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WHETHER IT IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE END TO BE COGNIZED SO THAT IT CAN CAUSE FINALLY (An esse cognitum sit fini conditione necessaria ut possit finaliter causare)

1. This question seems to coincide with the question which we are used to discussing with respect to the object of the will: whether will can be produced without cognition. But, nevertheless, in reality they are not entirely the same, although they are strongly connected. For, although the will is produced without cognition, the final cause does not for that reason cause without cognition, but rather it should then be said that the will elicits its act without proper causality of the end concerning itself, because in fact the will then is moved without having been drawn or moved by the object, but only by its own efficacy tending to the object. And this the present question does not entirely depend on the other one, although, by the converse, if the will cannot be produced without cognition, it is rightly inferred that the end also cannot cause except it is first cognized.

Haec quaestio coincidere videtur cum illa quae de obiecto voluntatis tractari solet, an voluntas possit ferri in incognitum; re tamen vera non omnino sunt eadem, licet valde connexae sint; nam, licet voluntas ferretur in incognitum, non propterea causa finalis causaret non cognita, sed potius dicendum tunc esset voluntatem elicere actum suum sine propria causalitate finis circa ipsam, quia tunc revera moveretur voluntas non tracta neque mota ab obiecto, sed ex sola sua efficacia tendens in obiectum. Atque ita praesens quaestio non omnino pendet ab illa alia, quamvis e converso si voluntas non potest ferri in incognitum, recte inferatur nec finem posse causare nisi sit praecognitus.

*The end does not cause except cognized (Finis non causat nisi cognitus)*

2. Therefore, I say first: in order for the end to cause, it is entirely necessary for it to first be cognized. This is the received view of all philosophers, whom we will examine below and especially in the following section. And it is shown first *a priori* from the mode of causing of this cause, which is by a metaphorical moving and enticing of the appetite. For this metaphorical motion, as was explained above, is founded in a natural concord and sympathy between the intellect and will, which cannot be understood except by intermediate acts of such powers. For as long as they do not operate, neither do they

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<sup>1</sup>Latin text is from <http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d23.htm>. Retrieved Feb. 5, 2008.

move nor are they moved nor do they have any vital concord. But with regard to this concord, it is necessary so that it precede the act of the intellect, because it holds itself through its act or object as motor and will as having been moved. Therefore, for this metaphorical motion which the final cause exercises on the will, it is necessary that the cognition of it [i.e., the end] lead the way.

Dico ergo primo: ut finis causet, necessarium omnino est ut praecognitus sit. Haec est omnium philosophorum recepta sententia, quos inferius, et praesertim sectione sequenti, recensebimus. Et probatur primo a priori ex modo causandi huius causae, qui est metaphorice movendo et alliciendo appetitum. Haec enim metaphorica motio, ut supra explicatum est, fundatur in naturali consensione et sympathia intellectus et voluntatis, quae intelligi non potest nisi mediis actibus talium potentiarum; nam dum non operantur, neque movent neque moventur, neque ullam vitalem consensionem habent. In hac vero consensione, necesse est ut praecedat actus intellectus, quia ille per suum actum vel obiectum se habet ut motor et voluntas ut mota; ergo ad hanc metaphorice motionem quam causa finalis exercet circa voluntatem necessaria est praevia eius cognitio.

3. Second, because, so that a real cause causes, it needs to be somewhere. But the final cause does not necessarily postulate the being of real existence properly and in itself. Therefore, it at least requires being in cognition, and so it results that the end often causes when it does not exist, as was seen above. But never if it has not been cognized. Just as, although it sometimes does really exist, if it is not apprehended, nothing moves an affection. So that on account of this cause, among others, it was said with merit: ‘secret treasure and invisible wisdom, what utility in either?’<sup>2</sup> And from the same root it results that the end, even if good in reality, if nevertheless it is not cognized as such but falsely apprehended as bad, it does not entice but rather withdraws the will.

Secundo, quia, ut realis causa causet, aliquo esse indiget; sed causa finalis non necessario postulat esse existentiae realis proprium et in se; ergo saltem requirit esse in cognitione, atque ita fit ut finis saepe causet quando non existit, ut supra visum est; nunquam autem si non sit cognitus. Sic adeo ut, licet interdum realiter existat, si non sit apprehensus, nihil moveat affectum. Ut propter hanc causam, inter alias, merito dictum sit: *thesaurus occultus et sapientia invisibilis, quae utilitas in utrisque?* Atque ex eadem radice fit ut finis, etiamsi in re bonus sit, si tamen ut talis non cognoscatur, sed falso apprehendatur ut malus, non alliciat, sed potius retrahat voluntatem.

