| De causa finali in communi. | On the final cause in general. |
| Quamvis finalis causa praecipua quodammodo omnium sit atque etiam prior, obscurior tamen est eius causandi ratio, et ideo veteribus philosophis paene incognita fuit, ob quam ignorationem in alios errores circa rerum naturalium cognitionem inciderunt, ut Aristot., tract. II Phys., c. 8, et I Metaph., et I de Partibus animal., in principio. Ob hanc ergo rationem, licet in superioribus definitum sit finem annumerandum esse inter quatuor causarum genera, ut hoc magis exponamus et difficultates dissolvamus, inquirendum imprimis erit an finis sit causa, deinde quomodo et quid causet, quotuplex etiam sit finis, et quae sit uniuscuiusque causandi ratio. | Although a final cause is in a certain way more eminent than all others and even prior [to them], its nature of causing is, nevertheless, more obscure and for that reason was almost entirely unknown to the ancient philosophers. On account of this ignorance they fell into other errors regarding the cognition of natural things, as Aristotle [says in] Physics II.8, Metaph. I, and in the beginning of PA. For this reason, therefore, although in earlier sections it was determined that the end is numbered in the four genera of causes, in order to explain this more thoroughly and to resolve the difficulties, it should first be inquired whether an end is a cause, then in what manner and what it causes, and also how many kinds of ends there are and what the nature of causing is for each one of them. |
| Sectio 1. | Section 1. |
| An finis sit vera causa realis. | Whether an end is a true real cause. |
| 1. Ratio dubitandi imprimis est quia de ratione causae est ut sit principium, ut ex definitione a nobis superius tradita constat; sed finis non est principium, nam potius opponitur principio, $<$844$>$ ut ex ipso nomine finis constat, et significat Aristoteles, III Metaph., tex. 3. | 1. A reason more than any other for doubting is that it is of the nature of a cause to be a principle, as is clear from the definition given by us earlier. But an end is not a principle, for it is rather opposed to a principle, as is clear from the name `end' itself. And Aristotle indicates [this] in Metaph. III, tex. 3. |
| 2. Secundo, de ratione causae realis est ut per se ac realiter influat in effectum, ut supra in definitione causae positum est; sed finis non influit esse realiter in effectum; ergo non est causa. Probatur minor, quia vel finis influit antequam sit vel postquam iam est; non primum, nam quod non est, quemnam realem influxum habere potest, cum fundamentum totius operationis et similiter totius causalitatis sit esse? Neque etiam dici potest secundum, quia quando finis est, iam tunc cessat actio et causalitas agentis; ergo iam non est tunc necessaria causalitas finis. | 2. Secondly, it is of the nature of a real cause per se and really to influence the effect, as is posited above in the definition of cause. But an end does not really pour being into the effect. Therefore it is not a cause. The minor is proven, because either (i) the end communicates before it is or (ii) after it already is. Not (i), for what sort of real influx can something that is not have, since the foundation of all action and similarly of all causality is being? But neither can (ii) be said, because once the end is the action and causality of the agent already ceases. Therefore, the causality of the end is not necessary anymore. |
| 3. Tertio, quia nihil potest esse causa realis sui ipsius; sed forma, teste Aristotele, est finis generationis naturalis qua ipsa forma fit, ut sanitas est finis curationis qua acquiritur; ergo quatenus est finis, non potest habere veram rationem causae realis. Dices formam esse finem generationis, quae ab ipsa distinguitur. Sed contra, quia nihil potest esse causa realis productionis rei, nisi sit etiam causa rei productae, quia non causatur res nisi per actionem qua fit; sed forma non potest esse causa realis sui ipsius; ergo neque generationis qua ipsa forma fit. Unde confirmatur, nam causa realis dicit relationem realem ad effectum; finis autem non est capax huiusmodi relationis, tum quia vel quando causat non habet esse reale, vel quando habet esse reale nec causat nec distinguitur ab effectu. | 3. Thirdly, because nothing can be a real cause of itself; but form, as Aristotle testifies, is the end of the natural generation by which the very form is made, as health is the end of the