Concerning the ultimate final cause or the ultimate end.

Although a disputation about the ultimate end belongs properly to moral philosophy, nevertheless it cannot be overlooked entirely by metaphysics, which is the supreme natural science. Because, just as in the other genera of causes the first cause is contemplated, which we have fulfilled so far, so also in this. Hence even Aristotle in Metaph. II, c. 2, touches on this matter until he has proven that a procession into infinity is not given in ends and in Metaph. XII the nature of an ultimate end seems to be attributed to the first mover. And a moral philosopher disputes about the ultimate end in order to compare human morals and the means to them, but it is left to the metaphysician to deal with the ultimate end insofar as it obtains the first nature of causing in this genus and insofar as it depends on that for all causality of other ends and, consequently, insofar as all beings which participate in being through causality depend on that. And, finally, insofar as being an ultimate end is an attribute of first being. Therefore, we will briefly explain two things concerning this ultimate end. First, whether it is the same and whether it is one and what it is. Then, what influence it has in this nature of causing.

SECTION I.

Whether it can be sufficiently shown by natural reason that some ultimate end is given and that a procession into infinity is not given in final causes.

1. An end can be understood to be ultimate in two modes, as we said above, namely, either secundum quid only or in some series of means

Two modes of an ultimate end.
tum, seu in aliqua serie mediorum seu respectu alicuius intentionis et electionum quae ab ea procedunt, vel simpliciter et respectu rerum omnium quae in finem ordinari possunt; hic praecipue agimus de fine ultimo hoc posteriori modo, quia in eo sita est praecipua huius rei difficilatias; tamen, ut a clarioribus procedamus, praemittimus aliqua de priori modo finis ultimi.

Resolution concerning an ultimate end taken only in a qualified sense.

2. Therefore, I say first: in every series or intention and action on account of an end, some ultimate end must necessarily be given, either negatively, that is, one which is not ordered to another end in that series or by the strength of that intention, or also positively secundum quid, or in that series, because, namely, everything which pertains to that is referred to such an end and stops here. And in this sense it is impossible to be given a procession into infinity with regard to these end. Aristotle particularly intends this conclusion in Metaph. II and the remaining ones are necessarily inferred from the last part. For if it does not proceed into infinity in proceeding from the election of the first means turned to an end, it must necessarily be stopped in something beyond which the intention does not tend. That, therefore, will be the ultimate end in that series, both negatively (because such an end is not ordered to another end—otherwise, the intention would not be stopped in it) and positively (because everything else which belongs to that series is referred to it, since everything else is desired for its sake—for if something is desired [but] not for its sake, it does not belong to that series but is as if added per accidens). So, for example, with respect to a doctor and in the series of cures, the health of a human being is the ultimate end negatively, because it is intended per se and the intention of the doctor does not progress beyond it. Therefore, once health has been achieved, action ceases. It is also the ultimate end positively, because everything else which belongs to that art is referred to it (for example, instruments for making medicines, medicines for tempering or purging a humour, and this, finally, for health itself). So if someone perhaps also ingests medicine either for the same of pleasure or for the sake of sustenance, now this end does not belong to the series of cures but to another intention per accidens conjointed with another.
3. Superest ut ultimam partem conclusionis probemus, quam late demonstrat Aristoteles, citato loco; facile autem in hunc modum formari potest demonstratio. Nam imprimis, descendendo ab intentione finis ad electionem vel executionem mediornum, ne-<891> cesse est ut tandem sistat electio in aliquo medio quod sit primum in executione et ultimum in ordine intentionis, quia alias nunquam possit actio inchoari et ita frustranea esset omnis electio, quia semper procederetur ab una electione in aliam, et numquam perveniretur ad usum, et ita tolleretur omnis actio. Unde quantum est evidens experimenta inchoari a nobis inquisitiones finium per media, tam est evidens in progressu finis ad media sisti in ultimo, seu primo medio. Rursus, quod ab hoc primo medio versus finem tendendo non possit infinitum procedi, probatur primo, quia impossibile est omnia quae in illa serie appetuntur, propter aliu appeti; ergo sistendum est in aliquo quod appetatur propter se; ille ergo erit finis ultimus in illa serie. Nam in illa particula propter se includitur negatio propter aliu appeti, quae negatio etiam in antecedenti supponitur dum assumimus non posse omnia objecta, seu omnes fines contentos in una serie, propter aliu appeti vel in aliu ordiniari.

4. Hoc autem antecedens probatur, nam sumo totam finium et mediornum collectionem (sive enim haec finita sit, sive infinita, potest tota concepiti); de illa ergo interrogo an propter se appetatur, vel propter aliu; non potest dici hoc posterius, alias extra totam collectionem esset aliquid, quod involvit contradictionem; ergo dandum est primum; ergo necessario intra illam collectionem sistendum est in aliquo quod propter se appetatur. Nam cum incipiendo a primo medio, il-lud eligatur propter secundum, et secundum propter tertium, et sic deinceps, nisi sistatur in aliquo fine propter se intento, non poterit tota collectio propter se appeti, quia neque ratione omnium vel singulorum quae in illa sunt, cum multa ac fere omnia propter aliu appetantur; nec ratione alicuius, nisi aliq-
uid admittatur propter se intentum; necessario igitur hoc admittendum est.

Obiectioni satisfit. 65

5. Dictur fortasse illam collectionem nec propter se appeti, nec propter aliud, quia non tota permodum uniun intenditur, sed per partes (ut ita dicoam, id est, amando singula ex contentis in illa collectione; atque ita dicitur solum appeti amando unum propter aliud. Unde etiam concedetur quod, licet collectio eorum quea amantur unum propter aliud semper sit finita, quia procedendo ab uno in aliud non potest in infinitum pertransiri, nihilominus fines appetibiles in illa serie non sunt finiti, <col. b> sed in infinitum procedunt, et ita non sitist in aliquo ultimo et propter se appetibili.

6. Sed contra hoc evidenter procedunt rationes Aristotelis. Prima, quia hoc modo nunquam possit inchoari intentio, nam haec inchoanda est ab aliquo quod sit primum in intentione; hoc autem nullum esse potest, si illo modo in infinitum proceditur. Nam vel illud, quod est primum in intentione amatur propter se, et sic cessat processus; vel amatur propter aliud et sic non potest esse illud primum in intentione, sed illud aliud propter quod amatur; ergo si semper procedit et et susam propter aliud, in illud aliud propter quod amatur, nonquam dari potest primum in intentione: ergo nec debetur prima intentio; ergo nonquam poterit intentio inchoari, quia non inchoatur nisi ab aliqua prima.

7. Secunda ratio (et fere in eamdem redit), quia sic tollitur causalitas finalis. Patet sequela, nam finis intermedius non causat nisi in virtute prioris et dependetener ab illo, ut praecedenti etiam disputatione declaratum et probatum est; ergo si in infinitum procedit et uno in alium priorem, et noniquam pervenitur ad finem primum in intentione, non poterunt omnes intermedi quidquam causare, cum omnes pendent ab illo primo et ille noniquam causet, vel non sit; necesseario ergo veniendum est ad aliquem qui sit primus in causando in hoc ordine quem nunc ultimum vocamus in executione, quia in processu mediiorum illic sistit iniquitio. Et which is in that, since many and almost all are desired for the sake of something else, nor by reason of anything, unless something intended for its own sake is admitted. Therefore, this must necessarily be admitted.

