

<868, col. b><sup>2</sup>

*Quae res possint causalitatem finalem exercere.*

1. Difficultas huius quaestionis ex duplici capite oriri potest. Primum est de mediis, an illa possint exercere causalitatem finis, videtur enim ex ipsis terminis manifestum non posse  
5 media habere causalitatem finis, nam sola res quae est finis, potest exercere causalitatem finis, sed medium est res distincta a fine: ergo non potest exercere causalitatem finis. In contrarium vero est, quia medium ut medium allicit voluntatem ut ipsum amet: ergo in hoc exercet causalitatem finis. Et  
10 maxime quia etiam ad unum medium potest aliud ordinari, tunc ergo illud medium quod est prius ordine intentionis, exercet causalitatem finis circa aliud, quod ad ipsum ordinatur.

2. Secunda difficultas est de privationibus aut negationibus, an sub hac propria ratione possint exercere causalitatem finis, id est absque errore iudicatae et existimatae, quod privationes vel negationes sint, et non vera entia. Et idem quaeri potest de relationibus, praesertim rationis. Et ratio difficultatis est, quia hae sicut non habent veram entitatem, ita nec bonitatem, et praesertim per se amabilem: ergo non habent  
20 vim et rationem proximam ad causandum finaliter. In contrarium vero est, quia saepe per se intendimus huiusmodi privationes, et earum gratia media eligimus, ut alicuius mortem, vel aliquid simile. Similiter intendimus aliquando relationem rationis, ut humanas dignitates, aut aestimationes apud alios, quae in sola relatione rationis consistunt. <869>

*What things can exercise final causality.*

1. This question's difficulty stems from two sources. The first concerns means: whether they can exercise the causality of an end. For it seems obvious from the terms themselves that means cannot have the causality of an end. Only a thing which is an end can exercise the causality of an end. But a means is something different from an end. Therefore, it cannot exercise the causality of an end. But the contrary position is right, because a means insofar as it is a means entices the will to love it. Therefore, in this it exercises the causality of an end. And especially because it can also order one means to another. Therefore, then, that means which is prior in the order of intention exercises the causality of an end with respect to that which is ordered to it.

2. The second difficulty concerns privations or negations: whether they can exercise the causality of an end under this proper *ratio*, that is, whether they can exercise the causality of an end apart from an error of judgement or estimation that they are privations or negations and not true beings. And one can ask the same thing about relations, especially relations of reason. And the reason for the difficulty is that just as these do not have true entity, so also they do not have goodness and they especially are not lovable in themselves. Therefore, they do not have the force and proximate *ratio* for final-causing. But a reason for the contrary position is that we often intend privations of this kind in themselves and we choose means for their sake. For example: the death of someone and other similar things. Likewise, we sometimes intend relations of reason, for example, human dignity or the esteem given by others, which consist in nothing but a relation of reason.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

*Possintne media causalitatem finis exercere.*

3. Circa priorem difficultatem sunt varii dicendi modi. Primus est media etiam ut media posse exercere causalitatem finis: in quo haec sententia contradicit aperte ultimae parti tertiae assertionis propositae in praecedenti sectione. Tenet vero illam Gabriel in 1. dist. 38. art. 1. ubi ex sententia Gregorii ibi art. 1. distinguit, finem alium esse propriissimum, alium proprium, alium communem seu communissimum, et hoc ultimo modo dicit media habere rationem finis, eiusque causalitatem exercere. Unde etiam illud medium, quod est ultimum in intentione, et primum in executione, propter quod nullum aliud eligitur, ait participare causalitatem finis. Fundamentum esse videtur, quia omne obiectum voluntatis habet rationem et causalitatem finis, sed medium ut medium, seu quod non est nisi medium, est obiectum voluntatis: ergo participat causalitatem finis. Minor constat, quia voluntas vere ac proprie versatur circa finem amando ipsum, illud autem est proprium obiectum potentiae circa quod ipsa versatur. Maior autem sumitur ex D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. ubi ait finem esse obiectum voluntatis: loquitur autem de obiecto adaequato, tum quia dicit, ita se habere finem ad voluntatem, sicut color ad visum, color autem est obiectum adaequatum visus. Tum etiam quia inde infert voluntatem amare omnia sub ratione finis, quia amat omnia sub ratione sui obiecti: quae consecutio bona non esset, nisi finis esset obiectum adaequatum. Favet etiam Aristoteles 2. *Physicae* cap. 3. dicens *finem et bonum idem esse*: bonum autem est obiectum adaequatum voluntatis: ergo et finis.

4. Secundus modus dicendi est, rem, quae est medium etiamsi propter se non ametur, neque amabilis sit, posse exercere causalitatem finis, non tamen quatenus medium est, sed quatenus propter illam aliud medium appeti potest. Itaque illud medium quod non est primum in executione, sed intercedit inter finem et primum medium, dicitur participare causalitatem finis, non quatenus amatur propter finem, sed quatenus aliud medium amatur propter ipsum, quia sub ea ratione est id cuius gratia, et consequenter habet rationem

*Whether means can ever exercise the causality of an end.*

3. There are various ways of speaking regarding the former difficulty. The first is that means as means can exercise the causality of an end, in which this view plainly contradicts the last part of the third assertion proposed in the preceding section. But Gabriel holds this view in I, dist. 38, art. 1, where according to Gregory's view here in art. 1 he distinguishes between ends taken most properly, properly, and generally or most generally. He says that means have the *ratio* of an end and exercise its causality taken in the last way. Hence, he also says that that means which is last in intention and first in execution and for whose sake nothing else is chosen participates in the causality of the end.

The foundation seems to be that every object of the will has the *ratio* and causality of an end. But means as means or that which is nothing but a means is an object of the will. Therefore, it participates in the causality of an end. The minor is obvious because the will truly and properly is directed to an end by loving it. That to which a power is directed is the proper object of that power. The major, moreover, is taken from St. Thomas, IaIIae.1.1, where he says that end is the object of the will. Moreover, he speaks of the adequate object, both [i] because he says that end is related to the will just as colour to sight and colour is the adequate object of sight and because [ii] he infers from this that the will loves everything under the *ratio* of an end, since it loves everything under the *ratio* of its object. This conclusion would not be good, unless end were the adequate object.

Aristotle also favours this view in *Physics* II.3, saying that 'the end and the good are the same'. The good, moreover, is the adequate object of the will; therefore, the end is also.

4. A second way of speaking is that a thing which is a means can exercise the causality of an end even if it is neither loved for its own sake nor lovable, though not insofar as it is a means but insofar as another means can be desired for its sake. Therefore, that means which is not first in execution but comes between the end and the first means is said to participate in the causality of the end, not insofar as it is loved for the sake of the end but insofar as the other means is loved for its sake. For under that aspect it is that for the sake of which and consequently has the *ratio* of a proximate end rather than of a means.

finis proximi, et non medii. Illud vero, quod est primum  
 40 medium, propter quod nullum aliud amatur, non partici-  
 pat causalitatem finis. Hanc sententiam tenet Aegidius in  
 2. dist. 38. q. 2. art. 2, Gabriel in 2. dist. 1. q. 5. <col. b> 40R  
 art. 1. et Ocham in 2. q. 3. et videtur favere D. Thomas  
 3. *Summae contra gentiles*, c. 2, ubi in ratione quarta dicit,  
 45 *Omnia intermedia inter agens et ultimum finem sunt fines re-*  
*spectu priorum, et principia activa respectu sequentium*, et in  
 2. *Physicae*, lect. 5. ait, de ratione finis non esse quod sit 45R  
 ultimum simpliciter, sed solum respectu praecedentis. Idem senti-  
 tit 1. *Ethnicorum ad Nicomachum*, c. 7. ubi Aristoteles multum  
 favet huic sententiae, dicit enim, non omnes fines esse perfec-  
 50 tos, et propter se expetibiles, et in 5. *Metaphysicae* et 2. *Physi-*  
*cae* inter fines numerat instrumenta artis, et divitias, quia per 50R  
 alia media fiunt vel acquiruntur, quamvis ipsa etiam sint me-  
 dia ad superiores fines. Ratio vero est iam tacta, quia in illis  
 est sufficiens ratio ad movendam voluntatem ut aliquid velit  
 55 propter ipsa: et hoc satis est ad exercendum aliquod munus  
 causae finalis, etiamsi non exercent omnia. 55R