healing by which it is acquired. Therefore, to the extent that it is an end it cannot have the true nature of a real cause. You may say that a form which is distinguished from itself is the end of generation. But to the contrary, because nothing can be a real cause of the production of a thing, except it is also a cause of the produced thing, because the thing is not caused except through the action by which it is made. But a form cannot be the real cause of it itself. Therefore, neither [can it be the real cause] of the generation by which the form itself is made. Whereupon, it is confirmed, for a real cause expresses a real relation to the effect. An end, however, is not capable of this sort of relation, because either (i) when it causes it does not have real being or (ii) when it has real being it neither causes nor is distinguished from the effect. |
| 4. Quarta ac praecipue ratio dubitandi est quia finis considerari potest aut in ratione principii moventis et allicientis agens ad agendum, vel in ratione termini ad quem tendit actio; haec enim duplex ratio distingui solet a philosophis in obiecto alicuius potentiae, scilicet, obiecti motivi et terminativi; eademque distinctio locum habet in fine, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Sed sub neutra ratione potest finis habere veram rationem causae. Et imprimis de ratione termini videtur manifestum, tum quia ut sic potius habet rationem effectus quam causae; et ut sic est postremum actionis, non origo eius; denique ut sic non influit, sed potius aliarum causarum influxus in illum tendit. Deinde neque sub altera ratione moventis potest habere rationem causae; nam, ut sentit Aristot.,\ledleftnote{Aristotel.} I de Gener., text. 55, motio finis tantum est metaphorica; non est ergo vera et realis; $<$col. b$>$ ergo non sufficit ad causalitatem realem. Et confirmatur primo, quia etiam in Deo reperitur haec motio metaphorica finis; nam revera Deus propter bonitatem suam, a qua eius voluntas metaphorice movetur seu allicitur, communicat se creaturis, et tamen dici non potest quod ille finis habet veram causalitatem circa Deum. Et confirmatur secundo, quia si finis sub hac ratione tantum habet rationem causae, ergo saltem respectu agentium naturalium non potest finis esse causa realis, quia non potest illa movere seu allicere ad sui amorem. | 4. Fourthly and most importanty, a reason for doubting is that the end can be considered either as a principle moving and enticing an agent to acting or as a terminus to which the action tends. For this double characterization, namely, the objectum motivum and the objectum terminativum, is customarily distinguished by philosophers in the object of any potency. And the same distinction has a place with regards to the end, which is the object of the will. But the end cannot have the true nature of a cause under either characterization. In the first place, concerning the characterization as a terminus it seems obvious, because, as such, it has more the nature of an effect than a cause and, as such, it is a result of the action rather than its origin. Finally, as such, it does not influence, but rather the influx of other causes tends to it. Next, it cannot have the nature of a cause under the other characterization as a moving [principle] either. For, as Aristotle thinks, De gener. I.55, the motion of the end is only metaphorical. Therefore, it is not true and real. Therefore, it does not suffice for real causality. And this is confirmed, first, because this metaphorical motion of an end is found even in God. For, in fact, God pours himself into creatures for the sake of his goodness, by which his will is metaphorically moved or enticed. And yet it cannot be said that that end has true causality in God. And this is confirmed, secondly, because if the end only has the nature of a cause under this characterization, for that reason the end---at least with respect to natural agents---cannot be a real cause, because it cannot move or entice to love of itself. |
