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<851, col. b>²

Quos effectus habeat causa finalis.

1. Priusquam de ratione causandi finis dicamus, agendum videtur de effectibus eius, ut ab iis quae nobis notiora sunt procedamus. Et quoniam, ut
5 supra dixi, nunc consideramus finalem causam respectu voluntatis creatae, per quam agentia intellectualia operantur propter finem, duplices effectus huius causae considerare possumus: quidam sunt intra ipsam voluntatem, et sunt actus vel
10 affectus ab illa elicit: alii sunt extra voluntatem, et sunt effectus, qui extra ipsam procedunt ex efficacitate, vel imperio, seu motione ipsius per proprios actus eius.

2. Est igitur imprimis certum, causam finalem, prout nunc illam consideramus, per se primo, ac maxime causare aliquem actum vel affectum in voluntate ipsa. Hoc est receptum omnium consensu, satisque ostendi potest rationibus, quibus in sect. 1 ostendimus dari causam finalem: nos
15 enim per effectus in causarum cognitionem pervenimus: per nullos autem effectus ita cognoscimus causalitatem finis, sicut per eos quos habet circa
20 humanam voluntatem, quam sua metaphorica motione allicit, ut et ipsum amet, et per convenientia

What effects the final cause has.

1. Before we discuss the *ratio* of causing of an end, it seems that we should first deal with its effects, so that we may proceed from those things that are better known to us. And since, as I said above,³ we are now considering final causes with respect to the created will by which intellectual agents act for the sake of an end, we can consider two kinds of effect of this cause. Some are internal to the will itself and are acts or affects elicited from it; others are external to the will and are effects which go out beyond it by an efficacy or command or motion of the will through its proper acts.

2. In the first place, then, it is certain that a final cause, in the way we are now considering it, first and foremost directly causes some act or affect in the will itself. This is the received consensus among everyone and can be satisfactorily shown by those arguments with which we showed in sect. 1 that a final cause is given.⁴ For we come to a cognition of causes through their effects. Moreover, through no effects do we so cognize the causality of an end as through those effects which an end has on the human will. An end draws the human will by its metaphorical motion so that the will loves it and seeks it through agreeable means until the will attains it and rests

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³DM XXIII.1.8.

⁴DM XXIII.1.8.

25 media quaerat donec illum consequatur, et in eo
quiescat.

*Prima difficultas de causalitate finis circa internos
actus voluntatis.*

30 3. Difficultas vero est an omnes actus, qui in
hoc progressu interveniunt, sint a fine ut a propria
causa in suo genere, an vero non omnes, sed aliqui
eorum, et quinam illi sint. Ut autem percipiatur
ratio difficultatis, distinguere oportet plures actus,
qui in hoc negotio interveniunt. Quidam tendunt
35 directe in finem, vel secundum se absolute, ut sim-
plex voluntas eius seu amor, vel ut consequendum
per media, sicut intentio: et hi actus antecedunt
non solum consecutionem finis, sed etiam elec-
tionem mediorum. Alii sunt actus, qui proxime
40 versantur circa media, quamvis ratione finis: et
huiusmodi proprie est electio, quam antecedit con-
sultatio et inquisitio mediorum, quae quatenus ad
inquirendum finem necessaria est vel utilis, ad
45 electionem quodammodo cadit, vel ad illam revo-
catur. Et haec duo genera actuum dicuntur per-
tinere ad ordinem intentionis, quia non solum finis
consecutionem, sed etiam executionem mediorum
antecedunt. Post ordinem vero intentionis sequitur
50 ordo executionis, in quo similiter possunt duo alia
genera actuum distingui: quidam enim versantur
circa mediorum executionem, per usum eorum,
quem activum vocant. Alii versantur circa finem,
ut iam consecutum et possessum, scilicet fruitio,
55 vel gaudium, quod etiam quies animi dicitur, et in
eo statu potest etiam durare amor.

4. Est ergo circa hos actus prima generalis
difficultas, quia finis solum est causa mediorum:
nullus autem ex his actibus est vere <col. b> ac
60 proprie medium ad finem obtinendum: ergo nul-
lus eorum causatur a fine. Maior constat ex def-

in it.

25R *The first difficulty concerning the causality of the end with re-
spect to internal acts of the will.*

30R 3. But there is the difficulty of whether all acts which occur
in this progression are from the end as from a proper cause
in its genus, or whether not all but only some of them, and
in that case which ones. But in order to perceive the nature
of the difficulty, it is necessary to distinguish the multiple
acts which occur in this process. Some tend directly to the
end, either absolutely as it is in itself (as with simple willing
or love for an end) or as something to be achieved through
means (as with intention). These acts not only precede the
35R attainment of the end but also the election of means. Others
are acts that are proximately directed towards the means
(although by reason of an end). Election is properly of this
kind. It is preceded by deliberation and inquiry into means,
which, insofar as inquiring into the end is necessary or useful
40R for leading to means and insofar as it is voluntary, falls in
a certain way under election and answers to it. And these
two genera of acts are said to belong to the order of intention,
because they not only precede the attainment of the end but
also precede the execution of the means.

45R But after the order of intention there follows the order
of execution, in which two other genera of acts can be dis-
tinguished in a similar way. For some are directed to the
execution of the means, through the use (*usum*) of them that
is called active. Others are directed to the end as already
50R achieved and possessed, namely, enjoyment (*fruitio*) or joy,
which is also called the rest of the soul; love can also remain
in that state.

55R 4. There is, therefore, a first general difficulty concerning
these acts, because an end is only a cause of means, but none
of these acts is truly and properly a means for obtaining the
end. Therefore, none of them is caused by an end. The major
is clear from the definition of end, for an end is that for the

initione finis, est enim id cuius gratia aliquid fit,
 quod solis mediis proprie convenit. Deinde est
 specialis et maior difficultas de actibus qui versantur
 65 circa finem, nam illi nullo modo sunt propter
 finem: ergo non sunt effectus finis. Antecedens
 patet, quia illud est propter finem, quod procedit ex
 amore vel intentione finis, nam illud *esse propter*
 70 dicit ordinationem ad finem ortam ex aliquo priori
 actu: sed intentio finis non oritur ex alia inten-
 tione, nec amor ex amore, alioqui esset processus
 in infinitum, ergo. Unde, sicut assensus conclu-
 sionis est ex principiis, assensus autem principii
 non est ex principio, ita voluntas medii potest esse
 75 ex fine et propter finem: voluntas autem finis non
 ita. Tertio augetur difficultas in iis actibus, qui
 versantur circa finem iam consecutum, nam finis
 non causat postquam comparatus est: consistit
 enim eius causalitas in motione, consecuto autem
 80 fine iam quiescit animus: cessat ergo omnis motio:
 ergo et causalitas finis. Unde Aristoteles 1. *De gen-
 eratione et corruptione* text. 55. dicit adepto fine
 cessare actionem: cessante autem actione etiam
 cessat causalitas finis, quia ubi non est causa effi-
 85 ciens, nec finalis esse potest, ut infra docebimus.

Primae difficultatis resolutio.

5. Ut a clarioribus incipiamus, dicendum primo
 est, usum seu executionem mediorum per se ac
 proprie esse effectum causae finalis. De hac conclu-
 5 sione nulla est controversia, nec dubitandi ratio,
 quia hic actus non solum procedit ex affectu et inten-
 tione finis, sed etiam vere ac proprie dici potest
 medium ad finem. Quia licet nomine usus et execu-
 tionis [*mediorum*] hic non intelligamus solum

sake of which something comes to be, which properly applies only to means.

60R Next, there is a special and more serious difficulty con-
 cerning the acts that are directed to an end, for they are in no
 way for the sake of the end. Therefore, they are not effects of
 the end. The antecedent is clear, because that is for the sake
 of an end which proceeds from love or intention for the end.
 65R For 'being for the sake of' expresses an ordering to an end
 that has arisen from some prior act. But an intention for an
 end does not arise from some other intention, nor love from
 love; otherwise, there would be an infinite regress. Therefore,
 [neither intention nor love are for the sake of an end]. Hence,
 70R just as an assent to a conclusion is based on principles but an
 assent to a principle is not based on a principle, so a willing
 of a means can be based on an end and be for the sake of an
 end but the willing of an end cannot be like that.

75R Third, a difficulty comes up in those acts that are directed
 to an end already attained. For an end does not cause after
 it has been secured. For its causality consists in motion.
 But a mind (*animus*) rests in an attained end. Therefore,
 all motion ceases. Therefore, the causality of the end [also
 ceases]. Hence, Aristotle in *On Generation and Corruption I*,
 80R text. 55 [324b16–18], says that action ceases once an end is
 attained. But once action has ceased, an end's causality also
 ceases, since where there is no efficient cause there cannot
 be a final cause, as we will teach below.

