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WHETHER THE END MOVES ACCORDING TO ITS OWN REAL BEING OR ACCORDING TO BEING COGNIZED (Utrum finis moveat secundum suum esse reale, vel secundum esse cognitum)

1. *The former view.*—The first view affirms that the end moves according to the being that it has in cognition, not according to being real and indeed the cognition is not so much a condition *sine qua non*, but is the formal nature of causing finally. This is thought to be by Avicenna, *Metaph.* VI, c. 5, and Soncinas holds it in *Metaph.* V, q. 3, and several other modern Thomists. And they attribute to St. Thomas, [ST] IaIIæ.31.3 ad 1, where he says: ‘the object of animal appetite is apprehended good and therefore a diversity of apprehensions pertain in a certain way to a diversity of objects.’ And similarly in [ST] Ia.80.1 and 2 he says that the appetite is varied according to the form or apprehension which is followed and thus he distinguishes three appetites: natural [appetite], sensitive [appetite], and will. For the first follows natural form apart from apprehension, the second follows the form apprehended through sense, and the third follows the form apprehended through intellect.

Prior sententia.—Prima sententia affirmat finem movere secundum esse quod habet in cognitione, non secundum esse reale; atque adeo cognitionem non tantum esse conditionem sine qua non, sed esse formalem rationem causandi finaliter. Haec censetur esse Avicen., VI *Metaph.*, c. 5, eamque tenet Soncinas, V *Metaph.*, q. 3, et nonnulli alii moderni² thomistae; et attribuunt D. Thomae, I-II, q. 31, a. 3, ad 1, ubi ait *obiectum appetitus animalis esse bonum apprehensum, et ideo diversitatem apprehensionis pertinere quodammodo ad diversitatem obiecti*. Et similiter I, q. 80, a. 1 et 2, ait appetitum variari iuxta formam vel apprehensionem quam sequitur, et ita distinguit tres appetitus, naturalem, sensitivum et voluntatem; nam primus sequitur naturalem formam absque apprehensione, secundus sequitur formam apprehensam per sensum, tertius sequitur formam apprehensam per intellectum.

2. The first reason for this view can drawn from this doctrine. For that which is distinguished essentially on the part of the object from appetite is not only a condition, but also a formal reason of moving or the object of the moving. But diverse apprehension

¹Latin text is from <http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d23.htm>. Retrieved Feb. 5, 2008.

²Changed from ‘modemi’.

is sufficient reason for distinguishing essentially from appetite. Therefore. The minor is from St. Thomas above. But the major is clear from the common doctrine that powers are distinguished through formal objects not through the conditions of the objects. Hence, St. Thomas in the cited place, when he has said in the body of the article that the appetite is the power of motion but that it is moved by an apprehended appetible and therefore through that is distinguished, he applies it in the solution to the first [argument]:

The appetible does not accidentally happen to be apprehended through sense or intellect, but agrees to it *per se*. For the appetible does not move the appetite except insofar as it is apprehended. Hence, differences in the thing apprehended are *per se* differences in the appetible. Hence, appetitive powers are distinguished according to the difference of apprehensions as according to their proper objects.'

And St. Thomas has the same in [ST] IaIIæ.30.3 ad 2, where he similarly distinguishes natural concupiscences from unnatural ones by diverse apprehensions. And Cajetan observes here that he was manifestly held by this response: 'that apprehension with respect to the object of appetite does not hold itself as an approach of the active to the passive but as objective reason.'

Ex qua doctrina potest concipi prima ratio pro hac sententia; nam id quod ex parte obiecti distinguit essentialiter appetitus, non est tantum conditio, sed etiam formalis ratio movendi, seu obiecti moventis; sed apprehensio diversa est sufficiens ratio distinguendi essentialiter appetitus; ergo. Minor est D. Thomae supra. Maior vero constat ex communi doctrina, quod potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta formalia, non per conditiones obiectorum. Unde D. Thomas citato loco, cum dixisset in corpore articuli appetitum esse potentiam motam, moveri autem appetibili apprehenso et ideo per illud distingui, subdit in solutione ad primum: *Appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit. Nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi in quantum est apprehensum, unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum sicut secundum propria obiecta. Et idem habet D. Thomas, I-II, q. 30, a. 3, ad 2, ubi similiter ex diversa apprehensione distinguit concupiscentias naturales a non naturalibus; et Caiet. ibi notat ex illa responsione manifeste haberi quod apprehensio respectu obiecti appetitus non se habet ut approximatio activi ad passivum, sed ut ratio obiectiva.*

