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<843, col. b>²

De causa finali in communi.

Consecutionis
inter has
disputationes
ordo.

5 Quamvis finalis causa praecipua quodammodo omnium sit,
atque etiam prior, obscurior tamen est eius causandi ratio,
et ideo veteribus Philosophis paene incognita fuit, ob
quam ignorationem in alios errores circa rerum naturalium
cognitionem inciderunt, ut Aristoteles tractat, 2. *Physicae*
cap. 8. et 1. *Metaphysicae* et 1. *De partibus animalibus* in principio. Ob hanc ergo rationem, licet in superioribus definitum sit finem annumerandum esse inter quatuor causarum
10 genera, ut hoc magis exponamus, et difficultates dissolvamus, inquirendum imprimis erit an finis sit causa, deinde quomodo et quid causet, quotuplex etiam sit finis, et quae sit uniuscuiusque causandi ratio.

SECTIO 1.

15 *An finis sit vera causa realis.*

Rationes
dubitandi.
Prima.

1. Ratio dubitandi imprimis est, quia de ratione causae est ut sit principium, ut ex definitione a nobis superius tradita constat; sed finis non est principium, nam potius opponitur principio, <844> ut ex ipso nomine finis constat, et significat Aristoteles 3. *Metaphysicae* text. 3.
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On the final cause in general.

5R Although the final cause is in a certain way the principal one among all the kinds of causes, and even prior to the others, the *ratio* of its causing is, nevertheless, more obscure. For that reason it was almost unknown to the ancient philosophers and because of this ignorance they fell into other errors regarding the cognition of natural things, as Aristotle discusses in *Physics* II.8, *Metaphysics* I, and in the beginning of *On the Parts of Animals*. For this reason, therefore, even though it was determined above that the end is numbered among the four genera of causes,³ in order to explain this more thoroughly and to resolve the difficulties, we should first inquire whether an end is a cause and then inquire how and what it causes, how many kinds of ends there are, and what the *ratio* of causing is for each of them.
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SECTION 1.

15R *Whether an end is a true real cause.*

1. The first reason for doubting that an end is a true cause is that it belongs to the *ratio* of a cause to be a principle, as is clear from the definition we gave above.⁴ But an end is not a principle; rather, it is opposed to a principle, as is clear from the very name ‘end’ and as Aristotle indicates in
5R *Metaphysics* III, text. 3 [996b22–24].

The order of
inquiry in these
disputations.

Reasons for
doubting.
First.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

³DM XII.3.3.

⁴DM XII.2.4.

Secunda.

2. Secundo, de ratione causae realis est ut per se ac realiter influat in effectum, ut supra in definitione causae positum est; sed finis non influit esse realiter in effectum: ergo non est causa. Probatur minor, quia vel finis influit antequam sit, vel postquam iam est: non primum, nam quod non est, quemnam realem influxum habere potest, cum fundamentum totius operationis, et similiter totius causalitatis sit esse? Neque etiam dici potest secundum, quia quando finis est, iam tunc cessat actio et causalitas agentis: ergo iam non est tunc necessaria causalitas finis.

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Tertia.

3. Tertio, quia nihil potest esse causa realis sui ipsius: sed forma, teste Aristotele, est finis generationis naturalis, qua ipsa forma fit, ut sanitas est finis curationis qua acquiritur: ergo quatenus est finis, non potest habere veram rationem causae realis. Dices, formam esse finem generationis, quae ab ipsa distinguitur. Sed contra, quia nihil potest esse causa realis productionis rei, nisi sit etiam causa rei productae, quia non causatur res nisi per actionem qua fit: sed forma non potest esse causa realis sui ipsius: ergo neque generationis qua ipsa forma fit. Unde confirmatur, nam causa realis dicit relationem realem ad effectum: finis autem non est capax huiusmodi relationis, tum quia vel quando causat, non habet esse reale, vel quando habet esse reale, nec causat, nec distinguitur ab effectum.

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Second.

2. Second, it belongs to the *ratio* of a real cause *per se* and really to have an influence on the effect, as was posited above in the definition of cause.⁵ But an end does not really inflow *esse* into the effect.⁶ Therefore it is not a cause. The minor premise is proven: either the end has an influence before it exists or after it already exists. But not the former, for what sort of real influence can something that does not exist have, given that being is the foundation of all activity and similarly of all causality? Nor can the latter be affirmed, since once the end exists, the action and causality of the agent cease at just that time. Therefore, the causality of the end is no longer necessary.

Third.

3. Third, [an end cannot be a real cause] because nothing can be a real cause of itself. But a form, as Aristotle testifies, is the end of the natural generation by which the form itself comes to be, as health is the end of the healing by which it is acquired. Therefore, insofar as a form is an end, it cannot have the true nature of a real cause.

