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<328, col. a><sup>2</sup>

DE BONO SEU BONITATE TRANSCENDENTALI.

1. Haec est ultima proprietas simplex, quae enti  
attribuitur, de qua imprimis supponimus bonitatem  
esse: id enim tam certum et per se notum est, ut  
non indigeat probatione: nam et Scriptura dicit,  
5 vidisse Deum bonitatem in creaturis a se productis, 5R  
Genesis primo et Aristoteles dixit, bonum esse, quod  
omnia appetunt, 1. *Ethicorum* cap. 1. Unde, quam  
<col. b> est certum et experimento cognitum, esse  
in rebus naturalem inclinationem seu appetitum  
10 ad aliquid, tam est etiam notum, esse bonum, seu 10R  
bonitatem in rebus. Hoc ergo posito explicandum  
est, quidnam bonitas sit, et quotuplex, et quaenam  
illarum sit passio entis, et quomodo ad ipsum ens  
comparetur.

SECTIO 1.

QUID BONUM, SEU BONITAS SIT.

1. Cum bonum nomen sit connotativum, seu de-  
nominativum, hic non inquirimus, quid illud sit,  
quod bonum denominatur: nam certum est, illud  
in communi loquendo, esse ens, quod natura seu  
5 ratione bonum antecedit, ut in superioribus dictum 5R  
est, et ex sequentibus magis constabit, sed inquir-  
imus, quaenam sit illa forma seu ratio, a qua res

ON TRANSCENDENTAL GOOD OR GOODNESS.

This is the last simple property attributed to being. With re-  
spect to it we assume in the first place that there is goodness.  
This is so certain and self-evident that it does not require  
proof. For both the Scriptures say that God saw goodness  
in the creatures made by him (Genesis 1[:31]) and Aristotle  
says that the good is what all things desire (*Nicomachean  
Ethics* I, ch. 1). Hence, just as it is certain and cognized  
through experience that there is in things a natural incli-  
nation or appetite for something, so also it is known that  
there is good or goodness in things. Having posited this, it  
remains to explain what goodness is, its kinds, and which of  
those kinds is an attribute of being and how it is related to  
being itself.

SECTION 1.

WHAT GOOD OR GOODNESS IS.

1. Since 'good' is a connotative or denominative name, we are  
not here inquiring into what that is which is denominated  
good. For it is certain that, commonly speaking, it is being  
that precedes good by nature or by *ratio*, as was said above  
and will be made more clear in what follows. But we are  
inquiring into what that form or *ratio* is according to which  
5R a thing is denominated good. There is the same variety of

<sup>1</sup>Latin text . . . by and large follows the 1597 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition and V = Vivès edition. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1597 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

bona denominatur. In qua explicanda eadem est  
varietas opinionum, quae in caeteris passionibus  
entis.

10 2. Prima opinio ait, bonitatem non dicere ali-  
quam rationem realem, sed solum relationem ratio-  
nis convenientiae unius ad alterum. Quae opinio  
indicatur a Capreolo 2. dist. 34. q. 1. et in hunc  
15 modum explicatur. Nam bonitas, ut ex ipsa voce  
et ex communi modo concipiendi constat, non ad-  
dit enti aliquam rationem privativam, quia privatio  
potius dicit carentiam perfectionis seu bonitatis:  
dicit ergo positivam rationem. Rursus, non dicit  
20 formaliter ipsam rationem entitatis, tum quia haec  
duo diversis conceptibus ac definitionibus a nobis  
conciipiuntur et explicantur, tum etiam, quia alias  
bonitas non esset proprietas entis, sed potius voces  
illae essent synonymae. Neque etiam bonitas potest  
25 in suo conceptu includere entitatem, et aliquid illi  
addere, quia proprietas non includit intrinsece in  
conceptu suo naturam seu essentiam sui subiecti.  
Necesse est ergo ut bonitas dicat aliquid superad-  
ditum enti: sed hoc non potest esse aliquid reale:  
30 quia ut supra late ostensum est de passionibus en-  
tis in communi, enti reali ut sic non potest addi  
aliqua ratio realis non solum ex natura rei, verum  
nec ratione distincta, quae sit passio eius. Item  
quia nec talis ratio potest esse absoluta, nec rela-  
35 tio realis, ut infra probabimus: ergo solum addere  
potest bonum supra ens, aliquid rationis, quod non  
potest esse, nisi praedicta relatio convenientiae. Qui  
discursus videtur esse D. Thomae q. 1. *De veritate*  
art. 1. et q. 21. art. 1. Et confirmari potest quia  
40 bonum et appetibile in re idem sunt, quamvis his  
<329> nominibus non idem respectus significetur:  
nam appetibile dicit formalem denominationem ab  
appetitu, vel respectum ad illum: bonum autem  
non id dicit formaliter, sed id, quod ex parte obiecti

opinions in explaining this as with the other attributes of  
being.

