

## **DM (DE BONITATE) X.1.1-5<sup>1</sup>**

### **ON GOODNESS OR TRANSCENDENTAL GOODNESS (DE BONO SEU BONITATE TRANSCENDENTALI)**

This is the last simple property which is attributed to being. Concerning it we first assume that goodness exists, for this is so certain and is evident *per se* that it requires no proof. For both the Scriptures say that God saw goodness in the creatures produced by him (in the first [chapter] of Genesis) and Aristotle said that good is what all things desire (in *E[N]* I, ch. 1). Hence, just as it is certain and known by experience that there is in things a natural inclination or appetite for something (*ad aliquid*), so it is also known that good or goodness is in things. Therefore, having posited this, it should be explained what goodness is, how many kinds there are and which of those kinds are attributes (*passio*) of being, and in what way it is compared to being itself.

Hæc est ultima proprietas simplex quæ enti attribuitur, de qua imprimis supponimus bonitatem esse; id enim tam certum et per se notum est ut non indigeat probatione; nam et Scriptura dicit vidisse Deum bonitatem in creaturis a se productis, Genesis primo; et Aristoteles dixit bonum esse quod omnia appetunt, I Ethic., c. 1. Unde, quam est certum et experimento cognitum esse in rebus naturalem inclinationem seu appetitum ad aliquid, tam est etiam notum esse bonum seu bonitatem in rebus. Hoc ergo posito, explicandum est quidnam bonitas sit et quotuplex, et quænam illarum sit passio entis et quomodo ad ipsum ens comparetur.

## **Section I**

### **WHAT GOOD OR GOODNESS IS (QUID BONUM SEU BONITAS SIT)**

1. Since ‘good’ is a connotative or denominative name, we are not inquiring here into what that is which is denominated good. For it is certain that, commonly speaking, it is being that by nature or reason precedes good, as was said above and will be made more clear in what follows. But we are inquiring into what that form or nature is by which a thing is denominated good. In the explanation of this there is the same variety of opinions as with the other attributes (*passionibus*) of being.

1. Cum bonum nomen sit connotativum seu denominativum, hic non inquirimus quid illud sit quod bonum denominatur; nam certum est illud in communi loquendo esse ens quod natura seu ratione bonum antecedit, ut in superioribus dictum est et ex sequentibus magis constabit; sed inquirimus quænam sit illa forma seu ratio a qua res bona denominatur. In qua explicanda eadem est varietas opinionum quæ in cæteris passionibus entis.

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<sup>1</sup>Latin text copied from file:///home/sydney/Desktop/Suarez/MD/suarez\_dm10.html. Retrieved Oct. 8, 2007.

2. The first opinion says that goodness does not express some real nature but only a conceptual relation of agreeableness of one [thing] to another. This opinion is mentioned by Capreolus in [book] II, dist. 34, q. 1 and it is explained in this way: For goodness, as is clear from the word itself and from the way it is commonly conceived, does not add any privative nature to being, because privation rather expresses a lack of perfection or goodness. Therefore, it expresses a positive nature. Again, it [goodness] does not formally express the nature itself of the entity, both because these two are conceived and explained by us with different concepts and definitions and also because otherwise goodness would not be a property of being but rather these two words [‘being’ and ‘good’] would be synonymous. Neither can goodness include entity in its concept and add something to it, because a property does not intrinsically include the nature or essence of its subject in its concept.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, it is necessary that goodness express something added to being. But this cannot be something real, because, as was shown extensively above concerning the attributes of being in general, no real nature that is an attribute of it can be added to real being as such, not only *ex nature rei* but also not by reason distinguished. Likewise, because such a nature can neither be absolute nor a real relations, as we will prove below. Therefore, good can only add something conceptual to being, which cannot be but the mentioned relation of agreeability.

This seems to be St. Thomas’s way of thinking in *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1. And it can be confirmed because goodness and desirability are the same in reality, although the same respect is not signified by these names. For desirability expresses a formal denomination from appetite or a respect to it; good, however, does not express that formally but that which is, on the part of the object, the foundation of such a denomination or habitude.<sup>3</sup> On account of that the following causal [claim] is true: Because it is good, it is desirable. But every thing is desired on account of the agreeability which it has with the one desiring. For each one loves what is agreeable. Therefore, the nature of good consists in this nature of agreeability. This nature of agreeability, moreover, is nothing but a relation, as the very word shows on account of itself. And it can be explained because the same thing with respect to all absolute things is agreeable to this and disagreeable to that, as heat is agreeable to fire and disagreeable to water. Therefore, agreeability consists in a relation; and not a real one, as we will show, [so it must] therefore [consist in a] conceptual one.

