

© Sydney Penner 2011

<858, col. b>²

Quid sit vel in quo consistat ratio causandi seu causalitas causae finalis.

1. Non inquirimus nunc rationem causandi in actu primo, ut sic dicam, seu id quod in finali causa est proxima ratio qua
5 potens est ad sic causandum, de hoc enim dicemus sectione sequenti; sed inquirimus causationem ipsam in actu secundo, quid nimirum sit, et ubi seu in quo subiecto vel effectu sit; hoc enim, cum in caeteris causis ad explicandum sit difficile, in hac revera est difficillimum, quia non apparet quae res, vel
10 quis modus realis esse possit haec causalitas; quod si nihil horum est, nec realis causalitas esse poterit.

Prima sententia expenditur.

2. Quidam ergo ab hac difficultate se facile expediunt, causalitatem hanc nihil aliud <859> esse nisi quod actio vel effectus fiat propter finem seu gratia finis. Aristoteles enim non
15 aliter explicuit hanc finis causalitatem, nisi dicendo *esse id cuius gratia aliquid fit*. Unde Caiet., II-II, q. 17, a. 5, optime docet quod, sicut in agente est ratio agendi quae est in ipso, et effectus, et causalitas, quae est quasi media inter rationem agendi et effectum, ita in fine sunt illa tria, ratio finalisandi, finalisatio, et effectus. Ait vero finalisationem esse quid innominatum, solumque significari per haec verba *esse id cuius gratia*, seu
20 *feri propter aliud*, neque posse causalitatem hanc amplius explicari, neque intelligi quid aliud sit, neque etiam ubi sit. Nam

What the nature of causing or the causality of the final cause is or in what it consists.

1. We are not now investigating the nature of causing in the first act (if I may speak in that way) or that which is the proximate nature in the final cause by which it is a power for causing in that way. We will
5R speak about that in the following section.³ Rather, we are investigating causation itself in the second act: namely, what it is and where or in what subject or effect it is. For this, while difficult to explain for the other causes, is actually most difficult with this one, because it is not
10R apparent what thing or what real mode this causality can be. But if it is none of these, then neither will there be able to be any real causality.

The first view is considered.

2. Certain parts of this difficulty, therefore, are easily resolved. This causality is nothing other than that an action or effect comes to be for the sake of or on account of an end. For Aristotle did not explain this causality otherwise than by saying that ‘being that for the sake of which something comes to be’. Hence, Cajetan in IIaIIæ.17.5 rightly teaches that just as there is in the agent the nature of acting which is in him, the effect, and the causality, so also in the end there are these three: the nature of final-causing, final-causation, and the effect. But he says that final-causation is something innominate and is only signified through the words ‘being that for the sake of which’ or ‘coming to be for the sake of something else’. Nor can this causality be explained further, nor can it be understood what other thing it is, nor even where it is.

¹Latin text is from <http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d23.htm>. Retrieved Feb. 11, 2008. Spelling errors corrected without note. I checked the text against the 1597 edition (generally the most reliable text) for significant textual variations. Marginal notes are as found in the 1597 edition. Many of those, though not all and not always in the right place, are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition, D = digital source, and V = Vivès edition.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³DM XXIII.5.

25 si dicatur esse in voluntate, contra hoc est imprimis quia hoc
 nec salvari potest in voluntate Dei, neque in naturalibus agen-
 tibus, quae etiam operantur propter finem. Et deinde inquirendum
 est in nostra voluntate quid illud sit, nam vel est aliquid
 30 antecedens actum elicited ab ipsa voluntate, et hoc non,
 iuxta veram et sanam doctrinam, quia in voluntate nihil recipitur
 ante actum ab ipsa elicited, ut supra satis probatum est
 agendo de concursu primae causae. Omitto habitus supernaturales,
 qui aliquando infunduntur ante omnem actum, quia illi
 35 habent locum potentiae, vel complent illam et ita non veniunt
 in praesentem considerationem. Item, quia si quid reciperetur
 in voluntate, deberet habere aliquod principium efficiens extra
 ipsam, quod nullum est praeter ipsam causam finalem; haec
 autem ut sic non est activa, alias confunderentur causalitates.
 Praeterquam quod finis sine reali esse haberet efficientiam. Et
 40 ideo Aristoteles merito dixit, I de Gener., text. 55: *Causa cuius
 gratia caetera fiunt, activa non est, et sanitas ipsa non est activa
 nisi per translationem.* Nec vero dici potest illud principium
 esse intellectum vel actum eius, quia improbable est intellectum
 se solo posse aliquid imprimere voluntati, et deinde explicari
 45 non potest quid illud sit. Et praeterea est id parum consentaneum
 libertati voluntatis. Aut vero illud quod in voluntate dicitur
 esse causalitas finis est ipsemet actus voluntatis, et hoc non,
 quia hic est effectus; causatio autem debet esse aliquo modo
 distincta ab effectu. Accedit praeterea, quod in actibus imperatis
 50 non poterit explicari quid sit haec causalitas, quia in huiusmodi
 actibus nihil immediate influit ipse finis; multoque minus
 explicari poterit in effectibus Dei et naturalium agentium.
 <col. b>

3. Haec sententia in eo magnam difficultatem habet quod
 55 rem non declarat, nam per illa verba, *id cuius gratia*, non tam
 declaratur causalitas finis quam denominatio quaedam resultans
 in ipso fine ex eo quod aliud ad ipsum ordinetur; quae denominatio
 non potest esse causalitas, tum quia non est aliquid rei in effectu,
 sed aliquid rationis in causa seu denominatio ex-

25R For if it is said to be in the will, the fact that this cannot be maintained
 in the case of the will of God or in natural agents (which also act for
 the sake of an end) [stands] against this [thesis] in the first place. And
 next it should be inquired what it would be in our will, for either it
 is [i] something antecedent to an act elicited by the will itself. But
 30R not this, according to sound and true doctrine, because nothing is accepted
 in the will before the act elicited by it, as was sufficiently proven
 above in dealing with the concurrence of the first cause. I lay aside
 supernatural habits which are sometimes infused prior to all acts because
 they have the position of a power or complete it and thus do not enter
 35R into present consideration. Also, because if something were accepted in
 the will, it ought to have some efficient principle beyond itself, which
 is nothing beyond the final cause itself. Moreover, this as such is not
 active; otherwise, the causalities would be confused. Besides that the
 end would have efficiency without real being. And therefore Aristotle
 40R rightly said in *De Gen.* I, text. 55: ‘the cause for the sake of which
 the rest come to be is not active and health itself is not active except
 through translation’.⁴ But neither can it be said that that principle is
 the intellect or an act of it, since it is improbable that the intellect can
 itself by itself impress something on the will and, next, it cannot be
 45R explained what that [principle] is. And, in addition, it is insufficiently in
 harmony with the freedom of the will. Or, [it is] [ii] that that which
 in the will is said to be the causality of the end is the very act of the will
 itself. But not this, because this is the effect. Causation, however, ought
 to be distinct in some way from the effect. Furthermore, there is the
 50R danger that it will not be possible to explain what this causality is in the
 case of commanded acts, since in acts of this kind the end itself gives no
 influx immediately. And much less will it be possible to explain in the
 case of the effects of God and of natural agents.

