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<847><sup>2</sup>

*Quotuplex sit finis.*

1. Antequam progrediamur ulterius ad explicanda caetera quae proposuimus ad causalitatem finis pertinentia, oportet varias divisiones, vel potius nominis significationes explicare, ut distincte intelligatur, de quo sit disputatio.

*Prima divisio finis, Cuius, et Cui.*

2. Est ergo prima ac celebris divisio finis in finem Cuius, et finem Cui, quae sumpta est ex Aristotele 2. *De anima* cap. 4. ubi Argyropilus vertit, *finem quo et cui*: sed priora verba sunt Graecis conformiora, et intentionem melius declarant, nam finis Cuius dicitur, cuius adipiscendi gratia homo movetur vel operatur, ut est sanitas in curatione: finis Cui dicitur ille, cui alter finis procuratur, ut est homo in intentione sanitatis, nam licet homo curetur propter sanitatem, ipsam vero sanitatem sibi et in suum commodum quaerit.

Quaestiuncula.

3. Quaei vero potest, quis horum habeat <col. b> propriam rationem finis. Quidam enim soli fini Cui illam attribuunt, quod sentit Gabriel in 2. dist. 1. q. 5. sequens Ocham in 2. q. 3. art. 1. atque idem sentit Henricus Quodli-

*How many kinds of ends there are.*<sup>3</sup>

1. Before we proceed to explain the remaining things that we mentioned as relevant to the causality of the end, we should explain the various divisions or, rather, the various significations of the name, in order to understand clearly the subject matter of the disputation.

*The first division: finis cuius and finis cui.*

2. There is, then, a first and famous division of ends into *finis cuius* (literally: ends of which) and *finis cui* (literally: ends for which), which is taken from Aristotle, *De anima* II, cap. 4, [415b20–22]. Argyropoulos turns it into *finis quo* and *finis cui*;<sup>4</sup> but the former words conform better to the Greek and better convey Aristotle's intention. For that for the sake of the obtaining of which a human being is moved or acts—for example, as health is that for the sake of the obtaining of which medical care is provided—is called a *finis cuius*. That for which or whom another end is procured—for example, as a human being is that for whom health is intended—is called a *finis cui*. For, although a human being is cured for the sake of health, he, however, seeks that health for himself and for his own advantage.

3. One can ask, however, which of these has the proper *ratio* of an end. For certain people attribute the proper *ratio* of an end only to the *finis cui*, as does Gabriel in II, dist. 1, q. 5, following Ockham in II, q. 3, art. 1. And Henry of Ghent thinks the same thing in *Quodlibet* II, q. 1. And is

A small question.

Gabriel.  
Ockham.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>See the parallel discussion in *DFH* 1.6.

<sup>4</sup>The reference is to John Argyropoulos (1415–1487), the Byzantine lecturer who taught Greek—and Aristotle—to a number of notable Italian humanists. The *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (ed. by William Smith, 1870) mentions a Latin translation of book III of *De Anima* but none of book II, though it does note that a commentary on *De Anima* has been credited to him.

bet 2. q. 1. Et probatur, nam ille est proprie finis, in quo  
 sistit intentio agentis, caetera enim potius habere videntur  
 rationem mediorum; sed intentio solum sistit in fine cui  
 caetera procurantur, nam ad illum omnia ordinantur: unde  
 25 sicut medium solum amatur, quatenus proportionatum est  
 fini: ita finis Cuius solum amatur, quatenus est proportion-  
 atus, et conveniens fini Cui; ergo. Et confirmatur, nam fi-  
 nis amari debet amore amicitiae, vel saltem benevolentiae,  
 quia debet amari propter se: sed solus finis Cui ita amatur,  
 30 nam finis Cuius amatur alteri, qui dicitur finis Cui: atque ita  
 amor finis Cuius est concupiscentiae, alterius vero est amici-  
 tiae seu benevolentiae; et ideo finis Cui amatur simpliciter,  
 finis autem Cuius tantum secundum quid, iuxta doctrinam  
 D. Thomae 1. 2. q. 26. art. 4. dicentis, *illud amari simpliciter,*  
 35 *cui amatur bonum: hoc autem bonum quod alteri amatur,*  
*tantum amari secundum quid.*

D. Thomae.

4. Aliunde vero apparet, solum finem Cuius proprie  
 habere rationem causae finalis, nam Aristoteles, ubicumque  
 hanc causam definit, per hoc eius rationem explicat, quod  
 40 sit *cuius gratia aliquid fit*, ut patet 2. *Physicae* cap. 3. et 7. et  
 5. *Metaphysicae* cap. 2. et hac ratione dicit, finem esse pri-  
 mum in intentione, et ultimum in executione: et similiter  
 ait, formam esse finem generationis, non vero ipsum gener-  
 antem. Et ratione declaratur, quia is cui alter finis acquiri-  
 45 tur, vel quaeritur, solum est subiectum, quod perficitur vel  
 actuatur alia re, quae intenditur ut finis: ut homo est subiec-  
 tum sanitatis, aut visionis beatae, quae est finis nostrarum  
 operationum: haec ergo habitudo non est proprie finis, sed  
 50 alterius rationis: nemo enim proprie dixerit hominem esse  
 finem visionis beatae, sed potius visionem esse finem ho-  
 minis: nam res est propter suam operationem, ut propter  
 finem. Et confirmatur, nam in fine Cuius comprehenditur,  
 ut infra dicam, obiectum operationis, ut est Deus respectu  
 visionis beatae: unde non solum amat sibi homo visionem  
 55 Dei, sed etiam Deum ipsum amore concupiscentiae perti-  
 nente ad spem, ut Theologi docent: non potest autem dici,  
 quod homo sit finis Dei, eo quod sit ille cui amatur Deus:

Aristoteles.

it shown: for that is properly an end in which the intention of an agent  
 stops. For the remaining things seem rather to have the nature of means.  
 But the intention only stops in the *finis cui*, [i.e., the end for which] the  
 other things are procured. For all things are ordered to it. Hence, just as  
 25R a means is loved only insofar as it is proportionate to the end, a *finis cuius*  
 is loved only insofar as it is proportionate to and agreeable to the *finis cui*.  
 Therefore.