| 5. Atque hinc oritur quinta difficultas, quia hinc evertitur totum fundamentum ob quod a philosophis introductum est hoc genus causae, nimirum, quia agentia naturalia non operantur casu aut fortuito, sed in determinatos fines suis actionibus tendunt. Ex hoc enim fundamento seu indicio solum colligitur habere res naturales definitos terminos suarum propensionum et inclinationum naturalium; id enim satis est ut non casu, sed per se operentur determinatos effectus, etiamsi nullum aliud genus causalitatis intercedat. Sicut dicunt theologi aeternum Patrem per se ac definite tendere (ut sic loquar) per generationem in talem terminum, nempe in hunc Filium, non ex causalitate finis, sed ex determinatione naturae. Et in naturalibus, lapis naturali inclinatione definite tendit in locum infernum, etiamsi locus ille nullum genus causalitatis habeat circa illum motum, sed solum rationem termini ad quem lapis habet naturalem propensionem. Idemque dici potest de operante per appetitum elicitum, sive ex necessitate, sive libere, quod nimirum moveatur motu elicito in obiectum sibi propositum, quia talis motus consentaneus est inclinationi naturali ipsius potentiae in tale obiectum, absque alia causalitate illius obiecti in talem actum; ergo nullum est sufficiens fundamentum ut fini tribuamus veram rationem causae. | 5. And from here arises the fifth difficulty, because from here is the whole foundation on account of which this genus of cause is introduced by philosophers is overthrown; namely, because natural agents do not operate by chance or fortuitously, but tend to the determinate ends with their actions. In fact, that a natural thing has definite termini for its propensities and natural inclinations can be gathered from this foundation or indication alone. For that is sufficient so that they work to determinate effects per se and not by chance, even if no other genus of causality intervenes. Just as the theologians say that the eternal Father per se and definitely tends (if I may speak this way) through generation to such a terminus, namely, to this Son, not by the causality of an end but by the determination of nature. And in natural [things], a stone definitely tends to a lower place by a natural inclination, even if that place has no genus of causality regarding that motion but only the nature of a terminus to which the stone has a natural propensity. And the same thing can be said concerning the one acting through elicited appetite, whether from necessity or freely, which without doubt is moved by elicited motion to the object proposed to it, because such motion is appropriate to the natural inclination of the power itself in such an object, apart from other causality of that object in such an act. Therefore, there is no sufficient foundation for attributing the true nature of a cause to an end. |
| 6. Sexta et ultima difficultas sit quia non potest satis explicari quid, vel circa quid finis causet. Aut enim causat aliquid in ipsum agens, et hoc non potest universe dici, quia, licet in agentibus creatis voluntariis possit aliquo modo defendi, non tamen in agentibus naturalibus, nec in Deo, qui est agens voluntarium increatum. Vel causat aliquid in ipso effectu, et hoc habet in universum difficultatem supra tactam in tertio argumento, et praeterea habet specialem difficul- $<$845$>$ tatem in agentibus voluntariis creatis, quia tota causalitas finis, qualiscumque illa sit, videtur versari circa voluntates talium agentium; circa effectus autem eorum non nisi remote et per accidens; ideoque effectus non habebunt propriam causam finalem. | 6. The sixth and final difficulty may be that it cannot be satisfactorily explained how or concerning what an end causes. For either (i) it causes something in the agent itself---and this cannot be said generally, because, although it can in some manner be defended for created agents who act voluntarily, [it can], nevertheless, not [be defended] in the case of natural agents nor in the case of God, who is an uncreated agent who acts voluntarily---or (ii) it causes something in the effect itself---and this has in general the difficulty mentioned above in the third argument and, in addition, has a special difficulty in the case of created agents who act voluntarily, because the whole causality of the end, whatever kind that is, seems to be concerned with the wills of such agents, but not with their effects except remotely and per accidens. For that reason, the effects do not have a proper final cause. |
| Quaestionis resolutio. | The resolution of the question. |