3. This view has a great difficulty in it in that it does not reveal the
 55R matter. For the causality of the end is not so much revealed through
 those words ‘that for the sake of’ as a certain denomination resulting in
 the end itself from the fact that something else is ordered to it. This
 denomination cannot be the causality, partly because there is nothing of
 the thing in the effect but [rather] something of reason in the cause or

⁴From Barnes edition: ‘but the end, for the sake of which it takes place, is not active. (That is why *health* is not active, except metaphorically.)’ (324b14–15).

60 trinseca, quod idem est; quod enim Deus sit id cuius gratia res
fit non est aliquid intrinsecum in rebus, neque in Deo ipso, sed
est denominatio extrinseca Dei a rebus ipsis desumpta. Tum
etiam quia in illis verbis non significatur finis ut principium,
65 sed potius ut terminus, et ideo non significatur emanatio ali-
qua vel influxus causae finalis in effectum, quod videtur esse de
ratione omnis causalitatis. Et confirmatur primo quia alias in
omni motu respectu sui termini esset propriissima causalitas fi-
nis, et in omni actu respectu sui obiecti; consequens est falsum;
ergo. Sequela patet, quia terminus est id cuius gratia est motus,
70 et obiectum cuius gratia est actus. Minor vero patet, quia
alias causalitas finis non magis conveniret obiecto voluntatis
quam aliarum potentiarum; nec magis esset in rationali motio-
ne quam in naturali. Unde confirmatur, secundo, quia alias,
quamdiu res est gratia alicuius finis, tamdiu actu causaretur a
75 tali fine, ut potentia visiva, quae est propter actum videndi, vel
propter obiectum visibile, semper actu causaretur ab illo fine,
quia semper durat illa denominatio, quod haec potentia est
propter suum actum vel obiectum; quae denominatio manere
potest vel ex actione praeterita, vel ex naturali propensione po-
80 tentiae in suum actum vel obiectum. Consequens autem est
falsum, quia actualis causalitas finis non est sine actuali causal-
itate agentis, ut statim dicam; per illam ergo denominationem
non satis declaratur causalitas finis. Praesertim quia omnes po-
nunt hanc causalitatem in motione metaphorica, quae non satis
85 declaratur per sola illa verba, nisi res amplius exponatur.

Expenditur secunda sententia.

4. Secundus modus explicandi hanc causalitatem esse potest
illam esse quamdam metaphoricam motionem; quod ita in
communi sumptum est ex Aristotele, I de Gener., c. 7, et
5 D. Thoma, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, et aliis locis quae statim referam.
Tamen in modo explicandi hanc motionem est singu- <860>

78 manere] manare D V.

60R an extrinsic denomination (which is the same thing). For the fact that
God is that for the sake of which something is made is not something
intrinsic in things nor in God himself but is an extrinsic denomination
of God taken up from the things themselves. Partly also because the
end is not signified as a principle in these words but rather as a *termi-*
65R *mus*. And therefore no emanation or influx of the final cause into the
effect is signified. [But] this seems to belong to the nature of all causal-
ity. And it is confirmed first because otherwise there would be a most
proper causality of the end in every motion with respect to its *termi-*
mus and in every act with respect to its object. The consequent is false.
70R Therefore. The consequence is clear, because the *terminus* is that for
the sake of which the motion is and the object for whose sake the act is.
But the minor is clear, since otherwise the causality of the end would
not be more fitting to the object of the will than [to the objects] of
other powers. Nor would it be more in rational motion than in natu-
75R ral. Whence it is confirmed, secondly, since otherwise a thing would
be caused actually by such an end just as long as it is for the sake of
some end. For example, a visive power, which is for the sake of the act
of seeing or for the sake of the visible object, would always be caused
actually by that end, because that denomination (that this power is for
80R the sake of its act or object) always endures. This denomination can
remain either from past action or from the natural propensity of the
power to its act or object. But the consequent is false, since the actual
causality of the end does not exist without the actual causality of the
agent, as I will point out shortly. Therefore, the causality of the end is
85R not satisfactorily indicated through that denomination, especially since
everyone considers this causality as metaphorical motion, which is not
satisfactorily indicated through those words alone, unless the matter is
explained more thoroughly.

The second view is considered.

4. The second way of explaining this causality can be that it is a kind
of metaphorical motion. This is commonly taken from Aristotle, *De*
gen. I, c. 7, and St. Thomas, IaIIæ.1.1, and other places to which I will
refer shortly. Nevertheless, this view is unusual in how it explains this
5R motion. For it says that this motion is such that from itself it precedes

laris haec sententia: dicit enim hanc motionem talem esse ut ex se antecedit actum a voluntate elicited, non solum natura, sed etiam tempore, quia haec motio naturali quadam necessitate resultat ex causa finali sufficienter proposita; actus autem voluntatis in eius manet libertate. Unde, licet haec motio respectu ipsius causae finalis sit veluti actus secundus, tamen respectu voluntatis se habet ut actus primus. Quod explicatur et probatur in hunc modum, nam hoc ipso quod bonitas finis sufficienter est cognita et voluntati proposita, excitat illam, et quantum in se est, trahit eam ad sui amorem; voluntas autem, eo quod libera sit, potest suspendere suum proprium actum; ergo haec motio finis est distincta ab ipso actu voluntatis et antecedit illum; ergo in hac motione consistit propria causalitas finis. Antecedens experientia constare videtur, et fundamentum eius videtur esse positum in sympathia quadam naturali, quae est inter intellectum et voluntatem, quatenus in eadem animae essentia radicanter. Prima vero consequentia per se nota est; secunda autem patet, quia nulla alia ratione videtur intelligi posse haec causalitas, tum quia quod proxime sequitur post hanc motionem in voluntate est aliquis actus eius, qui, ut supra dicebam, non est causalitas, sed effectus causae finalis; tum etiam quia, seclusa hac motione, in reliquis finis non se habet ut causa, sed potius ut terminus specificans, qui potius participat causalitatem formae, quam habent omnia obiecta quae specificant actus quarumcumque potentiarum.