And this is confirmed: for an end ought to be loved with friendship  
 love or at least with benevolent love, because it ought to be loved for its  
 30R own sake. But only a *finis cui* is loved in this way. For a *finis cuius* is  
 loved for something else, something that is called a *finis cui*. And thus love  
 for a *finis cuius* is concupiscent love, but love for the other kind of end  
 is friendship love or benevolent love. And therefore a *finis cui* is loved,  
 35R strictly speaking; a *finis cuius*, however, is loved only in a qualified sense,  
 according to the teaching of St. Thomas, IaIIae.26.4, [co.], when he says:  
 ‘that is loved strictly speaking for which (*cui*) a good is loved; this good,  
 however, which is loved for another, is only loved in a qualified sense.

St. Thomas.

4. But for other reasons it appears that only a *finis cuius* properly has  
 the *ratio* of a final cause. For Aristotle, wherever he defines this cause,  
 explicates its *ratio* through this: that it is that ‘for the sake of which (*cuius*)  
 something is done’, as is clear in *Physics* II, cap. 3, [194b33–34], and 7,  
 [198a23–25], and *Metaphysics* V, cap. 2, [1013a33–34]. For this reason he  
 40R says that an end is first in intention and last in execution, and likewise says  
 that the end of generation is the form and not the generating thing itself.  
 45R

Aristotle.

This is made evident by reason: that for which (*cui*) another end is  
 acquired or sought is just the subject that is perfected or actualized by  
 another thing that is intended as the end, as a human being is the subject  
 of health or of the beatific vision, which is the end of our activity. This  
 habitudo, therefore, is not properly of an end but of another *ratio*. For  
 50R no one will say, properly, that a human being is the beatific vision’s end;  
 rather, they will say that the vision is the human being’s end. For a thing  
 is for the sake of its activity as for the sake of an end.

This is confirmed: for the *finis cuius* includes, as I will say below,  
 the object of activity, as God is the object of activity with respect to the  
 55R beatific vision. Hence, not only does a human being love for himself the  
 vision of God, but he also loves God himself with the concupiscent love  
 pertaining to hope, as the theologians teach. Nor, moreover, can it be said  
 that a human being is the end for God by the fact that he is that for whom

ergo per illam particulam, *cui*, non explicatur propria ratio finis.

Dissolvitur. 60 5. Nihilominus dicendum <848> est in utroque horum salvari posse propriam rationem finis, interdum vero ita coniungi ut ex utroque coalescat unus integer finis. Hoc est consentaneum Aristoteli in citato loco *De anima*. Et ratione probatur, nam uterque horum finium potest per se excitare voluntatem, et ab ea diligi seu intendi propter suam bonitatem: sic enim quando homo inquit sanitatem, se diligit, cui sanitatem vult propter suum commodum et perfectionem, quam per se appetit, propter summam coniunctionem vel potius identitatem quam secum habet. Similiter diligit et intendit sanitatem, propter perfectionem ipsiusmet sanitatis. In quo magna est differentia inter medium, et finem Cuius, nam medium verbi gratia potio, solum est amabilis quatenus est utilis ad salutem: salus vero ipsa propter se amatur, quia per se perficit hominem cui amatur. Unde fit, ut totum hoc, *homo sanus*, sit integer, et adaequatus finis illius actionis, in quo praedicti duo fines includuntur, quasi componentes unum integrum finem. Sic etiam potentia dicitur esse propter operationem, ut propter finem cuius gratia fit, quamvis etiam operatio vere sit propter ipsam potentiam, nimirum ut ipsam perficiat, et in ultimo actu constituat. Ut merito dici possit, finem integrum esse potentiam ut perfecte actuatam, quod alii dicunt, potentiam non tam esse propter operationem, quam propter seipsam operantem. Atque hoc modo non repugnat duas res sub his diversis rationibus ad invicem esse unum finem alterius, et e converso: sic enim intellectus est propter visionem Dei, et visio etiam est propter intellectum ut ipsum perficiat. Neque hoc est inconveniens, tum propter rationes diversas, tum quia intentio agentis quasi adaequate fertur in compositum ex utroque cum mutua habitudine componentium inter se: quo modo materia est propter formam, et forma est etiam aliquo modo propter materiam: totum autem est, quod per se primo et adaequate intenditur. Quamvis autem finis Cui

60R (*cui*) God is loved. Therefore, the proper *ratio* of an end is not expressed through that phrase ‘for which’ (*cui*).

65R 5. Nevertheless, it should be said that the proper *ratio* of an end can be saved in each of these, though sometimes they are so conjoined that one integrated end coalesces from both. This is consistent with Aristotle in the cited passage from *De Anima*.<sup>5</sup> And it is shown by reason: for each of these ends can by itself excite the will and be selected or intended by the will for the sake of its goodness. For in this way when a human being seeks health, he loves himself, for whom (*cui*) he wills the health for the sake of his own advantage and perfection, which he desires in itself for the sake of the highest conjunction or, rather, the identity that it has with him. Similarly, he loves and intends health for the sake of the perfection of the health itself. In this there is a great difference between a means and a *finis cuius*. For a means—medicine, for example—is only lovable insofar as it is useful for health. But health is itself loved for its own sake, since it 70R of itself perfects the human being for whom (*cui*) it is loved.

75R And thus it happens that this whole—the healthy human being—is the integrated and adequate end of that action. In this the two mentioned ends are included, components, as it were, of one integrated end. In the same way a power is said to exist for the sake of activity as for the sake of the end for the sake of which it is made, although the activity also truly is for the sake of the very power, namely, insofar as it perfects the power and establishes it in the highest actuality. So it can rightly be said that the intergrated end is the power as perfectly actualized, or, what others say: 80R ‘a power is not so much for the sake of activity as for the sake of the one acting’.

