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<847><sup>2</sup>

*Quotuplex sit finis.*

1. Antequam progrediamur ulterius ad explicanda  
caetera quae proposuimus ad causalitatem finis  
pertinentia, oportet varias divisiones, vel potius  
5 nominis significationes explicare, ut distincte intel-  
ligatur, de quo sit disputatio.

*Prima divisio finis, Cuius, et Cui.*

2. Est ergo prima ac celebris divisio finis in finem  
Cuius, et finem Cui, quae sumpta est ex Aristotele  
10 2. *De anima* cap. 4. ubi Argyropilus vertit, *finem*  
*quo* et *cui*: sed priora verba sunt Graecis con-  
formiora, et intentionem melius declarant, nam  
finis Cuius dicitur, cuius adipiscendi gratia homo  
movetur vel operatur, ut est sanitas in curatione:  
15 finis Cui dicitur ille, cui alter finis procuratur, ut  
est homo in intentione sanitatis, nam licet homo  
curetur propter sanitatem, ipsam vero sanitatem  
sibi et in suum commodum quaerit.

*How many kinds of ends there are.*<sup>3</sup>

1. Before we proceed to explain the remaining things that  
we mentioned as relevant to the causality of the end, we  
should explain the various divisions or, rather, the various  
5R significations of the name, in order to understand clearly the  
subject matter of the disputation.

*The first division: finis cuius and finis cui.*

2. There is, then, a first and famous division of ends into *fines*  
*cuius* (literally: ends of which) and *fines cui* (literally: ends  
10R for which), which is taken from Aristotle, *De anima* II, cap. 4,  
[415b20–22]. Argyropoulos turns it into *finis quo* and *finis*  
*cui*;<sup>4</sup> but the former words conform better to the Greek and  
better convey Aristotle’s intention. For that for the sake of  
the obtaining of which a human being is moved or acts—for  
example, as health is that for the sake of the obtaining of  
15R which medical care is provided—is called a *finis cuius*. That  
for which or whom another end is procured—for example, as  
a human being is that for whom health is intended—is called  
a *finis cui*. For, although a human being is cured for the sake  
20R of health, he, however, seeks that health for himself and for  
his own advantage.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>See the parallel discussion in *DFH* 1.6.

<sup>4</sup>The reference is to John Argyropoulos (1415–1487), the Byzantine lecturer who taught Greek—and Aristotle—to a number of notable Italian humanists. The *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (ed. by William Smith, 1870) mentions a Latin translation of book III of *De Anima* but none of book II, though it does note that a commentary on *De Anima* has been credited to him.

Quaestiuncula.	3.	Quaeri vero potest, quis horum habeat		3. One can ask, however, which of these has the proper	A small
20	<col. b>	propriam rationem finis. Quidam enim		ratio of an end. For certain people attribute the proper	question.
Gabriel.		soli fini Cui illam attribuunt, quod sentit Gabriel in		of an end only to the <i>finis cui</i> , as does Gabriel in II, dist. 1, q. 5,	Gabriel.
Ocham.		2. dist. 1. q. 5. sequens Ocham in 2. q. 3. art. 1. atque	25R	following Ockham in II, q. 3, art. 1. And Henry of Ghent thinks	Ockham.
		idem sentit Henricus <i>Quodlibet</i> 2. q. 1. Et probatur,		the same thing in <i>Quodlibet</i> II, q. 1. And it is shown: for that	
25		nam ille est proprie finis, in quo sistit intentio		is properly an end in which the intention of an agent stops.	
		agentis, caetera enim potius habere videntur		For the remaining things seem rather to have the nature of	
		rationem mediorum; sed intentio solum sistit in	30R	means. But the intention only stops in the <i>finis cui</i> , [i.e., the	
		fine cui caetera procurantur, nam ad illum omnia		end for which] the other things are procured. For all things	
		ordinantur: unde sicut medium solum amatur,		are ordered to it. Hence, just as a means is loved only insofar	
30		quatenus proportionatum est fini: ita finis Cuius		as it is proportionate to the end, a <i>finis cuius</i> is loved only	
		solum amatur, quatenus est proportionatus, et		insofar as it is proportionate to and agreeable to the <i>finis cui</i> .	
		conveniens fini Cui; ergo. Et confirmatur, nam finis		Therefore.	
		amari debet amore amicitiae, vel saltem benevolentiae,	35R	And this is confirmed: for an end ought to be loved with	
		quia debet amari propter se: sed solus finis Cui ita		friendship love or at least with benevolent love, because it	
		amatur, nam finis Cuius amatur alteri,		ought to be loved for its own sake. But only a <i>finis cui</i> is	
35		qui dicitur finis Cui: atque ita amor finis Cuius		loved in this way. For a <i>finis cuius</i> is loved for something else,	
		est concupiscentiae, alterius vero est amicitiae seu		something that is called a <i>finis cui</i> . And thus love for a <i>finis</i>	
		benevolentiae; et ideo finis Cui amatur simpliciter,	40R	<i>cuius</i> is concupiscent love, but love for the other kind of end	
		finis autem Cuius tantum secundum quid, iuxta		is friendship love or benevolent love. And therefore a <i>finis cui</i>	
D. Thomae.		doctrinam D. Thomae 1. 2. q. 26. art. 4. dicentis,		is loved, strictly speaking; a <i>finis cuius</i> , however, is loved only	St. Thomas.
40		illud amari simpliciter, cui amatur bonum: hoc		in a qualified sense, according to the teaching of St. Thomas,	
		autem bonum quod alteri amatur, tantum amari		IaIIae.26.4, [co.], when he says: ‘that is loved strictly speaking	
		secundum quid.	45R	for which ( <i>cui</i> ) a good is loved; this good, however, which is	
				loved for another, is only loved in a qualified sense’.	
		4. Aliunde vero apparet, solum finem Cuius		4. But for other reasons it appears that only a <i>finis cuius</i>	
		proprie habere rationem causae finalis, nam Aristoteles,		properly has the <i>ratio</i> of a final cause. For Aristotle, wherever	Aristotle.
Aristoteles.	45	ubicumque hanc causam definit, per hoc eius		he defines this cause, explicates its <i>ratio</i> through this: that it	
		rationem explicat, quod sit <i>cuius gratia aliquid fit</i> ,	50R	is that ‘for the sake of which ( <i>cuius</i> ) something is done’, as is	
		ut patet 2. <i>Physicae</i> cap. 3. et 7. et 5. <i>Metaphysicae</i>		clear in <i>Physics</i> II, cap. 3, [194b33–34], and 7, [198a23–25],	
		cap. 2. et hac ratione dicit, finem esse primum		and <i>Metaphysics</i> V, cap. 2, [1013a33–34]. For this reason he	
		in intentione, et ultimum in executione:		says that an end is first in intention and last in execution,	
50		et similiter ait, formam esse finem generationis,		and likewise says that the end of generation is the form and	
		non vero ipsum generantem. Et ratione declaratur,	55R	not the generating thing itself.	
		quia is cui alter finis acquiritur, vel quaeritur,		This is made evident by reason: he for whom ( <i>cui</i> ) another	
		solum est subiectum, quod perficitur vel actuatur		end is acquired or sought is just the subject that is perfected	
		alia re, quae intenditur ut finis: ut homo est subiec-		or actualized by another thing that is intended as the end, as	
55		tum sanitatis, aut visionis beatae, quae est finis		a human being is the subject of health or of the beatific vision,	

