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<882, col. a>²

Utrum causalitas finis locum habeat in divinis actionibus et effectibus.

1. Ratio dubitandi sumitur ex hactenus dictis de agentibus intellectualibus creatis, nam in his non habet locum causalitas finis quoad actiones externas, nisi media causalitate in ipsam voluntatem causae agentis, sed finis non potest habere causalitatem suam in voluntatem Dei: ergo neque in effectus vel actiones externas quae ab illa voluntate procedunt. In contrarium vero est, quia Deus propriissime est finis creaturarum omnium, unde et proprie dicitur omnia propter seipsum operari: ergo est causa finalis rerum <col. b> omnium, et actionum quae ab ipso procedunt.

Sitne in decretis liberis divinae voluntatis causalitas finis.

2. Circa hanc dubitationem duo breviter declaranda sunt. Primum, an et quo modo finis exercent rationem suam vel causalitatem circa ipsas liberas determinationes divinae voluntatis, quae sunt veluti actus immanentes in ipsa. Secundum, quid dicendum sit de actionibus transeuntibus quae a divina potentia egrediuntur, et consequenter etiam de effectibus ad quos terminantur. Circa priorem partem, Soncinas 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 2. sentit, in divina voluntate reperiri propriam causalitatem finis. Fundamentum eius est, quia motio finis tantum est metaphorica, sed in Deum cadit haec metaphorica motio, quia divina bonitas propter quam Deus agit, movet voluntatem Dei: ergo et causalitas finalis cadit in divinam voluntatem. Se-

Soncinas.

Whether the causality of the end has a place in divine actions and effects.

1. The reason for doubting is taken from what has been said about created intellectual agents. For in their case the causality of the end has no place with respect to external actions, except by an intermediate causality in the will itself of the acting cause. But an end cannot have its causality in the will of God and so it cannot have it in the external effects or actions which proceed from his will. But to the contrary, because God is most properly the end of all created things. Hence, he is also properly said to do all things for his own sake. Therefore, he is the final cause of all things and actions which proceed from him.

Whether there is causality of the end in free decrees of the divine will.

2. Two doubts should be indicated briefly concerning this matter. The first is whether and in what way an end exercises its *ratio* or causality concerning these free determinations of the divine will, which are as if immanent in itself. Second, what should be said concerning the transeunt actions which proceed out of the divine power and consequently also about the effects in which they are terminated. With respect to the first part, Soncinas in *Metaphysics* V, q. 2, thinks that the proper causality of an end can be found in the divine will. His foundation is that the motion of the end is only metaphorical, but that this metaphorical motion applies to God because the divine goodness for the sake of which God acts moves God's will. Therefore, final causality also applies to the divine will. Second, because God loves himself for the sake of his good-

Soncinas.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

15 cundo quia Deus amat se propter bonitatem suam tamquam
propter finem, sed per hoc nihil aliud significatur, nisi quod
divina bonitas movet voluntatem Dei in amorem suae essen-
20 tia: ergo. Tertio quia Deus amat creaturas propter suam boni-
tatem, sed amare unum propter aliud, nihil aliud est, quam
ex amore unius metaphorice moveri ad amorem alterius: ergo
ita movetur Deus metaphorice a seipso ut fine. Quarto afferri
potest ratio supra insinuata, quia alias effectus Dei ut ab ipso
25 sunt non haberent causam finalem: nam causa finalis nullum
effectum habet nisi medio agente, quod ad agendum movet: si
ergo circa ipsum agens non habet causalitatem, neque circa ef-
fectus agentis potest causalitatem habere.

Negative
respondetur.
D. Thomas.