10R 2. The first opinion says that goodness does not express  
some real *ratio* but only a conceptual relation of agreeability  
of one thing to another. Capreolus mentions this opinion in  
II, dist. 34, q. 1. It is explained in this way: For goodness,  
as is clear from the word itself and from the way it is com-  
15R monly conceived, does not add any privative *ratio* to being,  
because privation rather expresses a lack of perfection or  
goodness. Therefore, it expresses a positive nature. Again,  
goodness does not formally express the *ratio* itself of entity,  
both because we conceive and explain these two with dif-  
20R ferent concepts and definitions, and also because otherwise  
goodness would not be a property of being but rather the  
two words 'being' and 'good' would be synonymous. Neither  
can goodness include entity in its concept and add some-  
thing to it, since a property does not intrinsically include  
25R the *ratio* or essence of its subject in its concept. It is nec-  
essary, therefore, that goodness express something added  
to being. But this cannot be something real, because, as  
was shown extensively above concerning the attributes of  
being in general, to real being as such no real *ratio* that is an  
30R attribute of it can be added, whether distinct *ex nature rei* or  
even only conceptually distinct. Also, because such a *ratio*  
can neither be something absolute nor a real relation, as we  
will prove below. Therefore, good can only add something  
conceptual to being, which cannot be anything other than  
35R the aforementioned relation of agreeability.

This line of thinking seems to belong to St. Thomas in  
*On Truth*, q. 1, art. 1 and q. 21, art. 1. It can, moreover, be  
confirmed because goodness and desirability are the same  
in reality, even though these names do not signify the same  
respect. For desirability expresses a formal denomination  
from appetite or a respect to it; good, however, does not  
express that [respect] formally but rather expresses that  
40R which on the part of the object is the foundation of such a

45 est fundamentum talis denominationis, seu habi-  
 tudinis: propter quod haec causalis vera est, quia 45R  
 bonum est, est appetibile. Sed omnis res appetitur,  
 propter convenientiam, quam habet cum appetente:  
 amat enim unusquisque, quod conveniens est: ergo  
 50 ratio boni in hac ratione convenientiae consistit:  
 haec autem ratio convenientiae non est nisi relatio, 50R  
 ut ipsa vox prae se fert: et explicari potest, quia res  
 eadem quoad omnia absoluta huic est conveniens,  
 illi disconveniens, ut calor est conveniens igni, et  
 55 disconveniens aquae: ergo consistit convenientia in  
 relatione, et non reali, ut ostendemus: ergo rationis. 55R

*Bonitas non est relatio rationis.*

3. Sed nihilominus haec opinio virtute improbata  
 est in superioribus, quoad duo. Primum quod neget,  
 has passiones entis includere in conceptu suo for-  
 mali et intrinseco entitatem, quod tam in communi,  
 5 quam in singulis supra tractatis ostendimus esse 5R  
 falsum, et in praesenti videtur manifestius: nam  
 quod entitatem non includit, nihil est: quis autem  
 concipiat bonitatem esse nihil, cum illa trahat ap-  
 petitum, et rationem causae finalis habere dicatur,  
 10 et sit ipsa perfectio rei, vel integra, vel ex parte ut 10R  
 explicabimus? Unde D. Thomas 1. p. q. 48. art. 5.  
 dicit, bonum per se et principaliter consistere in  
 perfectione: perfectio autem sine entitate, neque  
 intelligi potest. Unde Augustinus lib. 1. *De doctrina*  
 15 *Christiana* cap. 32. ait, quod *in quantum sumus,* 15R  
*boni sumus.* Secundum est, relationem rationis esse  
 passionem entis, nam loquendo proprie de relatione  
 rationis, prout dicit aliquid mente confictum, et