5. Haec vero sententia imprimis est aliena a mente D. Thomae, ubicumque ponit causalitatem finis in hac motione metaphorica, nam q. 22 de Verit., a. 2, explicans hanc motionem inquit: *Sicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti seu desiderari*; ubi clare sentit non esse in actu influentiam causae finalis, donec voluntas moveatur appetendo seu desiderando. Idem sentit q. 5 de Potent., a. 1. Et ratione probatur, quia est aperta repugnantia quod sit finis causans in actu secundo, et quod non sit aliquid actu causatum; sed antequam voluntas eliciat actum, nihil est causatum in ipsa; ergo neque causalitas finis potest esse in actu secundo. Maior patet, tum quia causare et causari sunt correlativa, tum etiam quia realis causalitas ad aliquid reale terminari debet et in sese debet

the act elicited by the will, not only in nature but also temporally, because this natural motion results by a kind of necessity from the final cause having been proposed sufficiently. But the act of will remains in its freedom. Hence, although this motion with respect to the final cause itself is as a second act, with respect to the will, nevertheless, it is related as a first act.

This is explained and proven in this way: for by the fact that the goodness of the end is sufficiently cognized and proposed to the will, it excites the will and insofar as the end itself is concerned it draws the will to a love for it. But the will, as a result of being free, can suspend its proper act. Therefore, this motion of the end is distinct from the act of the will and precedes it. Therefore, the proper causality of the end consists in this motion. The antecedent seems obvious from experience and its foundation seems to be placed in a certain natural sympathy between the intellect and the will, insofar as they are rooted in the same essence of the soul. But the first consequence is known *per se*. The second, moreover, is obvious, because it seems that this causality cannot be understood by any other *ratio*, both [i] because what proximately follows after this motion in the will is some act of it which, as I said above, is not the causality but an effect of the final cause and [ii] because, setting aside this motion, the end is not related as a cause to the other [acts] but rather as a specifying *terminus* which participates more in the causality of the form, which [causality] all objects have that specify the acts of any power whatever.

5. But this view is, in the first place, alien to the mind of St. Thomas, who everywhere places the causality of the end in this metaphorical motion. For in *De verit.*, q. 22, a. 2, he says when explaining this motion: ‘Just as to give the influx of the efficient cause is to act, so to give the influx of the final cause is to be sought (*appeti*) or desired (*desiderari*)’. He clearly does not think here that there is an actual giving of influx of the final cause until the will is moved to seeking or desiring. He thinks the same thing in *De potent.*, q. 5, a. 1. And it is proven by reason: there is an obvious repugnance between the claim that the end is causing in the second act and the claim that there is nothing that has actually been caused. But before the will elicited an act, nothing was caused in it. Therefore, neither can there be any causality of the end in the second act. The major is clear, both because to cause and to be

45 esse aliquid reale, alias esset nihil; si ergo in voluntate <col. b>
 nulla res nova, vel operatio aut affectio inest, neque actualis
 causalitas finis in illa esse potest; neque etiam est in intellectu, 45R
 ut per se constat; ergo intelligi non potest talis causalitas finis
 ante omnem actum voluntatis. Et confirmatur primo, quia finis
 50 finis non causat in actu, nisi agens etiam actu efficiat, nam, ut
 dixit Aristoteles, III *Metaph.*, c. 2, text. 3, *finis et id cuius gra-*
tia, alicuius actionis est finis; et ideo dixit idem Aristoteles, I
 de *Gener.*, c. 7, cessante actione sistere etiam finalem causam;
 ergo eodem modo prius tempore quam actio agentis inchoetur,
 55 non potest esse in actu secundo causalitas causae finalis; sed
 antequam voluntas eliciat actum, nulla causa efficiens mota a
 fine aliquid actu agit, et e contrario nihil etiam actu fit propter
 finem; ergo neque ipse finis aliquid actu causat in voluntate.
 Ultimo confirmatur declarando rem ipsam; nam antequam
 60 voluntas moveatur eliciendo proprium actum, solum est obiec-
 tum bonum seu finis repraesentatus per cognitionem seu iudi-
 cium intellectus; in voluntate autem nihil est quod antea non
 esset; ergo in toto illo tempore nulla est excitatio distincta a iu-
 dicio; ipsum autem iudicium non est causalitas, sed sufficiens
 65 approximatio finis ut causare possit; ergo non potest intelligi
 causalitas finis in actu posita ante actum voluntatis. Maxime
 cum neque illa causalitas versari possit circa ipsam potentiam,
 cum ipsa nondum aliter se habeat sed immutata maneat, neque
 circa actum ipsius voluntatis, cum ille nondum sit.

70 6. Dicet fortasse aliquis has rationes concludere hanc
 causalitatem finis esse aliquid novum in ipsa voluntate, quod
 sit proprius actus elicited seu consensus liber eius; nihilominus
 tamen esse posse novum aliquem modum se habendi, vel, ut
 clarius dicamus, esse aliquem simplicem affectum per quem sit
 75 actualiter et vitaliter propensa in finem, ut illum amet vel in-
 tendat. Sed hoc non est constanter dictum in illa sententia,
 nam talis affectus, quacumque ratione fingatur in voluntate,
 non potest esse non elicited ab illa, alias non potest esse vitalis

46 affectio] effectio D V.

caused are correlative and because real causality must be terminated in
 something real and must itself be something real. Otherwise it is noth-
 ing. If, therefore, there is no new thing in the will and no activity or
 affection in it, there cannot be an actual causality of the end in it. Nor
 can it be in the intellect, as is clear *per se*. Therefore, such a causality
 of the end before every act of the will cannot be understood. And it is
 confirmed, first, because an end does not actually cause except an agent
 50R also actually effect, for, as Aristotle said in *Metaph.* III, c. 2, text. 3: 'the
 end and that for the sake of which is the end of any action'. And there-
 fore the same Aristotle said in *De gen.* I, c. 7, that when an action cease
 the final cause also stops. Therefore, in the same way before the time
 in which the action of an agent is begun, the causality of the final cause
 55R cannot exist in second act. But before the will elicits an act, there is
 no efficient cause moved by an end that actually does something and,
 conversely, there is also nothing that actually is done for the sake of the
 end. Therefore, the end itself also does not actually cause something in
 the will. Lastly, it is confirmed by revealing the thing itself: for before
 the will is moved to elicited a proper act, there is only a good object
 or end represented through the cognition of judgement of the intellect.
 But there is nothing in the will that was not there before. Therefore,
 in that whole time there is no excitation distinct from the judgement.
 But the judgement itself is not a causality but is a sufficient approxi-
 60R mation of the end so that it can cause. Therefore, the causality of the
 end cannot be understood to be in the act posited before an act of the
 will, especially since that causality also cannot concern the power itself,
 since it does not yet hold itself otherwise but remains unchanged, nor
 65R can it concern the act of the will itself since it does not yet exist.