| 7. Nihilominus statuenda est conclusio certa finem esse veram, propriam ac realem causam. Hoc est receptum dogma et quasi primum principium in philosophia et theologia; illud docuit Aristot., II Metaph., c. 3, et lib. XI, c. 1, et II Phys., c. 1 et sequentibus; et ante illum docuerat Plato in Phaedone ubi in eamdem sententiam refert Socratem; immo ille solum finem vult esse causam, forte per antonomasiam, id est, primam et praecipuam, de quo dicemus infra in comparatione causarum. Ratio autem sumi imprimis potest ex communi modo loquendi de fine et de causa; nam finis esse dicitur propter quem aliquid fit vel est; in hunc enim modum Aristoteles finem ubique describit; constat autem particulam illam propter causalitatem significare; unaquaeque enim res propter causam suam dicitur habere esse; ergo signum est finem habere rationem causae. Praeterea causa efficiens, nisi temere agat, alicuius gratia agere debet; ergo et ipse effectus causae efficientis, ut per se ab illa fieri possit, intrinsece postulat ut alicuius gratia fiat; ergo talis effectus sicut per se pendet ab efficiente, ut a quo fit, ita in suo genere per se pendet ab aliquo cuius gratia fit; ille autem est finis; ergo per se pendet a fine; ergo e contrario finis est vera causa eius rei quae propter finem fit. | 7. Nevertheless, the firm conclusion that an end is a true, proper, and real cause should be established. This is the received doctrine and, as it were, a first principle in philosophy and theology. Aristotle teaches it in Metaph. II, c. 3, XI, c. 1, and in Phys. II, c. 3 and following. And before that Plato had taught it in the Phaedo, where he attributes the same view to Socrates. Indeed, he wants only the end to be a cause, perhaps through antonomasia, that is, first and especially, concerning which we speak below in the comparison of causes. The reason, moreover, can be assumed in the first place from the manner of speaking concerning the end and concerning the cause. For the end is said to be that `for the sake of which something becomes or is'. For Aristotle everywhere describes the end in this way. Moreover, it is clear that the phrase `for the sake of' signifies causality. For each thing is said to have being for the sake of its cause. Therefore, [this] is a sign that the end has the nature of a cause. Furthermore, the efficient cause, unless it is to act blindly, must act for the sake of something. Therefore the effect itself of the efficient cause also intrinsically requires [an end] so that it becomes for the sake of something so that the effect can per se become by the cause. Such an effect, therefore, depends per se on the efficient [cause], as that by which it becomes, just as it per se depends in its genus on something for whose sake it becomes. That [something], moreover, is an end. Therefore, it depends per se on an end. Therefore, contrariwise, an end is a true cause of that thing which becomes for the sake of the end. |
| 8. Sed in hac re non tam oportet rationes multiplicare quam rem exponere, ut difficultates solvantur et finis causalitas, quae obscura est, declaretur; huc enim tendunt difficultates in principio positae, non ut res certa in dubium revocetur. Ut autem hoc distinctius fiat, distinguamus tria agentia propter finem. Primum et supremum est intellectuale agens increatum, quod est solus Deus. In secundo ac medio ordine sunt agentia intellectualia creata, inter quae nobis notiores sunt homines, et ideo de illis semper loquemur, quamvis eadem ratio sit de intelligentiis creatis. In tertio et infimo ordine sunt agentia naturalia seu intellectu carentia, quamvis inter ea nonnulla sit differentia eorum quae sensum et appetitum habent et reliquorum, $<$col. b$>$ quam etiam suo loco indicabimus. Causalitas ergo finis, licet suo modo locum habeat in actionibus horum omnium agentium, tamen in creatis agentibus intellectualibus nobis notior est, et maiorem quamdam proprietatem et specialem modum habet, et ideo in illis peculiariter declarabimus hanc causalitatem finis et expediemus difficultates circa eam insurgentes; postea vero de aliis agentibus dicemus. Igitur quod in agentibus creatis per intellectum et voluntatem intercedat causalitas finis, sufficiens argumentum sumitur ex humanis actionibus. Constat enim nobis experientia intendere nos, cum humano modo, id est, libero et rationali operamur, certum aliquem finem in quem actiones nostras dirigimus et propter quem media eligimus; movemur ergo a fine, tum ad dilectionem seu intentionem sui, tum ad eligenda et exsequenda media propter illum; haec autem motio aliquid est in rerum natura; non est enim aliquid imaginarium vel fictum per intellectum; et aliquod genus causalitatis est, quandoquidem est origo operationum realium; est ergo finis vera et realis causa. Et hinc