85R And in this way it is not repugnant that two things under these different *rationes* each be the end for the other. For in this way the intellect is for the sake of the vision of God and the vision is also for the sake of the intellect as what perfects it. Nor is this disagreeable, because of the different *rationes* involved and because the intention of the agent is, as it were, 90R adequately brought to the composite of both ends with mutual habitudes of composing between themselves. This is the way in which matter is for the sake of form but form is also in some way for the sake of matter. The whole, however, is what is adequately and of itself intended. Moreover, although the *finis cui* and the *finis cuius* can be mutually related in that way, 95R

[The putative problem] is resolved.

<sup>5</sup>II, cap. 4 (415b20–22). Cf. n. 2 above.

Quaestiuncula  
consequens ad  
resolutionem  
praecedentis.

95 et Cuius possint ita ad invicem comparari, non est tamen id  
semper necessarium, ut statim declarabo.

100 6. Quaeret vero ulterius aliquis, esto uterque eorum  
sit proprie finis, quis eorum sit principalior. Respondeo,  
comparationem fieri posse, vel in ratione entis, vel in ra-  
tione causandi. Priori modo non est per se necessarium ut  
105 unus ex his finibus sit semper <col. b> perfectius ens, inter-  
dum enim finis Cui est res nobilior, ut cum homo propter  
sanitatem sibi acquirendam operatur: interdum vero accidit  
e converso, ut cum idem homo operatur propter acquiren-  
dum sibi Deum, qui longe nobilior est. Et ratio est, quia in-  
110 terdum res seu suppositum perfectius intendit sibi acquirere  
aliam perfectionem, quamvis minorem, ad quod satis est  
quod tale subiectum perfectiori modo se habeat cum tali  
forma, quam sine illa, quamvis, si praecise comparetur ad  
115 eandem formam, sit quid perfectius. Aliquando vero res ali-  
qua perficitur per coniunctionem ad perfectiorem, ut homo  
per coniunctionem ad Deum; et tunc optime potest res  
minus perfecta operari gratia alterius perfectioris, ut illam  
habeat et possideat prout potuerit: quo etiam modo materia  
120 appetit formam, et si posset gratia consequendi illam aliquid  
operari, id faceret: sub qua consideratione forma habet ra-  
tionem finis Cuius, et materia finis Cui, quae minus perfecta  
est, quam forma.

125 7. At vero si illa duo conferantur posteriori modo, scilicet  
in ratione causae et finis, idem videtur esse quaerere,  
quis eorum sit principalior, quod quaerere quis magis ame-  
tur, magisque intendatur. Et sane rationes prius factae vi-  
dentur suadere finem Cui magis amari, quia magis ratione  
sui diligitur, magisque in illo sistit motus voluntatis. Solum  
videtur obstare exemplum illud de amore concupiscentiae,  
130 et intentione consequendi Deum, quatenus bonum nostrum  
est. Neque enim dicere possumus, eo actu amare nos magis  
nos ipsos quam Deum: alias amor ille esset inordinatus:  
neque etiam dicere possumus illam intentionem principal-  
ius sistere in nobis, quam in Deo: alias absolute finis ultimus

it is, nevertheless, not always necessary, as I will explain shortly.

6. But someone will ask further: granting that each of these is properly an end, which one of them is more primary? I respond that the comparison can be made either under the *ratio* of being or under the *ratio* of causing. In the first way, it is not necessary *per se* that one of these ends always be a more perfect being. For sometimes the *finis cui* is a more noble thing, as in the case where a human being acts for the sake of acquiring health for himself. But sometimes it happens the other way around, as when the same human acts for the sake of acquiring God—who is far more noble than he is—for himself. And the reason is that sometimes the more perfect thing or *suppositum* intends to acquire for itself another perfection, although a lesser one. For this to happen it is sufficient that such a subject exist in a more perfect way with such a form than without it, even though the subject is more perfect if compared precisely to that form. But sometimes something is perfected through union with a more perfect thing—a human being through union with God, for example—and then the less perfect thing can well act for the sake of another more perfect thing in order that it may have and possess that more perfect thing insofar as it is able. This is the way in which even matter desires form, which, if it were able to act for the sake acquiring form, would do so. In this illustration, form has the *ratio* of a *finis cuius* and matter—which is less perfect than the form—has the *ratio* of a *finis cui*.

7. If, however, those two ends are compared in the latter way—namely, under the *ratio* of cause and end—it seems to be the same thing to ask which of them is more primary and to ask which of them is loved or intended more. And arguments soundly made before<sup>6</sup> seem to suggest that a *finis cui* is loved more, since it is loved more by its *ratio* and the movement of the will more stops in it. The only thing standing in the way seems to be the example of concupiscent love and the intention to pursue God insofar as he is our good. For we cannot say that by that act of concupiscent love we love ourselves more than we God. Otherwise, that love would be inordinate. Nor can we say that that intention to pursue God as our good stops more primarily in us than in God. Otherwise, the absolutely ultimate end of that intention would be us and not God,

A small question  
resulting from  
the preceding  
resolution.

<sup>6</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.3.

130 illius intentionis essemus nos, et non Deus, et ita esset etiam 130R  
inordinata intentio.