Resolution of the first difficulty.

5. So that we begin from the clearer things, it should
 first be said that use or execution of means is directly and
 properly an effect of a final cause. There is no controversy
 5R nor reason for doubting regarding this conclusion, because
 this act not only proceeds from the affect and intention for
 an end, but also can truly and properly be called a means
 to the end. For, although we do not here understand by the
 phrase 'use and execution of the means' only external use or

9 *mediorum*] finis A V.

10 externum usum vel executionem, sed etiam in-
 ternum actum, quo voluntas applicat membra vel
 instrumenta ad exsequendum medium: tamen tota
 illa actio ut includit tam imperantem actum quam
 imperatum, vere ac proprie dicitur esse medium
 15 ad finem: ergo est etiam propriissime effectus finis.
 Et confirmatur, nam electio est de mediis: quando
 vero media talia sunt ut per usum activum volun-
 tatis exerceri debeant, etiam ipse usus activas sub
 electionem cadit: nam eligitur ut medium tota illa
 20 actio humana, quae ex interno, et externo actu
 coalescit: ergo etiam actus internus voluntatis quo
 proxime fit <853> executio externi medii, habet
 rationem medii ad finem: ergo est etiam effectus
 ipsius finis.

25 6. Dico secundo. Electio mediorum vere ac
 proprie est effectus causae finalis. Probatum primo,
 quia ille actus est propriissime propter finem: sed
 per haec verba maxime declaratur causalitas finis:
 ergo ille actus est ex causalitate finis. Secundo,
 30 Ille actus procedit ex intentione finis, et ex ratione
 ordinante medium ad finem: sed in his videtur
 potissimum consistere causalitas finis: ergo. Ter-
 tio, talis actus pendet essentialiter ex fine, quia
 non versaretur circa media nisi ratione finis: quin
 35 potius ipsa media electa non sunt effectus finis
 nisi media electione: ergo multo magis necesse est
 ut ipsamet electio sit effectus finis. Et hae rationes
 aequae fere confirmant praecedentem assertionem.

40 7. Neque contra has assertiones obstat prima
 ratio dubitandi in principio posita. Primo quia non
 tantum media sunt propter finem, sed quidquid
 a fine essentialiter pendet, et ex illius amore pro-

10R execution but also the internal act by which the will applies
 the members or instruments to carrying out the means, still,
 that complete action—as it includes both the commanded act
 and the command—is truly and properly said to be a means
 to the end. Therefore, it is also most properly an effect of
 15R the end. And it is confirmed: for election is of means. But
 when the means are of such a kind that they have to be
 exercised through the active use of the will, that active use
 itself also falls under election. For the whole human action
 that coalesces from the internal and external acts is elected
 20R as a means. Therefore, the internal act of the will by which
 the execution of external means comes about proximately also
 has the *ratio* of a means to an end. Therefore, it is also an
 effect of an end itself.

25R 6. Second, I say that the election of means is truly and
 properly an effect of the final cause. It is proven, first, from the
 fact that that act is most properly for the sake of an end. But
 the causality of an end is especially declared through those
 words. Therefore, that act results from the causality of an end.
 Second: that act proceeds from an intention for an end and
 30R from reason ordering a means to that end. But the causality
 of the end seems especially to consist in these. Therefore, [the
 act of election proceeds on account of the end's causality].
 Third: such an act depends essentially on the end, because
 the act is not directed to the means except by reason of the
 35R end. In fact, the elected means themselves are not effects of
 the end except by means of election. Therefore, much more
 is it necessary that the election itself be an effect of the end.
 And these arguments confirm the preceding assertion almost
 equally.

40R 7. Nor does the first reason for doubting posited in the
 beginning⁵ stand against these assertions.⁶ First, because
 not only are means for the sake of an end, but whatever
 essentially depends on an end and proceeds from a love for

⁵*DM XXIII.3.4.*

⁶The assertions made in the preceding two paragraphs: namely, that (a) use or execution of the means is a proper effect of a final cause and that (b) election of means is a proper effect of a final cause.

cedit. Deinde quia ipsamet electio non incongrue
 dici potest medium ad finem. Quod potest explicari
 45 ex iis quae supra diximus tractando de potentia for-
 maliter libera, quod nimirum actus ab ea elicited,
 est intrinsece voluntarius, seu volitus per modum
 actus: ipsa ergo electio cum sit actus elicited a vol-
 untate, est etiam intrinsece volita: non est autem
 50 volita nisi propter consequendum finem, quia si-
 cut res quae eligitur, propter finem eligitur, ita ip-
 samet electio propter finem exercetur. Ut, qui eligit
 eleemosynam ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis, non
 solum refert in eum finem ipsam eleemosynam,
 55 quam eligit, sed etiam ipsam volitionem qua illam
 eligit, nam ad eum finem necessaria est illa electio,
 et in ea reperitur ea bonitas, et utilitas quae in-
 venit in medio ad finem intentum comparato. Et
 confirmatur primo, nam consultatio est mediorum
 60 ad finem, et, si contingat voluntatem actu directo,
 et formali velle consultare, quod saepe accidit, illa
 volitio revera est cuiusdam medii ad finem: quia
 non ob aliud vult quis consultare, nisi ut paret sibi
 viam ad finem obtinendum: ergo similiter si volun-
 65 tate propria, et reflexa velit hic et nunc eligere, ut
 etiam potest, illo actu vult electionem ut quoddam
 medium, quia etiam vult illam propter finem, si-
 cut consultationem: ergo etiam quando hoc non
 faciat distincto actu et reflexo, ipsamet electio, eo
 70 <col. b> modo quo est intrinsece volita, intrin-
 sece est quoddam medium ad finem, ratione cuius
 volita est: est ergo vere ac proprie effectus finis.

8. Dico tertio. Actus qui versantur circa finem
 ipsum, et antecedunt, vel antecedere possunt or-
 75 dine intentionis consecutionem eius, sunt vere et
 proprie effectus finis. Circa hanc conclusionem

⁷*DM XIX.5.*

⁸That is, the will.

it is for the sake of that end. Also, because the election itself
 can be said—not incongruously—to be a means to the end.
 This can be explained by those things which we said above⁷
 when discussing the formally free power:⁸ namely, that an
 act elicited from it is intrinsically voluntary or willed in the
 manner of an act. Election itself, therefore, since it is an act
 elicited from the will is also willed intrinsically. Moreover, it
 is not willed except for the sake of pursuing an end, because,
 just as a thing which is elected is elected for the sake of an
 end, so also the election itself is exercised for the sake of
 an end. Just as he who elects alms for satisfying for his
 sins refers not only the alms themselves that he elects to his
 end but also the very volition by which he elects them. For
 that election is necessary to that end and in it is found the
 goodness and utility that is found in a means that has been
 related (*comparato*) to an intended end.

This is confirmed, first: for deliberation is about the means
 to an end, and if it happens that the will by a direct and formal
 act wishes to deliberate, which often happens, that volition
 really is a kind of means to the end. For one does not will to
 deliberate on account of anything other than to prepare for
 oneself a way to obtain the end. Therefore, likewise, if by a
 proper and reflexive willing one wishes here and now to elect,
 as can also happen, then by that act one wills the election as
 a kind of means. For one wills even it for the sake of an end,
 just like the deliberation. Therefore, even when one does not
 do this by a distinct and reflexive act, the election itself (in the
 way in which it is intrinsically willed) is intrinsically a kind of
 means to that end for which it is willed. Therefore, it is truly
 and properly an effect of an end.

8. I say, third: acts that are directed to the end itself and
 precede or can precede its attainment in the order of intention
 are truly and properly effects of the end. I find some diversity
 among the authors concerning this conclusion.

inuenio nonnullam diversitatem inter auctores:
 quidam enim eam admittunt de actu intentionis,
 vel desiderii, non vero de primo actu amoris, seu 80R
 simplicis voluntatis. Et ratio esse potest, quia
 desiderium, vel intentio supponunt amorem finis,
 et ab eo procedunt, et ideo possunt causari a fine
 medio amore sui, et propriissime dicentur esse
 propter finem, vel gratia finis: et ideo esse possunt 85R
 effectus finis. Amor autem non supponit alium ac-
 tum vel amorem finis a quo procedat: et ideo non
 est ex amore finis: nec etiam est formaliter propter
 finem, quantum est ex directione ipsius voluntatis:
 non est ergo effectus finis in genere causae finalis, 90R
 sed solum in genere obiecti, efficientis, vel specifi-
 cantis iuxta varias opiniones. Et hanc sententiam
 videtur tenere Ferrariensis 1. *Summae contra gen-
 tiles* cap. 75. dicit enim licet res quae est finis
 amari possit, nihil ad ipsam ordinando, tamen non 95R
 exercere causalitatem finis, donec aliquid propter
 ipsam ametur, et fundatur in verbis D. Thomae
 ibi dicentis, causalitatem finis in hoc consistere,
 quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur. Tamen ibi
 D. Thomas non dicit hanc esse adaequatam causal- 100R
 itatem finis, sed pertinere hoc ad causalitatem finis.
 Alii vero de omnibus his actibus conclusionem ad-
 mittunt, cum quadam tamen moderatione, scilicet,
 quod hi actus revera sint effectus finis, non tamen
 ita proprie aut non ita perfecte sicut priores: quod 105R
 sumi potest ex Gabriele in 2. dist. 38. notab. 2,
 et Gregorio quem ipse citat: ibi art. 1.