You will respond that the form is the end of a generation, which is distinct from the form.⁷ But against this: for nothing can be a real cause of the production of a thing except it also be a cause of the thing that is produced, since a thing is not caused except through the action by which it comes to be. But a form cannot be the real cause of itself and neither, therefore, can it be the real cause of the generation by which the form itself comes to be.

Hence, it is confirmed, for a real cause expresses a real relation to the effect. An end, however, is not capable of this sort of relation, because at the time when it causes it does not have real being and when it does have real being it neither causes nor is distinct from the effect.

⁵*DM XII.2.4.*

⁶I will translate '*influxus*' with 'influence', '*influere*' with 'to have an influence', and transitive uses of the verb with 'to inflow *X*'.

Forms of the verb '*influere*' and the cognate noun '*influxus*' appear throughout Suárez's discussion of causation. Given that he defines cause as 'a principle that *per se* inflows *esse* into another thing' (*DM XII.2.4*: '*Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud*'), this is not surprising. It is, however, not entirely clear what the term means in this context nor how best to translate it. A paradigmatic use of the term would be to say that the Nile flows into (*influit*) the Mediterranean Sea. This might suggest that Suárez's model of causation is one in which some of the being from the cause flows into or is transferred to the effect. Leibniz, however, famously castigates Suárez for using the term on grounds that it is 'a most barbarous and obscure expression' that is 'metaphorical and more obscure than what it defines' and, furthermore, only an inept stylist would use the verb transitively as Suárez does (*Philosophical Papers and Letters*, translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd edition [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1969], 126). Suárez himself, immediately after providing the just-quoted definition, says that the 'inflows' should not be taken in a strict sense (*DM XII.2.4*). He says it means the same thing as 'give' or 'communicate'; a little later still he says that to say that something inflows being into a second thing is the same as to say that the second thing depends on the first (*DM XII.2.7*). For further discussion, see Eileen O'Neill, '*Influxus Physicus*', in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony*, edited by Steven Nadler (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania University State Press, 1993), 27–55.

⁷Suárez imagines an objector who makes the unpromising suggestion that the form is only the cause of the generation, but not the cause of the form resulting from the generation. Hence, the form does not cause itself.

Quarta. 30 4. Quarta ac praecipue ratio dubitandi est, quia fi-
nis considerari potest aut in ratione principii moventis,
et allicientis agens ad agendum, vel in ratione termini ad
quem tendit actio: haec enim duplex ratio distingui solet 35R
a Philosophis in obiecto alicuius potentiae, scilicet, obiecti
35 motivi et terminativi: eademque distinctio locum habet in
fine qui est obiectum voluntatis. Sed sub neutra ratione
potest finis habere veram rationem causae. Et imprimis
de ratione termini videtur manifestum, tum quia ut sic
40 potius habet rationem effectus quam causae, et ut sic est
postremum actionis, non origo eius: denique ut sic non in-
fluit, sed potius aliarum causarum influxus in illum tendit.
Deinde neque sub altera ratione moventis potest habere ra-
tionem causae, nam, ut sentit Aristoteles 1. *De generatione*
45 *et corruptione* text. 55. motio finis tantum est metaphor-
ica: non est ergo vera et realis: <col. b> ergo non suf-
ficit ad causalitatem realem. Et confirmatur primo, quia
etiam in Deo reperitur haec motio metaphorica finis; nam
50 revera Deus propter bonitatem suam, a qua eius voluntas
metaphorice movetur seu allicitur, communicat se creaturis,
et tamen dici non potest quod ille finis habet veram causal-
itatem circa Deum. Et confirmatur secundo, quia si finis
sub hac ratione tantum habet rationem causae: ergo saltem
respectu agentium naturalium non potest finis esse causa re-
alis, quia non potest illa movere seu allicere ad sui amorem.

Quinta. 55 5. Atque hinc oritur quinta difficultas, quia hinc ev-
ertitur totum fundamentum, ob quod a Philosophis intro-
ductum est hoc genus causae, nimirum quia agentia natu-
ralia non operantur casu aut fortuito, sed in determinatos
60 fines suis actionibus tendunt. Ex hoc enim fundamento seu
indicio solum colligitur, habere res naturales definitos ter-
minos suarum propensionum et inclinationum naturalium:

4. The fourth and principal reason for doubting is that the end can be considered either as a principle moving and enticing the agent to act or as a terminus to which the action tends. For philosophers customarily distinguish these two *rationes*—namely, the motive object and the terminative object—in the case of the object of any power.⁸ And this same distinction applies to an end which is the object of the will. But under neither *ratio* can an end have the true *ratio* of a cause. In the first place, this is obvious when considered under the *ratio* of a terminus, both because as such it has the *ratio* of an effect rather than of a cause and as such it is what comes at the end of an action and not its origin. Finally, as such it does not have an influence; rather, the influence of other causes tends to it.

