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<851, col. b><sup>2</sup>

*Quos effectus habeat causa finalis.*

1. Priusquam de ratione causandi finis dicamus, agendum videtur de effectibus eius, ut ab iis quae nobis notiora sunt procedamus. Et quoniam, ut supra dixi, nunc consideramus  
5 finalem causam respectu voluntatis creatae, per quam agentia intellectualia operantur propter finem, duplices effectus huius causae considerare possumus: quidam sunt intra ipsam voluntatem, et sunt actus vel affectus ab illa elicit: alii sunt extra vo- <852> luntatem, et sunt effectus, qui extra ipsam  
10 prodeunt ex efficacitate, vel imperio, seu motione ipsius per proprios actus eius.

2. Est igitur imprimis certum, causam finalem, prout nunc illam consideramus, per se primo, ac maxime causare aliquem actum vel affectum in voluntate ipsa. Hoc est recep-  
15 tum omnium consensu, satisque ostendi potest rationibus, quibus in sect. 1 ostendimus dari causam finalem: nos enim per effectus in causarum cognitionem pervenimus: per nullos autem effectus ita cognoscimus causalitatem finis, sicut per eos quos habet circa humanam voluntatem, quam sua  
20 metaphorica motione allicit, ut et ipsum amet, et per convenientia media quaerat donec illum consequatur, et in eo quiescat.

*Prima difficultas de causalitate finis circa internos actus voluntatis.*

*What effects the final cause has.*

1. Before we discuss the *ratio* of causing of an end, it seems that we should first deal with its effects, so that may proceed from those things that are better known to us. And since, as I said above,<sup>3</sup> we are now considering  
5R final causes with respect to the created will by which intellectual agents act for the sake of an end, we can consider two kinds of effect of this cause. Some are internal to the will itself and are acts or affects elicited from it; others are external to the will and are effects which go out beyond it by an efficacy or command or motion of the will through its  
10R proper acts.

2. In the first place, then, it is certain that a final cause, in the way we are now considering it, first and foremost directly causes some act or affect in the will itself. This is the received consensus among everyone and can be satisfactorily shown by those arguments with which we showed  
15R in sect. 1 that a final cause is given.<sup>4</sup> For we come to a cognition of causes through their effects. Moreover, through no effects do we so cognize the causality of an end as through those effects which an end has on the human will. An end draws the human will by its metaphorical motion so that the will loves it and seeks it through agreeable means until the will  
20R attains it and rests in it.

*The first difficulty concerning the causality of the end with respect to internal acts of the will.*

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>DM XXIII.1.8.

<sup>4</sup>DM XXIII.1.8.

25 3. Difficultas vero est an omnes actus, qui in hoc progressu inter-  
 30 veniunt, sint a fine ut a propria causa in suo genere, an vero  
 non omnes, sed aliqui eorum, et quinam illi sint. Ut autem  
 percipiatur ratio difficultatis, distinguere oportet plures actus,  
 qui in hoc negotio interveniunt. Quidam tendunt directe  
 in finem, vel secundum se absolute, ut simplex voluntas eius  
 seu amor, vel ut consequendum per media, sicut intentio: et hi  
 actus antecedunt non solum consecutionem finis, sed etiam  
 electionem mediorum. Alii sunt actus, qui proxime versantur  
 circa media, quamvis ratione finis: et huiusmodi proprie  
 35 est electio, quam antecedit consultatio et inquisitio medio-  
 rum, quae quatenus ad inquirendum finem necessaria est vel  
 utilis, ad media reducitur, et quatenus voluntaria est, sub elec-  
 tionem quodammodo cadit, vel ad illam revocatur. Et haec  
 duo genera actuum dicuntur pertinere ad ordinem intentio-  
 nis, quia non solum finis consecutionem, sed etiam execu-  
 tionem mediorum antecedunt. Post ordinem vero intentionis  
 sequitur ordo executionis, in quo similiter possunt duo alia  
 genera actuum distingui: quidam enim versantur circa medio-  
 rum executionem, per usum eorum, quem activum vocant.  
 40 Alii versantur circa finem, ut iam consecutum et possessum,  
 scilicet fruitio, vel gaudium, quod etiam quies animi dicitur,  
 et in eo statu potest etiam durare amor.

4. Est ergo circa hos actus prima generalis difficultas,  
 quia finis solum est causa mediorum: nullus autem ex his  
 50 actibus est vere <col. b> ac proprie medium ad finem obti-  
 nendum: ergo nullus eorum causatur a fine. Maior constat  
 ex definitione finis, est enim id cuius gratia aliquid fit, quod  
 solis mediis proprie convenit. Deinde est specialis et maior  
 difficultas de actibus qui versantur circa finem, nam illi nullo  
 modo sunt propter finem: ergo non sunt effectus finis. An-  
 55 tecedens patet, quia illud est propter finem, quod procedit ex  
 amore vel intentione finis, nam illud *esse propter* dicit ordi-  
 nationem ad finem ortam ex aliquo priori actu: sed inten-  
 tio finis non oritur ex alia intentione, nec amor ex amore,  
 alioqui esset processus in infinitum, ergo. Unde, sicut as-  
 60 sensus conclusionis est ex principiis, assensus autem principii  
 non est ex principio, ita voluntas medii potest esse ex fine et

25R 3. But there is the difficulty of whether all acts which occur in this pro-  
 30R gression are from the end as from a proper cause in its genus, or whether  
 not all but only some of them, and in that case which ones. But in order  
 to perceive the nature of the difficulty, it is necessary to distinguish the  
 multiple acts which occur in this process. Some tend directly to the end,  
 either absolutely as it is in itself (as with simple willing or love for an  
 end) or as something to be achieved through means (as with intention).  
 These acts not only precede the attainment of the end but also the elec-  
 35R tion of means. Others are acts that are proximately directed towards the  
 means (although by reason of an end). Election is properly of this kind.  
 It is preceded by deliberation and inquiry into means, which, insofar as  
 inquiring into the end is necessary or useful for leading to means and in-  
 40R sofar as it is voluntary, falls in a certain way under election and answers  
 to it. And these two genera of acts are said to belong to the order of  
 intention, because they not only precede the attainment of the end but  
 also precede the execution of the means.

40R But after the order of intention there follows the order of execution,  
 in which two other genera of acts can be distinguished in a similar way.  
 For some are directed to the execution of the means, through the use  
 (*usum*) of them that is called active. Others are directed to the end as  
 already achieved and possessed, namely, enjoyment (*fruitio*) or joy, which  
 is also called the rest of the soul; love can also remain in that state.

45R 4. There is, therefore, a first general difficulty concerning these acts,  
 because an end is only a cause of means, but none of these acts is truly  
 and properly a means for obtaining the end. Therefore, none of them is  
 caused by an end. The major is clear from the definition of end, for an  
 end is that for the sake of which something comes to be, which properly  
 50R applies only to means.

55R Next, there is a special and more serious difficulty concerning the  
 acts that are directed to an end, for they are in no way for the sake of  
 the end. Therefore, they are not effects of the end. The antecedent is  
 clear, because that is for the sake of an end which proceeds from love or  
 intention for the end. For 'being for the sake of' expresses an ordering to  
 an end that has arisen from some prior act. But an intention for an end  
 does not arise from some other intention, nor love from love; otherwise,  
 there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, [neither intention nor love  
 are for the sake of an end]. Hence, just as an assent to a conclusion is

propter finem: voluntas autem finis non ita. Tertio augetur  
 65 difficultas in iis actibus, qui versantur circa finem iam conse-  
 cutum, nam finis non causat postquam comparatus est: con-  
 sistit enim eius causalitas in motione, consecuto autem fine  
 iam quiescit animus: cessat ergo omnis motio: ergo et causal-  
 itas finis. Unde Aristoteles 1. *De generatione et corruptione*  
 70 actione etiam cessat causalitas finis, quia ubi non est causa ef-  
 ficiens, nec finalis esse potest, ut infra docebimus.

*Primae difficultatis resolutio.*

5. Ut a clarioribus incipiamus, dicendum primo est, usum  
 seu executionem mediorum per se ac proprie esse effectum  
 5 causae finalis. De hac conclusione nulla est controversia,  
 nec dubitandi ratio, quia hic actus non solum procedit ex af-  
 fectu et intentione finis, sed etiam vere ac proprie dici potest  
 medium ad finem. Quia licet nomine usus et executionis  
 [mediorum] hic non intelligamus solum externum usum vel  
 executionem, sed etiam internum actum, quo voluntas ap-  
 10 plicat membra vel instrumenta ad exsequendum medium:  
 tamen tota illa actio ut includit tam imperantem actum quam  
 imperatum, vere ac proprie dicitur esse medium ad finem:  
 ergo est etiam propriissime effectus finis. Et confirmatur,  
 nam electio est de mediis: quando vero media talia sunt ut per  
 15 usum activum voluntatis exerceri debeant, etiam ipse usus ac-  
 tivas sub electionem cadit: nam eligitur ut medium tota illa  
 actio humana, quae ex interno, et externo actu coalescit: ergo  
 etiam actus internus voluntatis quo proxime fit <853> exse-  
 cutio externi medii, habet rationem medii ad finem: ergo est  
 20 etiam effectus ipsius finis.

