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<882, col. a>²

Utrum causalitas finis locum habeat in divinis actionibus et effectibus.

1. Ratio dubitandi sumitur ex hactenus dictis de agentibus intellectualibus creatis, nam in his non habet locum
5 causalitas finis quoad actiones externas, nisi media causalitate in ipsam voluntatem causae agentis, sed finis non potest habere causalitatem suam in voluntatem Dei: ergo neque in effectus vel actiones externas quae ab illa voluntate procedunt. In contrarium vero est, quia Deus propriissime est finis creaturarum omnium, unde et proprie
10 dicitur omnia propter seipsum operari: ergo est causa finalis rerum <col. b> omnium, et actionum quae ab ipso procedunt.

Sitne in decretis liberis divinae voluntatis causalitas finis.

2. Circa hanc dubitationem duo breviter declaranda sunt. Primum, an et quo modo finis exercent rationem suam vel causalitatem circa ipsas liberas determinationes divinae voluntatis, quae sunt veluti actus immanentes in ipsa.
5 Secundum, quid dicendum sit de actionibus transeuntibus quae a divina potentia egrediuntur, et consequenter etiam de effectibus ad quos terminantur. Circa priorem partem, Soncinas 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 2. sentit, in divina voluntate reperiri propriam causalitatem finis. Funda-
10 mentum eius est, quia motio finis tantum est metaphor-

Whether the causality of the end has a place in divine actions and effects.

1. The reason for doubting is taken from what has been said about created intellectual agents. For in their case the causality of the end has no place with respect to external actions, except by an intermediate causality in the will itself of the acting cause. But an end cannot have its causality in the will of God and so it cannot have it in the external effects or actions which proceed from his will. But to the contrary, because God is most properly the end of all created things. Hence, he is also properly said to do all things for his own sake. Therefore, he is the final cause of all things and actions which proceed from him.

Whether there is causality of the end in free decrees of the divine will.

2. Two doubts should be indicated briefly concerning this matter. The first is whether and in what way an end exercises its *ratio* or causality concerning these free determinations of the divine will, which are as if immanent in itself. Second, what should be said concerning the transeunt actions which proceed out of the divine power and consequently also about the effects in which they are terminated. With respect to the first part, Soncinas in *Metaphysics* V, q. 2, thinks that the proper causality of an end can be found in the divine will. His foundation is that the motion of the end is only metaphorical, but that this metaphorical motion

Soncinas.

Soncinas.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

ica, sed in Deum cadit haec metaphorica motio, quia divina bonitas propter quam Deus agit, movet voluntatem Dei: ergo et causalitas finalis cadit in divinam voluntatem. Secundo quia Deus amat se propter bonitatem suam tamquam propter finem, sed per hoc nihil aliud significatur, nisi quod divina bonitas movet voluntatem Dei in amorem suae essentiae: ergo. Tertio quia Deus amat creaturas propter suam bonitatem, sed amare unum propter aliud, nihil aliud est, quam ex amore unius metaphorice moveri ad amorem alterius: ergo ita movetur Deus metaphorice a seipso ut fine. Quarto afferri potest ratio supra insinuata, quia alias effectus Dei ut ab ipso sunt non habent causam finalem: nam causa finalis nullum effectum habet nisi medio agente, quod ad agendum movet: si ergo circa ipsum agens non habet causalitatem, neque circa effectus agentis potest causalitatem habere.

Negative
respondetur.
D. Thomas.