2. Prima opinio ait bonitatem non dicere aliquam rationem realem, sed solum relationem rationis convenientiæ unius ad alterum. Quæ opinio indicatur a Capreolo, In II, dist. 34, q. 1, et in hunc modum explicatur. Nam bonitas, ut ex ipsa voce et ex communi modo concipiendi constat, non addit enti aliquam rationem privativam, quia privatio potius dicit carentiam perfectionis seu bonitatis; dicit ergo positivam rationem. Rursus, non dicit formaliter ipsam rationem entitatis, tum quia hæc duo diversis conceptibus ac definitionibus a nobis concipiuntur et explicantur; tum etiam quia alias bonitas non esset proprietas entis, sed potius voces illæ essent synonymæ. Neque etiam bonitas potest in suo conceptu includere entitatem et aliquid illi addere, quia proprietas non includit intrinsece in conceptu suo naturam seu essentiam sui subiecti.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. the translation by Garcia and Davis.

<sup>3</sup>I am using ‘habitude’ as a placeholder translation for *habitudō* (rather than translating it with ‘relation’, as Garcia and Davis do), since it is pretty clear from *DM XLVII* that Suárez at least some of the time makes a distinction between *habitudō* and *relatio*. My ‘habitude’ should be taken in the archaic usage found in, e.g., Locke and Berkeley; cf. the second definition in the entry in the *OED*.

Necesse est ergo ut bonitas dicat aliquid superadditum enti; sed hoc non potest esse aliquid reale, quia, ut supra late ostensum est de passionibus entis in communi, enti reali ut sic non potest addi aliqua ratio realis, non solum ex natura rei, verum nec ratione distincta, quæ sit passio eius. Item, quia nec talis ratio potest esse absoluta, nec relatio realis, ut infra probabimus; ergo solum addere potest bonum supra ens aliquid rationis, quod non potest esse nisi prædicta relatio convenientiæ. Qui discursus videtur esse D. Thomæ, q. 1 De Verit., a. 1, et q. 21, a. 1. Et confirmari potest quia bonum et appetibile in re idem sunt, quamvis his nominibus non idem respectus significetur; nam appetibile dicit formalem denominationem ab appetitu, vel respectum ad illum; bonum autem non id dicit formaliter, sed id quod ex parte obiecti est fundamentum talis denominationis seu habitudinis, propter quod hæc causalis vera est: Quia bonum est, est appetibile. Sed omnis res appetitur propter convenientiam quam habet cum appetente; amat enim unusquisque quod conveniens est; ergo ratio boni in hac ratione convenientiæ consistit; hæc autem ratio convenientiæ non est nisi relatio, ut ipsa vox præ se fert; et explicari potest, quia res eadem quoad omnia absoluta huic est conveniens, illi disconveniens, Ut calor est conveniens igni et disconveniens aquæ; ergo consistit convenientia in relatione; et non reali, ut ostendemus, ergo rationis.

### **Goodness is not a conceptual relation** (Bonitas non est relatio rationis)

3. But nevertheless this opinion has been implicitly disproven in the above [passages] in two [ways]. Firstly, because it denies that these attributes of being include entity in their formal and intrinsic concepts, which we showed to be false in both the general and in the particular [cases] discussed above. And in the present [case] it seems even more obvious, for what does not include entity is nothing. But who would conceive goodness to be nothing, when it draws appetite and is said to have the nature of a final cause and is the very perfection of a thing, either wholly or in part, as we will explain? Hence, St. Thomas, in [ST] Ia, q. 48, a. 5, [co.], says that good consists essentially and principally in perfection.<sup>4</sup> But perfection without entity is unintelligible. Hence, Augustine in book I, ch. 32 of *De Doct. Chr.* says that ‘insofar as we are, we are good’.

Secondly, [because it holds that] a conceptual relation is an attribute of being. For, strictly speaking concerning a conceptual relation as it expresses something fabricated by the mind and as if (*quasi*) added to things, we showed this to be false and this evidently remains true in the present [case]. First, because, as Aristotle teaches at the end of book VI of *Metaph.*, goodness is in things and in this he distinguishes it from the true. Therefore, it is not formally only a conceptual relation. Next, because, St. Thomas, in [ST] Ia, q. 5, a. 5, [s. c.], drawing on ch. 3 of Augustine’s book *De natura boni*, says that ‘good consists in mode, species, and order’ (which we will explain below). These, however, are not fabricated through the intellect, but exist in things themselves. Therefore, neither is the nature of good. Likewise, because this is the difference between true good and apparent [good]: the apparent good is only imagined and apprehended by the intellect, but the true good subsists in the things themselves and is supposed prior to every imagination of the intellect. Hence, it is said concerning God: ‘He saw all the things which he had made and they were very good’.<sup>5</sup> But he did not see a conceptual relation in them. Therefore,

<sup>4</sup>I reply that bad, as was said above, is the privation of good, which consists principally and essentially in perfection and act’ (*Respondeo dicendum quod malum, sicut supra dictum est, est privatio boni, quod in perfectione et actu consistit principaliter et per se*).