6. Dico secundo. Electio mediorum vere ac proprie  
 est effectus causae finalis. Probatur primo, quia ille actus  
 est propriissime propter finem: sed per haec verba maxime  
 declaratur causalitas finis: ergo ille actus est ex causalitate fi-

8 *mediorum*] finis A V.

60R based on principles but an assent to a principle is not based on a principle,  
 so a willing of a means can be based on an end and be for the sake of an  
 end but the willing of an end cannot be like that.

Third, a difficulty comes up in those acts that are directed to an end  
 already attained. For an end does not cause after it has been secured.  
 65R For its causality consists in motion. But a soul rests in an attained end.  
 Therefore, all motion ceases. Therefore, the causality of the end [also  
 ceases]. Hence, Aristotle in *On Generation and Corruption* I, text. 55  
 [324b16–18], says that action ceases once an end is attained. But once  
 action has ceased, an end’s causality also ceases, since where there is no  
 70R efficient cause there cannot be a final cause, as we will teach below.

*Resolution of the first difficulty.*

5. So that we begin from the clearer things, it should first be said  
 that use or execution of means is directly and properly an effect of a  
 final cause. There is no controversy nor reason for doubting regarding  
 5R this conclusion, because this act not only proceeds from the affect and  
 intention for an end, but also can truly and properly be called a means  
 to the end. For, although we do not here understand by the phrase ‘use  
 and execution of the means’ only external use or execution but also the  
 internal act by which the will applies the members or instruments to  
 carrying out the means, still, that complete action—as it includes both  
 10R the commanded act and the command—is truly and properly said to be  
 a means to the end. Therefore, it is also most properly an effect of the  
 end. And it is confirmed: for election is of means. But when the means  
 are of such a kind that they have to be exercised through the active use  
 of the will, that active use itself also falls under election. For the whole  
 15R human action that coalesces from the internal and external acts is elected  
 as a means. Therefore, the internal act of the will by which the execution  
 of external means comes about proximately also has the *ratio* of a means  
 to an end. Therefore, it is also an effect of an end itself.

6. Second, I say that the election of means is truly and properly an  
 effect of the final cause. It is proven, first, from the fact that that act  
 is most properly for the sake of an end. But the causality of an end is  
 especially declared through those words. Therefore, that act results from

25 nis. Secundo, Ille actus procedit ex intentione finis, et ex  
ratione ordinante medium ad finem: sed in his videtur po-  
tissimum consistere causalitas finis: ergo. Tertio, talis actus  
pendet essentialiter ex fine, quia non versaretur circa media  
nisi ratione finis: quin potius ipsa media electa non sunt ef-  
fectus finis nisi media electione: ergo multo magis necesse est  
30 ut ipsamet electio sit effectus finis. Et hae rationes aequae fere  
confirmant praecedentem assertionem.

7. Neque contra has assertiones obstat prima ratio du-  
bitandi in principio posita. Primo quia non tantum media  
35 sunt propter finem, sed quicquid a fine essentialiter pendet,  
et ex illius amore procedit. Deinde quia ipsamet electio non  
incongrue dici potest medium ad finem. Quod potest expli-  
cari ex iis quae supra diximus tractando de potentia formaliter  
libera, quod nimirum actus ab ea elicited, est intrinsece vol-  
40 untarius, seu volitus per modum actus: ipsa ergo electio cum  
sit actus elicited a voluntate, est etiam intrinsece volita: non  
est autem volita nisi propter consequendum finem, quia sicut  
res quae eligitur, propter finem eligitur, ita ipsamet electio  
propter finem exercetur. Ut, qui eligit eleemosynam ad satis-  
45 faciendum pro peccatis, non solum refert in eum finem ipsam  
eleemosynam, quam eligit, sed etiam ipsam volitionem qua il-  
lam eligit, nam ad eum finem necessaria est illa electio, et in  
ea reperitur ea bonitas, et utilitas quae invenitur in medio ad  
finem intentum comparato. Et confirmatur primo, nam con-  
50 sultatio est mediorum ad finem, et, si contingat voluntatem  
actu directo, et formali velle consultare, quod saepe accidit,  
illa volitio revera est cuiusdam medii ad finem: quia non ob ali-  
ud vult quis consultare, nisi ut paret sibi viam ad finem obti-  
nendum: ergo similiter si voluntate propria, et reflexa velit

25R the causality of an end. Second: that act proceeds from an intention for  
an end and from reason ordering a means to that end. But the causality  
of the end seems especially to consist in these. Therefore, [the act of  
election proceeds on account of the end's causality]. Third: such an  
act depends essentially on the end, because the act is not directed to the  
means except by reason of the end. In fact, the elected means themselves  
30R are not effects of the end except by means of election. Therefore, much  
more is it necessary that the election itself be an effect of the end. And  
these arguments confirm the preceding assertion almost equally.

7. Nor does the first reason for doubting posited in the beginning<sup>5</sup>  
stand against these assertions.<sup>6</sup> First, because not only are means for the  
sake of an end, but whatever essentially depends on an end and proceeds  
from a love for it is for the sake of that end. Also, because the election  
itself can be said—not incongruously—to be a means to the end. This can  
be explained by those things which we said above<sup>7</sup> when discussing the  
formally free power:<sup>8</sup> namely, that an act elicited from it is intrinsically  
40R voluntary or willed in the manner of an act. Election itself, therefore,  
since it is an act elicited from the will is also willed intrinsically. More-  
over, it is not willed except for the sake of pursuing an end, because, just  
as a thing which is elected is elected for the sake of an end, so also the  
election itself is exercised for the sake of an end. Just as he who elects  
45R alms for satisfying for his sins refers not only the alms themselves that  
he elects to his end but also the very volition by which he elects them.  
For that election is necessary to that end and in it is found the goodness  
and utility that is found in a means that has been related (*comparato*) to  
an intended end.

50R This is confirmed, first: for deliberation is about the means to an  
end, and if it happens that the will by a direct and formal act wishes to  
deliberate, which often happens, that volition really is a kind of means  
to the end. For one does not will to deliberate on account of anything  
other than to prepare for oneself a way to obtain the end. Therefore,

<sup>5</sup>*DM XXIII.3.4.*

<sup>6</sup>The assertions made in the preceding two paragraphs: namely, that (a) use or execution of the means is a proper effect of a final cause and that (b) election of means is a proper effect of a final cause.

<sup>7</sup>*DM XIX.5.*

<sup>8</sup>That is, the will.

55 hic et nunc eligere, ut etiam potest, illo actu vult electionem  
ut quoddam medium, quia etiam vult illam propter finem,  
sicut consultationem: ergo etiam quando hoc non faciat dis-  
tincto actu et reflexo, ipsamet electio, eo <col. b> modo  
60 quo est intrinsece volita, intrinsece est quoddam medium ad  
finem, ratione cuius volita est: est ergo vere ac proprie effec-  
tus finis.

8. Dico tertio. Actus qui versantur circa finem ip-  
sum, et antecedunt, vel antecedere possunt ordine intentio-  
nis consecutionem eius, sunt vere et proprie effectus finis.  
65 Circa hanc conclusionem invenio nonnullam diversitatem in-  
ter auctores: quidam enim eam admittunt de actu intentionis,  
vel desiderii, non vero de primo actu amoris, seu simplicis  
voluntatis. Et ratio esse potest, quia desiderium, vel intentio  
supponunt amorem finis, et ab eo procedunt, et ideo possunt  
70 causari a fine medio amore sui, et propriissime dicentur esse  
propter finem, vel gratia finis: et ideo esse possunt effectus  
finis. Amor autem non supponit alium actum vel amorem  
finis a quo procedat: et ideo non est ex amore finis: nec etiam  
est formaliter propter finem, quantum est ex directione ip-  
sius voluntatis: non est ergo effectus finis in genere causae fi-  
nalis, sed solum in genere obiecti, efficientis, vel specificantis  
75 iuxta varias opiniones. Et hanc sententiam videtur tenere Fer-  
rariensis 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 75. dicit enim licet res  
quae est finis amari possit, nihil ad ipsam ordinando, tamen  
non exercere causalitatem finis, donec aliquid propter ipsam  
80 ametur, et fundatur in verbis D. Thomae ibi dicentis, causalita-  
tem finis in hoc consistere, quod propter ipsum alia desider-  
antur. Tamen ibi D. Thomas non dicit hanc esse adaequatam  
causalitatem finis, sed pertinere hoc ad causalitatem finis. Alii  
85 vero de omnibus his actibus conclusionem admittunt, cum  
quadam tamen moderatione, scilicet, quod hi actus revera sint  
effectus finis, non tamen ita proprie aut non ita perfecte sicut  
prios: quod sumi potest ex Gabriele in 2. dist. 38. notab. 2,  
et. Gregorio quem ipse citat: ibi art. 1.