70R 6. Perhaps someone will say that these arguments support the con-
 clusion that this causality of the end is something new in the will itself
 that is a proper elicited act or a free consent to it. Still, nevertheless,
 there can be a new way of relating [to the end] or, so that we may
 75R speak more clearly, there can be some simple affect through which it
 is actually and vitally inclined to the end so that it loves or intends it.
 But this is not consistently stated in that view, for such an affect, for
 whatever reason it is constructed in the will, cannot fail to be elicited
 by it; otherwise, it could not be a vital motion or affection, but would

80 motio aut affectio, sed erit qualitas aliqua per modum habitus
 vel actus primi, quae nulla ratione fingi aut cogitari potest, ut
 satis probant rationes hactenus factae. Si autem ille motus est
 elicited a voluntate, ille est quidam actus voluntatis; non ergo
 datur causalitas finis ante actum voluntatis.

85 7. Quod si dicatur illum actum esse im- <861> perfec-
 tum et per modum velleitatis, ut vocant, secundam autem sen-
 tentiam quam examinamus esse intelligendam de perfecto actu
 et consensu, contra hoc obstat primo, quod ille actus, qualis-
 cumque sit, est quidam effectus ipsius finis; ergo non est causal-
 itas finis; vel si in illo distinguere potest causalitas ab effectu,
 90 idem dici poterit de primo actu perfecto et consummato, neque
 erit necessarium recurrere ad talem actum imperfectum. Ob-
 stat secundo quia causalitas quam finis exercet circa talem ac-
 tum, in illo habet suum proprium effectum et ideo illa non est
 causalitas propria et necessaria ad alium actum consummatum
 95 et perfectum, quam inquirimus, sed solum erit occasio et dis-
 positio quaedam ad illum ulteriorem effectum. Tandem obstat
 quia vel ille actus simplex est necessarius, aut liber: si est liber,
 ergo neque semper resultat ex sufficienti propositione finis, ut
 illa opinio dicebat; neque etiam oportet ut semper antecedit
 100 ante effectum consummati actus amoris, vel intentionis fi-
 nis; non est ergo per se necessarius ad causalitatem finis, neque
 in illo potest talis causalitas consistere. Si vero ille actus nat-
 uraliter fit et absque libertate, multo minus esse potest per se
 requisitus ad causalitatem finis circa actum liberum et perfec-
 105 tum; huiusmodi enim actus vel motus imperfecti insurgunt in
 nobis ex coniunctione appetitus, vel ex aliqua superiori causa
 praeveniens deliberationem nostram, et ideo solum sunt utiles
 vel necessarii hi actus, supposita aliqua imperfectione nostra,
 per modum dispositionis vel excitationis; non vero quia per se
 110 sint ad causalitatem finis requisiti. Unde in angelis, in Christi
 anima, in B. Virgine, et aliis, fuit perfectus modus operandi ex
 causalitate finis absque huiusmodi actibus.

Tertia sententia proponitur et suadetur.

80R be some quality in the mode of a habit or first act, which cannot be
 imagined or thought of for any reason, as the arguments made so far
 sufficiently prove. But if that motion is elicited by the will, it is a cer-
 tain act of the will. Therefore, no causality of the end is given before an
 act of the will.

85R 7.⁵ If it is said that that act is imperfect and in the mode of a velleity,
 as they say, but according to the view that we are examining it should
 be understood to be about a perfect act and consent, against this stands,
 firstly, the fact that that act, whatever it may be, is a certain effect of the
 end itself. Therefore, it is not the causality of the end. Or if the causal-
 ity can be distinguished in that from the effect, one will be able to say
 90R the same thing about the first perfect and consummate act nor will it
 be necessary to have recourse to an imperfect act of this sort. Secondly,
 there stands against this the fact that because the causality which the
 end exercises concerning such an act has in that [act] its proper effect
 and therefore it is not the causality proper and necessary to another
 95R consummate and perfect act which we seek but will only be a certain
 occasion and disposition to that more ultimate effect. Finally, there
 stands against this the fact that either this simple act is necessary or
 free. If it is free, then it will not always result from a sufficient propos-
 ing of the end, as that opinion said. Nor is it necessary that it always
 precede before the achievement of a consummate act of love or inten-
 tion for the end. Therefore, it is not *per se* necessary for the causality
 of the end nor can this kind of causality consist in that. But if that act
 happens naturally and without freedom, even less can it be *per se* requi-
 site for the causality of the end concerning a free and perfect act. For
 105R imperfect acts or motions of this kind arise in us from a conjunction of
 appetire or from some superior cause preceding our deliberation. And
 therefore these acts are only useful or necessary on the assumption of
 some imperfection on our part through the mode of disposition or ex-
 citation, but not because they are *per se* required for the causality of the
 end. Hence, in angels, in the soul of Christ, and in the Blessed Virgin
 Mary, and others, there was a perfect way of acting from the causality
 of the end without acts of this kind.
 110R

The third view is proposed and defended.

⁵The paragraph numbering in the 1597 and Vivès editions diverges from here on (the 1597 includes this paragraph as part of num. 6).