5. You will perhaps say that this collection is desired neither for its own sake nor for the sake of something else, because the whole collection is not intended as one but in parts (if I may say it that way), that is, by loving single things from the contents of that collection. And thus it is said that that alone is desired in loving one for the sake of another. Hence, it will also be conceded that, although the collection of those things which are loved one for the sake of another is always finite, because in proceeding from one to another it cannot pass right through to infinity, yet the desirable ends in that series are not finite but proceed to infinity and thus it is not stopped in something ultimate and desirable for its own sake.

6. But the arguments of Aristotle clearly proceed against this. First, because in this way intention can never get started, for this must be started by that which is first in intention. But this cannot be anything, if one proceeds into infinity in that way. For either that which is first in intention is loved for its own sake and thus the procession stops or it is loved for the sake of something else and thus it cannot be first in intention but that other thing for the sake of which it is loved. Therefore, if from one thing loved for the sake of another is always proceeded to that other thing for the sake of which it is loved, what is first in intention can never be given. Therefore, neither will the first intention be given. Therefore, intention will never be able to be started, because it is not started except by that first [intention].

7. The second argument (and it almost comes to the same): because thus final causality is destroyed. The sequel is clear, for the intermediate end does not cause except in virtue of the former and depending on it, as was also declared and proven in the preceding disputation. Therefore, if one proceeds from one to another prior [end] into infinity and one never arrives at an end which is first in intention, all the intermediates will not be able to cause anything whatever, since they all depend on that first one and it never causes (or does not exist). Therefore, it must necessarily come to something which is first in causing in this order which we now call last in execution, because that is where the search stops in the procession of means. And this argument is declared
declaratur haec ratio, ne quis putet in ea peti principium suppo- nendo dari primum finem; non enim supponitur, sed probatur esse necessarium, si futura est causalitas finalis. Declaratur autem fere argumento in principio facto; nam sumo totam se- riem finium collectum: vel illa est dependens in causando fi- naliter ab alio fine, et hoc est impossibile, alias iam non sumere- tur tota collectio; et praeterea quia iam tota illa non posset causare, nisi in turna alteri, a quo pendere dicitur; de quo ea- dem reducto quaestio, nam si ille finis dicitur esse independens, ille est ultimus quem inquirimus; dependens autem poni non potest, alias comprehensus esset in priori collectione. Si autem tota collectio est independens in causando finaliter, necesse est intra illam esse aliquem finem independentem ab alio priori in causando finaliter; impossibile est enim omnia contenta in collectione esse dependentia <892> et totam collectionem esse in- dependentem, et eadem ratione impossibile est inchoari causali- tatem, nisi in collectione causarum subordinatarum aliqua sit independens. Quem discursum latius prosequemur infra in causis efficientibus, demonstrando Deum esse.

8. Tertia ratio Aristotelis et optima est, quia dum dicitur omne medium appeti propter alium et nunquam perveniri ad aliqxi propter se amabile, destruitur ratio boni, quod per se constat esse absurdissimum. Sequela patet, quia bonum utile ad alium solum est bonum secundum quid et solnum fit appetibile ratione alterius ad quod est utile; ablato autem eo quod est tale simpliciter, necesse est tolli illud quod solum est tale secundum quid, praesertim cum solnum sit tale per habitudinem ad alia. Ablato ergo fine propter se appetibili, auferitur bonum simpli- citer, quod est per se bonum, et consequenter etiam auferitur bonum secundum quid, quia iam non habet unde sit bonum, neque unde redditur appetibile. Unde aperta est repugnanti- a dicere unum esse appetibile propter alium, et hoc dinceps propter alium, nullo existente appetibile propter se. Alias ra- tiones habet Aristoteles, tum citato loco, tum I Ethic., c. 2; sed haec sufficiunt, nam res etiam est satis clara.

lest someone think that in it the question is begged for supposing the first end to be given. For it is not supposed, but proven to be necessary, if there is going to be final causality. Moreover, it is almost declared by the argument made in the beginning, for I suppose the whole series of ends collectively. Or that is dependent in causing finally on another end and this is impossible. Otherwise, the whole collection would not have been supposed now. And, in addition, because now that whole would not be able to cause, except by leaning on the other from which it is said to depend, concerning which the same question returns. For if that end is said to be independent, it is the ultimate [end] which we seek. If dependent, however, it cannot be placed. Otherwise, it would have been included in the prior collection. If, however, the whole collection is independent in causing finally, it is necessary that within it there be some independent end prior from the others in causing finally. For it is impossible that everything contained in the collection be dependent and the whole collection be independent. And for the same reason it is impossible that causality be started unless in the collection of subordi- nated causes some [cause] is independent. We will pursue this discussion more broadly below with regard to efficient causes, demonstrating that God exists.

8. Aristotle’s third and best argument is because as long as it is said that every means is desired for the sake of another and one never arrives at something lovable for its own sake, the nature of good is demolished, which per se is evident to be most absurd. The sequel is clear, because something good useful for something else is only good secundum quid and only becomes desirable by reason of the other thing for which it is useful. But by that having been removed which is such simpliciter, that which is such only secundum quid is destroyed, especially since it is such only through a habitude to the other. Therefore, the end desirable for its own sake having been removed, good simpliciter (which is good per se) is removed and, consequently, good secundum quid is also removed, because it no longer has that by which it was good not that by which it was rendered desirable. Hence, the repugnancy of saying that one thing is desirable for the sake of another and this in turn for the sake of another, with nothing existing that is desirable for its own sake, is exposed. Aristotle has other arguments, both in the cited place and in EN I, c. 2, but these suffice for the matter is already sufficiently clear.
Suárez, DM XXIV

Resolutio de ultimo fine simpliciter.


10. Difficultas autem est an possit evidenti ratione demonstrari hunc finem ultimum esse unum respectu rerum omnium. Nam ex his demonstrationibus quibus probatur non dari processum in infinitum in finibus, non potest satis conclaudi dari hoc modo aliquem finem ultimum universaliter seu communem, in quem omnia referantur, et ipse non in alium; nam unaqueaque res potest in suum finem proprium ultimate tendere, et ita in nulla serie dabitur processus in infinitum in finibus, etiamsi nullus detur finis ultimus communis omnibus.

11. Respondetur aliud esse quaerere an detur aliquis finis ultimus communis in quem omnia ordinentur, aliud vero an res omnes et singulae illum finem intendant ac quaerant. De hoc posteriori puncto dicemus in sectione sequenti; nunc solum de priori sensu agimus. Et in eo dicimus esse evidens ratione naturali dari unum finem ultimum rerum omnium, idque colligi ex illo principio, quod non datur progressus in infinitum in finibus, adiunctis alis duobus supra etiam demonstratis, nimimum, dari unum principium primum effectivum.

Resolution concerning an ultimate end strictly speaking.

