| Quotuplex sit finis. | How many kinds of ends there are. |
| 1. Antequam progrediamur ulterius ad explicanda caetera quae proposuimus ad causalitatem finis pertinentia, oportet varias divisiones vel potius nominis significationes explicare, ut distincte intelligatur de quo sit disputatio. | 1. Before we go further in explaining the remaining things that we propose are relevant to the causality of the end, it is necessary to explain the various divisions or, rather, the significations of the name, in order to clearly understand what the disputation is about. |
| Prima divisio finis cuius et cui. | The first division: finis cuius and finis cui. |
| 2. Est ergo prima ac celebris divisio finis in finem cuius et finem cui, quae sumpta est ex Aristot., II de Anima, c. 4, ubi Argyropilus vertit finem quo et cui; sed priora verba sunt graecis conformiora et intentionem melius declarant; nam finis cuius dicitur cuius adipiscendi gratia homo movetur vel operatur, ut est sanitas in curatione; finis cui dicitur ille cui alter finis procuratur, ut est homo in intentione sanitatis; nam, licet homo curetur propter sanitatem, ipsam vero sanitatem sibi et in suum commodum quaerit. 3. Quaeri vero potest quis horum habeat $<$col. b$>$ propriam rationem finis. Quidam enim soli fini cui illam attribuunt, quod sentit Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, sequens Ocham, In II, q. 3, a. 1; atque idem sentit Henric., Quodl. II, q. 1. Et probatur: nam ille est proprie finis, in quo sistit intentio agentis; caetera enim potius habere videntur rationem mediorum; sed intentio solum sistit in fine cui caetera procurantur; nam ad illum omnia ordinantur; unde, sicut medium solum amatur quatenus proportionatum est fini, ita finis cuius solum amatur quatenus est proportionatus et conveniens fini cui; ergo. Et confirmatur: nam finis amari debet amore amicitiae vel saltem benevolentiae, quia debet amari propter se; sed solus finis cui ita amatur; nam finis cuius amatur alteri, qui dicitur finis cui; atque ita amor finis cuius est concupiscentiae, alterius vero est amicitiae seu benevolentiae, et ideo finis cui amatur simpliciter, finis autem cuius tantum secundum quid, iuxta doctrinam D. Thom., I-II, q. 26, a. 4, dicentis illud amari simpliciter, cui amatur bonum; hoc autem bonum, quod alteri amatur, tantum amari secundum quid. 4. Aliunde vero apparet solum finem cuius proprie habere rationem causae finalis; nam Aristoteles, ubicumque hanc causam definit, per hoc eius rationem explicat, quod sit cuius gratia aliquid fit, ut patet II Phys., c. 3 et 7, et V Metaph., c. 2; et hac ratione dicit finem esse primum in intentione et ultimum in exsecutione, et similiter ait formam esse finem generationis, non vero ipsum generantem. Et ratione declaratur, quia hic cui alter finis acquiritur vel quaeritur, solum est subiectum quod perficitur vel actuatur alia re quae intenditur ut finis; ut homo est subiectum sanitatis aut visionis beatae, quae est finis nostrarum operationum; haec ergo habitudo non est proprie finis, sed alterius rationis; nemo enim proprie dixerit hominem esse finem visionis beatae, sed potius visionem esse finem hominis; nam res est propter suam operationem ut propter finem. Et confirmatur: nam in fine cuius comprehenditur, ut infra dicam, obiectum operationis, ut est Deus respectu visionis beatae; unde non solum amat sibi homo visionem Dei, sed etiam Deum ipsum amore concupiscentiae pertinente ad spem, ut theologi docent; non potest autem dici quod homo sit finis Dei eo quod sit ille cui amatur Deus; ergo per illam particulam cui non explicatur propria ratio finis. 5. Nihilominus dicendum $<$848$>$ est in utroque horum salvari posse propriam rationem finis, interdum vero ita coniungi ut ex utroque coalescat unus integer finis. Hoc est consentaneum Aristoteli in citato loco De Anima. Et ratione probatur, nam uterque horum finium potest per se excitare voluntatem et ab ea diligi seu intendi propter suam bonitatem; sic enim quando homo inquirit sanitatem, se diligit, cui sanitatem vult propter suum commodum et perfectionem, quam per se appetit propter summam coniunctionem vel potius identitatem quam secum habet. Similiter diligit et intendit sanitatem propter perfectionem ipsiusmet sanitatis, in quo magna est differentia inter medium et finem cuius; nam medium, verbi gratia, potio, solum est amabilis quatenus est utilis ad salutem; salus vero ipsa propter se amatur, quia per se perficit hominem cui amatur. Unde fit ut totum hoc, homo sanus, sit integer et adaequatus finis illius actionis, in quo praedicti duo fines includuntur, quasi componentes unum integrum finem. Sic etiam potentia dicitur esse propter operationem ut propter finem cuius gratia fit, quamvis etiam operatio vere sit propter ipsam potentiam, nimirum ut ipsam perficiat et in ultimo actu constituat; ut merito dici possit finem integrum esse potentiam ut perfecte actuatam, quod alii dicunt: potentiam non tam esse propter operationem quam propter seipsam operantem. Atque hoc modo non repugnat duas res sub his diversis rationibus ad invicem esse unum finem alterius et e converso; sic enim intellectus est propter visionem Dei et visio etiam est propter intellectum, ut ipsum perficiat. Neque hoc est inconveniens, tum propter rationes diversas, tum quia intentio agentis quasi adaequate fertur in compositum ex utroque cum mutua habitudine componentium inter se, quo modo materia est propter formam, et forma est etiam aliquo modo propter materiam; totum autem est quod per se primo et adaequate intenditur. Quamvis autem finis cui et cuius possint ita ad invicem comparari, non est tamen id semper necessarium, ut statim declarabo. 