denomination or habitude.<sup>3</sup> On account of that the following  
 causal [claim] is true: Because it is good, it is desirable. But  
 every thing is desired on account of the agreeability which  
 it has with the one desiring. For each one loves what is  
 agreeable. Therefore, the *ratio* of good consists in this *ratio*  
 of agreeability. Moreover, this *ratio* of agreeability is nothing  
 but a relation, as the very word shows through itself. And it  
 can be explained because the very same thing with respect  
 to everything absolute is agreeable to this and disagreeable  
 to that, as heat is agreeable to fire and disagreeable to water.  
 Therefore, agreeability consists in a relatio. Moreover, it does  
 not consist in a real relation, as we will show, [so it must]  
 therefore [consist in] a conceptual one.

*Goodness is not a conceptual relation.*

3. But this opinion, however, has been implicitly disproven  
 above in two ways. First, because it denies that these at-  
 tributes of being include entity in their formal and intrinsic  
 concepts, which we showed to be false as much in general as  
 in the individual cases discussed above. It seems even more  
 obvious in the present case. For what does not include entity  
 is nothing. But who would conceive goodness to be nothing,  
 when it draws desire and is said to have the *ratio* of a final  
 cause and is the very perfection of a thing, either wholly or  
 in part, as we will explain? Hence, St. Thomas, in *ST Ia.48.5,*  
 [co.], says that good consists essentially and principally in  
 perfection.<sup>4</sup> But perfection without entity is unintelligible.  
 Hence, Augustine says in *On Christian Doctrine I, ch. 32,*  
 that ‘insofar as we are, we are good’.

Second, [because it holds that] a conceptual relation is  
 an attribute of being. For, speaking strictly speaking about  
 conceptual relations as they express something fabricated  
 by the mind and added, as it were, to things, we showed this

<sup>3</sup>I am using ‘habitude’ as a placeholder translation for *habitudo* (rather than translating it with ‘relation’, as Garcia and Davis do), since it is pretty clear from *DM XLVII* that Suárez at least some of the time makes a distinction between *habitudo* and *relatio*. My ‘habitude’ should be taken in the archaic usage found in, e.g., Locke and Berkeley; cf. the second definition in the entry in the *OED*.

<sup>4</sup>I reply that bad, as was said above, is the privation of good, which consists principally and essentially in perfection and actuality’ (*Respondeo dicendum quod malum, sicut supra dictum est, est privatio boni, quod in perfectione et actu consistit principaliter et per se*).

20 quasi additum rebus, ostendimus id esse falsum, 20R  
 et in praesenti evidenter etiam constat. Primo quia,  
 ut Aristoteles docet 6. *Metaphysicae* in fine, Bonum  
 est in rebus, et in hoc distinguit illud a vero, non  
 Augustinus. est ergo formaliter sola relatio rationis. Deinde quia  
 25 ut ex Augustino, lib. *De natura boni* cap. 3. trac- 25R  
 tat D. Thomas 1. p. q. 5. art. 5. *Bonum consistit in*  
*modo, specie, et ordine*, quod etiam infra expone-  
 mus: haec autem non sunt conficta per intellectum,  
 sed in rebus ipsis existunt: ergo neque ratio boni.  
 Item, quia haec est differentia inter verum bonum,  
 30 et apparens, <col. b> quod apparens solo intellectu 30R  
 fingitur, et apprehenditur, verum autem bonum in  
 re ipsa subsistit, et ante omnem fictionem intellec-  
 tus supponitur: unde de Deo dicitur; *vidit omnia*  
*quae fecerat, et erant valde bona*, at non vidit in eis  
 35 relationem rationis, non ergo consistit bonitas in 35R  
 ficta relatione neque haec ad illam requiritur.