135 8. Quapropter distinctione vel limitatione opus est,  
nam in bonis particularibus, quae praecipue, vel etiam omni-  
no amantur in commodum amantis, vel ut illum perficiant,  
135R vel sub aliqua alia habitudine ad illum, verum est finem  
Cui principaliter amari, esseque principaliter finem. Et  
hoc probant rationes prius factae. Quae confirmari pos-  
sunt, nam saepe huiusmodi particulare bonum quod est fi-  
nis Cuius, supponit absolutum amorem illius personae cui  
140 amatur, et amor eius ex illo amore nascitur: sic enim homo  
interdum amat seipsum proprio amore benevolentiae, et ex  
140R illo postea amat sibi sanitatem. Et hinc <849> etiam saepe  
fit, ut talia bona particularia amentur ut media, et utilia ad  
alios fines ipsi amanti convenientes: signum ergo est, re-  
145 spectu horum finium ipsum finem Cui esse principaliter,  
magisque dilectum. At vero quando finis cuius gratia est  
145R summum bonum, et finis ultimus, si ordinate ametur et in-  
tendatur, semper debet retinere principaliter rationem fi-  
nis, magisque trahere ad se intentionem operantis. Quia  
150 cum sit finis ultimus simpliciter, non potest ita referri in al-  
ium sub aliqua ratione finis, ut in alio principaliter sistatur.  
150R Atque ita, cum homo intendit consequi Deum, licet ipse sit  
aliquo modo finis cui bonum illud quaeritur, tamen abso-  
lute potius homo ordinat seipsum in illum finem, nam vult  
155 coniungi illi bono ut ultimo fini suo. Quo fit, ut licet in  
eo motu et tendentia, respectu mediorum, et operationis,  
155R homo proprie dicatur finis Cui, tamen respectu ipsius Dei,  
qui principaliter quaeritur, non tam dicendus sit finis, quam  
subiectum quod ordinatur ad consequendum illum finem.  
160 Quamvis non negem posse etiam vocari finem Cui, nam  
160R revera habet illam rationem, ita tamen, ut intelligatur potius  
ordinari ad alterum finem obiectivum et ultimum, quam il-  
lum ad se ordinare.

*Secunda divisio finis in operationem, et rem factam.*

<sup>7</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.3.

and thus it would also be an inordinate intention.

8. This is why a distinction or limitation is needed here. For in the case of particular goods, which are loved mainly or even entirely for the advantage of the one loving (either as they perfect him or under some other habitude to him), it is true that the *finis cui* is loved more primarily and is a more primary end. The arguments given earlier prove this.<sup>7</sup> They can be confirmed: for often a particular good of this sort that is a *finis cuius* presupposes an absolute love for that person for whom (*cui*) it is loved and the love for it is born from the love for that person. For example, a human being sometimes loves himself with a proper benevolent love and later as a result loves health for himself. And hence it also often happens that such particular goods are loved as means, useful to other ends that are themselves agreeable to the one loving. This, therefore, is evidence that with respect to these ends the *finis cui* is more primary and loved more.

But when, however, the end for the sake of which (*finis cuius gratia*) is the highest good and ultimate end and if it is loved and intended ordinate, it ought always retain the more primary *ratio* of an end and ought draw to itself the intention of the agent to a greater extent. For when it is the unqualifiedly ultimate end, it cannot be referred to another thing under some *ratio* of an end in such a way that [intention] is primarily stopped in that other thing. And so when a human being intends to follow God, although he himself is in some way the *finis cui*, [i.e., the end for whom] that good is sought, nevertheless, absolutely speaking, the human being orders himself to that end, for he wishes to be joined with that good as with his ultimate end.

From which it follows that, although in that motion and tendency with respect to means and activity a human being is properly called a *finis cui*, nevertheless, with respect to God himself (who is sought most of all), a human being should not be called an end so much as a subject who is ordered to pursuing that end. I do not deny, however, that the human being can also be called a *finis cui*. For he does in fact fall under that *ratio*, though he does so in such a way that he is understood to be ordered to another objective and ultimate end rather than that end is ordered to him.

*The second division of ends into activities and the things produced.*

165 9. Secundo dividi solet finis in eum qui est operatio tan-  
 tum, et eum qui ex operatione resultat, seu in quem ten- 165R  
 dit actio, ut in rem factam. Quam divisionem tetigit Aris-  
 toteles 1. *Ethicorum ad Nicomacheam* cap. 1. et lib. 1. *Mag-*  
*norum moralium* cap. 3. Et, quantum attinet ad rationem  
 170 formalem finis, videtur materialis divisio sumpta ex rebus,  
 quae hanc causalitatem exercent, potius quam ex varia 170R  
 ratione causandi. Nihilominus tamen ad intelligendos auc-  
 tores, praecipue varia loca Aristotelis et ad explicandas alias  
 divisiones, et praesertim ad declarandos fines diversarum re-  
 rum, et maxime hominis, est necessaria. Exempla itaque  
 175 utriusque membri facilia sunt, tam in operibus artis, quam  
 naturae. Nam finis curationis est sanitas, aedificationis do- 175R  
 mus, generationis res genita, et sic de aliis: at vero pulsatio-  
 nis cytharae non est alius finis praeterquam ipsa cythariza-  
 tio, et contemplatio nisi sola ipsa contemplatio. Quamquam  
 180 in secundo membro advertere oportet, etiam in illis actioni-  
 bus posse philosophice distingui terminum ab actione, nam  
 terminus semper est <col. b> aliqua qualitas: actio vero  
 est via seu tendentia illius qualitatis: tamen quia terminus  
 185 huius actionis talis est, ut non duret nisi quamdiu fit, eo  
 quod in fieri et conservari pendet ab actuali motu seu in- 185R  
 fluxu potentiae, ideo quod attinet ad rationem finis, non  
 distinguitur inter actionem ut actionem, et ut terminum:  
 in actionibus vero prioris generis finis intentus est res facta,  
 190 quae permanet cessante actione. Ex quo etiam intelligitur,  
 hanc divisionem tantum esse datam de fine Cuius: nam finis 190R  
 Cui neque est actio, neque fit per actionem, sed supponitur  
 potius ad actionem, cum sit ipsummet agens.

*Tertia divisio finis, scilicet, actionis, vel rei factae.*

195 10. Atque hinc orta est tertia divisio finis in finem actionis,  
 et in finem rei factae seu genitae. Quae sumitur ex Aris- 195R

9. Secondly, ‘end’ is usually divided into those which are activity only  
 and those which result from activity or to which action tends as to a pro-  
 duced thing. Aristotle mentioned this division in *Nicomachean Ethics* I,  
 cap. 1, [1094a3–4] and *Magna Moralia* I, cap. 3, [1184b10 ff.]. Insofar as  
 this division pertains to the formal *ratio* of an end, it seems to be a mate-  
 rial division taken from the things that exercise this causality rather than  
 from a variation in the causing. Nevertheless, this division is still neces-  
 sary in order to understand the authors (especially Aristotle in the various  
 passages), to explain other divisions, and especially to reveal the ends of  
 different things (especially of human beings).