6. Quaeret vero ulterius aliquis, esto uterque eorum sit proprie finis, quis eorum sit principalior. Respondeo comparationem fieri posse vel in ratione entis, vel in ratione causandi. Priori modo non est per se necessarium ut unus ex his finibus sit semper $<$col. b$>$ perfectius ens; interdum enim finis cui est res nobilior, ut cum homo propter sanitatem sibi acquirendam operatur; interdum vero accidit e converso, ut cum idem homo operatur propter aequirendum sibi Deum, qui longe nobilior est. Et ratio est quia interdum res seu suppositum perfectius intendit sibi acquirere aliam perfectionem, quamvis minorem, ad quod satis est quod tale subiectum perfectiori modo se habeat cum tali forma quam sine illa, quamvis si praecise comparetur ad eamdem formam, sit quid perfectius. Aliquando vero res aliqua perficitur per coniunctionem ad perfectiorem, ut homo per coniunctionem ad Deum, et tunc optime potest res minus perfecta operari gratia alterius perfectioris ut illam habeat et possideat prout potuerit, quo etiam modo materia appetit formam, et si posset gratia consequendi illam aliquid operari, id faceret; sub qua consideratione forma habet rationem finis cuius, et materia finis cui, quae minus perfecta est quam forma. 7. At vero si illa duo conferantur posteriori modo, scilicet, in ratione causae et finis, idem videtur esse quaerere quis eorum sit principalior quod quaerere quis magis ametur magisque intendatur. Et sane rationes prius factae videntur suadere finem cui magis amari, quia magis ratione sui diligitur, magisque in illo sistit motus voluntatis. Solum videtur obstare exemplum illud de amore concupiscentiae et intentione consequendi Deum quatenus bonum nostrum est. Neque enim dicere possumus eo actu amare nos magis nos ipsos quam Deum; alias amor ille esset inordinatus; neque etiam dicere possumus illam intentionem principalius sistere in nobis quam in Deo; alias absolute finis ultimus illius intentionis essemus nos et non Deus, et ita esset etiam inordinata intentio. 8. Quapropter distinctione vel limitatione opus est; nam in bonis particularibus, quae praecipue vel etiam omnino amantur in commodum amantis, vel ut illum perficiant, vel sub aliqua alia habitudine ad illum, verum est finem cui principalius amari esseque principaliorem finem. Et hoc probant rationes prius factae. Quae confirmari possunt, nam saepe huiusmodi particulare bonum quod est finis cuius supponit absolutum amorem illius personae cui amatur, et amor eius ex illo amore nascitur; sic enim homo interdum amat seipsum proprio amore benevolentiae et ex illo postea amat sibi sanitatem. Et hinc $<$849$>$ etiam saepe fit ut talia bona particularia amentur ut media et utilia ad alios fines ipsi amanti convenientes; signum ergo est respectu horum finium ipsum finem cui esse principaliorem magisque dilectum. At vero quando finis cuius gratia est summum bonum et finis ultimus, si ordinate ametur et intendatur, semper debet retinere principaliorem rationem finis magisque trahere ad se intentionem operantis. Quia cum sit finis ultimus simpliciter, non potest ita referri in alium sub aliqua ratione finis ut in alio principaliter sistatur. Atque ita, cum homo intendit consequi Deum, licet ipse sit aliquo modo finis cui bonum illud quaeritur, tamen absolute potius homo ordinat seipsum in illum finem, nam vult coniungi bono ut ultimo fini suo. Quo fit ut, licet in eo motu et tendentia respectu mediorum et operationis homo proprie dicatur finis cui, tamen respectu ipsius Dei, qui principaliter quaeritur, non tam dicendus sit finis quam subiectum quod ordinatur ad consequendum illum finem. Quamvis non negem posse etiam vocari finem cui; nam revera habet illam rationem, ita tamen ut intelligatur potius ordinari ad alterum finem obiectivum et ultimum, quam illum ad se ordinare. |
2. There is, then, the first and famous division of `end' into finis cuius and finis cui, which is taken from Aristotle, book II of De Anima, c. 4, [415b20--22], where Argyropoulos changes it to finis quo and finis cui; but the former words are conformed to the Greek and better show the intended [distinction]. For that is called the finis cuius for the sake of the obtaining of which a human is moved or operated on, as health is [the end of which] in medical care. That for which another end is procured, as a human is [the end for which] health is intended, is called a finis cui. For, although a human is cured for the sake of health, he seeks, however, that health for himself and to his own advantage. 3. But someone can ask which of these has the proper nature of an end. For certain people attribute that to the finis cui alone. This is what Gabriel thinks in [Sent] II, dist. 1, q. 5, following Ockham in [Sent.] II, q. 3, a. 1. And Henry [of Ghent] thinks the same in Quodlibet II, q. 1. And is it shown: for this is properly an end, in which the intention of an agent stops. For the remaining things seem rather to have the nature of intermediaries. But the intention only stops in the finis cui, [i.e., the end for which] the remaining things are procured. For all things are ordered to it. Hence, just as the intermediary is only loved in so far as it is proportionate to the end, the finis cuius is only loved insofar as it is proportionate to and agreeable to the finis cui. Therefore. And it is confirmed: for the end ought to be loved with friendship love or at least with benevolent love, because it ought to be loved for its own sake. But only the finis cui is loved in that way. For the finis cuius is loved for something else which is called the finis cui. And thus love for the finis cuius is concupiscent love, but [love] of the other [end] is friendship love or benevolent love. And therefore the finis cui is loved, strictly speaking; the finis cuius, however, [is loved] only in a qualified sense, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, [ST] IaIIae.26.4, [co.], when he says that that is loved, strictly speaking, for which (cui) good is loved; this good, however, which is loved for another, is only loved in a qualified sense. 