30 3. Haec vero sententia falsa omnino est. Unde dicendum
est finem non posse exercere causalitatem suam in divinam
voluntatem quantum ad actus immanentes, seu determina-
tiones liberas eiusdem voluntatis. Haec sumitur ex D. Thoma
I. p. q. 19. art. 5. ubi in hoc sensu generaliter negat dari aliquam
causam divinae voluntatis: et I. *Summae contra gentiles* c. 86. et
35 87. dicit quod licet divinae voluntatis sit aliqua ratio, non
tamen aliqua causa. Idem Alensis I. p. q. 35. art. 3. Driedo *De
concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis* I. lib. tract. 1. cap. 4. memb. 1.
4. Idem sentit Ferrariensis in dictum cap. 87. qui advertit, quod
40 licet divina bonitas secundum nostrum modum in-
<883> telligendi sit causa divinae voluntatis, non tamen secundum
realem causalitatem. Quod etiam est sano modo intelligendum
quoad priorem partem: non enim existimandum est objective
seu ex parte Dei esse in ipso causalitatem, etiam nostro modo
45 intelligendi, alioqui falsum intelligeremus, sed ex parte nos-
tra intelligere et explicare nos rationem divinae voluntatis ad
modum causalitatis, quia non possumus divina concipere aut
explicare nisi ad modum rerum creaturarum. Praeterea, in eo-
dem sensu, D. Augustinus *Liber 83 quaestionum* q. 28. negat
quaerendam esse causam divinae voluntatis, ob quam voluit
mundum creare, et rationem reddit *quia omnis causa efficiens
est*, quod ita intelligendum puto, ut supra etiam exposui, id est
quia in omni vera causalitate intercedit aliqua efficiens causa.

D. Augustinus.

13 se] om. V.
32 3] 5 V.

15R fore. Third, because God loves creatures for the sake of his goodness,
but to love one thing for the sake of something else is nothing other
than to be metaphorically moved by a love for one thing to love for
another thing. Therefore, in that way God is metaphorically moved
by himself as by an end. Fourth, the argument suggested above can be
20R brought to use, because otherwise the effects of God as they are from
him would have no final cause. For a final cause has no effect except
by means of an agent that it moves to acting. Therefore, if a final cause
has no causality with respect to the agent itself, it can also not have any
causality with respect to the agent's effects.

25R 3. But this view is completely false. For this reason it should be
said that the end cannot exercise its causality in the divine will as far as
immanent acts or free determinations of the will are concerned. This
is taken from St. Thomas in Ia.19.5 where in this sense he universally
denies that any cause can be given for the divine will. And in *Summa
30R contra gentiles* I, c. 86 and 87, he says that although there is some rea-
sons for the divine will there is, nevertheless, no cause. Alexander of
Hales in I, q. 35, art. 3, and John Driedo in *De concordia liberi arbi-
trii et praedestinationis* I, tract. 1, c. 4, memb. 1, ad 4, say the same
thing. Francis Sylvester of Ferrara in the mentioned c. 87, where he
points out that although divine goodness is a cause of the divine will in
35R our way of understanding, it is, nevertheless, not a cause according to
real causality. The first part of this needs to be understood in a sound
way. For one should not think that objectively or on the part of God
there is causality in him even in our way of understanding. Otherwise,
we understand falsely. But we should understand that on our part we
40R understand and explain divine will's reason in the mode of causality,
because we cannot conceive or explain the divine except in the mode of
created things. Furthermore, in the same sense, St. Augustine in *Liber
83 quaestionum*, q. 28, denies to be seeking the cause for why the divine
will wished to create the world. And he gives the reason that 'every
45R cause is efficient', which I think, as I also explained above, should be
understood as meaning that some efficient cause is involved in every
true causality.

It is responded in
the negative.

St. Thomas.

St. Augustine.