Examples, then, of each member of this division are straightforward,  
 in the works of art as in the works of nature. For the end of medical  
 care is health, of building a house, of generating a begotten thing, and  
 so on for others. But, on the other hand, there is no other end in the  
 striking of a lyre than the very playing of the lyre and in contemplation  
 other than the contemplation itself. Nevertheless, it should be noted with  
 respect to the second member that even in those actions a terminus can be  
 philosophically distinguished from the action. For the terminus is always  
 some quality, but the action is a way or tendency to that quality. Still, since  
 the terminus of this action is such that it does not endure except as long as  
 it is being made, by that fact in being made and being preserved it depends  
 on a power’s actual motion or influence. For this reason no distinction is  
 made between the action as action and the action as terminus as far as the  
*ratio* of an end is concerned.

But in actions of the former kind, the intended end is the thing pro-  
 duced, which continues after the action has ceased. From this one also sees  
 that this division is made only with respect to the *finis cuius*, for a *finis cui*  
 is neither an action nor made through an action, but rather is presupposed  
 for action since it is the very agent himself.

*The third division of ends, namely, of actions or of the things produced.*

10. From this last division there has arisen a third division of ends into the  
 ends of actions and the ends of the things that are produced of begotten.

168 cap. 1.] *om.* V.

171–172 varia ratione] variatione V.

Aristoteles. 200  
 Averroes. 205  
 210  
 215  
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totele partim 2. *Physicae* cap. 7. partim 2. *De caelo* cap. 3. Nam in priori loco dicit formam esse finem generationis, in posteriori autem dicit unamquamque rem, atque adeo ipsam formam seu rem genitam esse propter suam operationem. Atque ita fit (ut sumitur etiam ex Averroes 4. *De caelo* text. 22.) ut res genita sit finis generationis, et operatio etiam propter quam res generatur sit etiam finis, proxime quidem et immediate ipsius rei genitae, remote autem et mediate ipsius generationis. In qua divisione duo tantum occurrunt advertenda: unum est, cum Aristoteles dicit, formam esse finem generationis, sub forma comprehendere totum compositum, seu rem ipsam genitam, nam propter illam maxime est generatio: tamen quia res genita non fit nisi inducendo formam in materiam, ideo per formam explicuit generationis finem. Et, quod de generatione dixit Aristoteles, intelligendum est de omni actione tam naturali quam artificiali, per quam aliqua res fit, ita ut permaneat: et extendi etiam potest ad creationem, nam etiam res, quae creatur, est proximus finis illius actionis.

11. Alterum observandum est, finem rei genitae communiter censi esse aliquam operationem propter quam res fit, ut est visio Dei respectu hominis, vel illuminatio respectu Solis: tamen ut omnem finem rei genitae comprehendamus, per operationem necesse est intelligere omnem usum ad quem res genita ordinatur, nam finis materiae quae est res quaedam genita seu creata, non est propria aliqua operatio, est tamen causalitas <850> eius, scilicet sustentatio formae, aut talis compositio substantiae: similiter finis domus est habitatio, quae non est operatio, sed protectio quaedam, et quasi extrinseca informatio habitantium, et sic de aliis. Et iuxta hunc modum contingit, non solum respectu rei genitae dari finem, qui sit operatio, propter quem sit ipsa res genita, sed etiam respectu unius operationis dari aliam, quae sit finis eius: sic enim cytharizatio est propter delectationem, et locutio propter intellectionem. Potest enim una operatio ad aliam concurrere vel obiective, vel ef-

This division is taken from Aristotle, partly from *Physics* II, cap. 7,<sup>8</sup> and partly from *De caelo*, cap. 3, [286a8]. For in the first passage he says that form is the end of generation, but in the second he says every single thing—and so even the form itself or the begotten thing—is for the sake of its activity. And so it follows (as is also gathered from Averroes, *De caelo* IV, text. 22) that the begotten thing is the end of generation and, furthermore, that the activity for the sake of which the thing is generated is also an end—proximately and immediately, certainly, of the begotten thing itself; remotely and mediately, moreover, of the generation itself.

Only two things need to be noticed about this division. One is that when Aristotle says that form is the end of generation, we should include the whole composite or begotten thing under ‘form’. For generation is chiefly for the sake of that. Nevertheless, because the begotten thing is not made except by the induction of form into matter, for that reason Aristotle explicated the end of generation by focusing on form. And what Aristotle said about generation should be understood about every action, artificial as well as natural, through which some enduring thing is produced. It can even be extended to creation, since a thing that is created is likewise a proximate end of that action of creation.

11. The other thing that should be observed is that the end of the begotten thing is commonly thought to be some activity for the sake of which the thing is made, as the vision of God in the case of a human being and illumination in the case of the sun. Still, in order that we may include every end of begotten things, we must understand activity to include every use to which a begotten thing is ordered. For the end of matter, which is a certain begotten or created thing, is not some proper activity, but is its causality, namely, sustentance of the form or such a composition of the substance. Similarly, the end of a house is habitation, which is not an activity but a certain protection and, as it were, extrinsic informing of the inhabitant. And likewise in other cases.

And in this way of understanding activity, it is not only in the case of a begotten thing that it has an end that is the activity for the sake of which the thing was begotten, but also in the case of one activity there is another activity that is its end. For example, playing the lyre is for the sake of delighting and speaking is for the sake of understanding. For one activity can concur with another, either objectively or effectively or at least as a

<sup>8</sup>Perhaps 198b1–4?

Aristotle.

Averroes.

fective, vel saltem ut necessaria vel utilis conditio ad aliam operationem: et ideo potest ad illam ut ad finem ordinari.