Next, the end cannot have the nature of a cause under the other *ratio*, that of a moving principle, since, as Aristotle holds in *On Generation and Corruption* I, text. 55 [324b14–17], the motion of an end is merely metaphorical. Therefore, it is not true and real. Therefore, it does not suffice for real causality. And this is confirmed, first, because this metaphorical motion of an end is found even in God. For God indeed communicates himself to creatures for the sake of his goodness, by which his will is metaphorically moved or enticed, and yet it cannot be said that that end has true causality on God. And it is confirmed, second, because if an end has the *ratio* of a cause under this notion alone, then—at least with respect to natural agents⁹—the end cannot be a real cause, because it cannot move or entice [such agents] to love it.

5. And from here a fifth difficulty arises, since from the foregoing the whole foundation on account of which this genus of cause was introduced by the philosophers is overthrown—namely, because natural agents do not act by chance or fortuitously, but rather tend to determinate ends with their actions. For from this foundation or evidence one can only gather that natural things have defined termini by their natural inclinations and propensities. For this is sufficient so that they act *per se* to determinate

⁸Francisco Toletus makes the distinction between a motive object and terminative object when talking about the object of the intellect. The motive object is that which imprints the species on the intellect even though it is not what is cognized by the intellect. This Toletus takes to be the sensible phantasm, which moves one's intellect to understanding. The terminative object is that which is cognized by the intellect. This he takes to be the nature included in the phantasm and represented by the species. See his *Commentaria in tres libros Aristotelis De anima* (Cologne, 1594), 131v. Cf. Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), vol. 2, 283. The distinction seems to come up more often when discussing the intellect, but another place where Suárez refers to it when discussing the will is *DFH* 1.1.5.

⁹Suárez uses the term 'natural agents' for agents that lack intellect and will. See *DM XXIII.10*.

Fourth.

Aristotle.

Fifth.

id enim satis est ut non casu, sed per se operentur determinatos effectus, etiamsi nullum aliud genus causalitatis intercedat. Sicut dicunt Theologi aeternum Patrem per se ac definite tendere (ut sic loquar) per generationem in talem terminum, nempe in hunc Filium, non ex causalitate finis, sed ex determinatione naturae. Et in naturalibus lapis naturali inclinatione definite tendit in locum infernum, etiamsi locus ille nullum genus causalitatis habeat circa illum motum, sed solum rationem termini, ad quem lapis habet naturalem propensionem. Idemque dici potest de operante per appetitum elicited sive ex necessitate, sive libere, quod nimirum moveatur motu elicitio in obiectum sibi propositum, quia talis motus consentaneus est inclinationi naturali ipsius potentiae in tale obiectum, absque alia causalitate illius obiecti in talem actum: ergo nullum est sufficiens fundamentum ut fini tribuamus veram rationem causae.

Sexta.

6. Sexta et ultima difficultas sit, quia non potest satis explicari quid, vel circa quid finis causet. Aut enim causat aliquid in ipsum agens: et hoc non potest universe dici, quia licet in agentibus creatis voluntariis possit aliquo modo defendi, non tamen in agentibus naturalibus, nec in Deo, qui est agens voluntarium increatum. Vel causat aliquid in ipso effectu, et hoc habet in universum difficultatem supra tactam in tertio argumento; et praeterea habet specialem difficultatem in agentibus voluntariis creatis, quia tota causalitas finis, qualiscumque illa sit, videtur versari circa voluntates talium agentium: circa effectus autem eorum non nisi remote, et per accidens, ideoque effectus non habebunt propriam causam finalem.

Quaestionis resolutio.

7. Nihilominus statuenda est conclusio certa, finem esse veram, propriam, ac realem causam. Hoc est receptum dogma, et quasi primum principium in Philosophia, et The-

effects and not by chance, even if no other genus of causality is involved. Just as the theologians say that the eternal Father *per se* and in a defined way tends (if I may speak this way) through generation to such a terminus, namely, to this Son, not by the causality of an end but by the determination of nature.¹⁰ And among natural [things], a stone tends in a defined way to a lower place by a natural inclination, even though that place has no genus of causality with respect to the stone's motion but only the *ratio* of a terminus to which the stone has a natural propensity. And the same can be said about one acting through an elicited appetite, whether from necessity or freely. In such a case the appetite is moved with an elicited motion to an object proposed to it, because such a motion is appropriate to that power's natural inclination to such an object, without there being any other causality of that object on such an act. Therefore, there is no sufficient foundation for attributing the true *ratio* of a cause to an end.

6. Let the sixth and final difficulty be that one cannot satisfactorily explain what or with respect to what an end causes. For either [i] the end causes something in the agent itself—and this position cannot be universally affirmed, since, although it can in some way be defended for created voluntary agents, it cannot, nevertheless, be defended in the case of natural agents or in the case of God, who is an uncreated voluntary agent—or [ii] the end causes something in the effect itself—and this position has the general difficulty touched on in the third argument above.¹¹ In addition, it has a special difficulty in the case of created voluntary agents, since the whole causality of the end, of whatever kind it is, seems to be concerned with the wills of such agents and not with their effects except remotely and *per accidens*. And so the effects will not have a final cause proper to them.