4. Atque hinc sumitur prima ratio huius veritatis, quia
 50 in divina voluntate nulla est vera efficientia circa actum imma-
 nentem in ipsa etiam ut libere terminatum ad objecta externa:
 ergo nec vera causalitas finis habere potest locum circa talem
 actum. Consequentia patet ex superius dictis, nam causalitas
 finis non habet locum nisi in ordine ad causalitatem efficien-
 55 tem. Secundo declaratur amplius, quia actus divinae voluntatis
 quoad entitatem sibi essentialem ac necessariam non potest
 habere ullam veram causam in aliquo genere, quia ut sic est
 ens per essentiam, et omnino independens. Neque etiam ille
 actus ut libere terminatus ad creaturas potest habere realem
 60 causam, quia ut sic nihil reale addit entitati necessariae eius-
 dem actus: nec potest fingi causa realis, quae habeat pro ef-
 fectu solum respectum rationis. Quocirca, qui putant determi-
 nationem liberam addere aliquid reale divinae voluntati quod
 simpliciter posset non esse in ipsa, satis consequenter ponere
 65 possunt, vel etiam debent, hoc causalitatis genus circa illum
 actum: nam, ut ego existimo, coguntur ponere etiam causalita-
 tem effectivam, quod, quam est absurdum, tam est falsum il-
 lud fundamentum ex quo sequitur, ut infra suo loco ostendam.
 Neque Soncinas hac via procedit, quia non solum circa liberas
 70 determinationes, sed etiam circa ipsum actum, ut est necessaria
 dilectio Dei, admittit illam causalitatem finalem, quod, in rig-
 ore sumptum, est omni ratione improbabile, quia ille actus ut
 sic est ipsum ens per essentiam, et ideo independens, et non
 causatus sub quacumque ra- <col. b> tione. Unde ulterius, si
 75 determinatio libera ut est aliquid rei, nihil est praeter ipsum
 actum, et ut est quid rationis revera non est, sed concipitur aut
 fingitur ex modo nostro concipiendi, fit, ut sub nulla ratione
 possit ille actus veram causam habere.

Respondetur argumentis in oppositum.

5. Ad argumenta respondetur, quod sicut Deus eminentis-
 50 simo modo se per seipsum amat sine ulla causalitate, vel effec-
 tiva circa amorem quatenus a nobis concipitur ut vitalis actus,
 vel formali circa ipsum amantem, quatenus tali amore amans
 55 constituitur, ita intelligendum est Deum eminentissimo modo

4. And from here is taken the first argument for this truth. For
 50R there is no true efficiency in the divine will with respect to an imma-
 nent act in itself even as freely terminated in an external object. There-
 fore, true causality of an end cannot have a place with respect to the
 same act. The consequence is obvious from what was said earlier, for
 the causality of the end does not have any place except in relation to ef-
 55R ficient causality. Second, this is explained further by the fact that an act
 of the divine will cannot have any true of any kind as far as the essential
 and necessary entity for it is concerned. For as such it is a being through
 essence and wholly independent. Nor can that act as freely terminated
 in a created thing have a real cause, since as such it adds nothing real to
 60R the same act's necessary entity. Nor can one imagine a real cause that
 has only a respect of reason for its effect. For this reason those who
 think that a free determination adds something real to the divine will
 which, strictly speaking, cannot be in itself consequently can—or even
 ought to—posit this kind of causality with respect to that act. For, as it
 65R seems to me, they are compelled also to posit effective causality, which
 is just as absurd as the foundation from which it follows is false, as I will
 show below in its place. Nor does Soncinas proceed in this way, for he
 admits this final causality not only in the case of free determinations
 but also in the case of the act itself, e.g., the necessary love for God.
 70R This, taken rigorously, is improbably on every account, for that act as
 such is the being itself through essence and therefore is independent and
 not caused under any account. Hence, further, if a free determination
 insofar as it is something of the thing is nothing beyond the act itself
 and insofar as it is something of reason that does not really exist but is
 75R conceived or imagined according to our way of conceiving, the result is
 that that act cannot have a true cause under any account.

It is responded to the argument in opposition.

5. I respond to the arguments that just as God loves himself through
 50R himself in a most eminent way without any causality (either effective
 with respect to the love to the extent that he is conceived by us as vital
 act or formal with respect to the lover himself insofar as the lover is
 55R constituted by such love), so also it should be understood that God

10 amare se propter se, et alia etiam propter bonitatem suam ab-
 11 sque ulla causalitate finali circa eundem amorem vel sui, vel
 12 aliorum. Atque ita, cum dicitur se amare, metaphoricè mo-
 13 tus vel illectus a bonitate sua, locutio est metaphorica, sumpta
 14 ex modo quo nos concipimus res divinas ad modum huma-
 15 narum. Quomodo dixit etiam Boetius, lib. 3. *De consolatione*
 16 *philosophiae* pros. 3. *Insitam bonitatem livore carentem pepulisse*
 17 *Deum ut res externas operaretur.*

Boetius.