235 *Quarta divisio in finem obiectivum et formalem.*

12. Quarto ex his divisionibus, praesertim ex secunda oritur alia, qua dividitur finis in obiectivum et formalem. Nam, ut diximus, interdum finis est operatio: haec autem operatio, praesertim si sit immanens, praeter actum ipsum requirit obiectum circa quod versatur, ut contemplatio quae est finis hominis, versatur circa aliquam rem aut veritatem contemplatione dignam, propter quam aliquo modo est ipsa contemplatio, quia per illam quasi comparatur, et possidetur secundum modum sibi proportionatum. Et in hoc sensu distinguunt Theologi in fine hominis, visionem, et Deum visum, et visionem dicunt esse finem formalem, quem etiam appellant finem Quo, et adeptionem finis: Deum autem appellant finem obiectivum, seu finem Qui, quia comparatur per finem formalem. Ita sumitur ex D. Thoma, 1. 2. q. 1. art. 8. et q. 2. art. 7. et q. 11. art. 3. ad tertium. Ubi advertit, hos non tam esse duos fines, quam unum, quia neque obiectum attingi potest nisi per actum, neque actum fieri potest nisi circa obiectum: et ideo motio ac intentio agentis est ad utrumque per modum unius, et ita unam causam finalem complent. Quamquam eo modo quo sunt res diversae, possunt inter se comparari, et una ad alteram ordinari. Atque hoc modo potest ad hanc divisionem applicari fere tota doctrina, quae circa primam tradita est.

*Quinta divisio finis in eum, qui fit, et eum qui obtinetur.*

260 13. Et hinc ulterius fit (quae potest esse quinta divisio) quod finis Cuius aliquando supponitur operationi agentis, et intenditur <col. b> non ut efficiendus, sed ut obtinendus,

<sup>9</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.5–8.

condition that is necessary or useful for the other activity. One activity can, therefore, be ordered to it as to an end.

*The fourth division into objective ends and formal ends.*

12. Fourth, from these divisions, especially the second one, arises another, by which ends are divided into objective ends and formal ends. For, as we said, sometimes an end is an activity. This activity, however, especially if it is immanent, requires (besides the act itself) an object to which it is directed. For example, contemplation—which is a human being’s end—is directed to some thing or truth worthy of contemplation. The contemplation itself is in some way for the sake of this object, since the object is, as it were, collected and possessed through that contemplation according to a way proportionate to the object. And in this sense theologians distinguish, with respect to human beings’ end, the vision [of God] and God seen. They call the vision the ‘formal end’, which they also designate the ‘end by which’ (*finem quo*) and the ‘attainment of the end’. God, however, they call the ‘objective end’ or the ‘end which’ (*finem qui*), because he is attained through the formal end. So it is taken from St. Thomas, IaIIae.1.8 [co.], 2.7, and 11.3 ad 3, where he notes that these are not so much two ends as one. For the object cannot be attained except through an act and the act cannot come about except it is about the object. For this reason, the motion and intention of the agent is directed to both as to one thing. In this way both complete one final cause. Nevertheless, in the way in which there are different things, they can be related to each other and one can be ordered to the other. And in this way almost the entire doctrine given with respect to the first division<sup>9</sup> can be applied to this division.

*The fifth division of ends into those that are produced and those that are obtained.*

13. From the foregoing it further follows (which can be the fifth division) that a *finis cuius* is sometimes presupposed in an agent’s activity of the agent and is intended not as something to be effected but as something to

quod verum habet de fine obiectivo: et hoc modo est Deus  
 finis nostrarum actionum, et extenditur hoc ad omnes res,  
 265 quae supponuntur ut obiecta, vel materia circa quam, ut  
 divitiae sunt finis avari, non producendus, sed acquirendus, 265R  
 etiamsi iam existat. Aliquando vero finis non supponitur,  
 sed fit per actionem agentis, sive fieri dicatur proprie pro re  
 facta, sive late, ut etiam dici potest de actione. Atque hoc  
 270 modo visio Dei est finis hominis, et in universum omnis op-  
 eratio, vel terminus per ipsam factus, est finis non praeex-  
 istens, sed subsequens ad intentionem agentis. Atque hanc  
 270R divisionem in terminis docuit D. Thomas 3. *Summae con-*  
*tra gentiles* cap. 18. sumiturque ex doctrina Aristotelis par-  
 tim 2. *Physicae* et 5. *Metaphysicae* ubi potissimum facit men-  
 275 tionem eius finis qui fit per actionem agentis: partim 2. *De*  
*caelo* text. 64. et 12. *Metaphysicae* text. 36. ubi dicit Deum  
 esse finem, gratia cuius caetera agunt: constat autem Deum  
 non esse finem qui per actionem agentis fiat, sed qui ad ac-  
 280 tionem omnium agentium supponatur.

D. Thomas.  
 Aristoteles.

*Sexta divisio in finem ultimum et non ultimum.*

14. Sexto dividitur finis in proximum, et remotum, ac ul-  
 timum. Haec divisio frequens est apud auctores, et funda-  
 285 mentum habet in Aristotele citatis locis, et in 2. *Metaphysi-*  
*cae* cap. 2. ubi ostendit non dari processum in infinitum in  
 finibus. Videri tamen potest alicui, repugnantiam involvere  
 divisionem illam cum diviso, nam de ratione finis est ut sit  
 ultimus, ut nomen ipsum prae se fert. Et quia de ratione fi-  
 nis est ut propter se ametur, et alia propter ipsum, et conse-  
 290 quenter ut ipse non ametur propter alia: iam enim non esset  
 finis, sed medium: non ergo recte dividitur finis in proxi-  
 mum, et remotum vel ultimum. Ut ergo intelligatur divisio,  
 duae rationes in finali causa distingui possunt: prior est qua  
 finis dicitur propter se amari: posterior, quatenus alia aman-  
 295 tur propter ipsum: et ipse est ratio amandi illa. Sub priori  
 ergo ratione omnis finis, si praecise quatenus finis est consid-

287 illam] illa V.

be obtained. This is the case with objective ends and in this way God is the  
 end of our actions. This further applies to all things that are presupposed  
 as the object or the matter concerning which. Riches, for example, are the  
 end for the greedy, not as something to be produced but as something to  
 be acquired even if already existing.