Gabriel.

90 9. Alii nihilominus simpliciter affirmant finem esse pro-

55R likewise, if by a proper and reflexive willing one wishes here and now  
to elect, as can also happen, then by that act one wills the election as a  
kind of means. For one wills even it for the sake of an end, just like the  
deliberation. Therefore, even when one does not do this by a distinct  
and reflexive act, the election itself (in the way in which it is intrinsically  
60R willed) is intrinsically a kind of means to that end for which it is willed.  
Therefore, it is truly and properly an effect of an end.

8. I say, third: acts that are directed to the end itself and precede or  
can precede its attainment in the order of intention are truly and prop-  
erly effects of the end. I find some diversity among the authors concern-  
65R ing this conclusion.

For some admit it concerning acts of intention or desire but not  
concerning first acts of love or of simple willings. The argument can be  
that desire or intention presuppose a love for the end and proceed from  
it. For that reason, they can be caused by the end by means of a love for  
70R it and are most properly said to be for the sake of or on account of the  
end. For this reason they can be effects of the end. But love does not  
assume another act or love for the end from which it proceeds and for  
this reason it is not a result of love for the end. Neither is it formally  
for the sake of the end, insofar as it is a result of the direction of the  
will itself. Therefore, it is not an effect of the end in the genus of final  
75R cause, but only in the genus of object (effecting or specifying, according  
to various opinions). Francis Sylvester of Ferrara seems to hold this view  
in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 75, for he says that although a thing that is  
an end can be loved without anything being ordered to it, nevertheless,  
80R it does not exercise the causality of the end until something else is loved  
for its sake. And this is founded in the words of St. Thomas where he  
says that the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are  
desired for its sake. Nevertheless, St. Thomas here does not say that this  
is adequate to the causality of the end but only that this belongs to the  
85R causality of the end.

But others admit the conclusion concerning all these acts, but with  
a certain qualification: namely, that these acts really are effects of the  
end but not as properly or not as perfectly as the acts mentioned earlier.  
This can be gathered from Gabriel in II, dist. 38, notab. 2, and Gregory,  
90R whom he cites there in art. 1.

Gabriel.

9. Nevertheless, others affirm without qualification that an end is

Henricus.      prie finalem causam horum actuum, ut Henricus 2. p. *Sum-*  
*mae* art. 46. q. 6. Et in hoc sensu posita est assertio, quam  
D. Thomas.      mihi sumo ex D. Thoma, 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. ubi simpliciter ait,  
95                esse effectus finis: nam haec duo convertuntur, sicut esse ab  
                    agente et esse effectum agentis, comprehendendo sub effectu  
                    actionem ipsam. At vero hi actus de quibus nunc agimus,  
                    sunt vere actus humani, nam <854> procedunt ab homine ut  
100                rationalis est, immo etiam sunt liberi saltem pro statu huius  
                    vitae, ut supra disp. 19, sect. 3. probatum est, ergo.

10. Atque hinc confici potest prima ratio, nam homo  
                    quatenus exercet has actiones, etiam primum amorem finis,  
                    operatur propter finem, et non operatur ut ab alio motus in  
105                finem, sed ut proxime et immediate motus ab ipso fine se-  
                    cundum propriam et formalem rationem eius: ergo hi actus  
                    sunt propter finem ut causati ex propria motione finis ut fi-  
                    nis est: ergo sunt effectus finis ut finaliter causantis. Con-  
                    sequentiae sunt evidentes, quia causalitas finis propriissima  
110                est per dictam motionem. Maior etiam patet, quia illa actio  
                    non temere et casu fit, sed ad definitum scopum ex instituto  
                    tendit: hinc autem colligimus actionem aliquam esse propter  
                    finem. Minor etiam est satis clara, quia in quolibet illorum ac-  
                    tuum homo operatur illectus et attractus a fine cognito, non  
115                utcumque, sed quatenus est bonum quoddam propter se dili-  
                    gibile, quae est propria quaedam habitudo et formalis ratio  
                    finis: et ex vi huius cognitionis homo ita operatur in ea ac-  
                    tione, ut ipse seipsum dirigat et moveat in talem finem, et  
                    in formalem bonitatem eius. Atque haec ratio sumitur ex  
120                D. Thoma dicto art. 1. ubi non aliter probat actum humanum  
                    esse propter finem, nisi quia est ab obiecto voluntatis sub ra-  
                    tione finis, id est ut exercet propriam causalitatem finis: et  
                    3. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 2. rat. 5. sic ait, *De agentibus*

properly the final cause of these acts,<sup>9</sup> as Henry [of Ghent] does in *Sum-*  
*mae* II, art. 46, q. 6. And this is the sense in which I made the assertion,<sup>10</sup>  
                    which I take for myself from St. Thomas, *ST IaIIæ.1.1*, where he says  
95R                without qualification that all human acts are for the sake of an end and,  
                    consequently, are effects of an end. For being for the sake of an end and  
                    being effects of an end are convertible, just as being from an agent  
                    and being an effect of an agent are convertible (including actions under  
                    effects). But the acts that we are discussing now are truly human acts.  
100R                For they proceed from a human being insofar as he is rational; indeed,  
                    they are even free, at least in this life, as was shown above in *DM XIX.3*.  
                    Therefore, [these acts are effects of an end].

10. From here the first argument can be constructed: for insofar as a  
                    human being exercises these actions, even a first love for an end, he acts  
105R                for the sake of an end. And he does not act as moved by something else  
                    to the end but as proximately and immediately moved by the end itself  
                    according to its proper and formal *ratio*. Therefore, these acts are for the  
                    sake of an end, as caused by the proper motion of an end as end. They  
                    are, therefore, effects of an end as final-causing.

The consequences are evident, because the causality of an end occurs  
                    most properly through the stated motion. The major premise is also ob-  
                    vious, since that action does not happen blindly or by chance but tends  
                    to a definite target by design. From this, moreover, we gather that any  
                    action is for the sake of an end. The minor premise is also sufficiently  
115R                clear, since in every one of these actions the human being acts enticed  
                    and attracted by the cognized end, not in any way whatever, but pre-  
                    cisely as it is a kind of good lovable for its own sake, which is a certain  
                    proper habitudo and the formal *ratio* of an end. As a result of the force  
                    of this cognition, a human being acts in such a way in that action that  
                    he directs and moves himself to such an end and to its formal goodness.  
120R                And this argument is taken from St. Thomas, in the cited art. 1, where  
                    he shows that a human act is for the sake of an end in no other way than  
                    by pointing out that it is from the object of the will under the *ratio* of  
                    an end, that is, as it exercises the proper causality of an end. And in

Henry of Ghent.

St. Thomas.

<sup>9</sup>That is, acts directed to the end itself.

<sup>10</sup>See the first sentence of *DM XXIII.3.8*.

125 *per intellectum non est dubium quin agunt propter finem, agunt enim praeconci-  
piantes per intellectum id quod per actionem con-  
sequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt.* Haec autem verba  
applicari possunt etiam ad simplicem amorem ipsius finis.

130 11. Secundo, hoc amplius declaratur in ipso amore:  
potest enim dupliciter considerari: primo ut directe tendit  
in obiectum, secundo ut reflexione virtuali in seipsum cadit,  
eo videlicet modo quo supra dicebam huiusmodi actus esse  
intrinsicè voluntarios. Priori consideratione causatur a boni-  
tate obiecti ut cognita, et movente appetitum ad amandum  
talem rem propter bonitatem suam: et ita vere causatur ab  
135 obiecto ut a fine, non quidem ut a fine extrinseco rei volitae,  
sed ut a fine proprio et intrinseco ipsiusmet actus amoris qui  
in illum tendit. Atque ob eandem rationem dicitur vere ac  
<col. b> proprie talis actus esse propter finem, non tamquam  
propter extrinsecam rationem volendi, sed quia est propter  
intrinsicam bonitatem eius, et ex propria eius motione. In  
140 quo (quidquid alii dicant) eadem est ratio amoris et intentio-  
nis, nam etiam intentio non est propter finem, qui sit extrin-  
seca ratio volendi, sed quia tendit in finem propter seipsum  
et propter intrinsicam bonitatem eius. Illa autem differentia,  
quod intentio supponat priorem actum amoris, nihil ad rem  
145 praesentem refert, ut statim declarabimus. Tandem ex com-  
muni modo loquendi constat, vere ac proprie dici amare nos  
finem propter seipsum, vel propter bonitatem suam: sic enim  
amamus Deum: haec autem particula *propter*, attributa fini  
cum proprietate, declarat causalitatem eius: ergo hae locu-  
150 tiones verae sunt propter causalitatem finis circa talem actum.  
Unde hac etiam ratione, cum Deum super omnia amamus,  
dicimur illum amare ut ultimum finem, quia revera exercet  
circa nostrum amorem propriam causalitatem ultimi finis, et  
155 talis actus non in alium finem tendit, neque excitatur nisi a  
suprema bonitate talis finis, ipsi voluntati proposita.