Gabriel.

105

9. Alii nihilominus simpliciter affirmant finem
 esse proprie finalem causam horum actuum, ut
 Henricus 2. p. *Summae* art. 46. q. 6. Et in hoc
 sensu posita est assertio, quam mihi sumo ex 110R
 D. Thoma, 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. ubi simpliciter ait,
 omnes actus humanos esse propter finem: et con-

Henricus.

110

D. Thomas.

For some admit it concerning acts of intention or desire
 but not concerning first acts of love or of simple willings. The
 argument can be that desire or intention presuppose a love
 for the end and proceed from it. For that reason, they can
 be caused by the end by means of a love for it and are most
 properly said to be for the sake of or on account of the end.
 For this reason they can be effects of the end. But love does
 not assume another act or love for the end from which it
 proceeds and for this reason it is not a result of love for the
 end. Neither is it formally for the sake of the end, insofar as it
 is a result of the direction of the will itself. Therefore, it is not
 an effect of the end in the genus of final cause, but only in the
 genus of object (effecting or specifying, according to various
 opinions). Francis Sylvester of Ferrara seems to hold this view
 in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 75, for he says that although
 a thing that is an end can be loved without anything being
 ordered to it, nevertheless, it does not exercise the causality
 of the end until something else is loved for its sake. And this
 is founded in the words of St. Thomas where he says that
 the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are
 desired for its sake. Nevertheless, St. Thomas here does not
 say that this is adequate to the causality of the end but only
 that this belongs to the causality of the end.

But others admit the conclusion concerning all these acts,
 but with a certain qualification: namely, that these acts really
 are effects of the end but not as properly or not as perfectly as
 the acts mentioned earlier. This can be gathered from Gabriel
 in II, dist. 38, notab. 2, and Gregory, whom he cites there in
 art. 1.

Gabriel.

9. Nevertheless, others affirm without qualification that
 an end is properly the final cause of these acts,⁹ as Henry
 [of Ghent] does in *Summae* II, art. 46, q. 6. And this is
 the sense in which I made the assertion,¹⁰ which I take for
 myself from St. Thomas, *ST IaIIæ.1.1*, where he says without
 qualification that all human acts are for the sake of an end

Henry of
Ghent.

St. Thomas.

⁹That is, acts directed to the end itself.¹⁰See the first sentence of *DM XXIII.3.8*.

sequenter esse effectus finis: nam haec duo con-
vertuntur, sicut esse ab agente et esse effectum
115 agentis, comprehendendo sub effectu actionem ip- 115R
sam. At vero hi actus de quibus nunc agimus,
sunt vere actus humani, nam <854> procedunt
ab homine ut rationalis est, immo etiam sunt liberi
saltem pro statu huius vitae, ut supra disp. 19,
120 sect. 3. probatum est, ergo. 120R

10. Atque hinc confici potest prima ratio, nam
homo quatenus exercet has actiones, etiam pri-
mum amorem finis, operatur propter finem, et
non operatur ut ab alio motus in finem, sed ut
125 proxime et immediate motus ab ipso fine secun- 125R
dum propriam et formalem rationem eius: ergo
hi actus sunt propter finem ut causati ex propria
motive finis ut finis est: ergo sunt effectus fi-
nis ut finaliter causantis. Consequentiae sunt
130 evidentes, quia causalitas finis propriissima est 130R
per dictam motionem. Maior etiam patet, quia
illa actio non temere et casu fit, sed ad defini-
tum scopum ex instituto tendit: hinc autem col-
ligimus actionem aliquam esse propter finem. Mi-
135 nor etiam est satis clara, quia in quolibet illorum 135R
actuum homo operatur illectus et attractus a fine
cognito, non utcumque, sed quatenus est bonum
quoddam propter se diligibile, quae est propria
quaedam habitudo et formalis ratio finis: et ex vi
140 huius cognitionis homo ita operatur in ea actione, 140R
ut ipse seipsum dirigat et moveat in talem finem,
et in formalem bonitatem eius. Atque haec ratio
sumitur ex D. Thoma dicto art. 1. ubi non aliter
probat actum humanum esse propter finem, nisi
145 quia est ab obiecto voluntatis sub ratione finis, 145R
id est ut exercet propriam causalitatem finis: et
3. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 2. rat. 5. sic ait,
De agentibus per intellectum non est dubium quin

and, consequently, are effects of an end. For being for the
sake of an end and being effects of an end are convertible,
just as being from an agent and being an effect of an agent
are convertible (including actions under effects). But the acts
that we are discussing now are truly human acts. For they
proceed from a human being insofar as he is rational; indeed,
they are even free, at least in this life, as was shown above in
DM XIX.3. Therefore, [these acts are effects of an end].

10. From here the first argument can be constructed: for
insofar as a human being exercises these actions, even a first
love for an end, he acts for the sake of an end. And he does not
act as moved by something else to the end but as proximately
and immediately moved by the end itself according to its
proper and formal *ratio*. Therefore, these acts are for the sake
of an end, as caused by the proper motion of an end as end.
They are, therefore, effects of an end as final-causing.

The consequences are evident, because the causality of
an end occurs most properly through the stated motion. The
major premise is also obvious, since that action does not
happen blindly or by chance but tends to a definite target by
design. From this, moreover, we gather that any action is for
the sake of an end. The minor premise is also sufficiently
clear, since in every one of these actions the human being
acts enticed and attracted by the cognized end, not in any way
whatever, but precisely as it is a kind of good lovable for its
own sake, which is a certain proper habitudo and the formal
ratio of an end. As a result of the force of this cognition, a
human being acts in such a way in that action that he directs
and moves himself to such an end and to its formal goodness.
And this argument is taken from St. Thomas, in the cited
art. 1, where he shows that a human act is for the sake of
an end in no other way than by pointing out that it is from
the object of the will under the *ratio* of an end, that is, as
it exercises the proper causality of an end. And in *SCG III*,
cap. 2, rat. 5, he says it in this way: 'Concerning agents
who act through intellect, there is no doubt but that they

119 19] 18 V *lac. A.*120 3] *lac. A.*

150 *agunt propter finem, agunt enim praeconci-
per intellectum id quod per actionem consequuntur, 150R
et ex tali praeconceptione agunt.* Haec autem verba
applicari possunt etiam ad simplicem amorem ip-
sius finis.

155 11. Secundo, hoc amplius declaratur in ipso
amore: potest enim dupliciter considerari: primo 155R
ut directe tendit in obiectum, secundo ut reflex-
ione virtuali in seipsum cadit, eo videlicet modo
quo supra dicebam huiusmodi actus esse intrin-
sece voluntarios. Priori consideratione causatur
160 a bonitate obiecti ut cognita, et movente appeti-
tum ad amandum talem rem propter bonitatem
suam: et ita vere causatur ab obiecto ut a fine,
non quidem ut a fine extrinseco rei volitae, sed ut
a fine proprio et intrinseco ipsiusmet actus amoris
165 qui in illum tendit. Atque ob eandem rationem
dicitur vere ac <col. b> proprie talis actus esse
propter finem, non tamquam propter extrinsecam
rationem volendi, sed quia est propter intrinsecam
bonitatem eius, et ex propria eius motione. In
170 quo (quidquid alii dicant) eadem est ratio amoris
et intentionis, nam etiam intentio non est propter
finem, qui sit extrinseca ratio volendi, sed quia
tendit in finem propter seipsum et propter intrin-
secam bonitatem eius. Illa autem differentia, quod
175 intentio supponat priorem actum amoris, nihil ad
rem praesentem refert, ut statim declarabimus.
Tandem ex communi modo loquendi constat, vere
ac proprie dici amare nos finem propter seipsum,
vel propter bonitatem suam: sic enim amamus
180 Deum: haec autem particula *propter*, attributa fini
cum proprietate, declarat causalitatem eius: ergo
hae locutiones verae sunt propter causalitatem fi-
nis circa talem actum. Unde hac etiam ratione,
cum Deum super omnia amamus, dicimur illum

act for the sake of an end, for they act having preconceived through the intellect that which they pursue through action and they act as a result of that prior conception.’ These words, moreover, can also be applied to the simple love for an end itself.