8. Est ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalitatem in motione metaphorica. Addit vero huiusmodi motionem non poni in actu secundo nisi quando voluntas in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur in re, non esse aliquid distinctum ab ipsomet actu voluntatis. Sed sicut supra dicebamus unam et eandem actionem, prout fluit ab agente, esse causalitatem eius, ut vero inest materiae, esse etiam causalitatem eius circa formam, ita aiunt unam et eandem actionem voluntatis causari a fine et a voluntate ipsa, et prout est a voluntate esse causalitatem effectivam, prout vero est a fine esse causalitatem finalem, et priori ratione esse motionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat a potentia ut a proprio principio physico, posteriori autem ratione esse motionem metaphoricam, quia manat ab obiecto alliciente et trahente ad se voluntatem. Haec sententia sumitur ex D. Thoma, citatis locis, et I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ubi ait finem movere metaphorice voluntatem, sentiens in hoc consistere causalitatem eius, quamvis non ita expresse id declaret. Tamen, ex lib. I cont. Gent., c. 75, rat. 5, id clarius sumi potest; ait enim D. Thomas *causalitatem finis in hoc consistere, quod propter illud alia desiderantur*. Ex quibus verbis colligo desiderium ipsum quo aliquid propter finem desideratur, quatenus est a fine, vocari a D. Thoma causalitatem finis. Rursus quod causalitas finis in hac motione metaphorica consistat, communis est loquendi modus apud auctores, ut patet ex Avicena., lib. VI suae *Metaph.*, tract. V, c. 5; Alberto, V *Metaph.*, tract. I, c. 3; et Hervaeo, *Quodl.* II, q. 1, et clarius q. 8, §Ad rationes; Sonc., V *Metaph.*, q. 2. Sumitur etiam ex Alensi, I p., q. 17, membr. 3. Nullus tamen ita clare et expresse praedictam declaravit sententiam, sicut Ockham, In II, q. 3, a. 2, ubi ait causationem finis esse movere efficiens ad agendum; illud autem *movere* non esse aliud nisi ipsum finem amari ab agente, vel aliquod propter ipsum. Unde inferius respondens ad quoddam dubium ait non esse prius tempore causationem finis quam motionem agentis, saltem per amorem aut volitionem qua vult effectum exsequendum propter finem, vel finem ipsum propter se.

25 metaphorica] metaphorice D.

29 p.] om. D.

8. There is therefore a third view that also constitutes this causality of the end in metaphorical motion. But it adds that a motion of this kind is not place in the second act except when the will is moved in the second act and when it is placed in that way in the thing there is not something distinct from the act itself of the will. But just as we said above that one and the same action insofar as it flows from the agent is its causality but insofar as it is in the matter it is also its causality with respect to the form, so also they say that one and the same action of the will is caused by the end and by the will itself and insofar as it is caused by the will it is effective causality but insofar as it is caused by the end it is final causality. And for the former reason it is real and proper motion, because such an action flows from the power as from a proper physical principle, but for the latter reason it is a metaphorical motion, because it flows from an object enticing and attracting the will to itself. This view is taken from St. Thomas, in the cited places and *ST IaIIæ.9.1*, where he says that the end moves the will metaphorically, thinking its causality to consist of this, although he does not expressly declare it in that way. Still, it can be taken more clearly from *SCG I*, c. 75, rat. 5, for St. Thomas says that ‘the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are desired for its sake’. From these words I gather that the desire itself by which something is desired for the sake of the end, insofar as it is from the end, is called the causality of the end by St. Thomas. On the other hand, that the causality of the end consists in this metaphorical motion is a common way of speaking among authors, as is clear from Avicenna, *Metaph.* VI, tract. 5, c. 5; Albert [the Great], *Metaph.* V, tract. 1, c. 3; Hervæus [Natalis], *Quodl.* II, q. 1, and more clearly in q. 8, §Ad rationes; and Soncinas, *Metaph.* V, q. 2. It is also taken from [Alexander] of Hales, I p., q. 17, membr. 3. No one, however, declares the stated opinion as clearly and expressly as Ockham, II, q. 3, a. 2, where he says that the causation of the end is to move the efficient cause to acting. But that ‘to move’ is nothing other than for the end itself to be loved by the agent or something for its sake. Hence, later when responding to a certain doubt, he says that there is no causation of the end earlier in time than there is a motion of the agent, at least through the love or volition by which the agent wills to pursue an effect for the sake of the end or the end for its own sake.

9. Ratione videtur satis probari haec sententia impugna-
 tionibus aliarum et a sufficienti partium enumeratione, quia
 40 nihil aliud cogitari potest quod sit causalitas finis; neque etiam
 est aliud necessarium ut intelligatur voluntas moveri a fine in
 finem, et ut actus eius habeat dependentiam a fine ut finis est;
 ergo, in eo tantum quod haec sententia affirmat, consistit haec
 causalitas. Confirmatur ac declaratur a simili, nam actus po-
 45 tentiae cognoscitivae pendet et ab obiecto et a potentia; unde
 causalitas tam obiecti quam potentiae nihil aliud est quam ip-
 samet actio, quatenus fluit ab obiecto et a potentia, nam ut
 est ab obiecto dicitur causalitas eius, ut vero est a potentia est
 causalitas illius; sic igitur actio voluntatis simul ac fit, neces-
 50 sario pen- <862> det a voluntate et a fine; illa ergo eadem actio
 quatenus est a voluntate est dependentia activa ab illa, quatenus
 vero est a fine, est dependentia finalis. Est enim quoad hoc di-
 versitas inter finem et obiectum potentiae cognoscentis, nam
 obiectum potentiae cognoscitivae concurrat efficienter ad ac-
 55 tum eius, mediante aliqua forma reali qua coniungitur, vel
 per suamet entitatem, si per illam possit ei uniri; bonum
 autem voluntati propositum solum finaliter concurrat ad ac-
 tum eius, quia solum movet metaphorice attrahendo proposi-
 tum per cognitionem, etiamsi aliter in re non existat.

Quarta sententia reiicitur.

10. Sunt vero qui dicant hanc causalitatem finis non esse ac-
 tionem voluntatis ut dependentem a fine, sed e contrario esse
 ipsummet finem per intellectum obiective propositum, ut in-
 5 fluentem in suo genere seu concurrentem ad actum voluntatis.
 Quod si inquiras quid sit concursus ille, vel quid addat supra ip-
 sum finem, respondent nihil ei intrinsecum addere, sed conno-
 tare actualem dependentiam effectus a tali causa. Sed, licet hic
 modus dicendi in hoc cum praecedenti conveniat, quod in hac
 10 causalitate nullam aliam rem intervenire dicit praeter ipsum
 finem voluntati obiectum medio intellectu, et actum vel affec-
 tum inde resultantem in voluntate, et denominationes inde in-

11–12 affectum] effectum D.