*Statuitur principium ad resolutionem quaestionis necessarium.*

5. Nihilominus dicendum censeo, nullam rem posse proprie,  
 et (ut ita dicam) per intrinsecam denominationem exercere  
 causalitatem finis nisi quae per se bona sit, et expetibilis. Cur  
 5 addam illas particulas, *proprie et per intrinsecam denomina-* 5R  
*tionem*, infra declarabo. Sumo igitur hanc assertionem ex  
 Aristotele 2. *Metaphysicae*, cap. 2. ubi dicit, de ratione fi-  
 nis esse ut alia appetantur propter ipsum, ipsum vero non  
 propter alia ubi per hanc posteriorem negationem circum-  
 10 loquitur illam rationem, quam nos positive explicamus di- 10R  
 cendo, finem debere esse per se expetibilem, per propriam  
 bonitatem, quam in se habeat. Nam non est de ratione fi-  
 nis, generatim loquendo, ut propter aliud non appetatur, sed  
 hoc est proprium finis omnino ultimi. Unde in 1. *Ethico-*  
 15 *rum ad Nicomachum*, cap. 7. dicit, in unaquaque serie illud 15R

But that which is the first means and for whose sake nothing else is  
 loved does not participate in the causality of the end. This view is held by  
 Aegidius<sup>3</sup> in II, dist. 38, q. 2, art. 2; Gabriel in II, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1; and  
 Ockham in II, q. 3. And St. Thomas seems to favour it in *Summa contra*  
*gentiles* III, c. 2, where he says in the fourth argument: ‘All intermediates  
 between the agent and the ultimate end are ends with respect to the prior  
 ones and the active principle with respect to the subsequent ones’. And  
 in *Physics* II, lect. 5, he says concerning the *ratio* of end that it is not  
 45R that which is ultimate *simpliciter* but only ultimate with respect to the  
 preceding things. And he thinks the same in *Nicomachean Ethics* I, c. 7,  
 where Aristotle very much favours this view, for he says that not all ends  
 are perfect and sought for their own sake. And in *Metaphysics* V and  
*Physics* II he numbers wealth and the instruments of arts among ends,  
 50R because they are made or acquired through other means even though  
 they are also themselves means to further ends. But the argument was  
 already mentioned, because there is in these a sufficient *ratio* for moving  
 the will, so that it wishes something for its own sake. And this is enough  
 to exercise some function (*munus*)<sup>4</sup> of a final cause, even if they do not  
 55R exercise every function.

*The necessary principle for resolving the question is put in place.*

5. Nevertheless, I think it should be said that no thing can properly  
 and (if I may speak this way) through intrinsic denomination exercise  
 the causality of an end unless it is in itself good and desirable. I will  
 5R explain below why I add the phrase ‘properly and through intrinsic de-  
 nomination’. I take this assertion, then, from Aristotle in *Metaphysics* II,  
 c. 2, where he says that it belongs to the *ratio* of an end to be such that  
 other things are desired for its sake but not itself be desired for the sake  
 of other things. Here he indirectly gets at—through the latter negation—  
 10R that *ratio* which we positively explicated in saying that the end ought to  
 be desirable in itself through the proper goodness which it has in itself.

For it is not of the *ratio* of an end, speaking generally, not to be  
 desired for the sake of something else, but this is proper to a wholly  
 ultimate end. Hence, in *Nicomachean Ethics* I, c. 7, Aristotle says that  
 15R that is the end in each series which is desired as ultimate. That is, that

<sup>3</sup>Aegidius of Viterbo? But did he write a commentary on book II?

<sup>4</sup>For other uses of ‘munus’ in this sense by Suárez, see *DM* 47.4.10.

esse finem, quod appetitur ut ultimum, id est in quo sistit intentio mediorum omnium, quae propter finem appetuntur. Sic etiam 2. *Physicae*, cap. 3. dicit, omnia media quae inter se subordinata sunt, esse propter unum finem. Denique 20 lib. 1. *Magnorum moralium*, cap. 2. distinguit, *Bonorum alia sunt fines, alia non: quemadmodum sanitas quidem finis, atque sanitatis causa nequaquam finis est*, ubi sanitatis causam vocat medium ad sanitatem. Et probatur ratione, nam in unoquoque genere causae illa res potest causare in tali genere, 25 quae habet virtutem, seu formale principium constituens in actu primo causam talis generis: sed bonitas est ratio formalis causae finalis, constituens illam in actu primo sufficientem ad causandum: ergo tantum res illa quae bonitatem habet, esse potest causa finalis per intrinsecam potentiam seu 30 denominationem, omnis autem res, et illa sola, quae in se habet bonitatem, et convenientiam respectu appetentis, est per se bona, et appetibilis: ergo tantum res quae est per se bona, et appetibilis, potest causalitatem finis exercere.

6. Dices, Etiam res utilis ut sic habet in se bonitatem, cum in se habeat utilitatem, nam utilitas quaedam species 35 bonitatis est. Sed contra hoc est, quod supra diximus tractando de bonitate disp. 10. bonum utile ut sic non esse aliquid omnino intrinsecum rei, quae utilis censetur, nam licet utilitas, ut solum dicit vim aliquam vel efficacitatem, sit aliquid in re quae denominatur utilis, tamen tota illa utilitas 40 non est bona, neque appetibilis ut utilis nisi propter bonitatem finis intenti, et ut subest. Propter quod D. Thomas 1. q. 5. art. 6. merito dixit. *Utilia non esse amabilia propter se, sed solum ratione finis*. Et ideo etiam bonum utile ut sic non censetur bonum simpliciter, nec per intrinsecam denominationem, quia non est per se conveniens, sed solum ut substat 45 tali fini, et ab illo quasi formaliter convenientiam accipit.

7. Secundo igitur argumentor in hunc modum, nam ea res quae non est per se bona, non potest movere voluntatem ad amandum se propter se: ergo nec potest voluntatem movere ad amandum alia propter ipsam: ergo nullam causalitatem finis exercere potest. Haec secunda consequentia patet 50 ex dictis, quia tota causalitas finis in illis duobus capitibus con-

in which the intention for all the means that are desired for the sake of the end stops is the end in each series. Likewise, in *Physics* II, c. 3, he says that all means which are subordinated among themselves are for the sake of one end. Finally, in *Magna Moralia* I, c. 2, he distinguishes: ‘Of the goods, some are ends, some are not; just as health certainly is an end and the cause of health in no way is an end’, where he calls the means to health the cause of health.

And it is shown by argument, for in each genus of cause that thing can cause in that genus which has the force or formal principle constituting in the first act the cause of that genus. But goodness is the formal *ratio* of a final cause, constituting it in the first act sufficient for causing. Therefore, only that thing which has goodness can be a final cause through intrinsic potency or denomination. Moreover, all and only those things which have goodness and agreeability in themselves with respect to the one desiring are good and desirable in themselves. Therefore, only things which are good and desirable in themselves can exercise the causality of an end.

