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<890, col. a>²

De ultima finali causa, seu ultimo fine.

Quae sit hic ratio
agendi de materia
huius
disputationis.

Aristoteles.

5 Quamquam disputatio de ultimo fine propria sit philosopho-
rum moralium, tamen non potest metaphysica, quae suprema
sapientia naturalis est, illam omnino praetermittere; quia, sicut
in aliis generibus causarum primas causas contemplatur, quod
hactenus praestitimus, ita et in hoc. Unde et Aristoteles, II
Metaph., c. 2, hanc rem attigit, dum probavit non dari proces-
sum in infinitum in finibus, et XII Metaph., primo motori at-
tribuere videtur rationem finis ultimi. Itaque moralis philoso-
phus de fine ultimo disputat in ordine ad mores hominum et ad
10 media quibus comparandus est; metaphysici vero est agere de
ultimo fine, quatenus primam rationem causandi in hoc genere
obtinet, et quatenus ab eo pendet omnis causalitas aliorum
15 finium, et consequenter quatenus ab eo pendent omnia entia
quae per causalitatem esse participant; ac denique quatenus esse
finem ultimum attributum est primi entis. Duo igitur breviter
de hoc fine ultimo explicabimus. Primum, an sit simulque an
unus sit et quis sit. Deinde, quem influxum habeat in hac ra-
tione causandi.

20 SECTIO I.

*An possit sufficienter probari ratione naturali dari aliquem ulti-
mum finem, et non dari processum in infinitum in causis final-
ibus.*

Duplex modus
ultimi finis.

25 1. Duobus modis, ut in superioribus diximus, potest intelligi
aliquem finem esse ultimum, scilicet, vel secundum quid tan-

Concerning the ultimate final cause or the ultimate end.

5R Although a disputation about the ultimate end belongs properly to
moral philosophy, nevertheless it cannot be overlooked entirely by
metaphysics, which is the supreme natural science. Because, just as in
the other genera of causes the first cause is contemplated, which we
10R have fulfilled so far, so also in this. Hence even Aristotle in *Metaph.* II,
c. 2, touches on this matter until he has proven that a procession into
infinity is not given in ends and in *Metaph.* XII the nature of an ultimate
end seems to be attributed to the first mover. And a moral philosopher
disputes about the ultimate end in order to compare human morals and
the means to them, but it is left to the metaphysician to deal with the ul-
15R timate end insofar as it obtains the first nature of causing in this genus
and insofar as it depends on that for all causality of other ends and,
consequently, insofar as all beings which participate in being through
causality depend on that. And, finally, insofar as being an ultimate end
is an attribute of first being. Therefore, we will briefly explain two
things concerning this ultimate end. First, whether it is the same and
whether it is one and what it is. Then, what influence it has in this
nature of causing.

20R SECTION I.

*Whether it can be sufficiently shown by natural reason that some ultimate
end is given and that a procession into infinity is not given in final causes.*

1. An end can be understood to be ultimate in two modes, as we said
above, namely, either *secundum quid* only or in some series of means

What is the
nature of dealing
with the matter
of this
disputation.
Aristotle.

Two modes of an
ultimate end.

¹Latin text is from <http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d24.htm>. Retrieved Feb. 11, 2008. The text has not yet been fully checked against the 1597 edition (generally the most reliable text) for significant textual variations. Marginal notes are as found in the 1597 edition. Many of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition, D = digital source, and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

tum, seu in aliqua serie mediorum seu respectu alicuius intentionis et electionum quae ab ea procedunt, <col. b> vel simpliciter et respectu rerum omnium quae in finem ordinari possunt; hic praecipue agimus de fine ultimo hoc posteriori modo, quia in eo sita est praecipua huius rei difficultas; tamen, ut a clarioribus procedamus, praemitemus aliqua de priori modo finis ultimi.

Resolutio de fine ultimo tantum secundum quid.

2. Dico ergo primo: in omni serie seu intentione et actione propter finem, necessario dandus est aliquis finis ultimus, vel negative, id est, qui ad alium finem in illa serie seu ex vi illius intentionis non ordinetur, vel etiam positive secundum quid, seu in illa serie, quia, nimirum, omnia quae ad illam pertinent, ad talem finem referuntur et ibi sistunt. Atque in hoc sensu impossibile est dari processum in infinitum in his finibus. Hanc conclusionem praecipue intendit Aristoteles, lib. II *Metaph.*, et ex ultima parte necessario inferuntur reliquae. Nam si procedendo ab electione primi medii versus finem non proceditur in infinitum, sistendum necessario est in aliquo, ultra quem non tendat intentio; ille ergo erit finis ultimus in illa serie, et negative, quia talis finis ad alium non ordinatur, alias in eo non sisteretur; et positive, quia in illum referuntur omnia quae ad illam seriem pertinent, cum omnia propter illum appetantur; nam si quid non propter illum appeteretur, non pertineret ad illam seriem, sed quasi per accidens adiungeretur. Ut, verbi gratia, respectu medici et in serie curationis, sanitas hominis est finis ultimus negative, quia illa est per se intenta et ultra illam non progreditur intentio medici, ideoque, illa consecuta, cessat actio; est etiam finis ultimus positive, quia ad illam referuntur omnia quae sunt illius artis, ut instrumenta ad medicamenta conficienda, medicamenta ad temperandum vel evacuandum humorem, et hoc tandem ad ipsam sanitatem. Quod si aliquis fortasse medicamentum etiam sumat, vel propter delectationem, vel propter nutrimentum, iam ille finis non pertinet ad seriem curationis, sed ad aliam intentionem per accidens cum alia coniunctam.

Aristoteles.

25R or with respect to some intention or choice which proceed from it, or *simpliciter* and with respect to all things which can be ordered to the end. We deal especially with the ultimate end in this latter mode, because in that is the difficulty of this matter particularly allowed. Yet, so that we proceed from the clearer matters, we will first say something concerning the former mode of an ultimate end.

Resolution concerning an ultimate end taken only in a qualified sense.

2. Therefore, I say first: in every series or intention and action on account of an end, some ultimate end must necessarily be given, either negatively, that is, one which is not ordered to another end in that series or by the strength of that intention, or also positively *secundum quid*, or in that series, because, namely, everything which pertains to that is referred to such an end and stops here. And in this sense it is impossible to be given a procession into infinity with regard to these end. Aristotle particularly intends this conclusion in *Metaph.* II and the remaining ones are necessarily inferred from the last part. For if it does not proceed into infinity in proceeding from the election of the first means turned to an end, it must necessarily be stopped in something beyond which the intention does not tend. That, therefore, will be the ultimate end in that series, both negatively (because such an end is not ordered to another end—otherwise, the intention would not be stopped in it) and positively (because everything else which belongs to that series is referred to it, since everything else is desired for its sake—for if something is desired [but] not for its sake, it does not belong to that series but is as if added *per accidens*). So, for example, with respect to a doctor and in the series of cures, the health of a human being is the ultimate end negatively, because it is intended *per se* and the intention of the doctor does not progress beyond it. Therefore, once health has been achieved, action ceases. It is also the ultimate end positively, because everything else which belongs to that art is referred to it (for example, instruments for making medicines, medicines for tempering or purging a humour, and this, finally, for health itself). So if someone perhaps also ingests medicine either for the sake of pleasure or for the sake of sustenance, now this end does not belong to the series of cures but to another intention *per accidens* conjoined with another.

Aristotle.

30 3. Superest ut ultimam partem conclusionis probemus,
 quam late demonstrat Aristoteles, citato loco; facile autem in
 hunc modum formari potest demonstratio. Nam imprimis, de-
 scendendo ab intentione finis ad electionem vel executionem
 mediorum, ne- <891> cesse est ut tandem sistat electio in
 aliquo medio quod sit primum in executione et ultimum in
 35 ordine intentionis, quia alias nunquam posset actio inchoari et
 ita frustranea esset omnis electio, quia semper procederetur ab
 una electione in aliam, et numquam perveniretur ad usum, et
 ita tolleretur omnis actio. Unde quantum est evidens experi-
 entia inchoari a nobis inquisitiones finium per media, tam est
 40 evidens in progressu finis ad media sisti in ultimo, seu primo
 medio. Rursus, quod ab hoc primo medio versus finem ten-
 dendo non possit infinitum procedi, probatur primo, quia im-
 possibile est omnia quae in illa serie appetuntur, propter aliud
 appeti; ergo sistendum est in aliquo quod appetatur propter se;
 45 ille ergo erit finis ultimus in illa serie. Nam in illa particula
propter se includitur negatio propter aliud, quae negatio etiam
 in antecedenti supponitur dum assumimus non posse omnia
 obiecta, seu omnes fines contentos in una serie, propter aliud
 appeti vel in aliud ordinari.

50 4. Hoc autem antecedens probatur, nam sumo totam
 finium et mediorum collectionem (sive enim haec finita sit,
 sive infinita, potest tota simul concipi); de illa ergo interrogo
 an propter se appetatur, vel propter aliud; non potest dici hoc
 55 posterius, alias extra totam collectionem esset aliquid, quod in-
 volvit contradictionem; ergo dandum est primum; ergo nec-
 essario intra illam collectionem sistendum est in aliquo quod
 propter se appetatur. Nam cum incipiendo a primo medio, il-
 lud eligatur propter secundum, et secundum propter tertium,
 60 et sic deinceps, nisi sistatur in aliquo fine propter se intento,
 non poterit tota collectio propter se appeti, quia neque ratione
 omnium vel singulorum quae in illa sunt, cum multa ac fere
 omnia propter aliud appetantur; nec ratione alicuius, nisi aliq-

51 sit] set D.

30R 3. It remains for us to prove the last part of the conclusion, which
 Aristotle demonstrated more broadly in the cited place. Moreover,
 the demonstration can easily be formed in this way. For, in the first
 place, descending from the intention of the end to the election or per-
 formance of the means, it is necessary that election finally stop in some
 means which is first in execution and last in the order of intention, be-
 35R cause otherwise the action could never be started and thus every elec-
 tion would be frustrated, because it would always proceed from one
 election to another and would never be brought to use and thus every
 action would be destroyed. Hence, to the extent that it is evident from
 experience that searches for ends are begun by us through means, it is
 40R evident that in a progression of an end to means they are stopped in the
 ultimate or first means. On the other hand, that from this first means
 turned to an end one cannot proceed into infinity in tending is proven,
 first, because it is impossible that everything which is desired in that
 series is desired for the sake of something else. Therefore, it must be
 45R stopped in something that is desired for its own sake. That, therefore,
 will be the ultimate end in that series. For in that phrase ‘for its own
 sake’ (*propter se*) is included the negation ‘for the sake of something else’
 (*propter aliud*). This negation is also assumed in the antecedent as long
 as we assume that not every object or every end contained in one series
 50R can be desired for the sake of something else or ordered to something
 else.

