50 quia non est aliud ab ipsa forma seu informatione eius, unde
 sub hac ratione forma non tam est causa materiae absolute, et
 simpliciter, quam materiae informatae. Atque ita materia est
 causa formae simpliciter et secundum esse eius, forma vero
 55 est causa materiae solum quatenus formata est, et secundum
 hanc rationem dicimus non esse secundum idem sibi invicem
 causas materiam et formam.

5. At vero secundum aliud quod habet materia per for-
 mam, possunt dici invicem causari et causare secundum idem,
 nam materia per suum esse causat formam, et in eodem dici
 60 potest causari ab illa, quatenus illud habere non
 potest sine illa, nam hoc est signum dependentiae et causal-
 itatis alicuius. Tamen, si vera sunt quae de his causis supra
 diximus, in hoc quasi circulo non est omnino eadem prop-
 65 rietas et similitudo, nam materia per suum esse directe et
 per se causat ipsum esse formae, ita ut in nulla ratione de-
 beat aut possit intelligi esse formae ut quid praesuppositum
 ad influxum materiae, sed ut causatum per illum. At vero
 70 e converso, esse materiae simpliciter concipiendum est ut
 praesuppositum ad esse talis formae, quia est principium ip-
 sius influxus materialis, sine quo non fit talis forma: adeo ut
 eius naturalis effectio, si secundum propriam rationem con-
 70 cipiatur, non possit ita praescindi, quin praesupponat mate-
 riam, quia essentialiter est eductio de potentia materiae. Igi-
 tur esse materiae solum est a forma pendens ut a conditione

40R substantial forms, concerning which it is certain that they are caused
 by matter, both with respect to their being (for they come to be from
 it and are sustained in it) and with respect to their causality (for their
 information depends in the same way on matter). But, conversely, form
 is also the cause of matter in its genus, since it informs and actualizes
 matter and since matter cannot naturally exist without that information.
 In this two things should be considered to be contained in this causality
 45R of the form with respect to matter. One is that form perfects matter itself
 by informing it. The second is that matter preserves its own being by
 means of this information. With respect to the first, form and matter are
 causes of each other in turn, yet not *secundum idem*, since that perfection
 which form formally presents to matter is something distinct from the
 50R being itself of matter. For it is nothing other than the form itself or
 its information. Hence, under this aspect, form is not so much the cause
 of matter absolutely and without qualification as the cause of informed
 matter. And in this way matter is the cause of form without qualification
 and with respect to its being, but form is the cause of matter only insofar
 55R as it is formed. For this reason we say that it is not *secundum idem* that
 matter and form are causes of each other in turn.

5. But with respect to the other thing that matter has through form,
 they can be said in to be caused and to cause *secundum idem*, for matter
 through its own being causes form and in the same respect can be said to
 60R be caused by form, insofar as the former cannot be had without the latter.
 For this is a sign of dependency and something's causality. Nevertheless,
 if what said above about these causes is true, it is not entirely the same
 property and similitude in this, as it were, circle. For matter through its
 own being directly and *per se* causes the very being of the form in such a
 way that the being of a form should not, indeed, cannot, under any *ratio*
 65R be understood as something presupposed for the influx of matter, but
 as something caused through matter. Conversely, however, the being of
 matter is without qualification conceived as presupposed for the being of
 such a form, since it is the principle of that material influx without which
 70R such a form could not come to be; so much so that its natural effecting, if
 it is conceived according to its proper *ratio*, cannot be divided in this way,
 lest it presuppose matter since it essentially is the eduction of a potency
 of matter. Therefore, the being of matter only depends on form as on
 a superadded condition and actuality without which it cannot naturally

75 et actualitate superaddita, sine qua naturaliter esse non potest,
 quae a multis dicitur (ut supra notavi) dependentia a posteri-
 ori et non a priori. Ob hanc ergo causam dixi, quod licet
 haec mutua causalitas sit aliquo modo secundum idem, non
 tamen omnino, quia nimirum directe et immediate est secun-
 80 dum diversa, consequenter vero terminatur aliquo modo ad
 idem, quatenus ipsamet esse materiae pendet aliquo modo
 a forma.

Explicatur
 assertio in
 materia prima et
 rationali anima.

85 6. Et iuxta haec facile explicatur conclusio in materia, et
 forma substantiali subsistente, illa enim forma non causatur
 a materia secundum suum esse, sed tantum secundum in-
 formationem: est autem causa materiae eodem modo quo
 aliae formae substantiales, et ita minor quodammodo est in
 illa mutua causalitate difficultas. Inter subiectum item et ac-
 cidens proportionali modo intervenit illa mutua causalitas,
 90 nam subiectum est causa materialis accidentis, et propriissime
 causat fieri et esse illius, quia sustentat illud: accidens vero
 non est proprie causa subiecti secundum esse illius, est tamen
 causa aliquo modo actuans et perficiens illud, quod potius est
 esse causam formalem illius esse quod confert subiecto, quam
 95 ipsius subiecti. Interdum vero haec causalitas redundat aliquo
 modo in ipsamet subiectum, quando videlicet talis est con-
 nexio inter subiectum et accidens ut naturaliter manere non
 possit subiectum sine tali accidente seu dispositione: et tunc
 aliquo modo dici potest talis causalitas mutua secundum idem
 100 esse <col. b> subiecti: verumtamen illa non tam est causal-
 itas proprie et dependentia a priori, quam conditio quaedam
 necessaria secundum naturalem ordinem, ut saepe dictum est.

Quomodo finis et efficiens sint sibi invicem causae.

7. Dico secundo. Finis et efficiens sunt sibi invicem causae,
 non tantum secundum diversa, sed etiam secundum idem.
 Haec assertio quoad primam partem est Aristotelis 5. *Meta-*
 5 *physicae* cap. 2. et lib. 2. *Physicorum* cap. 3. Ubi non ad-
 hibet exempla huius mutuae causalitatis, nisi inter finem et
 efficiens. Communiter autem exponitur secundum diversa,
 scilicet, finem esse causam efficientis quoad causalitatem eius,

75R be. By many this is called (as we noted above) an a posteriori dependency
 and not an a priori dependency. Therefore, for this reason we said that
 although this mutual causality is *secundum idem* in a certain way though
 not entirely. For, namely, directly and *per se* it is *secundum diversa*, but
 it is consequently terminated in some way in the same respect insofar as
 80R the very same being of matter depends in some way on form.