15 6. Unde ad primum negatur metaphoricam motionem fi-
 16 nis ita habere locum in divina voluntate sicut in nostra, nam
 17 in nostra ita illa motio dicitur metaphorica, ut tamen sit vera
 18 causalitas, quia est vera dependentia in actu propter finem elic-
 19 ito ab ipso fine, in divina autem voluntate non est talis motio
 20 metaphorica, sed est eminens quaedam amandi ratio, quae si-
 21 cut est sine distinctione actuum vel potentiarum, ita etiam est
 22 sine ulla vera motione etiam metaphorica. Quare cavenda est
 23 aequivocatio in vocabulo *metaphoricae motionis*, nam respectu
 24 nostri illa particula *metaphoricae* additur ad distinguendam il-
 25 lam motionem a motione efficientis causae, non vero ad ex-
 cludendam illam a tota latitudine motionis et causalitatis realis
 proprie dictae, cum vero Deus dicitur moveri aut allici a boni-
 tate sua, tota locutio est metaphorica ad explicandam solam
 rationem divinae voluntatis.

Deus qualiter
 dicatur se vel alia
 amare propter
 suam ipsius
 bonitatem.

30 7. Et per haec responsum est ad secundam et tertiam
 31 rationem, nam illa particula *propter*, quando Deus dicitur
 32 amare se vel alia propter bonitatem suam, non significat veram
 33 causam ipsius amoris, sed rationem tantum (ut dixi) voluntatis
 34 divinae. Falsum autem est, Deum <884> se amare propter se
 35 tamquam propter finem, Deus enim non est finis sui ipsius:
 quis enim unquam ita locutus est? aut quomodo potest habere
 finem qui non habet principium? Nisi fortasse negative dicatur
 finis sui, quia non habet alium finem, sic enim dicitur Deus
 esse a se. Sed hoc sensu non est finis sui per causalitatem fi-
 nale, sicut neque est a se per efficientem. Falsum item est,
 40 amare unum propter aliud, esse idem, quod ex amore unius
 moveri ad amorem alterius, si illud *ex* significet causalitatem
 propriam, vel distinctionem in re inter unum amorem et al-

loves himself for his own sake and also loves all other things for the
 sake of his own goodness in a most eminent way apart from any final
 causality with respect to the same love whether for himself or for other
 things. And thus, when he is said to love himself, having been moved or
 enticed metaphorically by his goodness, the locution is metaphorical,
 having been taken from the way in which we conceive divine matters in
 a human way. As Boethius also said in *On the Consolation of Philosophy*
 III, pros. 3: ‘innate goodness free from envy pushes God so that he does
 external things’.

10R

15R 6. Hence, in response to the first argument I deny that the
 metaphorical motion of an end has a place in the divine will the way it
 does in ours. For in our will that motion is called metaphorical in such
 a way that it is still true causality, because there is a true dependency in
 the act elicited for the sake of the end on the end itself. In the divine
 20R will, however, there is no such metaphorical motion, but there is a cer-
 tain eminent reason for loving, which, just as it is without distinction of
 act or potency, so also it is without any true motion, even metaphorical.
 For this reason one should avoid equivocation in the term ‘metaphor-
 ical motion’. For with respect to us that word ‘metaphorical’ is added
 25R in order to distinguish that motion from the motion of the efficient
 cause, but not in order to exclude it from the whole breadth of what is
 properly called real motion and causality. But when God is said to be
 moved or attracted by his goodness, the whole locution is metaphorical
 in order to explain only the account of the divine will.