11. Second, this is explained more thoroughly the case of love itself. For love can be considered in two ways: first, as directly tending to an object and, second, as falling on itself by a virtual reflection, in that way, namely, in which I said above that an act of this sort is intrinsically voluntary.¹¹

Under the former consideration, the love is caused by the goodness of an object, insofar as it is cognized and moves the appetite to loving the relevant thing for the sake of its goodness. And in this way the love is truly caused by the object as by an end, not indeed as by an end extrinsic to the willed thing, but as by an end proper and intrinsic to the very act of love that tends to it. And for the same reason such an act is truly and properly said to be for the sake of an end, not as for the sake of an extrinsic reason for willing, but because the act is for the sake of its¹² intrinsic goodness and from its proper motion. The *ratio* of love and of intention is the same in this respect (whatever others may say), for intention is also not for the sake of an end that is an extrinsic reason for willing, but because it tends to an end for its own sake and for the sake of its intrinsic goodness. But this difference—that intention assumes a prior act of love—is not relevant to the present matter, as we will show at shortly.

Finally, it is clear from the common way of speaking that we are truly and properly said to love an end for its own sake or for the sake of its goodness. For that is the way we love God. Moreover, this term ‘for the sake of’, attributed to the end with propriety, expresses the causality of an end. Therefore, these locutions are true because of the causality of the end in the case of such an act. Hence, for this reason, too, when we love God beyond all other things, we are said to love him as an ultimate end, because he really exercises the proper causality

¹¹ *DM XIX.5.17.*

¹² Presumably ‘it’ refers to the end, but the Latin leaves open the possibility that it refers to the act.

185 amare ut ultimum finem, quia revera exercet circa 185R
 nostrum amorem propriam causalitatem ultimi fi-
 nis, et talis actus non in alium finem tendit, neque
 excitatur nisi a suprema bonitate talis finis, ipsi
 voluntati proposita.

190 12. Posteriori etiam consideratione virtualementem
 reflexionem includente apertissime constat talem 190R
 actum esse propter finem, quia etsi amari pos-
 sit propter suam honestatem (quod non est extra
 rationem causandi finalem) tamen revera amatur
 195 propter obiectum in quod directe tendit tamquam
 propter finem, eo fere modo quo supra de elec- 195R
 tione dicebamus. Quamvis in electione magis ap-
 pareat quaedam ratio medii ad finem, quam in
 amore, quia amor non ita ordinatur ad consequen-
 dum finem sicut electio. In quo etiam videtur esse
 200 nonnulla differentia inter desiderium seu inten-
 tionem, et amorem finis: nam desiderium, cum
 ex sua ratione supponat carentiam finis consecuti,
 est aliquo modo medium ad consequendum illum,
 205 immo est veluti quaedam inchoatio inquisitionis
 eius, quod eadem vel maiori ratione verum est de 205R
 intentione: amor vero ex ratione sua non supponit
 carentiam consecutionis finis, et ex hac parte mi-
 nus participare potest rationem medii. Sed haec
 210 differentia nihil obstat, quominus ipse amor sit
 vere causatus a fine, quia, ut supra dicebam, haec 210R
 causalitas non limitatur ad sola media, sed exten-
 ditur ad omnem actum qui vere sit propter finem,
 et ex propria eius motione. <855> Eo vel maxime
 215 quod etiam amor quando antecedit consecutionem
 finis, quatenus excitat et movet ad illum inquiren- 215R
 dum, potest dici utilissimum medium ad conse-
 quendum illum. Addo denique amorem ex ratione
 sua abstrahendo ab hoc vel illo statu amantis, ten-

of an ultimate end with respect to our love. And such an act does not tend to another end nor is it excited except by the supreme goodness of such an end having been proposed to the will itself.

12. Under the second consideration (which includes the virtual reflection), it is entirely obvious that such an act is for the sake of an end, because even if it could be loved for the sake of its own *honestatem* (which is not beyond the *ratio* of final-causing), still, it really is loved for the sake of the object to which it directly tends as for the sake of the end, in almost the same way that we spoke about above concerning election.¹³

A certain *ratio* of means to an end, however, appears more in the case of election than in the case of love, since love is not ordered to attaining an end in the way that election is. In this there also seems to be some difference between desire or intention and love for an end. For desire, since it presupposes according to its *ratio* that the end has not been achieved yet, is in some way a means to achieving it; indeed, desire is, as it were, a kind of beginning of the pursuit of the end. This is just as much or even more true of intention. Love, however, does not presuppose according to its *ratio* that the end has not been achieved yet, and in this respect can less participate in the *ratio* of a means. But this difference poses no trouble for love itself being truly caused by an end, because, as I said above, this causality is not limited to means alone but is extended to all acts which are truly for the sake of an end and result from an end's proper motion, especially in view of the fact that love, when it precedes attainment of an end, can, insofar as it excites and moves one to seek after the end, be called a most useful means to pursuing the end. I add, finally, that love according to its *ratio*, abstracting from this or that state of the lover, tends to an end so that it unites and conjoins the lover with the end. Hence, insofar as the love

¹³*DM XXIII.3.7.*

220 dere ad finem, ut illi uniat et coniungat amantem:
unde, quatenus ipsemet amor virtualiter aut for- 220R
maliter amatur, propter hunc finem amatur: ergo
propter finem quem pro obiecto habet, amatur:
ergo ab eodem fine causatur.

225 13. Quod optime potest confirmari ex doctrina
D. Thomae in 4. dist. 49. q. 1. art. 1. qc. 2. ubi ait,
Cum voluntatis obiectum sit finis, hoc ipsum quod 225R
est velle, et quemlibet alium voluntatis actum, non

230 *necessario supponere aliquem finem obiectivum in*
Capreolus. *quem ordinetur.* Addi etiam potest ex Capreolo
in 1. dist. 1. q. 1. ad 1. contra 3. concl. hunc
amorem, qui antecedit finis consecutionem, or- 230R
dinari ut in finem in ipsius rei amatae consecu-

235 tionem et fruitionem: et hoc modo etiam esse posse
effectum causae finalis. Et in discursu illius arti-
culi et solutionum argumentorum multa dicit et
congerit ex doctrina D. Thomae, quae ad hanc sen- 235R
tentiam confirmandam conferre possunt. Denique
240 etiam hic amor potest ordinari in ipsum amantem
ut in finem Cui, quatenus illum perficit, et unit
aliquo modo suo fini obiectivo: ergo ex hoc etiam
capite potest esse effectus finalis causae.

245 14. Dico quarto. Actus voluntatis, qui versan- 240R
tur circa finem iam consecutum, numerari etiam
possunt, et debent, inter effectus finalis causae.
Probat, nam hi actus tantum esse possunt aut
amor, aut gaudium, de quibus controversum est
an sint actus distincti prout versantur circa finem 245R
250 iam adeptum: quod tractat late Capreolus citato
loco: nunc de eis loquamur ut de distinctis, sive
re, sive ratione differant. Actus ergo amoris ut
sic eiusdem rationis est circa finem, qui propter

itself is virtually or formally loved, it is loved for the sake of
this end. Therefore, it is loved for the sake of the end that it
has as its object. Therefore, it is caused by that same end.

13. This position can best be confirmed from the teaching
of St. Thomas, IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, where he says: St. Thomas.
'since the object of the will is the end, this itself, namely, to
will, and any other act of the will is nothing other than some-
thing that is ordered to the end, and therefore it necessarily
assumes some objective end to which it is ordered.' One can
also add from Capreolus, I, dist. 1, q. 1, ad 1, the conclusion
contra 3, that this love, which precedes the attainment of the
end, is ordered to the attainment and enjoyment of the loved
thing itself as to an end. And in this way, too, it can be an
effect of the final cause. In the discussion of this article and
the solutions to the arguments, Capreolus brings together
and says many things from St. Thomas's teaching, which can
be brought to bear for confirming this view.¹⁴ Finally, this
love can also be ordered to the lover himself as to a *finis cui*,
insofar as it perfects him and unites him in some way with
his objective end. Therefore, it can also be an effect of a final
cause in this sense.

14. I say, fourth, that acts of the will that are directed to
an end already attained can and should also be numbered
among the effects of a final cause. It is proven: for these acts
can only be acts of love or acts of joy. There is controversy
about them as to whether they are distinct acts insofar as they
are directed to an end already attained. Capreolus treats this
matter more thoroughly in the cited place.¹⁵ Now we speak
about them as they are distinct, differing either in reality or in
reason. An act of love as such, then, is of the same *ratio* with
respect to an end that is loved for its own sake, whether that

¹⁴Namely, the position that an act of love is for the sake of an end.

¹⁵In I, dist. 1, q. 1, ad 1.