85R 6. And according to these points the conclusion with respect to mat-
 ter and subsisting substantial forms is easily explained. For those forms
 are not caused by matter according to its own being but only according
 to information. There is, moreover, a cause of matter in the same way
 in which there is of other substantial forms and so that difficulty about
 mutual causality is in some way less applicable. Likewise, that mutual
 causality comes up in an analogous way between subjects and accidents.
 For a subject is a material cause of an accident and most properly causes
 both the coming to be and the being of the accident, since it sustains
 90R it. But an accident is not properly a cause of the subject with respect to
 its being. It is, nevertheless, a cause in some way, actualizing and per-
 fecting the subject. This is more to be a formal cause of the being that
 it confers on the subject than to be a formal cause of the subject itself.
 But sometimes this causality redounds in some way to the subject itself,
 95R when, namely, there is such a connection between the subject and acci-
 dent that it cannot naturally remain a subject without such an accident
 or disposition. In that case one can in some way say that there is such a
 mutual causality according to the same subject. Nevertheless, that is not
 so much a proper causality and a priori dependency as a kind of neces-
 100R sary condition according to the natural order, as has often been said.

In what way ends and efficient causes are causes of each other in turn.

7. Second, I say: end and efficient cause are causes of each other in turn
 not only *secundum diversa* but also *secundum idem*. This assertion with
 respect to the first part comes from Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, cap. 2, and
 5R *Physics* II, cap. 3, where he does not bring up examples of this mutual
 causality except between end and efficient cause. It is often, however,
 explained, *secundum diversa*: namely, that end is the cause of the efficient
 cause with respect to its causality but the efficient cause is the cause of

The assertion is
 explained with
 respect to prime
 matter and
 rational souls.

10 efficiens vero esse causam finis quoad esse illius. Ita fere
 D. Thomas super Aristotelem et Alensis in *Metaphysicae* et
 Albertus 2. *Physicorum* tract. 2. cap. 6. sed non existimo esse
 omnino excludendum, quin aliquo modo hae duae causae sint
 sibi invicem causae etiam secundum idem, ut ex his quae dice-
 mus, constabit. Nunc declaratur facile sententia communis,
 15 quoad id, quod affirmat. Nam finis quem agens habet in
 agendo non est causa esse illius, nam supponit in illo esse,
 ut possit et agere et metaphorice moveri a fine ad agendum,
 si capax sit talis motionis. Quod autem finis sit causa effici-
 entis quoad causalitatem patet, quia excitat et movet efficien-
 tem causam ad agendum. Quod vero e contrario finis sit ef-
 20 fectus agentis secundum suum esse, patet, quia eadem forma
 quae movet agens ad agendum, est terminus actionis eius. Ra-
 tio denique a priori est, quia finis, ut causet, non requirit
 actualem existentiam, sed tantum esse in apprehensione: et
 25 ideo priusquam in re sit, potest movere in suo genere agens
 ad agendum, et rursus potest ab eo existentiam recipere per
 veram efficientiam.

Aliquot obiecta
 contra
 resolutionem de
 efficiente et fine.

8. Sed obiicitur primo contra utramque partem. Primo
 quia finis non confert efficienti ullo modo ut sit id, unde pri-
 mum motus proficiscitur, sed a se id habet, vel ab aliis causis
 30 prioribus, ergo finis non est causa efficientis quoad causalita-
 tem. Secundo, nam alias sequitur Deum quatenus efficiens
 est, causari a fine, quod dici nullo modo potest. Tertio e con-
 trario videtur, finem non solum esse causam efficientis quoad
 causalitatem, sed etiam quoad esse, ut patet in exemplo Aris-
 35 totelis: nam laborare vel <955> ambulare est causa effectiva
 sanitatis, causatur autem a sanitate in genere finis: causatur
 autem non tantum quoad causalitatem, sed etiam quoad esse:
 nam ipsummet esse deambulationis, seu fieri (quod in ea idem
 40 est) est propter sanitatem. Quarto falsum etiam videtur finem
 esse ab efficienti quoad suum esse, nam finis operantis est ip-
 summet agens, quod non potest esse a seipso effective.

9. Propter primam obiectionem quidam in universum
 negant finem esse causam efficientis quoad causalitatem: immo
 45 in omnibus causis negant esse sibi invicem causas quoad

10R the end with respect to its being. This is more or less the claim made by
 St. Thomas regarding Aristotle and by Alexander of Hales in *Metaphysics*
 and by Albert the Great in *Physics* II, tract. 2, cap. 6. But I do not think
 that it should be entirely excluded that these two causes are in some way
 causes of each other in turn even *secundum idem*, as will be clear from
 what we will say.

15R For now the common view is easily shown, with respect to that
 which it affirms. For the end which an agent has when acting is not
 the cause of the agent's being for it presupposes being in the agent so that
 the agent can act and be moved to acting by the end, if it is capable of
 such motion. That the end is the cause of the efficient cause with respect
 20R to causality is clear, since the end excites and moves the efficient cause to
 acting. But, the other way around, that the end is the effect of the agent
 according to its being is clear, since the same for that moves the agent
 to acting is the terminus of the agent's action. Finally, the reason is a
 priori, since an end does not require actual existence in order to cause,
 25R but only requires being in apprehension. And for this reason it can in its
 genus move the agent to acting before it exists in reality and, in turn, can
 receive existence from the agent through true efficiency.

8. But there is, first, an objection against each part. First: since an
 end does not confer anything to the efficient cause so that it is that from
 which the first motion proceeds, but has that from itself or from other
 prior causes, therefore, the end is not the cause of the efficient cause with
 respect to causality. Second: for otherwise it follows that God insofar
 as he is an efficient cause is caused by an end, which can in no way be
 said. Third: the other way around it seems that an end cannot be the
 cause of an efficient cause with respect to causality alone but also with
 respect to being, as is clear in the example from Aristotle. For working or
 walking is the effective cause of health; it is, moreover, caused by health
 in the genus of ends. But it is not only caused with respect to causality
 but also with respect to being. For the being itself of walking about or
 the becoming (which is the same in this case) is for the sake of health.
 Fourth: it also seems to be false that an end is from an efficient cause
 with respect to its being, for the end of the one acting is the agent itself,
 which cannot be effectively from itself.