55R 4. This antecedent, moreover, is proven, for I suppose the whole
 collection of ends and means (for whether this [collection] is finite or
 infinite, the whole can be conceived at the same time). Therefore, I
 ask concerning it whether it is desired for its own sake or for the sake
 of something else. The latter cannot be said. Otherwise, there would
 be something beyond the whole collection, which involves a contradic-
 tion. Therefore, the former must be granted. Therefore, within that
 collection it [i.e., election,] must be stopped in something which is de-
 60R sired for its own sake. For when beginning from the first means, that is
 elected for the sake of a second, and the second for the sake of a third,
 and so forth in succession, unless it is stopped in some end intended
 for its own sake, the whole collection will not be able to be desired for
 its own sake, because neither by reason of all or of a single [member]

uid admittatur propter se intentum; necessario igitur hoc admittendum est.

Obiectioni
satisfit.

65 5. Dicitur fortasse illam collectionem nec propter se appeti, nec propter aliud, quia non tota per modum unius intenditur, sed per partes (ut ita dicam), id est, amando singula ex contentis in illa collectione; atque ita dicitur solum appeti amando unum propter aliud. Unde etiam concedetur quod, licet collectio eorum quae amantur unum propter aliud semper sit finita, quia procedendo ab uno in aliud non potest in infinitum pertransiri, nihilominus fines appetibiles in illa serie non sunt finiti, <col. b> sed in infinitum procedunt, et ita non sistit in aliquo ultimo et propter se appetibili.

75 6. Sed contra hoc evidentiter procedunt rationes Aristotelis. Prima, quia hoc modo nunquam posset inchoari intentio, nam haec inchoanda est ab aliquo quod sit primum in intentione; hoc autem nullum esse potest, si illo modo in infinitum proceditur. Nam vel illud, quod est primum in intentione amatur propter se, et sic cessat processus; vel amatur propter aliud et sic non potest esse illud primum in intentione, sed illud aliud propter quod amatur; ergo si semper proceditur ab uno amato propter aliud, in illud aliud propter quod amatur, nunquam dari potest primum in intentione: ergo nec dabitur prima intentio; ergo nunquam poterit intentio inchoari, quia non inchoatur nisi ab aliqua prima.

90 7. Secunda ratio (et fere in eadem redit), quia sic tollitur causalitas finalis. Patet sequela, nam finis intermedius non causat nisi in virtute prioris et dependenter ab illo, ut praecedenti etiam disputatione declaratum et probatum est; ergo si in infinitum proceditur ab uno in alium priorem, et nunquam pervenitur ad finem primum in intentione, non poterunt omnes intermedii quidquam causare, cum omnes pendeant ab illo primo et ille nunquam causet, vel non sit; necessario ergo veniendum est ad aliquem qui sit primus in causando in hoc ordine quem nunc ultimum vocamus in executione, quia in processu mediorum illic sistit inquisitio. Et

65R which is in that, since many and almost all are desired for the sake of something else, nor by reason of anything, unless something intended for its own sake is admitted. Therefore, this must necessarily be admitted.

70R 5. You will perhaps say that this collection is desired neither for its own sake nor for the sake of something else, because the whole collection is not intended as one but in parts (if I may say it that way), that is, by loving single things from the contents of that collection. And thus it is said that that alone is desired in loving one for the sake of another. Hence, it will also be conceded that, although the collection of those things which are loved one for the sake of another is always finite, because in proceeding from one to another it cannot pass right through to infinity, yet the desirable ends in that series are not finite but proceed to infinity and thus it is not stopped in something ultimate and desirable for its own sake.

80R 6. But the arguments of Aristotle clearly proceed against this. First, because in this way intention can never get started, for this must be started by that which is first in intention. But this cannot be anything, if one proceeds into infinity in that way. For either that which is first in intention is loved for its own sake and thus the procession stops or it is loved for the sake of something else and thus it cannot be first in intention but that other thing for the sake of which it is loved. Therefore, if from one thing loved for the sake of another is always proceeded to that other thing for the sake of which it is loved, what is first in intention can never be given. Therefore, neither will the first intention be given. Therefore, intention will never be able to be started, because it is not started except by that first [intention].

85R 90R 95R 100R 7. The second argument (and it almost comes to the same): because thus final causality is destroyed. The sequel is clear, for the intermediate end does not cause except in virtue of the former and depending on it, as was also declared and proven in the preceding disputation. Therefore, if one proceeds from one to another prior [end] into infinity and one never arrives at an end which is first in intention, all the intermediates will not be able to cause anything whatever, since they all depend on that first one and it never causes (or does not exist). Therefore, it must necessarily come to something which is first in causing in this order which we now call last in execution, because that is where the search stops in the procession of means. And this argument is declared

An objection is
answered.

100 declaratur haec ratio, ne quis putet in ea peti principium supponendo dari primum finem; non enim supponitur, sed probatur esse necessarium, si futura est causalitas finalis. Declaratur autem fere argumento in principio facto; nam sumo totam seriem finium collective: vel illa est dependens in causando finaliter ab alio fine, et hoc est impossibile, alias iam non sumeretur tota collectio; et praeterea quia iam tota illa non posset causare, nisi innixa alteri, a quo pendere dicitur; de quo eadem redit quaestio, nam si ille finis dicatur esse independens, ille est ultimus quem inquirimus; dependens autem poni non potest, alias comprehensus esset in priori collectione. Si autem intra illam esse aliquem finem independentem ab alio priori in causando finaliter; impossibile est enim omnia contenta in collectione esse dependentia <892> et totam collectionem esse independentem, et eadem ratione impossibile est inchoari causalitatem, nisi in collectione causarum subordinatarum aliqua sit independens. Quem discursum latius prosequemur infra in causis efficientibus, demonstrando Deum esse. 105R 110R 115R 120R

120 8. Tertia ratio Aristotelis et optima est, quia dum dicitur omne medium appeti propter aliud et nunquam perveniri ad aliquid propter se amabile, destruitur ratio boni, quod per se constat esse absurdissimum. Sequela patet, quia bonum utile ad aliud solum est bonum secundum quid et solum fit appetibile ratione alterius ad quod est utile; ablato autem eo quod est tale simpliciter, necesse est tolli illud quod solum est tale secundum quid, praesertim cum solum sit tale per habitudinem ad alia. 130R
125 Ablato ergo fine propter se appetibili, aufertur bonum simpliciter, quod est per se bonum, et consequenter etiam aufertur bonum secundum quid, quia iam non habet unde sit bonum, neque unde reddatur appetibile. Unde aperta est repugnancia dicere unum esse appetibile propter aliud, et hoc deinceps propter aliud, nullo existente appetibili propter se. Alias rationes habet Aristoteles, tum citato loco, tum I Ethic., c. 2; sed haec sufficiunt, nam res etiam est satis clara. 135R

lest someone think that in it the question is begged for supposing the first end to be given. For it is not supposed, but proven to be necessary, if there is going to be final causality. Moreover, it is almost declared by the argument made in the beginning, for I suppose the whole series of ends collectively. Or that is dependent in causing finally on another end and this is impossible. Otherwise, the whole collection would not have been supposed now. And, in addition, because now that whole would not be able to cause, except by leaning on the other from which it is said to depend, concerning which the same question returns. For if that end is said to be independent, it is the ultimate [end] which we seek. If dependent, however, it cannot be placed. Otherwise, it would have been included in the prior collection. If, however, the whole collection is independent in causing finally, it is necessary that within it there be some independent end prior from the others in causing finally. For it is impossible that everything contained in the collection be dependent and the whole collection be independent. And for the same reason it is impossible that causality be started unless in the collection of subordinated causes some [cause] is independent. We will pursue this discussion more broadly below with regard to efficient causes, demonstrating that God exists.

8. Aristotle's third and best argument is because as long as it is said that every means is desired for the sake of another and one never arrives at something lovable for its own sake, the nature of good is demolished, which *per se* is evident to be most absurd. The sequel is clear, because something good useful for something else is only good *secundum quid* and only becomes desirable by reason of the other thing for which it is useful. But by that having been removed which is such *simpliciter*, that which is such only *secundum quid* is destroyed, especially since it is such only through a habitude to the other. Therefore, the end desirable for its own sake having been removed, good *simpliciter* (which is good *per se*) is removed and, consequently, good *secundum quid* is also removed, because it no longer has that by which it was good nor that by which it was rendered desirable. Hence, the repugnancy of saying that one thing is desirable for the sake of another and this in turn for the sake of another, with nothing existing that is desirable for its own sake, is exposed. Aristotle has other arguments, both in the cited place and in *EN* I, c. 2, but these suffice for the matter is already sufficiently clear.

Resolutio de ultimo fine simpliciter.

9. Dico secundo: etiam datur aliquis finis ultimus simpliciter respectu omnium rerum et particularium finium et coordinationum eorum, qui est ipsemet Deus. Haec assertio in doctrina fidei est certa, quam tradit D. Thomas, I, q. 44, a. 4, et q. 103, a. 2; et cum eo caeteri theologi ex illo Prov., 16: Omnia propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; et Apoc., 21 et 22: Ego sum Alpha et Omega. Idemque tradiderunt sancti Patres, praesertim Dionysius, c. 10 De Divin. nom.; et D. August., lib. I De Doctr. Christ., c. 23, et lib. XIX de Civit., a principio, et ex philosophis id attingit Arist., XII Metaph., c. 10, et lib. de Mundo ad Alex., et Plato in Timaeo, et lib. IV de Legib., et Trismegist. in Pimand.

10. Difficultas autem est an possit evidenti ratione demonstrari hunc finem ultimum esse unum respectu rerum omnium. Nam ex his demonstrationibus quibus probatur non dari processum in infinitum in finibus, non <col. b> potest satis concludi dari hoc modo aliquem finem ultimum universalem seu communem, in quem omnia referantur, et ipse non in alium; nam unaquaeque res potest in suum finem proprium ultimate tendere, et ita in nulla serie dabitur processus in infinitum in finibus, etiamsi nullus detur finis ultimus communis omnibus.