etiam obiter constat hanc causalitatem maxime habere locum in agentibus intellectualibus, quia illa maxime possunt cognoscere finem et media, et ordinem unius ad alterum, et propriam uniuscuiusque rationem. | 8. But in this matter it is not so much necessary to multiply reasons as to explain the matter so that the difficulties are resolved and the causality of the end, which is obscure, is revealed. For the difficulties posited in the beginning are aimed at this point, not to throw a settled matter back into doubt. Moreover, so that this becomes more distinct, let us distinguish three [kinds of] agents [acting] for the sake of an end. First and foremost is the uncreated intellectual agent, which is God alone. In the second and middle rank are created intellectual agents, among which human beings are better known to us, and therefore we will always speak concerning them, although the same account applies to [other] created intelligences. In the third and lowest rank are natural agents or [agents] lacking intellect, although among these there is some difference between those which have sense and appetite and the remaining [ones], which we will also indicate in its place. Therefore, the causality of the end, although it has a place in its way in the actions of all these agents, it is, nevertheless, better known to us in created intellectual agents and furthermore has a certain quality and special mode [in them]. And, for that reason, we will particularly reveal this causality of the end in them and we will loose the difficulties rising up concerning it. But afterwords we will talk of other agents. So for the claim that the causality of the end intervenes in created agents through intellect and will a sufficient argument is taken from human actions. For it is clear from our experience that, when we act in a human way, that is, freely and rationally, we intend some fixed end to which we direct our actions and for the sake of which we select means. Therefore, we move by the end, both by the love or intention of it and by selecting and executing means for the sake of it. This motion, moreover, is something in the nature of things. For it is not something imaginary or invented through intellect. And it is some genus of causality, since it is the source of real action. The end, therefore, is a true and real cause. And from this, by the way, it is also clear that this causality especially has a place in intellectual agents, because they especially can cognize the end and means and the order of one to another and the proper nature of each. |
| Rationes dubitandi solvuntur. | The reasons for doubting are resolved. |
| 9. Argumenta in principio facta partim postulant difficultates proprias pertinentes ad Deum et ad infima agentia naturalia, partim inculcant ea quae de causa tractari possunt; haec autem sunt illa omnia quae de caeteris causis tractantur, ut insinuavit Caietan., I, q. 5, a. 4, et II-II, q. 17, a. 5, scilicet, quae res possint finaliter causare, per quid seu quae sit illis ratio causandi, vel tamquam principalis ratio, vel tamquam proxima. Item quae sit necessaria conditio, quis effectus; in quo denique consistat eius causalitas, quod hic est omnium obscurissimum. Ne igitur omnia haec involvamus et confundamus, in sectionibus sequentibus distincte tractanda erunt; ergo exacta argumentorum solutio usque ad finem disputationis erit expectanda. Nunc perfunctorie per singula discurremus. | 9. The arguments made in the beginning in part postulate difficulties particularly pertaining to God and to the lowest natural agents and in part they drive home those which can be discussed concerning cause. These, however, are all those which are discussed with regard to the other causes, as Cajetan suggests in I, q. 5, a. 4 and II-IIae, q. 17, a. 5, namely, what things can final-cause, through what this nature of causing is or what it is, either as principal nature or as proximate. Also, what the necessary condition is, what the effect. Finally, in what its causality consists, which is the most obscure of all. Accordingly, lest we get wrapped up in them and confuse all of them, they will be discussed separately in the following sections. Therefore, an exact solution to these arguments should be expected all the way at the end of the disputation. At present, we will run perfunctorily through each one. |