9. On account of the first objection some people deny in general
 that ends are causes of efficient causes with respect to causality. Indeed,
 in the case of all causes they deny that they cause each other in turn with

Some objections
 against the
 resolution
 concerning
 efficient causes
 and ends.

causalitatem, quia nec materia habet a forma ut sustineat formam, nec forma a materia, ut informet. Sed vereor ne sit aequivocatio in his terminis, nam loqui possumus vel de causalitate in actu primo, vel in actu secundo. Cum ergo dicitur, unam causam esse causam alterius quoad eius causalitatem, proprie ac per se est sermo de causalitate in actu secundo: argumenta autem procedunt de actu primo. Sic enim verum est materiam non habere a forma sustentare, id est vim illam, quam habet ad sustentandam formam, et e contrario formam non habere a materia vim quam habet ad informandum. Quamquam hoc posterius non sit in universum verum, sed in anima tantum rationali, nam aliae formae sicut habent suum esse dependenter a materia, ita et omnem suam vim et substantialem aptitudinem, ut per se satis constat. Unde si etiam e contrario dicatur materia habere suum esse a forma, fatendum est ab illa etiam habere vim sustinendi formam, nos autem non ita loquimur, quia non censemus proprie loquendo, habere materiam proprie suum peculiare esse a forma, sed habere illud dependenter a forma ut a posteriori conditione, ut saepe declaratum est. At vero quoad actualem causalitatem falsum est materiam et formam non esse sibi invicem causas, nam et materia est in suo genere causa actualis informationis formae, quia non potest forma informare nisi materia causante materialiter ipsammet informationem formae, et e converso materia similiter non potest actualiter sustinere formam, nisi eadem forma causante in suo genere ipsammet sustentationem materiae, quidquid illa sit. Unde reipsa spectata haec mutua causalitas in causando non est aliud nisi mutuus concursus utriusque causae ad suas proprias causalitates. <col. b>

10. Sic igitur facile constat quomodo finis sit causa efficientis causae quoad causalitatem eius, quidquid sit de virtute causandi, de quo inferius dicam. Est ergo finis causa alliciens virtutem agentis ut causet, et consequenter in suo genere influens in actualem causalitatem eius. Ex quo ulterius colligo etiam efficientem causam posse dici in suo genere causam finis quoad actualem causalitatem. Quamvis enim virtus causandi finis prout antecedit in intentione non sit ab ipso efficiente,

respect to causality, since matter does not have anything from form in order to sustain form nor does form have anything from matter in order to inform. But I am afraid that there may be equivocation in these terms, for we can speak either about causality in the first act or in the second act. When, therefore, it is said that one cause is the cause of another with respect to its causality, the discussion is properly and *per se* about causality in the second act. The arguments, however, only apply concerning causality in the first act. For thus it is true that matter does not have from form so that it can sustain—that is, that power that it has for sustaining a form—and, conversely, form does not have from matter the power that it has for informing. Though this latter part is not universally true but only in the case of rational souls. For just as other forms have their being dependently on matter, so also they have all their power and substantial aptitude, as is sufficiently obvious *per se*. Hence, if it is also said the other way around that matter has its being from form, it should be acknowledged that it also has its power for sustaining form from form. But we do not speak in this way, since we do not think that, properly speaking, matter properly has its own peculiar being from form; rather, it has that dependently from form as from a posterior condition, as has often been shown. But with respect to actual causality, it is false that matter and form are not causes of each other in turn, for even matter is in its genus an actual cause of the information of the form, since form cannot inform except by the matter materially causing the information itself of the form. And, conversely, matter likewise cannot actually sustain form except by the same form causing in its genus the sustaining work itself of matter, whatever that is. Hence, in the cases looked at this mutual causality in causing is nothing other than a mutual concursus of each cause to their proper causalities.

10. In this way, therefore, it is readily clear in what way an end is the cause of an efficient cause with respect to its causality, whatever the case may be concerning its power of causing, concerning which I will speak below. An end, therefore, is a cause attracting the power of the agent so that it causes and consequently in its own genus gives influence into its actual causality. From this I gather further that an efficient cause can also be called in its genus the cause of an end with respect to actual causality. For although the power of causing of the end insofar as it

85 tamen actualis causalitas finis non potest esse sine efficientia
 agentis, ut supra demonstratum est, et ideo sicut causa effi-
 90 cients constituitur in actu secundo, concurrente fine propter
 quem causat, et ob hanc rationem dicitur causari a fine quoad
 causalitatem suam, ita e converso causa finalis non constitu-
 95 itur in actu secundo nisi concurrente causa efficiente in suo
 genere ad causalitatem eius, ergo habent in hoc mutuam in-
 ter se causalitatem in suis generibus, sicut materia et forma
 inter se. Et quoad hanc partem verum imprimis habet, quod
 in conclusione dixi, finem et efficiens esse sibi mutuo causas
 non tantum secundum diversa, sed etiam secundum idem.

Secundo. 95 11. Ad secundum responderi potest primo, non oportere
 conclusionem positam universe intelligi de omni fine et de
 omni efficiente. Quod enim in principio notavimus propo-
 100 sitionem Aristotelis non esse universalem de omnibus causis,
 potest ad praesentem etiam conclusionem applicari, quia, ut
 statim dicemus, non omne efficiens dat esse illi fini propter
 quem operatur, et simili modo non omne agens movetur a
 fine ad operandum per propriam finis causalitatem. Secundo
 105 vero dicitur, loquendo de Deo ut de efficiente non quoad
 vim efficiendi, nec quoad internam voluntatem causandi, sed
 quoad actuale et transeuntem causalitatem suam, verum
 esse, hanc causalitatem, qua denominatur Deus actu efficiens,
 causari ab ipso Deo ut fine, nam haec causalitas Dei non est
 aliud quam actio eius transiens ab ipso, et in creatura recepta,
 110 quae vere etiam causatur ab ipsomet Deo ut a fine, ut in su-
 perioribus visum est. Atque ita etiam in Deo verum est non
 constitui actu agentem nisi concurrente seipso ut fine ad suam
 causalitatem activam, et e converso non constitui actu finem
 nisi concurrente seipso active ad suam causalitatem finalem.

Tertio. 115 12. Ad tertium concedendum est id totum <956> quod
 intendit, nam aliqua est causa efficiens quae totum suum esse
 115R habet a fine in genere causae finalis quem et propter quem
 causat. Quod non solum Aristotelis exemplo, sed etiam aliis
 ostendi potest, nam finis intellectus verbi gratia, est intel-

85R precedes in intention is not from the efficient cause, nevertheless, the
 actual causality of an end cannot be without the efficiency of the agent,
 as was demonstrated above. And for this reason just as an efficient cause
 is constituted in second act by the concurring end for the sake of which
 it causes (and for this reason is said to be caused by the end with respect
 to its causality), so also, conversely, the final cause is not constituted in
 90R second act except by the efficient cause concurring in its genus for its
 causality. In this they have, then, a mutual causality between each other
 in their genera, just as matter and form have between each other. And
 with respect to this part what was said in the conclusion is especially held
 true: end and efficient cause are causes for each other in turn not only
secundum diversa but also *secundum idem*.