4. *The Aristotelian pronouncement.*—Third, this is confirmed *a posteriori* from the fact that the will cannot be produced except with cognition of good. This truth is as if a first principle and axiom of all philosophers and theologians. For Aristotle, *DA III*, c. 10, says: ‘the appetible does not move except perceived by the mind or imagination’. To

<sup>2</sup>Sirach 20:32. The Vulgate reads: ‘sapientia absconsa et thesaurus invisibilis quae utilitas in utrisque’.

which all interpreters of this passage consent and St. Thomas very well in [ST] Ia.82.4, IaIIæ.3.4 ad 4, and IaIIæ.9.1. And Augustine holds the expressed view, *De Trin.* X, c. 1 and 2: ‘The completely unknown thing’, he says, ‘can be loved by absolutely no one’; likewise in book XV, c. 26, where he says that ‘love arises in us from acquaintance of the mind’; likewise, in *De liber. arb.* VIII, c. 4 and III, c. 25, and frequently elsewhere. And St. Gregory, *Moral.* V, c. 23; XXIII, c. 12; and XXXI, c. 12. And Bernard very well in *De interiori domo*, c. 18 and 19, and in *De grat. et lib. arb.*, not far from the beginning, and in *Cantica*, sermons 7, 8, and 52. And Anselm in *Monol.* c. 48: ‘no thing is loved without memory or intelligence of it’.<sup>3</sup>

*Aristotelicum pronunciatum.*—Tertio a posteriori hoc confirmatur ex eo quod voluntas ferri non potest nisi in bonum cognitum. Quae veritas est quasi primum principium et axioma philosophorum omnium et theologorum. Aristoteles enim, III De Anim., c. 10, ait *appetibile non movere nisi mente aut imaginatione perceptum*; cui consentiunt ibi omnes interpretes, et optime D. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 4, et I-II, q. 3, a. 4, ad 4, et q. 9, a. 1. Estque expressa sententia D. Augustini, lib. X De Trin., c. 1 et 2: *Rem (inquit) prorsus ignotam amare omnino nullus potest*; idem, lib. XV, c. 26, ubi ait *amorem oriri in nobis ex mentis notitia*; idem, lib. VIII, c. 4, et lib. III De Liber. arb., c. 25, et alibi saepe; et D. Gregor., lib. V Moral., c. 23, et lib. XXIII, c. 12, et lib. XXXI, c. 12; et optime Bernard., lib. De Interiori domo, c. 18 et 19, et lib. de Grat. et lib. arb., non longe a principio, et serm. 7, 8 et 52 in Cantica; et Anselm., in Monolog., c. 48: *Nulla res amatur sine sui memoria aut intelligentia*.

5. Moreover, *a priori* nature of this truth should be taken up from the principle posited by us in the assertion that, without doubt, a final cause cannot cause except it is cognized. By something else having been joined, namely, that the will cannot move itself except having been moved finally in some manner and therefore it cannot be produced except a cognition lead the way. The minor or second proposition is clear from experience. For the vital appetite cannot begin its vital appetite only out of itself, except it is enticed and moved in some way by the appetible.

The argument, moreover, can be returned, first, from a general condition of vital potency, especially of that which acts with immanent action, which cannot act except having been moved in some way or made determinate by its object. This motion with respect to the appetite, however, is metaphorical. Or the argument can be returned by a condition of appetite. For every appetite follows some being and some form or nature. Elicited appetite, however, does not follow immediately from natural being or natural form itself, as is obvious, and therefore it is necessary so that it follows some apprehended form and cognized being that comes forth from that. Hence, just as apart from natural being it does not follow natural appetite, so neither does it follow elicited without cognition. But the difference is that natural appetite, because it is not in reality distinct from the nature or natural faculty itself, accompanies the latter as if formally or as if through a natural sequel, in our

<sup>3</sup>C. 50 in modern editions: ‘nulla enim res amatur sine ejus memoria et intelligentia’.

manner of conceiving. The elicited appetite, however, is of a completely different nature and is a distinct act from the apprehended form or from the concept, formal just as well as objective. And therefore it is not caused by the latter formally but finally from the good object having been applied through cognition.