4. Sunt vero, qui dicant, quamvis aliquae re-  
 lationes rationis tales sint, quae a fictione et cogi-  
 tatione intellectus pendeant, ut relationes generis, 40R  
 40 vel speciei, alias vero esse quae sunt in rebus ipsis  
 absque cogitatione intellectus, ut relatio creatoris  
 vel domini in Deo. Sed hi vel aequivoce loquuntur  
 de relationibus, vel in verbis involvunt repugnan-  
 tiam. Quomodo enim in rebus ipsis sunt ante opus 45R  
 45 rationis, si relationes rationis esse dicuntur? Aut  
 in quo differunt a relationibus realibus, si sunt  
 subiective in rebus, et non tantum obiective in in-  
 tellectu? Nec illae denominationes creatoris aut  
 domini prout intelliguntur antecedere cogitationem 50R  
 50 intellectus sumuntur a relationibus rationis, de quo  
 alias. Adde, qualiscumque haec relatio fingatur,  
 non posse in ea rationem bonitatis consistere, quod  
 magis constabit ex his, quae de relatione reali dice-  
 mus. Fundamentum autem huius sententiae ad 55R

to be false and it obviously remains true in the present case.  
 First, because, as Aristotle teaches at the end of *Metaphysics*  
 VI, good is in things, and in this he distinguishes it from the  
 true. Therefore, it is not formally a mere conceptual relation.  
 Also, because St. Thomas says in *ST Ia.5.5*, [s. c.], drawing  
 on ch. 3 of Augustine's *On the Nature of the Good*, that 'good  
 Augustinus. consists in mode, species, and order' (which we will explain  
 below). These, however, are not fashioned through the intel-  
 lect, but exist in things themselves. Therefore, neither is the  
*ratio* of good [fashioned through the intellect]. Likewise, be-  
 cause the difference between true good and apparent [good]  
 is this: the apparent good is only imagined and apprehended  
 by the intellect, but the true good subsists in reality itself  
 and is assumed prior to every imagination of the intellect.  
 Hence, it is said of God: 'He saw all the things which he  
 had made and they were very good'.<sup>5</sup> But he did not see  
 a conceptual relation in them. Therefore, goodness does  
 not consist in a fashioned relation nor is this required for  
 goodness.

4. But there are those who say that although some  
 conceptual relations are such that they depend on the fash-  
 ioning and thinking of the intellect (for example, the relations  
 of genera and species), others are such that they are in the  
 things themselves apart from the intellect's cogitation (for  
 example, the relation of being creator or lord in God).

But these people are either speaking equivocally or are  
 involved in a contradiction of words. For how can they be in  
 the things themselves before the work of reason if they are  
 said to be conceptual relations? Or how do they differ from  
 real relations if they are in things as in a subject and not just  
 in the intellect as its objects? Nor are these denominations of  
 'creator' or 'lord' insofar as they are understood to precede the  
 thinking of the intellect taken up from conceptual relations  
 ([we will talk] about this elsewhere). In addition, however this  
 relation is fashioned, the *ratio* of goodness cannot consist in  
 it. This will become clearer from what we will say about real  
 relations. Moreover, the foundation of this opinion at most

<sup>5</sup>Genesis 1:31.

55 summum probat, bonum praeter totam intrinsecam rei entitatem connotare aliquid aliud extrinsecum, seu denominationem sumptam ex consortio plurium, praesertim, quando una res dicitur bona alteri, ut infra declarabimus.

*Bonitas non est relatio realis.*

5. Secunda sententia ponit, rationem bonitatis in aliqua relatione reali superaddita enti consistere. Quae opinio fundanda ac declaranda est sumpto principio contra praecedentem sententiam probato, bonitatem consistere debere in ratione aliqua reali: nam illud non potest esse mere absolutum, ut probat satis argumentum factum, quod eadem res respectu unius sit bona, et respectu alterius mala: erit ergo relatio realis. Quae sententia tribuitur Durando in 2. dist. 34. q. 1. Sed cum Durandus in aliis etiam rebus neget proprias relationes reales, alia est in praesenti mens eius, ut infra videbimus. Cuiuscumque autem sit illa sententia, manifeste falsa est. Quod eisdem argumentis, quibus de veritate id probavimus, cum proportionem applicatis hic ostendi potest. Primo, quia Deus ab aeterno bonus est bonitate transcendentali communi <330> tribus personis, et tamen in eo nulla est relatio realis communis tribus personis. Secundo, quia calor, ubicumque existat, habet totam suam bonitatem, etiamsi ignis non existat, neque aliquod aliud subiectum, cui conveniens sit calor: ergo, et tunc non habet relationem realem convenientiae: ergo non consistit bonitas in hac relatione. Tertio, etiam quando calor existit in igne, vel iustitia in homine, non est bonum eius propter relationem realem: nam hoc ipso, quod talis forma per suam entitatem absolutam informat tale subiectum, est bonum et perfectio eius, praecisa omni insurgente relatione, vel secundum realem du-

60R

proves that 'good', besides connoting the whole intrinsic entity of a thing, also connotes some other extrinsic thing or a denomination taken up from the conjunction of multiple things, especially when one thing is said to be good for another, as we explain below.