6. You will say that even a useful thing as such has goodness in itself, since it has utility in itself. For utility is a certain species of goodness. But, contrary to this, we said above in discussing goodness in disp. X that useful good as such is not something wholly intrinsic to the thing which is considered useful. For although utility as only expressing some power or efficacy is something in the thing which is denominated useful, nevertheless, that entire utility is not good nor desirable as useful except for the sake of the goodness of an intended end and as subordinated. For this reason St. Thomas rightly says in Ia.5.6 that ‘useful things are not lovable for their own sakes but only by reason of an end’. And for that reason also useful good as such is not considered good *simpliciter* nor through intrinsic denomination, because it is not agreeable in itself but only as standing under such an end and formally, as it were, receiving agreeability from it.

7. Therefore, I argue secondly in this way: for that thing which is not good in itself cannot move the will to loving it for its own sake. Therefore, neither can it move the will to loving other things for its sake. Therefore, it cannot exercise any causality of the end. This second consequence is clear from what was said, for the entire causality of an end is contained in those two heads. But the first antecedent also seems known

55 tinetur. Primum vero antecedens etiam videtur ex terminis  
 per se notum, quia cum solum bonum trahat appetitum ad  
 sui dilectionem, illa tantum res potest trahere appetitum ad  
 60 amandum se propter se, quae secundum se et sine ordine ad  
 alium finem bona est. Unde non recte in ratione dubitandi  
 in principio posita sumebatur, medium ut medium trahere  
 voluntatem ad sui dilectionem: veriusque diceretur finem ip-  
 65 sum trahere voluntatem ad diligendum medium, nam revera  
 nihil aliud est velle medium propter finem, nisi quod tota rati-  
 o volendi illud sit ipse finis: ratio autem volendi est quae  
 voluntatem movet et attrahit, et ideo etiam motivum vol-  
 untatis appellari solet: medium autem est tamquam materi-  
 70 ale obiectum, quod <col. b> ratione finis amatur. Atque  
 hinc facile probatur prior consequentia, quia quod non suf-  
 ficit voluntatem trahere ad se amandum, multo minus potest  
 trahere voluntatem ad amandum aliud propter ipsum: sed res  
 illa quae non est per se bona, non potest trahere voluntatem  
 ad amandum se, ut ostendimus: ergo minus potest trahere  
 voluntatem ad amandum aliud propter ipsam. Maior patet,  
 tum ex illo principio, *Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud*  
 75 *magis*. Et ita si medium amatur propter finem, magis amatur  
 finis: ergo res quae facit aliud amari propter ipsam, oportet  
 ut magis faciat amari seipsam: ergo, e converso, quae non  
 potest trahere ad amandum se, multo minus poterit trahere  
 ad amandum aliud propter se. Tum etiam, quia amor medii  
 propter finem procedit ex amore finis: ergo si amor alicuius  
 80 rei ut finis non potest causari ab illa re, neque amor alterius  
 rei propter talem finem potest ab illo fine finaliter causari:  
 quod est dicere, illum non posse esse finem, si nomine finis  
 vera causa finalis significetur, prout nunc de illa loquimur in  
 ordine ad creatam voluntatem.

*Responsio generalis ad quaestionem propositam.*

<sup>5</sup>For more on this axiom, see Nunzio Signoriello, *Lexicon peripateticum*, alt. ed. (Naples: Officina Bibliothecae Catholicae Scriptorum, 1872), s. v. ‘Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis’, and J. Zama Mellini, *Lexicon peripateticum* (Barcelona: Thomas Gorchs, 1851), s. v. ‘Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis’.

60 veriusque] ulteriusque V.

55R *per se* from its terms, because—since only good draws appetite to delight  
 in it—only that thing can draw appetite to love it for its own sake which  
 is good according to itself and without order to another end.

60R Hence, it was not right to assume in the argument for doubting given  
 in the beginning that a means as means draws the will to delight in it. It  
 would be more accurate to say that the end itself draws the will to loving  
 the means, for to will a means for the sake of an end is really nothing  
 other than [to have] the entire reason for willing a means be the end  
 itself. Moreover, the reason for willing is what moves and draws the  
 will, which is why it is customarily called the will’s motive. The means,  
 moreover, is as it were the material object, which is loved by reason of  
 the end.

65R And from here the prior consequence can easily be proven, because  
 what is not sufficient to draw the will to loving it certainly cannot draw  
 the will to loving something else for its sake. But that thing which is not  
 good in itself cannot draw the will to loving it, as we showed. Therefore,  
 even less can it draw the will to loving something else for its sake.

70R The major is clear [i] from that principle ‘that on account of which  
 something is what it is is even more so’.<sup>5</sup> And so if the means is loved  
 for the sake of an end, the end is loved even more. Therefore, the thing  
 which makes something else be loved for its sake must make itself be  
 loved more. Therefore, conversely, what cannot draw love to itself will  
 75R much less be able to draw love to something else for its sake. The major  
 is also clear [ii] because love for a means for the sake of an end proceeds  
 from the love for the end. Therefore, if love for some thing as an end  
 cannot be caused that thing, neither can love for another thing for the  
 sake of such an end be final-caused by that end. That is to say, that cannot  
 80R be an end, if the name ‘end’ truly signifies a final cause, as we are now  
 speaking of it in relation to created wills.

*A general response to the proposed question.*

8. Ex hoc principio colligitur primo generalis responsio ad quaestionem in titulo sectionis propositam, scilicet, eam rem posse proprie exercere causalitatem finalem, quae in se habet bonitatem propter quam ametur (aut vere, aut in estimatione, quod intelligatur adiectum in omnibus similibus locutionibus, ne oporteat idem repetere). Haec conclusio est evidens ex praecedenti principio et probationibus eius. Quocirca non possumus in particulari descendere ad designandas res, quae possunt finaliter causare, nimirum an Deus, vel angelus, vel homo, vel substantia, vel accidens, vel divitiae, vel honor, vel aliae huiusmodi possint finaliter causare: sed in omnibus et singulis considerandum est quam bonitatem vel convenientiam per se habeant, et si aliquam habuerint, secundum illam poterunt esse finalis causa, si vero nullam habeant, non poterunt. Solum autem duplex bonum est per se et secundum se bonum nempe delectabile, et honestum, sub honesto comprehendendo quidquid est per se naturae conveniens, et ideo quidquid tale fuerit, poterit sub ea ratione causalitatem finis exercere, quod autem tale non est, nunquam exercet causalitatem finis, nisi quia tale existimatur, et hoc modo divitiae, aut honores appetuntur saepe ut finis, quamvis illae res, si rectum de illis feratur iudicium, non sint per sese amabiles aut convenientes, sed tantum propter aliud.

9. Dices, Eadem ratione bonum delectabile non erit vere sufficiens ad causandum finaliter, quia si rectum de illo feratur iudicium, non est amabile propter se, sed propter aliud. Immo neque scientia, sanitas, et res similes poterunt exercere causalitatem finalem, quia non sunt amabiles propter se, sed propter hominem. Ad priorem partem respondetur negando sequelam, est enim ratio longe diversa, quia bonum delectabile praecisum ab omni alio fine extrinseco vere habet in se unde ametur, et ideo potens est, et sufficiens de se ad exercendam causalitatem finis: quamvis si ab homine recta, id est honesta, ratione appetendum sit, non sit in eo ut in fine sistendum, sed ad aliquem superiorem finem ordinandum, quod non solum de bono delectabili, sed etiam de bono conveniente naturae, seu naturali prout condistin-

8. From this principle is gathered a first general response to the question proposed in the section's title, namely: that thing can properly exercise final causality which has in itself the goodness for the sake of which it is loved (either truly or in estimation, which addition is understood in all similar statements, lest the same thing has to be repeated).