nostrarum operationum: haec ergo habitudo non  
 est proprie finis, sed alterius rationis: nemo enim  
 proprie dixerit hominem esse finem visionis beatae,  
 sed potius visionem esse finem hominis: nam res  
 60 est propter suam operationem, ut propter finem.  
 Et confirmatur, nam in fine Cuius comprehenditur,  
 ut infra dicam, obiectum operationis, ut est Deus  
 respectu visionis beatae: unde non solum amat  
 sibi homo visionem Dei, sed etiam Deum ipsum  
 65 amore concupiscentiae pertinente ad spem, ut The-  
 ologi docent: non potest autem dici, quod homo  
 sit finis Dei, eo quod sit ille cui amatur Deus: ergo  
 per illam particulam, *cui*, non explicatur propria  
 ratio finis.

Dissolvitur. 70 5. Nihilominus dicendum <848> est in utroque  
 horum salvari posse propriam rationem finis, inter-  
 dum vero ita coniungi ut ex utroque coalescat unus  
 integer finis. Hoc est consentaneum Aristoteli in  
 citato loco *De anima*. Et ratione probatur, nam  
 75 uterque horum finium potest per se excitare vol-  
 untatem, et ab ea diligere seu intendi propter suam  
 bonitatem: sic enim quando homo inquit sanitatem,  
 se diligit, cui sanitatem vult propter suum  
 commodum et perfectionem, quam per se appetit,  
 80 propter summam coniunctionem vel potius identi-  
 tatem quam secum habet. Similiter diligit et inten-  
 dit sanitatem, propter perfectionem ipsiusmet sani-  
 tatis. In quo magna est differentia inter medium,  
 et finem Cuius, nam medium verbi gratia potio,  
 85 solum est amabilis quatenus est utilis ad salutem:  
 salus vero ipsa propter se amatur, quia per se per-  
 ficit hominem cui amatur. Unde fit, ut totum hoc,  
*homo sanus*, sit integer, et adaequatus finis illius  
 actionis, in quo praedicti duo fines includuntur,  
 90 quasi componentes unum integrum finem. Sic  
 etiam potentia dicitur esse propter operationem,

60R which is the end of our activity. This habitudo, therefore, is  
 not properly of an end but of another *ratio*. For no one will  
 say, properly, that a human being is the beatific vision's end;  
 rather, they will say that the vision is the human being's end.  
 For a thing is for the sake of its activity as for the sake of an  
 65R end.

This is confirmed: for the *finis cuius* includes, as I will say  
 below, the object of activity, as God is the object of activity  
 with respect to the beatific vision. Hence, not only does a  
 human being love for himself the vision of God, but he also  
 70R loves God himself with the concupiscent love pertaining to  
 hope, as the theologians teach. Nor, moreover, can it be said  
 that a human being is the end for God by the fact that he is  
 that for whom (*cui*) God is loved. Therefore, the proper *ratio* of  
 an end is not expressed through that phrase 'for which' (*cui*).

75R 5. Nevertheless, it should be said that the proper *ratio*  
 of an end can be saved in each of these, though sometimes  
 they are so conjoined that one integrated end coalesces from  
 both. This is consistent with Aristotle in the cited passage  
 from *De Anima*.<sup>5</sup> And it is shown by reason: for each of these  
 80R ends can by itself excite the will and be selected or intended  
 by the will for the sake of its goodness. For in this way when  
 a human being seeks health, he loves himself, for whom  
 (*cui*) he wills the health for the sake of his own advantage  
 and perfection, which he desires in itself for the sake of the  
 85R highest conjunction or, rather, the identity that it has with  
 him. Similarly, he loves and intends health for the sake of the  
 perfection of the health itself. In this there is a great difference  
 between a means and a *finis cuius*. For a means—medicine,  
 for example—is only lovable insofar as it is useful for health.  
 90R But health is itself loved for its own sake, since it of itself  
 perfects the human being for whom (*cui*) it is loved.

And thus it happens that this whole—the healthy human  
 being—is the integrated and adequate end of that action. In  
 this the two mentioned ends are included, components, as it  
 were, of one integrated end. In the same way a power is said  
 to exist for the sake of activity as for the sake of the end for

[The putative  
 problem] is  
 resolved.

<sup>5</sup>II, cap. 4 (415b20–22). Cf. n. 2 above.

ut propter finem cuius gratia fit, quamvis etiam operatio vere sit propter ipsam potentiam, nimirum ut ipsam perficiat, et in ultimo actu constituat. Ut  
 95 merito dici possit, finem integrum esse potentiam 100R  
 ut perfecte actuatam, quod alii dicunt, potentiam  
 non tam esse propter operationem, quam propter  
 seipsam operantem. Atque hoc modo non repugnat  
 100 duas res sub his diversis rationibus ad invicem 105R  
 esse unum finem alterius, et e converso: sic enim  
 intellectus est propter visionem Dei, et visio etiam  
 est propter intellectum ut ipsum perficiat. Neque  
 hoc est inconveniens, tum propter rationes diver-  
 105 sas, tum quia intentio agentis quasi adaequate 110R  
 fertur in compositum ex utroque cum mutua habi-  
 tudine componentium inter se: quo modo materia  
 est propter formam, et forma est etiam aliquo modo  
 propter materiam: totum autem est, quod per se  
 primo et adaequate intenditur. Quamvis autem fi-  
 110 nis Cui et Cuius possint ita ad invicem comparari, 115R  
 non est tamen id semper necessarium, ut statim  
 declarabo.