9. This view seems satisfactorily proven against the attacks from
 the other sides by reason and by a sufficient enumeration of parts. For
 40R nothing else can be thought of that is the causality of the end. Nor is
 anything else needed to understand that the will is moved by the end
 to the end and to understand that its act has a dependency on the end
 as an end. Therefore, this causality consists only in that which this
 view affirms. It is confirmed and established by analogy: for an act of
 45R the cognoscitive power depends both on its object and on the power.
 Hence, the causality of the object as well as of the power is nothing
 other than the action itself insofar as it flows from the object and from
 the power. For as it is from the object it is called the object's causality,
 but as it is from the power it is called the power's causality. In this way,
 50R therefore, the action of the will happens at the same time and necessar-
 ily depends on the will and on the end. That same action, therefore,
 insofar as it is from the will is an active dependence on the will but in-
 sofar as it is from the end it is a final dependence. For with respect to
 this there is a difference between the end and the object of a cognosci-
 55R tive power. The object of a cognoscitive power concurs efficiently for
 its act, by the mediation of some real form by which it is conjoined or
 through its own entity if it can be united to it through that. But the
 good proposed to the will only concurs finally for its act, because it
 only moves metaphorically by attracting [the will], having been pro-
 60R posed through cognition even if it does not otherwise exist in reality.

The fourth view is rejected.

10. But there are some who say that this causality of the end is not an
 action of the will as dependent on the end. Rather, they say, it is the
 5R end itself objectively proposed through the intellect, as giving influx in
 its genus or concurring with the act of the will. But if you ask what
 this concursus is or what it adds beyond the end itself, they answer that
 it adds nothing intrinsic to it but connotes an actual dependence of the
 effect on a cause of this kind. But, although this way of speaking in this
 matter can agree with the preceding [way] in saying that nothing else
 10R comes up in this causality beyond the end itself placed before (*obiec-*
tum) the will by means of the intellect and the act or affect thereby
 resulting in the will and the denominations thereby arising by which

See Fonseca,
Metaph. V, q. 13.

Vide Fonseca,
 lib. 5 *Metaph.*,
 q. 13.

15 surgentes quibus et finis dicitur causare actum et actus pendere
a fine, nihilominus tamen in eo displicet, quod ipsum finem
dicit esse suam causalitatem seu concursum suum ad actum,
quia concursus nunquam significat causam ipsam, sed aliquid
quod proxime profluit a causa in suo genere, quo causet effectum,
sive illud distinguatur aliquo modo in re ipsa ab effectu,
sive tantum ratione, quatenus concipitur ut quo et quod. De
20 qua re diximus supra, tractando de causalitate causae efficientis;
est autem eadem proportionalis ratio. Immo in hac est quodammodo
maior ratio, quia finis interdum causat non existens actu,
sed tantum obiective in intellectu.

25 11. Sed aiunt etiam non esse necessarium ut concursus finalis
causae realiter existat quando ipsa actu causat, sed satis esse
si existat obiective. Hoc tamen non recte dicitur, quia esse
obiective tantum est cognosci; at vero ut causa finalis actu
causet, non est necesse concursum eius actu cogitari aut
cognosci, sed sufficit cogitare de bonitate talis causae, et e
30 converso, quamvis ille concursus sit in esse obiectivo per formalem
ac expressam cogitationem de illo et de eius convenientia, id
satis non est ut effectus ponatur in voluntate, ut per se constat,
quia stante tota illa cogitatione potest voluntas non moveri. Igitur,
licet causa finalis secundum suum esse aut bonitatem suam
35 sit tantum obiective in intellectu, tamen ut actu causet, oportet
ut actualis concursus eius in re ipsa ponatur, quia hic concursus
in re non est aliud a dependentia effectus a sua causa; ut autem
causa actu causet, oportet ut effectus in re ipsa actu causetur;
ergo et quod dependeat realiter a causa; ergo et quod concursus
40 actualis, seu quod idem est, dependentia actualis in re ipsa
existat, et non tantum in intellectu, immo hoc posterius est
impertinens. Quia vero haec dependentia huius effectus causae
finalis ab illa solum consistit in intrinseca quadam habitudine
ad talem causam, quae habitudo in re ipsa existere potest et
45 terminari ad causam ut existentem tantum obiective in intellectu,
inde est quod possit causa finalis actu causare existens tantum
obiective, non possit autem causare actu nisi causalitas eius ex-

20 re] *om.* D.

43 consistit] consistat D.

15R both the end is said to cause the act and the act is said to depend on
the end, it displeases, nevertheless, in that it says that the end itself is
its causality or concursus with the act, because the concursus never sig-
nifies the cause itself but something that proximately flows forth from
the cause in its genus by which it causes the effect. The former thing
is distinguished in some way in reality itself from the effect or it is dis-
tinguished at least in reason, insofar as it is conceived as that by which
20R (*quo*) and that which (*quod*). We spoke about this matter above when
dealing with the causality of the efficient cause. There is here the same
proportional *ratio*. Indeed, there is in a certain way a greater *ratio* here,
because the end sometimes causes without actually existing but only
existing objectively in the intellect.

25R 11. But they also say that it is not necessary that the concursus of
the final cause really exist when it actually causes, but that it is enough
if it exist objectively. Yet this is not said rightly, because to be objec-
tively is only to be cognized. But for a final cause actually to cause it is
not necessary that its concursus actually be thought of or cognized; it
30R is enough to think about the goodness of such a cause and, conversely,
although that concursus is in objective being through the formal and
express cogitation about it and about its agreeability, that is not enough
for the effect to be placed in the will. This is clear in itself, since the
will can fail to be moved with the standing of that whole cogitation.
35R Therefore, although the final cause according to its being or its good-
ness is only objectively in the intellect, in order for it actually to cause,
nevertheless, its actual concursus must be placed in the thing itself, be-
cause this concursus in the thing is nothing other than the dependency
of the effect on its cause. But in order for a cause actually to cause,
40R the effect must actually be caused in the thing itself. Therefore, it must
also depend in reality on the cause. Therefore, an actual concursus or,
what is the same thing, an actual dependence in the thing itself must
exist, and not only in the intellect (indeed, whether it exists in the in-
tellect is irrelevant). But because this dependence of this effect of the
45R final cause by that only consists in a certain intrinsic relation to such a
cause, which relation can exist in the thing itself and can be terminated
in the cause as existing only objectively in the intellect, it follows that
a final cause can actually cause even though existing only objectively,

istat realiter, per habitudinem ad ipsam causam obiective existentem.

Tertia sententia eligitur et resolvitur quaestio.