The resolution of the question.

7. Nevertheless, the settled conclusion that an end is a true, proper, and real cause should be established. This is the received teaching and, as it were, a first principle in philosophy and theology. Aristotle taught it in

Sixth.

Aristotle.

¹⁰'Generation' refers here to the relation of generation between the Father and the Son in the Trinity, a relation commonly thought to be a non-causal relation. See *ST Ia.33.1* and Suárez, *De Deo Uno et Trino* tract. III, lib. 2, cap. 2, par. 8.

¹¹*DM XXIII.1.3.*

Aristoteles. 5 ologia. Illud docuit Aristoteles 2. *Metaphysicae* cap. 3. et
 Plato. 10 lib. 11. cap. 1. et 2. *Physicae* cap. 3 et sequentibus et ante il-
 lum docuerat Plato in *Phaedone*, ubi in eadem sententiam
 refert Socratem: immo ille solum finem vult esse causam,
 forte per antonomasiam, id est, primam et praecipuam: de
 15 quo dicemus infra in comparatione causarum. Ratio autem
 sumi imprimis potest ex communi modo loquendi de fine
 et de causa, nam finis esse dicitur *propter quem aliquid fit,*
vel est: in hunc enim modum Aristoteles finem ubique de-
 20 scribit: constat autem, particulam illam *propter* causalitatem
 significare: unaquaeque enim res propter causam suam dic-
 itur habere esse: ergo signum est finem habere rationem
 causae. Praeterea, causa efficiens nisi temere agat, alicuius
 gratia agere debet: ergo et ipse effectus causae efficientis ut
 per se ab illa fieri possit, intrinsece postulat ut alicuius gratia
 fiat: ergo talis effectus sicut per se pendet ab efficiente ut a
 25 quo fit, ita in suo genere per se pendet ab aliquo cuius gra-
 tia fit: ille autem est finis: ergo per se pendet a fine: ergo e
 contrario finis est vera causa eius rei quae propter finem fit.

8. Sed in hac re non tam oportet rationes multipli-
 25 care, quam rem exponere, ut difficultates solvantur, et finis
 causalitas, quae obscura est, declaretur: huc enim tendunt
 difficultates in principio positae, non ut res certa in dubium
 revocetur. Ut autem hoc distinctius fiat, distinguamus tria
 agentia propter finem. Primum et supremum est intellec-
 30 tuale agens increatum, quod est solus Deus. In secundo ac
 medio ordine sunt agentia intellectualia creata: inter quae
 nobis notiores sunt homines, et ideo de illis semper loque-
 mur, quamvis eadem ratio sit de intelligentiis creatis. In

¹²*DM* XXVII.1.8.

¹³I usually prefer translating ‘*propter*’ with ‘for the sake of’ in contexts where a relation to an end is meant, but the point being made here is best brought out precisely by using a translation with a wider range of meanings, e.g., ‘on account of’, in order to highlight that the Latin term has a similarly wide range.

¹⁴This sentence would sound less plausible if translated as follows: ‘Moreover, it is obvious that the phrase ‘for the sake of’ signifies causality, for each thing is said to have being for the sake of its cause.’

¹⁵*DM* XXIII.1.1–6.

5R *Metaphysics* II.3 and XI.1 and in *Physics* II, Chapter 3 and following. And
 before him Plato had taught it in the *Phaedo*, where he ascribes the same
 view to Socrates. Indeed, he wants only the end to be a cause, perhaps
 speaking antonomastically, meaning that the final cause is the first and pre-
 eminent cause. We will discuss this below when comparing the causes.¹²

10R The reason for this, moreover, can first of all be taken from the com-
 mon way of speaking about the end and about the cause. For the end is
 said to be that ‘on account of which something comes to be or is’.¹³ For
 Aristotle everywhere describes the end in this way. Moreover, it is obvi-
 15R ous that the phrase ‘on account of’ signifies causality, for each thing is said
 to have being on account of its cause.¹⁴ This, then, is a sign that the end
 has the *ratio* of a cause.

20R Furthermore, the efficient cause, unless it is to act blindly, must act
 for the sake of something. Therefore, the effect itself of the efficient cause,
 so that it can come to be *per se* by that cause, also intrinsically requires
 that it come to be for the sake of something. Such an effect, therefore,
 depends *per se* in its own genus on something for whose sake it comes to
 be, just as it depends *per se* on the efficient cause as that by which it comes
 to be. But that something is an end. Therefore, it depends *per se* on an end.
 Therefore, conversely, an end is a true cause of that thing which comes to
 be for its sake.

25R 8. But in this matter it is not so much necessary to multiply reasons
 [for thinking that an end is a true cause] as to explain the matter so that
 the difficulties are resolved and the causality of the end, which is obscure,
 is revealed. For the difficulties set out in the beginning¹⁵ aim at this, not
 at calling a settled matter back into doubt.