3. Haec vero sententia falsa omnino est. Unde dicendum est finem non posse exercere causalitatem suam in divinam voluntatem quantum ad actus immanentes, seu determinationes liberas eiusdem voluntatis. Haec sumitur ex D. Thoma I. p. q. 19. art. 5. ubi in hoc sensu generaliter negat dari aliquam causam divinae voluntatis: et I. *Summae contra gentiles* c. 86. et 87. dicit quod licet divinae voluntatis sit aliqua ratio, non tamen aliqua causa. Idem Alensis I. p. q. 35. art. 3. Driedo *De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis* I. lib. tract. 1. cap. 4. memb. 1. ad 4. Idem sentit Ferrariensis in dictum cap. 87. qui advertit, quod licet divina bonitas secundum nostrum modum intelligendi sit causa divinae voluntatis, non tamen secundum realem causalitatem. Quod etiam est sano modo intelligendum quoad priorem partem: non enim existimandum est objective seu ex parte Dei esse in ipso causalitatem, etiam nostro modo intelligendi, alioqui falsum intelligeremus, sed ex parte nostra intelligere et explicare nos rationem divinae voluntatis ad modum causalitatis, quia non possumus divina concipere aut ex-

applies to God because the divine goodness for the sake of which God acts moves God's will. Therefore, final causality also applies to the divine will. Second, because God loves himself for the sake of his goodness as for the sake of an end but this signifies nothing other than that the divine goodness moves God's will to a love of his essence. Therefore. Third, because God loves creatures for the sake of his goodness, but to love one thing for the sake of something else is nothing other than to be metaphorically moved by a love for one thing to love for another thing. Therefore, in that way God is metaphorically moved by himself as by an end. Fourth, the argument suggested above can be brought to use, because otherwise the effects of God as they are from him would have no final cause. For a final cause has no effect except by means of an agent that it moves to acting. Therefore, if a final cause has no causality with respect to the agent itself, it can also not have any causality with respect to the agent's effects.

3. But this view is completely false. For this reason it should be said that the end cannot exercise its causality in the divine will as far as immanent acts or free determinations of the will are concerned. This is taken from St. Thomas in Ia.19.5 where in this sense he universally denies that any cause can be given for the divine will. And in *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 86 and 87, he says that although there is some reasons for the divine will there is, nevertheless, no cause. Alexander of Hales in I, q. 35, art. 3, and John Driedo in *De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis* I, tract. 1, c. 4, memb. 1, ad 4, say the same thing. Francis Sylvester of Ferrara in the mentioned c. 87, where he points out that although divine goodness is a cause of the divine will in our way of understanding, it is, nevertheless, not a cause according to real causality. The first part of this needs to be understood in a sound way. For one should not think that objectively or on the part of God there is causality in him even in our way of understanding. Otherwise, we understand falsely. But we should understand that on our part we understand and explain divine will's reason in the mode of causality, because we cannot conceive or explain the divine except in the mode of created things. Furthermore, in the

It is responded
in the negative.

St. Thomas.

14 se] om. V.
35 3] 5 V.

D. Augustinus.

plicare nisi ad modum rerum creatarum. Praeterea, in eodem sensu, D. Augustinus *Liber 83 quaestionum* q. 28. negat quaerendam esse causam divinae voluntatis, ob quam voluit mundum creare, et rationem reddit *quia omnis causa efficiens est*, quod ita intelligendum puto, ut supra etiam exposui, id est quia in omni vera causalitate intercedit aliqua efficiens causa.

4. Atque hinc sumitur prima ratio huius veritatis, quia in divina voluntate nulla est vera efficientia circa actum immanentem in ipsa etiam ut libere terminatum ad obiecta externa: ergo nec vera causalitas finis habere potest locum circa talem actum. Consequentia patet ex superius dictis, nam causalitas finis non habet locum nisi in ordine ad causalitatem efficientem. Secundo declaratur amplius, quia actus divinae voluntatis quoad entitatem sibi essentialem ac necessariam non potest habere ullam veram causam in aliquo genere, quia ut sic est ens per essentiam, et omnino independens. Neque etiam ille actus ut libere terminatus ad creaturas potest habere realem causam, quia ut sic nihil reale addit entitati necessariae eiusdem actus: nec potest fingi causa realis, quae habeat pro effectu solum respectum rationis. Quocirca, qui putant determinationem liberam addere aliquid reale divinae voluntati quod simpliciter posset non esse in ipsa, satis consequenter ponere possunt, vel etiam debent, hoc causalitatis genus circa illum actum: nam, ut ego existimo, coguntur ponere etiam causalitatem effectivam, quod, quam est absurdum, tam est falsum illud fundamentum ex quo sequitur, ut infra suo loco ostendam. Neque Soncinas hac via procedit, quia non solum circa liberas determinationes, sed etiam circa ipsum actum, ut est necessaria dilectio Dei, admittit illam causalitatem finalem, quod, in rigore sumptum, est omni ratione improbabile, quia ille actus ut sic est ipsum ens per essentiam, et ideo independens, et non causatus sub quacunque ratione. Unde ulterius, si determinatio libera ut est aliquid rei, nihil est praeter ipsum actum, et ut est quid rationis revera non est, sed concipitur aut fingi-