4. But from elsewhere it appears that only the finis cuius properly has the nature of a final cause. For Aristotle, wherever he defines this cause, explains the nature of it through this, that it is for the sake of which (cuius) something is done, as is clear in Physics II, c. 3 [194b33--34] and 7 [198a23--25] and Metaphysics V, c. 2 [1013a33--34]. And for this reason he says that an end is first in intention and last in execution, and similarly says that the form is the end of generation but it is not the thing generating itself. And it is made clear by reason, because that for which (cui) another end is acquired or sought is just the subject that is perfected or actualized by another thing which is intended as the end, as a human is the subject of health of the beatific vision, which is the end of our activity. This disposition, therefore, is not properly an end but of another nature. For no one will properly say that a human is the end of the beatific vision, but rather that the vision is the end for a human. For a thing is on account of its activity as on account of an end. And it is confirmed: for in the finis cuius is comprehended, as I will say below, the object of acting, as God is with respect to the divine vision. Hence, not only does a human love the vision of God for himself, but [he] also [loves] God himself with concupiscent love pertaining to hope, as the theologians teach. Nor, moreover, can it be said that a human is the end of God by the fact that he is that for which (cui) God is loved. Therefore, through that particle `for which' (cui) is not explained the proper nature of an end. 5. Nevertheless, it should be said that the proper nature of an end can be saved in each of these, but sometimes they are so joined that one integrated end coalesces from both. This is consistent with Aristotle in the cited passage from De Anima. And it is shown by reason: for each of these ends can per se excite the will and can be selected or intended by it [i.e., the will] on account of its [i.e., either end's] goodness. For thus when a human seeks health, he selects himself for which he wishes the health on account of his advantage and perfection, which he desires in itself for the sake of the highest conjunction or, rather, identity which it has with him. Similarly, he loves and intends health for the sake of the perfection of the health itself, in which there is a great difference between the intermediary and the finis cuius. For the intermediary, for example, medicine, is only lovable insofar as it is useful for health. But health is itself loved for the sake of itself, because it per se perfects the human for whom (cui) it is loved. Hence it happens that this whole, the healthy human being, is the integrated and adequate end of that action, in which the two mentioned ends are included, components, as it were, of one integrated end. Thus also potency is said to be on account of activity as on account of the end for the sake of which it comes to be, although the action also truly is on account of the very potentiality without doubt as it perfects and in the ultimate act constitutes. As rightly can be said that the complete end is potentiality as perfectly actualized, which others say: `potentiality is not so much on account of activity as on account of the one acting'. And in this way it is not repugnant that two things under these different concepts be in turn one end for the other and vice versa. For thus the intellect is for the sake of the vision of God and also the vision for the sake of the intellect as perfecting it. Nor is this disagreeable, both on account of the different reasons and because the intention of the agent, as it were, is adequately brought into a composite of both with a mutual habitude of the composing things between each other, in the way in which matter is for the sake of form and form is also in some way for the sake of matter. The whole, however, is what per se and adequately is intended. Moreover, although the finis cui and the finis cuius can in that way be compared in turn, nevertheless, it is not always necessary, as I will show at once. 6. But someone might ask further: granting that either of these is properly an end, one of them is principal. I respond that the comparison can be made either in the nature of being or in the nature of causing. In the first way it is not per se necessary that one of these ends always be more perfect being. For sometimes the finis cui is a more noble thing, as when a human acts for the sake of acquiring health for himself. But sometimes it happens the other way around, as when the same human acts for the sake of acquiring God---who is far more noble [than he is]---for himself. And the reason is because sometimes the more perfect thing or suppositum intends to acquire for itself another perfection, although a lesser one, for which it is sufficient that such a subject has itself in a more perfect way with such a form than without it, although if compared precisely to that form, it [i.e., the subject] is more perfect. But, finally, any thing is perfected through union with the more perfect, as a human through union with God, and then the less perfect thing can best act for the sake of another more perfect so that it has and possesses that just as it will be able to, in which manner also matter desires form. And, if it were possible that something act for the sake of pursuing that, it would do so. Under this consideration a form has the nature of a finis cuius and matter---which is less perfect than the form---of a finis cui. 7. But if, however, those two are considered in the second way, namely, in the nature of cause and end, likewise it seems that it is asked which of them is more primary as far as which of them is loved more and is intended more. And, reasonably, the reasons just given seem to suggest that the finis cui is loved more, because it is selected more by its nature and the movement of the will more stops in it. It only seems to oppose that example of the friendship love and of the intention of following God insofar as he is our good. For neither can we say that by that act we love us ourselves more than God. Otherwise, that love would be inordinate. Nor can we say that that intention more primarily stops in us than in God. Otherwise, the absolutely ultimate end of that intention would be us and not God and thus it would also be an inordinate intention. 