30R Now, so that this may be done more clearly, let us distinguish three
 kinds of agents that act for the sake of an end. First and highest is the
 uncreated intellectual agent, which is God alone. In the second and middle
 rank are created intellectual agents. Human beings are better known to us
 of those in the second rank and so we will always speak of them, although

Plato.

tertio et infimo ordine sunt agentia naturalia, seu intellectu
 35 carentia, quamvis inter ea nonnulla sit differentia eorum,
 quae sensum et appetitum habent, et reliquorum, <col. b>
 quam etiam suo loco indicabimus. Causalitas ergo finis licet
 suo modo locum habeat in actionibus horum omnium agen-
 40 tium, tamen in creatis agentibus intellectualibus nobis no-
 tior est, et maiorem quamdam proprietatem, et specialem
 modum habet; et ideo in illis peculiariter declarabimus hanc
 causalitatem finis, et expediemus difficultates circa eam in-
 surgentes: postea vero de aliis agentibus dicemus. Igitur
 45 quod in agentibus creatis per intellectum et voluntatem in-
 tercedat causalitas finis, sufficiens argumentum sumitur ex
 humanis actionibus. Constat enim nobis experientia, in-
 tendere nos cum humano modo, id est libero et rationali,
 operamur, certum aliquem finem, in quem actiones nostras
 dirigimus, et propter quem media eligimus: movemur ergo
 50 a fine, tum ad dilectionem seu intentionem sui, tum ad eli-
 genda et exsequenda media propter illum: haec autem motio
 aliquid est in rerum natura, non est enim aliquid imaginari-
 um vel fictum per intellectum, et aliquod genus causalitatis
 est, quandoquidem est origo operationum realium: est ergo
 55 finis vera et realis causa. Et hinc etiam obiter constat hanc
 causalitatem maxime habere locum in agentibus intellectu-
 alibus, quia illa maxime possunt cognoscere finem et media,
 et ordinem unius ad alterum, et propriam uniuscuiusque ra-
 tionem.

Rationes dubitandi solvuntur.

9. Argumenta in principio facta partim postulant difficul-
 tates proprias pertinentes ad Deum, et ad infima agentia
 naturalia, partim inculcant ea, quae de hac causa tractari
 possunt, haec autem sunt illa omnia quae de caeteris cau-
 5 sis tractantur, ut insinuavit Cajetanus 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. et

¹⁶That is, angels.

¹⁷*DM XXIII.1.1-6.*

35R the same nature belongs to created intelligences.¹⁶ In the third and lowest
 rank are natural agents or those lacking intellect, although among these
 there is some difference between those which have sense and appetite and
 the remaining ones, which we will also point out in the proper place.

40R Therefore, the causality of the end, although it has a place in its own
 way in the actions of all these agents, is, nevertheless, better known to
 us in created intellectual agents and it has more of a certain quality and
 special mode in them. For this reason, we will explain this causality of the
 end especially in their case and resolve the difficulties that arise concerning
 this causality. But afterwards we will talk about the other agents.

45R A sufficient argument for the claim that the causality of the end has
 a place in created agents through intellect and will is taken from human
 actions. For it is clear from our experience that, when we act in a human
 way, that is, freely and rationally, we intend some definite end towards
 which we direct our actions and for the sake of which we select means.
 50R Therefore, we are moved by the end, both towards a love or intention for it
 and towards electing and executing means for the sake of it. This motion,
 moreover, is something in reality, for it is not something imaginary or
 invented by the intellect. And it is some genus of causality, since it is a
 source of real operations. The end, therefore, is a true and real cause.

55R It is, by the way, also clear from this reasoning that this kind of causal-
 ity is most at home in intellectual agents, since they in particular can cog-
 nize an end and means, the relation of one to the other, and the proper
 nature of each.

The reasons for doubting are answered.

9. The arguments made in the beginning¹⁷ in part pose difficulties that
 pertain particularly to God and to the lowest natural agents and in part
 they emphasize those difficulties which can be discussed concerning this
 cause. These, however, are all ones which are discussed with regard to the
 5R other causes, as Cajetan suggests in Ia.5.4 and IIaIIae.17.5: namely, which

2. 2. q. 17. art. 5. scilicet, quae res possint finaliter causare, per quid seu quae sit illis ratio causandi, vel tamquam principalis ratio vel tamquam proxima. Item quae sit necessaria conditio, quis effectus: in quo denique consistat eius causalitas, quod hic est omnium obscurissimum. Ne igitur omnia haec involvamus, et confundamus, in sectionibus sequentibus distincte tractanda erunt: ergo exacta argumentorum solutio usque ad finem disputationis erit expectanda. Nunc perfunctorie per singula discurremus.