Quaestiuncula  
 consequens ad  
 resolutionem  
 praecedentis. 115

6. Quaeret vero ulterius aliquis, esto uterque eorum sit proprie finis, quis eorum sit principalior. Respondeo, comparisonem fieri posse, vel in ratione entis, vel in ratione causandi. Priori modo  
 120 non est per se necessarium ut unus ex his finibus 120R  
 sit semper <col. b> perfectius ens, interdum enim  
 finis Cui est res nobilior, ut cum homo propter  
 sanitatem sibi acquirendam operatur: interdum  
 120 vero accidit e converso, ut cum idem homo operatur 125R  
 propter acquirendum sibi Deum, qui longe  
 nobilior est. Et ratio est, quia interdum res seu  
 suppositum perfectius intendit sibi acquirere aliam  
 125 perfectionem, quamvis minorem, ad quod satis est  
 quod tale subiectum perfectiori modo se habeat 130R  
 cum tali forma, quam sine illa, quamvis, si prae-  
 cise comparetur ad eandem formam, sit quid per-  
 perfectius. Aliquando vero res aliqua perficitur per

the sake of which it is made, although the activity also truly is for the sake of the very power, namely, insofar as it perfects the power and establishes it in the highest actuality. So it can rightly be said that the intergrated end is the power as perfectly actualized, or, what others say: ‘a power is not so much for the sake of activity as for the sake of the one acting’.

And in this way it is not repugnant that two things under these different *rationes* each be the end for the other. For in this way the intellect is for the sake of the vision of God and the vision is also for the sake of the intellect as what perfects it. Nor is this disagreeable, because of the different *rationes* involved and because the intention of the agent is, as it were, adequately brought to the composite of both ends with mutual habitudes of composing between themselves. This is the way in which matter is for the sake of form but form is also in some way for the sake of matter. The whole, however, is what is adequately and of itself intended. Moreover, although the *finis cui* and the *finis cuius* can be mutually related in that way, it is, nevertheless, not always necessary, as I will explain shortly.

6. But someone will ask further: granting that each of these is properly an end, which one of them is more primary? I respond that the comparison can be made either under the *ratio* of being or under the *ratio* of causing. In the first way, it is not necessary *per se* that one of these ends always be a more perfect being. For sometimes the *finis cui* is a more noble thing, as in the case where a human being acts for the sake of acquiring health for himself. But sometimes it happens the other way around, as when the same human acts for the sake of acquiring God—who is far more noble than he is—for himself. And the reason is that sometimes the more perfect thing or *suppositum* intends to acquire for itself another perfection, although a lesser one. For this to happen it is sufficient that such a subject exist in a more perfect way with such a form than without it, even though the subject is more perfect if compared precisely to that form. But sometimes something is perfected through union with a

A small  
 question  
 resulting from  
 the preceding  
 resolution.

130 coniunctionem ad perfectiorem, ut homo per co-  
 niunctionem ad Deum; et tunc optime potest res  
 minus perfecta operari gratia alterius perfectioris,  
 ut illam habeat et possideat prout potuerit: quo  
 etiam modo materia appetit formam, et si posset  
 135 gratia consequendi illam aliquid operari, id faceret:  
 sub qua consideratione forma habet rationem finis  
 Cuius, et materia finis Cui, quae minus perfecta  
 est, quam forma. 140R

7. At vero si illa duo conferantur posteriori  
 modo, scilicet in ratione causae et finis, idem vide-  
 tur esse quaerere, quis eorum sit principalior, quod  
 quaerere quis magis ametur, magisque intendatur. 145R  
 Et sane rationes prius factae videntur suadere  
 finem Cui magis amari, quia magis ratione sui  
 diligitur, magisque in illo sistit motus voluntatis.  
 Solum videtur obstare exemplum illud de amore  
 concupiscentiae, et intentione consequendi Deum,  
 quatenus bonum nostrum est. Neque enim dicere  
 possumus, eo actu amare nos magis nos ipsos  
 150 quam Deum: alias amor ille esset inordinatus:  
 neque etiam dicere possumus illam intentionem  
 principalius sistere in nobis, quam in Deo: alias  
 absolute finis ultimus illius intentionis essemus  
 nos, et non Deus, et ita esset etiam inordinata  
 155 intentio.

8. Quapropter distinctione vel limitatione opus  
 est, nam in bonis particularibus, quae praecipue,  
 vel etiam omnino amantur in commodum amantis,  
 vel ut illum perficiant, vel sub aliqua alia habi-  
 tudine ad illum, verum est finem Cui principal-  
 ius amari, esseque principalior finem. Et hoc  
 probant rationes prius factae. Quae confirmari  
 possunt, nam saepe huiusmodi particulare bonum  
 quod est finis Cuius, supponit absolutum amorem  
 160 illius personae cui amatur, et amor eius ex illo  
 165

more perfect thing—a human being through union with God,  
 for example—and then the less perfect thing can well act for  
 the sake of another more perfect thing in order that it may  
 have and possess that more perfect thing insofar as it is able.  
 This is the way in which even matter desires form, which,  
 if it were able to act for the sake acquiring form, would do  
 so. In this illustration, form has the *ratio* of a *finis cuius* and  
 matter—which is less perfect than the form—has the *ratio* of  
 a *finis cui*.

7. If, however, those two ends are compared in the latter  
 way—namely, under the *ratio* of cause and end—it seems  
 to be the same thing to ask which of them is more primary  
 and to ask which of them is loved or intended more. And  
 arguments soundly made before<sup>6</sup> seem to suggest that a *finis*  
*cui* is loved more, since it is loved more by its *ratio* and the  
 movement of the will more stops in it. The only thing standing  
 in the way seems to be the example of concupiscent love and  
 the intention to pursue God insofar as he is our good. For  
 we cannot say that by that act of concupiscent love we love  
 ourselves more than we God. Otherwise, that love would be  
 inordinate. Nor can we say that that intention to pursue  
 God as our good stops more primarily in us than in God.  
 Otherwise, the absolutely ultimate end of that intention would  
 be us and not God, and thus it would also be an inordinate  
 intention.