30R

30R 7. And through this I have also responded to the second and third
 arguments, for that phrase ‘for the sake of’ in the case where God is
 said to love himself or other things for the sake of his own goodness
 does not signify a true cause for that love but only a reason (as I call it)
 for the divine will. Moreover it is false that God loves himself for the
 sake of himself just as for the sake of an end, for God is not an end for
 35R himself. For who ever speaks that way? Or how can something that
 has no principle have an end? Unless perhaps he is said to be his end
 negatively in that he does not have any other end in the way God is said
 to have being from himself. But in this sense he is not his end through
 final causality, just as he does have being from himself through efficient
 40R causality. Likewise, it is false that to love one thing for the sake of an-
 other is the same thing as to be moved to a love for one thing by love for
 another thing, if that ‘by’ signifies proper causality or a distinction in

Boethius.

ium: nam in rigore ad veritatem illius locutionis sufficit, quod
 45 unum sit ratio amandi aliud. Unde sicut quando Deus dicitur
 esse immortalis, quia est immaterialis, illa particula *quia* designat
 non veram causam, sed rationem, ita dicitur amare creaturas
 propter bonitatem suam, non quia sit causa, sed quia est
 ratio amandi illas. Et sicut Deus illo actu quo se amat neces-
 50 sario, libere amat creaturas sine additione vel augmento reali,
 ita idem actus ut terminatus ad Deum potest dici ratio nostro
 modo concipiendi, cur extendatur (ut ita dicam) ad creaturas,
 nulla interveniente causalitate propria. Nam sicut illa termina-
 tio fit eminentissimo modo sine augmento reali, ita etiam sine
 causalitate reali. Quomodo dixit Dionysius 4. cap. *De divinis*
 55 *nominibus quod divinus amor non dimisit Deum esse sine ger-
 mine.*

Sitne causalitas finis in externis actionibus, et effectibus Dei.

8. Quarta ratio illius opinionis postulat ut explicemus secun-
 dum punctum in principio propositum, scilicet quomodo in
 actionibus, et effectibus Dei ad extra detur vera causalitas fi-
 5 nalis, si in ipsamet Dei voluntate non reperitur talis causalitas.
 Et ratio dubitandi satis proposita est in principio, et in
 illa ratione quarta. Propter quam posset aliquis concedere,
 in effectibus Dei inveniri proprie finem ad quem ordinantur,
 et propter quem fiunt, non tamen reperiri propriam causalitatem
 10 finalem. Ut enim notat Gabriel, in 2. dist. 1. q. 5. in
 principio, finis et causa finalis non omnino sunt idem, nam
 finis ut sic solum dicit terminum ad quem tendit operatio,
 vel ad quem motus ordinantur: causa autem finalis est, quae
 movet agens ad operandum. Quapropter, si detur finis qui non
 moveat agens per propriam causalitatem, poterit <col. b> dari
 15 finis, qui non sit causa finalis in proprietate et rigore sumpta.
 Sic igitur vere dici potest Deus omnia operari propter se ut
 propter finem ultimum in quem omnia ordinantur, non tamen
 per causalitatem finis, sed per eminentiorem modum ab omni
 causalitate liberum. Sed hic modus dicendi non omnino satis-
 20 facit. Primo quidem, quia ex omnium Theologorum sententia

Gabriel.

45R reality between one love and another. For taken rigorously it is enough
 for the truth of that statement that one is the reason for loving another.
 Hence, just as when God is said to be immortal because he is immate-
 rial that particle ‘because’ designates not a true cause but a reason, so
 also God is said to love creatures for the sake of his own goodness not
 because it is the cause but because it is the reason for loving them. And
 50R just as God freely loves creatures by that act by which he necessarily
 loves himself without any real addition or augmentation, so also the
 same act as terminating in God can be called the reason, according to
 our way of conceiving, for why it is extended (if I may speak in this
 way) to creatures without any intervening proper causality. For just as
 55R that termination comes to be in a most eminent way without real aug-
 mentation, so also without real causality. Just as Dionysius says in *On
 the Divine Names*, c. 4: ‘divine love does not permit God to be without
 offspring’.

Whether the causality of an end is in God’s external actions and effects.