125R SCG III, cap. 2, rat. 5, he says it in this way: ‘Concerning agents who act  
through intellect, there is no doubt but that they act for the sake of an  
end, for they act having preconceived through the intellect that which  
they pursue through action and they act as a result of that prior concep-  
tion.’ These words, moreover, can also be applied to the simple love for  
130R an end itself.

135R 11. Second, this is explained more thoroughly the case of love it-  
self. For love can be considered in two ways: first, as directly tending to  
an object and, second, as falling on itself by a virtual reflection, in that  
way, namely, in which I said above that an act of this sort is intrinsically  
voluntary.<sup>11</sup>

140R Under the former consideration, the love is caused by the goodness  
of an object, insofar as it is cognized and moves the appetite to loving the  
relevant thing for the sake of its goodness. And in this way the love is  
truly caused by the object as by an end, not indeed as by an end extrinsic  
to the willed thing, but as by an end proper and intrinsic to the very  
act of love that tends to it. And for the same reason such an act is truly  
and properly said to be for the sake of an end, not as for the sake of an  
extrinsic reason for willing, but because the act is for the sake of its<sup>12</sup>  
145R intrinsic goodness and from its proper motion. The *ratio* of love and  
of intention is the same in this respect (whatever others may say), for  
intention is also not for the sake of an end that is an extrinsic reason for  
willing, but because it tends to an end for its own sake and for the sake  
of its intrinsic goodness. But this difference—that intention assumes a  
prior act of love—is not relevant to the present matter, as we will show  
150R at shortly.

155R Finally, it is clear from the common way of speaking that we are  
truly and properly said to love an end for its own sake or for the sake of  
its goodness. For that is the way we love God. Moreover, this term ‘for  
the sake of’, attributed to the end with propriety, expresses the causality  
of an end. Therefore, these locutions are true because of the causality of  
the end in the case of such an act. Hence, for this reason, too, when we  
love God beyond all other things, we are said to love him as an ultimate  
end, because he really exercises the proper causality of an ultimate end  
with respect to our love. And such an act does not tend to another end

<sup>11</sup>*DM XIX.5.17.*

<sup>12</sup>Presumably ‘it’ refers to the end, but the Latin leaves open the possibility that it refers to the act.

12. Posteriori etiam consideratione virtualementem reflexionem includente apertissime constat talem actum esse propter finem, quia etsi amari possit propter suam honestatem (quod non est extra rationem causandi finalem) tamen revera  
 160 amatur propter obiectum in quod directe tendit tamquam propter finem, eo fere modo quo supra de electione dicebamus. Quamvis in electione magis appareat quaedam ratio  
 165 medii ad finem, quam in amore, quia amor non ita ordinatur ad consequendum finem sicut electio. In quo etiam videtur esse nonnulla differentia inter desiderium seu intentionem,  
 170 et amorem finis: nam desiderium, cum ex sua ratione supponat carentiam finis consecuti, est aliquo modo medium ad consequendum illum, immo est veluti quaedam inchoatio inquisitionis eius, quod eadem vel maiori ratione verum est de  
 175 intentione: amor vero ex ratione sua non supponit carentiam consecutionis finis, et ex hac parte minus participare potest rationem medii. Sed haec differentia nihil obstat, quominus ipse amor sit vere causatus a fine, quia, ut supra dicebam, haec causalitas non limitatur ad sola media, sed extenditur ad omnem  
 180 actum qui vere sit propter finem, et ex propria eius motione. <855> Eo vel maxime quod etiam amor quando antecedit consecutionem finis, quatenus excitat et movet ad illum inquirendum, potest dici utilissimum medium ad consequendum illum. Addo denique amorem ex ratione sua abstrahendo ab hoc vel illo statu amantis, tendere ad finem, ut illi uniat et coniungat amantem: unde, quatenus ipsemet amor virtualiter aut formaliter amatur, propter hunc finem amatur: ergo propter finem quem pro obiecto habet, amatur: ergo ab eodem fine causatur.

D. Thomas. 185 13. Quod optime potest confirmari ex doctrina D. Thomae in 4. dist. 49. q. 1. art. 1. qc. 2. ubi ait, *Cum voluntatis obiectum sit finis, hoc ipsum quod est velle, et quemlibet alium voluntatis actum, non esse aliud quam ordinari aliquid in finem,*

<sup>13</sup>*DM XXIII.3.7.*

167 carentiam ] carenti A.

160R nor is it excited except by the supreme goodness of such an end having been proposed to the will itself.

165R 12. Under the second consideration (which includes the virtual reflection), it is entirely obvious that such an act is for the sake of an end, because even if it could be loved for the sake of its own *honestatem* (which is not beyond the *ratio* of final-causing), still, it really is loved for the sake of the object to which it directly tends as for the sake of the end, in almost the same way that we spoke about above concerning election.<sup>13</sup>

170R A certain *ratio* of means to an end, however, appears more in the case of election than in the case of love, since love is not ordered to attaining an end in the way that election is. In this there also seems to be some difference between desire or intention and love for an end. For desire, since it presupposes according to its *ratio* that the end has not been achieved yet, is in some way a means to achieving it; indeed, desire is, as it were, a kind of beginning of the pursuit of the end. This is just as much or even more true of intention. Love, however, does not presuppose according to its *ratio* that the end has not been achieved yet, and in this respect can less participate in the *ratio* of a means. But this difference poses no trouble for love itself being truly caused by an end, because, as I said above, this causality is not limited to means alone but is extended to all acts which are truly for the sake of an end and result from an end's  
 175R proper motion, especially in view of the fact that love, when it precedes attainment of an end, can, insofar as it excites and moves one to seek after the end, be called a most useful means to pursuing the end. I add, finally, that love according to its *ratio*, abstracting from this or that state of the lover, tends to an end so that it unites and conjoins the lover with the end. Hence, insofar as the love itself is virtually or formally loved, it is loved for the sake of this end. Therefore, it is loved for the sake of the end that it has as its object. Therefore, it is caused by that same end.

180R 13. This position can best be confirmed from the teaching of St. Thomas, IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, where he says: 'since the object of the will is the end, this itself, namely, to will, and any other act of the will is nothing other than something that is ordered to the end,

St. Thomas.

Capreolus. 190 *et ideo necessario supponere aliquem finem obiectivum in quem ordinetur.* Addi etiam potest ex Capreolo in 1. dist. 1. q. 1. ad 1. contra 3. concl. hunc amorem, qui antecedit finis consecutionem, ordinari ut in finem in ipsius rei amatae consecutionem et fruitionem: et hoc modo etiam esse posse effectum causae finalis. Et in discursu illius articuli et solutionum argumentorum multa dicit et congerit ex doctrina D. Thomae, quae ad hanc sententiam confirmandam conferre possunt. Denique etiam hic amor potest ordinari in ipsum amantem ut in finem Cui, quatenus illum perficit, et unit aliquo modo suo fini obiectivo: ergo ex hoc etiam capite potest esse effectus finalis causae. 200

14. Dico quarto. Actus voluntatis, qui versantur circa finem iam consecutum, numerari etiam possunt, et debent, inter effectus finalis causae. Probatur, nam hi actus tantum esse possunt aut amor, aut gaudium, de quibus controversum est an sint actus distincti prout versantur circa finem iam adeptum: quod tractat late Capreolus citato loco: nunc de eis loquamur ut de distinctis, sive re, sive ratione differant. Actus ergo amoris ut sic eiusdem rationis est circa finem, qui propter se amatur, sive ille finis sit iam possessus, sive non: ergo, si amor secundum se, vel qui antecedit consecutionem finis, est effectus finalis causae, etiam amor ille, qui manet fine iam consecuto, est effectus eiusdem finis. Patet consequentia, quia eodem modo causatur amor in utroque statu ab obiecto cognito alliciente voluntatem ut ipsum propter se, et propter bonitatem suam amet. Atque ita D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 23. art. 4. et q. 26. <col. b> art. 2. eodem modo attribuit causalitati finis, seu obiecti boni amorem eius in utroque statu, immo et delectationem, ut statim dicam. Unde etiam rationes omnes, quibus probavimus primam voluntatem seu amorem erga finem, esse effectum finalis causae, idem probant de ultimo amore, maxime cum probabile sit eundem semper esse, ac perseverare posse. 210 215 220

and therefore it necessarily assumes some objective end to which it is ordered.' One can also add from Capreolus, I, dist. 1, q. 1, ad 1, the conclusion contra 3, that this love, which precedes the attainment of the end, is ordered to the attainment and enjoyment of the loved thing itself as to an end. And in this way, too, it can be an effect of the final cause. In the discussion of this article and the solutions to the arguments, Capreolus brings together and says many things from St. Thomas's teaching, which can be brought to bear for confirming this view.<sup>14</sup> Finally, this love can also be ordered to the lover himself as to a *finis cui*, insofar as it perfects him and unites him in some way with his objective end. Therefore, it can also be an effect of a final cause in this sense.