12. Unde ex impugnatione huius ultimae sententiae magis explicata et confirmata manet tertia, quae sine dubio vera est et optime satisfacit quoad hunc effectum quem finis habet intra
5 voluntatem creatam, et quoad causalitatem eius. Neque contra illam quidquam obstat obiectio supra facta, quod actus voluntatis potius est effectus quam causalitas finis. Nam imprimis in ipsomet actu voluntatis possumus distinguere actionem ab actu, et actum dicemus esse effectum, actionem vero, quatenus
10 in suo genere est a fine, esse causalitatem eius, sicut proportionaliter dicendum est de causalitate effectiva. Deinde, etiamsi in illo actu non distinguantur ex natura rei illae duae rationes, sed fingatur esse pura actio, nihilominus non repugnat ut eadem res quae est effectus causae, in eo genere in quo est effectus,
15 sit etiam causalitas, quando ille effectus est ipsamet actio, sufficitque distinctio rationis ut distinguantur per modum causalitatis vel per modum effectus, sicut in causalitate activa manifeste constat.

13. Difficilius videri alicui potest quod eadem omnino res, seu realis modus sine ulla distinctione in re, sit causalitas finis et
20 efficientis, cum tamen istae causae diversarum rationum sint. Sed si considerentur superius dicta de causalitatibus aliarum causarum, cessabit admiratio. Nam etiam eadem unio diversis respectibus est causalitas materiae et formae, licet illae causae diversarum rationum sint; immo eadem mutatio ut est actio,
25 est causalitas agentis, ut vero est passio, est causalitas materiae, quamvis actio et passio re non distinguantur; et similiter eadem actio diversis respectibus est causalitas primae causae et secundae. Et ratio est quia una et eadem actio per seipsam
30 potest immediate causari a multis causis, ab unaquaque in suo genere; atque ita mediante illa causatur effectus ab eisdem causis, ideoque per comparisonem ad unamquamque earum est causalitas uniuscuiusque, et e contrario est propria dependentia talis effectus a tali causa.

50R but it cannot cause actually except its causality exist in reality through a relation to the objectively existing cause.

The third view is chosen and a question is resolved.

12. Hence, as a result of the attack from this last view, the third view remains better explained and confirmed. It is without doubt true and most satisfactory with respect to this effect which the end has in created will and with respect to the end's causality. Nor does the objection made above that the act of the will is more the effect rather than the causality of the end pose any obstacle to it. For, in the first place, we can distinguish in that very act of the will the action from the act.
55R And we will say that the act is the effect but the action, insofar as in its genus it is from the end, is its causality, just as should proportionately be said about effective causality. Next, even if these two *rationes* were not distinguished in reality in that act, but it was imagined to be a pure action, still, there is no repugnance in the same thing which is an effect of the cause in that genus in which it is an effect also being a causality, when that effect is the action itself. And a distinction of reason is sufficient in order to distinguish through the mode of causality or through the mode of effect, just as is manifestly obvious in the case of active causality.
100R

13. It can seem more difficult to someone that entirely the same thing or real mode without any distinction in reality is the causality of the end and of the efficient cause, since these causes are nevertheless of different natures. But the surprise will cease if the things stated above about the causalities of other causes are considered. For there is the same union of different respects with the causality of matter and of form, although these are causes of different natures. Indeed, the same change as it is an action is the causality of the agent but as it is a passion is the causality of matter, even though the action and passion are not distinguished in reality. And likewise the same action in different respects is the causality of the first cause and of a second cause. The reason is that one and the same action in itself can be immediately caused by multiple causes by each in its genus. And so by means of that the effect is caused by the same causes and for that reason it is the causality of each of them through relation to each of them. And, conversely, there is a proper dependence of such an effect on such a cause.
155R

35 14. Altera difficultas explicanda manet, quia, licet haec ratio explicandi causalitatem finalem satisfaciat quoad actus elicitos a voluntate creata, non tamen satisfacit quoad actiones imperatas et effectus exteriores seu transeuntes (ut interim omitamus voluntatem divinam et actiones naturalium agentium, de quibus infra dicturi sumus); videtur ergo superiorem sententiam et doctrinam non posse applicari ad praedictas actiones et effectus, quia causa finalis non movet metaphorice potentias subiectas voluntati, sed solum ipsam voluntatem, quae postea non finaliter, sed effective movet aut applicat inferiores potentias ad actiones earum; ergo finis ut sic nullam propriam causalitatem habet in has actiones, vel illa non consistit in tali motione metaphorica.

40 15. In hac re imprimis statuendum est effectus exteriores qui per has actiones producuntur in tantum esse posse effectus causae finalis in quantum actiones per quas fiunt causantur aliquo modo in suo genere a causa finali et ab ea pendent; quia, ut supra cum Aristotele dicebamus, causa finalis non causat actu nisi quando agens agit aliquid propter finem. Unde, sicut effectus factus ab agente, si ab eo non pendet in <col. b> conservari, sed tantum in fieri, cessante actione iam non causatur, sed causatus est, ita idem effectus prout est causatus a fine propter quem factus est, cessante omnino actione agentis propter finem, iam non causatur a fine, sed causatus est, et manet ordinatus in finem, vel per intrinsecam habitudinem seu propensionem, vel per extrinsecam denominationem seu relationem ab actione praeterita.

60 16. Relinquitur ergo tota difficultas circa actiones imperatas, nam, eo modo quo illae causatae fuerint a fine, erunt causalitates eiusdem finis respectu effectuum seu terminorum, nam per illas pendebunt huiusmodi effectus a causa finali et solum ratione illarum dicentur fieri propter talem finem.

De ipsis ergo actionibus imperatis dici potest, quamvis physice et secundum entitatem actio externa sit distincta ab

53 agens agit] agit actu D V.

35R 14. There is another difficulty that remains to be explained, since, although this way of explaining final causality satisfies with respect to the acts elicited by a created will, it does not, nevertheless, satisfy with respect to commanded actions and external or transeunt effects (as for the time being we pass by the divine will and the actions of natural agents, about which we will speak below). Therefore, it seems that the above view and doctrine cannot be applied to the mentioned actions and effects, because a final cause cannot metaphorically move the powers subject to the will but only the will itself. Afterwards the will moves or applies the lower powers to their actions but does so effectively not finally. Therefore, the end as such either has no proper causality in these actions or it does not consist in metaphorical motion of this kind.