8. This is why a distinction or limitation is needed here.  
 For in the case of particular goods, which are loved mainly  
 or even entirely for the advantage of the one loving (either  
 as they perfect him or under some other habitude to him),  
 it is true that the *finis cui* is loved more primarily and is a  
 more primary end. The arguments given earlier prove this.<sup>7</sup>  
 They can be confirmed: for often a particular good of this  
 sort that is a *finis cuius* presupposes an absolute love for that  
 person for whom (*cui*) it is loved and the love for it is born  
 from the love for that person. For example, a human being

<sup>6</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.3.

<sup>7</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.3.

amore nascitur: sic enim homo interdum amat  
 seipsum proprio amore benevolentiae, et ex illo 170R  
 postea amat sibi sanitatem. Et hinc <849> etiam  
 saepe fit, ut talia bona particularia amentur ut  
 170 media, et utilia ad alios fines ipsi amanti conveni-  
 entes: signum ergo est, respectu horum finium  
 ipsum finem Cui esse principaliorem, magisque 175R  
 dilectum. At vero quando finis cuius gratia est  
 summum bonum, et finis ultimus, si ordinate ame-  
 175 tur et intendatur, semper debet retinere princi-  
 paliorem rationem finis, magisque trahere ad se  
 intentionem operantis. Quia cum sit finis ultimus 180R  
 simpliciter, non potest ita referri in alium sub ali-  
 qua ratione finis, ut in alio principaliter sistatur.  
 180 Atque ita, cum homo intendit consequi Deum, licet  
 ipse sit aliquo modo finis cui bonum illud quaer-  
 itur, tamen absolute potius homo ordinat seipsum 185R  
 in illum finem, nam vult coniungi illi bono ut ul-  
 timo fini suo. Quo fit, ut licet in eo motu et ten-  
 185 dentia, respectu mediorum, et operationis, homo  
 proprie dicatur finis Cui, tamen respectu ipsius  
 Dei, qui principaliter quaeritur, non tam dicendus 190R  
 sit finis, quam subiectum quod ordinatur ad conse-  
 quendum illum finem. Quamvis non negem posse  
 190 etiam vocari finem Cui, nam revera habet illam  
 rationem, ita tamen, ut intelligatur potius ordinari  
 ad alterum finem obiectivum et ultimum, quam 195R  
 illum ad se ordinare.

195 *Secunda divisio finis in operationem, et rem fac-  
 tam.*

9. Secundo dividi solet finis in eum qui est op- 200R  
 eratio tantum, et eum qui ex operatione resultat,  
 seu in quem tendit actio, ut in rem factam. Quam  
 divisionem tetigit Aristoteles 1. *Ethicorum ad Nico-*

sometimes loves himself with a proper benevolent love and  
 later as a result loves health for himself. And hence it also  
 often happens that such particular goods are loved as means,  
 useful to other ends that are themselves agreeable to the one  
 loving. This, therefore, is evidence that with respect to these  
 ends the *finis cui* is more primary and loved more.

But when, however, the end for the sake of which (*finis  
 cuius gratia*) is the highest good and ultimate end and if it  
 is loved and intended ordinately, it ought always retain the  
 more primary *ratio* of an end and ought draw to itself the  
 intention of the agent to a greater extent. For when it is the  
 unqualifiedly ultimate end, it cannot be referred to another  
 thing under some *ratio* of an end in such a way that [intention]  
 is primarily stopped in that other thing. And so when a human  
 being intends to follow God, although he himself is in some  
 way the *finis cui*, [i.e., the end for whom] that good is sought,  
 nevertheless, absolutely speaking, the human being orders  
 himself to that end, for he wishes to be joined with that good  
 as with his ultimate end.

From which it follows that, although in that motion and  
 tendency with respect to means and activity a human being  
 is properly called a *finis cui*, nevertheless, with respect to God  
 himself (who is sought most of all), a human being should  
 not be called an end so much as a subject who is ordered to  
 pursuing that end. I do not deny, however, that the human  
 being can also be called a *finis cui*. For he does in fact fall  
 under that *ratio*, though he does so in such a way that he is  
 understood to be ordered to another objective and ultimate  
 end rather than that end is ordered to him.

*The second division of ends into activities and the things pro-  
 duced.*

9. Secondly, ‘end’ is usually divided into those which are  
 activity only and those which result from activity or to which  
 action tends as to a produced thing. Aristotle mentioned this  
 division in *Nichomachean Ethics* I, cap. 1, [1094a3–4] and

200 *macheam* cap. 1. et lib. 1. *Magnorum moralium*  
 cap. 3. Et, quantum attinet ad rationem formalem 205R  
 finis, videtur materialis divisio sumpta ex rebus,  
 quae hanc causalitatem exercent, potius quam  
 ex varia ratione causandi. Nihilominus tamen ad  
 205 intelligendos auctores, praecipue varia loca Aris-  
 totelis et ad explicandas alias divisiones, et prae- 210R  
 sertim ad declarandos fines diversarum rerum, et  
 maxime hominis, est necessaria. Exempla itaque  
 utriusque membri facilia sunt, tam in operibus  
 210 artis, quam naturae. Nam finis curationis est sani-  
 tas, aedificationis domus, generationis res genita, 215R  
 et sic de aliis: at vero pulsationis cytharae non est  
 alius finis praeterquam ipsa cytharizatio, et con-  
 templatio nisi sola ipsa contemplatio. Quamquam  
 215 in secundo membro advertere oportet, etiam in illis  
 actionibus posse philosophice distingui terminum 220R  
 ab actione, nam terminus semper est <col. b> ali-  
 qua qualitas: actio vero est via seu tendentia illius  
 qualitatis: tamen quia terminus huius actionis  
 220 talis est, ut non duret nisi quamdiu fit, eo quod in  
 fieri et conservari pendet ab actuali motu seu in- 225R  
 fluxu potentiae, ideo quod attinet ad rationem finis,  
 non distinguitur inter actionem ut actionem, et ut  
 terminum: in actionibus vero prioris generis finis  
 225 intentus est res facta, quae permanet cessante ac-  
 tione. Ex quo etiam intelligitur, hanc divisionem 230R  
 tantum esse datam de fine Cuius: nam finis Cui  
 neque est actio, neque fit per actionem, sed sup-  
 ponitur potius ad actionem, cum sit ipsummet  
 230 agens.