*Goodness is not a real relation.*

5R

5. The second opinion posits that the *ratio* of goodness consists in some real relation added to being. This opinion is to be supported and declared by assuming the principle proven against the previous view, [namely, that] goodness must consist in some real *ratio*. For the former [i.e., goodness] cannot be simply absolute, as is sufficiently proven by the argument that was made from the fact that the same thing with respect to one thing is good and with respect to another is bad. Therefore, it will be a real relation. This view is attributed to Durandus, II, dist. 34, q. 1. But since Durandus also denies proper real relations in other things, he means something different in the present case, as we will see below.

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15R

Moreover, this view is obviously false regardless to whom it might belong. The same arguments by which we proved this concerning truth can show this, when applied proportionally. First, [it is false] because God is good from eternity by a transcendental goodness common to the three persons [of the Trinity] but there is in him no real relation common to the three persons.

20R

Second, because heat has all its goodness whenever it exists, even if neither fire nor any other subject to which heat is agreeable exists. Therefore, heat also does not have a real relation of agreeability in that case. Therefore, [its] goodness does not consist in this relation.

25R

Third, even when heat exists in fire or justice in a human being, they are not their good on account of a real relation. For they are their good and perfection simply in virtue of the fact that such a form through its absolute entity informs such a subject, apart from any relation that arises, whether

9 tribuitur] attribuitur V.

30 rationem, si revera nulla est talis relatio, vel secun-  
 dum intellectum, et naturae ordinem: prius enim  
 natura sunt talia extrema secundum suas entitates  
 et perfectiones absolutas, quam inter ea insurgat  
 35 relatio. Quarto, quia, vel relatio illa realis dicit per-  
 fectionem, et entitatem realem, vel non. Si non dicit  
 (ut multi existimant) aliquam perfectionem realem,  
 quomodo potest esse bonitas alicuius rei, cum boni-  
 tas perfectionem dicat? Si autem dicit perfectionem,  
 40 ergo et bonitatem: dicit ergo realem relationem con-  
 venientiae, et illa relatio erit eius bonitas: et sic  
 procedetur in infinitum, quod argumentum vulgare  
 est in relationibus. Vel si illa relatio est conveniens  
 et bona absque tali relatione convenientiae, idem  
 45 facillime intelligi poterit in quacumque forma, vel re  
 absoluta.

*Bonitas nihil absolutum dicit in re distinctum ab en-  
 titate.*

6. Tertia sententia est, bonitatem dicere quamdam  
 proprietatem absolutam ac realem superadditam  
 enti, et ex natura rei seu formaliter distinctam ab  
 illo, quae sententia tribuitur Scoto in 1. dist. 3. q. 3.  
 5 et aliis locis, quae supra tractata sunt, et videre licet  
 in Capreolo 2. dist. 34. q. 1. Et potest probari ex  
 dictis sufficienti enumeratione, quia bonitas oportet  
 ut sit aliquid reale, et non potest esse relatio: ergo  
 debet esse absolutum. Et ut sit proprietatis oportet  
 10 ut in re aliquo modo distinguatur. Sed contra hanc  
 sententiam procedunt omnia, quae in communi de  
 passionibus entis, et in particulari de unitate, et  
 veritate dicta sunt. Et praeterea, ut clarius in prae-  
 senti falsa esse intelligatur, distinguere possumus,  
 15 dupliciter ens aliquod dici bonum, uno modo abso-  
 lute et in se, scilicet, quia in se bonum est, quomodo

30R according to real duration (if there really is no such relation)  
 or according to the intellect and order of nature. For such  
 relata (*extrema*) according to their entities and absolute per-  
 fections are prior in nature to a relation that arises between  
 them.

35R Fourth, because either that real relation expresses real  
 perfection or entity or not. If, as many think, it does not  
 express some real perfection, how can it be the goodness  
 of some thing when goodness expresses perfection? But  
 if it expresses perfection, then it also expresses goodness.  
 40R Therefore, it expresses a real relation of agreeability and that  
 relation will also be its goodness. And thus one proceeds to  
 infinity. This argument is common with relations.<sup>6</sup> Or, if that  
 relation is agreeable and good apart from such a relation of  
 agreeability, the same could very easily be understood in the  
 45R case of any absolute form or thing.