8. The fourth argument for that opinion demands that we explain the
 second point proposed in the beginning, namely, how true final causal-
 ity is granted in the case of God’s actions and effects that are beyond
 himself if such causality is not found in God’s will itself. And the rea-
 5R son for doubting was adequately laid out in the beginning and in that
 fourth argument. For this reason someone could concede that in God’s
 effects there is properly found an end to which they are ordered and for
 the sake of which they were brought about yet no proper final causality
 is found. For as Gabriel notes in II, dist. 1, in the beginning of q. 5: end
 10R and final cause are not entirely the same, for an end as such only ex-
 presses a terminus to which an activity tends or to which a motions are
 ordered but a final cause is that which moves an agent to acting. This
 is why if an end were given which does not move the agent through a
 proper causality, an end would be given that is not a final cause taken
 15R properly and rigorously. Therefore, in this way it can truly be said that
 God does everything for the sake of himself as for the sake of an ulti-
 mate end to which everything is ordered, yet not through the causality
 of an end but through a more eminent way that is free of all causality.
 But this way of speaking is not entirely satisfactory. First, indeed, be-
 20R cause it is the view of all theologians that God is the final cause of all

Gabriel.

D. Thomas.

Deus est causa finalis omnium rerum, ut tradit D. Thomas, I. p. q. 44, art. 4. Secundo, quia Aristoteles definit causam finalem esse id propter quod aliquid fit: Deus autem vere ac proprie est id propter quod creaturae fiunt, iuxta illud Proverbiorum 16. *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus*. Tercio, quia causa finalis ut sic nullam includit imperfectionem, immo censetur esse prima, et perfectissima omnium causarum, modo inferius explicando: ergo convenit Deo proprie ac formaliter, et cum summa perfectione: non convenit autem illi nisi respectu effectuum ad extra: ergo.

9. Quare dicendum est, quod licet causa finalis non causet proprie effectus suos nisi quodammodo medio agente quod movet et allicit ad operandum, tamen, ut finis sit propria causa effectus agentis, necessarium non est, ut prius habeat in ipso agente aliquam causalitatem propriam. Nam licet hoc contingat in agentibus intellectualibus creatis, eo quod immediate ipsa se movent, seu applicant ad operandum, vel amandum per aliquam realem motionem, et propriam causalitatem: tamen in agente intellectuali increato id non est necessarium, quia sine ulla sui mutatione, vel reali additione, dependentia, aut causalitate, simplicissimo et eminentissimo modo sese applicat (ut ita dicam) seu determinat ad libere amandum et operandum. Consistit autem causalitas finalis Dei respectu effectuum ad extra in hoc, quod Deus intuitu et amore suae bonitatis effectus extra se producit: unde ipsamet operatio quam ad extra habet, essentialiter pendet a Deo tum in ratione efficientis, tum etiam in ratione finis, quia respicit Deum et ut omnipotentem, et ut summe bonum, qui ratione suae bonitatis, et dignus est ut omnia ad ipsum ut ad finem ordinentur, et seipsum dicto eminenti modo inclinatur ad communicandam aliis suam bonitatem propter ipsam. Atque ita facilis est responsio ad rationem dubitandi: negamus enim esse semper necessariam causalitatem finis intra ipsum agens, ut habere <885> possit locum extra ipsum in alios effectus eius: quomodo inferius etiam declarabimus habere locum in effectibus Dei causalitatem exemplarem, sine ulla causalitate propria in-

things, as St. Thomas relates in I.44.4. Second, because Aristotle defines a final cause to be that for the sake of which something is done. But God truly and properly is that for the sake of which creatures were made, according to Proverbs 16[:4]: ‘The Lord has made all things for his own sake’. Third, because a final cause as such includes no imperfection (in fact, it is thought to be the first and most perfect of all the causes in a way to be explained below). Therefore, it is fitting to God properly and formally and with the highest perfection. But it is not fitting to him except with respect to the effects beyond him. Therefore.