3. And this reason is confirmed: for in the same intellectual appetite, the effect of the final cause is greatly varied by the diversity of cognition. But the condition or application of the cause along cannot suffice for such diversity. The antecedent is thought, for the cognition of God through vision clear or obscure, intuitive or abstractive, causes, as many wish, specific diversity in love, and, at a minimum, is in the cause so that one love is free and another necessary. Again, the same apprehended good absolutely causes love so that

absent and needing to be acquired it causes desire or intention. But as present it causes joy. These acts are diverse in species. And sadness and fear are distinguished by the same proportion according to evil apprehended as absent or present. Again, acts of virtue and vice in the will are not distinguished by an object according to its real being but according to its apprehended being. For from here it happens that if someone wishes to give alms out of a wrong conscience, thinking that he is acting well, he does not perform an act of vice but virtue, properly and according to the true species of real virtue. Finally, a similar argument is that good does not move by the kind it is but by the kind that is apprehended. And therefore we said with Aristotle that for causality of the end it does not report what kind it is but what kind it is estimated (*existimetur*). Moreover, to be estimated is the same as to be apprehended.

Et confirmatur haec ratio; nam in eodem appetitu intellectivo, effectus causae finalis plurimum variatur ex diversitate cognitionis; sola autem conditio vel applicatio causae non posset sufficere ad tantam diversitatem. Antecedens patet, nam cognitio Dei per visionem claram vel obscuram, intuitivam aut abstractivam, causat, ut multi volunt, diversitatem specificam in amore, et, ut minimum, est in causa ut unus amor sit liber et alter necessarius. Rursus idem bonum apprehensum absolute causat amorem, ut absens et acquirendum causat desiderium vel intentionem; ut praesens vero causat gaudium, qui actus specie diversi sunt; et eadem proportione distinguuntur circa malum apprehensum ut absens vel praesens, tristitia et timor. Rursus actus virtutis et vitii in voluntate non distinguuntur ex obiecto secundum eius esse reale, sed secundum eius esse apprehensum; hinc enim fit ut, si quis ex conscientia erronea velit eleemosynam facere putans se malefacere, ille non sit actus virtutis sed vitii; et e converso, qui ex ignorantia invincibili vult furari ut eleemosynam faciat, putans se bene facere, non facit actum vitii, sed virtutis, proprie et secundum veram speciem realem virtutis. Denique simile argumentum est, quod bonum non movet quale est, sed quale apprehenditur; et ideo supra diximus cum Aristotele ad causalitatem finis non referre qualis sit, sed qualis existimetur; esse autem existimatum idem est quod esse apprehensum.

4. The second principal reason for this view is that the former to be that which the final cause *per se* and alone requires in order to cause is not only a condition but a formal principle of causing. But to be existent is not a requisite for causing by the end. However, to be cognized is *per se* necessary and that alone suffices. Therefore. The majow seems to be known from its terms, because the formal principle of causing is nothing other than to be that which *per se* first and formally is required in a cause so that it can cause. Hence in the above [sections] we often said, and also will say below, that to be existent is not a requisite condition with respect to the efficient cause but the same nature of causing, because it is the entity itself of the thing and first to be that which is required for causing.

The minor, moreover, as long as the first part was satisfactorily proven in the above section and that necessity of the apprehension is through itself from the strength of the final cause, is clear from the manner of its causality, which is through metaphorical motion.

for this proceeds through itself from objective being, not from the being of the thing in itself. Indeed, as long as the other part is clear from what was said, for it was shown that the end often causes before it exists. More correctly, even one which never will be or even sometimes those which cannot even be, if nevertheless it is apprehended as possible.