40R 15. In this matter it should, in the first place, be established that the external effects which are produced through these actions can only be effects of the final cause to the extent that the actions through which they come about are causes in some way in its genus by a final cause and to the extent that they depend on it. Because, as we said above with Aristotle, a final cause does not actually cause except when the agent does something for the sake of the end. Hence, just as an effect that has been made by an agent—if it does not depend on the agent in being conserved but only in being made—is not presently caused but was caused since the action has already ceased, so also the same effect as it was caused by the end for the sake of which it was made is not presently caused by the end but was caused since the action of the agent for the sake of the end has already wholly ceased. It remains ordered to the end either through an intrinsic relation or inclination or through an extrinsic denomination or relation from the past action.

45R 16. There remains, then the whole difficulty about commanded actions, for in that way in which these were caused by the end, they will be causalities of the ends themselves with respect to their effects or *termini*. For effects of this kind depend through those on the final cause; it is only by reason of them that they are said to have been made for the sake of such an end.

Therefore, one can say about these commanded actions that, although a an external action is distinct from an interior act of will phys-

70 interiori actu voluntatis, tamen in ratione actionis et in or-
 dine ad causalitatem finis habere rationem unius, et ab eadem
 causalitate seu metaphorica motione oriri, quia finem, verbi
 gratia, metaphorice movere ad volendum scribere et ad scrip-
 tionem ipsam, non sunt duo, sed unum et idem, quia illa duo
 75 ita sunt connexa ut separari non possint; loquor enim de voli-
 tione quae est per modum usus et proxime imperat actionem
 externam scribendi. Unde ulterius dici potest causalitatem fi-
 nale, quam diximus esse in actu interiori et cum ipsa actione
 elicita identificari, esse simul causalitatem ipsius actus interi-
 oris et exterioris, qui cum illo necessario coniungitur, quamvis
 80 diverso modo, nam respectu interioris se habet proxime et in-
 trinsece, respectu vero exterioris, magis extrinsece et remote.
 Neque propter hanc rationem dicitur finis causa per accidens
 externae actionis, cum omnino necessario ac per se sequatur ex
 causalitate eius, et ipse ita moveat voluntatem ut simul et per
 85 modum unius moveat ad executionem actionis imperandae a
 voluntate. Neque etiam obstat quod huiusmodi causalitas ni-
 hil addat actioni exteriori nisi denominationem extrinsecam,
 quia talis actio non dicitur effectus finis solum quia illa denomi-
 nationis extrinseca est a fine, sed quia ipsamet actio, prout hic et
 90 nunc fit, revera procedit ex motione finis in suo genere, etiamsi
 possit illa actio exterior, physice et entitative sumpta, fieri ab-
 sine illa motione metaphorica et propria causalitate finis, quia
 solum mediante actione interna a tali causa <864> procedit.
 Eo vel maxime quod haec causalitas quodammodo est moralis
 95 et quasi artificiosa et intellectualis, et ideo non est in omnibus
 aequiparanda cum causalitate efficientis, quae est magis phys-
 ica et realis. Atque ita simul responsum est difficultati tactae in
 fine sectionis praecedentis et in hunc locum remissae.

100 17. Ultimo addi potest ipsam actionem imperatam, eo
 modo quo hic et nunc a tali agente progreditur, esse et effectum
 causae finalis per modum actionis et causalitatem eius respectu

96 efficientis] efficienti D.

70R ically and according to its entity, it, nevertheless, has the *ratio* of one
 in the nature of action and in relation to the causality of the end and it
 arises from the same causality or metaphorical motion. For the end, for
 example, that metaphorically moves to willing to write and the end that
 metaphorically moves to the written work itself are not two but are one
 75R and the same, because those two are connected in such a way that they
 cannot be separated. For I am speaking about the volition which is in
 the mode of use and which proximately commands the external action
 of writing. Hence, one can further say that the final causality that we
 said is in an internal act and that is identified with the elicited action
 80R itself is at the same time the causality of the internal act and of the ex-
 ternal act. It is conjoined with that necessity, although in a different
 way, for with respect to the internal act it holds itself proximately and
 intrinsically, but with respect to the external act more extrinsically and
 85R remotely. Nor is the end for this reason called the cause *per accidens* of
 the external action, since the action follows wholly necessarily and *per*
se from the end's causality and the end moves the will in such a way that
 it simultaneously and in the mode of one moves towards the execution
 of the action to be commanded by the will. And the fact that causality
 of this kind adds nothing except an extrinsic denomination is no objec-
 90R tion, since such an action is not called an effect of the end only because
 that extrinsic denomination is by the end. [It is also called an effect
 of the end] because the action itself, as it happens here and now, really
 proceeds from the motion of the end in its genus, even if that external
 action, taken physically and entitatively can be made apart from that
 95R metaphorical motion and proper causality of the end because it pro-
 ceeds from such a cause only by means of an internal action, especially
 in view of the fact that this causality is in a certain way moral and, as it
 were, skillful (*artificiosa*) and intellectual. For this reason it should not
 be made equal in everything to an efficient cause which is more phys-
 100R ical and real. And in this way there is at the same time a response to the
 difficulty touched on at the end of the preceding section and returned
 to in this place.

105R 17. Lastly, one can add that the commanded action itself, in the
 way in which it comes forth here and now from such an agent, is both
 the effect of the final cause through the mode of action and its causality

105 rei factae propter illum finem per eandem actionem, nam illa
 mediante pendet ille effectus a tali fine, et nihil aliud est esse
 causalitatem quam esse quasi viam qua pendet effectus a causa
 in tali genere causae. In hac autem dependentia non est con-
 siderandus effectus quasi materialiter, ut est talis res; sic enim 110R
 non semper requiret illam dependentiam per talem causali-
 tatem ut per se necessarium ad suum esse, sed considerandus
 est formaliter quatenus est effectus hic et nunc tali modo fac-
 tus, quo modo necessario includit ordinem ad talem actionem
 110 et ad modum agendi talis causae. Atque ita haec responsio fere
 coincidit cum praecedente, et utramque melius explicabimus 115R
 inferius declarando causalitatem finalem in effectibus Dei.

with respect to the thing made for the sake of that end through the same
 action. For by means of that this end depends on an end of that kind.
 And to be causality is nothing other than to be, as it were, the way
 by which an effect depends on a cause in that kind of genus of cause.
 But in this dependency the effect should not be considered materially,
 as it were, as it is such a thing. For it does not always require that
 dependency in this way through such a causality as *per se* necessary for
 its being. Rather, it should be considered formally insofar as it is an
 effect that was produced here and now in such a way. In this way it
 necessarily includes a relation to such an action and to the way of acting
 of such a cause. And in this way this response almost coincides with the
 preceding one. And we will better explain both of them below when
 declaring the final causality in the effects of God.