*Goodness expresses nothing absolute that is really distinct  
 from entity.*

6. The third view is that goodness expresses a kind of  
 absolute and real property added to being that is *ex natura  
 rei* distinct from the latter. This view is attributed to Scotus  
 in I, dist. 3, q. 3, and in other places that were treated above.<sup>7</sup>  
 5R It may also be seen in Capreolus in II, dist. 34, q. 1. It can be  
 proven from what was said by a sufficient enumeration. For  
 goodness must be something real and it cannot be a relation.  
 Therefore, it must be something absolute. And in order to be  
 a property, it must be distinguished in reality in some way.  
 10R But everything that was said about the attributes of  
 being in general and about unity and truth in particular goes  
 against this view. Furthermore, in order to better understand  
 what is false in the present case, we can distinguish two  
 ways in which some being can be called good. In one way  
 15R absolutely and in itself, namely, because it is good in itself  
 in the way that God is called good or a human being is called

<sup>6</sup>Cf. *DM* 47.4.7.

<sup>7</sup>*DM* 3.1.2.

dicitur Deus bonus, aut homo bonus. Alio modo dic-  
 itur aliquid bonum, <col. b> quia alteri bonum est,  
 quomodo virtus dicitur esse bona, quia bonum facit  
 20 habentem, et sic ait D. Thomas q. 21. *De veritate* art. 20R  
 1. *bonum dicere rationem perfectivi alterius*. De qua  
 distinctione statim plura dicemus. Res ergo, quae  
 dicitur bona alteri, non potest denominari bona ab  
 aliquo modo reali et absoluto ex natura rei distincto  
 25 ab entitate eius; quia huiusmodi res praecise conce- 25R  
 26 pta in sua entitate, ratione illius est conveniens  
 ei, cui bona dicitur, ut sanitas per seipsam et non  
 ratione alicuius modi superadditi, est conveniens  
 animali, et virtus aut scientia ex eo praecise quod  
 30 virtus et scientia est, est conveniens homini: omnino 30R  
 31 ergo fictum est ponere in huiusmodi formis modos  
 superadditos, quibus bonae sint: praescindamus  
 enim per intellectum talem modum, et considere-  
 mus in scientia solam essentiam eius, et inveniemus  
 35 illam convenientem, valdeque proportionatam hu- 35R  
 36 mano intellectui. Et similiter forma ex eo praecise  
 quod forma est, est bona et conveniens materiae, et  
 sic de aliis. Adde, hic etiam habere locum argumen-  
 tum illud, quod de illo modo superaddito interrogari  
 40 poterit, an sit conveniens alteri necne: nam si con- 40R  
 41 veniens non est, quomodo forma illo modo affecta  
 ratione illius potest esse conveniens? Si autem  
 etiam ille modus conveniens est per seipsum (ne  
 ulterius et in infinitum progrediamur) etiam forma  
 45 ex vi suae essentiae, seu differentiae ultimae per 45R  
 46 seipsam poterit esse conveniens.

7. Et hinc facile intelligitur, in re, quae bona dic-  
 itur in se et absolute, etiam esse confictum modum  
 illum. Aut enim res dicitur bona essentialiter, aut  
 50 accidentaliter, quomodo dicitur bonus homo stu- 50R  
 51 diosus. Hoc posteriori modo est quidem bonitas  
 aliquid distinctum ab ipsa re, quae denominatur  
 bona, ut sanitas est distincta a sano, et pulchri-  
 tudo a pulchro: unde interdum est modus rei sic

good. Something is called good in the second way when it  
 is good for something else, in the way that virtue is said to  
 be good because it makes the one who has it good. In this  
 way St. Thomas says in *On Truth*, q. 21, art. 1, that good  
 expresses a *ratio* perfective of another.