| 10. Ad primum negamus minorem, scilicet, finem non esse principium: nam eo modo $<$846$>$ quo est primum quid, habet rationem principii; est autem finis primus in intentione, quamvis sit ultimus in exsecutione. Aristoteles autem, in dicto loco III Metaph., non opponit finem omni principio, sed principio motus, per quod causam efficientem intelligit, quam distinguit a finali. | 10. Regarding the first [argument], we deny the minor, namely, that the end is not a principle. For in that way in which it is the first thing it has the nature of a principle. The end, moreover, is first in intention, although it is last in execution. Aristotle, moreover, in the cited place in Metaph. III, does not oppose the end to every principle but to the principle of motion, through which is understood the efficient cause which is distinguished from the final [cause]. |
| 11. Ad secundum negatur minor, scilicet, finem non influere realiter; ad probationem autem communis responsio est finem influere quando non est in re, sed tantum in apprehensione seu cognitione. Sed distinctione opus est, tam ex parte finis quam ex parte effectus seu actionis quam finis causat. Nam, ut sectione sequenti dicam, finis alius est cuius gratia fit actio, alius vero cui finis acquiritur; item alius est finis formalis, ut visio Dei, et alius obiectivus, ut Deus ipse; item finis causare potest desiderium sui, vel etiam potest causare quietem, vel delectationem, quae omnia mox declarabimus. Finis ergo cui non causat nisi quando existit; dicitur enim finis cui ipsummet agens, quatenus propter se vel in suum commodum operatur, quod non potest facere nisi existat. Item finis obiectivus potest etiam supponi existens quando finaliter causat, ut Deus, propter quem videndum ad bene operandum movemur. Rursus finis formalis, seu consecutio finis intenti non causat delectationem seu fruitionem sui nisi quando existit, quia delectatio non est nisi de bono possesso; quod si sit de spe eius, tunc ipsa spes habet rationem imperfectae consecutionis. In his ergo omnibus non procedit illud argumentum, quia existente fine obiectivo vel fine cui (qui claritatis gratia posset subiectivus appellari), non cessat inquisitio nec causalitas finis, nisi adsit etiam consecutio finis, et hac obtenta, quamvis cesset motus in finem per modum desiderii, non tamen per modum quietis et delectationis. Solum ergo de fine formali seu consecutione finis verum est, per se loquendo, quod causat sui desiderium quando non est in re, et de illo recte responsum est sufficere quod sit in apprehensione et iudicio intellectus, eo quod eius motio intentionalis sit et (ut ita dicam) animalis, per sympathiam et consonantiam potentiarum animae, intellectus scilicet et voluntatis. | 11. The minor of the second [argument]---namely, that the end does not really influence---is denied. In general, moreover, the response to the proof is that the end influences even when it is not in reality but only in apprehension or cognition. But there is need for a distinction, as much on the part of the end as on the part of the effect or action which the end causes. For, as I will say in the following section, one end, [i.e., the finis cuius], is that for the sake of which the action is done, but another, [i.e., finis cui], is that for which the end is acquired. Also, one is a formal end (for example, the vision of God) and another an objective [end] (for example, God himself). Also, an end can cause desire of itself, or it can also cause rest or delight, all of which we will soon show. Therefore, a finis cui does not cause except when it exists. For the agent itself is called the finis cui, since it acts for the sake of itself or for its advantage. This cannot happen unless it exists. Likewise, the objective end can also be assumed to exist when it causes finally (for example, God, for the sake of seeing whom we are moved to act well). In turn, the formal end, or the attainment of the intended end, does not cause its pleasure or enjoyment except when it exists, because there is no pleasure except when the good is possessed. If there is pleasure from the hope for it, then the very hope has the nature of imperfect attainment. In all these, therefore, that argument does not go through, because the existing objective end or finis cui (which can be called the subjective [end] for the sake of clarity) does not cease the search nor the causality of the end, unless attainment of the end also approaches, and, having obtained this [attainment], although motion to the end in the manner of desire ceases, motion in the manner of rest and pleasure does not cease. Therefore, only concerning the formal end or the attainment of the end is it true, speaking strictly, that it causes desire of itself when it does not really exist. And it is rightly responded concerning it that it suffices that it is in the apprehension and judgement of the intellect, in that which is its intentional motion and (if I may say it thus) animal [motion], through the sympathy and concordance of the powers of the soul, namely, the intellect and will. |