same sense, St. Augustine in *Liber 83 quaestionum*, q. 28, denies to be seeking the cause for why the divine will wished to create the world. And he gives the reason that ‘every cause is efficient’, which I think, as I also explained above, should be understood as meaning that some efficient cause is involved in every true causality.

St. Augustine.

4. And from here is taken the first argument for this truth. For there is no true efficiency in the divine will with respect to an immanent act in itself even as freely terminated in an external object. Therefore, true causality of an end cannot have a place with respect to the same act. The consequence is obvious from what was said earlier, for the causality of the end does not have any place except in relation to efficient causality. Second, this is explained further by the fact that an act of the divine will cannot have any true of any kind as far as the essential and necessary entity for it is concerned. For as such it is a being through essence and wholly independent. Nor can that act as freely terminated in a created thing have a real cause, since as such it adds nothing real to the same act’s necessary entity. Nor can one imagine a real cause that has only a respect of reason for its effect. For this reason those who think that a free determination adds something real to the divine will which, strictly speaking, cannot be in itself consequently can—or even ought to—posit this kind of causality with respect to that act. For, as it seems to me, they are compelled also to posit effective causality, which is just as absurd as the foundation from which it follows is false, as I will show below in its place. Nor does Soncinas proceed in this way, for he admits this final causality not only in the case of free determinations but also in the case of the act itself, e.g., the necessary love for God. This, taken rigorously, is improbable on every account, for that act as such is the being itself through essence and therefore is independent and not caused under any account. Hence, further, if a free determination insofar as it is something of the thing is nothing beyond the act itself and insofar as it is something of reason that does not really exist but is conceived or imagined according to our way of conceiving, the result is that that act cannot have a true cause under any account.

85 tur ex modo nostro concipiendi, fit, ut sub nulla ratione
possit ille actus veram causam habere.

Respondetur argumentis in oppositum.

5. Ad argumenta respondetur, quod sicut Deus eminentissimo modo se per seipsum amat sine ulla causalitate, vel effectiva circa amorem quatenus a nobis concipitur ut vitalis actus, vel formali circa ipsum amantem,
5 quatenus tali amore amans constituitur, ita intelligendum est Deum eminentissimo modo amare se propter se, et alia etiam propter bonitatem suam absque ulla causalitate finali circa eundem amorem vel sui, vel aliorum. Atque ita, cum dicitur se amare, metaphorice motus vel
10 illectus a bonitate sua, locutio est metaphorica, sumpta ex modo quo nos concipimus res divinas ad modum humanarum. Quomodo dixit etiam Boetius, lib. 3. *De consolatione philosophiae* pros. 3. *Initam bonitatem livore carentem pepulisse Deum ut res externas operaretur.*

Boetius.