Secunda ratio principalis pro hac sententia est quia illud esse quod per se ac solum requirit finalis causa ut causet, non est tantum conditio, sed formale principium causandi; sed esse existentiae non est requisitum in fine ad causandum; esse autem cognitum est per se necessarium et illud solum sufficit; ergo. Maior videtur nota ex terminis, quia nihil aliud est esse formale principium causandi quam esse id quod per se primo ac formaliter requiritur in causa ut causare possit. Unde in superioribus saepe diximus, et inferius etiam dicemus, esse existentiae respectu causae efficientis non esse conditionem requisitam, sed ipsam rationem causandi, quia est ipsa entitas rei et primum esse quod ad causandum requiritur. Minor autem quoad priorem partem satis probata est in superiori sectione, et, quod illa necessitas apprehensionis sit per se ex vi causae finalis, constat ex modo causalitatis eius, qui est per metaphoricam motionem; haec enim per se procedit ex esse obiectivo, non ex esse rei in se. Quoad alteram etiam partem constat ex dictis, nam ostensum est saepe finem causare antequam sit; immo et illum qui nunquam futurus est, vel etiam interdum qui nec esse potest, si tamen ut possibilis apprehendatur.

5. *The latter contrary view.*—The second view is that the end moves according to real being and that being is the formal reason for moving and consequently cognition of the end is only a condition or necessary approach for this kind of cause. This opinion is widely taught by Cajetan [commenting on *ST*] IaIIæ.1.1, around ad 1, and he thinks that it is the view of Averroes in *Metaph.* XII, com. 36, to the extent that he says that the health which is in the thing causes finally, although just as it is in the soul it effects a desire for it. And it can be taken from St. Thomas [*ST*] Ia.82.3, insofar as he says: ‘the will is inclined to the thing itself just as it is in itself’; and from the Philosopher, who is cited here, in *Metaph.* VI, text. 8, saying: ‘good and bad, which are the objects of the will, are in things’. Francesco Silvestri holds the same opinion in [his commentary on] *SCG* I, c. 44, where he says that to be in the mind is only a requisite condition for finalizing. Javellus also holds it in *Metaph.* V, q. 6; and Ockham in [*Sent.*] II, q. 3, a. 2; and Biel in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3; and it is also taken from Scotus in [*Sent.*] I, dist. 1, q. 4.

Posterior sententia contraria.—Secunda sententia est finem movere secundum esse reale illudque esse rationem formalem movendi, et consequenter cognitionem finis esse tantum conditionem seu approximationem necessariam huiusmodi causae. Hanc opinionem docuit late Caietanus, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, circa ad 1, existimatque esse sententiam Averrois, XII *Metaph.*, com. 36, quatenus ait sanitatem quae est in re causare finaliter, licet prout est in anima efficiat desiderium sui. Et potest sumi ex D. Thoma, I, q. 82, a. 3, quatenus ait *voluntatem inclinari ad ipsam rem prout in se est*; et ex Philosopho, quem ibi citat, in VI

Metaph., text. 8, dicentem *bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, esse in rebus*. Eadem opinionem tenet Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 44, ubi dicit esse in mente tantum esse conditionem requisitam ad finalisandum. Tenet etiam Iavellus, V Metaph., q. 6; Ocham, In II, q. 3, a. 2; et Gabr., In II dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3; et sumitur etiam ex Scoto, In I, dist. 1, q. 4.

Judgement is brought between the stated views (Fertur inter praedictas sententias iudicium)

6. Between these views this latter one seems to me to be true, strictly speaking. And the whole matter appears so clear that there can hardly be strength for dissenting except some equivocation in the words themselves confounds matters. That will easily be clear, if we distinguish those in which the authors of either opinion agree or those which are so manifest that it is necessary to agree in them.

Inter has sententias haec posterior mihi videtur simpliciter vera; et res tota tam clara apparet ut vix possit esse dissentendi ratio, nisi in vocibus ipsis aliqua aequivocatio misceatur. Quod patebit facile, si ea in quibus auctores utriusque opinionis conveniunt, vel tam manifesta³ sunt ut in eis convenire necessario debeant, distinxerimus.

7. *The end does not need actual existence so that it causes.*—And so first all agree that the end does not need real existence or having been exercised (as they say) for causing finally, by which sense it is clear that to be existent is not the nature of causing finally nor, indeed, a necessary condition. I add, furthermore, that neither is being of a true essence or being of possible existence really necessary for causing finally. For apprehension suffices. And by this alone they for the greater part prove the reasons for the first opinion.

Finis ut causet non eget existentia actuali.—Primo itaque conveniunt omnes finem non indigere existentia reali, seu exercita (ut vocant) ad causandum finaliter, quo sensu clarum est esse existentiae non esse rationem causandi finaliter, immo nec conditionem necessariam. Addo etiam neque esse essentiae verum aut esse existentiae possibile reipsa esse necessarium ad causandum finaliter; nam apprehensum sufficit, et hoc tantum magna ex parte probant rationes primae opinionis.