9. I say secondly: Some ultimate end simpliciter is also given with respect to all things, both [with respect to] particular ends and the coordination of them. This [end] is God himself. This assertion is certain in the teaching of faith, which St. Thomas hands down in [ST] Ia.44.4 and 103.2 and with him the rest of the theologians on the basis of Prov. 16:[4] ‘The Lord has made everything for his own sake’ and Rev. 21:[6] and 22:[13] ‘I am the Alpha and the Omega’. And the holy Fathers handed down the same teaching, especially [pseudo-]Dionysius in c. 10 of On the Divine Names and St. Augustine in book I, c. 23, of De Doct. Chr. and in the beginning of book XIX of On the City of God. And among the philosophers Aristotle touched on it in Metaph. XII, c. 10 and De Mundo, Plato in Tim., Laws IV, and [Hermes] Trismegistus in Poimandres.3

10. But the difficulty is whether it can be demonstrated by an evident argument that this ultimate end is one with respect to all things. For from these demonstrationes by which it is proven that a procession into infinity is not given with end, it cannot adequately be concluded that in this way some universal or common ultimate end is given, to which everything is referred and which is not referred to anything else. For each thing can tend to its own proper ultimate end and thus a procession of ends into infinity will not be given in any series, even if no ultimate end is given that is common to everything.

11. It is responded that it is one thing to ask whether some common ultimate end to which everything is ordered is given, but another whether each and every single thing seeks that end. We will talk about this latter point in the following section. Now we will discuss only the prior sense. And regarding that we say that it is evident by natural reason that one ultimate end is given for all things. And it can be inferred from the principle that a procession into infinity is not given with ends, by adjoining two others also demonstrated above, namely, that one effective first principle of all things is given and that

3Poimandres is the first book of the Corpus Hermeticum, a collection of Hermetic works popular among some Renaissance figures (especially those with interests in alchemy, magic, and the like) after it was reintroduced to the West by Marsilio Ficino. The Church generally disapproved of it thanks to its occultic character, so it is interesting that Suárez cites it here. In 1614, Swiss philologist Isaac Casaubon showed that the documents were not written by an ancient Egyptian priest but rather had their provenance in Neoplatonism.
rerum omnium et illud operari propter finem. Ex quibus ita concluditur ratio. Primum principium efficiens rerum omnium propter aliquem finem illas produxit, conservat ac regit, et in eius intentione non datur processus in infinitum; ergo propter aliquem finem ultimum haec omnia operatur; ille ergo finis ultimus, quem primum agens intendit, est unus, et consequenter est finis ultimus simpliciter rerum omnium. Probatur haec ultima consequentia, caetera enim clara sunt. Quia non potest Deus plures ultimos fines et suae intentioni adequatos in suis operibus intendere; nam etiam homo non potest hoc modo plures fines ultimos intendere, ut I-II, q. 1, a. 5, demonstratur; multo ergo minus Deus, quia intendere plures fines non ad perfectionem, sed ad imperfectionem potius pertinet.

12. Dices esse longe diversam rationem de homine et de Deo; nam homo intendit finem ultimum ut finem suum, in quo suam beatitudinem et sufficientiam bonorum omnium collocat, et ideo fieri non potest ut homo simul intendat duos ultimos fines completos; nam si neutrum sine altero sibi sufficere existimat, neuter est finis ultimus completus; si autem unum ex ills amat ut sufficientem, alter non potest habere rationem finis ultimi. At vero Deus, dum operatur propter ultimum finem, non operatur propter ultimum finem suum, sed earum rerum quas creat; nam in superioribus est ostensum esse differentiam inter voluntatem creatam et divinam, quod in voluntate creatae actus <893> ipse voluntatis ordinatur, ut ad finem, ad obiectum quod amat; in voluntate autem divina minime, sed una res volita ordinatur in aliam ut in finem. Sic igitur non repugnabit Deum intendere plures ultimos fines earum rerum quas extra se vult et operatur, quia respectu diversarum rerum nihil repugnat dari diversa bona in quibus earum ultima perfectio et quasi felicitas consistat. Sicut possunt plures homines plures fines ultimos intendere, licet unus non possit. Nam ita se habet Deus intendendo pluribus rebus fines earum. Unde confirmatur, nam res, quorum Deus fines intendit, sunt diversarum rationum et naturarum; ergo habet etiam possunt varios fines ultimos sibi proportionatos; ergo et Deus potest illos fines, ut plures sunt, variis rebus intendere.

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et distinctionem nisi in ordine ad aliquid unum, verbi gratia, complementum universi vel aliquid simile, et ideo necessarium esse ut in procreatione rerum quantumvis distinctarum unum finem ultimum intendant. Sed hoc non satisfacit. Primo, quia non est adeo evidens Deum intendere res omnes creatas ad unius compositionem vel complementum; nam, licet in corporealibus ita appareat, de spirituialibus non ita potest ratione probari, maxime si spiritualia cum corporealibus comparantur, et præcipue si Deus plures mundos produxisset, prout potuit. Secondo, illud non satis est ut omnia dicantur habere unum finem ultimum simpliciter, tum quia ipsa unitas et constitutio universi est quid valde imperfectum ut ad illud dicantur omnia sicut ad finem ultimum ordinari, tum etiam quia ipse ordo rerum universi ordinatur ad singularum rerum vel specierum conservationem et omnia corporalia ordinantur aliquo modo ad hominem, ut etiam Aristoteles agnovit, I Polit., c. 5.

Aristoteles.

14. Quapropter non potest aliter tota haec demonstratio conclaudi, nisi demonstrando ultimam partem conclusionis, nimirum, hunc ultimum finem quem primum efficiens intendit in suis actionibus, non posse esse aliquid aliud a seipso; nam hic evidenter sequitur res omnes procreatas, quantumvis inter se diversas, sicut uniuirtur in uno primo principio, ita etiam uniri in uno ultimo fine, etiamsi fingamus aliquas eam ita esse constitutas ut inter se una ad alteram, vel plures ad unam aliquam extra Deum ordinentur. Prima autem propositio assumpta pro- <col. b> batur, quia id quod est uniciueque agenti finis potissimus suarum actionum, est illi optimum et maximum bonum, praesertim si ordinta sit et recta intentione, ut docuit Arist., I Ethic., c. 7; sed primo agneti nihil est optimum et maximum bonum, nisi eius intrinsea bonitas; ergo respectu illius nihil potest esse ultimus finis actionem et effectum eius, nisi ipsem ratione suae bonitatis; ultimus enim finis est potissimus in omni intentione et actione. Praeterea, quia ratio causeae finalis perfecta est et de se pertinet ad perfectionem simpliciter; ergo convenit Deo in summo gradu perfectionis, tum quia omnis perfectio simpliciter est in Deo in summo gradu, tum etiam quia, cum bonitas sit ratio causandi finaliter et Deus sit summum bonum, necesse est ut rationem distinction of things except as far as one thing is concerned, for example, the universal complement or something similar, and therefore it is necessary that in the procreation of things as distinct as you like one ultimate end is intended. But this is not satisfactory. First, because it is not exactly evident that God intends all created things for one composition or complement. For, although it appears that way with corporeal things, it cannot be proven to be thus with spiritual things, certainly if spiritual beings are compared with corporeal and especially if God produced multiple worlds as he could have. Secondly, that is not enough so that all are said to have one ultimate end *simpliciter*, both because the unity and universal structure itself is something very imperfect so that all are called to that just as they ordered to the ultimate end and also because the universal order of things itself is ordered to the conservation of single things or species and all corporeal things are ordered in some way to human beings, as Aristotle also recognizes in *Pol.* I, c. 5.