8. For what the distinction or determination is useful: for in the case of particular goods, which especially or even entirely are loved for the advantage of the one loving, either as they perfect him or under some other disposition to him, it is true that a finis cui is loved more primarily and is more primarily an end. And the arguments given earlier show this. They can be confirmed: for often a particular good of this sort that is a finis cuius presupposes an absolute love of that person for whom (cui) it is loved, and the love of it is born from that love. For example, a human sometimes loves himself with a proper benevolent love and afterwards as a result loves health for himself. And hence it also sometimes happens that such particular goods are loved as means and tools to other ends themselves agreeable to the one loving. Therefore, this is evidence with respect to these ends that the finis cui itself is more primary and more selected. But when, however, the end for the sake of which (finis cuius gratia) is the highest good and ultimate end, if it is loved and intended ordinately, it ought always retain the more primary nature of an end and draw more to the intention itself of the one acting. Because when it is the ultimate end, strictly speaking, it cannot thus be directed to another under some concept of an end so that is is primarily stopped in another. And thus, when a human intends to follow God, although he himself is in some way the finis cui, [i.e., the end for which] that good is sought, nevertheless, the human, rather, simply orders himself to that end, for he wishes to be joined with the good as his ultimate end. By which it happens that, although in that motion and tendency with respect to means and actions a human properly is called the finis cui, nevertheless, with respect to God himself, who is primarily sought, he should not so much be called an end as a subject which is ordered to the following of that end. Although I would not deny that he can also be called a finis cui. For in fact he has that character, though in such a way that he is understood more as ordered to another objective and ultimate end than that that [end] is ordered to him. |
| Secunda divisio finis in operationem et rem factam. | The second division of `end' into activity and the thing produced. |
| 9. Secundo dividi solet finis in eum qui est operatio tantum et eum qui ex operatione resultat seu in quem tendit actio ut in rem factam. Quam divisionem tetigit Aristoteles, I Ethic., et lib. I Magnor. Moral., c. 3. Et quantum attinet ad rationem formalem finis, videtur materialis divisio sumpta ex rebus quae hanc causalitatem exercent, potius quam ex variatione causandi. Nihilominus tamen ad intelligendos auctores, praecipue varia loca Aristotelis, et ad explicandas alias divisiones et praesertim ad declarandos fines diversarum rerum et maxime hominis, est necessaria. Exempla itaque utriusque membri facilia sunt, tam in operibus artis quam naturae. Nam finis curationis est sanitas, aedificationis domus, generationis res genita, et sic de aliis; at vero pulsationis cytharae non est alius finis praeterquam ipsa cytharizatio, et contemplatio nisi sola ipsa contemplatio. Quamquam in secundo membro advertere oportet etiam in illis actionibus posse philosophice distingui terminum ab actione; nam terminus semper est $<$col. b$>$ aliqua qualitas; actio vero est via seu tendentia illius qualitatis; tamen, quia terminus huius actionis talis est ut non duret nisi quamdiu fit, eo quod in fieri et conservari pendet ab actuali motu seu influxu potentiae, ideo quod attinet ad rationem finis non distinguitur inter actionem ut actionem et ut terminum; in actionibus vero prioris generis finis intentus est res facta, quae permanet cessante actione. Ex quo etiam intelligitur hanc divisionem tantum esse datam de fine cuius; nam finis cui neque est actio, neque fit per actionem, sed supponitur potius ad actionem, cum sit ipsummet agens. | 9. Secondly, `end' is usually divided into that which is the activity only and that which results from the activity or to which the action tends as in the produced thing. Aristotle mentioned this division in [Nichomachean] Ethics I [1094a3--4] and Magna Moralia I, c. 3 [1184b10 ff.]. And insofar as it holds on to the formal nature of an end, the division of the material seems to have been taken from the things which exercise this causality rather than from variation in the causing. All the same, nevertheless, [the division] is necessary in order to understand the authors, especially Aristotle in the various places, and in order to explain other divisions and especially to show the ends of different things and especially of humans. The examples, accordingly, of either member [of the division] are easy, so in the works of art as in nature. For the end of curing is health, of building a house, of generating a begotten thing, and so on for others. But, on the other hand, there is no other end in the striking of a kithara than the very playing of the kithara and in contemplation other than the contemplation itself. Nevertheless, in the second member it must also be noticed that in those actions a terminus can be philosophically distinguished from the action. For the terminus is always some quality, but the action is a way or course to that quality. Still, because the terminus of this action is such that it does not endure except as long as it is made, by the fact that in being made and being preserved it depends on the actual motion or influx of power. Therefore, what holds on to the nature of an end is not distinguished between the action as action and [the action] as terminus. But in actions of the former genus the intended end was the produced thing which continued after the cessation of action. By which is also understood that this division is only given concerning the finis cuius, for the finis cui is neither an action nor made through an action, but rather is supposed on account of the action since it is the very agent himself. |