8. *The will is not brought to pursuing the end in being cognized, but in being real.* Second, it is certain that the will does not tend to the end so that in it [i.e., the end] being cognized as such it is pursued, but so that in proper real being, which is apprehended in it according to its condition, the former is followed, and in this sense it is most certain that being in cognition is not the reason for finalizing, but only a necessary condition. The former part of the example and of the thing itself becomes evident in the saying. For anyone who intends health or riches does not intend to cognize them or to think about them, but to really pursue the thing according to true real existence, and likewise for other [ends].

³Changed from 'manifiesta'.

The reason, moreover, should be taken from the statements in sect. 5 that the nature of a final cause's formal causing is its goodness and agreeability. The thing, however, which moves as end does not have its goodness and agreeability in being objective or cognized, but in order to itself be real. For health is agreeable as belonging [to one], not as being apprehended. Therefore, the formal nature of moving is its real being, insofar as it is agreeable or good or the its real agreeability insofar as real being is founded in it and it delivers [something] good and appetible.

It is confirmed because the end according to that being moves and according to that the appetite of the agent is satisfied after it [i.e., the end] has been attained and without which it would not be at rest. But then the end is compared to the will according to real being and not according to apprehended being. Therefore. The major is clear, first, because that is first in intention which is last in execution and second also because the end is that to which the impetus of the agent tends. That to which it tends, moreover, is that by the achievement of which it rests. The minor is also clear, because the soul is not at rest by the apprehension of the end unless it is attained in reality by the soul. And apart from this kind of attainment the intention of the agent is thought to be frustrated. And the authors of the first opinion do not deny this, Medina⁴ finally admits in [his commentary on *ST*] IaIIæ.1.1, although perhaps not entirely appropriately, as will be clear from what will be said.

Voluntas non fertur ad assequendum finem in esse cognito, sed in esse reali.—Secundo certum est voluntatem non tendere in finem ut illum in esse cognito ut sic assequatur, sed ut in proprio esse reali, quod in eo apprehendit iuxta eius conditionem, illud assequatur, atque hoc sensu certissimum est esse in cognitione non esse rationem finalisandi, sed solum conditionem necessarium. Prior pars exemplis et ipsius rei declaratione fit evidens. Nam qui intendit sanitatem aut divitias, non intendit illas cognoscere aut de illis cogitare, sed reipsa consequi secundum veram existentiam realem, et idem de aliis. Ratio autem sumenda est ex dictis sect. 5, quod ratio formalis causandi finalis causae est bonitas eius et convenientia; res autem quae movet ut finis non habet suam bonitatem et convenientiam in esse obiectivo seu cognito, sed in ordine ad suum esse reale; sanitas enim est conveniens ut insit, non ut apprehendatur; ergo formalis ratio movendi est reale esse eius, quatenus conveniens seu bonum, seu realis convenientia eius, quatenus in ipso esse reali fundatur et illud reddit bonum et appetibile. Confirmatur, quia finis secundum illud esse movet secundum quod satiat appetitum agentis postquam illum est consecutus et sine quo non quiescit; sed ita comparatur finis ad voluntatem secundum esse reale et non secundum esse apprehensum; ergo. Maior constat, tum quia illud est primum in intentione quod est ultimum in executione; tum etiam quia finis est id in quod tendit impetus agentis; in id autem tendit quo consecuto quiescit. Minor etiam est clara, quia non quiescit animus apprehensione finis nisi illum in re ipsa consequatur, et absque huiusmodi consecutione frustrari censetur inten-

⁴Which one? Suárez cites more than one. But perhaps Bartholomew Medina is the likeliest one—certainly, he wrote a commentary on the *Prima Secundæ*.

tio agentis. Et hoc non negant auctores primae opinionis, ut tandem fatetur Medina, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, quamquam fortasse non admodum consequenter, ut ex dicendis constabit.

9. I said, moreover, that the will tends to the end according to real being along with its condition, because sometimes it happens that the end itself of the acting will is nothing other than the cognition of some object, as when we intend or desire to see God. For then that being seen pertains to the formal nature of such a final cause. And it is similar when a human desires as end solely the contemplation or speculation of some truth. And also in this way the theologians say that sometimes a human can be delighted in a cognition alone and not in the thing cognized, except according to being cognized, by which in this case the act receives its goodness or badness.