We shall immediately say more about this. The thing  
 that is said to be good for something else, then, cannot be  
 denominated good from some real and absolute mode that  
 is *ex natura rei* distinct from its entity, because a thing of  
 this kind when conceived precisely in that entity by reason  
 of which it is agreeable to that other thing is said to be good  
 for it. For example, health is agreeable to an animal in itself  
 and not by reason of some mode added to it, and virtue or  
 science are agreeable to a human being precisely from their  
 being virtue or science. It is, therefore, entirely fictitious to  
 posit added modes to these forms by which they are good.  
 For if we prescind from such a mode through the intellect  
 and we consider in science only its essence, we shall also  
 find it agreeable and very proportional to the human intellect.  
 Likewise, form is good for and agreeable to matter precisely  
 from the fact that it is form. Likewise in other cases.

Let us add that the argument about that added mode  
 also has a place here. One could ask about the mode whether  
 it is agreeable to another or not. For if it is not agreeable,  
 then how can the form affected by that mode be agreeable  
 by reason of it? But if that mode is also agreeable through  
 itself (lest we proceed further and to infinity), the form could  
 also be agreeable in virtue of its own essence or ultimate  
 difference.

7. And from this it is easily understood that in a thing  
 which is said to be good in itself and absolutely, that mode  
 has also been constructed. For the thing is said to be good ei-  
 ther essentially or accidentally (in the way in which someone  
 studious is said to be good). In the second way, goodness  
 is indeed something distinct from the thing itself that is de-  
 nominated good, as health is distinct from what is healthy  
 and beauty from what is beautiful. Hence, sometimes it is

55 affectae ut figura, interdum vero est entitas addita  
 alteri enti ad perficiendum illud, ut scientia additur  
 intellectui. Non tamen est haec bonitas, quam nunc  
 consideramus, quia talis bonitas respectu illius en-  
 60 tis cui accidit, non est intrinseca passio entis, sed  
 est quoddam accidens eius: unde non est bonitas  
 transcendentalis, sed potest dici bonitas formalis,  
 vel materialis, vel obiectiva, vel alia similis iuxta  
 varios respectus convenientiae, quos una res potest  
 ad alteram habere. Nisi forte consideretur illa boni-  
 65 tas respectu ipsiusmet rei vel formae, quae bona  
 alteri dicitur, de <331> qua iam dictum est: vel  
 respectu totius constituti per illam, quomodo est  
 intrinseca pars entitatis eius, sicut forma est intrin-  
 seca pars compositi, et dici potest quoddam bonum,  
 70 vel bonitas eius, et sic iam pertinet ad bonitatem es-  
 sentialem illius constituti ut sic. De hac ergo etiam  
 est evidens non posse addere modum intrinsecum et  
 absolutum ex natura rei distinctum ab entitate rei:  
 quia bonitas totius non est, nisi quae consurgit ex  
 75 bonitate partium: sed ostensum est, bonitatem for-  
 mae non addere aliquid intrinsecum ultra formam,  
 et consequenter nec bonitatem materiae supra ma-  
 teriam, nec bonitatem unionis supra unionem, ergo  
 nec bonitas compositi addet aliquam proprietatem  
 80 distinctam supra totam entitatem compositi ut sic.  
 Et declaratur applicando argumentum factum: nam  
 praecisa illa proprietate manent in illo composito  
 tota bonitas materiae, et formae, inter se unitae:  
 ergo et bonitas compositi. Quod si neque in ente  
 85 composito bonitas addit illum modum, neque etiam  
 in ente simplici quod ordinatur ad aliud componen-  
 dum: evidenter infertur, etiam in substantiis simpli-  
 cibus bonitatem substantialem seu essentialem vel  
 transcendentalem nihil intrinsecum addere entitati  
 90 earum, est enim eadem vel maior ratio: quia haec  
 entia sunt et simpliciora et perfectiora.

55R a mode of a thing thus affected (for example, figure), but  
 sometimes it is an entity added to another being in order to  
 perfect it (for example, science added to an intellect).

60R But this is not the goodness that we are now consider-  
 ing, since with respect to the being in which such goodness  
 happens to fall it is not an intrinsic attribute of that being.  
 Rather, it is a kind of accident of it. Hence, it is not transcen-  
 dental goodness, but rather may be called goodness that is  
 formal or material or objective or something else like that,  
 according to the various respects of agreeability that one  
 thing can have to another. Unless, perhaps, that goodness  
 65R is considered with respect to the very thing or form that is  
 said to be good for another (which was already discussed), or  
 with respect to the whole constituted through it. In the latter  
 way, goodness is an intrinsic part of its entity, just as a form  
 is an intrinsic part of the composite and can be said to be a  
 kind of good or goodness of it. Thus it already belongs to the  
 70R essential goodness of what is constituted as such.