14. I say, fourth, that acts of the will that are directed to an end already attained can and should also be numbered among the effects of a final cause. It is proven: for these acts can only be acts of love or acts of joy. There is controversy about them as to whether they are distinct acts insofar as they are directed to an end already attained. Capreolus treats this matter more thoroughly in the cited place.<sup>15</sup> Now we speak about them as they are distinct, differing either in reality or in reason. An act of love as such, then, is of the same *ratio* with respect to an end that is loved for its own sake, whether that end is already possessed or not. Therefore, if love in itself, or love that precedes the attainment of the end, is an effect of a final cause, that love which remains once the end has been attained is also an effect of the same end. The consequence is clear, because the love is caused in the same way in either case by the cognized object enticing the will so that it loves the object for its own sake and for the sake of its goodness. And thus St. Thomas, *ST IaIIæ.23.4* and *26.2*, in the same way attributes love for the end in either case to the causality of the end or to the good object. He even attributes delight [to the causality of the end], as I will discuss shortly. Hence, all the arguments by which we proved that the first willing or love for an end is an effect of a final cause also prove the same thing concerning last love, especially since it is probable that the same love can always exist and continue to exist.

<sup>14</sup>Namely, the position that an act of love is for the sake of an end.

<sup>15</sup>In I, dist. 1, q. 1, ad 1.

15. De gaudio autem, quatenus est quid distinctum ab amore, videtur esse nonnulla dubitandi ratio: tum quia est veluti passio quaedam necessario consequens possessionem finis amati: tum etiam quia est veluti ultima quies animi, ad quam caetera ordinantur, etiam ipse amor, ipsa vero non ordinatur ad aliud, et ita non videtur habere finem a quo causari possit. Sed nihilominus probatur etiam de hoc actu assertio posita, nam revera gaudium non est mera passio, sed est actus vitalis ab ipsa voluntate elicited, et causatus in suo genere ab obiecto per se bono, et per rationem proposito, et invitante voluntatem ut in ipso, et in possessione eius quiescat et gaudeat propter illius bonitatem: sed haec causalitas obiecti non est alia quam finalis, quantum ad hunc motionis modum, quidquid sit an aliunde interveniat etiam causalitas effectiva inter illos actus, quod nihil ad praesentem quaestionem refert. Et confirmatur primo, nam ipsa delectatio ex natura rei ordinatur, ut in finem, in actionem ipsam ad quam consequitur, tamquam perfectio quaedam, et decor eius, et ut conferat ad constantiam et facilitatem eius: ergo etiam delectatio, quae consequitur ex fine consecuto, ordinatur ad ipsammet consecutionem finis ut ad finem quem suo modo perficit, et firmat: ergo si delectatio intellectualis sit, et consequatur ex illo fine perfecte cognito, et proposito voluntati, causabitur ab illo in genere finis. Unde, licet delectatio dicatur esse quid ultimum via generationis, tamen in ordine finium secundum se non est simpliciter ultimum, quamvis interdum possit ab appetente sumi ut ultimus finis Cuius. Et tunc etiam ipsa delectatio ordinatur ad ipsummet qui delectationem capit, ut ad finem Cui, et ex hac parte potest esse effectus causae finalis.

16. Neque contra hanc, et praecedentem conclusionem

15. Concerning joy, however, insofar as it is something distinct from love, there seems to be some reason doubting. This is both because joy is, as it were, a kind of passion necessarily following upon possession of a loved end, and because it is, as it were, the ultimate rest of the soul to which everything else is ordered (even love itself) but which is not itself ordered to anything else, and thus it does not seem to have an end by which it could be caused.

But, nevertheless, the assertion made<sup>16</sup> is also proven concerning this act. For in fact joy is not a mere passion, but is a vital act elicited from the will itself and caused in its genus by an object that is good in itself and that is proposed through reason invites the will, so that the will may rest and take joy in the object and in the possession of it for the sake of its goodness. But this causality of the object is nothing other than final-causality, with respect to this mode of motion, regardless whether for some other reason effective causality is also involved among these acts, a matter irrelevant to the present question.

This is confirmed, first, by the fact that delight itself is ordered *ex natura rei* to the very action on which it follows as to an end, as a kind of perfection and ornament of it and as it confers constancy and facility upon the action. Therefore, that delight which follows upon the end having been attained is also ordered to the very attainment of the end, as to an end which it perfects and establishes in its own way. Therefore, if the delight is intellectual and follows upon the end having been perfectly cognized and proposed to the will, it will have been caused by that end in the genus of end. Hence, although delight is said to be something ultimate by way of generation, nevertheless, in the order of ends it is taken in itself not strictly speaking ultimate, although sometimes it can be taken by the person desiring it as an ultimate *finis cuius*.<sup>17</sup> In that case, the delight itself is also ordered to the very person who takes delight as to a *finis cui* and can be an effect of the final cause for this reason.

16. Nor do the arguments made earlier<sup>18</sup> threaten this conclusion<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup>Namely, that acts of will that are directed to an end already attained are included among the effects of a final cause.

<sup>17</sup>For the distinction between *finis cuius* and *finis cui*, see *DM XXIII.2.2*.

<sup>18</sup>*DM XXIII.3.4*.

<sup>19</sup>Namely, 'that acts of the will that are directed to an end already attained can and should also be numbered among the effects of a final cause' (*DM XXIII.3.14*).

urgent rationes prius factae. Ad primam enim iam respon-  
 255 sum est non sola media esse effectus causae finalis, sed om-  
 nem actum qui ad finem confert, vel ad <856> illum ordi-  
 natur, vel tamquam medium, vel tamquam perfectio posses-  
 sionis eius: ac denique quidquid est ex propria motione 260R  
 finis praeconcepti, et propositi secundum propriam rationem  
 boni propter se diligibilis. Ad secundum, negamus hos actus  
 260 non esse propter finem, nam revera amamus Deum propter  
 ipsum, et delectamur in Deo propter ipsum. Neque ad hoc  
 necessarium est ut actus, qui causatur a fine, seu dicitur esse  
 265 propter finem, causetur ex priori amore finis, sed satis est  
 quod causetur ex bonitate ipsius finis allicientis voluntatem.  
 Quamquam delectatio quatenus est actus ab amore distinctus,  
 revera causatur ex amore: delectatur enim aliquis in fine pos-  
 sesso quia amat illum. Illa vero causalitas quatenus est inter  
 270 actus, magis pertinet ad quemdam modum efficientiae, vel  
 naturalis resultantiae, quam ad causalitatem finalem, quam  
 nunc inquirimus. Haec ergo magis consideranda est ex habi-  
 tudine actus ad obiectum seu finem, et ex peculiari modo  
 275 quo res intellectualis movetur a fine ad huiusmodi actus. Ad  
 tertium respondetur, quamvis delectatio dicatur quies, non  
 tamen esse mortuo modo (ut ita dicam) ut est naturalis quies,  
 quae consistit in sola carentia motus, sed esse vitalem qui-  
 etem, quae non est sine interna actione: tamen quia illa non  
 est ad obtinendum et inquirendum finem, sed ad fruendum 280R  
 fine iam possesso, ideo dicitur animi quies. Quatenus ergo  
 proprius actus est ac vera actio, potest esse effectus finis.  
 280 Quod vero Aristoteles ait, consecuto fine cessare motum vel  
 actionem, intelligendum est de motu, quo tenditur ad conse-  
 cutionem finis, non vero de interna actione, qua quiescitur in  
 285R fine. Immo addit D. Thomas in 4. dist. 48. q. 2. art. 2. ad  
 [quartam] rationem in oppositum, quod tunc cessat mo-

or the preceding one.<sup>20</sup> For to the first argument I already responded<sup>21</sup>  
 that not only means are effects of the final cause, but all acts which relate  
 to the end or are ordered to it, either as means or as a perfection of its  
 possession. And, finally, whatever comes from the proper motion of an  
 end preconceived and proposed [to the will] according to a proper *ratio*  
 of good lovable for its own sake [is an effect of the final cause].