| Tertia divisio finis, scilicet, actionis vel rei factae. | The third division of `end', namely, of action or of the produced thing. |
| 10. Atque hinc orta est tertia divisio finis in finem actionis et in finem rei factae seu genitae. Quae sumitur ex Aristotele, partim II Phys., c. 7, partim II de Caelo, c. 3. Nam in priori loco dicit formam esse finem generationis; in posteriori autem dicit unamquamque rem, atque adeo ipsam formam seu rem genitam esse propter suam operationem. Atque ita fit (ut sumitur etiam ex Averroe, IV de Caelo, text. 22) ut res genita sit finis generationis, et operatio etiam propter quam res generatur sit etiam finis proxime quidem et immediate ipsius rei genitae, remote autem et mediate ipsius generationis. In qua divisione duo tantum occurrunt advertenda: unum est, cum Aristoteles dicit formam esse finem generationis, sub forma comprehendere totum compositum seu rem ipsam genitam; nam propter illam maxime est generatio; tamen, quia res genita non fit nisi inducendo formam in materiam, ideo per formam explicuit generationis finem. Et quod de generatione dixit Aristoteles intelligendum est de omni actione, tam naturali quam artificiali, per quam aliqua res fit ita ut permaneat, et extendi etiam potest ad creationem; nam etiam res quae creatur est proximus finis illius actionis. 11. Alterum observandum est, finem rei genitae communiter censeri esse aliquam operationem propter quam res fit, ut est visio Dei respectu hominis vel illuminatio respectu solis; tamen, ut omnem finem rei genitae comprehendamus, per operationem necesse est intelligere omnem usum ad quem res genita ordinatur; nam finis materiae, quae est res quaedam genita seu creata, non est propria aliqua operatio, est tamen causalitas $<$850$>$ eius, scilicet, sustentatio formae, aut talis compositio substantiae; similiter finis domus est habitatio, quae non est operatio, sed protectio quaedam et quasi extrinseca informatio habitantium, et sic de aliis. Et iuxta hunc modum contingit non solum respectu rei genitae dari finem qui sit operatio, propter quem sit ipsa res genita, sed etiam respectu unius operationis dari aliam quae sit finis eius; sic enim cytharizatio est propter delectationem et locutio propter intellectionem. Potest enim una operatio ad aliam concurrere, vel obiective, vel effective, vel saltem ut necessaria vel utilis conditio ad aliam operationem, et ideo potest ad illam ut ad finem ordinari. |
10. And from this there arises a third division of ends into the end of the action and the end of the produced or begotten thing, which is taken from Aristotle, Physics part II, c. 7 [198b1--4?] and De Caelo part II, c. 3 [286a8?]. For in the first passage he says that form is the end of generation, but in the second he says every single thing, and therefore the form itself or the begotten thing, is on account of its activity. And so it happens (as is also taken from Averroes, De Caelo, IV, text. 22) that the begotten thing is the end of generation and, furthermore, the activity on account of which the thing is generated is also the end---certainly, proximately and immediately of the begotten thing itself; remotely and mediately, moreover, of the generation itself. In which division two things so far come to mind which should be noticed: one is that when Aristotle says that the form is the end of generation, under the form is comprehended the whole composite or the begotten thing itself. For generation is chiefly for the sake of that. Nevertheless, because the begotten thing is not made except that the form is introduced into the matter, therefore the end of generation is set forth through the form. And that which Aristotle says concerning generation should be understood concerning every action, natural just as much as artificial, through which some thing becomes such that it endures, and can also be extended to creation. For a thing which is created is also a proximate end of that action. 11. The other thing which should be observed is that the end of the begotten thing is commonly thought to be some activity on account of which the thing is made, as the vision of God is with respect to a human or illumination with respect to the sun. Still, in order that we may comprehend every end of the begotten thing, it is necessary to understand of activity every use to which the begotten thing is ordered. For the end of matter, which is a certain begotten or created thing, is not a some proper activity yet it is its causality, namely, sustenance of the form or such a composition of the substance. Similarly, the end of a house is habitation, which is not an activity but a certain protection and, as it were, extrinsic information of the inhabitant. And likewise concerning others. And in accordance with this way it happens not only with respect to the begotten thing that an end is given which is activity---for the sake of which is the begotten thing itself---but also with respect to one activity is given another which is its end. For example, playing the kithara is for the sake of delight and speaking for the sake of understanding. For one activity can concur with another, either objectively or effectively or at least as a necessary or useful condition for the other activity. And, therefore, it can be ordered to it as to an end. |
| Quarta divisio in finem obiectivum et formalem. | The fourth division into objective and formal ends. |