255 se amatur, sive ille finis sit iam possessus, sive
 non: ergo, si amor secundum se, vel qui antecedit
 consecutionem finis, est effectus finalis causae,
 etiam amor ille, qui manet fine iam consecuto,
 est effectus eiusdem finis. Patet consequentia,
 quia eodem modo causatur amor in utroque statu
 260 ab obiecto cognito alliciente voluntatem ut ipsum
 propter se, et propter bonitatem suam amet. Atque
 ita D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 23. art. 4. et q. 26. <col. b>
 art. 2. eodem modo attribuit causalitati finis, seu
 265 obiecti boni amorem eius in utroque statu, immo
 et delectationem, ut statim dicam. Unde etiam ra-
 tiones omnes, quibus probavimus primam volun-
 tatem seu amorem erga finem, esse effectum finalis
 causae, idem probant de ultimo amore, maxime
 cum probabile sit eundem semper esse, ac perse-
 270 verare posse.

15. De gaudio autem, quatenus est quid dis- 265R
 tinctum ab amore, videtur esse nonnulla dubitandi
 ratio: tum quia est veluti passio quaedam neces-
 sario consequens possessionem finis amati: tum
 275 etiam quia est veluti ultima quies animi, ad quam
 caetera ordinantur, etiam ipse amor, ipsa vero non
 ordinatur ad aliud, et ita non videtur habere finem
 a quo causari possit. Sed nihilominus probatur
 etiam de hoc actu assertio posita, nam revera
 280 gaudium non est mera passio, sed est actus vi-
 talis ab ipsa voluntate elicited, et causatus in suo
 genere ab obiecto per se bono, et per rationem
 proposito, et invitante voluntatem ut in ipso, et
 in possessione eius quiescat et gaudeat propter
 285 illius bonitatem: sed haec causalitas obiecti non
 est alia quam finalis, quantum ad hunc motionis
 modum, quidquid sit an aliunde interveniat etiam
 causalitas effectiva inter illos actus, quod nihil ad
 praesentem quaestionem refert. Et confirmatur
 290 primo, nam ipsa delectatio ex natura rei ordinatur,

end is already possessed or not. Therefore, if love in itself, or
 love that precedes the attainment of the end, is an effect of a
 final cause, that love which remains once the end has been
 attained is also an effect of the same end. The consequence
 is clear, because the love is caused in the same way in either
 case by the cognized object enticing the will so that it loves
 the object for its own sake and for the sake of its goodness.
 And thus St. Thomas, *ST IaIIæ.23.4* and *26.2*, in the same
 way attributes love for the end in either case to the causality
 of the end or to the good object. He even attributes delight
 [to the causality of the end], as I will discuss shortly. Hence,
 all the arguments by which we proved that the first willing
 or love for an end is an effect of a final cause also prove the
 same thing concerning last love, especially since it is probable
 that the same love can always exist and continue to exist.

15. Concerning joy, however, insofar as it is something
 distinct from love, there seems to be some reason doubting.
 This is both because joy is, as it were, a kind of passion
 necessarily following upon possession of a loved end, and
 because it is, as it were, the ultimate rest of the soul to which
 everything else is ordered (even love itself) but which is not
 itself ordered to anything else, and thus it does not seem to
 have an end by which it could be caused.

But, nevertheless, the assertion made¹⁶ is also proven
 concerning this act. For in fact joy is not a mere passion,
 but is a vital act elicited from the will itself and caused in its
 genus by an object that is good in itself and that is proposed
 through reason invites the will, so that the will may rest and
 take joy in the object and in the possession of it for the sake
 of its goodness. But this causality of the object is nothing
 other than final-causality, with respect to this mode of motion,
 regardless whether for some other reason effective causality
 is also involved among these acts, a matter irrelevant to the
 present question.

This is confirmed, first, by the fact that delight itself is

¹⁶Namely, that acts of will that are directed to an end already attained are included among the effects of a final cause.

ut in finem, in actionem ipsam ad quam conse- 285R
quitur, tamquam perfectio quaedam, et decor eius,
et ut conferat ad constantiam et facilitatem eius:
ergo etiam delectatio, quae consequitur ex fine
295 consecuto, ordinatur ad ipsammet consecutionem
finis ut ad finem quem suo modo perficit, et firmat: 290R
ergo si delectatio intellectualis sit, et consequatur
ex illo fine perfecte cognito, et proposito volun-
tati, causabitur ab illo in genere finis. Unde, licet
300 delectatio dicatur esse quid ultimum via genera-
tionis, tamen in ordine finium secundum se non
est simpliciter ultimum, quamvis interdum possit
ab appetente sumi ut ultimus finis Cuius. Et tunc
etiam ipsa delectatio ordinatur ad ipsummet qui
305 delectationem capit, ut ad finem Cui, et ex hac
parte potest esse effectus causae finalis. 300R

16. Neque contra hanc, et praecedentem con-
clusionem urgent rationes prius factae. Ad primam
enim iam responsum est non sola media esse ef-
310 fectus causae finalis, sed omnem actum qui ad
finem confert, vel ad <856> illum ordinatur, vel 305R
tamquam medium, vel tamquam perfectio posses-
sionis eius: ac denique quidquid est ex propria
motive finis praeconcepti, et propositi secundum
315 propriam rationem boni propter se diligibilis. Ad
secundum, negamus hos actus non esse propter 310R
finem, nam revera amamus Deum propter ipsum,
et delectamur in Deo propter ipsum. Neque ad
hoc necessarium est ut actus, qui causatur a fine,
320 seu dicitur esse propter finem, causetur ex priori

ordered *ex natura rei* to the very action on which it follows as
to an end, as a kind of perfection and ornament of it and as
it confers constancy and facility upon the action. Therefore,
that delight which follows upon the end having been attained
is also ordered to the very attainment of the end, as to an end
which it perfects and establishes in its own way. Therefore,
if the delight is intellectual and follows upon the end having
been perfectly cognized and proposed to the will, it will have
been caused by that end in the genus of end. Hence, although
delight is said to be something ultimate by way of generation,
nevertheless, in the order of ends it is taken in itself not strictly
speaking ultimate, although sometimes it can be taken by the
person desiring it as an ultimate *finis cuius*.¹⁷ In that case,
the delight itself is also ordered to the very person who takes
delight as to a *finis cui* and can be an effect of the final cause
for this reason.

16. Nor do the arguments made earlier¹⁸ threaten this
conclusion¹⁹ or the preceding one.²⁰ For to the first argument
I already responded²¹ that not only means are effects of the
final cause, but all acts which relate to the end or are ordered
to it, either as means or as a perfection of its possession. And,
finally, whatever comes from the proper motion of an end
preconceived and proposed [to the will] according to a proper
ratio of good lovable for its own sake [is an effect of the final
cause].

In response to the second argument, we deny that these
acts are not for the sake of the end, for in reality we love
God for his own sake and we delight in God for his own sake.
Nor is it necessary for this that the act that it is caused by
the end or is said to be for the sake of the end be caused

¹⁷For the distinction between *finis cuius* and *finis cui*, see *DM XXIII.2.2*.

¹⁸*DM XXIII.3.4*.

¹⁹Namely, 'that acts of the will that are directed to an end already attained can and should also be numbered among the effects of a final cause' (*DM XXIII.3.14*).

²⁰The one stated in *DM XXIII.3.8*: that 'acts that are directed to the end itself and precede or can precede its attainment in the order of intention are truly and properly effects of the end.'

²¹*DM XXIII.3.7* and 12.

amore finis, sed satis est quod causetur ex boni- 315R
 tate ipsius finis allicientis voluntatem. Quamquam
 delectatio quatenus est actus ab amore distinctus,
 revera causatur ex amore: delectatur enim
 325 aliquis in fine possesso quia amat illum. Illa vero
 causalitas quatenus est inter actus, magis pertinet 320R
 ad quemdam modum efficientiae, vel naturalis re-
 sultantiae, quam ad causalitatem finalem, quam
 nunc inquirimus. Haec ergo magis consideranda
 330 est ex habitudine actus ad obiectum seu finem, et
 ex peculiari modo quo res intellectualis movetur 325R
 a fine ad huiusmodi actus. Ad tertium responde-
 tur, quamvis delectatio dicatur quies, non tamen
 esse mortuo modo (ut ita dicam) ut est naturalis
 335 quies, quae consistit in sola carentia motus, sed
 esse vitalem quietem, quae non est sine interna 330R
 actione: tamen quia illa non est ad obtinendum
 et inquirendum finem, sed ad fruendum fine iam
 possesso, ideo dicitur animi quies. Quatenus ergo
 340 proprius actus est ac vera actio, potest esse ef-
 fectus finis. Quod vero Aristoteles ait, consecuto 335R
 fine cessare motum vel actionem, intelligendum
 est de motu, quo tenditur ad consecutionem finis,
 non vero de interna actione, qua quiescitur in fine.
 345 Immo addit D. Thomas in 4. dist. 48. q. 2. art. 2. ad
 [quartam] rationem in oppositum, quod tunc ces- 340R
 sat motus habito fine, quando talis motus non con-
 comitatur ipsum finem, seu consecutionem eius:
 sicut caelum consequitur suum finem mediante
 350 suo motu, non tamen cessat, quia ad illum finem
 necessarius est ille motus: sic igitur non cessat 345R
 interna actio amoris vel delectationis consecuto
 fine, quia comitatur talem finem, et ad ipsius
 perfectionem est necessaria: et ideo respectu talis
 355 actionis non cessat causalitas finis.