11. Respondetur aliud esse quaerere an detur aliquis finis ultimus communis in quem omnia ordinentur, aliud vero an res omnes et singulae illum finem intendant ac quaerant. De hoc posteriori puncto dicemus in sectione sequenti; nunc solum de priori sensu agimus. Et in eo dicimus esse evidens ratione naturali dari unum finem ultimum rerum omnium, idque colligi ex illo principio, quod non datur progressus in infinitum in finibus, adiunctis aliis duobus supra etiam demonstratis, nimirum, dari unum principium primum effectivum

³*Poimandres* is the first book of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, a collection of Hermetic works popular among some Renaissance figures (especially those with interests in alchemy, magic, and the like) after it was reintroduced to the West by Marsilio Ficino. The Church generally disapproved of it thanks to its occultic character, so it is interesting that Suárez cites it here. In 1614, Swiss philologist Isaac Casaubon showed that the documents were not written by an ancient Egyptian priest but rather had their provenance in Neoplatonism.

Resolution concerning an ultimate end strictly speaking.

9. I say secondly: Some ultimate end *simpliciter* is also given with respect to all things, both [with respect to] particular ends and the coordination of them. This [end] is God himself. This assertion is certain in the teaching of faith, which St. Thomas hands down in [ST] Ia.44.4 and 103.2 and with him the rest of the theologians on the basis of Prov. 16[:4] ‘The Lord has made everything for his own sake’ and Rev. 21[:6] and 22[:13] ‘I am the Alpha and the Omega’. And the holy Fathers handed down the same teaching, especially [pseudo-]Dionysius in c. 10 of *On the Divine Names* and St. Augustine in book I, c. 23, of *De Doct. Chr.* and in the beginning of book XIX of *On the City of God*. And among the philosophers Aristotle touched on it in *Metaph.* XII, c. 10 and *De Mundo*, Plato in *Tim.*, *Laws* IV, and [Hermes] Trismegistus in *Poimandres*.³

10. But the difficulty is whether it can be demonstrated by an evident argument that this ultimate end is one with respect to all things. For from these demonstrationes by which it is proven that a procession into infinity is not given with end, it cannot adequately be concluded that in this way some universal or common ultimate end is given, to which everything is referred and which is not referred to anything else. For each thing can tend to its own proper ultimate end and thus a procession of ends into infinity will not be given in any series, even if no ultimate end is given that is common to everything.

11. It is responded that it is one thing to ask whether some common ultimate end to which everything is ordered is given, but another whether each and every single thing intends and seeks that end. We will talk about this latter point in the following section. Now we will discuss only the prior sense. And regarding that we say that it is evident by natural reason that one ultimate end is given for all things. And it can be inferred from the principle that a procession into infinity is not given with ends, by adjoining two others also demonstrated above, namely, that one effective first principle of all things is given and that

St. Thomas.

Prov. 16.

Augustine.
Aristotle. Plato.
Trismegistus.

rerum omnium et illud operari propter finem. Ex quibus ita
 35 concluditur ratio. Primum principium efficiens rerum om-
 nium propter aliquem finem illas produxit, conservat ac regit,
 et in eius intentione non datur processus in infinitum; ergo
 propter aliquem finem ultimum haec omnia operatur; ille ergo
 finis ultimus, quem primum agens intendit, est unus, et conse-
 40 quenter est finis ultimus simpliciter rerum omnium. Probat
 haec ultima consequentia, caetera enim clara sunt. Quia non
 potest Deus plures ultimos fines et suae intentioni adaequatos
 in suis operibus intendere; nam etiam homo non potest hoc
 modo plures fines ultimos intendere, ut I-II, q. 1, a. 5, demon-
 45 stratur; multo ergo minus Deus, quia intendere plures fines
 non ad perfectionem, sed ad imperfectionem potius pertinet.

12. Dices esse longe diversam rationem de homine et
 de Deo; nam homo intendit finem ultimum ut finem suum,
 in quo suam beatitudinem et sufficientiam bonorum omnium
 collocat, et ideo fieri non potest ut homo simul intendat duos
 50 ultimos fines completos; nam si neutrum sine altero sibi suf-
 ficere existimat, neuter est finis ultimus completus; si autem
 unum ex illis amat ut sufficientem, alter non potest habere
 rationem finis ultimi. At vero Deus, dum operatur propter
 ultimum finem, non operatur propter ultimum finem suum,
 55 sed earum rerum quas creat; nam in superioribus est ostensum
 esse differentiam inter voluntatem creatam et divinam, quod
 in voluntate creata actus <893> ipse voluntatis ordinatur, ut ad
 finem, ad obiectum quod amat; in voluntate autem divina min-
 ime, sed una res volita ordinatur in aliam ut in finem. Sic igitur
 60 non repugnabit Deo intendere plures ultimos fines earum re-
 rum quas extra se vult et operatur, quia respectu diversarum
 rerum nihil repugnat dari diversa bona in quibus earum ul-
 tima perfectio et quasi felicitas consistat. Sicut possunt plures
 homines plures fines ultimos intendere, licet unus non possit.
 65 Nam ita se habet Deus intendendo pluribus rebus fines earum.
 Unde confirmatur, nam res, quarum Deus fines intendit, sunt
 diversarum rationum et naturarum; ergo habere etiam possunt
 varios fines ultimos sibi proportionatos; ergo et Deus potest il-
 los fines, ut plures sunt, variis rebus intendere.

70 13. Dicit aliquis Deum non intendere rerum varietatem

it acted for the sake of an end. The argument is thus concluded from
 these. The first efficient principle of all things produced them and con-
 35 serves and rules them for the sake of some end and a procession into
 infinity is not given in its intention. Therefore, it did all these for the
 sake of some ultimate end. That ultimate end, therefore, which the
 first agent intends is one and, consequently, is the ultimate end *sim-*
pliciter of all things. This last consequence is proven, for the others are
 40 clear. Because God cannot intend multiple ultimate ends [that are] also
 adequate to his intention in his works, for a human being also cannot
 intend multiple ultimate ends in this way, as is demonstrated in [ST]
 IaIIæ.1.5. Therefore, far less can God, since to intend multiple ends
 belongs not to perfection but rather to imperfection.

12. You may say that the argument concerning the human being is
 very different from the argument concerning God. For a human being
 intends the ultimate end as his end, in which his happiness and a suffi-
 45 ciency of all goods are collected, and therefore it cannot happen that a
 human being at the same time intends two complete ultimate ends. For
 if neither is considered to suffice without the other, then neither is a
 complete ultimate end. If, however, he loves one of them as sufficient,
 50 the other one cannot have the nature of an ultimate end. But God, on
 the other hand, while he acts for the sake of an ultimate end, does not
 act for the sake of his ultimate end, but of those which he creates. For
 the difference between created and divine will was shown above, i.e.,
 55 that in created will the act itself is ordered by the will to an object which
 is loved as to an end. In the divine will, however, not at all, but one
 willed thing is ordered to another as to an end. So, therefore, it will not
 be repugnant for God to intend multiple ultimate ends of those things
 60 which he wishes beyond himself and does, because it is not repugnant
 with respect to diverse things that diverse goods be given in which their
 ultimate perfection and quasi-felicity consists, just as multiple humans
 can intend multiple ultimate ends, although one cannot. For thus God
 holds himself in intending their ends with multiple things. Hence it
 65 is confirmed: for the things, of which God intends the ends, are of di-
 verse characters (*rationum*) and natures. Therefore, they can also have
 various ultimate ends proportionate to them. Therefore, God can also
 intend those ends that are multiple for various things.

13. Someone may say that God does not intend the variety and

et distinctionem nisi in ordine ad aliquid unum, verbi gratia, complementum universi vel aliquid simile, et ideo necessarium esse ut in procreatione rerum quantumvis distinctarum unum finem ultimum intendat. Sed hoc non satisfacit. Primo, quia non est adeo evidens Deum intendere res omnes creatas ad unius compositionem vel complementum; nam, licet in corporalibus ita appareat, de spiritualibus non ita potest ratione probari, maxime si spiritualia cum corporalibus comparentur, et praecipue si Deus plures mundos produxisset, prout potuit. Secundo, illud non satis est ut omnia dicantur habere unum finem ultimum simpliciter, tum quia ipsa unitas et constitutio universi est quid valde imperfectum ut ad illud dicantur omnia sicut ad finem ultimum ordinari, tum etiam quia ipse ordo rerum universi ordinatur ad singularum rerum vel specierum conservationem et omnia corporalia ordinantur aliquo modo ad hominem, ut etiam Aristoteles agnovit, I *Polit.*, c. 5.

Aristoteles.

14. Quapropter non potest aliter tota haec demonstratio concludi, nisi demonstrando ultimam partem conclusionis, nimirum, hunc ultimum finem quem primum efficiens intendit in suis actionibus, non posse esse aliquid aliud a seipso; nam hinc evidenter sequitur res omnes procreatas, quantumvis inter se diversas, sicut uniuntur in uno primo principio, ita etiam uniri in uno ultimo fine, etiamsi fingamus aliquas earum ita esse constitutas ut inter se una ad alteram, vel plures ad unam aliquam extra Deum ordinentur. Prima autem propositio assumpta pro- <col. b> batur, quia id quod est unicuique agenti finis potissimum suarum actionum, est illi optimum et maximum bonum, praesertim si ordinata sit et recta intentio, ut docuit Arist., I *Ethic.*, c. 7; sed primo agenti nihil est optimum et maximum bonum, nisi eius intrinseca bonitas; ergo respectu illius nihil potest esse ultimus finis actionum et effectuum eius, nisi ipsemet ratione suae bonitatis; ultimus enim finis est potissimum in omni intentione et actione. Praeterea, quia ratio causae finalis perfecta est et de se pertinet ad perfectionem simpliciter; ergo convenit Deo in summo gradu perfectionis, tum quia omnis perfectio simpliciter est in Deo in summo gradu, tum etiam quia, cum bonitas sit ratio causandi finaliter et Deus sit summum bonum, necesse est ut rationem

Aristoteles.

70R distinction of things except as far as one thing is concerned, for example, the universal complement or something similar, and therefore it is necessary that in the procreation of things as distinct as you like one ultimate end is intended. But this is not satisfactory. First, because it is not exactly evident that God intends all created things for one composition or complement. For, although it appears that way with corporeal things, it cannot be proven to be thus with spiritual things, certainly if spiritual beings are compared with corporeal and especially if God produced multiple worlds as he could have. Secondly, that is not enough so that all are said to have one ultimate end *simpliciter*, both because the unity and universal structure itself is something very imperfect so that all are called to that just as they ordered to the ultimate end and also because the universal order of things itself is ordered to the conservation of single things or species and all corporeal things are ordered in some way to human beings, as Aristotle also recognizes in *Pol.* I, c. 5.