| 12. Tertium argumentum postulat quid causet finis, et specialiter attingit difficultatem quomodo forma sit finis generationis naturalis, quod spectat ad difficultatem de naturalibus agen- $<$col. b$>$ tibus infra tractandam, et ideo breviter nunc dicitur finem causare desiderium sui seu alium similem affectum erga seipsum, et ita non causare immediate seipsum, sed aliquid distinctum a se. Et hinc etiam constat ad confirmationem, ex hac parte non repugnare relationem causae in fine esse realem; est enim sufficiens distinctio inter ipsam et talem effectum, et quando ipse finis non sit in re distinctus ab effectu eius dicemus inferius sect. 3. | 12. The third argument postulates what causes the end and especially touches on the difficulty of how a form is the end of natural generation. This concerns the difficulty about natural agents discussed below and so it is said briefly now that the end causes desire of itself or another similar affect towards itself and thus does not immediately cause itself, but something distinct from itself. And from here it is clear with respect to the confirmation that it is not repugnant from this part that a relation of cause in the end be real. For there is a sufficient distinction between itself and such an effect. And we will discuss cases where the end itself is not in reality distinct from its effect later in section 3. |
| 13. An vero ex alio capite repugnet illam relationem esse realem, nimirum, ex eo quod finis ipse non habet esse reale dum causat, res est dubia et controversa. Soncin., V Metaph., q. 3, et Iavell., q. 6, aiunt illud esse obiectivum quod finis habet in intellectu sufficere ut realiter referatur ad effectum; sed id difficile creditu est; nam illud esse obiectivum in ipso fine nihil rei ponit, sed solum denominationem extrinsecam ab actu qui realiter est in intellectu; ille autem actus non refertur realiter ad effectum causae finalis, quia non concurrit per se ad illum, ut infra dicam. Melius ergo respondent qui negant ad omnem causalitatem realem sequi relationem realem in causa; non est enim, necesse ex vi causalitatis, si aliae conditiones non concurrant, ut patet in causalitate Dei effectiva. Unde addo, etiamsi finis existat dum causat, non referri realiter ad suum effectum, quia in suo modo causandi est superioris cuiusdam rationis, quia ipse nullo modo ordinatur ad effectum, sed effectus ad ipsum. Quare, etiamsi ex parte effectus admittatur hic relatio realis, quod est probabile, maxime quando effectus non tantum per extrinsecam denominationem, sed per intrinsecam habitudinem ordinatur in finem iuxta ea quae inferius declarabimus, nihilominus illa relatio censenda est non mutua; effectus enim referri potest ad finem, quatenus ab eo pendet; unde, sicut ad hanc dependentiam satis est quod finis praeexistat in mente, ita etiam sufficiet ad realem habitudinem transcendentalem, licet praedicamentalis forte non sit nisi ad finem actu existentem; tamen, quia finis causat ut omnino immotus et non ordinatus ad suum effectum, ideo non oportet ut ex parte eius relatio sit realis. Sicut enim Aristoteles dixit scientiam referri realiter ad scibile, non e contrario, ita nos dicere possumus de appetitione et appetibili; est enim eadem ratio, et similiter est eadem de appetibili et de fine. $<$847$>$ | 13. But whether it is repugnant from another source that that relation be real---namely, from the fact that the very end does not have real being while it causes---is a matter of doubt and controversy. Soncinas, Metaph. V, q. 3, and Javelli, [Metaph. V], q. 6, say that that objective being which the end has in the intellect suffices for it really to be referred to the effect. But that is difficult to believe. For that objective being in the end itself provides nothing real, but only an extrinsic denomination from the act which really is in the intellect. That act, however, does not really refer to the effect of the final