10. Ad primum negamus minorem, scilicet, finem non esse principium, nam eo modo <846> quo est primum quid, habet rationem principii: est autem finis primus in intentione, quamvis sit ultimus in executione. Aristoteles autem in dicto loco 3. *Metaphysicae* non opponit finem omni principio, sed principio motus, per quod causam efficientem intelligit, quam distinguit a finali.

11. Ad secundum negatur minor scilicet, finem non influere realiter: ad probationem autem communis responsio est, finem influere quando non est in re, sed tantum in apprehensione seu cognitione. Sed distinctione opus est, tam ex parte finis, quam ex parte effectus seu actionis, quam finis causat. Nam, ut sectione sequenti dicam, finis alius est cuius gratia fit actio, alius vero cui finis acquiritur: item alius est finis formalis ut visio Dei, et alius obiectivus, ut Deus ipse: item finis causare potest desiderium sui, vel etiam potest causare quietem, vel delectationem, quae omnia mox declarabimus. Finis ergo cui, non causat nisi quando existit: dicitur enim finis cui ipsomet agens, quatenus propter se vel in suum commodum operatur, quod non potest facere nisi existat. Item finis obiectivus potest etiam supponi existens, quando finaliter causat, ut Deus, propter quem videndum ad bene operandum movemur. Rursus finis formalis,

things can final-cause,¹⁸ and through what, or, what their nature of causing is, either as principal nature or as proximate. Also, what the necessary condition is and what the effect is. Finally, in what its causality consists, which [in the case of final causes] is the most obscure question of all. Accordingly, lest we become overwhelmed and confuse all of them, they should be discussed separately in the sections that follow. A full solution to these arguments, therefore, should be expected only at the end of the disputation. At present, we will run perfunctorily through each one.

10. In reply to the first argument, we deny the minor premise, namely, that the end is not a principle. For in the way in which it is something first, it has the character of a principle. The end, moreover, is first in intention, although it is last in execution. Furthermore, in the place cited from *Metaphysics* III [996b22–24], Aristotle does not contrast the end with every principle but only with a principle of motion, by which he means an efficient cause which he distinguishes from a final cause.

11. In reply to the second argument, I deny the minor premise, namely, that the end does not really have an influence. Now, a common response to the proof [for the minor premise] is that the end has an influence even when it does not exist in reality but only in apprehension or cognition. But a distinction is needed here, both on the part of the end and on the part of the effect or action caused by the end. For, as I will say in the following section, one end is that for the sake of which the action is done but another is that for which the end is acquired.¹⁹ Also, a formal end (for example, the vision of God) is one thing and an objective end (for example, God himself) is another. Also, an end can cause desire for itself, or it can even cause rest or delight, all of which we will soon explain.

A *finis cui*, therefore, does not cause except when it exists. For the agent itself is called the *finis cui*, since it acts for its own sake or for its own advantage.²⁰ and it cannot do this without existing.

Likewise, the objective end can also be assumed to exist when it final-causes (for example, God, for the sake of seeing whom we are moved to

First.
The end truly is a principle.

Prima.
Finis vere principium.

¹⁸I use this graceless locution instead of the potentially confusing ‘finally cause’ or the rather lengthy ‘cause in the manner of a final cause’.

¹⁹In the terminology that he explains in the following section (*DM* XXIII.2.2–8), the former is a *finis cuius* and the latter is a *finis cui*. If I act in order to get food for myself, then the food is the *finis cuius* and I am the *finis cui*.

²⁰Note the assumption here that agents always have themselves as the *finis cui*.

40 seu consecutio finis intenti non causat delectationem seu
 fruitionem sui nisi quando existit, quia delectatio non est
 nisi de bono possesso: quod si sit de spe eius, tunc ipsa spes
 habet rationem imperfectae consecutionis. In his ergo
 45 omnibus non procedit illud argumentum, quia existente fine
 obiectivo vel fine cui (qui claritatis gratia posset subiectivus
 appellari), non cessat inquisitio, nec causalitas finis, nisi ad-
 50 sit etiam consecutio finis, et hac obtenta, quamvis cesset motus
 in finem per modum desiderii, non tamen per modum
 quietis et delectationis. Solum ergo de fine formali, seu con-
 secutione finis verum est per se loquendo quod causat sui
 desiderium quando non est in re, et de illo recte responsum
 est, sufficere quod sit in apprehensione et iudicio intellec-
 tus, eo quod eius motio intentionalis sit, et (ut ita dicam)
 animalis, per sympathiam et consonantiam potentiarum ani-
 mae, intellectus scilicet et voluntatis.

Quid sit id quod
 finis causat.

55 12. Tertium argumentum postulat quid causet finis,
 et specialiter attingit difficultatem quomodo forma sit finis
 generationis naturalis, quod spectat ad difficultatem de
 naturalibus agen- <col. b> tibus infra tractandam: et ideo
 breviter nunc dicitur, finem causare desiderium sui, seu ali-
 60 um similem affectum erga seipsum, et ita non causare im-
 mediate seipsum, sed aliquid distinctum a se. Et hinc etiam
 constat ad confirmationem, ex hac parte non repugnare rela-
 tionem causae in fine esse realem: est enim sufficiens distinc-
 tio inter ipsam et talem effectum, et quando ipse finis non
 sit in re distinctus ab effectu eius, dicemus inferius sect. 3.