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14. Wherefore this whole demonstration cannot be concluded otherwise except by demonstrating the last part of the conclusion, namely, this ultimate end which the first efficient [agent] intended in its actions cannot be something other than itself. For from here it evidently follows that all things brought into existence, however diverse they may among themselves, are united in one first principle just as also they are also united in one ultimate end, even if we imagine some of them to be constituted such that among them one is ordered to another or multiple ones are ordered to some one thing besides God. The first assumed proposition, moreover, is proven because that which to each agent the foremost end of its actions is for it the best and greatest good, especially if it is ordered and [has] a right intention, as Aristotle taught in *EN* I, c. 7. But for the first agent nothing is the best and greatest good except its own intrinsic goodness. Therefore, with respect to it nothing can be the ultimate end of its actions and effects except the very nature of its goodness. For the ultimate end is foremost in every intention and action. In addition, because the nature of a final cause is perfect and belongs of itself to perfection *simpliciter*. Therefore, it is agreeable to God in the highest degree of perfection, both because every perfection *simpliciter* is in God to the highest degree and also because, since goodness is the nature of causing finally and God is the highest good, it is necessary that he have the nature and perfection of a final cause in the

Aristotle.

Aristotle.

et perfectionem finalis causae in summo habeat. Sicut autem
 110 summa perfectio in ordine efficientium est quod sit primum
 et universalissimum, ita in ordine finium, quod sit ultimus et
 universalissimus; ergo talis perfectio necessario tribuenda est
 Deo. Praeterea omne agens, in quantum agens, operatur aliquo
 modo propter seipsum, atque ita est finis suarum actionum;
 115 ergo et primum agens omnia operatur propter se; ergo est finis
 omnium, cum omnia sint ex actione et effectione eius; non est
 autem finis non ultimus, nam is semper est in suo ordine imper-
 115R fectus; ergo est finis ultimus. Tandem huc tendit illud axioma,
 quod ordo finium est iuxta ordinem agentium; nam agens, quo
 120 perfectius vel universalius, eo intendit perfectiorem vel univer-
 saliorem finem; Deus autem est perfectissimum et universalissi-
 mum agens; ergo intendit perfectissimum et universalissimum
 finem. Legatur D. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 17 et 18.

D. Thom.

15. Ad objectionem ergo superius factam respondetur,
 125 quamvis Deus non agat propter se ut propter finem suum,
 sed suorum effectuum vel actionum, nihilominus non posse
 habere nisi unum finem ultimum omnium earum, non quia
 illum finem quaerat ut satietur et in eo habeat sufficientiam
 125R bonorum omnium, sed potius quia supponitur habens in se
 sufficientiam bonorum omnium et summam bonitatem ac per-
 130 fectionem, a qua sola primo moveri seu invitari potuit ut alias
 beneficeret propter seipsum. Unde, licet verum sit ex ipsis re-
 bus quas creat, quasdam ordinare ad alias ut ad fines, vel potius
 130R omnes ita inter se connectere ut aliae aliis vi- <894> cissim
 135 deserviant, atque hoc modo sub ipso Deo assignari possint
 alii fines communes vel universales ad quos singulae creaturae,
 praeter privatos fines, ordinantur ab ipsomet creatore, et prae-
 sertim ad ordinem vel pulchritudinem universi, tamen simp-
 135R pliciter nullus extra Deum potest dici finis ultimus in quem
 divina intentio seu actio tendit. Adeo ut dixerit D. Thomas,
 q. 3 de Potent., a. 15, ad 14, ipsam etiam communicationem
 divinae bonitatis non esse finem ultimum, sed ipsammet divi-
 140R nam bonitatem, quia communicatio bonitatis divinae quid
 creatum est, unde ipsa etiam refertur in bonitatem increatam,

D. Thom.

120 perfectiorem] perfectionem D.

128 habeat] habent D.

highest [degree]. Moreover, just as the highest perfection in the order
 of efficient [causes] is that which is first and most universal, so also in
 the order of ends that which is ultimate and most universal. Therefore,
 such a perfection necessarily ought to be attributed to God. In addition,
 every agent insofar as it is an agent acts in some way for its own sake
 and thus is the end of its actions. Therefore, also the first agent does
 everything for its own sake. Therefore, it is the end of all things, since
 all things exist by its action and effect. Moreover, it is not an end that is
 110R not an ultimate, for that is always imperfect in its order. Therefore, it is
 an ultimate end. Finally, to this tends the axiom that the order of ends
 is according to the order of agents. For an agent by being more perfect
 or universal intends a more perfect or universal end. God, moreover,
 is the most perfect and universal agent. Therefore, he intends the most
 perfect and universal end. St. Thomas is read in *SCG III*, c. 17 and 18.

St. Thomas.

15. Therefore, to the objection made above it is responded that al-
 though God does not act for the sake of himself as for the sake of his
 end, but of his effects or actions, nevertheless he cannot have except
 one ultimate end of all of them, not because he seeks that end in order
 to be satisfied and to have in that a sufficiency of all goods, but rather
 because he, having in himself a sufficiency of all goods and the highest
 goodness and perfection, is supposed that he could first be moved or in-
 vited by that alone so that he conferred benefits on others for his own
 sake. Hence, although it is true that from the things themselves which
 he made certain ones are ordered to others as to ends—or, rather, all are
 connected among themselves so that others are of service to others in
 turn—and in this way under God himself other common or universal
 ends can be assigned to which, in addition to private ends, single crea-
 tures are ordered by the Creator himself, and especially to the universal
 order or beauty. Still, *simpliciter* nothing beyond God can be called
 an ultimate end to which divine intention or action tends. Indeed, as
 St. Thomas said in *De Potent.* q. 3, a. 15 ad 14, the communication it-
 self of divine goodness is also not the ultimate end, but the very divine
 goodness itself [is], because the communication of divine goodness is
 what was created. Hence, it itself is also referred to the uncreated good-
 ness, by the love of which God himself wished to communicate, not

St. Thomas.

145 ex cuius amore Deus se communicare voluit, non quia ei sit
commodum aut utile, sed quia ipsam deceat, sitque suae boni-
tati consentaneum. Addit vero ibidem D. Thomas Deum non
agere ex appetitu finis ultimi, sed ex amore sui, quia non agit ad
consequendum finem ultimum, sed ad communicandam
150 tatem eius. Quod quidem est verum respectu ipsiusmet Dei,
quia, ut saepe diximus, non agit propter se ut propter finem
suum; tamen respectu creaturarum dici etiam potest Deum op-
erari ex appetitu finis, id est, appetens ut creaturae seipsum ut
finem consequantur. 145R

155 16. Ex quo etiam intelligitur, cum in praecedenti dis-
putatione distinxerimus duplicem finem, obiectivum et for-
malem, Deum non dici ultimum finem formalem, sed obiec-
tivum creaturarum, vel proprie vel late de obiecto loquendo,
iuxta ea quae dicemus sectione sequenti. Et ratio est quia fi-
nis formalis non est ultimus simpliciter, cum in obiectivum
160 ordinetur, ut supra ostensum est. Item, quia, licet Deus sit
summum bonum, tamen creaturae non assequuntur illud nisi
quatenus aliquo modo illud participant; unde assecutio illius
boni summi, quae finis formalis dicitur, semper est aliquid
165 creatum. Unde obiter solvitur quaedam obiectio supra facta,
nimirum, quomodo tanta rerum ac naturarum varietas possit
ad eundem ultimum finem ordinari; ratio enim est quia ille
non est finis ut assecutio, sed ut bonum assecutum; res autem
diversae habent diversitatem in modo assequendi finem illum
170 quamvis in eodem fine ultimo conveniant, sicut conveniunt in
eodem primo principio, differunt tamen in modo aut gradu
emanationis ab ipso. 165R

175 17. <col. b> Tandem intelligitur ex dictis, quod, licet re-
spectu creaturarum Deus sit finis ultimus obiectivus, cuius gra-
tia vel creatae sunt vel ipsae operantur, tamen respectu actionis
ipsius Dei est ultimus finis cui; nam illi creantur vel aguntur
omnia, vel potius sibimet creat et efficit omnia. Omne enim
agens habet rationem finis cui respectu suae actionis, sive per
eam quaerat commoditatem suam, ut communiter agunt agen-
180 tia creata, vel tantum communicationem et manifestationem
175R

because it is advantageous or useful to him, but because it is fitting and
is agreeable to his goodness. But St. Thomas adds in that place that
God does not act from a desire for the ultimate end, but from his love,
because he does not act for the attainment of the ultimate end but for
the communication of his goodness. That, indeed, is true with respect
to God himself, because, as we have often said, he does not act for the
sake of himself as for the sake of his end. Yet with respect to creatures it
can also be said that God acts from a desire for the end, that is, desiring
that creatures may seek after him as an end. 145R

16. From which it is also understood that, since in the preceding
disputation we distinguished between two ends, objective and formal,⁴
God is not called the ultimate formal end but rather the ultimate objec-
tive end of creatures, either properly or by speaking more broadly of
the object, according to that which we will say in the following section.
And the reason is because the formal end is not ultimate *simpliciter*,
since it is ordered to the objective, as was shown above. Likewise, be-
cause, although God is the highest good, nevertheless, creatures do not
attain that except to the extent that they participate in some way in
that. Hence, the attainment of that highest good, which is called the
formal end, is always something created. Hence, by the way, is solved
a certain objection made above, namely, in what way such a great vari-
ety of things and natures can be ordered to the same ultimate end. For
the reason is that that is not the end as attainment but as good having
been pursued. Moreover, diverse things have diversity in their way of
attaining that end although they agree in the same ultimate end, just as
they agree in the same first principle yet differ in the way or degree of
emanation from it. 165R

17. Finally, it is understood from what was said that, although,
with respect to creatures God is the objective ultimate end for the sake
of which they are created or themselves are done, yet with respect to
the actions themselves of God he is the ultimate *finis cui*. For all are
created or done for him or, rather, he creates and effects everything for
his own sake. For all agents have the nature of a *finis cui* with respect
to their own actions, either seeking through that their advantage, as
created agents commonly act, or seeking only the communication and
175R

Deus ultimus
creaturarum finis
obiectivus, non
formalis.

Actionum Dei
finis cui, ipse
Deus.