But although the cognition itself is desired as end in these and similar examples, yet it has its own proper real being according to which it is desired. And such a cognition then is also not the nature of finalizing insofar as any prerequisite on the part of the end as it moves the will but insofar as it is a certain action which in itself is judged agreeable and as such is put forward to the will as sufficient for moving it or as the *terminus* to which it tends. And so according to the appropriate division that is true for everyone the end moves according to real being which by means of an apprehension is put before the will. For according to that it is judged agreeable and, insofar as it is judged agreeable, it moves [the will].

Dixi autem voluntatem tendere in finem secundum esse reale iuxta eius conditionem, quia interdum contingit ipsum finem voluntatis operantis non esse alium quam obiecti alicuius cognitionem, ut cum intendimus seu desideramus videre Deum; tum enim illud esse visum pertinet ad rationem formalem talis causae finalis; et simile est quando homo appetit ut finem solam contemplationem vel speculationem alicuius veritatis. Et hoc etiam modo dicunt theologi interdum hominem posse delectari in sola cognitione et non in re cognita, nisi secundum esse cognitum, a quo tunc actus accipit suam bonitatem vel malitiam. Quamquam vero in his et similibus exemplis cognitio ipsa appetatur ut finis, tamen ipsa habet suum proprium esse reale, secundum quod appetitur, et talis cognitio etiam tunc non est ratio finalisandi in quantum est quid praerequisitum ex parte finis ut voluntatem moveat, sed in quantum est actio quaedam quae per se iudicatur conveniens et ut sic proponitur voluntati tamquam sufficiens ad movendum illam, seu tamquam terminus in quem tendat. Atque ita secundum accommodatam distributionem verum in universum est finem movere secundum esse reale, quod media apprehensione obiicitur voluntati; nam secundum illud iudicatur conveniens, et quatenus conveniens iudicatur, movet.

10. *The cognition alone is a necessary condition for causing finally.*—Third, it must be said that the apprehension or its judgement of real agreeability properly and formally speaking is not the nature of moving or finalizing, but is a necessary condition through the

mode of necessary approach to such a genus of causality. As long as this more truly and properly is said by the second view and is shown because to be in cognition is not the goodness or agreeability according to which the end moves, as has been proven. Therefore, the cognition itself is not the formal nature of the end itself as it moves. Therefore, it will be a necessary condition. The consequence is thought by a sufficient enumeration of the parts.*I.e.*, *induction*? Wherefore, just as with an efficient cause a local approach is a requisite condition, so with the final cause a quasi-animal or -vital approach is a requisite condition for such a mode of causing, because since the motion of this cause is metaphorical, it ought to happen through a natural concordance of cognitive and appetitive powers, as has often been said.

Cognitio tantum est conditio necessaria ad causandum finaliter.—Tertio dicendum est apprehensionem seu iudicium illius convenientiae realis proprie ac formaliter loquendo non esse rationem movendi seu finalisandi, sed esse conditionem necessariam per modum approximationis necessariae ad tale genus causalitatis. Quoad hoc verius ac proprius loquitur secunda sententia, et probatur quia esse in cognitione non est bonitas seu convenientia secundum quam finis movet, ut probatum est; ergo nec cognitio ipsa est ratio formalis ipsi fini ut moveat; erit ergo necessaria conditio. Patet consequentia a sufficienti partium enumeratione. Quocirca, sicut in causa efficiendi approximatō localis est conditio requisita, ita in causa finali approximatō quasi animalis seu vitalis est requisita conditio ad talem causandi modum, quia cum motio huius causae metaphorica sit, debet fieri per naturalem consensionem potentiarum cognoscitivae et appetitivae, ut saepe dictum est.

11. To this it should be added, fourth, that this kind of cognition is such by its nature or rather by mediating it that the nature or principle of formally finalizing can vary, not because it itself is the formal motive nature, but because it applies diverse formal natures of moving. And in this the authors of the first view seem to have laboured in equivocation. Moreover, it is declared from the stated similarity of the efficient cause. For although that which applies the cause through itself acting is only the cause *per accidens*, nevertheless, if the power is for applying diverse causes having diverse principles of acting, it will be able by that part to vary the formal nature of acting and consequently to be the cause of diversity in effect. Such therefore, because apprehensive strength is universal, can be the cause or occasion so that a nature of this kind is varied. And by a similar reason apprehensive strength can apprehend the same material thing under diverse reasons, either truly or apparently. And for that reason also come forth so that from a diversity of apprehension or judgement the motion or causality of the end is changed, not because that variety comes forth formally and through itself from the apprehension, but because it formally applies a diverse end, as was said.