Ratio autem a priori huius veritatis sumenda est ex principio a nobis posito in assertione, nimirum, quod causa finalis non potest causare nisi cognita; adiuncto alio, videlicet, quod voluntas non potest se movere nisi aliquo modo finaliter mota, et ideo ferri non potest nisi praevia cognitione. Minor seu secunda propositio experientia constat; non enim potest appetitus vitalis inchoare suam vitalem appetitionem solum ex seipso, nisi aliquo modo alliciatur et moveatur ab appetibili. Ratio autem reddi potest vel ex generali conditione potentiae vitalis, praesertim eius quae agit actione immanenti, quae agere non potest nisi mota aliquo modo vel determinata a suo obiecto; haec autem motio respectu appetitus metaphorica est. Vel reddi potest ratio ex conditione appetitus; omnis enim appetitus sequitur aliquod esse et aliquam formam seu naturam; appetitio autem elicita non sequitur immediate ex ipso naturali esse seu naturali forma, ut constat, et ideo necesse est ut sequatur formam apprehensam et esse cognitum quod ab illa provenit; unde sicut absque naturali esse non sequitur appetitus naturalis, ita nec sine cognitione sequitur elicitus. Sed est discrimen quod appetitus naturalis, quia in re non est distinctus ab ipsa natura vel facultate naturali, comitatur illam quasi formaliter seu quasi per naturalem sequelam, nostro modo concipiendi; appetitus autem elicitus est longe alterius rationis, et est actus distinctus a forma apprehensa seu a conceptu, tam formali quam obiectivo; et ideo non causatur ab illo formaliter, sed finaliter ab obiecto bono per cognitionem applicato.

*Whether God can effect such that the will loves without cognition* (Deusne possit efficere ut amet voluntas incognitum)

6. And from these reasons theologians more often than not inder that not only according to the order of nature is it necessary that cognition precede elicited appetite, but also that it is impossible that it happen otherwise, i.e., that the will be produced without cognition, even by absolute power. St. Thomas suggests this view in the cited places and Henry openly teaches it in *Quodl.* I, q. 15; and Gabriel in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 3; and Denis the Carthusian<sup>4</sup> in *De laudib. vitæ solit.* a. 36 and 37.<sup>5</sup> And this view seems to me true and satisfactorily proven by the reasons given above. But it is best shown by these two principles, namely, (1) that the will in its own act essentially depends on final causality, because it cannot desire unless it has been metaphorically moved or excited by the good which is about to be loved and (2) that the final cause altogether with necessity and essentially requires that it is cognized in order to cause, because metaphorical motion cannot be understood except via the means of cognition, as has sufficiently been shown.

<sup>4</sup>Also known as Denys van Leeuwen or Denis Ryckel.

<sup>5</sup>Did Denis write a *De laudibus vitæ solitariae*? Others did, e.g., Conrad Rittershaus, but I haven't tracked one down yet for Denis. He did, however, write a well-known *De Laudibus B. V. Mariae*.

Atque ex his rationibus inferunt frequentius theologi non solum secundum naturae ordinem esse necessarium ut cognitio praecedat appetitionem elicita, sed etiam de potentia absoluta impossibile esse ut aliter fiat, seu quod voluntas feratur in incognitum. Quam sententiam insinuat D. Thomas locis citatis, et apertius id docet Henricus, Quodl. I, q. 15; et Gabriel, In II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 3; Dionysius Carthus., lib. De Laudib. vitae solit., a. 36 et 37. Et haec sententia mihi vera videtur satisque probari rationibus superius factis. Optime vero declaratur ex illis duobus principiis, scilicet, quod voluntas in suo actu essentialiter pendet ex causalitate finali, quia non potest appetere nisi metaphorice mota seu excitata a bono quod amatura est; et quod causa finalis omnino necessario et essentialiter requirit esse cognitum ut causet, quia metaphorica motio neque intelligi potest nisi media cognitione, ut satis declaratum est.

7. Yet theologians are not lacking who say that God can effect so that the will loves without cognition leading the way. Thus Palud in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2, n. 29.<sup>6</sup> It is also customarily attributed to Gregory in the same place and Ockham, q. 25, ad. 7 and 15. Also, some mystical theologians have asserted that in the deepest contemplation they sometimes arrive at that state in which the will loves without cognition leading the way. Nevertheless, these authors do not explain whether then the final cause also causes without cognition or whether the will then loves without the proper concurrence of the final cause. And indeed they may consequently speak more of this later. For then the object is only the *terminus* of an act of the will but not a principle and consequently not a cause. If it is true that the will can love by receiving an act which it did not effect itself, that view would be more intelligible. For then it would be sufficient that that act, insofar as it is from an extrinsic cause, would also have a final cause. Nevertheless, since the will cannot love except by vitally eliciting the love and it itself moving through that and inclining in a vital mode, it cannot be understood that it in itself begins motion in this way, except through having been excited and enticed by the object through final causality, which cannot be without cognition.