God is the
ultimate
objective end of
creatures, not the
ultimate formal
end.

God himself is
the *finis cui* of the
actions of God.

⁴*DM XXIII.2.12.*

suae bonitatis, ut Deus.

SECTIO II.

Utrum finis ultimus per se ac proprie concurrat cum omnibus finibus proximis ad finaliter causandum, et consequenter an omnia agentia in omnibus actionibus suis finem ultimum intendant.

Explicatur titulus
quaestionis.

5 1. Quaestio haec intelligenda est de ultimo fine simpliciter
seu universalis; nam de illo qui tantum est ultimus in aliqua
serie, iam supra ostendimus ipsum esse qui immediate influit
finaliter in omnes effectus vel actiones ad illam seriem per se
10 pertinentes. Immo diximus huiusmodi finem esse totam rationem
causandi, ita ut media vel fines intermedii nullam propriam
causalitatem finalem habeant, nisi quatenus substant, vel
quasi informantur ab hoc fine. De fine vero ultimo simpliciter
est specialis quaestio, an influat cum omnibus finibus particularibus
15 ad causalitates eorum per se et immediate, per modum
causae universalis in eo genere, ad eum modum quo prima
causa efficiens in genere efficientis causae concurrat per se et
immediate cum omnibus causis efficientibus particularibus.

Argumenta in partem affirmantem.

20 2. Et videtur quidem omnino ita esse dicendum: primo, quia
ratio causae finalis tam perfecte et universe convenit Deo in
suo genere, sicut ratio efficientis in suo; ergo, sicut ratio primi
efficientis ita convenit Deo ut omnia ab ipso pendeant per se
et immediate in causando efficienter, ita ratio primi seu ultimi
25 finis convenit Deo cum hac perfectione et universalitate,
ut ab ipso in causando pendeant per se et immediate omnes
particulares fines. Nec satis est si quis dicat causalitates
particularium finium pendere quidem immediate a Deo, non tamen
in genere finis, sed in genere efficientis, sicut de materiali et
30 est satis, quia causalitas materialis et formalis includunt
imperfectiorem, propter quam a Deo in suo genere exerceri non
possint, et ideo concursus Dei ad illas causalitates est per effici-

manifestation of his goodness, as God [does].

SECTION II.

Whether an ultimate end per se and properly concurs with all proximate ends for causing finally and consequently whether all agents intend an ultimate end in all their actions.

5R 1. This question should be understood to be about the ultimate end
simpliciter or universal. For concerning the end which is only ultimate
in some series, we already showed above to be the very one which immediately
influences finally in every effect or action that belong *per se*
10R to that series. Indeed, we said that an end of this kind is the whole
reason of causing, so that means or intermediate ends have no proper
final causality except insofar as they stand under or are as if informed
by this end. But there is a special question concerning the ultimate end
simpliciter: whether it *per se* and immediately influences their causality
with all particular ends in the manner of a universal cause in that genus,
15R according to the manner by which the first efficient cause in the genus
of efficient causes concurs *per se* and immediately with all particular
efficient causes.

The argument affirmed in part.

20R 2. And it seems indeed that it should be said entirely that way. First, because
the nature of a final cause so perfect and universal is agreeable to
God in its genus, just as the nature of an efficient [cause] in its. Therefore,
just as the nature of the first efficient [cause] agreeable to God
such that everything *per se* and immediately depends on him in causing
efficiently, so the nature of the first or ultimate end is agreeable to God
25R with this perfection and universality so that every particular end *per se*
and immediately depends on him in causing. Nor is it enough if someone
says that the causality of a particular end indeed depends immediately
on God, yet not in the genus of ends but in the genus of efficient
[causes], like we said above concerning the material and formal cause.
30R For material and formal causality includes imperfection, which is why
they cannot be exercised by God in their genus and therefore God's
concursus to those causalities is through efficiency. But final causal-

The title of the
question is
explained.

entiam; at vero causalitas finalis ut sic formaliter nullam imperfectionem involvit, et ideo tam immediate ac per se potest Deo convenire circa omnem actionem et causalitatem, sicut causalitas effectiva; ergo aequae illi convenit, nam quicquid perfectionis simpliciter in Deo intelligi potest, illi inest. Unde confirmatur, nam sicut est ordo per se inter causam efficientem proximum et primam, ita inter finem proximum et ultimum; nam, sicut proxima efficiens causa habet entitatem et vim efficiendi participatam a prima, ac propterea dependentem ab illa, ita finis proximus habet bonitatem, per quam finaliter causat, participatam a summa bonitate finis ultimi; ergo aequae pendet ab illo quoad causalitatem in suo genere.

45 *Argumenta pro negativa parte.*

3. In contrarium autem est, quia neque in propriis agentibus propter finem, ut sunt intellectualia, neque etiam in inferioribus videtur intervenire per se et immediate huiusmodi influxus ultimi finis in omni finali causalitate. Probatur prior pars, quia in agentibus per intellectum, finis non habet causalitatem, nisi cognitus sit ab eo qui propter finem operatur; sed haec agentia operantur propter finem particularem, quando nihil omnino cogitant de fine ultimo universalis; ergo tunc finis particularis causat finaliter sine actuali influxu per se ac immediato ipsius finis ultimi in illo genere causae. Et confirmatur ac declaratur amplius: nam causalitas in genere finis per motionem metaphoricam; ergo, ut Deus concurrat immediate per modum ultimi finis et in genere causae finalis necesse est ut metaphorice simul moveat, seu ut metaphorice motio quae est a fine particulari sit etiam immediate ab ipso, ut talis est; hoc autem esse non potest, nisi ipse cognitus, ut constat ex supra dictis de metaphorica motione; ergo. Et sane ipsa experientia hoc satis suadere videtur; nam quando homo movetur a sanitate, ut illam inquirat, nullo modo movetur immediate bonitate divina, de qua nil cogitat, sed convenientia sanitatis.

40 proxima] proxime D V.

54 particularis] particulares D.

58 est] om. D.

ity as such, on the other hand, formally involves no imperfection and, therefore, it can immediately and *per se* be agreeable to God concerning every action and causality just as in the case of effective causality. Therefore, it is equally agreeable to him, for whatever [kind of] perfection *simpliciter* can be understood of God belongs to him. Hence, it is confirmed, for just as there is a *per se* order between a proximate and an efficient first cause, so there is between a proximate and an ultimate end. For, just as a proximate efficient cause has entity and efficient power by participation in the first [efficient cause] and do this reason depends on it, so a proximate end has goodness—through which it causes finally—by participation in the highest goodness of the ultimate end. Therefore, it equally depends on it with respect to causality in its genus.

45R *The negative part of the argument.*

3. But it is to the contrary, because this kind of influence of the ultimate end in every final causality seems to intervene neither in the case of those properly acting for the sake of an end—for example, intellectual agents—nor in the case of lower beings. The former part is proven because in those acting through intellect the end does not have causality unless it was cognized by the one who acts for the sake of the end. But these agents act for the sake of particular ends, since they do not cognize anything entirely of the universal ultimate end. Therefore, a particular end then causes finally without actual *per se* and immediate influence of the ultimate end itself in that genus of cause. And it is confirmed and declared further: for the causality in the genus of end is through metaphorical motion. Therefore, so that God concurs immediately in the manner of an ultimate end and in the genus of final cause it is necessary that he moves metaphorically at the same time or that the metaphorical motion which is from the particular end is also immediately from him so that it is such. This, however, cannot be except it itself is cognized, as is clear from what was said above concerning metaphorical motion. Therefore. And certainly experience itself seems sufficiently to urge this. For when a human being is moved by health so that he seeks it, he in no way is immediately moved by divine goodness,

4. Nec refert si quis dicat sanitatem non movere, nisi quatenus habet bonitatem par- <col. b> ticipatam a divina bonitate; nam hoc perinde est ac si dicatur remote provenire illam motionem a bonitate per essentiam, quatenus ab illa
70 derivata est aliqua bonitas in sanitatem, non tamen quod ipsamet bonitas per essentiam immediate ac per se etiam concurrat. Sicut etiam calor non calefacit, nisi per virtutem agendi participatam a virtute effectiva per essentiam, quae est in Deo; ex vi tamen huius participationis seu emanationis illius effectus
75 a tali virtute participata, non est immediate a Deo, sed remote, et ideo necesse est quod per ipsam virtutem increatam Deus immediate influat, ut habet proprium influxum primae causae efficientis; hunc autem modum influxus non habet in genere finis, ut probare videtur ratio facta.

80 5. Atque hinc a fortiori probatur altera pars de inferioribus agentibus; nam bruta, eo modo quo per cognitionem metaphorice moventur, nullo modo dici possunt immediate moveri ab ipsa bonitate ultimi finis, quam multo minus possunt cognoscere. Inferiora autem agentia naturalia solum
85 dicuntur operari propter finem, quatenus in suos fines tendunt aut diriguntur; illa autem non tendunt immediate in bonitatem ultimi finis, sed solum in talem formam aut terminum actionis suae. Quod vero dici solet, haec agentia intendere assimilari ultimo fini in communicanda sua perfectione, metaphorice
90 potius quam proprie dictum videtur; atque ita nihil deservit ad explicandam immediatam causalitatem ultimi finis circa has actiones. Assumptum patet, tum quia haec agentia per se non intendunt similitudinem ut relatam ad bonitatem Dei, sed solum intendunt fundamentum illius similitudinis, quod non
95 est aliquod praeter bonum illud creatum, quod est in eorum actionibus; tum etiam quia in sua communicatione, regulariter loquendo, non intendunt se communicare propter solam communicationem (ut sic dicam), sed propter aliquod commodum, vel perfectionem suam, scilicet, ut conservent suam speciem,
100 vel ut se perficiant; signum ergo est, in sua communicatione non intendere proprie ac formaliter assimilationem ad communicationem Dei.

about which he is not thinking at all, but by the agreeability of health.

4. Nor does it matter if someone says that health does not move unless to the extent it has goodness by participation in divine goodness. For this is exactly the same as if it is said that that motion comes into being remotely by goodness through essence to the extent that some
70R goodness in health is derived from it, yet that goodness itself does not also *per se* and immediately concur through essence. [It is] also just as heat that does not warm unless through a power of acting by participation in an effective power through essence, which is in God. Yet from
75R the strength of this participation or emanation of that effect in such a participated strength is not immediately from God but remotely. And therefore it is necessary that God influences immediately through uncreated power itself so that he has the proper influence of a first efficient cause. But influence does not have this mode in the genus of end, as the
80R given argument seems to prove.