Aristoteles.
et perfectionem finalis causae in summo habeat. Sicut autem
summa perfectio in ordine efficientium est quod sit primum
et universalissimum, ita in ordine finium, quod sit ultimum et
universalissimum; ergo talis perfectione necessario tribuenda est
Deo. Praeterea omne agens, in quantum agens, operatur aliquo
modo propter seipsum, atque ita est finis suarum actionum;
ergo et primum agens omnia operatur propter se; ergo est finis
omnium, cum omnia sint ex actione et effectione eius; non est
autem finis non ultimus, nam is semper est in suo ordine imper-
fectus; ergo est finis ultimus. Tandem hac tendit illud axioma,
quo ordo finium est iuxta ordinem agentium; nam agens, quo
perfectius vel universalius, eo intendit perfectionem vel universal-
itiem finem; Deus autem est perfectissimum et universalissi-
am agens; ergo intendit perfectissimum et universalissimum

Ad obiectionem ergo superius factam respondetur, quan-
vis Deus non agat propter se ut propter finem suum,
se suorum effectuum vel actionum, nihilominus non posse
habere nisi unum finem ultimum omnium omnium eorum, non quia
illum finem quaerat ut satietur et in eo habeat sufficientiam
bantorum omnium, sed potius quia supponitur habens in se
sufficientiam honorum omnium et summam bonitatem ac per-
fectionem, a qua sola primo moveri seu invitari potuit ut alias
benefacere propter seipsum. Unde, licet verum sit ex ipsis re-
bus quas creat, quasdam ordinare ad alias ut ad fines, vel potius
omnes ita inter se connectere ut aliae alis vi-
cissim connected among themselves so that others are of service to others in
<894>
turn—and in this way under God himself other common or universal
ends can be assigned to which, in addition to private ends, single crea-
tures are ordered by the Creator himself, and especially to the universal
order or beauty. Still, simpliciter nothing beyond God can be called
an ultimate end to which divine intention or action tends. Indeed, as
St. Thomas said in De Potent. q. 3, a. 15 ad 14, the communication it-
self of divine goodness is also not the ultimate end, but the very divine
goodness itself [is], because the communication of divine goodness is
what was created. Hence, it itself is also referred to the uncreated good-
ness, by the love of which God himself wished to communicate, not

120 perfectior][ perfectionem D.
128 habet] habent D.
ex cuius amore Deus se communicare voluit, non quia ei sit commodum aut utile, sed quia ipsum debeat, sitque suiae bonitati consentaneum. Addit vero ibidem D. Thomas Deum non agere ex appetitu finis ultimi, sed ex amore sui, quia non agit ad consequendum finem ultimum, sed ad communicandam bonitatem eius. Quod quidem est verum respectu ipsiusmet Dei, quia, ut saepe diximus, non agit propter se ut propter finem suum; tamen respectu creaturarum dicit etiam potest Deum operari ex appetitu finis, id est, appetens ut creaturae seipsum ut finem consequantur.

145 Deus ultimus creaturarum finis obiectivus, non formalis.

155 16. Ex quo etiam intelligitur, cum in praecedenti disputatione distincterimus duplicem finem, obiectivum et formalem, Deum non dici ultimum finem formalem, sed obiectivum creaturarum vel proprie vel late de obiecto loquendo, iuxta ea quae dicemus sectione sequenti. Et ratio est quia finis formalis non est ultimus simpliciter, cum in obiectivum ordinetur, ut supra ostensum est. Item, quia, liceat Deus sit summum bonum, tamen creaturae non assequuntur illud nisi quatenus aliquo modo illud participat; unde assecutio illius boni summi, quae finis formalis dicitur, semper est aliquid creatum. Unde obiter solvitur quaedam obieictio supra facta, nimirum, quomodo tanta rerum ac naturarum varietas possit ad eundem ultimum finem ordinari; ratio enim est quia ille non est finis ut assecutio, sed ut bonum assecutum; res autem diversae habent diversitatem in modo assequendi finem illum quamvis in eodem fine ultimo conveniant, sicut conveniunt in eodem primo principio, differunt tamen in modo aut gradu emanationis ab ipso.

165 17. <col. b> Tandum intelligitur ex dictis, quod, liceat respectu creaturarum Deus sit finis ultimus obiectivus, cuius gratia vel creatae sunt vel ipsae operantur, tamen respectu actionis ipsius Dei est ultimus finis cui; nam illi creatur vel aguntur omnia, vel potius sibimet creat et efficit omnia. Omne enim agens habet rationem finis cui respectu suae actionis, sive per eam quaerat commoditatem suam, ut communiter agunt agentia creat, vel tantum communicacionem et manifestationem because it is advantageous or useful to him, but because it is fitting and is agreeable to his goodness. But St. Thomas adds in that place that God does not act from a desire for the ultimate end, but from his love, because he does not act for the attainment of the ultimate end but for the communication of his goodness. That, indeed, is true with respect to God himself, because, as we have often said, he does not act for the sake of himself as for the sake of his end. Yet with respect to creatures it can also be said that God acts from a desire for the end, that is, desiring that creatures may seek after him as an end.

170 God himself is the finis cui of the actions of God.
Suárez, *DM* XXIV

**Sectio II.**

_Utrum finis ultimus per se ac propriè concurrat cum omnibus finibus proximis ad finaliter causandum, et consequenter an omnia agentia in omnibus actionibus suis finem ultimum intendant._

1. Quaestio haecc intelligenda est de ultimo fine simpliciter seu universali; nam de illo qui tantum est ultimus in aliqua serie, iam supra ostendimus ipsum esse qui immediate influit finaliter in omnes effectus vel actiones ad illam seriem per se pertinentes. Immo diximus huiusmodi finem esse totam rationem causandi, ita ut media vel fines intermedii nullam propter præmiam causalitatem finallem habeant, nisi quatenus substant, vel quasi informantur ab hoc fine. De fine vero ultimo simpliciter est specialis quaestio, an influat cum omnibus finibus particularibus ad causates eorum per se et immediate, per modum causæ universalis in eo genere, ad eum modum quo prima causa efficientis in genere efficientis causæ concurrat per se et immediate cum omnibus causis efficientibus particularibus.

*Argumenta in partem affirmantem.*

2. Et videtur quidem omnino ita esse dicendum: primo, quia ratio causæ finalis tam perfecte et universæ convenit Deo in suo genere, sicut ratio efficientis in suo; ergo, sicut ratio præmii efficientis ita convenit Deo ut omnia ab ipso pendet per se et immediate in causando efficienter, ita ratio præmii sui ultimi finis convenit Deo cum hac perfectione et universalitate, ut ab ipso in causando pendet per se et immediate omnes partiales finis. Nec satis est si quis dicit causales particularum finium pendere quidem immediate a Deo, non tamen in genere finis, sed in genere efficientis, sicut de materiali et for<>mali causa superius diximus; non (inquam) hoc est satis, quia causales materialis et formalis includunt imperfectionem, propter quam a Deo in suo genere exercerì non possint, et ideo concursus Dei ad illas causales est per effici-

manifestation of his goodness, as God [does].