This conclusion is evident from the preceding principle and its proofs. Wherefore we cannot descend to particulars in designating which things which can final-cause, namely, whether God, angel, human, substance, accident, wealth, honour, or anything else of this sort can final-cause. But in every and each case one should consider how much goodness or agreeability the things have in themselves and if they have something according to which they can be final causes. But if they have nothing, they cannot be final causes.

Moreover, only two kinds of good are good in themselves and according to themselves: pleasurable goods and *honesta*, of course. Under *honestum* is included whatever is in itself agreeable to nature. Therefore whatever is of this kind will be able to exercise the causality of an end under that *ratio*. But something not of this kind never exercises the causality of an end except because it is esteemed as such. In this way wealth and honour are often desired as ends even though these things—if a right judgement is made about them—are not lovable nor agreeable in themselves but only for the sake of something else.

9. You will say that pleasurable good will not truly be sufficient for final-causing for the same reason, since it is not lovable for its own sake but for the sake of something else if a right judgement is made about it. Indeed, science, health, and other similar things will not be able to exercise final causality, since they are not lovable for their own sakes but for the sake of a human being.

I respond to the first part by denying the consequence, since the argument is very different. For pleasurable good apart from every other extrinsic end truly has in itself that for which it is loved and for that reason it capable and sufficient of itself for exercising the causality of an end. Although if it is to be desired by a human being according to right—that is, *honesta*—reason, he must not stop in that as in an end but must order it to some higher end. This should be understood to be the case not only concerning pleasurable good but also concerning natural good

40 guitur a morali honesto, intelligendum est. Unde claritatis  
 gratia dici posset bonum delectabile secundum verum iudi-  
 cium speculativum seu physicum esse per se amabile, quod  
 satis est ut per se sufficiat ad exercendam causalitatem finis, et  
 non tantum ex falsa aestimatione operantis, sed etiam ex pro-  
 45 pria vi quam in se habet: quamvis secundum verum iudicium  
 practicum et morale, quod attenditur per conformitatem ad  
 appetitum rectum et honestum non sit appetendum ut finis  
 ab homine honeste operante. Secus vero est de aliis rebus,  
 quae omni huiusmodi bonitate carent, illae enim nec secun-  
 50 dum iudicium practicum, nec etiam secundum speculativum  
 verum possunt esse finales causae, sed solum ex falsa existima-  
 tione.

10. Ad posteriorem partem respondetur negando seque-  
 lam, nam illae res vere sunt propter se amabiles, nam per se  
 55 sunt naturae convenientes. Nec refert quod tantum sint am-  
 abiles homini, nam hinc solum fit non esse amabiles amore  
 amicitiae, sed concupiscentiae, quod non impedit veram et  
 propriam causalitatem finalem: quidquid Gabriel loco supra  
 citato significet. Et patet, quia tales res per bonitatem quam  
 60 in se vere habent, alliciunt, et ad se trahunt voluntatem, iuxta  
 modum et capacitatem earum. Nam quia ipsae tales sunt, ut  
 natura sua <col. b> coaptentur homini, et sint perfectiones  
 eius, ideo licet propter se diligentur, homini tamen diligun-  
 65 tur: et istae duae habitudines non repugnant inter se, neque  
 comparantur ut medium ad finem, sed ut finis cuius, et finis  
 cui, qui integrant unum completum finem, ut supra vidimus.

#### *Resolutio de causalitate mediorum.*

11. Secundo principaliter colligitur ex dicto principio reso-  
 lutio prioris difficultatis de causalitate mediorum. Res enim  
 quae est medium ad alium finem, potest sub aliqua alia ra-  
 5 tione esse per se appetibilis, ratione alicuius bonitatis, quam  
 in se vere habet etiam praecisa relatione ad illum finem, et sub  
 ea ratione non est dubium quin possit res quae est medium,

or good that is agreeable to nature insofar as it is contradistinguished  
 from moral *honestum*.

40R Hence, for the sake of clarity it can be said that pleasurable good is  
 lovable in itself according to a true speculative or physical judgement.  
 This is enough for it to suffice in itself for exercising the causality of  
 an end, and not only from an agent's false estimation but also from the  
 proper force that it has in itself, even though according to a true practical  
 and moral judgement which is attained through conformity to right and  
 45R *honestum* desire it should not be desired as an end by a human being act-  
 ing *honeste*. But it is otherwise concerning other things which are devoid  
 of all good of this sort. For those things cannot be final causes either  
 according to practical judgment nor even according to true speculative  
 50R judgment, but only by a false estimation.

10. I respond to the latter part by denying the sequel, for those  
 things truly are lovable for their own sakes since they are in themselves  
 agreeable to nature. Nor does it matter that they are only lovable to a  
 human being. For from this it merely follows that it is not lovable with  
 55R friendship love but with concupiscent love, which does not impede the  
 true and proper causality of an end, whatever Gabriel may indicate in  
 the place cited earlier. And this is obvious, since such things entice and  
 draw the will towards themselves according to their ways and capacities  
 through the goodness which they truly have in themselves. For because  
 60R they are themselves such that by their own nature they are suited to a  
 human being and are his perfections, therefore, even though they are  
 loved for their own sake, nevertheless, they are loved for a human being.  
 And those two habitudes are nor repugnant to each other. They are not  
 related as a means to an end but as a *finis cuius* and a *finis cui*, which are  
 65R integrated as one complete end, as we saw above.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Resolution concerning the causality of means.*

11. Second, the resolution of the former difficulty concerning the causal-  
 ity of means is in the first place gathered from the stated principle. For a  
 thing which is a means to some other end can be desirable in itself under  
 some other *ratio*, by reason of some goodness which it truly has in itself  
 5R even apart from its relation to that end. There is no doubt but that the  
 thing which is a means can have final causality under this *ratio*, since it

<sup>6</sup>*DM XXIII.2.5.*

habere causalitatem finalem, quia non habet illam ut medium. Immo respectu illius materiale quid, et per accidens est, quod talis res sit medium, seu ametur propter alium finem: neque de hoc est ulla controversia. Alio ergo modo potest se habere res quae est medium, ita ut nullam habeat rationem per se boni, vel saltem quod per illam non causet, nec propter illam ametur, sed tantum quatenus utilis est: et sub hac consideratione simpliciter negari debet rem illam ut sic sufficientem esse ad exercendam causalitatem finalem. Et quidem si illa res talis sit ut solum ametur propter finem, res videtur evidentissima, quia tunc amatur ut pure medium, quod omnes Philosophi a fine ut fine distinguunt, et potius censent pertinere ad effectum finis, quam habere rationem causae. Et hoc etiam confirmant omnia, quae in probatione primae assertionis adduximus. At vero quando haec res quae est medium, induit habitudinem termini respectu alterius medii, quod amatur propter ipsam, videtur iam participare aliquo modo rationem finis.