5. And from here the other part concerning lower agents is *a fortiori* proven. For brute animals, in that way in which [agents] are metaphorically moved through cognition, can in no way be said to be moved immediately by the goodness itself of the ultimate end, which
85R they much less can cognize. But lower natural agents are only said to act for the sake of an end insofar as they tend or are directed to their ends. But they do not tend immediately to the goodness of an ultimate end, but only to such a form or *terminus* of their actions. But what is usually said—that these agents intend to become like the ultimate
90R end in communicating its perfection—seems to have been said more metaphorically than properly. And thus there is no point in explaining the immediate causality of the ultimate end with regard to these actions. The assumption is clear because these agents do not *per se* intend similitude as related to the goodness of God but only intend the foundation
95R of that similitude, which is not something beyond that created good that is in their actions. Also, because in their communication, speaking regularly, they do not intend that they communicate for the sake of communication alone (if I may speak that way) but for the sake of some advantage or their perfection, namely, in order to conserve their species or to perfect themselves. Therefore, it is a sign that in their
100R communication they do not properly and formally intend becoming like the communication of God.

Variae sententiae.

D. Thom. 5 6. In hac re inuenio frequenter a theologis dictum, Deum esse finem ultimum creaturarum omnium, ita ut omnes in actionibus suis illum assequi intendant, unaquaeque iuxta captum suum. Ita docet late D. Thomas, III <896> cont. Gent., c. 18 et 19, 20 et 21, et I-II q. 1, a. 6, 7 et 8; et in ea doctrina reliqui omnes consentiunt. Nullus tamen, quod ego viderim, satis declarat propriam dependentiam finium proximorum ab ultimo in causando intra proprium genus, neque modum influxus quem ultimus finis habet simul cum proximis seu particularibus. Quin potius, ita tandem declarant illam rationem ultimi finis ut solum remotum concursum ad motiones proximorum finium ei tribuere videantur. Nam de agente a proposito, homine, verbi gratia, dicunt solum operari propter finem ultimum in omnibus actionibus suis, quia operatur propter bonum aliquod, quod non habet vim movendi finaliter, nisi quatenus est quaedam participatio summi boni; de inferioribus vero agentibus dicunt solum intendere ultimum finem, in quantum intendunt aliquam repraesentationem seu participationem bonitatis eius; per quae omnia non declaratur nisi remota causalitas ultimi finis, ut inter obiiciendum probatum videtur. Fonseca vero, lib. V *Metaph.*, c. 2, q. 12, cum sentiat Deum per se et immediate concurrere cum omnibus causis ad earum causalitates, et cum unaquaque per proprium concursum ad suum genus pertinentem, hanc suam sententiam specialiter solum ibi conatur probare de materiali et formali; nam de finali supponit tam esse certum et receptum dogma, sicut de efficienti, de qua iam ipse disputaverat. Omissis autem causa materiali et formali, de quibus supra dictum est et ad rem praesentem non spectat, de finali expresse ibi docet, sect. 5, concurrere immediate cum finibus proximis ad causalitates eorum, ex illa generali ratione, quod sunt causae essentialiter subordinatae in eodem genere; modum autem illius immediati concursus non declarat sed affirmat solum.

35 *Quaestionis resolutio.*

Various views.

5R 6. In this matter I frequently find the statement by the theologians that God is the ultimate end of all creatures so that they all intend to pursue him in their actions according to its capacity. St. Thomas teaches this more widely in *SCG* III, c. 18, 19, 20, and 21 and in [*ST*] IaIIæ.1.6–8. And all the others agree with this doctrine. Yet no one that I have seen satisfactorily reveals the proper dependency of the proximate end on the ultimate [end] in causing within the proper genus nor the mode of influence which the ultimate end has at the same time with the proximate or particular [ends]. On the contrary, they finally reveal that nature of the ultimate end in such a way that it that they seem to attribute to it only a remote concurrence with the motions of proximate ends. For concerning the agent in question, namely, a human being, for example, they say only that they act for the sake of the ultimate end in all their actions because it acts for the sake of some good that does not have the power of moving finally except insofar as it has a certain participation in the highest good. But concerning lower agents they say only that they intend the ultimate end insofar as they intend some representation or participation of its goodness. Through all of this nothing is revealed except a remote causality of an ultimate end, as seems to have been proven during the objecting. But Fonseca in *Metaph.* V, c. 2, q. 12, since he thinks that God *per se* and immediately concurs with all causes according to their causality and with each through a proper concurrence belonging to its genus, he especially tries to prove this view of his there only of material and formal [causation]. For concerning final [causation] he supposes it to be certain and received dogma, just as with efficient [causation], which he had already discussed. But having omitted the material and formal causes, which were spoken about above and which do not appear in the present matter, he expressly teaches here in sec. 5 of the final [cause] that it immediately concurs with proximate ends to their causality, by that general reason that causes are essentially subordinated in the same genus. But he does not reveal but affirms only that mode of immediate concurrence.

The resolution of the question.

St. Thomas.

Fonseca.

7. Mihi autem haec res ita explicanda videtur, ut finium causalitates per proportionem ad agentia declarem; nam, ut saepe dictum est, causalitas finis optime intelligitur per respectum ad agens ut agens est, seu ad actionem agentis. Est ergo considerandum, quod supra tradidimus, omnes actiones secundorum agentium esse etiam actiones Dei; nam ea potissimum ratione dicitur Deus ad omnes illas concurrere per se et immediate ut prima causa efficiens. Ex quo inferitur illas actiones esse propter finem, atque adeo <col. b> esse causatas ab aliquo fine, non solum ut sunt ab agentibus proximis, sed etiam, ac multo magis, ut sunt a primo agente. Quia primum agens, sicut in omni actione sua operatur per intellectum et voluntatem, ita in omni sua actione operatur propter finem longe excellentiori modo quam quodlibet aliud agens; atque ita omnis actio, quatenus extra Deum est transiens et a Deo immediate manat, causata est ab aliquo fine, ab ipso etiam Deo intento.

Deus ut finis ultimus concurrat finaliter ad omnes creaturarum actiones propter finem.

8. Dico iam primo: Deus ut ultimus finis immediate et per se influit in omnem actionem creaturae quatenus ab ipso Deo est, atque hoc saltem modo immediate ac per se concurrat causando finaliter cum omni fine proximo. Probatum prima pars, nam omnis actio agentis creati est immediate a Deo propter finem operante; ergo est a Deo ut ab ultimo fine; ergo Deus ut ultimus finis causat in suo genere immediate illam actionem. Antecedens probatum est. Prima vero consequentia probatur, quia Deus non agit propter finem, nisi agendo propter se ut propter ultimum finem, quia, ut supra probatum est, non potest per se primo moveri seu inclinari ad agendum ab aliqua extrinseca bonitate, sed a propria.

9. Dices, nonne potest Deus moveri ab aliqua bonitate creata, ut aliam conferat vel efficiat? Sic enim propter bonitatem meriti movetur ad dandum praemium et quia promisit, movetur ad implendum promissum, atque hoc modo exercet Deus actum fidelitatis, vel iustitiae, aut misericordiae, etc., propter uniuscuiusque honestatem; ergo etiam operatur Deus propter aliquem finem proximum creatum; ergo non est certa et formalis praedicta illatio.

10. Aliqui non audent concedere antecedens illud, quia

35R 7. To me, however, it seems that this matter should be explained in such a way that we will reveal the causalities of ends through proportion to the agents. For, as was said frequently, the causality of the end is best understood with respect to the agent as it is an agent, or to the action of the agent. Therefore, it should be considered, which we talked about above, that all actions of second agents are also actions of God. For especially by that reason God is said to concur with all those *per se* and immediately as a first efficient cause. From which it is inferred that those actions are for the sake of an end, and truly are things having been caused by some end, not only as they came about by proximate agents but also, and to a much greater extent, as they came about by the first agent. Because the first agent, just as in all his actions he acts through intellect and will, so in all his actions he acts for the sake of an end in a much more excellent way than any other agent. And thus every action, insofar as it goes beyond God and immediately flows from God, has been caused by some end having, indeed, been intended by God himself.

55R 8. I say now first: God as ultimate end immediately and *per se* influences every action of a creature to the extent that it is from God and in this way at least immediately and *per se* concurs in causing finally with every proximate end. The first part is proven, for every action of a creature exists immediately by having been done by God for the sake of an end. Therefore, it is by God as by an ultimate end. Therefore, God as ultimate end immediately causes that action in its genus. The antecedent was proven. But the first consequence is proven, because God does not act for the sake of an end except in acting for the sake of himself as for the sake of an ultimate end, because, as was proven above, he cannot *per se* first be moved or inclined to acting by some extrinsic goodness but only by his own.

60R 9. You may say: but can God not be moved by some created goodness so that he adds or effects another? For thus he is moved for the sake of the goodness of the deserving one to giving a reward. And because he promised, he is moved to fulfilling the promise. And in this way God exercises the act of faithfulness or justice or mercy, etc., for the sake of the honesty of each one. Therefore, God also acts for the sake of some proximate created end. Therefore, the conclusion made above is not certain and formal.

70R 10. Some will not dare to concede that antecedent because it seems

God as ultimate end concurs finally with all actions of creatures for the sake of an end.

75 videtur esse praeter divinam perfectionem aliquid velle propter
finem creatum. Tamen, cum Deum agere propter finem non
sit agere propter finem suum, sed propter finem ad quem ordi-
nat eam rem quam efficit, non est inconveniens ut proxime
aliquid efficiat propter aliquem finem creatum, quia hoc nihil
aliud est quam unam creaturam ordinare in aliam ut in finem
80 proximum, quod est ordinatissimum et absque ulla imperfec-
tione. Atque hoc modo res singulas Deus ordinavit ad pul-
chritudinem universi, et herbas et animalia condidit propter
hominem, <897> etc. Et eadem ratione, quia creaturae non
sunt bonae formaliter bonitate divina, sed propria, ut supra
dictum est, ita vult Deus creaturas propter suammet boni-
85 tatem, ut tamen unicuique velit bonitatem vel perfectionem illi
propriam, et hoc modo vult Deus homini gratiam, ut est perfec-
tio ipsius hominis; unde proxime vult illum propter com-
modum vel utilitatem ipsius hominis. Atque hoc modo, licet
90 comparatione suae bonitatis velit omnes creaturas ut media
ad sui manifestationem et communicationem, tamen compara-
ndo unam creaturam ad aliam, vult unam ut finem proximum
alterius.