17. Hic vero oriebatur difficultas theologica, 350R
 praesertim ex ultima conclusione, nam hinc se-

from a prior love for the end. Rather, it is enough that it be
 caused by the goodness of the very end that is enticing the
 will. Although delight, insofar as it is an act distinct from love,
 is in fact caused by love. For someone delights in an end that
 is possessed because he loves it. But that causality, insofar
 as it is between the act of love and the act of delight, pertains
 more to a kind of mode of efficacy or natural resultancy than
 to the final causality that we are investigating now. Therefore,
 this should be considered more according to an act's habitude
 to its object or end and according to the distinctive way in
 which an intellectual being is moved by an end to acts of this
 kind.

To the third argument, I respond that although delight is
 called rest, still it is not in a deceased mode (as I will put it),
 as natural rest is that which consists only in a lack of motion.
 Rather, it is a vital rest, which is not without internal action.
 Still, since delight is not directed to obtaining and seeking an
 end, but to enjoying an end already possessed, it is for that
 reason called rest for the soul. Therefore, insofar as delight is
 a proper act and true action, it can be an effect of an end.

But Aristotle's statement that motion or action ceases
 once an end is attained should be understood as being about
 the motion by which one tends to the attainment of an end,
 but not as being about the internal action by which one rests
 in an end. Indeed, St. Thomas adds in IV, dist. 48, q. 2, art. 2,
 in response to the fourth opposing argument, that the motion
 to an end that is held ceases at that point at which such a
 motion does not accompany to end itself or its attainment,
 just as the heavens attain their end by means of their motion,
 yet do not cease, because that motion is necessary for that
 end. In the same way, therefore, the internal action of love
 or of delight does not cease once an end has been achieved,
 since it accompanies such an end and is necessary for its
 perfection. And for this reason the causality of an end does
 not cease with respect to such actions.

17. But here a theological difficulty comes up, especially
 from the last conclusion, for it follows that beatific love and

346 *quartam*] primam A V.

360 quitur, ipsum amorem et fruitionem beatificam
 vere ac proprie causari a Deo viso, vel a visione eius
 in genere causae fina- <col. b> lis: et consequenter
 illos actus vere ac proprie esse propter finem, quod 355R
 videtur inconueniens, cum illi actus sint simpliciter
 necessarii. Sed quia res est Theologica, breuiter
 respondeo, concedendo illos actus esse ex causalita-
 365 tate finis, id enim aequae probant omnes rationes
 superius factae. Nec quidquam obstat quod sint 360R
 necessarii immo in superioribus dixi, necessitatem
 illius amoris provenire a Deo clare viso, ut ultimo
 fine, cuius summa bonitas tam est potens in cau-
 370 sando etiam in eo genere, ut omnino sibi subiiciat
 voluntatem. Denique illa necessitas non provenit 365R
 ex imperfectione, aut ex irrationali modo operandi,
 sed potius ex summa perfectione, tum ipsius fi-
 nis ultimi, tum etiam modi applicandi illum per
 375 cognitionem rationalem seu intellectualem perfec-
 tissimam ad movendam voluntatem: et ideo nihil 370R
 obstat, quominus illa voluntatis motio quantumvis
 necessaria, sit ex propria causalitate finis. An vero
 380 satis sit ut ille amor necessarius dicatur actus hu-
 manus necne, tractatur a Theologis, et pertinet
 magis ad moralem Philosophiam quam ad Meta-
 physicam.

De effectibus externis finalis causae.

18. Diximus hactenus de effectibus, quos causa
 finalis habet intra ipsam voluntatem causae agen-
 tis a proposito: nunc superest dicendum de ef-
 5 fectibus, qui exterius prodeunt a tali causa, id est, 5R
 extra ipsam humanam voluntatem, ita ut sub his
 effectibus comprehendantur tum actus omnium
 aliarum facultatum ipsius hominis, scilicet intel-
 lectus, sensuum, etc. tum etiam externi effectus,
 10 si qui sunt qui per has actiones resultent. In qua 10R

²²E.g., *DM XIX.8.10*.

enjoyment themselves are truly and properly caused in the
 genus of final cause by God having been seen or by the vision
 of him. It follows that these acts are truly and properly for the
 sake of an end, which seems disagreeable since these acts are
 strictly speaking necessary.

But since the matter is theological, I respond briefly by
 conceding that those acts are by the causality of an end. For
 the arguments made above equally prove this. Nor is it a
 problem that they are necessary. Indeed, I said in previous
 sections²² that the necessity of that love originates from God
 having been clearly seen as the ultimate end, whose supreme
 goodness is so powerful in causing even in the genus of final-
 causality that it entirely subjects the will to it. Finally, this
 necessity does not originate from imperfection or from an
 irrational way of acting, but rather from supreme perfection,
 both of the ultimate end itself and also of the mode of applying
 the end to moving the will through most perfect rational or
 intellectual cognition. And for this reason there is no problem
 with this motion of the will being from the proper causality
 of an end, however necessary it may be. But whether this is
 enough for that necessary love to be called a human act or
 not is discussed by theologians and pertains more to moral
 philosophy than to metaphysics.

Concerning the external effects of a final cause.

18. So far we have talked about the effects which a final
 cause has within the will itself of a cause acting purposefully.
 What is left is to talk about those effects which proceed more
 externally from such a cause, that is, beyond the human will
 itself. Thus among these effects are included both the acts
 of all the other faculties of a human being (namely, of the
 intellect, of the senses, etc.) and the external effects, if there
 are any, that result from these actions. Two points are certain
 and uncontroversial in this matter. The first point is that

re duo sunt certa et extra controversiam. Unum
est actiones omnes naturales quas homo exercet
sine imperio seu motione voluntatis, non esse ef-
fectus causae finalis, eo speciali modo, quo nunc
15 loquimur: huiusmodi sunt actiones omnes ani- 15R
mae vegetativae, quatenus sunt mere naturales; et
actus sensuum, vel etiam intellectus, quatenus in-
terdum antecedunt motionem voluntatis. Et ratio
est, quia causalitas finis quatenus proprie versatur
20 circa agentia a proposito, quae seipsa movent in 20R
finem, primo per se est circa voluntatem, et sup-
ponit sufficientem applicationem talis causae per
intellectum: sed in his actionibus quae non proced-
dunt ex motione voluntatis, non sic movetur homo
25 ex fine, sed agit ad modum aliorum agentium natu- 25R
ralium, ergo. Unde talis modus agendi per <857>
se non requirit propriam et rationalem cognitionem
ipsius finis. Immo et in ipsomet intellectu cog-
nitio vel apprehensio ipsiusmet finis, si naturalis
30 sit, et nullo modo a voluntate, non procedit a cog- 30R
nitione finis, sed est ipsa cognitio finis: et ideo
non procedit ex causalitate finis ut sic, prout est
propria agentium a proposito. Quod idcirco sem-
per addo, quia in his actibus naturalibus operatur
35 homo propter finem, sicut alia agentia naturalia, 35R
de quibus postea videbimus quid in eis sit operari
propter finem, et qualis in eis esse possit causalitas
finis. Atque in hac assertionem sic exposita nulla
relinquitur difficultas.

40 19. Secundo certum est, omnes actiones, et
effecta earum, quae procedunt ex imperio et mo-
tione voluntatis creatae operantis propter finem,
esse effectus causae finalis. Probatur primo ex
45 modo loquendi et sentiendi omnium, nam quando
homo deambulat propter sanitatem consequen-

all the natural actions that a human being exercises without
command or a motion of the will are not effects of the final
cause in the special way of which we are now speaking. Of
this sort are all the actions of the vegetative soul, insofar as
they are merely natural, and the acts of the senses or even of
the intellect, insofar as they sometimes precede the motion of
the will.

The reason is that the causality of an end insofar as it
properly concerns purposeful agents, who move themselves
to an end, in the first place directly concerns the will and
assumes the sufficient application of such a cause through
the intellect. But in those actions which do not proceed from
the motion of the will, the human being is not in that way
moved by the end but acts in the way other natural agents
acts. Therefore, [those actions are not effects of the final cause
in the special way of which we are now speaking]. Hence, such
a way of acting does not in itself require proper and rational
cognition of an end. Indeed, even in the intellect itself a
cognition or apprehension of the end, if it is natural and in
no way from the will, does not proceed from a cognition of an
end but is itself the cognition of an end. For this reason, it
does not proceed from the causality of an end as such, as is
proper to purposeful agents.