| 12. Quarto, ex his divisionibus, praesertim ex secunda, oritur alia, qua dividitur finis in obiectivum et formalem. Nam, ut diximus, interdum finis est operatio; haec autem operatio, praesertim si sit immanens, praeter actum ipsum requirit obiectum circa quod versatur, ut contemplatio, quae est finis hominis, versatur circa aliquam rem aut veritatem contemplatione dignam, propter quam aliquo modo est ipsa contemplatio, quia per illam quasi comparatur et possidetur secundum modum sibi proportionatum. Et in hoc sensu distinguunt theologi, in fine hominis, visionem et Deum visum, et visionem dicunt esse finem formalem, quem etiam appellant finem quo, et adeptionem finis; Deum autem appellant finem obiectivum, seu finem qui, quia comparatur per finem formalem. Ita sumitur ex D. Thoma, I-II, q. 1, a. 8, et q. 2, a. 7, et q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, ubi advertit hos non tam esse duos fines quam unum, quia neque obiectum attingi potest nisi per actum, neque actum fieri potest nisi circa obiectum, et ideo motio ac intentio agentis est ad utrumque per modum unius, et ita unam causam finalem complent. Quamquam eo modo quo sunt res diversae, possunt inter se comparari et una ad alteram ordinari. Atque hoc modo potest ad hanc divisionem applicari fere tota doctrina quae circa primam tradita est. | 12. Fourthly, from these divisions, especially from the second, arises another, by which ends are divided into objective and formal [ends]. For, as we said, sometimes an end is an activity. This activity, however, at least if it is immanent, requires besides the act itself an object to which it is turned, as contemplation, which is the end of a human, is turned to some thing or truth worthy of contemplation, for the sake of which the contemplation itself is in some way, because through that it is, as it were, collected and taken hold of in accordance with a mode proportionate to itself. And in this sense theologians distinguish, in the end of humans, vision and God having been seen. And they say that the vision is the formal end---which they also designate the `end by which' (finem quo) and the `attainment of the end'. God, however, they call the `objective end' or the `end which' (finem qui), because he is attained through the formal end. So it is taken from St. Thomas, [ST] IaIIae.1.8 [co.], 2.7, and 11.3 ad 3, where he draws attention to these not so much as two ends as one, because neither can the object be attained except through the act nor can the act become except on account of the object. And therefore the motion and intention of the agent is to each in the manner of one and thus they make up one final cause. Although in that manner by which they are different things, they can be compared to each other and one ordered to the other. And in this way this division can be applied to almost the entire doctrine which has been handed down on account of the first. |
| Quinta divisio finis in eum qui fit et eum qui obtinetur. | The fifth division of `end' into that which is done and that which is obtained. |
| 13. Et hinc ulterius fit (quae potest esse quinta divisio) quod finis cuius aliquando supponitur operationi agentis et intenditur $<$col. b$>$ non ut efficiendus, sed ut obtinendus, quod verum habet de fine obiectivo, et hoc modo est Deus finis nostrarum actionum, et extenditur hoc ad omnes res quae supponuntur ut obiecta vel materia circa quam, ut divitiae sunt finis avari, non producendus sed acquirendus, etiamsi iam existat. Aliquando vero finis non supponitur, sed fit per actionem agentis, sive fieri dicatur proprie pro re facta, sive late, ut etiam dici potest de actione. Atque hoc modo visio Dei est finis hominis, et in universum omnis operatio, vel terminus per ipsam factus, est finis non praeexistens, sed subsequens ad intentionem agentis. Atque hanc divisionem in terminis docuit D. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 18, sumiturque ex doctrina Aristotelis, partim II Phys., et V Metaph., ubi potissimum facit mentionem eius finis qui fit per actionem agentis; partim II de Caelo, text. 64, et XII Metaph., text. 36, ubi dicit Deum esse finem gratia cuius caetera agunt; constat autem Deum non esse finem qui per actionem agentis fiat, sed qui ad actiones omnium agentium supponatur. | 13. And hence it further happens (which can be the fifth division) that the finis cuius is sometimes supposed in the activity of the agent and is intended not as something to be effected but as something to be obtained, which is true concerning the objective end. And in this way God is the end of our actions and this is extended to all things which are supposed as the object or matter on account of which, as riches are the end for the greedy, not the producing but the acquiring, even if they have already appeared. But sometimes the end is not presupposed but is made through the action of the agent, either as it is said to become properly through the produced thing, or, more broadly, as it can also be said concerning the action. And in this way the vision of God is the end of humans and in general every activity or terminus made through it is not an end pre-existing but subsequent to the intention of the agent. And St. Thomas taught this division in termini in Contra Gentiles III, c. 18, and it is taken from the doctrine of Aristotle, Physics part II, and Metaphysics V, where he especially makes mention of that end which is made through the action of the agent, and De Caelo part II, text. 64 and Metaphysics XII, text. 36, where he says that God is the end for the sake of which (finis gratia cuius) the remaining things act. It is clear, however, that God is not the end which is made through the action of agents, but that which is presupposed for the actions of all agents. |
| Sexta divisio in finem ultimum et non ultimum. | The sixth division into ultimate and non-ultimate ends. |