11. Nihilominus tamen necesse est ut in omni actione et
operatione propter finem Deus propter se, ut propter ultimum
95 finem operetur. Tum quia semper operatur propter finem per-
fectissimo modo, et ideo simplicissimo et eminentissimo actu
omnia ducit usque ad supremam causam refertque in seipsum
tamquam in ultimum finem. Tum etiam quia divina bonitas
ita est Deo universalis ratio volendi omnem aliam bonitatem
100 vel finem creatum, ut sine relatione vel habitudine ad illam ni-
hil sit amabile Deo extra ipsum Deum. Nam si per bonitates
creatas non communicaretur, praesentaretur vel ostenderetur
divina bonitas, non esset cur ab ipso Deo amarentur. Tamen,
quia id quo creatura repraesentat et participat divinam boni-
105 tatem, aliquid secundum se et propter se amabile respectu ap-
petitus creati, ideo non repugnat quod simul velit Deus unam
creaturam ut finem alterius et ut aliquid ordinatum ad se ut
ad finem ultimum. Hic ergo respectus non est separabilis a
volitione Dei, ut ad creaturam terminatur, et ideo optime in-
110 fertur si Deus aliquid propter finem operatur, etiam operari

75R to be contrary to divine perfection for him to wish something for the
sake of a created end. Yet, since God acting for the sake of an end is
not acting for the sake of his end but for the sake of an end to which he
orders that thing which he effects, it is not disagreeable that he proxi-
mately effect something for the sake of some created end, because this is
nothing other than ordering one creature to another as to a proximate
end, which is most ordained and free from any imperfection. And in
80R this way God ordains individual things to universal beauty and plants
and animals are preserved for human beings, etc. And for the same rea-
son, because creatures are not formally good by divine goodness but
by their own [goodness], as was said above, God thus wishes creatures
for the sake of his own goodness so that he still wishes for each one
85R the goodness or perfection proper to it. And in this way God wishes
grace for a human being, as it is the perfection of the human being him-
self. Hence, he proximately wishes that for the sake of the advantage
or utility of the human being himself. And in this way, although by
a comparison of his goodness he wishes all creatures as means to his
90R manifestation and communication, yet in comparing one creature to
another he wishes one as a proximate end for another.

11. Nevertheless, it is still necessary that in every action and op-
eration for the sake of an end God acts for the sake of himself as for
the sake of an ultimate end. First, because he always acts for the sake
95R of an end in a most perfect way and therefore in a most simple and
most eminent act he leads all things all the way to the highest cause
and refers them to himself just as to an ultimate end. Next also because
divine goodness with God is such a universal reason for willing every
other goodness or created end that without relation or habitude to that
nothing is lovable to God beyond God himself. For if divine goodness
were not communicated, presented, or revealed through created good-
ness, it would not be why they are loved by God himself. Still, because
it is that by which a created being represents and participates in divine
goodness, something in accordance with it and for the sake of it lovable
with respect to created desire, therefore it is not repugnant that God at
the same time wishes one creature as an end for another and as some-
thing ordered to himself as to an ultimate end. Therefore, this respect
is not separable by the volition of God, that it terminates in a creature,
and therefore it is rightly inferred that if God does something for the

illud propter se, ut propter ultimum finem actualiter et perfectissime intentum.

115 12. Iam vero facilis est ad probandum altera consecutio, nimirum, finem ultimum immediate ac per se influere cum quocumque fine proximo ad omnem actionem creaturae, quia finis immediate influit suo modo in eam actionem quae ex formali et directa intentione agentis propter illum fit; nam causalitas finalis, praesertim circa actiones transeuntes, solum consistit in hac dependentia quam actio habet ab agente sic ordinante
120 illam in finem; sed ostensum est omnem actionem creaturae, saltem quatenus est a primo agente, fieri necessario cum hac actuali relatione <col. b> seu ordinatione in ultimum finem; ergo omnis huiusmodi actio causatur immediate ac per se ab ultimo fine in suo genere.

An Deus cum
finibus inhonestis
concurrat ad
finaliter
causandas
actiones pravas.

125 13. Dices non posse hoc in universum verum esse; nam, licet in actionibus mere naturalibus et in liberis honestis videatur possibile et sine inconvenienti, tamen in actionibus liberis et peccaminosis videtur hoc et indecens et impossibile; primum patet quia indecens est Deum has actiones velle; ergo multo magis velle illas propter seipsum. Secundum patet, quia illae actiones sunt intrinsece repugnantes summae Dei bonitati; quomodo ergo possunt in summum bonum ut in finem ultimum referri? Respondetur imprimis, totum argumentum concedi posse et debere de actionibus peccaminosis, ut peccaminosae sunt; nam in rigore de eis tentum ut sic procedit obiectio; nam ut sic repugnant divinae bonitati, et de illis ut sic fatemur non esse a Deo ut ab ultimo fine, neque id est incommodum, quia etiam ut sic non sunt a Deo ut a primo agente, quia ut sic non sunt actiones, sed defectus actionis.
135 Unde ulterius additur has actiones quantumvis peccaminosas respectu causae secundae, ut actiones sunt, esse etiam actiones ipsius Dei, et ut sic esse per se et immediate ex fine ultimo, et propter finem ultimum; nam ut sic nullum defectum vel malitiam includunt ratione cuius repugnent summae bonitati finis ultimi. Et quamvis Deus efficaciter et absolute non velit illas propter respectum quem absolute sumptae habent ad causam

110R sake of an end, it is also done for the sake of him, so that it was actually and most perfectly intended for the sake of the ultimate end.

115R 12. But now it is easy to prove the other consequence, namely, that an ultimate end immediately and *per se* influences along with whatever proximate end every action of a creature, because the end immediately in its way influences that action which happens for the sake of it by a formal and direct intention of the agent. For final causality, especially regarding *transeunt* actions, only consists in this dependency which the action has by the agent thus having ordered it to the end. But it was shown that every action of a creature, at least insofar as it is from a first agent, necessarily takes place with this actual relation or ordering to an ultimate end. Therefore, every action of this sort is caused immediately and *per se* by the ultimate end in its genus.
120R

125R 13. You may say that this cannot be true in general. For, although in merely natural actions and in free, honest [actions] it seems possible and without disagreeability, nevertheless in actions that are free and sinful this seems both unbecoming and impossible. It is evident, first, because it is unbecoming for God to wish these actions. Therefore, much more to wish them for the sake of himself. It is evident, secondly, because those actions are intrinsically repugnant to the highest goodness of God. How, then, can they be referred to the highest goodness as to an ultimate end? It is responded, in the first place, that the whole argument can and ought to be conceded regarding sinful actions insofar as they are sinful. For the objection holds concerning those held in rigour as such. For as such they are repugnant to divine goodness and concerning them as such we admit that they are not from God as from an ultimate end. Nor is that a disadvantage, because as such they are also not from God as from a first agent, because as such they are not actions but defective of action. Hence, it is further added that these actions, however much they are sinful with respect to the second cause, as they are actions are also actions of God himself and as such are *per se* and immediately from the ultimate end and for the sake of the ultimate end. For as such they include no defect or badness by reason of which they would be repugnant to the highest goodness of the ultimate end. And, although God does not efficaciously and absolutely wish

Whether God
concurrat with
dishonest ends to
final-cause
perverse actions.

144 repugnet] repugnet D V.

150 secundam cum quo et ex quo habent concomitantem mali-
tiam, tamen vult ad illas concurrere et ita vult illas quatenus
actiones suae sunt, et hoc modo ordinat illas in se ut in finem
ultimum, quia in illis sub hac ratione spectatis relucet maxime
155 bonitas Dei, quae ad omnia se diffundit quatenus aliquid boni
habent et potens est ita influere in bonitatem, ut, quamvis
illi sit coniuncta malitia, illam non attingat, neque ipsi ulla
ratione imputanda sit. In quo etiam manifestat omnipoten-
tiam et sapientiam suam, immo et quodammodo iustitiam,
160 vel quia iure suo utitur offerendo concursum suum etiam illis
qui illo abuseri sunt, vel quia unicuique principio dat concur-
sum ei naturaliter debitum, et unumquodque secundum suum
modum agere sinit. Sic igitur nulla est actio creaturae causata
a fine proximo quae non sit simul causata per se et immediate
165 a fine ultimo, saltem respectu pri- <898> mi agentis. Legatur
D. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 17, praesertim ratione 6, nam
ibi virtute continet totam doctrinam huius assertionis.

Non semper
creaturae in suis
165 finibus intendunt
ultimum finem
formaliter.

14. Dico secundo: actio creaturae, ut est ab ipsa crea-
tura propter finem, non semper causatur immediate ac per se a
165 fine ultimo formaliter et secundum suam propriam bonitatem,
sed ad summum virtualiter seu implicite; atque in hoc sensu
potest debita proportione dici finem ultimum ad has actiones
ut sic non concurrere semper immediate immediatione sup-
170 positi, sed tantum virtutis. Hanc conclusionem satis, ut opinor
probant rationes supra positae posteriori loco, cum iis etiam
quae adduximus referendo communem doctrinam D. Thomae
et aliorum. Et quidem de agentibus naturalibus vel irrationali-
175 bus nulla potest esse dubitandi ratio, quia haec non operantur
propter finem in quem ipsa dirigant actiones suas; ergo multo
minus possunt operari propter finem ultimum. Deinde, qua
ratione dicuntur metaphorice intendere finem, quatenus per
naturalem inclinationem vel appetitum in aliquid certum ac de-
180 terminatum tendunt, revera non tendunt proprie ac formaliter
in Deum, sed in aliquid creatum sibi ipsis commodum vel pro-

159 est actio creaturae] es creatura D.

162 c. 17] om. D.

145R them for the sake of the respect which they have, taken absolutely, to
the second cause with which and from which they have a concomitant
badness, nevertheless, he wishes to concur with them and thus wishes
them insofar as they are his actions. And in this way he orders them
to himself as to an ultimate end, because the goodness of God espe-
150R cially shines forth in them when they are regarded under this aspect.
The goodness of God diffuses itself to all things insofar as they have
something of goodness and in that way it has the power to influence
to goodness, so that, although badness is next to him, it will not touch
him nor should it be imputed to him for any reason. In this he also
155R manifests his omnipotence and wisdom, indeed, even justice in a cer-
tain way, either because he uses his justice to offer his concurrence even
to those who will squander it or because he gives to each principle the
concurrence naturally owed to it and allows each one to act in its own
way. Therefore, in this way no action of a creature is caused by a prox-
160R imate end which is not at the same time caused *per se* and immediately
by the ultimate end, at least with respect to the first agent. St. Thomas
is read in *SCG III*, c. 17, especially rat. 6, for here he maintains virtually
the whole doctrine of this assertion.