95R 11. To the second objection one can respond, first, that the posited
 conclusion must not be understood universally of every end and every
 efficient cause. For what we noted at the outset—that Aristotle’s propo-
 sition is not universally true of all causes—can also be applied to the
 present conclusion. For, as we will say at once, not every efficient cause
 100R gives being to the end for the sake of which it acted. In a similar way not
 every agent is moved by an end to acting through the proper causality
 of an end. But, second, it is said, it is true when speaking about God
 as an efficient end, not with respect to the power of effecting nor with
 respect to the internal will for causing but with respect to his actual and
 transeunt causality, that the causality by which God is denominated an
 105R efficient cause in act is caused by God himself as by an end. For this
 causality of God is nothing other than the action transiting from him
 and received in a creature, which indeed is also caused by God himself as
 by an end, as was seen in earlier sections.⁵ And in this way it is also true
 110R in the case of God that he is not constituted an agent in act except by
 himself concurring as an end with his active causality. Conversely, he is
 not constituted an end in act except by himself concurring actively with
 his final causality.

115R 12. To the third objection one should concede everything that is in-
 tended, for there is something that is an efficient cause and has its whole
 being from an end in the genus of final cause which and for the sake
 of which it causes. Aristotle’s example is not the only one; others can
 also be pointed out. The end of intellect, for example, is to understand.

Second.

Third.

⁵*DM* XXIII.9.

120 ligere: immo in universum potentia vel agens creatum, dic-
itur esse propter operationem: ergo in genere finis intellectus 120R
causatur ab intelligere, non solum quoad causalitatem, sed
etiam quoad esse, nam propter intellectionem fit, et est. Et
hinc etiam intelligitur interdum finem esse causam agentis,
125 non solum quoad actualem causalitatem in actu secundo, sed
etiam quoad virtutem causandi in actu primo, ut verbi gratia 125R
sanitas est causa finalis rhabbari, non tantum ut actu expel-
lentis, vel applicati ad expellendam choleram, sed etiam
quoad ipsam virtutem innatam quam habet ad illum effec-
tum, nam propter hunc finem illam recepit ab auctore natu-
130 rae ut sanitatem causaret. Et hoc secundum a fortiori collig-
itur ex primo, ut supra in simili dicebam, nam, si ipsum esse
rei quae est causa efficiens, causatur finaliter a suomet effectu,
multo magis virtus effectiva ad causandum, quae consequitur
ad ipsum esse, poterit ab eodem fine causari. Atque in hoc
135 etiam verificatur quod in conclusione diximus, finem et effi-
ciens posse esse sibi invicem causas secundum idem, nam et
finis in suo genere causat efficiens quoad esse eius, et efficiens
in suo causat finem quoad suum esse reale. Et ratio est ea-
dem quae supra tacta est, quia finis ut causet, non supponitur
140 esse secundum esse reale, et ideo, si supponatur apprehensus
in causa efficiente aliam efficientem causam ipsiusmet finis,
potest finaliter illam movere, vel cum illa finaliter concurrere
ad dandum esse illi rei, a qua postea idemmet finis secundum
realem existentiam procedit, et sic domus in mente artificis,
145 est causa finalis fabricandi serram verbi gratia, a qua serra do-
mus ipsa postea efficienter fit. 145R

13. Quapropter, cum graves auctores dicunt, finem et effi-
ciens esse sibi mutuo causas secundum diversa, exponendi
sunt, quod explicuerint id quod magis per se convenit his
150 causis ac formalius ut actu causantibus, non vero quod ex-
cluserint omnem alium modum mutuae causalitatis, qui inter
has causas haberi potest. Itaque specialiter attribuitur fini,
quod sit causa agentis quoad actualem causalitatem seu ac-
tionem, quia hoc est semper ac per se necessarium, eo quod
150R

⁶Rhubarb was prescribed for purging bile.

Indeed, created powers or agents are generally said to be for the sake of activity. Intellect, therefore, in the genus of ends is caused by understanding, not only with respect to causality but also with respect to being, for it comes to be and is for the sake of understanding.

And from this one also understands that sometimes an end is the cause of an agent not only with respect to actual causality in second act but also with respect to the power of causing in first act, as, for example, health is the final cause of rhubarb⁶ not only as actually expelling or as applied in order to expel jaundice but also with respect to the innate power that it has for that effect. For it receives this power from the author of nature for the sake of this end so that it would cause health. And this second point is gathered a fortiori from the first, as I was saying in similar cases above, for, if the being itself of a thing that is an efficient cause is final-caused by its own effect, much more can the effective power for causing that follows from the being itself be caused by that same end.

And in this is also verified what we said in the conclusion: that end and efficient cause can be causes of each other *secundum idem*. For the end in its genus causes the efficient cause with respect to its being and the efficient cause in its genus causes the end with respect to its real being. And the reason is the same as the one mentioned above: for in order for an end to cause it is not assumed to be according to real being and so, if it is assumed apprehended in the efficient cause [and there is] another efficient cause of the end itself, the end can final-move the former efficient cause or final-concur with it to give being to that thing from which afterwards the same end proceeds according to real existence. In this way the house in the mind of the builder is the final cause, for example, of a saw, by which saw the house itself afterwards efficiently comes to be.

13. For this reason, when weighty authors say that ends and efficient causes are mutual causes of each other *secundum diversa*, they should be explained to have expounded that which more *per se* applies to these causes and more formally as they are actually causing but not to have excluded every other mode of mutual causality that can be had between these causes. And so it is especially to ends that they are causes of agents with respect to actual causality of action, since this is always and *per se* necessary by the fact that every action is in some way for the sake of an

155 omnis actio <col. b> est aliquo modo propter finem: quod
 vero sit causa ipsius esse agentis, non est ita per se aut neces- 155R
 sarium, quamvis saepe ita contingat. Et quamvis agens etiam
 concurrat ad causalitatem finis, ut declaravimus, tamen hoc
 magis attribuitur fini, quia ipse est primus in movendo et in-
 fluendo ad causalitatem agentis, ut supra etiam declaratum 160
 est. E converso autem efficiens dicitur causare finem secun-
 dum esse eius, quia hoc per se ac semper illi convenit, quia
 non potest operari propter finem nisi aliquo modo efficiat ip-
 sum finem.

165 14. Hoc autem (ut ad quartam obiectionem iam respon-
 deamus) intelligendum est de fine cuius, vel etiam de fine quo
 seu formali, qui est adeptio finis obiectivi. Nam finis cui, non
 fit ab efficiente, ut recte probat illa quarta obiectione: nec etiam 165R
 finis obiectivus fit, sed obtinetur: finis autem cuius, est ter-
 minus intrinsecus ad quem tendit et terminatur actio agentis,
 et ideo per se, et secundum suum esse est effectus agentis. Et
 similiter quando bonum amatur seu desideratur, non ut fiat,
 sed ut possideatur, ipsa consecutio vel possessio finis fit ab 170R
 ipso agente, quia tota intentio, et applicatio mediorum ad il-
 lam tendit, et tunc in illa serie, illa est quidam finis, cuius
 175 gratia et propter quem fit operatio.