<sup>5</sup>Genesis 1: 31. The Vulgate from 1598 reads: *Viditque Deus cuncta quæ fecerat, et erant valde bona.*

goodness does not consist in an imagined relation nor is this required for it [goodness].

3. Sed nihilominus hæc opinio virtute improbata est in superioribus quoad duo. Primum, quod neget has passiones entis includere in conceptu suo formali et intrinseco entitatem, quod tam in communi quam in singulis supra tractatis ostendimus esse falsum et in præsentia videtur manifestius, nam quod entitatem non includit, nihil est; quis autem concipiat bonitatem esse nihil, cum illa trahat appetitum et rationem causæ finalis habere dicatur et sit ipsa perfectio rei, vel integra vel ex parte, ut explicabimus? Unde D. Thom., I, q. 48, a. 5, dicit bonum per se et principaliter consistere in perfectione; perfectio autem sine entitate, neque intelligi potest. Unde August., lib. 1 De Doct. Christiana, c. 32, ait quod *in quantum sumus, boni sumus*. Secundum est, relationem rationis esse passionem entis; nam loquendo proprie de relatione rationis prout dicit aliquid mente confictum et quasi additum rebus, ostendimus id esse falsum et in præsentia evidenter etiam constat. Primo, quia, ut Aristoteles docet, VI Metaph., in fine, bonum est in rebus, et in hoc distinguit illud a vero; non est ergo formaliter sola relatio rationis. Deinde quia, ut ex Augustino, lib. De natura boni, c. 3, tractat D. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, *bonum consistit in modo, specie et ordine*, quod etiam infra exponemus; hæc autem non sunt conficta per intellectum, sed in rebus ipsis existunt; ergo neque ratio boni. Item, quia hæc est differentia inter verum bonum et apparens, quod apparens solo intellectu fingitur et apprehenditur, verum autem bonum in re ipsa subsistit et ante omnem fictionem intellectus supponitur; unde de Deo dicitur: *Vidit omnia quæ fecerat et erant valde bona*; at non vidit in eis relationem rationis; non ergo consistit bonitas in ficta relatione neque hæc ad illam requiritur.

4. But there are those who say that although some conceptual relations are such that they depend on the imagining and thinking of the intellect (for example, the relations of genera and species), others are such that they are in the things themselves apart from the thinking of the intellect (for example, the relation of creator or lordship in God).

But these people are either speaking equivocally or are involved in a contradiction of words. For how can they be in the things themselves before the work of reason if they are said to be conceptual relations? Or how do they differ from real relations if they are subjectively in things and not just objectively in the intellect? Nor are these denominations of ‘creator’ or ‘lord’ insofar as they are understood to precede the thinking of the intellect taken up from conceptual relations (concerning which [we will speak] elsewhere). In addition, however this relation is imagined, the nature of goodness cannot consist in it, which will become more clear from what we will say concerning real relations. Moreover, the foundation of this opinion at most proves that ‘good’, besides connoting the complete intrinsic entity of a thing, connotes some other extrinsic thing or a denomination taken up from the conjunction of multiple [things], especially when one thing is called good for another, as we indicate below.

4. Sunt vero qui dicant, quamvis aliquæ relationes rationis tales sint quæ a fictione et cogitatione intellectus pendeant, ut relationes generis vel speciei, alias vero esse quæ sunt in rebus ipsis absque cogitatione intellectus, ut relatio creatoris vel domini in Deo. Sed hi vel æquivoce loquuntur de relationibus vel in verbis involvunt repugnantiam. Quomodo enim in rebus ipsis sunt ante opus

rationis, si relationes rationis esse dicuntur? Aut in quo differunt a relationibus realibus, si sunt subiective in rebus et non tantum obiective in intellectu? Nec illæ denominationes creatoris aut domini prout intelliguntur antecedere cogitationem intellectus, sumuntur a relationibus rationis, de quo alias. Adde, qualiscumque hæc relatio fingatur, non posse in ea rationem bonitatis consistere, quod magis constabit ex his quæ de relatione reali dicemus. Fundamentum autem huius sententiæ ad summum probat bonum præter totam intrinsecam rei entitatem connotare aliquid aliud extrinsecum seu denominationem sumptam ex consortio plurium, præsertim quando una res dicitur bona alteri, ut infra declarabimus.