I therefore always add the qualification ‘as is proper to
purposeful agents’, because in these natural acts a human
being *does* act for the sake of an end just as other natural
agents do. Concerning natural agents, we will see later²³
what it means to act for the sake of an end in their case and
what the causality of an end could be in their case. And no
difficulty remains in this assertion once it has been explained
in this way.

19. The second certain point is that all actions and their
effects that proceed from the command and motion of a cre-
ated will acting for the sake of an end are effects of a final
cause. It is proven, first, from the way everyone talks and
thinks. For when a human being walks for the sake of achiev-
ing health, his walking is thought to be an effect of the health

²³*DM XXIII.10.*

dam, talis deambulatio censetur esse effectus san-
 itatis praeconceptae et intentae: et ideo dicitur
 esse propriissime propter finem, non ex directione
 alicuius extrinseci agentis, sed ipsiusmet operantis,
 50 tis, quod hac ratione vocatur agens a proposito: et
 idem est de omnibus similibus. Et quando per has
 actiones fit aliquis terminus permanens in facto
 esse, ille etiam censetur effectus finis praeconcepti,
 55 permanet: quomodo dixit Aristoteles instrumenta
 esse propter finem: et similiter domus, et aliae res
 artificiales sunt effectus alicuius finis praeconcepti.
 Ratio vero est, quia finis movet ad has omnes ac-
 60 tionem: ergo omnes sunt effectus eius. Item tales
 actiones prout ab homine fiunt, pendent essen-
 tialiter a fine ut causante: quia non possunt aliter
 ab homine fieri: ergo sunt effectus finis. Item il-
 lae actiones sunt media quibus comparatur finis
 65 intentus: sed finis non solum causat intentionem,
 vel electionem: sed etiam mediorum executionem:
 immo in hac maxime videtur relucere eius causalitas.

20. Dices, Interdum actio imperata a volun-
 tate non est medium, sed ipse finis intentus, iuxta
 70 quamdam divisionem superius datam, quod finis
 interdum est res acta, interdum ipsamet actio, ut
 cytharizatio, aut contemplatio: ergo tunc saltem
 non erit actio propter finem, etiamsi procedat a vol-
 untate: ergo non erit causata a fine. Respondetur,
 75 ut iam supra notavimus, nullam esse actionem,
 quae si proprie sumatur ut actio est, <col. b>
 non habeat aliquem terminum intrinsecum propter
 quem fit, ut cytharizatio ipsa quatenus est motio
 80 quaedam efficit quemdam sonum proportionatum,
 qui est qualitas quaedam artificiose composita: et
 hoc modo omnis actio est aliquo modo medium ad

preconceived and intended. And for this reason his walking
 is said to be most properly for the sake of an end, not as a
 result of the direction of some extrinsic agent but as a re-
 sult of the direction of the very person acting, who for this
 reason is called a purposeful agent. And the same is true
 in all similar cases. And when through these actions some
 enduring terminus comes to exist in fact, it also is thought
 55R to be an effect of the end that was preconceived, whether in
 becoming while it is actually being made or in having come
 to be when it endures afterwards. In this sense Aristotle said
 that instruments exist for the sake of an end, and likewise
 a house and other artifacts are effects of some end that was
 preconceived. The reason is that an end moves [the agent] to
 60R all these actions. Therefore, all are effects of an end. Likewise,
 insofar as such actions are performed by a human being, they
 depend essentially on an end as causing [them]. For otherwise
 they could not be performed by the human being. Therefore,
 65R they are effects of an end. Likewise, those actions are means
 by which the intended end is attained. But the end does not
 cause only the intention or election, but also the execution of
 the means. Indeed, its causality seems to shine out especially
 in [causing the execution of the means].

20. You will respond that sometimes an act commanded by
 the will is not a means but the intended end itself, according
 to a distinction made earlier (that sometimes the end is a
 thing produced but sometimes the action itself, as in playing
 a lyre or contemplation²⁴). Therefore, at least in such a case
 75R the action will not be for the sake of an end, even if it action
 proceeds from the will. Therefore, it will not be caused by an
 end.

I respond that, as I already noted above,²⁵ there is no
 action which if taken properly as an action does not have
 some intrinsic terminus for the sake of which it is done. The
 very playing of a lyre, insofar as it is a kind of motion, effects
 80R a certain proportionate sound, which is a kind of skillfully
 composed quality. And in this way every action is in some way

²⁴*DM XXIII.2.9.*

²⁵*DM XXIII.2.9.*

85 suum terminum, et ea ratione potest esse causata
 ab illo ut a fine. Si vero de ipso termino loqua- 85R
 mur, vel comprehendatur sub actione per modum
 unius, sic non est proprie medium, supposito quod
 sit finis ultimus in sua serie: tamen nihilominus
 licet sit finis Cuius, potest habere finem Cui. Nam
 cytharizatio ut fit ab homine, est propter ipsum 90R
 operantem: vel si talis actus sit finis formalis,
 potest esse propter obiectivum, ut contemplatio
 est propter veritatem ipsam. Atque ita semper
 omnis actio, quae est imperata a voluntate, est
 effectus alicuius finis praeconcepti. 95R

95 21. Circa hanc vero posteriorem assertionem
 occurrunt duo breviter explicanda. Primum est
 tactum supra sect. 1. quia ex dictis sequitur idem
 esse causam sui ipsius, quod videtur absurdum. 100R
 Et sequela patet imprimis, quia operatio imper-
 ata a voluntate saepe est vera causa finalis, quae
 apprehensa movet ad sui executionem, et non tan-
 tum ad desiderium vel intentionem: ergo executio
 illius operationes est effectus eiusdem operationis 105R
 apprehensae per modum finis: illa autem executio
 non est aliud ab ipsamet operatione, ergo. Deinde
 quia consecutio finis (sive in operatione consistat,
 sive in sola inhaerentia alicuius formae, vel in alia
 simili habitudine) est ultimus effectus causae fi- 110R
 nalis, ut finis curationis est sanitas non utcumque,
 sed ut mihi inhaerens, et me afficiens, et hoc est
 ultimum quod causatur ex vi illius intentionis: et
 idem est proportionaliter in reliquis. Sed primus
 finis, qui movet, et causat usque ad hunc effectum, 115R
 est ipsamet consecutio finis ut apprehensa: causat
 ergo seipsam.

a means to its terminus and for that reason can be caused by
 the terminus as by an end.

But if we speak about the terminus itself, it is either [i]
 included in the action as part of one whole with it—and in
 that way it is not properly a means, since we have assumed
 that it is the ultimate end in its series—nevertheless, still,
 although it is the *finis cuius*, it can have a *finis cui*, for playing
 a lyre as it done by a human being is for the sake of the very
 person playing, or [ii] if such an act is a formal end, it can be
 for the sake of an objective end in the way that contemplation
 is for the sake of truth itself. And so in this way it is always
 the case that every action which is commanded by the will is
 an effect of some preconceived end.

21. But concerning the latter assertion two points come up
 that need to be explained briefly. First,²⁶ it follows from what
 was said that the same thing is a cause of itself, which seems
 absurd (this was touched on above in sect. 1²⁷). The inference
 is clear, first of all, because the activity commanded by the
 will is often a true final cause, which when apprehended
 moves [the agent] and not only to desire or intention but to
 the execution of the activity. Therefore, the execution of that
 action is an effect of the very same activity apprehended in
 the manner of an end. That execution, moreover, is nothing
 other than the activity itself. Therefore, [such an activity is a
 cause of itself].

The inference is also true because the attainment of an
 end (whether it consists in activity or only in the inherence of
 some form or in some other similar relation) is the ultimate
 effect of the final cause. For example, the end of curing is
 health, and not health in just any way but health as inhering
 in me and affecting me. And this is the ultimate effect that
 is caused by the force of that intention. And the same is true
 proportionately in other cases. But the first end, which moves
 and causes all the way up to this [ultimate] effect, is the very
 attainment of the end as apprehended. Therefore, it causes
 itself.

²⁶The second point is taken up in n. 23, below.