**Section II.**

_Whether an ultimate end per se and properly concurs with all proximate ends for causing finally and consequently whether all agents intend an ultimate end in all their actions._

1. This question should be understood to be about the ultimate end _simpliciter_ or universal. For concerning the end which is only ultimate in some series, we already showed above to be the very one which immediately influences finally in every effect or action that belong _per se_ to that series. Indeed, we said that an end of this kind is the whole reason of causing, so that means or intermediate ends have no proper final causality except insofar as they stand under or are as if informed by this end. But there is a special question concerning the ultimate end _simpliciter_; whether it _per se_ and immediately influences their causality with all particular ends in the manner of a universal cause in that genus, according to the manner by which the first efficient cause in the genus of efficient causes concurs _per se_ and immediately with all particular efficient causes.

*The argument affirmed in part.*

2. And it seems indeed that it should be said entirely that way. First, because the nature of a final cause so perfect and universal is agreeable to God in its genus, just as the nature of an efficient [cause] in its. Therefore, just as the nature of the first efficient [cause] agreeable to God such that everything _per se_ and immediately depends on him in causing efficiently, so the nature of the first end is agreeable to God with this perfection and universality so that every particular end _per se_ and immediately depends on him in causing. Nor is it enough if someone says that the causality of a particular end indeed depends immediately on God, yet not in the genus of ends but in the genus of efficient [causes], like we said above concerning the material and formal cause. For material and formal causality includes imperfection, which is why they cannot be exercised by God in their genus and therefore God’s concursus to those causalities is through efficiency. But final causal-
Suárez, DM XXIV

entiam; at vero causalitas finalis ut sic formaliter nullam imperfectionem involvit, et ideo tam immediate ac per se potest Deo convenire circa omnem actionem et causalitatem, sicut causalitas effectiva; ergo aeque illi convenit, nam quidquid perfectionis simpliciter in Deo intelligi potest, illi inest. Unde confirmatur, nam sicut est ordo per se inter causam efficientem proximum et primam, ita inter finem proximum et ultimum; nam, sicut proxima efficiens causa habet entitatatem et vin efficiendi participatam a prima, ac propterea dependentem ab illa, ita finis proximus habet bonitatem, per quam finaliter causat, participatam a summa bonitate finis ultimi; ergo aeque pendent ab illo quod causalitatatem in suo genere.

35 Argomenta pro negativa parte.

3. In contrarium autem est, quia neque in propriis agentibus propter finem, ut sunt intellectualia, neque etiam in inferioribus videtur intervenire per se et immediate huissmodi influxus ulteriorum finis in omni finali causalitate. Probatur prior pars,quia in agentibus per intellectum, finis non habet causalitatem, nisi cognitus sit ab eo qui propter finem operatur; sed haec agentia operantur propter finem particularum, quando nihil omnino cogitant de fine ultimo universalis; ergo tunc finis particularis causat finaliter sine actuali influxu per se ac immediate ipsis finis ultimi in illo genere cause. Et confirmatur ac declaratur amplius: nam causalitas in genere finis per motionem metaphoricam; ergo, ut Deus concurrat immediate per modum ultimi finis et in genere cause finalis necesse est ut metaphorice simul moveat, seu ut metaphorica motio quae est a fine particulari sit etiam ab ipso, ut talis est; hoc autem esse non potest, nisi ipse cognitor, ut constat ex supra dictis de metaphorica motione; ergo. Et sane ipsa experientia hoc satis suadere videtur; nam quando homo movetur a sanitate, ut illam inquirat, nullo modo moveatur immediate bonitate divina, de qua nil cognitat, sed convenientia sanitatis.

40 proxima] proxime D V.
54 particularis] particulares D.
58 est] om. D.
4. Nec refert si quis dicat sanitatem non movere, nisi quatenus habet bonitatem par<col,b> a divina bonitate; nam hoc perinde est ac si dicatur remote provenire illam motionem a bonitate per essentiam, quatenus ab illa derivata est aliqua bonitas in sanitatem, non tamen quod ipsam bonitatem per essentiam immediate ac per se etiam concurrat. Sicut etiam calor non calefacit, nisi per virtutem agendi participatam a virtute effectiva per essentiam, quae est in Deo; ex vi tamen huius participationis seu emanationis illius effectus a tali virtute participata, non est immediate a Deo, sed remote, et ideo necesse est quod per ipsum virtutem increatam Deus immediate influat, ut habet proprium influxum primae causae efficientis; hunc autem modum influxus non habet in genere finis, ut probare videtur ratio facta.

5. Atque hinc a fortiori probatur altera pars de inferioribus agentibus; nam bruta, eo modo quo per cognitionem metaphorice moventur, nullo modo dici possunt immediate moveri ab ipsa bonitate ultimi finis, quam multo minus possunt cognoscere. Inferiora autem agentia naturalia solum dum aut diriacht, illa autem non tendunt immediate in bonitatem ultimi finis, sed solum in talem formam aut terminum actionis suae. Quod vero dici solet, haec agentia intendere assimilari ultimo fini in communicanda sua perfectione, metaphorice potius quam proprie dictum videtur; atque atque huius deservit ad explicandum immediatam causalitatem ultimi finis circa has actiones. Assumptum patet, tum quia haec agentia per se non intendunt similitudinem ut relatum ad bonitatem Dei, sed solum intendunt fundamentum illius similitudinis, quod non est aliquod praeter bonum illud creatum, quod est in eorum actionibus; tum etiam quia in sua communicacione, regulariter loquendo, non intendunt se communicare propter solam communicacionem (ut sic dicam), sed propter aliquod commodum, vel perfectionem suam, scilicet, ut conservent suam speciem, vel ut se perficient; signum ergo est, in sua communicacione non intendere proprie ac formaliter assimilationem ad communicationem Dei. About which he is not thinking at all, but by the agreeability of health.

4. Nor does it matter if someone says that health does not move unless to the extent it has goodness by participation in divine goodness. For this is exactly the same as if it is said that that motion comes into being remotely by goodness through essence to the extent that some goodness in health is derived from it, yet that goodness itself does not also per se and immediately concur through essence. [It is] also just as heat that does not warm unless through a power of acting by participation in an effective power through essence, which is in God. Yet from the strength of this participation or emanation of that effect in such a participated strength is not immediately from God but remotely. And therefore it is necessary that God influences immediately through uncreated power itself so that he has the proper influence of a first efficient cause. But influence does not have this mode in the genus of end, as the given argument seems to prove.

5. And from here the other part concerning lower agents is a fortiori proven. For brute animals, in that way in which [agents] are metaphorically moved through cognition, in no way be said to be moved immediately by the goodness of the ultimate end, which they much less can cognize. But lower natural agents are only said to act for the sake of an end insofar as they tend or are directed to their ends. But they do not tend immediately to the goodness of an ultimate end, but only to such a form or terminus of their actions. But what is usually said—that these agents intend to become like the ultimate end in communicating its perfection—seems to have been said more metaphorically than properly. And thus there is no point in explaining the immediate causality of the ultimate end with regard to these actions. The assumption is clear because these agents do not per se intend similitude as related to the goodness of God but only intend the foundation of that similitude, which is not something beyond that created good that is in their actions. Also, because in their communication, speaking regularly, they do not intend that they communicate for the sake of communication alone (if I may speak that way) but for the sake of some advantage or their perfection, namely, in order to conserve their species or to perfect themselves. Therefore, it is a sign that in their communication they do not properly and formally intend becoming like the communication of God.
Suárez, DM XXIV

Variae sententiae.