12. Et ideo maioris claritatis gratia, et ad declarandas locutiones nonnullorum gravium auctorum, possumus hic accommodare distinctionem quam Gabriel citato loco adducit, nam aliud est loqui de fine ut puram rationem termini induit, aliud vero ut habet propriam rationem causae finalis: hic enim de illo loquimur sub hac posteriori ratione. Et hoc modo negamus tale medium etiamsi aliud ad ipsum ordinetur, exercere veram causalitatem finalem proprie loquendo, et secundum intrinsecam denominationem, ut ita dicam. Et hoc probant omnia in priori assertione adducta, quia medium etiam sub hac ratione consideratum, non habet in se unde trahat voluntatem ad amandum se propter se, sed ipse finis ad quem omnia media ordinantur, movet voluntatem ad amandum omnia media, et subordinationem eorum inter se, seu quod idem est, idem finis movet voluntatem ad amandum aliquod medium immediate propter se, aliquod vero immediate propter aliud medium, mediate vero seu ultimate propter se. Ipsa ergo bonitas finis est, quae proxime et finaliter movet, quamvis non semper terminet proxime et immediate relationem seu habitudinem medii ad finem: causalitas autem

does not have that *ratio* as a means. Indeed, as far as it goes, it is something material and *per accidens* that such a thing is a means or is loved for the sake of another end. Nor is there any controversy about this.

Therefore, a thing which is a means can hold itself in another way such that it has no *ratio* of good in itself or at least such that it neither causes through that *ratio* nor is loved for its sake, but only insofar as it is useful. And regarding this consideration it should simply be denied that that thing as such is sufficient for exercising final causality. And certainly if that thing is such that it is only loved for the sake of an end, the matter appears entirely obvious, since in that case it is loved purely as a means, which all philosophers distinguish from an end as end. They rather think that it pertains to the effect of an end which has the *ratio* of a cause. And all those whom we adduced in the evidence for the first assertion also confirm this. But when this thing which is a means puts on a habitude to a terminus with respect to another means which is loved for its sake, it seems now to participate in some way in the nature of an end.

12. And so for the sake of greater clarity and to explain the expressions of several important authors, we can accommodate this distinction which Gabriel makes in the cited place. For it is one thing to speak of an end as putting on the pure *ratio* of a terminus but another thing to speak of it as having the proper *ratio* of a final cause. For here we are speaking of it under this latter *ratio*. And in this way we deny that such a means, even if something else is ordered to it, exercises true final causality properly speaking and according to intrinsic denomination (if I may speak in this way).

And by this they prove everything adduced in the prior assertion, because even a means considered under this *ratio* does not have in itself that by which it draws the will to loving it for its own sake. Rather, the end itself to which all the means are ordered moves the will to loving all the means and to their subordination to each other, or, what is the same thing, the same end moves the will to loving one means immediately for the sake of the end, but another means immediately for the sake of another means but mediate or ultimately for the sake of the end. Therefore, the end's goodness itself is what proximately and finally moves, although it does not always proximately and immediately terminate the relation or habitude of the means to the end. Moreover, final

finalis in motione metaphorica consistit: haec ergo non est in medio, etiam quatenus aliud ad ipsum ordinatur, sed est tantum in fine. Et confirmatur ex specificatione actuum voluntatis, seu electionum omnium mediiorum tendentium ad eundem finem nam omnes illae recipiunt speciem, et honestatem vel malitiam ab ipso fine, ut latius tradunt Theologi in 1. 2. q. 18. ergo signum est, licet unum medium ordinetur ad aliud, tamen si omnia appetuntur tantum ut media, solum finem propter quem omnia appetuntur, esse, qui per bonitatem suam causat finaliter omnes illas electiones.

13. At vero si de fine loquamur solum prout est terminus ordinationis seu habitudinis alterius ad ipsum, sic unum medium dicitur finis alterius quod ad ipsum ordinatur, quia est terminus ad quem proxime refertur. Medium enim remotum ut tale est non habet convenientiam et proportionem cum fine nisi intercedente proximo medio, et ideo ad illud proxime ordinatur: ergo sub hac ratione participat tale medium rationem proximi finis. Atque hoc confirmant testimonia Aristotelis et D. Thomae in favorem secundae sententiae adducta, favet etiam communis loquendi modus, absolute enim dicitur unum medium amari propter aliud: ex quo genere locutionis colligit Aristoteles ubique rationem finis. Dices si medium participat munus et rationem finis sub ratione termini ad quem aliud medium ordinatur, cur etiam non participabit causalitatem finis, quae in metaphorica motione consistit? Videtur enim esse aequalis ratio. Maxime quia sicut v. g. sanitatis amor movet ad procurandam evacuationem, vel digestionem, aut aliquid simile, ita desiderium evacuationis movet ad sumendam potionem, vel ad ambulandum, aut aliud simile medium. <col. b>

14. Respondetur imprimis differentiam esse, quia proxima ordinatio unius medii ad aliud attenditur secundum id quod est materiale in ipsis, nimirum quatenus unum medium potest esse causa effectiva illius effectus, et ita potest bene ordinari unum medium ad aliud, et e converso unum esse terminus proximus ordinationis alterius, secundum id quod in ipso vere et realiter est atque ita potest participare rationem

causality consists in metaphorical motion. This, therefore, is not in the means, even to the extent that something is ordered to it, but is only in the end.

This is confirmed from the specification of the acts of the will or of the choices of all means tending to the same end. For these all receive their species and *honestas* or wickedness from the end itself, as theologians explain more thoroughly in IaIIae.18. Therefore, it is a sign that, although one means is ordered to another, nevertheless, if all are desired only as means, only the end for the sake of which they are all desired is something which through its goodness final-causes all those choices.

13. But, on the other hand, if we speak of the end only as it is the terminus of the ordering or habitude of something else to it, one means is then called an end for another means that is ordered to it, since it is the terminus to which the other means is proximately referred. The remote means, indeed, as it is such, does not have agreeability and proportion with the end except by the proximate means between them. And for this reason it is proximately ordered to that. Under this *ratio*, therefore, such a means participates in the *ratio* of a proximate end. And the testimony of Aristotle and St. Thomas confirms this argument adduced in favour of the second view. The common manner of speaking also favours this. For people say without qualification that one means is loved for the sake of another. Aristotle everywhere gathers the *ratio* of an end from this sort of expression.

You will ask: if the means participates in the function (*munus*) and *ratio* of an end under the *ratio* of a terminus to which another means is ordered, why will it not also participate in the causality of an end, which consists in metaphorical motion? For the argument seems to be equal in force, especially since just as, for example, love for health moves to procuring evacuation, digestion, or something similar, so the desire for evacuation moves to the taking of a potion, to walking, or some similar means.

14. I respond in the first place that there is a difference because the proximate ordering of one end to another is attained in accordance with that which is material in them, namely, insofar as one means can be an effective cause of that effect and so one means can be well ordered to another. And, conversely, one can be the proximate terminus of the ordering of another according to that which is truly and really is in it and so can participate in the *ratio* of an end as terminus. Final causality, how-

85 finis ut termini. Causalitas autem finalis formaliter provenit  
a fine quatenus bonum est: et quia bonitas finis non partic-  
ipatur intrinsece a medio propinquiori, etiamsi aliud ad ip-  
sum ordinetur, ideo non ita participatur ab eo causalitas finis,  
90 sicut ratio vel habitudo termini. Non est autem confun-  
denda motio, vel naturalis resultantia, quae est inter ipsos ac-  
tus voluntatis (quatenus ex uno excitatur voluntas ad alium)  
cum causalitate finali, nam illa causalitas inter actus potius  
est effectiva, quam finalis, sive sit per propriam efficientiam  
95 physicam (sive per naturalem sympathiam, et consensionem  
de quo alias, nam ad praesens non refert) ratio autem finalis  
est ab ipso obiecto, et ideo, quamvis desiderium unius medii  
causet vel excitet desiderium alterius, nihilominus tamen in  
genere finalis causae tota illa motio provenit ab eodem fine.