In response to the second argument, we deny that these acts are not  
 for the sake of the end, for in reality we love God for his own sake and we  
 delight in God for his own sake. Nor is it necessary for this that the act  
 that it is caused by the end or is said to be for the sake of the end be caused  
 from a prior love for the end. Rather, it is enough that it be caused by  
 the goodness of the very end that is enticing the will. Although delight,  
 insofar as it is an act distinct from love, is in fact caused by love. For  
 someone delights in an end that is possessed because he loves it. But that  
 causality, insofar as it is between the act of love and the act of delight,  
 270R pertains more to a kind of mode of efficacy or natural resultancy than to  
 the final causality that we are investigating now. Therefore, this should  
 be considered more according to an act's habitude to its object or end and  
 according to the distinctive way in which an intellectual being is moved  
 by an end to acts of this kind.

To the third argument, I respond that although delight is called rest,  
 still it is not in a deceased mode (if I may speak in that way), as natural  
 rest is that which consists only in a lack of motion. Rather, it is a vital  
 rest, which is not without internal action. Still, since delight is not di-  
 280R rected to obtaining and seeking an end, but to enjoying an end already  
 possessed, it is for that reason called rest for the soul. Therefore, insofar  
 as delight is a proper act and true action, it can be an effect of an end.

But Aristotle's statement that motion or action ceases once an end is  
 attained should be understood as being about the motion by which one  
 tends to the attainment of an end, but not as being about the internal  
 action by which one rests in an end. Indeed, St. Thomas adds in IV,  
 dist. 48, q. 2, art. 2, in response to the fourth opposing argument, that the

<sup>20</sup>The one stated in *DM XXIII.3.8*: that 'acts that are directed to the end itself and precede or can precede its attainment in the order of intention are truly and properly effects of the end.'

<sup>21</sup>*DM XXIII.3.7* and 12.

262 qui] quia V.

284 *quartam*] primam A V.

285 tus habito fine, quando talis motus non concomitatur ip-  
sum finem, seu consecutionem eius: sicut caelum consequitur  
suum finem mediante suo motu, non tamen cessat, quia ad 290R  
illum finem necessarius est ille motus: sic igitur non cessat in-  
terna actio amoris vel delectationis consecuto fine, quia con-  
290 comitatur talem finem, et ad ipsius perfectionem est neces-  
saria: et ideo respectu talis actionis non cessat causalitas finis.

17. Hic vero oriebatur difficultas theologica, praesertim  
ex ultima conclusione, nam hinc sequitur, ipsum amorem  
et fruitionem beatificam vere ac proprie causari a Deo viso,  
295 vel a visione eius in genere causae fina- <col. b> lis: et  
consequenter illos actus vere ac proprie esse propter finem,  
quod videtur inconueniens, cum illi actus sint simpliciter 300R  
necessarii. Sed quia res est Theologica, breuiter respondeo,  
concedendo illos actus esse ex causalitate finis, id enim aequae  
300 probant omnes rationes superius factae. Nec quidquam ob-  
stat quod sint necessarii immo in superioribus dixi, necessi-  
tatem illius amoris provenire a Deo clare viso, ut ultimo fine,  
cuius summa bonitas tam est potens in causando etiam in eo  
305 genere, ut omnino sibi subiiciat voluntatem. Denique illa  
necessitas non provenit ex imperfectione, aut ex irrationali  
modo operandi, sed potius ex summa perfectione, tum ip- 310R  
sius finis ultimi, tum etiam modi applicandi illum per cog-  
nitionem rationalem seu intellectualem perfectissimam ad  
movendam voluntatem: et ideo nihil obstat, quominus illa  
310 voluntatis motio quantumvis necessaria, sit ex propria causal-  
itate finis. An vero satis sit ut ille amor necessarius dicatur 315R  
actus humanus necne, tractatur a Theologis, et pertinet magis  
ad moralem Philosophiam quam ad Metaphysicam.

*De effectibus externis finalis causae.*

18. Diximus hactenus de effectibus, quos causa finalis habet  
intra ipsam voluntatem causae agentis a proposito: nunc su-  
perest dicendum de effectibus, qui exterius prodeunt a tali  
5 causa, id est, extra ipsam humanam voluntatem, ita ut sub his 5R

motion to an end that is held ceases at that point at which such a motion  
does not accompany to end itself or its attainment, just as the heavens  
attain their end by means of their motion, yet do not cease, because that  
motion is necessary for that end. In the same way, therefore, the internal  
action of love or of delight does not cease once an end has been achieved,  
since it accompanies such an end and is necessary for its perfection. And  
for this reason the causality of an end does not cease with respect to such  
actions.

17. But here a theological difficulty comes up, especially from the  
last conclusion, for it follows that beatific love and enjoyment themselves  
are truly and properly caused in the genus of final cause by God having  
been seen or by the vision of him. It follows that these acts are truly and  
properly for the sake of an end, which seems disagreeable since these acts  
are strictly speaking necessary.

But since the matter is theological, I respond briefly by conceding  
that those acts are by the causality of an end. For the arguments made  
above equally prove this. Nor is it a problem that they are necessary. In-  
deed, I said in previous sections<sup>22</sup> that the necessity of that love originates  
from God having been clearly seen as the ultimate end, whose supreme  
goodness is so powerful in causing even in the genus of final-causality that  
it entirely subjects the will to it. Finally, this necessity does not originate  
from imperfection or from an irrational way of acting, but rather from  
supreme perfection, both of the ultimate end itself and also of the mode  
of applying the end to moving the will through most perfect rational or  
intellectual cognition. And for this reason there is no problem with this  
motion of the will being from the proper causality of an end, however  
necessary it may be. But whether this is enough for that necessary love  
to be called a human act or not is discussed by theologians and pertains  
more to moral philosophy than to metaphysics.

*Concerning the external effects of a final cause.*

18. So far we have talked about the effects which a final cause has within  
the will itself of a cause acting purposefully. What is left is to talk about  
those effects which proceed more externally from such a cause, that is,  
beyond the human will itself. Thus among these effects are included

<sup>22</sup>E.g., *DM* XIX.8.10.

effectibus comprehendantur tum actus omnium aliarum facultatum ipsius hominis, scilicet intellectus, sensuum, etc. tum etiam externi effectus, si qui sunt qui per has actiones resultent. In qua re duo sunt certa et extra controversiam. Unum est actiones omnes naturales quas homo exercet sine imperio seu motione voluntatis, non esse effectus causae finalis, eo speciali modo, quo nunc loquimur: huiusmodi sunt actiones omnes animae vegetativae, quatenus sunt mere naturales: et actus sensuum, vel etiam intellectus, quatenus interdum antecedunt motionem voluntatis. Et ratio est, quia causalitas finis quatenus proprie versatur circa agentia a proposito, quae seipsa movent in finem, primo per se est circa voluntatem, et supponit sufficientem applicationem talis causae per intellectum: sed in his actionibus quae non procedunt ex motione voluntatis, non sic movetur homo ex fine, sed agit ad modum aliorum agentium naturalium, ergo. Unde talis modus agendi per <857> se non requirit propriam et rationalem cognitionem ipsius finis. Immo et in ipsomet intellectu cognitio vel apprehensio ipsiusmet finis, si naturalis sit, et nullo modo a voluntate, non procedit a cognitione finis, sed est ipsa cognitio finis: et ideo non procedit ex causalitate finis ut sic, prout est propria agentium a proposito. Quod idcirco semper addo, quia in his actibus naturalibus operatur homo propter finem, sicut alia agentia naturalia, de quibus postea videbimus quid in eis sit operari propter finem, et qualis in eis esse possit causalitas finis. Atque in hac assertionem sic exposita nulla relinquitur difficultas.

19. Secundo certum est, omnes actiones, et effecta earum, quae procedunt ex imperio et motione voluntatis creatae operantis propter finem, esse effectus causae finalis. Probatum primo ex modo loquendi et sentiendi omnium, nam quando homo deambulat propter sanitatem consequendam, talis deambulatio censetur esse effectus sanitatis praekonceptae et intentae: et ideo dicitur esse propriissime propter finem, non ex directione alicuius extrinseci agentis, sed ip-

both the acts of all the other faculties of a human being (namely, of the intellect, of the senses, etc.) and the external effects, if there are any, that result from these actions. Two points are certain and uncontroversial in this matter. The first point is that all the natural actions that a human being exercises without command or a motion of the will are not effects of the final cause in the special way of which we are now speaking. Of this sort are all the actions of the vegetative soul, insofar as they are merely natural, and the acts of the senses or even of the intellect, insofar as they sometimes precede the motion of the will.

The reason is that the causality of an end insofar as it properly concerns purposeful agents, who move themselves to an end, in the first place directly concerns the will and assumes the sufficient application of such a cause through the intellect. But in those actions which do not proceed from the motion of the will, the human being is not in that way moved by the end but acts in the way other natural agents acts. Therefore, [those actions are not effects of the final cause in the special way of which we are now speaking]. Hence, such a way of acting does not in itself require proper and rational cognition of an end. Indeed, even in the intellect itself a cognition or apprehension of the end, if it is natural and in no way from the will, does not proceed from a cognition of an end but is itself the cognition of an end. For this reason, it does not proceed from the causality of an end as such, as is proper to purposeful agents.