6. In hac re invenio frequenter a theologis dictum, Deum esse finem ultimum creaturarum omnium, ita ut omnes in actionibus suis illum assequi intendant, unaquaeque iuxta(certum) captum suum. Ita docet late D. Thomas, III <896> cont. Gent., c. 18 et 19, 20 et 21, et I-II q. 1, a. 6, 7 et 8; et in ea doctrina reliqui omnes consentiunt. Nullus tamen, quod ego viderim, satissent declarat primum finium proximorum ab ultimo in causando intra proprium genus, neque modum influxus quem ultimus finis habet simul cum proximis seu particularibus. Quin potius, ita tandem declarant illam rationem ultimi finis ut solum remotum concursum ad motiones proximorum finium ei tribuere videantur. Nam de agente a proposito, homine, verbi gratia, dicunt solum operari propter finem ultimum in omnibus actionibus suis, quia operatur propter bonum aliquod, quod non habet vim movendi finaliter, nisi quatenus est quaedam participatio summii boni; de inferioribus vero agentibus dicunt solum intendere ultimum finem, in quantum intendunt aliquam representationem seu participationem bonitatis eius; per quae omnia non declaratur nisi remota causalitas ultimi finis, ut inter obiciendum probatum videtur. Fonseca vero, lib. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 12, cum sentiat Deum per se et immediate concurrerre cum omnibus causis ad earum causalitates, et cum unaquaeque per proprium concursum ad suum genus pertinentem, hanc suam sententiam specialiter solum ibi conatur probare de materiali et formali; nam de finali supponit tam esse certum et receptum dogma, sicut de efficienti, de qua iam ipse disputaverat. Omissis autem causa materiali et formali, de quibus supra dictum est et ad rem praesentem non spectat, de finali expresse ibi docet, sect. 5, concurrere immediate cum finibus proximis ad causalitates eorum, ex illa generali ratione, quod sunt causae essentialiter subordinate natae in eodem genere; modum autem illius immediati concurrerre non declarat sed affirmat solum.

Various views.

6. In this matter I frequently find the statement by the theologians that God is the ultimate end of all creatures so that they all intend to pursue him in their actions according to its capacity. St. Thomas teaches this more widely in SCG III, c. 18, 19, 20, and 21 and in [ST] IaIIæ.1.6–8. And all the others agree with this doctrine. Yet no one that I have seen satisfactorily reveals the proper dependency of the proximate end on the ultimate [end] in causing within the proper genus nor the mode of influence which the ultimate end has at the same time with the proximate or particular [ends]. On the contrary, they finally reveal that nature of the ultimate end in such a way that it that they seem to attribute to it only a remote concurrence with the motions of proximate ends. For concerning the agent in question, namely, a human being, for example, they say only that they act for the sake of the ultimate end in all their actions because it acts for the sake of some good that does not have the power of moving finally except insofar as it has a certain participation in the highest good. But concerning lower agents they say only that they intend the ultimate end insofar as they intend some representation or participation of its goodness. Through all of this nothing is revealed except a remote causality of an ultimate end, as seems to have been proven during the objecting. But Fonseca in Metaph. V, c. 2, q. 12, since he thinks that God per se and immediately concurs with all causes according to their causality and with each through a proper concurrence belonging to its genus, he especially tries to prove this view of his there only of material and formal [causation]. For concerning final [causation] he supposes it to be certain and received dogma, just as with efficient [causation], which he had already discussed. But having omitted the material and formal causes, which were spoken about above and which do not appear in the present matter, he expressly teaches here in sec. 5 of the final [cause] that it immediately concurs with proximate ends to their causality, by that general reason that causes are essentially subordinated in the same genus. But he does not reveal but affirms only that mode of immediate concurrence.

The resolution of the question.
7. Mihi autem haec res ita explicanda videtur, ut finium causal-itates per proportionem ad agentia declararemus; nam, ut saepe dictum est, causalitas finis optime intelligitur per respectum ad agens ut agens est, seu ad actionem agentis. Est ergo considerandum, quod supra tradidimus, omnes actiones secundorum agentium esse etiam actiones Dei; nam ea potissimum ratione dicitur Deus ad omnes illas concurrere per se et immediate ut prima causa efficiens. Ex quo inferuntur illas actiones esse propter finem, atque adeo <b>esse causatas ab aliquo fine, non solum ut sunt ab agentibus proximis, sed etiam, ac molto magis, ut sunt a primo agente. Quia primum agens, sicut in omni actione sua operatur per intellectum et voluntatem, ita in omni sua actione operatur propter finem longe excellentiori modo quam quodlibet alium agens; atque ita omnis actio, quatenus extra Deus est transiens et a Deo immediate manat, causata est ab aliquo fine, ab ipso etiam Deo intento.

8. Dico iam primo: Deus ut ultimus finis immediate et per se influet in omnem actionem creaturarum quatenus ab ipso Deo est, atque hoc saltem modo immediate ac per se concurrendo causando finaliter cum omni fine proximo. Probatur prima pars, nam omnis actio agentis creati est immediate a Deo propter finem operante; ergo est a Deo ut ab ultimo fine; ergo Deus ut ultimus finis causat in suo genere immediate illam actionem. Antecedens probatum est. Prima vero consequentia probatur, quia Deus non agit propter finem, nisi agendo propter se ut propter ultimum finem, quia, ut supra probatum est, non potest per se primo moveri seu inclinari ad agendum ab aliquo extrinseca bonitate, sed a propria.

9. Dices, nonne potest Deus moveri ab aliqua bonitate creato, ut aliam conferat vel efficiat? Sic enim propter bonitatem meriti movetur ad dandum praemium et quia promisit, moveretur ad impleendum promissum, atque hoc modo exercet Deus actum fidelitatis, vel iustitiae, aut misericordiae, etc., propter uniuersiusque honestatem; ergo etiam operatur Deus propter aliquem finem proximum creatum; ergo non est certa et formalis praedicta illatio.

10. Aliquía non audent concedere antecedens illud, quia
videtur esse praeter divinam perfectionem aliquid velle propter finem creatum. Tamen, cum Deum agere propter finem non sit agere propter finem suum, sed propter finem ad quem ordinat eam rem quam efficit, non est inconveniens ut proxime aliquid efficiat propter aliquem finem creatum, quia hoc nihil aliud est quam unam creaturam ordinare in aliam ut in finem proximum, quod est ordinatissimum et absqueulla imperfectione. Atque hoc modo res singulas Deus ordinavit ad pulchritudinem universi, et herbas et animalia condidit propter hominem, <897> etc. Et eadem ratione, quia creaturae non sunt bonae formaliter bonitate divina, sed propria, ut supra dictum est, ita vult Deus creaturas propter suum bonitatem, ut tamen uniciuque velit bonitatem vel perfectionem illi propriam, et hoc modo vult Deus homini gratiam, ut est perfecto ipsius hominis; unde proxime vult illam propter commodum vel utilitatem ipsius hominis. Atque hoc modo, licet comparatione suae bonitatis velit omnes creaturas ut media ad sui manifestationem et communicationem, tamen comparando unam creaturam ad aliam, vult unam ut finem proximum alterius.