15 6. Unde ad primum negatur metaphoricam motionem finis ita habere locum in divina voluntate sicut in nostra, nam in nostra ita illa motio dicitur metaphorica, ut tamen sit vera causalitas, quia est vera dependentia in actu propter finem elicito ab ipso fine, in divina autem
20 voluntate non est talis motio metaphorica, sed est eminentis quaedam amandi ratio, quae sicut est sine distinctione actuum vel potentiarum, ita etiam est sine ulla vera motione etiam metaphorica. Quare cavenda est aequivocatio in vocabulo *metaphoricae motionis*, nam respectu
25 nostri illa particula *metaphoricae* additur ad distinguendam illam motionem a motione efficientis causae, non vero ad excludendam illam a tota latitudine motionis et causalitatis realis proprie dictae, cum vero Deus dicitur moveri aut allici a bonitate sua, tota locutio est metaphorica
30 ica ad explicandam solam rationem divinae voluntatis.

Deus qualiter dicitur se vel alia amare propter suam ipsius bonitatem.

7. Et per haec responsum est ad secundam et tertiam

It is responded to the argument in opposition.

5. I respond to the arguments that just as God loves himself through himself in a most eminent way without any causality (either effective with respect to the love to the extent that he is conceived by us as vital act or formal with respect to the lover himself
5R insofar as the lover is constituted by such love), so also it should be understood that God loves himself for his own sake and also loves all other things for the sake of his own goodness in a most eminent way apart from any final causality with respect to the same love whether for himself or for other things. And thus, when he is said to love himself, having been moved or enticed metaphorically by his goodness, the locution is metaphorical, having been taken from the way in which we conceive divine matters in a human way. As Boethius also said in *On the Consolation of Philosophy* III, pros. 3: 'innate goodness free from envy pushes God so that he does external things'.
10R 15R

Boethius.

6. Hence, in response to the first argument I deny that the metaphorical motion of an end has a place in the divine will the way it does in ours. For in our will that motion is called metaphorical in such a way that it is still true causality, because there is a true dependency in the act elicited for the sake of the end on the end itself. In the divine will, however, there is no such metaphorical motion, but there is a certain eminent reason for loving, which, just as it is without distinction of act or potency, so also it is without any true motion, even metaphorical. For this reason one should avoid equivocation in the term 'metaphorical motion'. For with respect to us that word 'metaphorical' is added in order to distinguish that motion from the motion of the efficient cause, but not in order to exclude it from the whole breadth of what is properly called real motion and causality. But when God is said to be moved or attracted by his goodness, the whole locution is metaphorical in order to explain only the account of the divine will.
20R 25R 30R

7. And through this I have also responded to the second and

rationem, nam illa particula *propter*, quando Deus dicitur amare se vel alia propter bonitatem suam, non significat veram causam ipsius amoris, sed rationem tantum (ut dixi) voluntatis divinae. Falsum autem est, Deum <884> se amare propter se tamquam propter finem, Deus enim non est finis sui ipsius: quis enim unquam ita locutus est? aut quomodo potest habere finem qui non habet principium? Nisi fortasse negative dicatur finis sui, quia non habet alium finem, sic enim dicitur Deus esse a se. Sed hoc sensu non est finis sui per causalitatem finalem, sicut neque est a se per efficientem. Falsum item est, amare unum propter aliud, esse idem, quod ex amore unius moveri ad amorem alterius, si illud *ex* significet causalitatem propriam, vel distinctionem in re inter unum amorem et alium: nam in rigore ad veritatem illius locutionis sufficit, quod unum sit ratio amandi aliud. Unde sicut quando Deus dicitur esse immortalis, quia est immaterialis, illa particula *quia* designat non veram causam, sed rationem, ita dicitur amare creaturas propter bonitatem suam, non quia sit causa, sed quia est ratio amandi illas. Et sicut Deus illo actu quo se amat necessario, libere amat creaturas sine additione vel augmento reali, ita idem actus ut terminatus ad Deum potest dici ratio nostro modo concipiendi, cur extendatur (ut ita dicam) ad creaturas, nulla interveniente causalitate propria. Nam sicut illa terminatio fit eminentissimo modo sine augmento reali, ita etiam sine causalitate reali. Quomodo dixit Dionysius 4. cap. *De divinis nominibus quod divinus amor non dimisit Deum esse sine germine*.

Sitne causalitas finis in externis actionibus, et effectibus Dei.