I therefore always add the qualification ‘as is proper to purposeful agents’, because in these natural acts a human being *does* act for the sake of an end just as other natural agents do. Concerning natural agents, we will see later<sup>23</sup> what it means to act for the sake of an end in their case and what the causality of an end could be in their case. And no difficulty remains in this assertion once it has been explained in this way.

19. The second certain point is that all actions and their effects that proceed from the command and motion of a created will acting for the sake of an end are effects of a final cause. It is proven, first, from the way everyone talks and thinks. For when a human being walks for the sake of achieving health, his walking is thought to be an effect of the health preconceived and intended. And for this reason his walking is said to be most properly for the sake of an end, not as a result of the direction of some extrinsic agent but as a result of the direction of the

<sup>23</sup>*DM XXIII.10.*

45 siusmet operantis, quod hac ratione vocatur agens a propo-  
 50 sito: et idem est de omnibus similibus. Et quando per has ac-  
 55 tiones fit aliquis terminus permanens in facto esse, ille etiam  
 censetur effectus finis praeconcepti, vel in fieri dum actu fit,  
 vel in facto esse cum postea permanet: quomodo dixit Aris-  
 toteles instrumenta esse propter finem: et similiter domus, et  
 aliae res artificiales sunt effectus alicuius finis praeconcepti.  
 Ratio vero est, quia finis movet ad has omnes actiones: ergo  
 omnes sunt effectus eius. Item tales actiones prout ab homine  
 fiunt, pendent essentialiter a fine ut causante: quia non pos-  
 sunt aliter ab homine fieri: ergo sunt effectus finis. Item illae  
 actiones sunt media quibus comparatur finis intentus: sed fi-  
 nis non solum causat intentionem, vel electionem: sed etiam  
 mediorum executionem: immo in hac maxime videtur re-  
 lucere eius causalitas.

20. Dices, Interdum actio imperata a voluntate non est  
 medium, sed ipse finis intentus, iuxta quamdam divisionem  
 superius datam, quod finis interdum est res acta, interdum  
 ipsamet actio, ut cytharizatio, aut contemplatio: ergo tunc  
 saltem non erit actio propter finem, etiamsi procedat a volun-  
 tate: ergo non erit causata a fine. Respondetur, ut iam supra  
 notavimus, nullam esse actionem, quae si proprie sumatur ut  
 actio est, <col. b> non habeat aliquem terminum intrinse-  
 cum propter quem fit, ut cytharizatio ipsa quatenus est mo-  
 tio quaedam efficit quemdam sonum proportionatum, qui est  
 qualitas quaedam artificiose composita: et hoc modo omnis  
 actio est aliquo modo medium ad suum terminum, et ea ra-  
 tione potest esse causata ab illo ut a fine. Si vero de ipso ter-  
 mino loquamur, vel comprehendatur sub actione per modum  
 unius, sic non est proprie medium, supposito quod sit finis  
 ultimus in sua serie: tamen nihilominus licet sit finis Cuius,  
 potest habere finem Cui. Nam cytharizatio ut fit ab homine,  
 est propter ipsum operantem: vel si talis actus sit finis for-  
 malis, potest esse propter obiectivum, ut contemplatio est

45R very person acting, who for this reason is called a purposeful agent. And  
 50R the same is true in all similar cases. And when through these actions  
 some enduring terminus comes to exist in fact, it also is thought to be an  
 effect of the end that was preconceived, whether in becoming while it is  
 actually being made or in having come to be when it endures afterwards.  
 In this sense Aristotle said that instruments exist for the sake of an end,  
 and likewise a house and other artifacts are effects of some end that was  
 preconceived. The reason is that an end moves [the agent] to all these  
 55R actions. Therefore, all are effects of an end. Likewise, insofar as such  
 actions are performed by a human being, they depend essentially on an  
 end as causing [them]. For otherwise they could not be performed by  
 the human being. Therefore, they are effects of an end. Likewise, those  
 actions are means by which the intended end is attained. But the end  
 60R does not cause only the intention or election, but also the execution of  
 the means. Indeed, its causality seems to shine out especially in [causing  
 the execution of the means].

20. You will respond that sometimes an act commanded by the will  
 is not a means but the intended end itself, according to a distinction made  
 earlier (that sometimes the end is a thing produced but sometimes the  
 action itself, as in playing a lyre or contemplation<sup>24</sup>). Therefore, at least  
 in such a case the action will not be for the sake of an end, even if it action  
 proceeds from the will. Therefore, it will not be caused by an end.

65R I respond that, as I already noted above,<sup>25</sup> there is no action which  
 if taken properly as an action does not have some intrinsic terminus for  
 the sake of which it is done. The very playing of a lyre, insofar as it is a  
 kind of motion, effects a certain proportionate sound, which is a kind of  
 skillfully composed quality. And in this way every action is in some way  
 a means to its terminus and for that reason can be caused by the terminus  
 70R as by an end.

75R But if we speak about the terminus itself, it is either [i] included in  
 the action as part of one whole with it—and in that way it is not properly  
 a means, since we have assumed that it is the ultimate end in its series—  
 nevertheless, still, although it is the *finis cuius*, it can have a *finis cui*, for  
 playing a lyre as it done by a human being is for the sake of the very  
 person playing, or [ii] if such an act is a formal end, it can be for the sake

<sup>24</sup>*DM XXIII.2.9.*

<sup>25</sup>*DM XXIII.2.9.*

75 propter veritatem ipsam. Atque ita semper omnis actio, quae  
est imperata a voluntate, est effectus alicuius finis praecon-  
cepti.

21. Circa hanc vero posteriorem assertionem occur- 80R  
runt duo breviter explicanda. Primum est tactum supra  
sect. 1. quia ex dictis sequitur idem esse causam sui ipsius,  
80 quod videtur absurdum. Et sequela patet imprimis, quia o-  
peratio imperata a voluntate saepe est vera causa finalis, quae  
apprehensa movet ad sui executionem, et non tantum ad  
85R desiderium vel intentionem: ergo executio illius operationes  
est effectus eiusdem operationis apprehensae per modum fi-  
85 nis: illa autem executio non est aliud ab ipsamet operatione,  
ergo. Deinde quia consecutio finis (sive in operatione consi-  
stat, sive in sola inhaerentia alicuius formae, vel in alia simili  
90R habitudine) est ultimus effectus causae finalis, ut finis curatio-  
nis est sanitas non utcumque, sed ut mihi inhaerens, et me  
afficiens, et hoc est ultimum quod causatur ex vi illius inten-  
tionis: et idem est proportionaliter in reliquis. Sed primus fi-  
95 nis, qui movet, et causat usque ad hunc effectum, est ipsamet  
consecutio finis ut apprehensa: causat ergo seipsam.

22. Respondetur imprimis nullum esse inconveniens hoc  
95 totum concedere, quia in causa finali non intervenit ea repug-  
nantia, quae in causa efficiente, ut non possit esse causa sui ip-  
sius, quia non requirit praeexistentiam realem ad causandum,  
sed sufficit intentionalis, media apprehensione: cum ergo fi-  
100 nis causet priusquam habeat existentiam in actu, mirum non  
est, quod possit in sua genere concurrere ad suamet existen-  
105R tiam. Atque ita concedimus, rem eandem secundum diversas  
conditiones existendi posse <858> causare seipsam, nam in-  
tentionaliter existens causat seipsam ut realiter sit. Neque hoc  
105 est diversum ab eo, quod communi axiomate dicitur, *Illud  
quod est primum in intentione, esse ultimum in executione*: vel  
110R quod etiam Aristoteles dixit, *formam et finem concurrere in*

of an objective end in the way that contemplation is for the sake of truth  
itself. And so in this way it is always the case that every action which is  
commanded by the will is an effect of some preconceived end.

21. But concerning the latter assertion two points come up that  
need to be explained briefly. First,<sup>26</sup> it follows from what was said that  
the same thing is a cause of itself, which seems absurd (this was touched  
on above in sect. 1<sup>27</sup>). The inference is clear, first of all, because the  
activity commanded by the will is often a true final cause, which when  
85R apprehended moves [the agent] and not only to desire or intention but  
to the execution of the activity. Therefore, the execution of that action  
is an effect of the very same activity apprehended in the manner of an  
end. That execution, moreover, is nothing other than the activity itself.  
Therefore, [such an activity is a cause of itself].

The inference is also true because the attainment of an end (whether  
it consists in activity or only in the inherence of some form or in some  
other similar relation) is the ultimate effect of the final cause. For exam-  
ple, the end of curing is health, and not health in just any way but health  
as inhering in me and affecting me. And this is the ultimate effect that  
is caused by the force of that intention. And the same is true propor-  
95R tionately in other cases. But the first end, which moves and causes all  
the way up to this [ultimate] effect, is the very attainment of the end as  
apprehended. Therefore, it causes itself.