100 15. Nisi quis tandem velit dicere, quod sicut medium  
ex coniunctione ad finem fit amabile et appetibile, ita fit  
potens ad causandum finaliter, saltem electionem alterius  
medii propter ipsum, et ita participare causalitatem finalem.  
Quod quidem in re non est diversum ab eo quod diximus,  
105 nam ad summum hoc potest attribui medio per quamdam ex-  
trinsecam denominationem. Nam sicut medium non accipit  
aliquam intrinsecam bonitatem a fine, qua fiat appetibile, sed  
solum per extrinsecam denominationem, et quasi informa-  
tionem accipit ab illo convenientiam et appetibilitatem obiec-  
110 tivam; ita ad summum per similem denominationem extrin-  
secam potest participare causalitatem finalem: re tamen vera,  
tota illa causalitas provenit ab ipso fine, eiusque bonitate: et  
ideo saepe dixi in superioribus, proprie, et per intrinsecam  
denominationem solum finem exercere causalitatem finalem.

115 16. Dices, Ergo eo modo quo ratio finis attribuitur  
mediis ad quae alia ordinantur, ita potest attribui illi medio,  
quod est primum in executione, et ultimum via intentionis:  
nam, licet ad illud <873> non ordinetur aliud medium ex-  
trinsecum, ordinatur tamen ad illud ipsemet actus voluntatis,  
115R qui ad illud terminatur: unde etiam dici potest esse propter  
illud, iuxta doctrinam superius traditam sect. 3. Rursus, licet

85R ever, formally comes into being from an end insofar as it is good. And  
since the closer means does not intrinsically participate in the goodness  
of an end even if another means is ordered to it, for this reason that  
causality of the end as a *ratio* or habitudo of a terminus does not partic-  
ipate in it. Moreover, the motion or natural results which are between  
those acts of the will (insofar as the will is excited from one to another)  
should not be confused with final causality. For that causality between  
the acts is more an effective causality than a final causality (it is either  
90R through proper physical efficiency or through a natural sympathy and  
harmony—about which [I say more] elsewhere, for it does not matter  
at present). The *ratio* of final [causality], moreover, is from the object  
itself. And for that reason, although a desire for one means causes or  
excites desire for another means, in the genus of final causes that whole  
95R motion still comes to be from the same end.

100R 15. Unless, finally, someone wants to say that just as a means by  
conjunction with the end becomes lovable and desirable, so it becomes  
able to final-cause—at least to final-cause the choice of another means for  
its sake—and thus to participate in final causality. This is not really dif-  
ferent from what we said, since this can at most be attributed to a means  
through a kind of extrinsic denomination. For, just as a means does not  
receive some intrinsic goodness from the end by which it becomes desir-  
able but receives objective agreeability and desirability only through  
extrinsic denomination and, as it were, information, so also it can partic-  
105R ipate in final causality at most through a similar extrinsic denomination.  
In true reality, however, that whole causality comes to be from the end  
itself and its goodness. And for that reason I often said in earlier sec-  
tions that only the end can exercise final causality properly and through  
intrinsic denomination.

110R 16. You will say that, therefore, in that way in which the *ratio* of an  
end is attributed to means to which other means are ordered, it can also  
be attributed to that means which is first in execution and last in the way  
of intention. For even though no other extrinsic means are ordered to  
it, the very act of will which is terminated in it can still be ordered to  
115R it. Hence, it also can be said to be for the sake of that means, according  
to the doctrine related earlier in sect. 3.<sup>7</sup> Again, although that means

Obiectioni  
satisfit.

An objection is  
addressed.

<sup>7</sup>*DM XXIII.3.3–17.*

120 illud medium per intrinsecam bonitatem non trahat volun-  
tatem, tamen ut coniunctum fini, sicut ab illo redditur ap-  
petibile et conveniens per extrinsecam denominationem, ita  
per eandem potest dici causare finaliter, non per seipsum, sed  
125 per finem tamquam per suam formam extrinsecam. Respon-  
detur primo, non esse magnum inconveniens hoc totum con-  
cedere, quod magis spectat ad modum loquendi quam ad rem.  
Quod si quis velit hoc modo sustinere opinionem Gabrielis,  
facile poterit, nam et D. Thomas 1. p. q. 6. art. 6. vocat  
130 bonum utile ut sic, terminum proximum motionis volun-  
tatis. Verumtamen modus ille loquendi, praesertim quoad  
participationem causalitatis per extrinsecam denominationem,  
mihi videtur valde improprius, nam in rigore non movet  
medium, sed finis ad medium, ut supra dicebam. Tamen  
135 quantum ad habitudinem termini potest dici participari a  
primo medio quatenus est materiale obiectum in quo versatur  
actus voluntatis, quod solum D. Thomas loco citato intendit.  
Immo sub ea ratione qua dicitur actus esse propter ipsum,  
iam non habet rationem primi medii, nam ipsemet actus subit  
135R quodammodo rationem prioris medii, ut in sect. 3. declaravi.

*Satisfit fundamentis aliarum opinionum.*

17. Fundamenta aliarum opinionum fere non indigent nova  
solutione, quia declarando veram sententiam partim soluta,  
partim ad ea quae diximus confirmanda accommodata sunt.  
5 Solum ad id quod in favorem prioris sententiae obiiciebam  
de obiecto adaequato voluntatis, dicendum est duplex  
esse obiectum potentiae, materiale et formale: finis ergo non  
potest dici adaequatum obiectum materiale voluntatis, quia  
etiam media sunt materia circa quam voluntas versatur, ut  
10 dictum est: finis autem dici potest formale obiectum adae-  
quatum, quia quidquid voluntas amat, est finis, vel propter  
finem: et hoc intendit D. Thomas citato loco. Cum ergo dic-  
itur omne obiectum voluntatis habere causalitatem finalem,  
intelligendum est de obiecto formali, non de materiali. Et eo-

does not draw the will through intrinsic goodness, yet as conjoined with  
the end, just as it is rendered desirable and agreeable through extrinsic  
denomination by that end, so also it can be said to final-cause in the same  
way: not through it itself but through the end as through its extrinsic  
form.

I respond, first, that it is not all that disagreeable to concede all of  
this, because it looks more like a matter of speaking than a matter of re-  
ality. For if someone wishes in this way to sustain the opinion of Gabriel,  
he will be able to do so easily. Even St. Thomas in Ia.5.6 calls useful good  
as such a proximate terminus of the will's motion. But even so this man-  
ner of speaking, especially with respect to the participation of causality  
through extrinsic denomination, seems to me most unsuitable. For, as  
I said above, strictly speaking it is not the means that moves [the will]  
but the end that moves [the will] to the means. Still, to the extent that it  
can be said that the first means participates in the habitude to a terminus,  
the first means can also be called the material object to which the act of  
will is directed, which is all that St. Thomas intended to say in the cited  
place. Or better, under that *ratio* by which the act is said to be for the  
sake of the means, the means no longer has the *ratio* of a first means, for  
the very act itself in some way assumes a kind of *ratio* of a prior means,  
as I said in sect. 3.<sup>8</sup>

*The basis of the other opinions is addressed.*

17. The foundations of the other opinions hardly require a new solu-  
tion, since they have already in part been resolved in revealing the true  
view and in part been accommodated to those things which we said in  
confirming the true view. It only remains to say in response to that  
which we brought up in favour of the former view regarding the ade-  
quate object of the will that the object of a power is two-fold: material  
and formal. So then, an end cannot be called the will's adequate material  
object, since means are also material to which the will is directed, as was  
said. An end can, however, be called the adequate formal object, since  
whatever the will loves is an end or for the sake of an end. And this is  
what St. Thomas intends in the cited place.

Therefore, when it is said that every object of the will has final  
causality, it should be understood as concerning the formal object and

What the will's  
adequate object  
is.