*Tertia divisio finis, scilicet, actionis, vel rei factae.* 235R

10. Atque hinc orta est tertia divisio finis in

*Magna Moralia* I, cap. 3, [1184b10 ff.]. Insofar as this division  
 pertains to the formal *ratio* of an end, it seems to be a material  
 division taken from the things that exercise this causality  
 rather than from a variation in the causing. Nevertheless, this  
 division is still necessary in order to understand the authors  
 (especially Aristotle in the various passages), to explain other  
 divisions, and especially to reveal the ends of different things  
 (especially of human beings).

Examples, then, of each member of this division are  
 straightforward, in the works of art as in the works of nature.  
 For the end of medical care is health, of building a  
 house, of generating a begotten thing, and so on for others.  
 But, on the other hand, there is no other end in the striking of  
 a lyre than the very playing of the lyre and in contemplation  
 other than the contemplation itself. Nevertheless, it should  
 be noted with respect to the second member that even in  
 those actions a terminus can be philosophically distinguished  
 from the action. For the terminus is always some quality, but  
 the action is a way or tendency to that quality. Still, since  
 the terminus of this action is such that it does not endure  
 except as long as it is being made, by that fact in being made  
 and being preserved it depends on a power's actual motion or  
 influence. For this reason no distinction is made between the  
 action as action and the action as terminus as far as the *ratio*  
 of an end is concerned.

But in actions of the former kind, the intended end is the  
 thing produced, which continues after the action has ceased.  
 From this one also sees that this division is made only with  
 respect to the *finis cuius*, for a *finis cui* is neither an action  
 nor made through an action, but rather is presupposed for  
 action since it is the very agent himself.

*The third division of ends, namely, of actions or of the things  
 produced.*

10. From this last division there has arisen a third division of

200 cap. 1.] *om.* V.

204 varia ratione] variatione V.

Aristoteles. 235 finem actionis, et in finem rei factae seu genitae. Quae sumitur ex Aristotele partim 2. *Physicae* cap. 7. partim 2. *De caelo* cap. 3. Nam in priori loco dicit formam esse finem generationis, in posteriori autem dicit unamquamque rem, atque adeo ipsam formam seu rem genitam esse propter suam operationem. Atque ita fit (ut sumitur etiam ex Averroes. 240 Averroes 4. *De caelo* text. 22.) ut res genita sit finis generationis, et operatio etiam propter quam res generatur sit etiam finis, proxime quidem et immediate ipsius rei genitae, remote autem et mediate ipsius generationis. In qua divisione duo tantum occurrunt advertenda: unum est, cum Aristoteles dicit, formam esse finem generationis, sub forma comprehendere totum compositum, seu rem ipsam genitam, nam propter illam maxime est generatio: tamen quia res genita non fit nisi inducendo formam in materiam, ideo per formam explicuit generationis finem. Et, quod de generatione dixit Aristoteles, intelligendum est de omni actione tam naturali quam artificiali, per quam aliqua res fit, ita ut permaneat: et extendi etiam potest ad creationem, nam etiam res, quae creatur, est proximus finis illius actionis. 245R 250R 255R 260R

11. Alterum observandum est, finem rei genitae communiter censi esse aliquam operationem propter quam res fit, ut est visio Dei respectu hominis, vel illuminatio respectu Solis: tamen ut omnem finem rei genitae comprehendamus, per operationem necesse est intelligere omnem usum ad quem res genita ordinatur, nam finis materiae quae est res quaedam genita seu creata, non est propria aliqua operatio, est tamen causalitas <850> eius, scilicet sustentatio formae, aut talis compositio substantiae: similiter finis domus est habitatio, quae non est operatio, sed protectio quaedam, et 260R 270R

ends into the ends of actions and the ends of the things that are produced of begotten. This division is taken from Aristotle, partly from *Physics* II, cap. 7,<sup>8</sup> and partly from *De caelo*, cap. 3, [286a8]. For in the first passage he says that form is the end of generation, but in the second he says every single thing—and so even the form itself or the begotten thing—is for the sake of its activity. And so it follows (as is also gathered from Averroes, *De caelo* IV, text. 22) that the begotten thing is the end of generation and, furthermore, that the activity for the sake of which the thing is generated is also an end—proximately and immediately, certainly, of the begotten thing itself; remotely and mediately, moreover, of the generation itself.

Only two things need to be noticed about this division. One is that when Aristotle says that form is the end of generation, we should include the whole composite or begotten thing under ‘form’. For generation is chiefly for the sake of that. Nevertheless, because the begotten thing is not made except by the induction of form into matter, for that reason Aristotle explicated the end of generation by focusing on form. And what Aristotle said about generation should be understood about every action, artificial as well as natural, through which some enduring thing is produced. It can even be extended to creation, since a thing that is created is likewise a proximate end of that action of creation.

11. The other thing that should be observed is that the end of the begotten thing is commonly thought to be some activity for the sake of which the thing is made, as the vision of God in the case of a human being and illumination in the case of the sun. Still, in order that we may include every end of begotten things, we must understand activity to include every use to which a begotten thing is ordered. For the end of matter, which is a certain begotten or created thing, is not some proper activity, but is its causality, namely, sustentance of the form or such a composition of the substance. Similarly, the end of a house is habitation, which is not an activity but a certain protection and, as it were, extrinsic informing of the

Aristotle.

Averroes.

<sup>8</sup>Perhaps 198b1–4?