Non defuerunt tamen theologi qui dicerent posse Deum efficere ut voluntas amet sine praevia cognitione. Ita sentit Palud., In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2, n. 29; solet etiam attribui Gregorio ibi, et Ochamo, q. 25, ad 7 et 15. Nonnulli etiam theologi mystici asseruerunt in altissima contemplatione perveniri interdum ad eum statum in quo voluntas amat sine praevia cognitione. Non tamen explicant hi auctores an tunc etiam causa finalis causet sine cognitione, an vero voluntas tunc amet sine concursu proprio causae finalis; et quidem magis consequenter hoc posterius dicerent; nam tunc obiectum solum esset terminus actus voluntatis, non autem principium, et consequenter neque causa. Quod si verum esset voluntatem posse amare recipiendo actum quem ipsa non efficeret, esset magis intelligibilis illa sententia; nam tunc satis esset quod illa actio, quatenus est a causa extrinseca, haberet etiam causam finalem. Tamen,

<sup>6</sup>Is this a reference to Pierre de la Palud? He did write a commentary on the *Sentences*.

cum voluntas non possit amare nisi vitaliter eliciendo amorem et seipsam per illum movendo et inclinando vitali modo, intelligi non potest quod ipsa in se inchoet huiusmodi motum, nisi excitata et illecta ab objecto per causalitatem finalem, quae sine cognitione esse non potest.

*What kind of cognition is necessary for the causality of the end (Qualis cognitio ad causalitatem finis necessaria sit)*

8. But various questions immediately occur here, which, because the same ones are discussed with respect to the object of the will, I will only suggest and return to in the proper place. One is: what is this cognition which is required for causing finally? Namely, whether it is necessarily intellective or whether sensitive [cognition] suffices. Two [questions] are included in this. One is: whether sensitive cognition suffices for moving the will, and this part for the present does not consider [it]. We suppose, moreover, that a cognition of the intellect is necessary so that the will is moved, because only intellective potency is proportionate to the will for purposes of moving it. This matter is examined in [ST] Ia [read: IaIIæ], q. 9, a. 1 and 2, and is touched on by Cajetan, q. 10, a. 3, on account of a certain statement of St. Thomas saying here, ad. 3: 'the will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended through the intellect, but also by particular good apprehended through sense',<sup>7</sup> which should not thus be understood so that an apprehension of sense is thought sufficient for such motion, but so that these material goods which sense apprehends can also move the will insofar as they always come to reason by means of sense. The other part of said included question can be hypothetical, whether if the will is moved by an object through having thus been apprehended by sense, that motion would suffice for final causality or (what is the same) whether motion of the sensitive appetite by good cognized through sense is final causality. We will explain this in the last section of this disputation.

Statim vero occurrunt hic variae quaestiones, quas quia eadem tractantur de objecto voluntatis, solum insinuabo et in proprium locum remittam. Una est, qualis sit haec cognitio quae ad finaliter causandum requiritur, an scilicet necessaria sit intellectiva, vel sensitiva sufficiat. In qua duae includi possunt; una est, an sensitiva cognitio sufficiat ad movendam voluntatem, et haec pars ad praesens non spectat; supponimus autem necessariam esse intellectus cognitionem ut voluntas moveatur, quia sola potentia intellectiva est proportionata voluntati ad movendam illam; de qua re disseritur in I, q. 9, a. 1 et 2, et tangitur a Caiet., q. 10, a. 3, propter quaedam verba D. Thomae ibi, ad 3, dicentis *voluntatem moveri non solum a bono universali apprehenso per intellectum, sed etiam a bono particulari apprehenso per sensum*, quae non sunt ita intelligenda ut apprehensio sensus putetur sufficiens ad talem motionem, sed ita ut haec bona materialia quae sensus apprehendit, possint movere etiam voluntatem quatenus medio sensu usque ad rationem perveniunt. Altera pars in dicta quaestione inclusa esse posset hypothetica, an si voluntas moveretur ab objecto per sensum

<sup>7</sup>Not an exact quotation: '*voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum.*'

tantum apprehenso, illa motio sufficeret ad causalitatem finalem, vel (quod idem est) an illa motio esset causalitas finalis, de qua quaestione eadem est ratio ac de simili quaestione absoluta, an motio appetitus sensitivi a bono cognito per sensum sit causalitas finalis, quam explicabimus sectione ultima huius disputationis.