Hinc addendum est quarto hanc cognitionem talem esse ut ratione illius, vel potius mediante illa, possit variari ratio seu principium formale finalisandi, non quia ipsa sit ratio formalis motiva, sed quia applicat diversam rationem

formalem movendi. Et in hoc videntur aequivocatione laborasse auctores primae sententiae. Declaratur autem ex praedicto simili causae efficientis; quamvis enim is qui applicat causam per se agentem solum sit causa per accidens, tamen si potens sit ad applicandas diversas causas habentes diversa principia agendi, poterit ex ea parte variare rationem formalem agendi, et consequenter esse causa diversitatis in effectu. Sic igitur, quia vis apprehensiva universalis est, potest applicare diversa obiecta et diversas rationes formales movendi; et ideo, licet ipsa non sit ratio finalis, potest esse causa vel occasio ut huiusmodi ratio varietur. Et simili ratione potest vis apprehensiva eandem materialem rem sub diversis rationibus apprehendere, aut vere aut apparenter; et inde etiam provenit ut ex diversitate apprehensionis vel iudicii mutetur motio vel causalitas finis; non quia formaliter ac per se illa varietas proveniat ex apprehensione, sed quia applicat finem formaliter diversum, ut declaratum est.

The foundation of the first view is set free (Fundamenta prioris sententiae expediuntur)

12. And according to this last assertion all the testimony and reasons which the former view brought forward are best revealed and set free. For whenever St. Thomas says that a diversity of apprehension pertains to a diversity of object, 'pertains' should be understood not formally but applicatively, if I may say it thus. Or it can be said in another way (and it comes to the same) that diversity of apprehension, not that which it holds on the part of the subject, but that which it holds on the part of the object, varies the appetite and its object and the causality of the end. Moreover, I call the conditions of apprehension on the part of the subject which is clear or obscure, certain or probably, and similarly, which overflow to the application of the object under diverse reasons of goodness or agreeability. However, when the diversity of apprehension concerns this, it is also said to be diverse on the part of the object.

Et iuxta hanc ultimam assertionem declarantur optime et expediuntur testimonia omnia et rationes quas prior sententia afferebat. Quandocumque enim D. Thomas ait diversitatem apprehensionis pertinere ad diversitatem obiecti, intelligendum est pertinere non formaliter, sed applicative, ut sic dicam. Vel aliter dici potest (et in idem redit) diversitatem apprehensionis, non quae se tenet ex parte subiecti, sed quae se tenet ex parte obiecti, variare appetitum et obiectum eius et causalitatem finis. Voco autem conditiones apprehensionis ex parte subiecti quod sit clara vel obscura, certa aut probabilis, et similes, quae non redundant in applicationem obiecti sub diversa ratione bonitatis vel convenientiae; quando autem diversitas apprehensionis ad hoc pertingit, dicitur esse diversa etiam ex parte obiecti.

13. Hence, with regards to the first reason, the major should be distinguished. For what on the part of the object is distinguished essentially from appetite, if through itself in the first place it makes that, it will be the formal nature of the object. But if it makes only that as applying to a diverse formal object, it will be able to be only a requisite

condition. And in this way the apprehension concurs with this diversity. And intellectual and sensitive appetite must be understood to be distinguished according to the same doctrine, because they follow the apprehension of sense of intellect. For if this distinction should be reduced to the apprehended object, it consists in that that through the sense it is applied to the object under a diverse reason of agreeability to sensitive and rational nature. And although sometimes the intellect can apprehend and propose the nature of agreeability to the sensitive nature, nevertheless this is with respect to it as if materially. For the adequate nature of it is more universal and in that itself it applies the formal nature of such a good far differently than sense, and so that whole diversity, to the extent that by the apprehension it overflows to the object, does not happen except as through the condition having been applied.