Quod sit  
obiectum  
adaequatum  
voluntatis.

<sup>8</sup>*DM XXIII.3.5 and 7.*

15 dem modo intelligendum est quod Aristoteles ait, <col. b>  
finem et bonum idem esse: intelligit enim de bono sim-  
pliciter, quod in se ac per se bonum est; quo sensu dixit etiam  
1. *Ethicorum ad Nicomachum* cap. 7. bonum uniuscuiusque  
rei esse, cuius gratia operatur. Et in idem redit quod alii aiunt,  
20 finem esse adaequatum obiectum motivum voluntatis, non  
autem terminativum, et causalitatem finalem proprie con-  
venire obiecto motivo, non autem pure terminativo. Con-  
radus vero 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. dicit finem esse adaequatum obiec-  
tum per se voluntatis, medium autem esse obiectum per ac-  
cidens, quod in idem redit, dummodo illud *per accidens* non  
25 ita intelligatur, ut existimetur voluntas non attingere ipsum  
medium in se: sic enim falsum esset, media esse obiecta per  
accidens, nam proprie et in se amantur; sed intelligendum  
est *per accidens*, id est per aliud, nempe per finem, atque hoc  
30 modo solum obiectum per se voluntatis potest habere causal-  
itatem finalem.

Conradus.

An sit actus  
aliquis voluntatis  
a fine non  
causatus.

18. Dices, Ergo nullus est actus voluntatis qui non sit  
a causa finali, quia nullus est qui non sit ab obiecto formali  
adaequato eius: hoc autem videtur falsum, tum quia aliquis  
35 est actus in voluntate qui nec circa finem nec circa media  
versatur, ut Scotus, et nonnulli alii Theologi contendunt in  
1. dist. 1. tum etiam quia simplex complacentia, vel ineffi-  
cax desiderium rei impossibilis non causatur a fine, cum nullo  
modo moveat ad consecutionem finis. Haec obiectio petebat  
40 longam disputationem an in voluntate sit actus neuter, qui  
non sit causatus a fine: sed quia hoc non est nostri instituti,  
breviter respondetur ad argumentum concedendo sequelam,  
nimirum, nullum esse actum in voluntate cum ratione et ali-  
qua deliberatione operante qui non sit effectus finis, ut recte  
45 probat ratio facta, et ex omnibus dictis in sect. 3. confirmari  
potest. Ad priorem vero partem objectionis negamus esse ac-  
tum in voluntate, qui non sit aliquo modo, vel circa finem,  
vel circa medium propter finem, quod late probat Gregorius  
50 in 1. dist. 1. q. 1. praesertim ex Augustini 1. *De doctrina chris-  
tiana* c. 8. ubi omnia bona amabilia revocat ad bona quibus

Gregorius.

15R not as concerning the material object. And Aristotle should be under-  
stood in the same way when he says that the end and the good are the  
same. For he is thinking about good *simpliciter*, which is good in and of  
itself. He also speaks in this sense in *Nicomachean Ethics* I, c. 7: the good  
of each thing is that for the sake of which it acts. And what others say—  
20R that the end is the adequate motive object of the will but not the adequate  
terminative object and that final causality properly suits the motive ob-  
ject but not the purely terminative object—amounts to the same thing.

But Conrad says in IaIIae.1.1 that the end is the will's *per se* adequate  
object, but a means is a *per accidens* object. This amounts to the same  
25R thing, provided that the '*per accidens*' is not understood in such a way  
that the will is considered not to reach the very means in itself. For then  
it would be false that means are objects *per accidens*, for they are loved  
properly and in themselves. But it should be understood as *per accidens*,  
that is, through (*per*) something else (through the end, of course). In this  
30R way only the *per se* object of the will can have final causality.

Conrad.

18. You will say: therefore, there is no act of the will which does not  
result from a final cause, because there is no act which does not result  
from an adequate formal object of the will. But this seems to be false,  
both because there is some act in the will that is not directed at an end or  
35R a means, as Scotus and some other theologians contend in I, dist. 1, and  
because simple complacency or an inefficacious desire for an impossible  
thing is not caused by an end since it in no way moves to an attainment  
of an end.

This objection demands a long disputation on whether there is in  
the will a neutral act that is not caused by an end. But since this is not  
40R part of our plan here, I respond briefly to the argument by conceding the  
consequence, namely, that there is no act in the will in someone acting  
with reason and a certain measure of deliberation that is not the effect of  
an end. The given argument rightly shows this and it can be confirmed  
45R from all that was said in sect. 3.<sup>9</sup>

But in response to the prior part of the objection, we deny that there  
is an act in the will that is not in some way either directed to an end or di-  
rected to a means for the sake of an end. This is more thoroughly shown  
by Gregory in I, dist. 1, q. 1, and especially by Augustine in *De doctrina*

Whether there is  
some act of the  
will not caused  
by an end.

Gregory.

<sup>9</sup>*DM XXIII.3.*

Aristoteles.  
D. Thomas.

est fruendum vel utendum, id est quae sunt fines aut media. Quod etiam sentit Aristoteles 3. *Ethicorum ad Nicomachum* cap. 3 et 4. et sumitur etiam ex D. Thoma 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 86. Et ratio est quia inter bonum propter se amabile, aut tantum propter aliud, non potest reperiri medium. Nam quod Scotus pu- <874> tavit, bonum in communi, seu abstracte sumptum posse esse medium, verum non est, quia bonum in communi non abstrahitur nisi ut per se amabile, quia aliud quod solum propter extrinsecum finem amatur, non est bonum simpliciter, sed analogice, et per extrinsecam denominationem, in qua non datur communis conceptus abstractus, ut ex superioribus constat. Ad alteram partem obiectionis respondetur, in illo actu simplici seu inefficaci circa obiectum impossibile, non amari obiectum ipsum impossibile per modum finis inquirendi, vel assequendi, sed vel amari delectationem ipsam, quae ex illo actu capitur, per modum finis, vel amari rationem aliquam boni, quae in illo obiecto impossibili repraesentatur vel absolute, vel sub conditione. Nam illa est quae movet voluntatem ad illum simplicem affectum, et illa etiam est quae participat causalitatem finis, non quidem quantum ad intentionem vel electionem, sed solum quantum ad simplicem affectum, hic enim etiam versatur circa finem.

*Quomodo privationes participant causalitatem finalem.*

19. Ultimo facilis plane est ex supra dictis resolutio secundae difficultatis in principio positae de obiectis negativis vel privativis. Ad quam aliqui respondent, bonum quod potest causare finaliter, non esse sumendum ita stricte ut cum vero ente reali convertatur, sed latius quatenus convertitur cum ente, prout analogice comprehendit etiam privationes vel negationes: iuxta superius dicta disp. 11. sect. 3. n. 3. Ut enim dixit Aristoteles 5. *Ethicorum ad Nicomachum* cap. 1. *Minus malum quodammodo bonum est*: privationes ergo, et negationes, quamvis revera non afferant bonitatem, tamen

50R *christiana* I, c. 8, where he classes all lovable goods under goods which are to be enjoyed or used, that is, which are ends or means. Aristotle also thinks this in *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 3 and 4, and it is also taken from St. Thomas in *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 86. And the reason is that no intermediate can be found between goods that are lovable for their own sake and goods that are lovable only for the sake of something else. 55R For what Scotus thought—that good in general or taken abstractly can be an intermediate—is not true, because good in general is not abstracted except as lovable in itself, because something else that is loved only for the sake of an extrinsic end is not a good *simpliciter* but analogically and through an extrinsic denomination. A general abstract concept is not given in this, as is clear from earlier [sections].<sup>10</sup> 60R