Quomodo materia et finis sint sibi invicem causae.

15. Tertio dicendum est, finem et materiam posse mutuo sibi
 invicem esse causas. Probatur, quia Aristoteles ait formam
 et finem coincidere in idem numero: est autem forma non
 5 tantum finis generationis, sed etiam ipsius materiae, quia ma- 5R
 teria natura sua est propter formam tamquam propter finem,
 et simul etiam est propter compositum, quia haec duo non re-
 pugnant, sed subordinata sunt. Est ergo materia effectus for-
 mae et compositi in genere causae finalis: sed eadem materia
 10 est causa materialis formae et compositi: ergo est reciproca- 10R

⁷On the distinction between *finis cuius* and *finis cui*, see *DM* XXIII.2.2–8.

end. But that they are causes of the agents' being is not *per se* and neces-
 sary in the same way, although it often happens that way. And, although
 agents also concur with the causality of ends, as we showed, nevertheless,
 this is attributed more to ends, since ends are first in moving and influ-
 encing to the causality of agents, as was also shown above. Conversely,
 however, efficient causes are said to cause ends according to their being,
 since this always and *per se* applies to them. For they cannot act for the
 sake of ends except by in some way effecting the ends themselves.

14. This, moreover, in order now to respond to the fourth objection,
 should be understood as of *finis cuius* or also as of *finis quo* or formal
 ends, which are the attainments of objective ends.⁷ For a *finis cui* does
 not come to be from the efficient cause, as the fourth objection rightly
 shows. Nor does the objective end come to be; rather, it is obtained.
 A *finis cuius*, however, is the intrinsic terminus to which the action of
 an agent tends and in which it is terminated. And so it is *per se* and
 according to its being an effect of the agent. Similarly, when a good is
 loved or desired not so that it come to be but so that it be possessed, that
 attainment or possession of the end comes to be by the agent itself, since
 the entire intention and application of the means tends to that. And
 then in that series that for the sake of which and on account of which
 the activity comes to be is indeed the end.

In what way matter and end are causes of each other in turn.

15. Third, it should be said that end and matter can be mutual causes
 of each other in turn. It is proven, for Aristotle says that form and end
 coincide as one in number. But form is not only the end of generation
 but also of matter itself, since matter by its nature is for the sake of form
 as for the sake of an end. It is at the same time also for the sake of the
 composite, since these two are not repugnant but subordinated. Matter
 is, then, an effect of the form and of the composite in the genus of final
 causes. But the same matter is the material cause of the form and of the
 composite. There is, therefore, a reciprocation between these two causes

tio inter has duas causas in ratione causae et causati. Quod quidem generale est ex parte materiae, non vero ex parte finis, sed tunc solum, quando talis est finis ut materia constet vel ab illa pendeat: omnis enim materia ordinatur ad aliquam formam vel compositum ut ad finem, et ideo in quacumque materia respectu talis intercedit semper dicta causalitas mutua: non autem omnis finis constat materia aut pendet ab illa, ut per se notum est, et ideo ex parte eius non potest esse universalis illa <957> reciprocatio. Atque ita explicata hac assertionem nulla manet in ea difficultas, et fundamentum eius est idem quod supra tactum est, quia finis ut causet, non supponit praeexistere realiter, et ideo potest esse causa suae materiae, licet ab illa realiter causetur in suo genere.

Mutua causalitas inter formam, et finem excluditur.

16. Dico quarto. Forma et finis, proprie ac per se loquendo, nunquam possunt esse sibi invicem causae. Loquor de forma ut exercet genus causae formalis, et ideo dixi *proprie et per se loquendo*: nam interdum contingit unam formam, quae est effectus alterius in genere causae finalis, esse causam eiusdem formae quae est finis, tamen nunquam est causa formalis eius, sed aut efficiens, aut materialis. Ut lumen gloriae est effectus visionis beatificae in genere causae finalis, et est etiam causa eius, non formalis, sed efficiens: et intellectus etiam est effectus eiusdem visionis in genere finis, quia propter illam fit, et est causa eius, et materialis, et efficiens, formalis autem esse non potest. Et ratio conclusionis est, nam vel consideratur forma ut est finis generationis, vel ut ordinatur in aliam formam seu operationem ut in finem. Priori modo forma et finis incidunt in idem numero, et ideo non potest illa forma esse causa formalis illius finis, quia non potest esse causa formalis sui ipsius: quod secus est in causalitate finali, nam eadem forma ut antecedens in intentione est causa sui ipsius in executione secundum causalitatem finalem, quae non requirit praeexistentiam in re. At vero in genere formalis causae non potest forma causare seipsam, sed compositum, quia causali-

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under the *ratio* of cause and caused. This indeed is generally true on the part of matter but not on the part of ends, but only then when the end is such that the matter stands on or depends on it. For all matter is ordered to some form or composite as to an end and for this reason with any matter whatever with respect to such the mentioned mutual causality is always involved. But not every end stands on matter or depends on it, as is known *per se*, and so that reciprocation cannot be universal on its part. Explained in this way, no difficulty remains in this assertion and its foundation is the same as what was mentioned above, since in order for an end to cause it need not be assumed to preexist in reality. And so it can be a cause of its matter, although it be caused to be in reality by that matter in its genus.

Mutual causality between form and end is ruled out.

16. Fourth, I say: form and end, speaking properly and *per se*, can never be causes of each other in turn. . . .

tas eius consistit in compositione et unione ad materiam.

17. Ut autem conclusio quoad hanc partem omni careat
difficultate, intelligenda est de forma comparata ad proprium
effectum suum, ut est compositum: quod dico, quia si com-
paretur ad ipsammet unionem vei actualement informationem,
50 revera in genere finis est effectus eius, nam forma est ut in-
formet, et propter hunc finem fit, et tamen ipsamet informa-
tio est a forma in genere causae formalis, tamen non tam pro-
prie est effectus eius, quam causalitas eius: si tamen ipsa etiam
55 unio vel informatio, effectus formae vocetur in genere causae
formalis, quoad talem effectum limitanda est posita conclu-
sio propter <col. b> specialem connexionem quam habet
cum ipsa forma ut exercet rationem formae. Nam sicut ef-
ficiens est propter operationem, et ideo inter illa est mutua
60 causalitas, nam operatio est causa finalis potentiae activae, et
potentia est causa efficiens operationis; ita forma est propter
informationem, et in suo genere est causa eius. At vero com-
parando formam prout est finis generationis, ad eandem pro-
priam formam ut informantem, non potest intercedere dicta
65 mutua causalitas, quia est una et eadem prorsus forma.