9. Wherefore it should be said that, although a final cause does not properly cause its effects except in a certain way via an agent that it moves and entices to acting, nevertheless, in order for an end to be a proper cause of the effects of an agent it is not necessary that it first have some proper causality in the agent itself. For although this happens in the case of created intellectual agents by the fact that they immediately move or apply themselves to acting or to loving through some real motion and proper causality, it is, nevertheless, not necessary in the case of an uncreated intellectual agent. For in a most simple and eminent way it applies (if I may speak in this way) or determines itself to freely loving and acting without any change, real addition, dependency, or causality in it. Moreover the final causality of God with respect to effects beyond himself consists in this: that God by an intuition and love for his goodness produces effects beyond himself. Hence, the very activity which he has beyond himself essentially depends on God both in the *ratio* of an effecting cause and also in the *ratio* of an end. For it is related to God both as omnipotent and as the highest good, who by reason of his goodness is both worthy of having everything ordered to him as to an end and of inclining himself in the eminent way mentioned earlier to communicating to other things his goodness for his own sake. And in this way there is a ready response to the reason for doubting: for we deny that it is always necessary that there be the causality of an end internal to the agent itself in order for it to be able to have a place beyond the agent in its other effects, just as we will also show later that exemplary causality has a place in God’s effects without having any proper causality internal to God.

tra ipsum Deum.

Dubium
occurrens
expeditur.
Cajetanus.

60 10. Atque hinc expeditur facile dubium quod attingit Caietanus circa dictum art. 4. q. 44. 1. p. an possit concedi Deum ut agens est, habere causam finalem: quod idem est ac quaerere an actio Dei ad extra habeat propriam finalem causam. Dicendum est enim habere quidem causam finalem. Nam Deus vere ac proprie exercet illam actionem propter aliquem finem quem intendit. Item quia, ut D. Thomas ait in illo articulo, idem est finis agentis et patientis, licet diversimode: est autem sermo de agente ut agens est, et de patiente late ut se extendit ad effectum ab agente factum: sed effectus Dei ut sic habet propriam causam finalem: ergo actio Dei ut sic habet eandem causam finalem, quae licet non sit finis Dei, est tamen finis effectuum Dei, et consequenter etiam actionis eius: finis enim ad quem ordinatur effectus, est qui movet agens ad operandum: unde ad eundem ordinat actionem suam.

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D. Thomas.

10. And now it is easy to resolve the doubt that Cajetan touches on concerning the statement in Ia.44.4 about whether it can be granted that God has a final cause insofar as he is an agent. This is the same as to ask whether an action of God beyond himself has a proper final cause. For it should indeed be said to have a final cause. For God truly and properly exercises that action for the sake of some end that he intends. Also because, as St. Thomas says in that article, the same thing is the end for the agent and for the patient, although in different ways. Moreover, the discussion is about agents insofar as they are agents and about patients more widely insofar as they extend to effects brought about by the agents. But an effect of God as such has a proper final cause. Therefore, an action of God as such has the same final cause, which, although it is not an end for God, is nevertheless an end for God's effects and consequently also for his action. For the end to which an effect is ordered is that which moves an agent to acting. Hence, it orders his action to the same end.

A doubt that
occurs is
resolved.
Cajetan.

St. Thomas.

Obiectio.

11. Sed statim insurgit difficultas, nam actio Dei est ipsa essentia Dei: ergo non potest habere causam finalem. In qua obiectione haerent et laborant Thomistae: et Cajetanus respondet illam actionem quantum ad rem quae est actio, non habere causam finalem: formaliter tamen in quantum actio est habere causam finalem ipsam bonitatem Dei. Sed non satisfacit responsio, quia vel illa actio ut actio aliquid rei addit ipsi Deo, et sic non erit in Deo, vel nihil rei addit, et secundum id non potest habere causam finalem. Respondent nonnulli moderni, actionem ut sic solum addere respectum rationis intrinsecum, et quantum ad illum habere causam finalem. Adduntque, cum finis moveat agentem metaphorice, non esse necessarium ut inter finem et agentem, seu eius operationem sit realis distinctio, sed sufficere distinctionem rationis: et quod agens determinetur a fine ad actionem, sive illa determinatio sit per modum realem, sive per modum rationis. Sed haec doctrina falsa est, et incidit in opinionem Soncinatis, et ex illa plane sequitur amorem Dei ut libere terminatum ad creaturas, habere propriam causam finalem: quod tamen esse omnino falsum ostensum est. Et sequela patet, nam <col. b> in illa determinatione libera est etiam identitas realis, et modus rationis, prove-