9. Another question, following the preceding one, is, what intellectual cognition then is necessary, whether, evidently apprehensive [cognition] suffices, as Scotus seems to think in [*Sent.*] II, dist. 6, q. 1, or whether a judicative [cognition] is necessary (which matter is discussed in [*ST*] IaIIæ.9.1.). And the strength can fall into doubt but that a judicative cognition is necessary concerning the object under the aspect of agreeability and concerning its agreeability. This is the manifest view of the Philosopher in *DA* II, c. 3, who in this sense says that the bare phantasm does not move the appetite, but opinion [does]; and in c. 7 he denies that the appetite is moved until a judgement of good or bad arrives; and *Metaph.* IV, c. 4, text. 18 is very good evidence. For so to be found for a determinate motion of the will he thinks a determinate judgement regarding the agreeability of the matter in which the will is moved is necessary, so that by this experience he refutes philosophers who deny the first principle and he shows that no thing at the same time is and is not, but one such thing is determined. St. [John] of Damascus has the same view in *De fide* II, c. 22 and St. Thomas in [*ST*] IaIIæ.9.1 and Ia.53.3 and numerous other places. And the reason is clear, because until the intellect judges the object to be agreeable, it does not yet cognize the agreeability of it. For an apprehension that is pure and apart from all judgements is indifferent so that that which is apprehended is thought to be or not to be thus. And therefore someone who apprehends only and does not judge starts to be proportionate does not know that they are proportionate but remains doubtful and ignorant. Therefore, in this way an apprehension of the agreeability of a thing cannot be sufficient to move the will, as the experiences itself also sufficiently teaches. Therefore, neither [is it sufficient] for causing finally. Therefore, it requires judgement.

Altera quaestio, ad praecedentem consequens, est, quaenam cognitio intellectiva necessaria sit, an, nimirum, apprehensiva sufficiat, ut Scotus In II, dist. 6, q. 1, opinari videtur, vel iudicativa necessaria sit. De qua re tractatur in I-II, q. 9, a. 1. Et vix potest cadere in dubium quin iudicativa cognitio necessaria sit de obiecto sub ratione convenientia et de convenientia eius. Quae est aperta sententia Philosophi, II de Anim., c. 3, qui hoc sensu ait phantasiam nudam non movere appetitum, sed opinionem; et c. 7 negat moveri appetitum donec adsit iudicium boni aut mali; et lib. IV *Metaph.*, c. 4, text. 18, est optimum testimonium. Nam ita compertum esse putat ad determinatum voluntatis motum necessarium esse determinatum iudicium de convenientia rei in quam voluntas movetur, ut hoc experimento redarguat philosophos negantes primum principium et ostendat quod nulla res simul sit et non sit, sed alterum tantum determinate. Eadem est sententia D. Damasceni, lib. II *De Fide*, c. 22; et D. Thomae, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, et I, q. 53, a. 3, et saepe alias. Et ratio est clara, quia donec intellectus iudicet obiectum esse conveniens, nondum cognoscit convenientiam eius; nam apprehensio pura ac praecisa ab omni iudicio indifferens

est ut id quod apprehenditur ita esse aut non esse existimetur; et ideo qui apprehendit tantum et non iudicat astra esse paria, non cognoscit esse paria, sed dubius manet et ignorans; huiusmodi ergo apprehensio de convenientia rei non potest esse satis ad movendam voluntatem, ut ipsa etiam experientia satis docet; ergo nec ad finaliter causandum; requiritur ergo iudicium.

10. You may say: the sensitive appetite is moved without judgement by apprehension of the object. Therefore the will will also be able to be thus moved. It is responded that the antecedent is false. For, as St. Thomas says, [ST] Ia.59.3: 'A sheep flees the wolf by a certain judgement whereby it thinks it harmful to itself'. Such a judgement in a beast, however, is not through reasoning nor through composition nor through formal cognition of that reason on account of which the thing is agreeable, but is through a simple and natural estimation (*existimationem*) of the agreeability of such a thing. But the intellect of a human follows a perfect judgement concerning the agreeability and concerning the formal reason of such agreeability, both by composing and also by reasoning. But higher intelligences judge through simple acts in a higher way.

But whether sometimes in a human a cognition of the object through a simple act (which, although it does not say that it is or is not such through formal composition and division, is, nevertheless, not a pure apprehension but virtually includes a judgement and cognition that such an object is agreeable) suffices so that the will is moved is disputed by theologians. And it is plausible that such a mode of cognition can suffice for some simple affect of the will. And perhaps Scotus was speaking in this sense above, and, more widely, Marsilius [of Inghen]<sup>8</sup> in *Sent.* II, q. 16, a. 1; also [John] Mair and Gabriel [Biel] in *Sent.* II, dist. 6.