18. Si autem formas duas comparemus, quarum una ad
alteram ut ad finem ordinatur, etiam non potest illa mutua
causalitas intercedere, quia una forma non potest esse causa
formalis alterius, quatenus etiam forma est: si enim contin-
70 gat unam formam alia accidentali informari, necesse est ut ea
quae informatur, exerceat sub ea ratione causalitatem mate-
rialem, non formalem. Scio nonnullos ita loqui, ut dicant
actus immanentes dependere ab anima vel a potentia vitali in
genere causae formalis, cum tamen ipsimet actus immanentes
75 sint causae formales accidentales: et similiter dici solet pas-
siones, vel potentias animae pendere ab illa in genere causae
formalis, cum tamen illam informant. Sed hae locutiones
sunt impropriae, nam neque actus neque potentiae pendeat
a forma nisi aut materialiter aut effective: quia vero illa effi-
80 cientia est valde intrinseca, aut per resultantiam naturalem, dici
solet secundarius effectus formae, tamen proprie et in rigore

47 17] 16 A.

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17.

18.

non pertinet ad effectum formalem.

Excluditur mutua causalitas inter efficientem causam respectu materialis et formalis.

19. Dico quinto. Causa efficiens non potest habere mutua
causalitatem cum materia vel forma, sed solum cum
5 finali causa, ut iam explicuimus. Sensus conclusionis est,
quod si aliqua causa vere ac proprie efficiat aliquam formam,
non potest ab illa causari in genere causae formalis, et e con-
verso, si aliqua forma formaliter constituit aliquam rem, non
10 potest ab illa effective fieri. Et quoad has duas partes nulla
est difficultas in conclusione posita. Et ratio est, primo quia
causa efficiens supponitur absolute existens ad efficiendum:
ergo non potest formaliter constitui per formam quam ef-
ficat. Patet consequentia, quia si illa res in suo esse per formam
15 constituenda est, iam forma supponitur constituta, quia iam
supponitur habens esse: <958> ergo non potest formaliter
constitui per formam a se factam. Secundo, quia forma est
principium agendi: ergo forma quae est terminus actionis,
non potest esse causa formalis ipsiusmet agentis: hac enim ra-
20 tione Aristoteles dixit 2. *Physicorum* cap. 7. text. 70. formam
quae fit non coincidere in idem numero cum efficiente, sed
in idem specie. Ex his autem rationibus facile colligitur, con-
clusionem intelligendam esse de causalitate formali quantum
ad proprium esse ipsius causae efficientis: nam, si loquamur
25 de causalitate formali quantum ad aliquod aliud esse super-
additum ipsi efficienti, saepe accidere potest ut forma facta a
causa efficiente suam causam informet, ut amor informat vol-
untatem a qua fit, non vero informat illam quoad dandum ei
illud esse, per quod ab ipsa causatur: unde nec informat il-
lam ut efficiens est, sed ut subiectum et causa materialis esse
30 potest.

20. Simili modo intelligenda est conclusio comparando
efficientem causam ad materialem. Nam si res aliqua efficit
aliquam materiam, non potest ab illa materialiter causari, et

Mutual causality between efficient causes and material and formal causes is ruled out.

19. Fifth, I say: an efficient cause cannot have mutual causality with matter or form, but only with a final causes, as we will explain now. . . .

5R 20.

3 19] 18 A.

31 20] 19 A.

35 e converso, si una res materialiter causat aliam, non potest
 40 ab illa effective fieri. Et quidem, si sermo est tantum de ma-
 45 teria prima, est res evidentissima, quia materia prima non
 potest fieri nisi per creationem, et ideo causa eius est remotis-
 50 sima ab omni dependentia a materia: ergo impossibile est ut
 quidquid ex tali materia causatur, sit causa efficiens materiae,
 non modo eiusdem numero, verum neque ullius omnino. Tamen extendendo conclusionem (ut revera intelligenda est)
 ad omnem causam materialem seu subiectivam, ratio gener-
 55 alis est, quia causa efficiens supponitur simpliciter et abso-
 lute existens ad agendum, et ideo si indiget aliqua causa, vel
 causalitate materiali ut sit, talis causa supponitur ante omnem
 efficientiam eius, ac proinde non potest talis res esse causa ef-
 60 ficiens suae materiae. Et confirmatur, nam causa materialis
 est intrinseca si comparetur ad compositum, vel est intime
 coniuncta, si comparetur ad formam: ergo sive res quae dic-
 65 itur causa efficiens, sit compositum, sive forma, non potest
 efficere materiam vel subiectum a quo pendet. Patet conse-
 quentia, quia intrinseca rei constitutio vel unio est simpliciter
 prior quam efficientia eius: item etiam quia intrinseca consti-
 70 tutio non potest esse effective ab ipsamet re quae constituitur;
 nec intrinseca unio materialis <col. b> potest esse effective
 ab ipsa forma quae unitur: alias etiam ipsa eductio formae
 posset esse effective ab eadem forma quae educitur.

Dispositio ultima
 non est effective a
 forma.

21. Solent autem contra hanc partem nonnullae instan-
 75 tiaae afferri. Una est de forma et dispositione ultima; sed de
 hac multa dicta sunt disp. 13. de causa materiali; ubi prob-
 80 abiliter esse ostendimus, dispositionem ultimam, quae vere
 praeparat materiam, non esse effective a forma: quae vero est
 effective a forma, non esse praeparantem materiam, nec par-
 85 ticipare causalitatem materialem, sed esse dispositionem or-
 nantem, et quasi foventem, et conferentem unionem formae
 cum materia.

Expulsio unius
 formae an causa
 materialis
 introductionis
 alterius.

22. Altera instantia est de introductione unius formae, et
 90 expulsionem alterius, nam haec expulsio est quasi causa materi-
 95 alis illius. Sed haec magis pertinet ad mutuam causalitatem

58 21] 20 A.
 67 22] 21 A.

21.

22.

70 inter materiam et formam quam ad praesens, nam forma
introducita non expellit alteram effective, sed formaliter, ut
supra visum est: si autem sit sermo de forma active intro-
ducente aliam, respectu illius expulsio formae nullam habet
causalitatem, sed tantum est effectus secundarius illius actio-
75 nis. Addo etiam, expulsionem formae improprie dici causam
materiale[m] introductionis alterius formae, nam potius est re-
motio cuiusdam impedimenti non tam antecedens, quam sub-
sequens, vel concomitans, vel si aliquis est ordo vel prioritas,
est magis secundum considerationem nostram, quam secun-
80 dum veram causalitatem.