cause, because it does not concur per se to it, as I will say below. Therefore, those who deny that a real relation accompany every real causality in a cause respond more agreeably. For it is not necessary on the basis of causality, if other conditions do not concur, as is clear with the effective causality of God. Hence I add that, even if the end exists while it causes, it is not really referred to its effect, because in its mode of causing it is a certain higher nature, since it is in no way ordered to the effect but the effect to it. Wherefore, even if on the part of the effect this real relation is admitted---which is plausible, especially when the effect not only through extrinsic denomination but through an intrinsic habitude is ordered to the end according to that which we will show later---that relation, nevertheless, should not be thought mutual. For the effect can be referred to the end, insofar as it depends on it. Hence, just as for this dependence it is enough that the end pre-exist in the mind, so also it suffices for a real transcendental habitude, although perhaps it is not a categorical [habitude] unless to an actually existing end. Nevertheless, because the end causes as entirely unchanged and not ordered to its effect, therefore it is not necessary that the relation be real from its side. For just as Aristotle said that science is really referred to the knowable, but not the other way around, so we can say concerning appetite and the appetitible. For it is of the same nature and similarly it is the same concerning the appetitible and concerning the end. |
| 14. In quarto argumento multa tanguntur pertinentia ad Deum et ad agentia naturalia; nunc, illis omissis, concedimus causalitatem convenire fini ut habet rationem principii, et consequenter ut habet rationem moventis. Eius autem motio dicitur metaphorica, non quia non sit realis, sed quia non fit per influxum effectivum, nec per motionem physicam, sed per motionem intentionalem et animalem, et ideo nihil obstat quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas. | 14. In the fourth argument many things are touched on pertaining to God and to natural agents. Now, those having been set aside, we concede that causality agrees with the end as it has the nature of a principle and consequently as it has the nature of a mover. Its motion, however, is called metaphorical, not because it is not real, but because it does not happen through effective influx nor through physical motion but through intentional and animal motion. And therefore nothing prevents it from being the case that its causality is true and proper. |
| 15. Ad quintum, quidquid sit de agentibus naturalibus, de quibus postea respondetur modum operandi intellectualium creaturarum non posse intelligi sine causalitate finis, quia revera alliciuntur et moventur a fine ad operandum, et quamvis ipsa habeant naturalem propensionem ad obiecta seu fines ad quos per proprios vitales actus moventur, tamen illa naturalis propensio non potest operari in suo genere, id est, effective, nisi sufficienter applicato fine et in suo genere concausante, et ita determinatio operationis, seu destinatio in certum scopum, quae cernitur in agentibus intellectualibus, manifeste procedit non ex sola inclinatione naturali, sed ex causalitate finis. Ad sextum, quantum hic locus patitur, satis explicatum est quid, vel circa quid finis causet; integram vero huius rei tractationem trademus inferius. | 15. Regarding the fifth [argument]---whatever may be the case concerning natural agents, about which is responded afterwards---the mode of action of intellectual creatures cannot be understood without the causality of the end, because in reality they are enticed and moved by the end to action, and, although they have a natural propensity to the objects or ends to which they are moved through proper life-giving actions, that natural propensity, nevertheless, cannot act in its own genus, i.e., effective, except by the end having been applied and co-causing in its own genus. And thus the determination of the action or the designation into a fixed scope, which is discerned in intellectual agents, manifestly proceeds not from a natural inclination alone but from the causality of an end. Regarding the sixth [argument], insofar as this place allows, it has been explained sufficiently what or concerning what the end causes. But we will hand over the complete treatment of this matter below. |