8. Quarta ratio illius opinionis postulat ut explicemus secundum punctum in principio propositum, scilicet quomodo in actionibus, et effectibus Dei ad extra detur vera causalitas finalis, si in ipsamet Dei voluntate non reper-

third arguments, for that phrase ‘for the sake of’ in the case where God is said to love himself or other things for the sake of his own goodness does not signify a true cause for that love but only a reason (as I call it) for the divine will. Moreover it is false that God loves himself for the sake of himself just as for the sake of an end, for God is not an end for himself. For who ever speaks that way? Or how can something that has no principle have an end? Unless perhaps he is said to be his end negatively in that he does not have any other end in the way God is said to have being from himself. But in this sense he is not his end through final causality, just as he does have being from himself through efficient causality. Likewise, it is false that to love one thing for the sake of another is the same thing as to be moved to a love for one thing by love for another thing, if that ‘by’ signifies proper causality or a distinction in reality between one love and another. For taken rigorously it is enough for the truth of that statement that one is the reason for loving another. Hence, just as when God is said to be immortal because he is immaterial that particle ‘because’ designates not a true cause but a reason, so also God is said to love creatures for the sake of his own goodness not because it is the cause but because it is the reason for loving them. And just as God freely loves creatures by that act by which he necessarily loves himself without any real addition or augmentation, so also the same act as terminating in God can be called the reason, according to our way of conceiving, for why it is extended (if I may speak in this way) to creatures without any intervening proper causality. For just as that termination comes to be in a most eminent way without real augmentation, so also without real causality. Just as Dionysius says in *On the Divine Names*, c. 4: ‘divine love does not permit God to be without offspring’.

Whether the causality of an end is in God’s external actions and effects.

8. The fourth argument for that opinion demands that we explain the second point proposed in the beginning, namely, how true final causality is granted in the case of God’s actions and effects that are beyond himself if such causality is not found in God’s will

5 itur talis causalitas. Et ratio dubitandi satis proposita est
 in principio, et in illa ratione quarta. Propter quam pos-
 set aliquis concedere, in effectibus Dei inveniri proprie
 finem ad quem ordinantur, et propter quem fiunt, non
 Gabriel. 10 tamen reperiri propriam causalitatem finalem. Ut enim
 notat Gabriel, in 2. dist. 1. q. 5. in principio, finis et causa
 finalis non omnino sunt idem, nam finis ut sic solum dicit
 terminum ad quem tendit operatio, vel ad quem motus
 ordinantur: causa autem finalis est, quae movet agens ad
 operandum. Quapropter, si detur finis qui non moveat
 15 agens per propriam causalitatem, poterit <col. b> dari
 finis, qui non sit causa finalis in proprietate et rigore
 sumpta. Sic igitur vere dici potest Deus omnia operari
 propter se ut propter finem ultimum in quem omnia ordi-
 nantur, non tamen per causalitatem finis, sed per emi-
 20 nentiosem modum ab omni causalitate liberum. Sed hic
 modus dicendi non omnino satisfacit. Primo quidem,
 quia ex omnium Theologorum sententia Deus est causa
 finalis omnium rerum, ut tradit D. Thomas, I. p. q. 44, art. 4.
 D. Thomas. 25 Secundo, quia Aristoteles definit causam finalem esse id
 propter quod aliquid fit: Deus autem vere ac proprie est
 id propter quod creaturae fiunt, iuxta illud Proverbiorum
 16. *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus.*
 Tertio, quia causa finalis ut sic nullam includit imperfec-
 tionem, immo censetur esse prima, et perfectissima om-
 30 nium causarum, modo inferius explicando: ergo convenit
 Deo proprie ac formaliter, et cum summa perfectione:
 non convenit autem illi nisi respectu effectuum ad extra:
 ergo.
 9. Quare dicendum est, quod licet causa finalis non
 35 causet proprie effectus suos nisi quodammodo medio
 agente quod movet et allicit ad operandum, tamen, ut
 finis sit propria causa effectus agentis, necessarium non
 est, ut prius habeat in ipso agente aliquam causalitatem
 propriam. Nam licet hoc contingat in agentibus intel-
 40 lectualibus creatis, eo quod immediate ipsa se movent,