But sometimes the end is not presupposed but rather is produced  
 through the agent's action, where 'produced' is either said properly, apply-  
 ing to things that are made, or said more broadly, applying also to actions.  
 In this way the vision of God is the end of human beings. And in general  
 every activity or terminus made through activity is not a pre-existing end  
 but an end subsequent to the agent's intention.

And St. Thomas taught this division of terms in *Summa contra gentiles*  
 III, cap. 18. It is also taken from Aristotle's doctrine, partly from *Physics* II  
 and *Metaphysics* V, where he especially makes mention of that end which is  
 produced through an agent's agent, and partly from *De caelo*, text. 64, and  
*Metaphysics* XII, text. 36, where he says that God is the end for the sake of  
 which (*finis gratia cuius*) the other things act. It is obvious, moreover, that  
 God is not an end that is produced through the action of agents, but an  
 end that is presupposed for the actions of all agents.

St. Thomas.  
 Aristotle.

*The sixth division into ultimate ends and non-ultimate ends.*

14. Sixth, ends are divided into proximate, remote, and ultimate ends.  
 This division is common in the writings of authors and it has a foundation  
 in Aristotle, in the places already cited and in *Metaphysics* II, cap. 2, where  
 he shows that there is not an infinite regress of ends. Still, it might  
 seem to someone that this division involves a repugnance to what is being  
 divided. For it is of the *ratio* of an end to be ultimate, as the very name  
 'end' implies. And since it is of the *ratio* of an end to be loved for its own  
 sake and other things to be loved for its sake, and consequently it itself is  
 not loved for the sake of other things (for then it would not be an end,  
 but a means), ends, therefore, are not rightly divided into proximate and  
 remote ends or ultimate ends.

Therefore, in order to understand this division, two *rationes* can be  
 distinguished in a final cause. The former is that by which an end is said  
 to be loved for its own sake; the latter, insofar as other things are loved  
 for its sake and it is itself the reason for loving the other things. Under

eretur, habet rationem ultimi, ut ratio facta ostendit, nam in illo quod dicitur propter se amari, includitur negatio amoris propter aliud: in qua negatione consummatur ratio ultimi. 300  
 Contingit tamen ut quamvis aliquod obiectum propter se et propter bonitatem suam ametur, nihilominus vel natura sua, vel ex intentione operantis, referatur et tendat in ulteriorem <851> finem, ut cum quis facit eleemosynam, et quia honesta sit actio in ratione misericordiae, et quia est accommodata ad satisfaciendum Deo pro peccatis. Tunc ergo unus 305  
 finis ordinatur ad alium, quamquam sub ea ratione qua ordinatur, non habeat rationem finis sed medii. Ille igitur finis, qui immediate propter se amatur, dicitur finis proximus: alius vero finis ad quem alter ordinatur, dicitur remotus: quod 310  
 si in illo sistat intentio operantis, erit etiam ultimus: si vero in ulteriorem finem ille ordinetur, erit tantum remotus, non tamen ultimus: quia vero non potest in infinitum procedi, sistendum erit in aliquo qui sit ultimus.

15. Atque ita facile constat necessitas praedictae divisionis, nam quia intentio agentis necessario debet in aliquo fine immediate versari, quia alias nunquam inchoaretur, ideo necesse est esse aliquem finem proximum: est enim ille 315  
 quem proxime et immediate agens intendit tali actu seu intentione. Non est autem simpliciter necessarium, ut praeter finem proximum detur remotus, quia potest intentio agentis sistere in uno fine: tamen quia potest etiam in ulteriorem finem tendere, ideo praeter proximum dari potest finis remotus. Et similiter quamvis aliquis finis ultimus semper sit necessarius, eo quod non proceditur in infinitum, 320  
 non est tamen necessarium ut finis ultimus semper sit distinctus a proximo: nam si voluntas in uno tantum fine sistat, quod facere potest, ille erit simul proximus et ultimus, saltem negative, id est, post quem non est alius: quando 325  
 330R

the former *ratio*, therefore, every end, if it is considered precisely insofar as it is an end, has the *ratio* of an ultimate end, as the argument made showed. For saying that it is loved for its own sake includes a negation of love for the sake of something else.<sup>10</sup> This negation sums up the *ratio* of an ultimate end.

Still, it happens that, although some object is loved for its own sake and for the sake of its own goodness, nevertheless, either from its nature or from the intention of the one acting, it is referred to and tends to a more ultimate end. This occurs, for example, when someone gives alms, both because the action is *honestum* under the *ratio* of compassion and because it is appropriate for making satisfaction to God for one's sins. In that case, therefore, one end is ordered to another, although under that *ratio* by which it is ordered it does not have the *ratio* of an end but of a means. Therefore, that end which is immediately loved for its own sake is called a proximate end. But another end to which it is ordered is called a remote end. If the intention of the one acting is stopped in the remote end, it will also be an ultimate end. If, however, it is ordered to a yet more ultimate end, it will only be a remote end but not an ultimate end. But since there cannot be an infinite regress, the agent's intention will be stopped in something that is ultimate. 315R

15. And so the necessity for the mentioned division is easily obvious. For, since an agent's intention must necessarily be immediately turned to some end (since otherwise it would never be started), it is for that reason necessary that there be some proximate end. For the proximate end is that which the agent proximally and immediately intends in such an act or intention. It is not, however, strictly necessary that there be a remote end besides the proximate end, since the agent's intention can stop in one end. Still, since the agent's intention can also tend to a more ultimate end, there can be a remote end besides the proximate end.