Nevertheless, for a proper and formal motion on account of the end, which is what we're discussing now, a more perfect judgement is necessary, [one] that is not had without reasoning or composition or division, because it must cognize either the proper and formal agreeability which is in the end<sup>9</sup> or the proportionate means to the end. This cognition is not had except through a collation of one to another, which does not happen without composition and reasoning and a perfect judgement that is put together thereupon. And therefore the undeliberated operations of the will are not properly thought to be on account of the end, as St. Thomas observed in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 ad 3, because, although they do not become without some cognition of the intellect, nevertheless they are imperfect and in the way are similar to imaginary estimations. But here doubt almost immediately has arise concerning the will of the insane, whether in this case it has the proper causality of the end, concerning which I will speak at once.

Dices: appetitus sensitivus movetur sine iudicio ex [4] apprehensione obiecti; ergo et voluntas poterit ita moveri. Respondetur falsum esse antecedens; nam, ut D. Thomas ait, I, q. 59, a. 3: *Ovis fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat*

<sup>8</sup>Or is this some other Marsilius? Presumably not Marsilius of Padua?

<sup>9</sup>The agreeability is in the end? Wouldn't it be between the end and the agent? Perhaps there is a clue here for why Suárez denies that agreeability is a relation.



*eum sibi noxium*. Tale autem iudicium in bruto non est per ratiocinationem, nec per compositionem, neque per formalem cognitionem illius rationis propter quam res est conveniens, sed est per simplicem et naturalem existimationem de convenientia talis rei. Intellectus vero humanus consequitur perfectum iudicium de convenientia et de formali ratione talis convenientiae, tum componendo, tum etiam ratiocinando; superiores vero intelligentiae superiori modo iudicant per simplices actus. An vero interdum in homine, ut moveatur voluntas, sufficiat cognitio obiecti per simplicem actum, qui licet non dicat ita esse vel non esse per formalem compositionem et divisionem, non sit tamen pura apprehensio sed virtuale iudicium includat et cognitionem quod tale obiectum conveniens sit, disputatur a theologis; et probabile est posse sufficere talem cognitionis modum ad aliquem simplicem affectum voluntatis; et fortasse hoc sensu locutus est Scotus supra, et latius Marsil., In II, q. 16, a. 1; Maior etiam et Gabriel, In II, dist. 6. Tamen ad propriam et formalem motionem propter finem, de qua nunc agimus, perfectius iudicium necessarium est, quod non habetur sine ratiocinatione vel compositione aut divisione, quia oportet cognoscere vel propriam et formalem convenientiam quae est in fine, vel proportionem mediorum ad finem, quae cognitio non habetur nisi per collationem unius ad aliud, quae non fit sine compositione et ratiocinatione et perfecto iudicio quod inde comparatur. Et ideo operationes voluntatis indeliberatae non censentur esse proprie propter finem, ut notavit D. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, quia, licet non fiant sine aliqua cognitione intellectus, tamen est imperfecta, et in modo est similis existimationi imaginariae. Hic vero statim oriebatur dubium de voluntate amentium, an in ea locum habeat causalitas propria finis, de qua re statim dicam.

11. But on the other hand it is usual to doubt whether this judgement ought to be practical or whether a speculative [judgement] suffices, concerning which matter many things are also disputed by the theologians in the cited places. From those things, however, which were said earlier by us concerning the use of human freedom and concerning the way by which the will can be determined by a judgement of the intellect, a sufficient resolution can be gathered for the stated doubts insofar as is necessary for the present. And because much depends on the use of the word, it is necessary to distinguish them. Therefore, if through a practical judgement we understand some act of the intellect—so judging concerning the end that it *per se* and by its own strength has the power to efficiently determine the will—such [a judgment] it should be said does not require such a practical judgement for final causality, because the motion of the end, or the judgement through which the end is applied, does not impede the use of freedom. Indeed, such a practical motion would be almost entirely contrary to the will, as we showed above.<sup>10</sup>

If, however, through practical judgement is understood a judgement concerning the agreeability of the end, not only according to itself but also with respect to the human judging, not only in general and abstractly, but also in particular here and now, and consequently judging not only concerning the object of end itself, but also concerning the act

<sup>10</sup>Is there a missing negation in this sentence?

or tendency itself to the end, that is, so that not only is the object judged to be agreeable, but also that to will here and now is agreeable, if such (I say) judgement is signified by the name 'practical judgement', it is true that a judgement practical in this way is required for final causality. And in this sense, a speculative judgement as distinct from this practical judgement does not suffice.