| 14. Sexto, dividitur finis in proximum et remotum ac ultimum. Haec divisio frequens est apud auctores, et fundamentum habet in Aristotele, citatis locis, et in II Metaph., c. 2, ubi ostendit non dari processum in infinitum in finibus. Videri tamen potest alicui repugnantiam involvere divisionem illam cum diviso; nam de ratione finis est ut sit ultimus, ut nomen ipsum prae se fert. Et quia de ratione finis est ut propter se ametur et alia propter ipsum, et consequenter ut ipse non ametur propter alia; iam enim non esset finis, sed medium; non ergo recte dividitur finis in proximum et remotum vel ultimum. Ut ergo intelligatur divisio, duae rationes in finali causa distingui possunt: prior est qua finis dicitur propter se amari; posterior, quatenus alia amantur propter ipsum et ipse est ratio amandi illa. Sub priori ergo ratione omnis finis, si praecise quatenus finis est consideretur, habet rationem ultimi, ut ratio facta ostendit; nam in illo quod dicitur propter se amari includitur negatio amoris propter aliud; in qua negatione consummatur ratio ultimi. Contingit tamen ut, quamvis aliquod obiectum propter se et propter bonitatem suam ametur, nihilominus vel natura sua vel ex intentione operantis referatur et tendat in ulteriorem $<$851$>$ finem, ut cum quis facit eleemosynam, et quia honesta sit actio in ratione misericordiae, et quia est accommodata ad satisfaciendum Deo pro peccatis. Tunc ergo unus finis ordinatur ad alium, quamquam sub ea ratione qua ordinatur non habeat rationem finis, sed medii. Ille igitur finis qui immediate propter se amatur, dicitur finis proximus; alius vero finis ad quem alter ordinatur, dicitur remotus; quod si in illo sistat intentio operantis, erit etiam ultimus; si vero in ulteriorem finem ille ordinetur, erit tantum remotus, non tamen ultimus; quia vero non potest in infinitum procedi, sistendum erit in aliquo qui sit ultimus. 15. Atque ita facile constat necessitas praedictae divisionis; nam, quia intentio agentis necessario debet in aliquo fine immediate versari, quia alias nunquam inchoaretur, ideo necesse est esse aliquem finem proximum; est enim ille quem proxime et immediate agens intendit tali actu seu intentione. Non est autem simpliciter necessarium ut praeter finem proximum detur remotus, quia potest intentio agentis sistere in uno fine; tamen, quia potest etiam in ulteriorem finem tendere, ideo praeter proximum dari potest finis remotus. Et similiter, quamvis aliquis finis ultimus semper sit necessarius, eo quod non proceditur in infinitum, non est tamen necessarium ut finis ultimus semper sit distinctus a proximo; nam si voluntas in uno tantum fine sistat, quod facere potest, ille erit simul proximus et ultimus, saltem negative, id est, post quem non est alius; quando vero plures sunt fines subordinati, tunc necesse est hos fines esse distinctos. Atque hinc fit ut, quamvis contingat plura media inter se subordinari, ut primum sit propter secundum et secundum propter tertium et sic usque ad finem qui propter se amatur, si tamen nullum ex illis mediis amatur propter se, sed pure ut medium propter aliud, nullum eorum habeat rationem finis proximi aut remoti sub praedicta ratione; sed ille finis ad quem ordinatur tota mediorum series, licet videtur remotus in ratione obiecti voliti et materialis, tamen in ratione finis est proximus seu primus in quem ut in finem tendit voluntas, et erit etiam ultimus, si non in alium finem ordinetur. 16. Si vero finem consideremus sub alia habitudine, scilicet, quatenus propter ipsum aliquid eligitur aut fit, sic facilius est distinguere illas tres rationes finium, non solum $<$col. b$>$ in rebus quae propter se appetuntur, sed etiam in rebus quae sunt pure media quae propter aliud eliguntur. Nam quando ad unum finem plura media inter se subordinata eliguntur, necesse et dari primum et ultimum medium, tam ordine intentionis quam ordine exsecutionis; in neutro enim ordine potest in infinitum procedi; alias vel electio vel exsecutio nunquam inchoaretur. Dicitur autem primum medium ordine intentionis id quod est immediatum fini quodque primo eligitur post intentionem finis, et illud ipsum est ultimum in exsecutione. E contrario vero illud medium quod est in ordine eligendi postremum, est in exsecutione primum; nam ubi finitur electio, inde incipit exsecutio, ut paulatim per media usque ad consecutionem finis perveniatur. Hoc ergo medium quod est in exsecutione primum et in electione ultimum nullam habet rationem finis, quia nec propter se amatur, cum tantum sit medium, nec etiam aliud amatur propter ipsum, cum in illo finita sit electio; tamen secundum medium habet iam rationem finis proximi respectu medii prioris, quod propter ipsum electum est. Tertium autem medium habet rationem finis remoti respectu primi medii, et sic potest per plures fines magis vel minus remotos procedi donec sistatur in ultimo, quod semper necessarium est, cum non possit in infinitum procedi. Atque ita satis constat illa, divisio quantum ad expositionem terminorum pertinet; nonnullae vero quaestiones quae ex illa oriuntur, in discursu disputationis tractabuntur commodius, praesertim duae, scilicet, an media participent aliquo modo causalitatem finis, et an necesse sit constituere aliquem finem ultimum, ubi etiam varias acceptiones finis ultimi declarabimus, et an habeat propriam et per se causalitatem quatenus finis ultimus est seu remotus. |