14. I say secondly: an action of a creature, as it is from the crea-
ture itself for the sake of an end, is not always immediately and *per se*
165R caused by an ultimate end formally and according to its proper good-
ness, but at most virtually or implicitly. And in this sense it can by
an appropriate proportion be said that an ultimate end does not always
concur immediately by an immediate supposition with these actions as
such, but only by virtue. This conclusion is satisfactory, as I suppose
170R the reasons posited above in the latter place prove, and also with those
which we adduced in referring to the common doctrine of St. Thomas
and others. And indeed there can be no reason for doubting concern-
ing natural and irrational agents, because these do not act on account
of an end to which itself they direct their actions. Therefore, much
175R less can they act on account of an ultimate end. In the next place, by
which reason they are said to intend an end metaphorically, insofar as
they tend to something certain and determinate through natural incli-
nation or appetite, they do not in reality properly and formally tend
180R to God, but to some created thing advantageous and proportionate to

Creatures do not
always formally
intend an
ultimate end in
their ends.

portionatum, atque ita solum virtualiter et quasi interpretative tendunt in Deum. Denique, si considerentur quatenus per extrinsecam denominationem dicuntur dirigi in finem a suo auctore et cooperatore Deo, sic quidem dici possunt tendere in ipsum finem ultimum formaliter intentum; tamen illa directio et ordinatio in finem iam est ab ipso primo agente, a quo solo finis ille intenditur.

15. De agentibus vero a proposito, non oportet ut eorum actiones nunquam sint per se ac immediate ab ultimo fine, etiam quatenus sunt propter finem ex directione et intentione talium agentium. Saepe enim ita esse possunt, nimirum, quando haec agentia ipsum finem ultimum in se considerant et in eum referunt omnes actiones et privatas intentiones suas, quod facere possunt quia per intellectum et voluntatem possunt obiective attingere finem ultimum in seipso, quod non possunt inferiora agentia. Diximus autem non semper actiones horum agentium, quatenus ab ipsis sunt propter finem, causari finaliter per se et immediate ab ultimo fine immediatione suppositi, id est, per seipsum et per bonitatem suam finaliter influentem in talem <col. b> actionem, et hoc sensu satis probatur assertio illa ratione supra posita, quia finis ultimus in seipso cogitatus non semper movet haec agentia, quando propter aliquem finem particularem operantur. Virtualiter autem dici potest ultimus finis movere semper huiusmodi agentia, quia semper moventur ab aliquo bono vel sub ratione alicuius boni, quod, in quantum est quaedam participatio summi boni, censeatur in virtute illius movere; et e converso, qui tendit in illud bonum, virtute censeatur tendere in ultimum finem, quia appetendo (ut sic dicam) partem boni, virtute censeatur magis amare totius boni complementum, quem sensum declaravit D. Thom., In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 4, et in eodem loquitur I, q. 60, a. 2, et I-II, q. 1, a. 6, ubi, in solutione ad 3, ait quod virtus primae intentionis respectu ultimi finis movet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiamsi de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Lege Aristot., I Ethic., c. 4 et 7, et I Rhetoric.,

themselves, and thus they only virtually and quasi-interpretatively tend to God. Finally, if they are considered insofar as they are said to be directed through an extrinsic denomination to an end by their author and co-operator God, to that extent they can certainly be said to tend to an ultimate end itself having been formally intended. Yet that direction and ordering to the end is now by the first agent himself, by whom alone that end is intended.

15. But concerning the agents under discussion, it is not necessary that their actions never be *per se* and immediately from the ultimate end, even insofar as they are for the sake of the end by the direction and intention of such agents. For they can often be that way, namely, when these agents consider the very ultimate end according to themselves and refer all their actions and private intentions to it, which they can do because through the intellect and will they can objectively reach the ultimate end in itself, which lower agents cannot do. But we said that the actions of these agents, insofar as they are for the sake of the end from themselves, are not always caused finally *per se* and immediately by the ultimate end by an immediate supposition, that is, through itself and through its goodness having influenced finally such an action, and in this sense the assertion of that argument made above is sufficiently proven, because the ultimate end cognized in itself does not always move these agents when they act for the sake of some particular end. But it can be said that the ultimate end always virtually moves agents of this kind, because they are always moved by some good or under the aspect of some good, that, insofar as it is a certain participation in the highest good, is thought to move in virtue of that.⁵ And, conversely, he who tends to that good is thought virtually to tend to the ultimate end, because in desiring (if I may speak that way) a part of the good, he is thought virtually even more to love the complement of all goods. St. Thomas indicated this sense in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, q. 4. He says the same thing in [*ST*] Ia.60.2 and IaIIæ.1.6, where, in ad 3, he says that the strength of the first intention with respect to the ultimate end moves in any desire for whatever thing, even if one is not actually thinking about the ultimate end. Read Aristotle, *EN* I, c. 4 and 7 and *Rhet.* I, c. 5 and Augustine, *Conf.* X, c. 20 and 21 and *De*

D. Thom.

Aristoteles.

St. Thomas.

Aristotle.

⁵Cf. *De Fine Hominis* 2.4. The virtual moving here looks more like the interpretative intention there than the virtual intention. On the other hand, Suárez cites Aquinas's IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3 here but that would look like the virtual intention of *DFH* 2.4, so it is not clear how these texts fit together.

c. 5; August., X Confess., c. 20 et 21, et lib. XI de Trinit., c. 6.

Incidentis quaestionis brevis resolutio.

Augustinus.

16. Hic vero insinuabat se statim quaestio an in his agentibus
necessarium semper sit ut intentio ultimi finis propria et elicita
et terminata ad ipsum ultimum finem in se propositum sub
5 ratione summi aut completi vel communis boni, debeat nec-
essario antecedere ad intentiones particularium finium. Non-
nulli enim theologi sentire videntur necessarium esse ut talis
intentio quasi universalis praecedat saltem aliquando, vel semel
10 in vita, ut aliae intentiones finium particularium in virtute il-
lius haberi possint. Sed haec quaestio theologorum est propria,
et tractari solet in citatis locis D. Thomae. Mihique videtur
certa sententia quae negat talem intentionem esse necessariam,
quia nec ex parte intellectus est aliquid quod necessitet ad cogi-
15 tandum prius de illo obiecto, nec ex parte voluntatis est neces-
saria illa intentio ut velle possit bona particularia sibi proposita
ut per se amabilia, cum in illis obiectis sit sufficiens ratio ad ten-
dendum in illa propter eorum bonitatem. Immo etiam si illa
universalis intentio praecedat, tamen si postea neque in memo-
ria, neque in aliquo affectu aut habitu manet, nihil deservire
20 potest ad subsequentes actus. Vide Scot., In I, dist. 1, q. 4, et
In IV, dist. 49, <899> q. 3; et ibi Palud., Maior., Capreol., et
alios.

Scotus.
Capreolus.

Satisfit rationibus dubitandi initio positis.

17. Argumenta priori loco posita in principio confirmant pri-
orem conclusionem nostram; non tamen obstant posteriori,
quia non est de ratione primae causae ut influat in actionem
causae secundae, nisi cum debita proportione; neque etiam
25 oportet ut causalitas causae primae et secundae, formaliter ac
praecise sumptae, dicant eandem habitudinem, quamvis in re,
30 prout sunt in effectu, non distinguantur. Sic igitur ad subordi-
nationem finis proximi et ultimi satis est ut ille ab hoc pendeat
in causando in suo genere, et quod hic non possit causare nisi
causante illo; non tamen necesse est ut respectu eiusdem agen-

Trin. XI, c. 6.

A brief resolution of an incidental question.

16. But here the question at once suggests itself whether in these agents
it is always necessary that an intention of the ultimate end that is
proper, elicited, and terminates in the very ultimate end proposed to
5 itself under the aspect of the highest, complete, or general good must
necessarily precede intentions of particular ends. For some theologians
seem to think that it is necessary that such a quasi-universal intention
precede at least at some time or once in life so that other intentions of
particular ends can be had in virtue of this one. But this question is
10 properly of the theologians and is usually discussed in the cited place of
St. Thomas. And to me the view which denies that such an intention
is necessary seems settled, because neither on the part of the intellect
is there something that necessitates first thinking about such an object
nor on the part of the will is that intention necessary so that it can will
15 particular goods proposed to itself as lovable *per se* since there is a suf-
ficient reason in these objects for tending to them for the sake of their
goodness. Indeed, if that universal intention precede, still if afterwards
it remains neither in memory nor in some affect or habit, nothing can
be of use to subsequent acts. See Scotus, [*Sent.*] I, dist. 1, q. 4 and IV,
20R dist. 49, q. 3 and Paludanus, [John] Maior, Capreolus, and others.

Augustine.

Scotus.
Capreolus.

It satisfies the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning.

17. The arguments made in the former place in the beginning confirm
our former conclusion. Yet it does not oppose the latter, because it is
not of the nature of a first cause to influence the action of second cause
25 except with due proportion. It is also not necessary that the causality
of a first cause and that of a second cause, taken formally and precisely,
express the same habitude, although in reality as they are in the effect
they are not distinguished. Therefore, in this way it is enough for the
subordination of the proximate and ultimate ends that the former de-
30R pend on the latter in causing in its own genus and that the latter cannot
cause without causing the former. Still, it is not necessary that either

35 tis uterque finis causet, sed solum respectu eiusdem effectus vel
actionis. Quin potius finis proximus causat respectu proximi
agentis et actionis quae in illo vel ab illo est; finis autem ultimus
non causat respectu ipsius primi agentis, sed respectu effectus
40 vel actionis prout ab ipso manat. Argumenta autem posteriori
loco in contrarium posita nihil obstant priori conclusioni, ut
per se satis constat; confirmant autem posteriorem, ut declara-
tum est.

35R end cause with respect to the same agent but only with respect to the
same effect or action. On the contrary, the proximate end causes with
respect to a proximate agent and action which is in that or from that.
But the ultimate end does not cause with respect to the first agent itself
but with respect to the effect or action as flowing from it. But the ar-
guments posited in the latter place for the contrary [position] do not
oppose the former conclusion at all, as is sufficiently clear by itself. But
they confirm the latter, as was shown.