Rursus vero dubitari solet an hoc iudicium debeat esse practicum vel speculativum sufficiat, de qua re multa etiam disputantur a theologis in citatis locis. Ex his autem quae superius dicta sunt a nobis de usu libertatis humanae, et de modo quo voluntas potest a iudicio intellectus determinari, sumi potest sufficiens resolutio dictae dubitationis quantum ad praesens necessaria est. Et quia multum pendet ex usu vocum, eas distinguere necesse est. Si ergo per iudicium practicum intelligamus aliquem actum intellectus, ita iudicantem de fine ut per se et vi sua potens sit determinare efficaciter voluntatem, sic dicendum est non requiri tale iudicium practicum ad causalitatem finalem, quia motio finis, aut iudicium per quod finis applicatur, non impedit usum libertatis; talis enim motio practica omnino contraria esset voluntati, ut supra ostendimus. Si autem per iudicium practicum intelligatur iudicium de convenientia finis, non tantum secundum se sed etiam respectu hominis iudicantis, non tantum in communi et abstracte, sed etiam in particulari hic et nunc, et consequenter iudicantis non tantum de ipso obiecto seu fine, sed etiam de ipso actu seu tendentia in finem, id est, ut non solum iudicetur obiectum esse conveniens, sed etiam hic et nunc esse conveniens illud velle, si tale (inquam) iudicium significetur nomine iudicii practici, verum est iudicium hoc modo practicum requiri ad causalitatem finalem; et eodem sensu, iudicium speculativum huic iudicio practico condistinctum non sufficere.

12. This is the sense in which I understand Aristotle's statement in *DA III*, c. 9, text. 42: 'Contemplative intellect does not say anything at all about if it is to be fled or pursued, but the motion of fleeing or pursuing is always something'. Indeed, that what is said here concerning practical judgement or command is in this latter way and not the former is clear from text. 47 in which he says: 'Sometimes intellect commands and reason says to flee something or to pursue, but the human does not obey and is not moved, but acts with cupidity, as in itself it is accustomed to become incontinent.' Moreover, the reason why such a judgement is required, it is clear, is because, as was also said above, while the will is moved, not only does it wish the object, but also in its own way it wishes here and now a proper action and its own motion. Therefore, it is necessary so that a judgement is brought concerning this whole and concerning such agreeability. But that such a judgement suffices is clear, because it sufficiently applies both the agreeability of the object and of practical motion to it. But whatever else is examined can be founded neither in the nature of a final cause nor in the mode of operating of the will, so that not more by that part by which it is free, it opposes that. Therefore.

Quo sensu intelligo dictum Aristotelis, *III De Anim.*, c. 9, text. 42: *Intellectus contemplativus non dicit quidquam omnino si sit fugiendum aut prosequendum; at*

*motus semper fugientis aut prosequentis quidpiam.*<sup>11</sup> Quod enim loquatur ibi de iudicio vel imperio practico hoc posteriori modo et non priori, patet ex text. 47, in quo subdit: *Intellectus nonnunquam iubet, ratioque fugere aliud, aut persequi dicit, at non obtemperat homo atque movetur, sed agit cupiditate, ut in ipso fieri solet incontinente.* Ratio autem cur tale iudicium requiratur, clara est, quia, ut supra etiam dictum est, dum voluntas movetur, non tantum vult obiectum, sed etiam suo modo vult hic et nunc proprium actum et motionem suam; ergo necesse est ut de hoc toto et de tali convenientia feratur iudicium. Quod vero tale iudicium sufficiat, patet, quia sufficienter applicat et convenientiam obiecti et practicae motionis in ipsum; at quidquid aliud exigitur, neque in ratione causae finalis fundari potest, neque in modo operandi voluntatis; quin potius ex ea parte qua libera est, ei repugnat; ergo.