Fenestrae apertio
an habeat
causalitatem
respectu ingressus
lucis.

23. Alia instantia esse solet de apertione fenestrae, et in-
troductione lucis, quae magis videtur vulgaris, quam Philo-
sophica, nam apertio fenestrae est remotio cuiusdam impedi-
menti simpliciter antecedens ordine naturae, quia nullo modo
85 est effectus introductionis lucis. Quod si fingamus fenestram
aperiri ab externo vento impellente et introeunte, sic apertio
quidem est effective ab aere impellente: tamen ille aer ut im-
pellens et efficiens, nullo modo est effectus ipsius apertionis
in genere causae materialis, quia aer impellens non efficit il-
90 lum motum fenestrae ut introductus iam in locum eius, sed ut
contingens, et imprimens illi impetum, quod facit prius tem-
pore vel instanti, quam in locum fenestrae introduca- <959>
tur, et quam fenestra ipsa a loco suo moveatur, et ita respectu
illius efficientiae nulla est causalitas materialis in effectu eius.
95 Quod si consideretur aer ut iam occupans locum fenestrae
quae aperitur, sic non est causa effectiva apertionis, sed for-
malis, per formalem nimirum impossibilitatem illorum
duorum corporum in eodem spatio. Et secundum hanc ra-
tionem si est mutua causalitas inter apertionem fenestrae, et
100 introductionem aeris, pertinet ad materiale[m] et formalem,
non ad efficientem: et idem iudicium de illa est, quod de
introductione unius formae, et expulsionem alterius. Atque
ita in universum verum est, causam efficientem non habere
mutuam causalitatem cum suo effectu nisi in genere finis:
105 neque Aristoteles unquam aliam docuit. Statim vero occurret

23.

hic Theologis difficultas de ultima dispositione ad gratiam, quam illis remittimus: existimamus autem iuxta haec principia verum iudicium de illa ferendum esse.

Quomodo inter causas eiusdem generis esse possit causalitas reciproca.

In eodem genere
causae simpliciter
nullae sunt sui
mutuo causae.

5

24. Ultimo dicendum est intra idem genus causae non posse duas res esse sibi invicem causas simpliciter et secundum idem: secundum quid autem, et secundum diversas rationes veluti specificas intra idem genus causae non renugnare. Prior pars est sententia Aristotelis citatis locis, quam absolute etiam docent omnes eius interpretes; et potest inductione probari, nam res quae aliam efficit, non potest ab ea vicissim fieri, et sic de caeteris. Ratio autem in singulis potest propria reddi, nam materia vel non habet materialem causam, ut materia prima, vel si habet, ut materia secunda, non potest eadem res, quam ipsa componit aut recipit esse materia eius. Quia materia comparatur ut pars, vel potentia receptiva ad suum effectum, et ad illum supponitur: si vero ipsa habet causam materialem, ad illam comparatur ut totum ad partem, et generationis seu existendi ordine illam supponit: et ideo non potest esse talis circulus inter causas materiales. Nec vero inter formales, quia forma non habet causam formalem, ut supra dicebamus. In causa etiam finali est res manifesta, quia causa finalis ut sic non habet causam finalem: quod si illam habet quatenus induit aliquam rationem medii, non potest in eadem rem, quae est medium ad illam, ut in finem <col. b> ordinari: alioqui in eodem ordine intentionis esset prior et posterior, quod repugnat. In efficientibus est etiam manifesta ratio, quia res quae efficit aliam, supponitur esse, et consequenter facta, si effectione indigeat: et ideo impossibile est ut a suo effectu effective fiat. Quod semper intelligendum est (quod in finibus etiam est observandum) loquendo de actuali causalitate mutua, quae simul sit: nam loquendo tantum de potentia causandi, et divisim, non repugnat ut res, quae nunc est finis alterius, cesset ab illa causalitate, et postea ordinetur

5R

In what way there can be reciprocal causality between causes of the same genus.

24. Lastly, it should be said that two things cannot be causes of each other in turn without qualification and *secundum idem* within the same genus of cause. . . .

No things are
without
qualification
mutual causes of
each other in the
same genus of
cause.

Intra causam
materialem
probatum.

10

15

Intra formalem.

Intra finalem.

20

Intra efficientem.

25

30

ad alteram ut in finem ex libertate agentis. Et similiter non
 repugnaret ut res quae nunc efficit aliam, fieret ab illa, si ordo
 35 causandi a principio fuisset mutatus, et res quae nunc fit ab
 una causa, non fieret ab illa, sed ab alia, nam tunc sine in-
 convenienti posset illa efficere eandem rem a qua nunc facta
 est, ut supra tractavi. Nunc autem non divisim, sed coniunc-
 tim loquimur, et sic impossibile est ut res fiat ab effectu quem
 40 facit.

25. Alia ratio generalis hic tradi solet, quia alias idem
 esset causa sui ipsius, nam quod est causa causae, est causa
 causali: quod axioma tenet in causis eiusdem generis, ut
 omnes dicunt, et specialiter adnotavit Scotus in 4. dist. 49. q. 2. et
 45 in *Theorematibus* 22. conclus. universali. Non immerito
 autem interrogare potest aliquis, quare illa consecutio teneat
 in causis eiusdem generis, non autem diversorum. Deinde
 dubitare quis potest, quia non sequitur quod aliquid sit causa
 sui per se, sed tantum per accidens, sicut avus est causa nepo-
 50 tis, quod non videtur magnum inconueniens. Ad priorem
 partem respondeo rationem esse, quia in diversis generibus,
 hoc ipso quod mutatur causandi modus, mutatur etiam ra-
 tio essendi quae in causa supponitur ad effectum. Et conse-
 quenter id quod est causa suae causae, non est causa eius se-
 55 cundum id quod habet a sua causa, sed secundum aliud, ut
 quamvis finis sit causa sui efficientis, non est causa eius se-
 cundum esse existentiae exercitum quod ab illo habet, sed ut
 apprehensum. At vero si in eodem genere duo se mutuo ef-
 ficerent, et secundum eundem ordinem unum supponeretur
 60 ad aliud, et e converso, quod repugnat; et unum causaret al-
 iud secundum illudmet esse quod ab illo habet, et e converso,
 et ideo virtute causaret seipsum. Unde ad alteram partem re-
 spondetur illam causam dici per accidens, quia non immedi-
 ate influit in effec- <960> tum mediatum: tamen est causa
 65 per se sui immediati effectus; in quo virtute continetur alius
 effectus, et per se ab illo manat: et ideo perinde repugnat aliq-
 uid hoc modo esse causam sui, ac si per se et immediate se
 efficeret.