Similarly, although some ultimate end is always necessary so that there is not an infinite regress, it is not, nevertheless, necessary that there always be an ultimate end distinct from the proximate end. For if the will stops in only one end, which can happen, that end will at the same time be both proximate and ultimate (at least ultimate negatively, that is, without another end after it). But when there are multiple subordinated ends, it is

<sup>10</sup>Should not the claim be that saying that something is loved for its own sake is a negation of the claim that it is loved *merely* for the sake of something else? That is all that Suárez's further claim requires and seems more plausible.

330 vero plures sunt fines subordinati, tunc necesse est hos fines  
 esse distinctos. Atque hinc fit, ut quamvis contingat plura  
 media inter se subordinari, ut primum sit propter secun-  
 dum, et secundum propter tertium, et sic usque ad finem 335R  
 qui propter se amatur: si tamen nullum ex illis mediis ama-  
 tur propter se, sed pure ut medium propter aliud, nullum  
 335 eorum habeat rationem finis proximi, aut remoti sub prae-  
 dicta ratione: sed ille finis ad quem ordinatur tota medio-  
 rum series, licet videatur remotus in ratione obiecti voliti et  
 340 materialis, tamen in ratione finis est proximus, seu primus  
 in quem ut in finem tendit voluntas, et erit etiam ultimus, si  
 non in alium finem ordinetur.

16. Si vero finem consideremus sub alia habitudine,  
 scilicet, quatenus propter ipsum aliquid eligitur aut fit, sic 345R  
 facilius est distinguere illas tres rationes finium non solum  
 <col. b> in rebus, quae propter se appetuntur, sed etiam in  
 345 rebus quae sunt pure media, quae propter aliud eliguntur.  
 Nam quando ad unum finem plura media inter se subor-  
 dinata eliguntur, necesse est dari primum et ultimum medi- 350R  
 um, tam ordine intentionis, quam ordine executionis: in  
 neutro enim ordine potest in infinitum procedi: alias vel  
 350 electio, vel executio nunquam inchoaretur. Dicitur autem  
 primum medium ordine intentionis, id quod est immedia-  
 tum fini, quodque primo eligitur post intentionem finis: et 355R  
 illud ipsum est ultimum in executione. E contrario vero  
 illud medium quod est in ordine eligendi postremum, est  
 355 in executione primum, nam ubi finitur electio, inde incipit  
 executio, ut paulatim per media usque ad consecutionem fi-  
 nis perveniatur. Hoc ergo medium, quod est in executione 360R  
 primum, et in electione ultimum, nullam habet rationem fi-  
 nis, quia nec propter se amatur, cum tantum sit medium,  
 360 nec etiam aliud amatur propter ipsum, cum in illo finita  
 sit electio, tamen secundum medium habet iam rationem  
 finis proximi respectu medii prioris, quod propter ipsum 365R  
 electum est. Tertium autem medium habet rationem finis

necessary in this case that the proximate and ultimate ends be distinct.

From this it follows that, although it may happen that multiple means are subordinated to each other so that the first is for the sake of the second and the second for the sake of the third and so on all the way to the end that is loved for its own sake, if, nevertheless, none of these means is loved for its own sake but purely as means to another, none of them will have the *ratio* of a proximate or remote end under the aforementioned *ratio*.<sup>11</sup> But that end to which the entire series of means is ordered, although it may seem remote in the *ratio* the willed and material object, nevertheless, in the *ratio* of an end it is proximate or the first thing to which the will tends as to an end. And if it is not ordered to a further end, it will also be an ultimate end.

16. If, however, we consider an end under another habitude (namely, insofar as something is elected or done for its sake), it is in this case easier to distinguish these three *rationes* of ends, not only in the things which are desired for their own sakes, but also in things which are purely means, which are chosen for the sake of something else. For when multiple means subordinated among themselves are chosen for one end, it is necessary that there be both a first and an ultimate means, in the order of intention as much as in the order of execution. For in neither order can there be an infinite regress. Otherwise, either the election or the execution would never begin. The first means in the order of intention, however, is said to be that which is immediate to the end and which is elected first after the intention of the end. And this same thing is ultimate in execution. But, contrariwise, that means which is last in the order of electing is first in execution. For execution begins where election ends, so that one gradually comes through the means all the way to the attainment of the end.

Therefore, this means which is first in execution and last in election does not have the *ratio* of an end, since it is loved neither for its own sake (since it is only a means) nor is something else loved for its sake (since election is ended in it). The second means, however, already has the *ratio* of a proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was chosen for its sake. The third means, moreover, has the *ratio* of a remote end with respect to the first means. And we can continue in this way through many ends until we stop in the ultimate end, which is always necessary since

<sup>11</sup>*DM* XXIII.2.14.

365 remoti respectu primi medii: et sic potest per plures fines  
 magis vel minus remotos procedi, donec sistatur in ultimo,  
 quod semper necessarium est, cum non possit in infinitum  
 procedi. Atque ita satis constat illa divisio quantum ad expo- 370R  
 sitionem terminorum pertinet: nonnullae vero quaestiones  
 quae ex illa oriuntur, in discursu disputationis tractabuntur  
 370 commodius, praesertim duae, scilicet, an media participant  
 aliquo modo causalitatem finis, et an necesse sit constituere  
 aliquem finem ultimum, ubi etiam varias acceptiones finis 375R  
 ultimi declarabimus, et an habeat propriam et per se causal-  
 itatem, quatenus finis ultimus est, seu remotus.

there cannot be an infinite regress.

And so this division is sufficiently clear as far as an exposition of terms is concerned. But some questions that arise from this division will be discussed more advantageously in the course of the disputation, especially these two: [i] whether means share in some way in the causality of an end<sup>12</sup> and [ii] whether it is necessary to posit some ultimate end.<sup>13</sup> When discussing these questions, I will also explain the different means of ‘end’ and whether it has a proper and *per se* causality insofar as it is an ultimate or remote end.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup>*DM* XXIII.6.3–18.

<sup>13</sup>*DM* XXIV.1.

<sup>14</sup>*DM* XXIV.2?