22. First of all, I respond that there is nothing disagreeable about  
conceding all this, because that repugnance that comes up in the case  
of efficient causes—so that something cannot be the cause of itself—does  
not come up in the case of final causes. This is because a final cause does  
not require a real pre-existence in order to cause; an intentional [pre-  
existence] by means of apprehension suffices. When, therefore, an end  
causes before it has actual existence, it is not surprising that it can concur  
105R in its genus with its own existence. And so we concede that the same  
thing according to different conditions for existing can cause itself. For  
an end existing intentionally causes itself to exist in reality.

Nor is this different from what is generally said axiomatically: ‘that  
which is first in intention is last in execution’. Nor is it different from  
what Aristotle said: ‘the form and the end concur to be the same in

<sup>26</sup>The second point is taken up in n. 23, below.

<sup>27</sup>*DM XXIII.1.3.*

110 *idem numero*, quamvis forma et efficiens solum possint con-  
currere in idem specie. Forma enim, seu effectus formalis eius  
est effectus agentis, et ut sic est etiam effectus finis, qui exci-  
tavit agens ad operandum, quique non est aliud ab ipsa forma. 115R  
Deinde vero addimus, nullam esse finis consecutionem, quae  
non sit aliquo modo propter finem, vel obiectivum, si illum  
habeat, vel saltem propter finem Cui, qui semper supponi-  
tur ad causalitatem finalem, et ut sic non est effectus eius:  
115 atque hoc modo semper effectus finis etiam ultimus distin-  
guitur aliquo modo ab adaequata causa finali. Tandem conse-  
cutio finis ultimi vel simpliciter vel in aliqua serie, non causat  
se immediate, sed proxime causat in intellectuali agente, de  
120 quo nunc loquimur, affectum et intentionem, et alios actus,  
quibus mediantibus pervenit eius causalitas usque ad illam ac-  
tionem, qua finis ipse comparatur, et in qua consistit: et ita  
semper concurrat aliquid distinctum ab ipso ad huiusmodi  
causalitatem.

125 23. Sed tunc occurrit explicanda altera difficultas propo-  
sita, nimirum, qualis sit haec causalitas finis circa actiones vel  
res externas, manantes a motione voluntatis. Est enim in his  
specialis dubitandi ratio, nam actus interni eliciti a voluntate  
habent realem, et intrinsecam habitudinem ad ipsum finem  
130 ut ad proprium obiectum, vel formale simul et materiale, ut  
in intentione, et aliis actibus qui proxime versantur circa ip-  
sum finem, vel formale tantum, ut in electione mediorum:  
et ideo recte intelligitur, ipsum finem per se ac proxime exci-  
tare ac movere ad tales actus: et e converso tales actus per  
135 se et intrinsece pendere a causalitate talis finis. At vero actus  
imperati tantum a voluntate (et multo magis effectus eorum)  
nullo modo excitantur proxime ab ipso fine, neque ipsi dicunt  
intrinsicam habitudinem ad finem, sed solum per extrinsecam  
denominationem dicuntur ordinari in finem mediis in-  
140 terioribus actibus, ut deambulatio exterior mere extrinsecus  
ordinatur ad sanitatem. Ex quo videtur sequi primo, finem  
non per se, sed per accidens esse causam huiusmodi effec-  
tuum eo modo quo applicans vel excitans efficientem causam  
dici- <col. b> tur esse causa effectus causati ab illa, vel eo  
145 modo quo avus est causa nepotis, quia genuit patrem eius: sic

number', although the form and efficient cause can only come together  
to be the same in species. For the form, or its formal effect, is an effect  
of the agent and as such is also an effect of the end that excited the agent  
to acting and that is nothing other than the form itself. But we also add  
that nothing is the attainment of an end that is not in some way for the  
sake of an end, either for the sake of an objective end, if it has that, or at  
least for the sake of a *finis cui* (which is always assumed for final causality  
and as such is not an effect of it). And so in this way an effect of an  
end—even an ultimate effect—is always distinguished in some way from  
the adequate final cause.

Finally, the attainment of an end (whether unqualifiedly ultimate or  
only ultimate in some series) does not cause itself immediately. Rather,  
it proximately causes in the intellectual agent (concerning which we now  
speak) an affect and intention and other acts by means of which its causal-  
ity comes to that action by which the end itself is attained and in which  
it consists. And in this way something distinct from the ultimate end  
always concurs [with it] in this kind of causality.

23. But then the second difficulty mentioned before that needs ex-  
plaining comes up: namely, what this causality of an end is with respect  
to the external actions or things that flow from a motion of the will. For  
there is a special reason for doubting with respect to these. Internal acts  
elicited by the will have a real and intrinsic habitude to the end itself as  
to a proper object, whether the end is formal and material at the same  
time (as in the case of intention and other acts that are directed prox-  
imately to the end itself) or formal only (as in the case of the election of  
means). For this reason one rightly understands that an end directly and  
proximately excites and moves [the will] to such acts and, conversely,  
that such acts directly and intrinsically depend on the causality of such  
an end. But, on the other hand, acts merely commanded by the will are  
in no way proximately excited by an end itself nor do they express and  
intrinsic habitude to an end. (This is all the more true of the effects of  
such acts.) Rather, they are only said through an extrinsic denomination  
to be ordered to an end by means of interior acts. For example, external  
walking is merely extrinsically ordered to health.

It seems to follow from this, first, that an end is not a *per se* cause of  
such an effect but only a *per accidens* cause, either in the way in which  
something applying or exciting an efficient cause is thereby said to be the  
cause of the caused effect or in the way in which a grandfather is the cause

enim finis est causa actionis externae, solum quia genuit in-  
 ternam. Deinde videtur sequi ex vi huius causalitatis finis ni-  
 hil rei poni in huiusmodi actionibus et effectibus externis per  
 se loquendo, sed solam extrinsecam denominationem, quae  
 150 non est satis ad causalitatem realem. Sequela patet, quia inde  
 solum habet actus exterior ut ordinetur medio interiori ad  
 talem finem, quod solum est denominatio extrinseca in ipso  
 exteriori. Cuius signum est, nam si contingeret illam exteri-  
 orem actionem, vel propter alium finem, vel casu et sine ullo  
 155 fine fieri: in se et in sua entitate non mutaretur, nec minuere-  
 tur, neque actio physica qua fit, esset alia: ergo signum est  
 non causari per se ab illo fine, sed tantum remote et per ac-  
 cidens. In causis enim efficientibus, licet contingat eundem  
 effectum qui fit ab una causa, posse causari ab alia, tamen si sit  
 160 causa per se, necesse est saltem actionem esse diversam ut in  
 superioribus traditum est: unde si ex mutatione causae neque  
 effectus neque actio mutatur, signum est talem causam nec  
 per se nec immediate influere in talem effectum: idem ergo,  
 proportionem servata, erit in praesenti.

165 24. Haec difficultas postulat ut explicemus quid sit  
 causalitas causae finalis, vel quid ponat in suis effectibus, quod  
 sequenti sectione praestabimus, et in fine eius difficultati sat-  
 isfaciemus.

150R of his grandson because he begot the grandson's father. For in this way  
 an end is the cause of external actions only because it begot the internal  
 actions.

155R Next, it seems to follow that, properly speaking, no real thing is  
 placed in [commanded] actions and their external effects by virtue of  
 this causality of an end. Only an extrinsic denomination is placed in  
 them, which is not sufficient for real causality. The inference is clear,  
 because an external act has nothing more from the account given than  
 that it is ordered to such an end by means of an internal act, which is  
 only an extrinsic denomination in that external act. A sign of this is that  
 160R that external action would not be changed or diminished in itself or in  
 its entity nor would the physical action by which it is produced be any  
 different, if it were to be produced for the sake of another end or if it  
 were produced by chance and without any end. Therefore, this is a sign  
 that it is not caused *per se* by that end but only remotely and *per accidens*.  
 165R For in efficient causes, although it happens that the same effect which  
 is produced by one cause can be caused by another, nevertheless, if it is  
 a *per se* cause, it is necessary that at least the action be different, as was  
 treated in previous sections.<sup>28</sup> Hence, if by changing the cause neither  
 the effect nor the action is changed, this is a sign that such a cause neither  
 170R *per se* nor immediately has an influence on such an effect. Therefore, the  
 same thing will be true, preserving proportion, in the present case.

24. This difficulty demands that we explain what the causality of a  
 final cause is or what it places in its effects. We will do this in the follow-  
 ing section; we will address this difficulty at the end of that section.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup>*DM XVIII.10.8.*

<sup>29</sup>See *DM XXIII.4.16–17.*