13. *Whether the insane wish something on account of the end.*—But immediately a difficulty comes up, because such a practical judgement does not seem necessary. Otherwise, causality of the end will not have a place in the insane or in children before their complete use of reason, which seems to be contrary to experience, because they show with words that they cognize the nature of the good by which they are moved and the utility of means to the end. It is responded by absolutely denying the sequel. For, although these humans cannot exercise practical judgements in the order to be morally honest or depraved, because cognition of honesty requires complete use of reason and sound judgement, nevertheless they can have practical judgement concerning the matter as actionable here and now and agreeable to some lower reason, as is the reason of pleasure or the reason of agreeability or disagreeability to animal nature, which is found in health, for example, and utility, which is in the means with respect to such an end. For, although they are insane, they are not deprived of all discursive [ability] and reasoning, through which the cause of the end is sufficiently applied so that it can have some of its causality although not to the most complete degree.

*Amentesne velint aliquid propter finem.*—Sed statim occurrit difficultas, quia nec tale iudicium practicum necessarium videtur, alioqui non habebit locum in amentibus vel pueris ante perfectum usum rationis causalitas finis, quod videtur esse contra experientiam, quia verbis ostendunt se cognoscere rationem boni a qua moventur et utilitatem medii ad finem. Respondetur absolute negando sequelam; nam, licet hi homines non possint exercere iudicia practica in ordine ad mores honestos aut pravos, quia cognitio honestatis requirit perfectum rationis usum et integrum iudicium, possunt tamen habere iudicium practicum de re ut hic et nunc operabili et convenienti sub aliqua inferiori ratione, ut est ratio delectabilis vel ratio convenientis aut disconvenientis animali naturae, quae reperitur in sanitate, verbi gratia, et utilitate, quae est in medio respectu talis finis. Nam, licet hi amentes sint, non privantur omni discursu et ratiocinatione, per quam sufficienter applicetur causa finalis ut habere possit aliquam causalitatem suam, quamvis non perfectissimam.

<sup>11</sup>Vivès edition reads: ... *prosequentis quippiam est.*

14. *Whether a cognition is a per se cause for finalising*—Last, it can be inquired regarding this cognition, which we say is necessary for causing finally, whether it is required only as a necessary condition for this causality or whether also as a principle or cause *per se*. This doubt can have two senses. One is whether a cognition of the end has another causality *per se* concerning the act of the will on account of which it is also necessary besides that necessity which is taken from the part of the final cause. In this sense this question is not to be discussed at present. For it coincides with that, whether the cognition concurs effectively<sup>12</sup> for the act of the will just as a proper principle *per se* flowing into that, to which nothing in the present question concerning the final cause refers. For it is certain, as I said above, that the final cause, which is applied through a cognition does not effectively flow into an act of the will. But that act itself of cognition by which such a cause is applied elsewhere may have the strength for a sufficiently causing act of the will, not related to final causality, although more probably the cognition does not have that strength of effecting in the act of the will, as has been touched on in above [sections] and is to be disputed more extensively in the science of the soul. The other sense of this doubt is: whether the being cognized that the final cause has through the cognition is that nature of causing finally, and for that reason the cognition not only is a necessary condition but also the principle *per se* of that causality. And this doubt is usually thought serious, which the following section claims.

*Cognitio an causa per se finalisandi.*—Ultimo inquiri potest circa hanc cognitionem, quam necessariam dicimus ad finaliter causandum, an requiratur solum ut conditio necessaria ad hanc causalitatem, an vero etiam ut principium seu causa per se. Quae dubitatio duplicem potest habere sensum. Unus est an cognitio finis, praeter eam necessitatem quae ex parte causae finalis sumitur, habeat aliam causalitatem per se circa actum voluntatis, ob quam etiam necessaria sit. Quo sensu in praesenti non est tractanda haec quaestio; coincidit enim cum illa, an cognitio concurrat effective ad actum voluntatis tamquam proprium principium per se influens in illum, quae nihil ad praesentem quaestionem de causa finali refert. Certum est enim, ut supra dixi, causam finalem, quae per cognitionem applicatur, non influere effective in actum voluntatis; quod vero actus ipse cognitionis quo talis causa applicatur, aliunde habeat vim ad sufficienter causandum voluntatis actum, impertinens est ad causalitatem finalem, quamquam probabilius est non habere cognitionem eam vim efficiendi in actum voluntatis, ut in superioribus est tactum et latius in scientia de anima disputandum est. Alius sensus illius dubitationis est an esse cognitum quod finalis causa habet per cognitionem sit illi ratio causandi finaliter, ideoque cognitio non solum sit conditio necessaria, sed etiam principium per se huius causalitatis; et hoc dubium grave censi solet, quod sequentem sectionem postulat.

<sup>12</sup>It should be noted that ‘effective’ and its cognates, include the adverbial form, will all have the sense of effective cause in this discussion, e.g., the adverb here is not to be read as ‘successfully’ or something like that.