²⁷*DM XXIII.1.3.*

115 22. Respondetur imprimis nullum esse incon- 120R
 veniens hoc totum concedere, quia in causa finali
 non intervenit ea repugnantia, quae in causa effi-
 ciente, ut non possit esse causa sui ipsius, quia
 non requirit praeexistentiam realem ad causan-
 120 dum, sed sufficit intentionalis, media apprehen- 125R
 sione: cum ergo finis causet priusquam habeat
 existentiam in actu, mirum non est, quod possit
 in sua genere concurrere ad suamet existentiam.
 Atque ita concedimus, rem eandem secundum di-
 125 versas condiciones existendi posse <858> causare 130R
 seipsam, nam intentionaliter existens causat seip-
 sam ut realiter sit. Neque hoc est diversum ab
 eo, quod communi axiomate dicitur, *Illud quod est*
primum in intentione, esse ultimum in executione:
 130 vel quod etiam Aristoteles dixit, *formam et finem* 135R
concurrere in idem numero, quamvis forma et ef-
 ficiens solum possint concurrere in idem specie.
 Forma enim, seu effectus formalis eius est effectus
 agentis, et ut sic est etiam effectus finis, qui exci-
 135 tavit agens ad operandum, quique non est aliud 140R
 ab ipsa forma. Deinde vero addimus, nullam esse
 finis consecutionem, quae non sit aliquo modo
 propter finem, vel obiectivum, si illum habeat, vel
 saltem propter finem Cui, qui semper supponitur
 140 ad causalitatem finalem, et ut sic non est effectus 145R
 eius: atque hoc modo semper effectus finis etiam
 ultimus distinguitur aliquo modo ab adaequata
 causa finali. Tandem consecutio finis ultimi vel
 simpliciter vel in aliqua serie, non causat se imme-
 145 diate, sed proxime causat in intellectuali agente, 150R
 de quo nunc loquimur, affectum et intentionem,
 et alios actus, quibus mediantibus pervenit eius
 causalitas usque ad illam actionem, qua finis ipse
 150 comparatur, et in qua consistit: et ita semper con-
 currit aliquid distinctum ab ipso ad huiusmodi
 causalitatem.

23. Sed tunc occurrit explicanda altera difficul- 155R

22. First of all, I respond that there is nothing disagreeable about conceding all this, because that repugnance that comes up in the case of efficient causes—so that something cannot be the cause of itself—does not come up in the case of final causes. This is because a final cause does not require a real pre-existence in order to cause; an intentional [pre-existence] by means of apprehension suffices. When, therefore, an end causes before it has actual existence, it is not surprising that it can concur in its genus with its own existence. And so we concede that the same thing according to different conditions for existing can cause itself. For an end existing intentionally causes itself to exist in reality.

Nor is this different from what is generally said axiomatically: ‘that which is first in intention is last in execution’. Nor is it different from what Aristotle said: ‘the form and the end concur to be the same in number’, although the form and efficient cause can only come together to be the same in species. For the form, or its formal effect, is an effect of the agent and as such is also an effect of the end that excited the agent to acting and that is nothing other than the form itself. But we also add that nothing is the attainment of an end that is not in some way for the sake of an end, either for the sake of an objective end, if it has that, or at least for the sake of a *finis cui* (which is always assumed for final causality and as such is not an effect of it). And so in this way an effect of an end—even an ultimate effect—is always distinguished in some way from the adequate final cause.

Finally, the attainment of an end (whether unqualifiedly ultimate or only ultimate in some series) does not cause itself immediately. Rather, it proximately causes in the intellectual agent (concerning which we now speak) an affect and intention and other acts by means of which its causality comes to that action by which the end itself is attained and in which it consists. And in this way something distinct from the ultimate end always concurs [with it] in this kind of causality.

23. But then the second difficulty mentioned before that

155 tas proposita, nimirum, qualis sit haec causalitas
 finis circa actiones vel res externas, manantes a
 160 motione voluntatis. Est enim in his specialis du-
 bitandi ratio, nam actus interni eliciti a voluntate
 habent realem, et intrinsecam habitudinem ad ip- 160R
 sum finem ut ad proprium obiectum, vel formale
 simul et materiale, ut in intentione, et aliis actibus
 165 qui proxime versantur circa ipsum finem, vel for-
 male tantum, ut in electione mediorum: et ideo
 recte intelligitur, ipsum finem per se ac proxime ex- 165R
 citare ac movere ad tales actus: et e converso tales
 actus per se et intrinsece pendere a causalitate
 170 talis finis. At vero actus imperati tantum a volun-
 tate (et multo magis effectus eorum) nullo modo
 excitantur proxime ab ipso fine, neque ipsi dicunt 170R
 intrinsecam habitudinem ad finem, sed solum per
 extrinsecam denominationem dicuntur ordinari in
 175 finem mediis interioribus actibus, ut deambula-
 tio exterior mere extrinsecus ordinatur ad sani-
 tatem. Ex quo videtur sequi primo, finem non 175R
 per se, sed per accidens esse causam huiusmodi
 effectuum eo modo quo applicans vel excitans ef-
 180 ficientem causam dici- <col. b> tur esse causa
 effectus causati ab illa, vel eo modo quo avus est
 causa nepotis, quia genuit patrem eius: sic enim 180R
 finis est causa actionis externae, solum quia ge-
 nuit internam. Deinde videtur sequi ex vi huius
 185 causalitatis finis nihil rei poni in huiusmodi ac-
 tionibus et effectibus externis per se loquendo, sed
 solam extrinsecam denominationem, quae non est 185R
 satis ad causalitatem realem. Sequela patet, quia
 inde solum habet actus exterior ut ordinetur medio
 190 interiori ad talem finem, quod solum est denom-
 inatio extrinseca in ipso exteriori. Cuius signum
 est, nam si contingeret illam externam actionem, 190R
 vel propter alium finem, vel casu et sine ullo fine
 fieri: in se et in sua entitate non mutaretur, nec
 minueretur, neque actio physica qua fit, esset alia:

needs explaining comes up: namely, what this causality of
 an end is with respect to the external actions or things that
 flow from a motion of the will. For there is a special reason
 for doubting with respect to these. Internal acts elicited by
 the will have a real and intrinsic habitude to the end itself as
 to a proper object, whether the end is formal and material at
 the same time (as in the case of intention and other acts that
 are directed proximately to the end itself) or formal only (as in
 the case of the election of means). For this reason one rightly
 understands that an end directly and proximately excites and
 moves [the will] to such acts and, conversely, that such acts
 directly and intrinsically depend on the causality of such an
 end. But, on the other hand, acts merely commanded by the
 will are in no way proximately excited by an end itself nor do
 they express and intrinsic habitude to an end. (This is all the
 more true of the effects of such acts.) Rather, they are only
 said through an extrinsic denomination to be ordered to an
 end by means of interior acts. For example, external walking
 is merely extrinsically ordered to health.

It seems to follow from this, first, that an end is not a
per se cause of such an effect but only a *per accidens* cause,
 either in the way in which something applying or exciting an
 efficient cause is thereby said to be the cause of the caused
 effect or in the way in which a grandfather is the cause of his
 grandson because he begot the grandson's father. For in this
 way an end is the cause of external actions only because it
 begot the internal actions.

Next, it seems to follow that, properly speaking, no real
 thing is placed in [commanded] actions and their external
 effects by virtue of this causality of an end. Only an extrinsic
 denomination is placed in them, which is not sufficient for real
 causality. The inference is clear, because an external act has
 nothing more from the account given than that it is ordered
 to such an end by means of an internal act, which is only an
 extrinsic denomination in that external act. A sign of this is
 that that external action would not be changed or diminished
 in itself or in its entity nor would the physical action by which
 it is produced be any different, if it were to be produced for

ergo signum est non causari per se ab illo fine, sed tantum remote et per accidens. In causis enim
 195 efficientibus, licet contingat eundem effectum qui fit ab una causa, posse causari ab alia, tamen si
 sit causa per se, necesse est saltem actionem esse
 diversam ut in superioribus traditum est: unde si
 ex mutatione causae neque effectus neque actio
 200 mutatur, signum est talem causam nec per se nec immediate influere in talem effectum: idem ergo,
 proportione servata, erit in praesenti.

24. Haec difficultas postulat ut explicemus quid sit causalitas causae finalis, vel quid ponat in suis effectibus, quod sequenti sectione praestabimus, et in fine eius difficultati satisfaciemus.

the sake of another end or if it were produced by chance and without any end. Therefore, this is a sign that it is not caused *per se* by that end but only remotely and *per accidens*. For in efficient causes, although it happens that the same effect which is produced by one cause can be caused by another, nevertheless, if it is a *per se* cause, it is necessary that at least the action be different, as was treated in previous sections.²⁸ Hence, if by changing the cause neither the effect nor the action is changed, this is a sign that such a cause neither *per se* nor immediately has an influence on such an effect. Therefore, the same thing will be true, preserving proportion, in the present case.

24. This difficulty demands that we explain what the causality of a final cause is or what it places in its effects. We will do this in the following section; we will address this difficulty at the end of that section.²⁹

²⁸*DM XVIII.10.8.*

²⁹See *DM XXIII.4.16–17.*