And the same should be said about all the examples which are adduced for confirmation. For vision and abstractive cognition, if perhaps they are in a cause, so that loves are diverse in species, is for this reason, namely, that the goodness of God through vision is also applied very differently on its part, so that according to all its perfections formally and distinctly cognized in one, most simple, perfect, and clear vision it moves the will of the one seeing, when yet in abstractive cognition it only moves as cognized under the determinate nature of some attribute or under some nature of some very blurred good.

And similarly if necessity, which is greater in one love than in another, comes from the object, it is because they are apprehended through the vision and object and love of it as here and now more necessary. Also such a good absent or present does not vary the act on account on only the apprehensions, but because the thing itself and the condition in the apprehended thing itself was started to cause a diverse motion in the appetite. And the same reason applies to the remaining examples, as each person will easily be able to understand by the application of each to the given doctrine.

Unde ad primam rationem distinguenda est maior; nam quod ex parte obiecti distinguit essentialiter appetitus, si id per se primo faciat, erit ratio formalis obiecti; si vero solum id faciat ut applicans diversum obiectum formale, esse poterit tantum conditio requisita; atque hoc modo concurrat apprehensio ad hanc diversitatem. Et iuxta eandem doctrinam intelligendum est appetitum intellectivum et sensitivum distingui, quia consequuntur apprehensionem sensus vel intellectus; nam si haec distinctio reducenda est ad obiectum apprehensum, in eo consistit quod per sensum applicatur obiectum sub diversa ratione convenientiae ad naturam sensitivam vel rationalem. Et quamvis interdum intellectus possit apprehendere et proponere rationem convenientiae ad naturam sensitivam, tamen hoc est respectu illius quasi materiale; nam adaequata ratio eius universalior est, et in eo ipso longe aliter applicat rationem formalem talis boni quam sensus, et ita tota illa diversitas, quatenus ex apprehensione in obiectum redundat, non fit nisi ut per conditionem applicantem. Atque idem dicendum est ad omnia exempla quae in confirmationem adducuntur; nam visio et abstractiva cognitio, si fortasse in causa sunt, ut amores sint diversi in specie, ideo est quia bonitas Dei per visionem longe aliter applicatur etiam ex parte eius, ita ut secundum omnes perfectiones suas formaliter ac distincte

cognitas in una simplicissima perfectione clare visa moveat voluntatem videntis, cum tamen in cognitione abstractiva solum moveat ut cognita sub determinata ratione alicuius attributi vel sub aliqua ratione boni valde confusi. Et similiter si necessitas, quae est maior in uno amore quam in alio, provenit ex obiecto, ideo est quia per visionem et obiectum et amor eius apprehenduntur ut hic et nunc magis necessaria. Sic etiam bonum absens vel praesens non variant actus propter solas apprehensiones, sed quia ipsa res et conditio in ipsa apprehensa nata est diversum motum causare in appetitu; eademque ratio est de caeteris exemplis, ut facile unusquisque intelligere poterit applicando singula ad doctrinam traditam.

14. To the second argument is responded that there can be equivocation in either of the assumed premisses. For when in the major is said that the former being of the cause which by itself and alone is required for causing is the formal nature of causing, it is understood concerning being of existence having been exercised, it is false in the final cause, because, as was frequently said, it does not always require this being for causing. But it is understood concerning the being of existence, strictly speaking, namely, by abstracting from that which is then when it causes or that will be in the future or is estimated, then it is true that some being of this sort is in the cause the nature of causing. But in this sense the minor is false, because, although the end when it first moves in reality itself often does not have this existence except in apprehension, just as it is said to be first in intention, yet it is put before and is represented in that apprehension according to some real being on account of which the will is moved.

Ad secundam rationem respondetur, in utraque praemissa sumpta posse esse equivocationem. Cum enim in maiori dicitur illud esse causae quod per se ac solum requiritur ad causandum esse rationem formalem causandi, si intelligatur de esse existentiae exercito, falsum est in causa finali, quia, ut saepe dictum est, non semper requirit hoc esse ad causandum. Si vero intelligatur de esse existentiae absolute, scilicet abstrahendo ab eo quod tunc sit quando causat, vel quod futurum sit, aut existimetur, sic verum est rationem causandi esse in causa aliquod huiusmodi esse. In hoc vero sensu falsa est minor, quia, licet finis cum primo movet in re ipsa saepe non habeat hanc existentiam nisi in apprehensione, quomodo dicitur esse primum in intentione, tamen in illa apprehensione obiicitur et repraesentatur secundum aliud esse reale, propter quod voluntas movetur.