25.

- Leviores
obiectiones
contra praedicta
solvuntur. 70
26. Aliae obiectiones leviores fieri solent contra hanc conclusionem, quia in omnibus generibus causarum videtur pati calumniam: in efficiente, quia duae manus si sint calidae, et simul se contingant, se mutuo foveant et conservant: si vero sint frigidae, confricatione se mutuo calefaciunt. In dispositionibus, quae ad materialem causam pertinent, calor vere disponit ad raritatem, et raritas ad calorem. In finibus potentia est gratia operationis, et operatio propter potentiam. In formalibus denique, quamvis physice non inveniatur illa vicissitudo, reperitur tamen metaphysice, dum una differentia contrahit aliam, et vicissim potest contrahi ab illa, nam mortale contrahit rationale, vel intellectuale late sumptum, ut si homo dicatur vivens, intellectuale, mortale: et e contrario rationale contrahit mortale. 75
- Manus invicem se
fricantes qualiter
se mutuo
calefaciant. 85
27. Respondetur tamen ad primam, duas manus, si aequae sint calidae, non se conservare mutuo agendo, sed fortius resistendo contrario, aut expugnando illud. Si vero sint frigidae, non per se, se calefacere, sed per accidens medio motu: et tunc una non agit in aliam, quatenus calorem recipit media confricatione alterius, sed vi movendi ac tangendi, quam habet: et hoc modo non est inconveniens duas res mutuo agere in seipsas, si per se agant per proprias virtutes, et non per id quod ad invicem recipiant, ut stomachus calefacit vinum calore formali et innato, et vinum calefacit stomachum calore virtuali quem ex se habet: et hoc modo non repugnat duo mutuo in se efficere, id tamen non est secundum proprium esse per quod causant: et ita formaliter loquendo, non fit causa ab effectu suo, quod repugnare dicimus. 90
- Duae formae
sibi mutuae
dispositiones. 100
28. Ad secundam instantiam respondetur imprimis, causam dispositivam proprie non esse causam materialem, sed secundum quid, et reductive: unde illa non tam est mutua causalitas materialis, quam mutua quaedam concordia vel proportio inter duas formas in eodem subiecto existentes: in qua nulla est <col. b> repugnantia. Deinde dicitur, has dispositiones semper esse aliquo modo diversarum rationum, ut 95

26.

27.

28.

69 26] 25 A.

83 27] 26 A.

97 28] 27 A.

105 in exemplo posito de calore et raritate, calor videtur esse non
tantum dispositio, sed etiam aliquo modo efficiens, et tunc
raritas non tam est dispositio praeparans, quam consequens,
quae non habet propriam rationem causae. Et similia multa
diximus de his causis supra disp. 13. sect. 3.

Duo partiales
fines sibi invicem
sunt finales
causae.

110 29. Denique de hac dispositionum connexionem intelligi
potest posterior pars conclusionis. Sed praecipue posita est
propter instantiam tertiam, ad quam concedimus secundum
diversas rationes finium non repugnare ut duo sint sibi in-
vicem fines, ut argumentum probat, tamen illud est tantum
115 secundum quid, nam illi sunt quasi fines partiales, ex quibus
unus integer coalescit, qui totus cadit sub unam adaequatam
intentionem: tamen ad illam qualemcumque mutuam habi-
tudinem necesse est ut illi fines in suo genere sint aliquo
modo diversarum rationum. Ad quartum respondetur, hic
120 nos agere de causis propriis et realibus: differentiae autem
non sunt huiusmodi, sed tantum secundum rationem; et ad-
huc illo modo differentiae non se mutuo contrahunt per se,
sed ad summum quatenus in uno communi genere coniun-
guntur.

Satisfit rationi dubitandi positae in principio.

30. Ultimo ex dictis manet expedita ratio dubitandi in prin-
cipio posita. Nam si quis attente consideret quae diximus,
nunquam duae causae ita mutuo comparantur, ut una sim-
5 pliciter supponat aliam in existendo, et e converso, etiam or-
dine naturae: nam finis ut est causa agentis, non necessario
supponitur existens: ut vero est effectus, supponit causam ef-
ficientem ut existentem: forma item supponit materiam, non
tamen materia simpliciter supponit formam, sed eam tantum
10 requirit ut concomitantem seu consequentem ordine natu-
rae. Atque ita facile vitatur circulus prioris et posterioris in

⁸*DM XXVII.2.1.*

109 29] 28 A.
1 *positae*] posita V.
2 30] 29 A.

10R 29.

A reason for doubting mentioned at the beginning is addressed.

30. Lastly, it remains to resolve from what has been said the reason for
doubting posited in the beginning.⁸ For if someone attentively consid-
5R ers what we have said, no two causes are mutually compared in such a
way that one without qualification assumes another in existing, and con-
versely, even by the order of nature. For an end, in order to be a cause
of the agent, is not assumed necessarily existing. But in order to be an
effect it assumes the efficient cause as existing. Likewise, form assumes
matter, but matter does not without qualification assume form but only
10R requires it as something concomitant or consequent in the order of na-
ture. And in this way the circle of prior and posterior causes in existing

15 existendo, etiam secundum naturae ordinem. In causando
 vero secundum diversa genera causarum nullum habet incom-
 modum, quia vel una causalitas talis est ut non supponat exis-
 tentiam, ut contingit in fine, vel, si existentiam requirit, non
 20 sunt sibi mutuo causae secundum esse simpliciter: et ita, si
 in una causa supponitur esse, secundum illud non est proprie
 effectus alterius, sed secundum aliquid quod illi adi-
 ungitur: sicut in forma respectu materiae, et in accidentibus
 respectu subiecti declaravimus: et ita vitantur facile omnia
 20R in hac mutua causarum connexione
 et causalitate. Atque hactenus de causis entis, et de prima
 principali huius operis parte dicta sint.

is easily avoided, even according to the order of nature. But in causing
 according to different genera of causes there is no disagreeability, since
 either one causality is such that it does not assume existence (as happens
 15R in the case of ends) or, if existence is required, they are not mutual causes
 of each other with respect to being without qualification. And so, if be-
 ing is assumed in the case of one cause, it is not properly the effect of
 another with respect to that being, but with respect to something that is
 conjoined to it; just as we showed in the case of form with respect to mat-
 20R ter and in the case of accidents with respect to a subject. And so every
 disagreeability in this mutual connection and causality of causes is easily
 avoided.

And here ends the discussion about the causes of being and the first
 principal part of this work.