Soncinas.
 Iavellus.

65 13. An vero ex alio capite repugnet illam relationem
 esse realem, nimirum, ex eo quod finis ipse non habet esse
 reale dum causat, res est dubia et controversa. Soncinas
 5. *Metaphysicae* q. 3. et Iavellus q. 6. aiunt, illud esse obiec-
 70 tivum, quod finis habet in intellectu, sufficere ut realiter
 referatur ad effectum: sed id difficile creditu est, nam il-

64 inferius] *om.* V.

act well). In turn, the formal end, or the attainment of the intended end,
 does not cause delight or enjoyment of it except when it exists, since there
 is no delight except when the good is possessed. If there is delight from
 40R hope for the intended good, then the hope itself has the character of an
 imperfect attainment. Therefore, the argument [for the minor premise]
 does not go through in any of these cases, since objective end or *finis cui*
 (which can be called the subjective [end] for the sake of clarity) existing
 does not cease the seeking [of the agent for the end] nor the causality of
 45R the end. This only ceases when the attainment of the end also arrives
 and, even once this is obtained, motion to the end in the way of rest and
 delight does not cease, although motion in the way of desire does then
 cease. Therefore, strictly speaking it is true only of the formal end or of
 the attainment of the end that it causes desire for itself when not existing
 50R not existing in reality. And concerning this case, it was rightly responded
 that [for an end to cause desire] it is sufficient that it exist in the intellect's
 apprehension and judgement. This is because its motion is intentional and
 (if I may put it this way) animal, [coming about] through the sympathy
 and concordance of the powers of the soul, namely, the intellect and will.

55R 12. The third argument asks what an end causes and touches especially
 on the difficulty about how a form is the end of natural generation. This
 has to do with the difficulty about natural agents to be discussed below
 and so for now I will say briefly that the end causes desire for itself or
 another similar affection for itself. Thus, it does not immediately cause
 60R itself, but rather something distinct from itself. Hence, in response to the
 confirming argument [at the end of n. 3], it is obvious that as far as this
 goes it is not repugnant that the end's relation of being a cause be a real
 relation, since there is a sufficient distinction between the end and such an
 effect [for a real relation between them to be possible]. As for cases where
 65R the end itself is not distinct in reality from its effect, we will discuss them
 later in sect. 3.

13. But whether it is repugnant from another source—namely, from
 the end itself not having real being when causing— that that relation be
 real is a matter of doubt and controversy. Soncinas, *Metaphysics* V, q. 3,
 and Iavellus, *Metaphysics* V, q. 6, say that the objective being which an end
 has in the intellect is enough for it really to be referred to the effect. But
 that is difficult to believe. For that objective being implies nothing real

What it is that
 the end causes.

Soncinas.
 Iavellus.

75 lud esse obiectivum in ipso fine nihil rei ponit, sed solum
denominationem extrinsecam ab actu qui realiter est in in-
tellectu: ille autem actus non refertur realiter ad effectum
75 causae finalis, quia non concurrat per se ad illum, ut in-
fra dicam. Melius ergo respondent, qui negant ad om-
nem causalitatem realem sequi relationem realem in causa:
non est enim necesse ex vi causalitatis, si aliae conditiones
non concurrant, ut patet in causalitate Dei effectiva. Unde
80 addo, etiamsi finis existat dum causat, non referri realiter
ad suum effectum, quia in suo modo causandi est superi-
oris cuiusdam rationis, quia ipse nullo modo ordinatur ad
effectum, sed effectus ad ipsum. Quare etiamsi ex parte
effectus admittatur hic relatio realis, quod est probabile
85 maxime quando effectus non tantum per extrinsecam de-
nominationem, sed per intrinsecam habitudinem ordinatur
in finem, iuxta ea quae inferius declarabimus: nihilomi-
nus illa relatio censenda est non mutua. Effectus enim re-
ferri potest ad finem, quatenus ab eo pendet: unde, sicut ad
90 hanc dependentiam satis est, quod finis praexistat in mente,
ita etiam sufficiet ad realem habitudinem transcendentalem,
licet praedicamentalis forte non sit nisi ad finem actu exis-
tentem: tamen quia finis causat ut omnino immotus, et non
ordinatus ad suum effectum, ideo non oportet ut ex parte
95 eius relatio sit realis. Sicut enim Aristoteles dixit scientiam
referri realiter ad scibile, non e contrario, ita nos dicere pos-
sumus de appetitione et appetibili: est enim eadem ratio; et
similiter est eadem de appetibili et de fine. <847>

Cur motio finis
metaphorica
dicatur.