5R itself. And the reason for doubting was adequately laid out in the
 beginning and in that fourth argument. For this reason some-
 one could concede that in God's effects there is properly found
 an end to which they are ordered and for the sake of which they
 were brought about yet no proper final causality is found. For as
 Gabriel notes in II, dist. 1, in the beginning of q. 5: end and final
 10R cause are not entirely the same, for an end as such only expresses
 a terminus to which an activity tends or to which a motions are
 ordered but a final cause is that which moves an agent to acting.
 This is why if an end were given which does not move the agent
 through a proper causality, an end would be given that is not a fi-
 15R nal cause taken properly and rigorously. Therefore, in this way it
 can truly be said that God does everything for the sake of himself
 as for the sake of an ultimate end to which everything is ordered,
 yet not through the causality of an end but through a more emi-
 20R nent way that is free of all causality. But this way of speaking is
 not entirely satisfactory. First, indeed, because it is the view of all
 theologians that God is the final cause of all things, as St. Thomas
 relates in I.44.4. Second, because Aristotle defines a final cause
 to be that for the sake of which something is done. But God truly
 and properly is that for the sake of which creatures were made,
 according to Proverbs 16[4]: 'The Lord has made all things for his
 own sake'. Third, because a final cause as such includes no im-
 25R perfection (in fact, it is thought to be the first and most perfect
 of all the causes in a way to be explained below). Therefore, it is
 fitting to God properly and formally and with the highest perfec-
 30R tion. But it is not fitting to him except with respect to the effects
 beyond him. Therefore.

Gabriel.

9. Wherefore it should be said that, although a final cause
 does not properly cause its effects except in a certain way via an
 agent that it moves and entices to acting, nevertheless, in order
 for an end to be a proper cause of the effects of an agent it is not
 necessary that it first have some proper causality in the agent it-
 35R self. For although this happens in the case of created intellectual
 agents by the fact that they immediately move or apply them-

seu applicant ad operandum, vel amandum per aliquam
 45 reale motionem, et propriam causalitatem: tamen in
 agente intellectuali increato id non est necessarium, quia
 sine ulla sui mutatione, vel reali additione, dependen-
 50 tia, aut causalitate, simplicissimo et eminentissimo modo
 sese applicat (ut ita dicam) seu determinat ad libere aman-
 dum et operandum. Consistit autem causalitas finalis Dei
 respectu effectuum ad extra in hoc, quod Deus intuitu et
 amore suae bonitatis effectus extra se producit: unde ip-
 55 samet operatio quam ad extra habet, essentialiter pendet
 a Deo tum in ratione efficientis, tum etiam in ratione fin-
 nis, quia respicit Deum et ut omnipotentem, et ut summe
 bonum, qui ratione suae bonitatis, et dignus est ut om-
 60 nia ad ipsum ut ad finem ordinentur, et seipsum dicto
 eminenti modo inclinatur ad communicandam aliis suam
 bonitatem propter ipsam. Atque ita facilis est responsio
 ad rationem dubitandi: negamus enim esse semper nec-
 65 cessariam causalitatem finis intra ipsum agens, ut habere
 <885> possit locum extra ipsum in alios effectus eius:
 quomodo inferius etiam declarabimus habere locum in
 effectibus Dei causalitatem exemplarem, sine ulla causal-
 70 itate propria intra ipsum Deum.