11. Nihilominus tamen necesse est ut in omni actione et operatione propter finem Dei Deus propter se, ut propter ultimum finem operetur. Tum quia semper operatur propter finem perfectissimo modo, et ideo simplicissimo et eminentissimo actum omnia ducit usque ad supremam causam refertque in seipsum tamquam in ultimum finem. Tum etiam quia divina bonitas ita est Deo universalis ratio volendi omnem aliam bonitatem vel finem creatum, ut sine relatione vel habitudine ad illam nihil sit amabile Deo extra ipsum Deum. Nam si per bonitatem creatas non communicaretur, praesentaretur vel ostenderetur divina bonitas, non esset cur ab ipso Deo amarentur. Tamen, quia id quo creatura reprehendatur et participat divinam bonitatem, aliquid secundum se et propter se amabile respectu appetitus creati, ideo non repugnat quod simul velit Deus unam creaturam ut finem alterius et ut aliquid ordinatum ad se ut ad finem ultimum. Hic ergo respectus non est separabilis a volitione Dei, ut ad creaturam terminatur, et ideo optime infectur si Deus aliquid propter finem operatur, etiam operari to be contrary to divine perfection for him to wish something for the sake of a created end. Yet, since God acting for the sake of an end is not acting for the sake of his end but for the sake of an end to which he orders that thing which he effects, it is not disagreeable that he proximately effect something for the sake of some created end, because this is nothing other than ordering one creature to another as to a proximate end, which is most ordained and free from any imperfection. And in this way God ordains individual things to universal beauty and plants and animals are preserved for human beings, etc. And for the same reason, because creatures are not formally good by divine goodness but by their own [goodness], as was said above, God thus wishes creatures for the sake of his own goodness so that he still wishes for each one the goodness or perfection proper to it. And in this way God wishes grace for a human being, as it is the perfection of the human being himself. Hence, he proximately wishes that for the sake of the advantage or utility of the human being himself. And in this way, although by a comparison of his goodness he wishes all creatures as means to his manifestation and communication, yet in comparing one creature to another he wishes one as a proximate end for another.

11. Nevertheless, it is still necessary that in every action and operation for the sake of an end God acts for the sake of himself as for the sake of an ultimate end. First, because he always acts for the sake of an end in a most perfect way and therefore in a most simple and most eminent act he leads all things all the way to the highest cause and refers them to himself just as to an ultimate end. Next also because divine goodness with God is such a universal reason for willing every other goodness or created end that without relation or habitue to that nothing is lovable to God beyond God himself. For if divine goodness were not communicated, presented, or revealed through created goodness, it would not be why they are loved by God himself. Still, because it is that by which a created being represents and participates in divine goodness, something in accordance with it and for the sake of it lovable with respect to created desire, therefore it is not repugnant that God at the same time wishes one creature as an end for another and as something ordered to himself as to an ultimate end. Therefore, this respect is not separable by the volition of God, that it terminates in a creature, and therefore it is rightly inferred that if God does something for the
illud propter se, ut propter ultimum finem actualiter et perfectissime intentum.

12. Iam vero facilis est ad probandum altera consecutio, nimium, finem ultimum immediate ac per se influere cum quocumque fine proximo ad omne actionem creaturae, quia finis immediate influit suo modo in eam actionem quae ex formalis et directa intentione agentis propter illum fit; nam causalitas finalis, praesertim circa actiones transeuntes, solum consitit in hac dependentia quam actio habet ab agente sic ordinante illam in finem; sed ostensum est omne actionem creaturae, saltem qualiter est a primo agente, fieri necessario cum hac actuali relatione <col. b> seu ordinatione in ultimum finem; ergo omnis huiusmodi actio causatur immediate ac per se ab ultimo fine in suo genere.

13. Dices non posse hoc in universum verum esse; nam, licet in actionibus mere naturalibus et in liberis honestis videatur possibile et sine inconveniunt, tamen in actionibus libere et peccaminosissimis videtur hoc et indecens et impossible; pri
timum patuit quia indecens est Deum habet actionem velle; ergo multo magis velle illas propter seipsum. Secundum patuit quia illae actiones sunt intrinsecum repugnantes summae Dei bonitati; quomodo ergo possunt in sumnum bonum ut in finem ultimum referri? Respondetur imprimis, totum argumentum concedi posse et debere de actionibus peccaminosae, ut peccaminosae sunt; nam in rigore de eis tentum ut sic procedit obiectio; nam ut sic repugnent divinae bonitati, et de illis ut sic fatemur non esse a Deo ut ab ultimo fine, neque id est incon commodum, quia etiam ut sic non sunt a Deo ut a primo agente, quia ut sic non sunt actions, sed defectus actionis. Unde ulterius additur has actiones quantumvis peccaminosae respectu causae secundae, ut actiones sunt, esse etiam actiones ipsius Dei, et ut sic esse per se et immediate ex fine ultimo, et propter finem ultimum; nam ut sic nullum defectum vel mali tiem includunt ratione cuius repugnet summae bonitati finis ultimi. Et quamvis Deus efficaciter et absolute non velit illas propter rem uniuscunque sumptae habent ad causam

sake of an end, it is also done for the sake of him, so that it was actually and most perfectly intended for the sake of the ultimate end.

12. But now it is easy to prove the other consequence, namely, that an ultimate end immediately and per se influences along with whatever proximate end every action of a creature, because the end immediately in its way influences that action which happens for the sake of it by a formal and direct intention of the agent. For final causality, especially regarding transact actions, only consists in this dependency which the action has by the agent thus having ordered it to the end. But it was shown that every action of a creature, at least insofar as it is from a first agent, necessarily takes place with this actual relation or ordering to an ultimate end. Therefore, every action of this sort is caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end in its genus.