270 quasi extrinseca informatio habitantium, et sic 275R  
 de aliis. Et iuxta hunc modum contingit, non  
 solum respectu rei genitae dari finem, qui sit op-  
 eratio, propter quem sit ipsa res genita, sed etiam  
 respectu unius operationis dari aliam, quae sit  
 275 finis eius: sic enim cytharizatio est propter delectationem, et locutio propter intellectionem. Potest enim una operatio ad aliam concurrere vel obiective, vel effective, vel saltem ut necessaria vel utilis conditio ad aliam operationem: et ideo potest ad illam ut ad finem ordinari. 285R

280 *Quarta divisio in finem obiectivum et formalem.*

12. Quarto ex his divisionibus, praesertim ex secunda oritur alia, qua dividitur finis in obiectivum et formalem. Nam, ut diximus, interdum finis est operatio: haec autem operatio, praesertim si sit immanens, praeter actum ipsum requirit obiectum circa quod versatur, ut contemplatio quae est finis hominis, versatur circa aliquam rem aut veritatem contemplatione dignam, propter quam aliquo modo est ipsa contemplatio, quia per illam quasi comparatur, et possidetur secundum modum sibi proportionatum. Et in hoc sensu distinguunt Theologi in fine hominis, visionem, et Deum visum, et visionem dicunt esse finem formalem, quem etiam appellant finem Quo, et adeptionem finis: Deum autem appellant finem obiectivum, seu finem Qui, quia comparatur per finem formalem. Ita sumitur ex D. Thoma, 1. 2. q. 1. art. 8. et q. 2. art. 7. et q. 11. art. 3. ad tertium. Ubi advertit, hos non tam esse duos fines, quam unum, quia neque obiectum attingi potest nisi per actum, neque actum fieri potest nisi circa obiectum: et ideo motio ac intentio agentis est ad utrumque per modum unius, et ita unam causam finalem complent. Quamquam

inhabitant. And likewise in other cases.

And in this way of understanding activity, it is not only in the case of a begotten thing that it has an end that is the activity for the sake of which the thing was begotten, but also in the case of one activity there is another activity that is its end. For example, playing the lyre is for the sake of delighting and speaking is for the sake of understanding. For one activity can concur with another, either objectively or effectively or at least as a condition that is necessary or useful for the other activity. One activity can, therefore, be ordered to it as to an end.

*The fourth division into objective ends and formal ends.*

12. Fourth, from these divisions, especially the second one, arises another, by which ends are divided into objective ends and formal ends. For, as we said, sometimes an end is an activity. This activity, however, especially if it is immanent, requires (besides the act itself) an object to which it is directed. For example, contemplation—which is a human being's end—is directed to some thing or truth worthy of contemplation. The contemplation itself is in some way for the sake of this object, since the object is, as it were, collected and possessed through that contemplation according to a way proportionate to the object. And in this sense theologians distinguish, with respect to human beings' end, the vision [of God] and God seen. They call the vision the 'formal end', which they also designate the 'end by which' (*finem quo*) and the 'attainment of the end'. God, however, they call the 'objective end' or the 'end which' (*finem qui*), because he is attained through the formal end. So it is taken from St. Thomas, I-IIae.1.8 [co.], 2.7, and 11.3 ad 3, where he notes that these are not so much two ends as one. For the object cannot be attained except through an act and the act cannot come about except it is about the object. For this reason, the motion and intention of the agent is directed to both as to one thing. In this way both complete one final cause. Nevertheless, in the way in which

D. Thomas.

305 eo modo quo sunt res diversae, possunt inter se  
comparari, et una ad alteram ordinari. Atque hoc  
modo potest ad hanc divisionem applicari fere tota  
doctrina, quae circa primam tradita est.

*Quinta divisio finis in eum, qui fit, et eum qui obtine-*  
*tur.*

310 13. Et hinc ulterius fit (quae potest esse quinta  
divisio) quod finis Cuius aliquando supponitur op-  
erationi agentis, et intenditur <col. b> non ut ef-  
ficiendus, sed ut obtinendus, quod verum habet  
de fine obiectivo: et hoc modo est Deus finis nos- 320R  
315 trarum actionum, et extenditur hoc ad omnes res,  
quae supponuntur ut obiecta, vel materia circa  
quam, ut divitiae sunt finis avari, non producen-  
dus, sed acquirendus, etiamsi iam existat. Ali-  
quando vero finis non supponitur, sed fit per ac- 325R  
320 tionem agentis, sive fieri dicatur proprie pro re  
facta, sive late, ut etiam dici potest de actione.  
Atque hoc modo visio Dei est finis hominis, et in  
universum omnis operatio, vel terminus per ipsam  
factus, est finis non praeexistens, sed subsequens 330R  
325 ad intentionem agentis. Atque hanc divisionem  
in terminis docuit D. Thomas 3. *Summae contra*  
*gentiles* cap. 18. sumiturque ex doctrina Aristotelis  
partim 2. *Physicae* et 5. *Metaphysicae* ubi potis-  
simum facit mentionem eius finis qui fit per ac- 335R  
330 tionem agentis: partim 2. *De caelo* text. 64. et  
12. *Metaphysicae* text. 36. ubi dicit Deum esse  
finem, gratia cuius caetera agunt: constat autem  
Deum non esse finem qui per actionem agentis fiat,  
sed qui ad actiones omnium agentium supponatur. 340R

D. Thomas.  
Aristoteles.

335 *Sexta divisio in finem ultimum et non ultimum.*

<sup>9</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.5-8.

there are different things, they can be related to each other  
and one can be ordered to the other. And in this way almost  
the entire doctrine given with respect to the first division<sup>9</sup> can  
be applied to this division.

*The fifth division of ends into those that are produced and*  
*those that are obtained.*

13. From the foregoing it further follows (which can be the  
fifth division) that a *finis cuius* is sometimes presupposed  
in an agent's activity of the agent and is intended not as  
something to be effected but as something to be obtained.  
This is the case with objective ends and in this way God is  
the end of our actions. This further applies to all things  
that are presupposed as the object or the matter concerning  
which. Riches, for example, are the end for the greedy, not as  
something to be produced but as something to be acquired  
even if already existing.

But sometimes the end is not presupposed but rather  
is produced through the agent's action, where 'produced' is  
either said properly, applying to things that are made, or  
said more broadly, applying also to actions. In this way the  
vision of God is the end of human beings. And in general every  
activity or terminus made through activity is not a pre-existing  
end but an end subsequent to the agent's intention.

And St. Thomas taught this division of terms in *Summa*  
*contra gentiles* III, cap. 18. It is also taken from Aristotle's  
doctrine, partly from *Physics* II and *Metaphysics* V, where  
he especially makes mention of that end which is produced  
through an agent's agent, and partly from *De caelo*, text. 64,  
and *Metaphysics* XII, text. 36, where he says that God is the  
end for the sake of which (*finis gratia cuius*) the other things  
act. It is obvious, moreover, that God is not an end that is  
produced through the action of agents, but an end that is  
presupposed for the actions of all agents.