100 14. In quarto argumento multa tanguntur pertinentia
ad Deum, et ad agentia naturalia: nunc illis omissis, con-
cedimus causalitatem convenire fini ut habet rationem prin-
cipii, et consequenter ut habet rationem moventis. Eius
autem motio dicitur metaphorica, non quia non sit realis,

75R in the end itself, but merely an extrinsic denomination from an act which
is really in the intellect. That act, moreover, is not really referred to the
effect of the final cause, since it does not concur *per se* with it, as I will say
below.

80R Therefore, those who deny that a real relation in the cause follows
every real causality provide the better answer. For this is not necessary on
the basis of causality, if other conditions do not concur, as is clear in the
case of God's effective causality.²¹

85R Hence, I add that, even if an end exists while it causes, it is not really
referred to its effect, because it is in its own mode of causing of a kind
of higher nature, since it is in no way ordered to the effect but the effect
to it. For this reason, even if this real relation is admitted on the side of
the effect—which is probable, especially when the effect is ordered to the
end not only through an extrinsic denomination but through an intrinsic
habitude,²² as I will explain later—that relation, nevertheless, should
be considered non-mutual. For an effect can be referred to an end insofar
as the effect depends on the end. Hence, just as for this dependence it is
90R enough that the end pre-exist in the mind, so also it is enough for a real
transcendental habitude to obtain (although perhaps there is no categori-
cal relation except to an actually existing end).²³ Nevertheless, because the
end causes as something that is entirely unchanged and not ordered to its
effect, therefore it is not necessary that the relation be real from its side.
95R For just as Aristotle said that knowledge is really referred to the knowable,
but not the other way around,²⁴ so we can say concerning desire and the
desirable. For it is the same argument, and likewise it is the same for the
desirable and for the end.

100R 14. In the fourth argument many points pertaining to God and to nat-
ural agents are touched on. Setting those cases aside for now, we concede
that causality is appropriate to an end insofar as it falls under the *ratio* of
a principle and, consequently, insofar as it falls under the *ratio* of a mover.
Its motion, however, is called metaphorical, not because it is not real, but

Why the motion
of the end is
called
metaphorical.

²¹Suárez alludes here to the doctrine that God is not related to creatures with a real relation even though he is the efficient cause of creatures.

²²The Latin '*habitudo*' is often just another term for 'relation', but since Suárez tends to use it when he has in mind transcendental relations rather than categorical relations (see *DM* XLVII.3–4), I shall mirror the Latin word choice with the English cognate 'habitude'.

²³The view in the background here says that categorical relations require actually existing termini, while transcendental relations do not. For more on Suárez's account of relations, see *DM* XLVII.

²⁴*Categories* c. 7, 7b22–34.

sed quia non fit per influxum effectivum, nec per motionem
 physicam, sed per motionem intentionalem et animale[m] 105R
 105 ideo nihil obstat, quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas.

15. Ad quintum, quidquid sit de agentibus naturalibus,
 de quibus postea, respondetur, modum operandi intellec-
 tualium creaturarum non posse intelligi sine causalitate fi- 110R
 110 nis, quia revera alliciuntur et moventur a fine ad operandum:
 et quamvis ipsa habeant naturalem propensionem ad
 obiecta seu fines, ad quos per proprios vitales actus moventur,
 tamen illa naturalis propensio non potest operari in suo
 genere, id est effective, nisi sufficienter applicato fine, et in 115R
 115 suo genere concausante: et ita determinatio operationis, seu
 destinatio in certum scopum, quae cernitur in agentibus intel-
 lectualibus, manifeste procedit non ex sola inclinatione
 naturali, sed ex causalitate finis. Ad sextum, quantum hic
 locus patitur, satis explicatum est, quid, vel circa quid finis 120R
 120 causet: integram vero huius rei tractationem trademus in-
 ferius.

because it does not happen through an effective influence²⁵ nor through
 physical motion but through intentional and animal motion.²⁶ And there-
 fore nothing stands in the way of an end's causality being true and proper
 causality.

15. In reply to the fifth argument—whatever the case may be concern-
 ing natural agents, about which I will respond later—intellectual creatures'
 mode of operating cannot be understood without the causality of the end,
 because they are in reality enticed and moved to operating by the end.
 And, although intellectual creatures have a natural propensity to the ob-
 jects or ends to which they are moved through their own vital acts, that
 natural propensity, nevertheless, cannot operate in its own genus, i.e., ef-
 fectively, except by an end having been applied and co-causing in its own
 genus. And thus the determination of the operation or the resolution to a
 definite aim that is seen in intellectual agents obviously proceeds not from
 a natural inclination alone but from the causality of an end.

In reply to the sixth argument, as much as this place allows, it has
 been already been sufficiently explained what or with respect to what an
 end causes. But we will provide a complete discussion of this matter below.

²⁵That is, through the kind of influence that efficient causes have.

²⁶Note the significant homeoteleutonic omission in the Vivès edition in this sentence.