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11. But a difficulty arises at once, for God's action is the very essence of God; therefore, it cannot have a final cause. The Thomists are stuck to this objection and labour over it. Cajetan responds that that action insofar as the thing that is the action is concerned does not have a final cause, yet formally inasmuch as the action is it has a final cause, [namely], the very goodness of God. But the response is not satisfactory, since either that action as action adds something to the thing, to God, and thus would not be in God, or it does not add anything and accordingly cannot have a final cause. Some moderns respond that action as such only adds an intrinsic relation of reason and with respect to that has a final cause. And they add that when an end metaphorically moves an agent, it is not necessary that there be a real distinction between the end and the agent or its activity, but that a distinction of reason suffices. And insofar as an agent is determined by an end to an action, either that determination is through a real mode or through a mode of reason. But this doctrine is false and collapses into Soncinas's opinion. It plainly follows that God's love as freely terminated in creatures has a proper final cause. But this was already shown to be entirely false. And the consequence is obvious, for in that free determination there is also a real identity and a mode of reason, arising in its way from God as from an end. Likewise, it is false that a relation of reason be-

An objection.

95 niens suo modo a Deo ut a fine. Item falsum est, relationem
 rationis esse de intrinseca ratione actus realis, cum illa nihil sit.
 Ideoque etiam non magis potest intelligi quod per propriam
 causalitatem finalem causetur, quam quod per propriam effici- 95R
 entiam. Et ideo alii Thomistae negant quod diximus, nempe
 Deum ita operari propter finem, ut ille finis sit causa actionis
 100 Dei, sed tantum passionis, ut sic dicam, seu effectus, aut etiam
 ipsius fieri. In quo quidem videntur consequenter loqui, nam 100R
 iuxta illos actio Dei non est aliud quam volitio Dei: volitio
 autem Dei non potest habere causam finalem. Sed ex falso fun-
 damento coacti sunt recedere a vera sententia.

Vera responsio. 105 12. Et ideo facilius respondetur negando antecedens, nam
 actio Dei transiens non est Deus, nec in Deo, sed in creatura,
 et ideo habere potest causam finalem, et ordinari in finem. 105R
 Atque ita, licet Deus non habeat finem sui esse, habet tamen
 finem suae actionis transeuntis: qui si sit finis proximus, esse
 110 potest aliquid extra Deum: agit enim Deus ad extra ut sese
 communicet: quae communicatio aliquid est extra Deum, et in
 universum actio dici potest ordinari in terminum ut in suum 110R
 finem: si vero sit sermo de fine ultimo, est ipsemet Deus, non
 quia intendat aliquid commodum vel bonum sibi acquirere, sed
 115 quia agit propter suam bonitatem communicandam et man-
 ifestandam. Et hanc sententiam bene declarat Durandus, in
 Durandus. 2. dist. 1. q. 6. quamvis nonnulla misceat quae vera non sunt, 115R
 quae nunc examinare non est necesse.

longs to the intrinsic account of a real act, for it is nothing. And for
 that reason it is no more intelligible that it is caused through a proper
 final causality than through a proper efficient causality. And, therefore,
 95R other Thomists deny what we say, namely, that God acts for the sake
 of an end in such a way that that end is the cause of his action, but only
 of passion, if I may call it that, or of the effect or even of its becoming.
 They indeed seem to speak logically in this, for according to them the
 100R action of God is nothing other than the volition of God, but the vo-
 lition of God cannot have a final cause. But they are forced to retreat
 from the true view because of a false foundation.

12. And, therefore, I easily respond by denying the antecedent. For
 a transeunt action of God is not God nor in God, but is in something
 created. And so it can have a final cause and be ordered to an end. And
 thus, although God does not have an end for himself, he nevertheless
 has an end for his transeunt action, which, if the end is proximate, can
 be something outside of God. For God acts externally in order to com-
 municate himself. This communication is something external to God.
 105R And action can universally be said to be ordered to a terminus as to its
 end. But if the discussion is about the ultimate end, it is God himself,
 not because he intends to acquire some advantage or good for himself,
 but because he acts for the sake of communicating and manifesting his
 goodness. And Durandus reveals this view nicely in II, dist. 1, q. 6,
 although he mixes in some things which are not true. But it is not
 110R necessary to examine those things now.

The true
 response.

Durandus.