St. Thomas.  
Aristotle.

*The sixth division into ultimate ends and non-ultimate ends.*

14. Sexto dividitur finis in proximum, et remotum,  
ac ultimum. Haec divisio frequens est apud auc- 345R  
tores, et fundamentum habet in Aristotele citatis  
locis, et in 2. *Metaphysicae* cap. 2. ubi ostendit  
340 non dari processum in infinitum in finibus. Videri  
tamen potest alicui, repugnantiam involvere divi-  
sionem illam cum diviso, nam de ratione finis est 350R  
ut sit ultimus, ut nomen ipsum prae se fert. Et  
quia de ratione finis est ut propter se ametur, et  
345 alia propter ipsum, et consequenter ut ipse non  
ametur propter alia: iam enim non esset finis, sed  
medium: non ergo recte dividitur finis in proxi- 355R  
mum, et remotum vel ultimum. Ut ergo intelligatur  
divisio, duae rationes in finali causa distingui pos-  
350 sunt: prior est qua finis dicitur propter se amari:  
posterior, quatenus alia amantur propter ipsum:  
et ipse est ratio amandi illa. Sub priori ergo ra- 360R  
tione omnis finis, si praecise quatenus finis est  
consideretur, habet rationem ultimi, ut ratio facta  
355 ostendit, nam in illo quod dicitur propter se amari,  
includitur negatio amoris propter aliud: in qua  
negatione consummatur ratio ultimi. Contingit 365R  
tamen ut quamvis aliquod obiectum propter se et  
propter bonitatem suam ametur, nihilominus vel  
360 natura sua, vel ex intentione operantis, referatur  
et tendat in ulteriorem <851> finem, ut cum quis  
facit eleemosynam, et quia honesta sit actio in ra- 370R  
tione misericordiae, et quia est accommodata ad  
satisfaciendum Deo pro peccatis. Tunc ergo unus  
365 finis ordinatur ad alium, quamquam sub ea ra-  
tione qua ordinatur, non habeat rationem finis sed  
medii. Ille igitur finis, qui immediate propter se 375R  
amatur, dicitur finis proximus: alius vero finis ad  
quem alter ordinatur, dicitur remotus: quod si in

14. Sixth, ends are divided into proximate, remote, and  
ultimate ends. This division is common in the writings of  
authors and it has a foundation in Aristotle, in the places  
already cited and in *Metaphysics* II, cap. 2, where he shows  
that there is a not an infinite regress of ends. Still, it might  
seem to someone that this division involves a repugnance to  
what is being divided. For it is of the *ratio* of an end to be  
ultimate, as the very name ‘end’ implies. And since it is of the  
*ratio* of an end to be loved for its own sake and other things to  
be loved for its sake, and consequently it itself is not loved for  
the sake of other things (for then it would not be an end, but a  
means), ends, therefore, are not rightly divided into proximate  
and remote ends or ultimate ends.

Therefore, in order to understand this division, two *ra-  
tiones* can be distinguished in a final cause. The former is  
that by which an end is said to be loved for its own sake;  
the latter, insofar as other things are loved for its sake and  
it is itself the reason for loving the other things. Under the  
former *ratio*, therefore, every end, if it is considered precisely  
insofar as it is an end, has the *ratio* of an ultimate end, as  
the argument made showed. For saying that it is loved for its  
own sake includes a negation of love for the sake of something  
else.<sup>10</sup> This negation sums up the *ratio* of an ultimate end.

Still, it happens that, although some object is loved for its  
own sake and for the sake of its own goodness, nevertheless,  
either from its nature or from the intention of the one acting,  
it is referred to and tends to a more ultimate end. This  
occurs, for example, when someone gives alms, both because  
the action is *honestum* under the *ratio* of compassion and  
because it is appropriate for making satisfaction to God for  
one’s sins. In that case, therefore, one end is ordered to  
another, although under that *ratio* by which it is ordered it  
does not have the *ratio* of an end but of a means. Therefore,  
that end which is immediately loved for its own sake is called

<sup>10</sup>Should not the claim be that saying that something is loved for its own sake is a negation of the claim that it is loved *merely* for the sake of something else? That is all that Suárez’s further claim requires and seems more plausible.

370 illo sistat intentio operantis, erit etiam ultimus: si  
 vero in ulteriorem finem ille ordinetur, erit tantum  
 remotus, non tamen ultimus: quia vero non potest 380R  
 in infinitum procedi, sistendum erit in aliquo qui  
 sit ultimus.

375 15. Atque ita facile constat necessitas prae- 385R  
 dictae divisionis, nam quia intentio agentis neces-  
 sario debet in aliquo fine immediate versari, quia  
 alias nunquam inchoaretur, ideo necesse est esse  
 aliquem finem proximum: est enim ille quem prox- 390R  
 ime et immediate agens intendit tali actu seu in-  
 tentione. Non est autem simpliciter necessarium,  
 ut praeter finem proximum detur remotus, quia  
 potest intentio agentis sistere in uno fine: tamen  
 quia potest etiam in ulteriorem finem tendere, ideo 395R  
 praeter proximum dari potest finis remotus. Et  
 similiter quamvis aliquis finis ultimus semper sit  
 necessarius, eo quod non proceditur in infinitum,  
 non est tamen necessarium ut finis ultimus sem-  
 per sit distinctus a proximo: nam si voluntas in  
 uno tantum fine sistat, quod facere potest, ille erit 400R  
 simul proximus et ultimus, saltem negative, id est,  
 post quem non est alius: quando vero plures sunt  
 fines subordinati, tunc necesse est hos fines esse  
 distinctos. Atque hinc fit, ut quamvis contingat  
 395 plura media inter se subordinari, ut primum sit  
 propter secundum, et secundum propter tertium,  
 et sic usque ad finem qui propter se amatur: si  
 tamen nullum ex illis mediis amatur propter se,  
 sed pure ut medium propter aliud, nullum eorum  
 400 habeat rationem finis proximi, aut remoti sub prae- 410R  
 dicta ratione: sed ille finis ad quem ordinatur tota  
 mediorum series, licet videatur remotus in ratione

a proximate end. But another end to which it is ordered  
 is called a remote end. If the intention of the one acting is  
 stopped in the remote end, it will also be an ultimate end. If,  
 however, it is ordered to a yet more ultimate end, it will only  
 be a remote end but not an ultimate end. But since there  
 cannot be an infinite regress, the agent's intention will be  
 stopped in something that is ultimate.