13. You may say that this cannot be true in general. For, although in merely natural actions and in free, honest [actions] it seems possible and without disagreeableness, nevertheless in actions that are free and sinful this seems both unbecoming and impossible. It is evident, first, because it is unbecoming for God to wish these actions. Therefore, much more to wish them for the sake of himself. It is evident, secondly, because those actions are intrinsically repugnant to the highest goodness of God. How, then, can they be referred to the highest goodness as to an ultimate end? It is responded, in the first place, that the whole argument can and ought to be conceded regarding sinful actions insofar as they are sinful. For the objection holds concerning those held in rigour as such. For as such they are repugnant to divine goodness and concerning them as such we admit that they are not from God as from an ultimate end. Nor is that a disadvantage, because as such they are also not from God as from a first agent, because as such they are not actions but defective of action. Hence, it is further added that these actions, however much they may be sinister with respect to the second cause, as they are actions are also actions of God himself and as such are per se and immediately from the ultimate end and for the sake of the ultimate end. For as such they include no defect or badness by reason of which they would be repugnant to the highest goodness of the ultimate end. And, although God does not efficaciously and absolutely wish
secundam cum quo et ex quo habent concomitantem mali-
tiam, tamen vult ad illas concurrere et ita vult illas quatenus
actiones suae sunt, et hoc modo ordinat illas in se ut in finem
ultimum, quia in illis sub hac ratione spectatis relucet maxime
bonitas Dei, quae ad omnia se diffundit quatenus aliquid boni
habent et potens est ita influere in bonitatem, ut, quamvis
ili sit coniuncta malitiam, illum non attingat, neque ipsi ulla
ratione imputanda sit. In quo etiam manifestat omnipoten-
tiam et sapientiam suam, immo et quodammodo iustitiam,
vel quia iure suo utitur offerendo concursum suum etiam illis
qui illo abusuri sunt, vel quia unicumque principio dat concur-
sum ei naturaliter debitum, et unumquodque secundum suum
modum agere sinit. Sic igitur nulla est actio creaturae causata
a fine proximo quae non sit simul causata per se et immediate
a fine ultimo, saltem respectu pri-

159 est actio creaturae ] es creatura D.
162 c. 17 ] om. D.

14. Dico secundo: actio creaturae, ut est ab ipsa crea-
tura propter finem, non semper causatur immediate ac per se a
fine ultimo formaliter et secundum suum proprium bonitatem,
sed ad summum virtualiter seu implicite; atque in hoc sensu
potest debita proportione dici finem ultimum ad has actiones
ut sic non concurrere semper immediate immeditamnatione sup-
positi, sed tantum virtutis. Hanc conclusionem satis, ut opinor
probant rationes supra positae posteriori loco, cum iis etiam
quae adduximus referendo communem doctrinam D. Thomae
et aliorum. Et quidem de agentibus naturalibus vel irrational-
ibus nulla potest esse dubitandi ratio, quia haec non operantur
propter finem in quem ipsa dirigant actiones suas; ergo multo
minus possunt operari propter finem ultimum. Deinde, qua
ratione dicuntur metaphorice intendere finem, quatenus per
naturalem inclinationem vel appetitum in aliquid certum ac de-
terminatum tendunt, revera non tendunt proprie ac formaliter
in Deum, sed in aliquid creatum sibi ipsis commodum vel pro-
portionatum, atque ita solum virtualiter et quasi interpretative
tendunt in Deum. Denique, si considerentur quatenus per ex-
trinsecam denominationem dicuntur dirigi in finem a suo auctore
et cooperatore Deo, sic quidem dici possunt tendere in
ipsum finem ultimam formaliter intentum; tamen illa directio
et ordinatio in finem iam est ab ipso primo agente, a quo solo
finis ille intenditur.

15. De agentibus vero a proposito, non oportet ut eorum
actiones nunquam sint per se ac immediate ab ultimo
fine, etiam quatenus sunt propter finem ex directione et inten-
tione talium agentium. Saepe enim ita esse possunt, nimirum,
quo haec agentia ipsum finem ultimum in se considerant
et in eum referunt omnes actiones et voluntatem suas,
quod facere possunt quia per intellectum et voluntatem pos-
sunt obiective attingere finem ultimum in seipso, quod non
possunt inferiora agentia. Diximus autem non semper actiones
horum agentium, quatenus ab ipsis sunt propter finem, causari
finaliter per se et immediate ab ultimo fine immediatione sup-
positi, id est, per seipsum et per bonitatem suam finaliter influ-
entem in talem <col. b> actionem, et hoc sensu satis probatur
assertio illa ratione supra posta, quia finis ultimus in seipso
cogitatus non semper movet haec agentia, quando propter
aliquem finem particularem operantur. Virtualiter autem dici
potest ultimus finis movere semper huæusmodi agentia, quia
semper moventur ab aliquo bono vel sub ratione aliucius boni,
quod, in quantum est quaedam participatio summi boni, conse-
tur in virtute illius movere; et e converso, qui tendit in illud
bonum, virtute censetur tendere in ultimum finem, quia ap-
petendo (ut sic dicam) partem boni, virtute censetur magis
amare totius boni complementum, quem sensum declaravit
D. Thom., In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, quaest. 4, et in eodem
loquitur I, q. 60, a. 2, et I-II, q. 1, a. 6, ubi, in solutione ad 3, ait
quod virtus primae intentionis respectu ultimi finis movet in
quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiamsi de uestre fine actu
non cogitetur. Lege Aristot., I Ethic., c. 4 et 7, et I Rhetoric.,

3 Cf. De Fine Hominis 2.4. The virtual moving here looks more like the interpretative intention there than the virtual intention. On the other hand, Suárez cites Aquinas's IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3 here but that would look like the virtual intention of DFH 2.4, so it is not clear how these texts fit together.
Incidentis quaestionis brevis resolutio.

A brief resolution of an incidental question.

16. But here the question at once suggests itself whether in these agents it is always necessary that an intention of the ultimate end that is proper, elicited, and terminates in the very ultimate end proposed to itself under the aspect of the highest, complete, or general good must necessarily precede intentions of particular ends. For some theologians seem to think that it is necessary that such a quasi-universal intention precede at least at some time or once in life so that other intentions of particular ends can be had in virtue of this one. But this question is properly of the theologians and is usually discussed in the cited place of St. Thomas. And to me the view which denies that such an intention necessarily seems settled, because neither on the part of the intellect is there something that necessitates first thinking about such an object nor on the part of the will is that intention necessary so that it can will particular goods proposed to itself as lovable *per se* since there is a sufficient reason in these objects for tending to them for the sake of their goodness. Indeed, if that universal intention precede, still if afterwards it remains neither in memory nor in some affect or habit, nothing can be of use to subsequent acts. See Scotus, [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 4 and IV, dist. 49, q. 3 and Paludanus, [John] Maior, Capreolus, and others.

It satisfies the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning.

17. The arguments made in the former place in the beginning confirm our former conclusion. Yet it does not oppose the latter, because it is not of the nature of a first cause to influence the action of second cause except with due proportion. It is also not necessary that the causality of a first cause and that of a second cause, taken formally and precisely, express the same habitude, although in reality as they are in the effect they are not distinguished. Therefore, in this way it is enough for the subordination of the proximate and ultimate ends that the former depend on the latter in causing in its own genus and that the latter cannot cause without causing the former. Still, it is not necessary that either...
Suárez, *DM* XXIV 21

tis uterque finis causet, sed solum respectu eiusdem effectus vel actionis. Quin potius finis proximus causat respectu proximi agentis et actionis quae in illo vel ab illo est; finis autem ultimus non causat respectu ipsius primi agentis, sed respectu effectus vel actionis prout ab ipso manat. Argumenta autem posteriori loco in contrarium posita nihil obstant priori conclusioni, ut per se satis constat; confirmant autem posteriori, ut declaratum est.

end cause with respect to the same agent but only with respect to the same effect or action. On the contrary, the proximate end causes with respect to a proximate agent and action which is in that or from that. But the ultimate end does not cause with respect to the first agent itself but with respect to the effect or action as flowing from it. But the arguments posited in the latter place for the contrary [position] do not oppose the former conclusion at all, as is sufficiently clear by itself. But they confirm the latter, as was shown.