14. Sixthly, ends are divided into proximate and remote and ultimate ends. This division is common in the writings of authors and it has a foundation in Aristotle, in the cited places and in Metaphysics II, c. 2, where he shows that a progression into infinity is not given in ends. Still, it can seem to someone that this division involves a repugnance with a divided [part]. For it is of the nature of an end to be ultimate, as the name itself makes clear. And because it is of the nature of an end to be loved for its own sake and others for its sake and consequently it itself is not loved for the sake of others. For then it would not be an end, but a means. Therefore, ends are not rightly divided into proximate and remote or ultimate. Therefore, in order to understand the division, two concepts in final causes can be distinguished. The former is that by which an end is said to be loved for its own sake; the latter, insofar as other [things] are loved for its sake and it itself is that reason for loving. Under the former concept, therefore, every end, if it is considered precisely insofar as it is an end, has the nature of an ultimate [end], as the given reason shows. For in that which is said to be loved for its own sake is included the negation of love for the sake of another, in which negation is brought about the nature of an ultimate [end]. Still, it happens that, although some object is loved for its own sake and for the sake of its good, nevertheless, either from its nature or from the intention of the one acting, it is directed to and tends to a more ultimate end, as when someone gives alms, both because the action is honest\footnote{I am using `honest' here in the old-fashioned sense in which it is contrasted to pleasurable and useful goods.} in accordance with the aspect of compassion and because it is appropriate for making satisfaction to God on behalf of sins. Therefore, in that case one end is ordered to another, although under that aspect by which it is ordered it does not have the nature of an end but of means. Therefore, that end which is immediately loved for its own sake is called a proximate end. But the other end to which it is ordered is called a remote [end]. But if the intention of the one acting is stopped in the remote end, it will also be an ultimate [end]. But if it is ordered to a more ultimate end, it will only be a remote [end] but not an ultimate [end]. But because it cannot proceed into infinity, it will be stopped in something which is an ultimate [end]. 15. And thus the necessity for the mentioned division is easily clear. For, because the intention of an agent must necessarily be immediately turned to some end, because otherwise it would never be started, therefore it is necessary that there be some proximate end. For it is that which the agent proximately and immediately intends in such an act or intention. It is not, however, strictly speaking, necessary that a remote [end] is given besides the proximate end, because the intention of the agent can stop in one end. Still, because it can also tend to a more ultimate end, therefore a remote end can be given besides the proximate [end]. And, similarly, although some ultimate end is always necessary, so that one does not proceed into infinity, it is not, nevertheless, necessary that an ultimate end always be distinct from the proximate [end]. For if the will stops in only one end, which can happen, that [end] will at the same time be proximate and ultimate, at least negatively, that is, there is not another after it. But when more than one end is subordinated, then it is necessary that these ends be distinct. And hence it happens that, although it may turn out that multiple intermediaries are subordinated, so that the first is for the sake of the second and the second is for the sake of the third and so on all the way to the end which is loved for its own sake, if nevertheless, none of these intermediates is loved for its own sake but purely as means to another, none of them will have the character of a proximate or remote end under the just-stated characters. But that end to which the entire series of intermediates is ordered, although it seems remote in the nature of the willed and material object, nevertheless in the nature of an end it is proximate or the first to which the will tends as to an end. And it will also be ultimate, if it is not ordered to another end. 16. But if we consider an end under another disposition, namely, insofar as for the sake of it something is chosen or done, then it is easier to distinguish these three concepts of ends, not only in the things which are desired for their own sakes, but also in things which are purely means which are chosen for the sake of something else. For when multiple means subordinated among themselves are chosen for one end, it is necessary both to be given a first and an ultimate means, as much in the order of intention as in the order of execution. For in neither order can one proceed into infinity. Otherwise, either the choice or the execution would never begin. The first means in the order of intention, however, is called that which is immediate in the end and which is chosen first after the intention of the end and that itself is ultimate in execution. But in the other direction that means which is last in the order of choosing is first in execution. For where a choice is ended, there begins the execution, so that one gradually through the means comes all the way to the attainment of the end. Therefore, this means which is first in execution and last in choice has no character of an end, because it is loved neither for its own sake, since it is only a means, nor is something else loved for its sake, since in that the choice is ended. Still, the second means has now the character of a proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was chosen for its sake. The third means, moreover, has the character of a remote end with respect to the first means, and thus can be proceeded through many ends more or less remote until it is stopped in the ultimate [end], which is always necessary, since one cannot proceed into infinity. And so it is sufficiently clear how much this division pertains to the exposition of termini. But some questions which arise from this are discussed more advantageously in the course of the disputation, especially two, namely, whether means share in some way in the causality of the end and whether it is necessary to set up some ultimate end, where we also show different meanings of `end' and whether it has a proper and per se causality insofar as it is an ultimate end or a remote [end]. |