To the second part of the objection, I respond that in that act which is simple or inefficacious and directed to an impossible object the impossible object itself is not loved in the manner of an end to be sought or attained, but either the pleasure itself which is taken from that act is loved in the manner of an end or some *ratio* of good which is represented either absolutely or under some condition in that impossible object. For that is what moves the will to that simple affect and that also is what participates in the causality of an end, not indeed as far as intention or election is concerned but only insofar as the simple affect is concerned. 65R For this is also directed to an end. 70R

*In what way privations participate in final causality.*

19. Lastly, the resolution of the second difficulty posited in the beginning concerning negative or privative objects is readily obvious. Some respond to this that good that can cause finally should not be taken so strictly that it is convertible with true real being but should be taken more widely so that it is convertible with being as it analogically also comprehends privations or negations, according to what was said earlier in disp. XI, sect. 3, n. 3.<sup>11</sup> For as Aristotle says in *Nicomachean Ethics* V, c. 1: ‘the less bad is in a certain way good’. Privations and negations, therefore, although they do not really bring goodness, still, insofar as they remove some disadvantage, they are considered to have some agree-

Aristotle.  
St. Thomas.

<sup>10</sup>Reference?

<sup>11</sup>*DM XI.3.3.*

quatenus removet aliquod incommodum, censentur habere  
 aliquam convenientiam, ratione cuius possunt finaliter causare.  
 Quae sententia in re vera est: addere vero possumus, car-  
 entiam mali non habere vim causandi finaliter nisi in vir-  
 15 tute alicuius positivi boni: meritoque dici posse, privationem  
 magis amari ut medium ad obtinendum bonum vel ad plene  
 illo fruendum, quam proprie ut finem, ideoque illam causali-  
 tatem finis quae est in effectu alicuius privationis, magis esse  
 20 tribuendam bono, ratione cuius illa privatio amatur, quam  
 ipsi privationi. Amat enim quis carere dolore propter delectationem  
 illi oppositam, vel certe propter amorem suae naturae, et sta-  
 <col. b> tus convenientis illi, qualis est indolentia,  
 etiamsi alia voluntas positiva desit. Solum videtur huic doc-  
 25 trinae obstare, quod interdum amare potest aliquis non esse  
 simpliciter, qui amor non potest causari ex amore alicuius  
 boni positivi, quia non esse simpliciter et absolute nullum  
 fundamentum positivi boni relinquit. Dicendum vero est,  
 etiam ipsum non esse, non posse amari, neque habere vim  
 30 movendi affectum nisi ex amore commodi ipsius esse: non  
 enim amat aliquis non esse, nisi ut evitet aliquod grave incom-  
 modum ipsius esse, quod apprehenditur maius respectu pro-  
 priae naturae, quam propter se diligit, quam omnino carere  
 esse. Atque ita fit (quod est mirabile) ut ex nimio amore  
 35 sui esse, appetere possit aliquis non esse. Lege D. Thomam  
 1. p. q. 5. art. 2. Hervaeum *Quodlibet* 8. q. 8. Durandum  
 in 4. dist. 50. q. 2. Ferrariensem 3. *Summae contra gentiles*  
 cap. 19. Soncinam 9. *Metaphysicae* q. 16.

*Quomodo relatio participet causalitatem finis.*

20. Ad aliud de relationibus, aliqui contendunt non solum  
 relationes reales, sed etiam rationis posse causalitatem finis  
 exercere. Alii etiam relationibus realibus eam vim negant,  
 5 ut Hervaeus *Quodlibet* 2. q. 1. et satis consequenter, si tenet  
 relationem realem nullam habere perfectionem. Et sane ex-  
 istimo nullam relationem vel rationis, vel ex iis realibus quae  
 praedicamentales dicuntur, et solum censetur esse per resul-  
 tantiam ex fundamento et termino, nullam (inquam) ex his

ability by reason of which they can final-cause. This view is true in real-  
 ity. We can add, however, that a lack of badness does not have the power  
 of final-causing except in virtue of some positive good. And it can rightly  
 15R be said that a privation is loved more as a means to obtaining a good or to  
 fully enjoying a good than properly as an end. And for this reason that  
 causality of an end which is in the effect of some privation is attributed  
 more to the good by reason of which that privation is loved than to the  
 privation itself. For someone who loves the absence of pain loves it for  
 20R the sake of the pleasure opposed to it or, at least, for the sake of a love for  
 his nature and a state agreeable to him, which is a kind of freedom from  
 pain even if the will lacks other positive goods.

The only thing that seems to stand in the way of this doctrine is  
 that sometimes someone can love simply not to be. This love cannot be  
 caused by a love for some positive good, since simply and absolutely not  
 being does not leave behind any foundation for positive good. It should  
 be said, however, that one cannot love oneself not to be nor does this  
 25R have the force to move an affect, except from a love for the advantage of  
 one's being. For no one loves not to be except in order to avoid some  
 serious disadvantage for his being that is apprehended as more serious  
 with respect to his own nature—which he loves for its own sake—than  
 30R entirely to lack being. And so it happens—which is astonishing—that  
 someone can desire not to be as a result of an excessive love for himself.  
 Read St. Thomas, Ia.5.2; Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 8; Durandum, IV,  
 dist. 50, q. 2; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 19;  
 35R and Soncinas, *Metaphysics* IX, q. 16.

*In what way relations participate in the causality of an end.*

20. Concerning the issue with relations, some contend that not only real  
 relations but also relations of reason can exercise the causality of an end.  
 Others deny that even real relations have this power, as Hervaeus does  
 5R in *Quodlibet* II, q. 1, and it is consequently satisfactory, if he holds that  
 real relations have no perfection. And certainly I think that no relation,  
 either of reason or from those real ones that are called categorical and are  
 thought to come to be merely through a foundation and a terminus, none  
 of these relations—I say—is lovable for its own sake, but only by reason

10 relationibus esse propter se amabilem, sed solum ratione sui  
 fundamenti vel propter concomitantiam sui termini, nam qui  
 amat famam, non amat relationem resultantem, sed realem  
 existimationem sui quam censet sibi esse valde convenientem,  
 15 et sic de aliis. Quare si falsa existimatio non intercedat, nun-  
 quam haec possunt causalitatem finalem exercere. Secus vero  
 est de relationibus transcendentalibus, quae per sese habent  
 suas entitates, vel in conceptibus aliquarum rerum absolu-  
 tarum includuntur: ideo enim per se bonae ac convenientes  
 20 esse possunt, ut patet de habitudine scientiae, visus, et sim-  
 ilibus, et ita possunt hanc causalitatem exercere. Omitto  
 etiam relationes divinas, quae alia superiori ratione possunt  
 hanc causalitatem obtinere, maxime cum essentialiter inclu-  
 dant totam essentiae bonitatem ac perfectionem.

10R of its foundation or for the sake of its accord with its terminus. For  
 anyone who loves fame does not love the resulting relation, but his real  
 reputation, which he considers most agreeable to himself. And likewise  
 for other cases. Hence, if no false estimation is involved, these relations  
 can never exercise final causality.

15R But the case is different when it comes to transcendental relations,  
 which have their own entity through themselves or are included in the  
 concepts of other absolute things.<sup>12</sup> For that reason they can be good  
 and agreeable in themselves—as is thought concerning the habitude of  
 science, vision, and similar things—and thus they can exercise this causal-  
 20R ity. I also leave aside divine relations, which can possess this causality  
 by another, superior reason, especially since they essentially include the  
 complete goodness and perfection of the essence.

<sup>12</sup>On transcendental relations, see *DM XLVII.3–4*.