### **Goodness is not a real relation** (Bonitas non est relatio realis)

5. The second opinion supposes that the nature of goodness consists in some real relation added to being. This opinion is to be supported and declared once the supposed principle against the preceding opinion has been proven, [i.e., that] goodness must consist in some real relation. For the former [i.e., goodness] cannot be simply absolute, as is sufficiently proven by the given argument that the same thing from the respect of one is good and from the respect of another is bad. Therefore, it will be a real relation. This opinion is attributed to Durandus, [*Sent.*] II, dist. 34, q. 1. But since Durandus also denies proper real relations in other things, his mind is different in the present [case], as we will see below.

But this opinion is obviously false to whomever it might belong. The same arguments by which we proved this concerning truth, when applied proportionally, can show this.

- Firstly, because God is good from eternity with a transcendental goodness common to the three persons and yet there is in him no real relation common to the three persons.
- Secondly, because heat, wherever it exists, has its complete goodness, even if neither fire exists nor any other subject to which heat is agreeable. Therefore, it [i.e., heat] does not then have a real relation of agreeability. Therefore, goodness does not consist in this relation.
- Thirdly, even when heat exists in fire or justice in a human, it [i.e., heat or justice] is not its [i.e., the fire's or the human's] good on account of the real relation, for this itself, [namely], that such a form through its own absolute entity informs such a subject is its good and perfection, apart from all relations that arise either according to real duration, if in reality there is not such a relation, or according to the intellect and the order of nature. For such *relata* according to their entities and absolute perfections are prior by nature to the relation arising between them.
- Fourthly, because, either this real relation expresses real perfection and entity or not. If it does not express (as many think) some real perfection, how can it be the goodness of some thing since goodness expresses perfection? But if it expresses perfection, then also goodness. Therefore, it expresses a real relation of agreeability and this relation will be its goodness. And thus one proceeds into infinity (which argument is common with regard to relations). Or if this relation is agreeable and good apart from such a relation of agreeability, the same could very easily be understood in any form or absolute thing.

5. Secunda sententia ponit rationem bonitatis in aliqua relatione reali superaddita enti consistere. Quæ opinio fundanda ac declaranda est, sumpto principio contra præcedentem sententiam probato, bonitatem consistere debere in ratione aliqua reali; nam illud non potest esse mere absolutum, ut probat satis argumentum factum, quod eadem res respectu unius sit bona et respectu alterius mala; erit ergo relatio realis. Quæ sententia attribuitur Durando, In II, dist. 34, q. 1. Sed cum Durandus in aliis etiam rebus neget proprias relationes reales, alia est in præsentis mens eius ut infra videbimus. Cuiuscumque autem sit illa sententia, manifeste falsa est. Quod eisdem argumentis quibus de veritate id probavimus, cum proportionem applicatis hic ostendi potest. Primo, quia Deus ab æterno bonus est bonitate transcendentali communi tribus personis et tamen in eo nulla est relatio realis communis tribus personis. Secundo, quia calor, ubicumque existat habet totam suam bonitatem, etiamsi ignis non existat neque aliquod aliud subiectum cui conveniens sit calor: ergo et tunc non habet relationem realem convenientiæ; ergo non consistit bonitas in hac relatione. Tertio, etiam quando calor existit in igne vel iustitia in homine, non est bonum eius propter relationem realem, nam hoc ipso quod talis forma per suam entitatem absolutam informat tale subiectum est bonum et perfectio eius, præcisa omni insurgente relatione vel secundum realem durationem, si revera nulla est talis relatio, vel secundum intellectum et naturæ ordinem; prius enim natura sunt talia extrema secundum suas entitates et perfectiones absolutas quam inter ea insurgat relatio. Quarto, quia vel relatio illa realis dicit perfectionem et entitatem realem, vel non. Si non dicit (ut multi existimant) aliquam perfectionem realem, quomodo potest esse bonitas alicuius rei cum bonitas perfectionem dicat? Si autem dicit perfectionem, ergo et bonitatem; dicit ergo realem relationem convenientiæ et illa relatio erit eius bonitas; et sic procedetur in infinitum, quod argumentum vulgare est in relationibus. Vel si illa relatio est conveniens et bona absque tali relatione convenientiæ, idem facillime intelligi poterit in quacumque forma vel re absoluta.