40R selves to acting or to loving through some real motion and proper
 causality, it is, nevertheless, not necessary in the case of an unre-
 45R created intellectual agent. For in a most simple and eminent way it
 applies (if I may speak in this way) or determines itself to freely
 loving and acting without any change, real addition, dependency,
 or causality in it. Moreover the final causality of God with respect
 to effects beyond himself consists in this: that God by an intu-
 ition and love for his goodness produces effects beyond himself.
 Hence, the very activity which he has beyond himself essentially
 depends on God both in the *ratio* of an effecting cause and also
 50R in the *ratio* of an end. For it is related to God both as omnipotent
 and as the highest good, who by reason of his goodness is both
 worthy of having everything ordered to him as to an end and of
 inclining himself in the eminent way mentioned earlier to com-
 municating to other things his goodness for his own sake. And in
 55R this way there is a ready response to the reason for doubting: for
 we deny that it is always necessary that there be causality of an
 end internal to the agent itself in order for it to be able to have
 a place beyond the agent in its other effects, just as we will also
 show later that exemplary causality has a place in God's effects
 60R without having any proper causality internal to God.

10. And now it is easy to resolve the doubt that Cajetan
 touches on concerning the statement in Ia.44.4 about whether it
 can be granted that God has a final cause insofar as he is an agent.
 This is the same as to ask whether an action of God beyond him-
 65R self has a proper final cause. For it should indeed be said to have
 a final cause. For God truly and properly exercises that action for
 the sake of some end that he intends. Also because, as St. Thomas
 says in that article, the same thing is the end for the agent and
 for the patient, although in different ways. Moreover, the discus-
 70R sion is about agents insofar as they are agents and about patients
 more widely insofar as they extend to effects brought about by
 the agents. But an effect of God as such has a proper final cause.
 Therefore, an action of God as such has the same final cause,
 75R which, although it is not an end for God, is nevertheless an end
 for God's effects and consequently also for his action. For the end
 to which an effect is ordered is that which moves an agent to act-

Dubium
 occurrens
 expeditur.
 Cajetanus.

A doubt that
 occurs is
 resolved.
 Cajetan.

D. Thomas.

St. Thomas.

Obiectio. 80 nat actionem suam.
 11. Sed statim insurgit difficultas, nam actio Dei est
 ipsa essentia Dei: ergo non potest habere causam finalem.
 In qua obiectione haerent et laborant Thomistae: et Cai- 80R
 etanus respondet illam actionem quantum ad rem quae
 est actio, non habere causam finalem: formaliter tamen
 85 in quantum actio est habere causam finalem ipsam boni-
 tatem Dei. Sed non satisfacit responsio, quia vel illa actio
 ut actio aliquid rei addit ipsi Deo, et sic non erit in Deo, vel 85R
 nihil rei addit, et secundum id non potest habere causam
 finalem. Respondent nonnulli moderni, actionem ut sic
 90 solum addere respectum rationis intrinsecum, et quan-
 tum ad illum habere causam finalem. Adduntque, cum fi-
 nis moveat agentem metaphorice, non esse necessarium 90R
 ut inter finem et agentem, seu eius operationem sit realis
 distinctio, sed sufficere distinctionem rationis: et quod
 95 agens determinetur a fine ad actionem, sive illa deter-
 minatio sit per modum realem, sive per modum rationis.
 Sed haec doctrina falsa est, et incidit in opinionem Son- 95R
 cinatis, et ex illa plane sequitur amorem Dei ut libere ter-
 minatum ad creaturas, habere propriam causam finalem:
 100 quod tamen esse omnino falsum ostensum est. Et se-
 quela patet, nam <col. b> in illa determinatione libera
 est etiam identitas realis, et modus rationis, proveniens 100R
 suo modo a Deo ut a fine. Item falsum est, relationem
 rationis esse de intrinseca ratione actus realis, cum illa
 105 nihil sit. Ideoque etiam non magis potest intelligi quod
 per propriam causalitatem finalem causetur, quam quod
 per propriam efficientiam. Et ideo alii Thomistae negant 105R
 quod diximus, nempe Deum ita operari propter finem, ut
 ille finis sit causa actionis Dei, sed tantum passionis, ut
 110 sic dicam, seu effectus, aut etiam ipsius fieri. In quo qui-
 dem videntur consequenter loqui, nam iuxta illos actio
 Dei non est aliud quam volitio Dei: volitio autem Dei non 110R
 potest habere causam finalem. Sed ex falso fundamento
 coacti sunt recedere a vera sententia.