15. And so the necessity for the mentioned division is eas-  
 ily obvious. For, since an agent's intention must necessarily  
 be immediately turned to some end (since otherwise it would  
 never be started), it is for that reason necessary that there  
 be some proximate end. For the proximate end is that which  
 the agent proximately and immediately intends in such an  
 act or intention. It is not, however, strictly necessary that  
 there be a remote end besides the proximate end, since the  
 agent's intention can stop in one end. Still, since the agent's  
 intention can also tend to a more ultimate end, there can be  
 a remote end besides the proximate end.

Similarly, although some ultimate end is always necessary  
 so that there is not an infinite regress, it is not, nevertheless,  
 necessary that there always be an ultimate end distinct from  
 the proximate end. For if the will stops in only one end, which  
 can happen, that end will at the same time be both proximate  
 and ultimate (at least ultimate negatively, that is, without  
 another end after it). But when there are multiple subordi-  
 nated ends, it is necessary in this case that the proximate  
 and ultimate ends be distinct.

From this it follows that, although it may happen that  
 multiple means are subordinated to each other so that the  
 first is for the sake of the second and the second for the sake  
 of the third and so on all the way to the end that is loved for  
 its own sake, if, nevertheless, none of these means is loved  
 for its own sake but purely as means to another, none of  
 them will have the *ratio* of a proximate or remote end under  
 the aforementioned *ratio*.<sup>11</sup> But that end to which the entire

<sup>11</sup> *DM* XXIII.2.14.

obiecti voliti et materialis, tamen in ratione finis  
est proximus, seu primus in quem ut in finem ten-  
405 dit voluntas, et erit etiam ultimus, si non in alium 415R  
finem ordinetur.

16. Si vero finem consideremus sub alia habi-  
tudine, scilicet, quatenus propter ipsum aliquid  
eligitur aut fit, sic facilius est distinguere illas tres 420R  
410 rationes finium non solum <col. b> in rebus, quae  
propter se appetuntur, sed etiam in rebus quae  
sunt pure media, quae propter aliud eliguntur.  
Nam quando ad unum finem plura media inter  
se subordinata eliguntur, necesse et dari primum 425R  
415 et ultimum medium, tam ordine intentionis, quam  
ordine executionis: in neutro enim ordine potest  
in infinitum procedi: alias vel electio, vel execu-  
tio nunquam inchoaretur. Dicitur autem primum  
medium ordine intentionis, id quod est immedia- 430R  
420 tum fini, quodque primo eligitur post intentionem  
finis: et illud ipsum est ultimum in executione.  
E contrario vero illud medium quod est in ordine  
eligendi postremum, est in executione primum,  
nam ubi finitur electio, inde incipit executio, ut 435R  
425 paulatim per media usque ad consecutionem finis  
perveniatur. Hoc ergo medium, quod est in exe-  
cutione primum, et in electione ultimum, nullam  
habet rationem finis, quia nec propter se amatur,  
cum tantum sit medium, nec etiam aliud amatur 440R  
430 propter ipsum, cum in illo finita sit electio, tamen  
secundum medium habet iam rationem finis prox-  
imi respectu medii prioris, quod propter ipsum  
electum est. Tertium autem medium habet rati- 445R  
435 onem finis remoti respectu primi medii: et sic  
potest per plures fines magis vel minus remotos  
procedi, donec sistatur in ultimo, quod semper  
necessarium est, cum non possit in infinitum pro-  
cedi. Atque ita satis constat illa divisio quantum  
ad expositionem terminorum pertinet: nonnullae 450R

series of means is ordered, although it may seem remote in  
the *ratio* the willed and material object, nevertheless, in the  
*ratio* of an end it is proximate or the first thing to which the  
will tends as to an end. And if it is not ordered to a further  
end, it will also be an ultimate end.

16. If, however, we consider an end under another habi-  
tude (namely, insofar as something is elected or done for its  
sake), it is in this case easier to distinguish these three *ra-*  
*tiones* of ends, not only in the things which are desired for  
their own sakes, but also in things which are purely means,  
which are chosen for the sake of something else. For when  
multiple means subordinated among themselves are chosen  
for one end, it is necessary that there be both a first and an  
ultimate means, in the order of intention as much as in the  
order of execution. For in neither order can there be an infi-  
nite regress. Otherwise, either the election or the execution  
would never begin. The first means in the order of intention,  
however, is said to be that which is immediate to the end  
and which is elected first after the intention of the end. And  
this same thing is ultimate in execution. But, contrariwise,  
that means which is last in the order of electing is first in  
execution. For execution begins where election ends, so that  
one gradually comes through the means all the way to the  
attainment of the end.

Therefore, this means which is first in execution and last  
in election does not have the *ratio* of an end, since it is loved  
neither for its own sake (since it is only a means) nor is  
something else loved for its sake (since election is ended in  
it). The second means, however, already has the *ratio* of a  
proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was  
chosen for its sake. The third means, moreover, has the *ratio*  
of a remote end with respect to the first means. And we can  
continue in this way through many ends until we stop in the  
ultimate end, which is always necessary since there cannot  
be an infinite regress.

And so this division is sufficiently clear as far as an expo-  
sition of terms is concerned. But some questions that arise  
from this division will be discussed more advantageously in

440 vero quaestiones quae ex illa oriuntur, in discursu  
disputationis tractabuntur commodius, praesertim  
duae, scilicet, an media participant aliquo modo  
causalitatem finis, et an necesse sit constituere  
aliquem finem ultimum, ubi etiam varias accep- 455R  
445 tiones finis ultimi declarabimus, et an habeat pro-  
priam et per se causalitatem, quatenus finis ul-  
timus est, seu remotus.

the course of the disputation, especially these two: [i] whether means share in some way in the causality of an end<sup>12</sup> and [ii] whether it is necessary to posit some ultimate end.<sup>13</sup> When discussing these questions, I will also explain the different means of ‘end’ and whether it has a proper and *per se* causality insofar as it is an ultimate or remote end.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>*DM* XXIII.6.3–18.

<sup>13</sup>*DM* XXIV.1.

<sup>14</sup>*DM* XXIV.2?