Vera responsio. 115 12. Et ideo facilius respondetur negando antecedens,
 nam actio Dei transiens non est Deus, nec in Deo, sed in

ing. Hence, it orders his action to the same end.

11. But a difficulty arises at once, for God's action is the very
 essence of God; therefore, it cannot have a final cause. The
 Thomists are stuck to this objection and labour over it. Cajetan
 responds that that action insofar as the thing that is the action is
 concerned does not have a final cause, yet formally inasmuch as
 the action is it has a final cause, [namely], the very goodness of
 God. But the response is not satisfactory, since either that action
 as action adds something to the thing, to God, and thus would
 not be in God, or it does not add anything and accordingly cannot
 have a final cause. Some moderns respond that action as such
 only adds an intrinsic relation of reason and with respect to that
 has a final cause. And they add that when an end metaphorically
 moves an agent, it is not necessary that there be a real distinction
 between the end and the agent or its activity, but that a distinc-
 tion of reason suffices. And insofar as an agent is determined by
 an end to an action, either that determination is through a real
 mode or through a mode of reason. But this doctrine is false and
 collapses into Soncinas's opinion. It plainly follows that God's love
 as freely terminated in creatures has a proper final cause. But this
 was already shown to be entirely false. And the consequence is
 obvious, for in that free determination there is also a real iden-
 tity and a mode of reason, arising in its way from God as from an
 end. Likewise, it is false that a relation of reason belongs to the
 intrinsic account of a real act, for it is nothing. And for that reason
 it is no more intelligible that it is caused through a proper final
 causality than through a proper efficient causality. And, there-
 fore, other Thomists deny what we say, namely, that God acts for
 the sake of an end in such a way that that end is the cause of his
 action, but only of passion, if I may call it that, or of the effect or
 even of its becoming. They indeed seem to speak logically in this,
 for according to them the action of God is nothing other than the
 volition of God, but the volition of God cannot have a final cause.
 But they are forced to retreat from the true view because of a false
 foundation.

12. And, therefore, I easily respond by denying the antecedent.
 For a transeunt action of God is not God nor in God, but is in

An objection.

The true
 response.

120 creatura, et ideo habere potest causam finalem, et ordi-
 nari in finem. Atque ita, licet Deus non habeat finem sui 115R
 esse, habet tamen finem suae actionis transeuntis: qui si
 sit finis proximus, esse potest aliquid extra Deum: agit
 enim Deus ad extra ut sese communicet: quae commu-
 nicatio aliquid est extra Deum, et in universum actio dici
 potest ordinari in terminum ut in suum finem: si vero sit 120R
 sermo de fine ultimo, est ipsemet Deus, non quia intendat
 125 aliquid commodum vel bonum sibi acquirere, sed quia
 agit propter suam bonitatem communicandam et mani-
 festandam. Et hanc sententiam bene declarat Durandus,
 in 2. dist. 1. q. 6. quamvis nonnulla misceat quae vera non 125R
 sunt, quae nunc examinare non est necesse.

Durandus.

something created. And so it can have a final cause and be or-
 dered to an end. And thus, although God does not have an end
 for himself, he nevertheless has an end for his transeunt action,
 which, if the end is proximate, can be something outside of God.
 For God acts externally in order to communicate himself. This
 communication is something external to God. And action can
 universally be said to be ordered to a terminus as to its end. But
 if the discussion is about the ultimate end, it is God himself, not
 because he intends to acquire some advantage or good for him-
 self, but because he acts for the sake of communicating and man-
 ifesting his goodness. And Durandus reveals this view nicely in II,
 dist. 1, q. 6, although he mixes in some things which are not true.
 But it is not necessary to examine those things now.

Durandus.