75R Concerning this goodness, then, it is also evident that  
 it cannot add an intrinsic and absolute mode that is *ex*  
*naturae rei* distinct from the entity of the thing, since the  
 goodness of the whole is nothing other than what arises  
 from the goodness of the parts. But it was already shown  
 that the goodness of a form does not add anything intrinsic  
 beyond the form. Consequently, neither does the goodness  
 of matter add anything intrinsic beyond the matter nor the  
 80R goodness of a union anything beyond the union. Therefore,  
 neither does the goodness of the composite add any distinct  
 property beyond the whole entity of the composite as such.  
 This is shown by applying the argument already made. For,  
 prescinding from that property, the whole goodness of the  
 matter and of the form that are united to each other remains  
 in the composite. Therefore, the goodness of the composite  
 also [remains]. But if goodness does not add that mode  
 either to a composite being or even to a simple being that is  
 85R ordered to composing another being, it is obviously inferred  
 that substantial or essential or transcendental goodness  
 also does not add anything intrinsic to the entity of simple  
 90R

8. Et hinc a fortiori impugnatur opinio, quam  
 refert Soncinas 4. *Metaphysicae* q. 19. quae as- 95R  
 serebat, bonitatem hanc transcendentalem esse  
 accidens quoddam vere ac proprie pertinens ad  
 95 praedicamentum qualitatis. Quod est evidenter  
 falsum, tum quia praedicatum transcendens non  
 potest ad unum genus limitari, tum etiam quia un- 100R  
 aquaeque res per seipsam bona est, quod non solum  
 in Deo est certissimum, sed etiam in aliis entibus,  
 ex discursu facto. Nam anima verbi gratia praecise  
 ratione suae substantiae aliquid perfectionis habet, 105R  
 et bona est ac conveniens homini, et appetibilis ab  
 ipso, et idem est in quantitate, et in qualitibus  
 105 ipsis: nam in singulis speciebus est propria bonitas  
 ac perfectio, unde bonitas non constituit proprium  
 qualitatis genus, vel speciem, alioqui una qualitas  
 per aliam bona esset, quod est ridiculum: maxime  
 cum eadem qualitas possit esse bona uni, et mala  
 110 alteri.

*Bonitas absolute non consistit in perfectione reali en-  
 tis.*

9. Est ergo quarta sententia, bonitatem nihil aliud  
 dicere, quam intrinsecam rei per- <col. b> fec-  
 tionem quae absoluta est in absolutis, et relativa  
 in relativis. Unde fieri videtur consequens, bonum  
 5 nihil aliud esse quam ipsum ens, quatenus in se  
 aliquid perfectionis habet. Haec opinio tribuitur  
 Hervaeo *Quodlibet* 3. q. 2. ibi tamen magis sentit  
 bonitatem dicere entitatem, quatenus est perfectiva  
 alterius, seu quatenus ad alterius perfectionem or-  
 10 dinatur, quam ut in se habet perfectionem aliquam,  
 de quo sensu infra dicam. Aliter ergo potest expli-  
 cari haec opinio, quod bonitas uniuscuiusque rei sit  
 illa perfectio, qua unaquaeque res in sua entitate

substances. In fact, the argument is as strong or stronger  
 [in this case], since these beings are both more simple and  
 more perfect.

8. From here the opinion to which Soncinas refers in  
*Metaphysics* IV, q. 19—which asserts that this transcenden-  
 tal goodness is a certain accident that truly and properly  
 belongs to the category of quality—is *a fortiori* challenged.  
 That view is evidently false, both because a transcendental  
 predicate cannot be limited to one genus and because each  
 thing is good through itself. This is not only most certain  
 in the case of God but also in the case of other beings from  
 the reasoning given. A soul, for example, precisely by rea-  
 son of its substance, has something of perfection and is  
 good and is agreeable for and desirable to a human being.  
 The same is true with quantity and with the qualities them-  
 selves. For there is a proper goodness and perfection in  
 each species. Hence, goodness does not constitute a proper  
 genus or species of quality. Otherwise, one quality would be  
 good through another quality, which is laughable, especially  
 since the same quality can be good for one thing and bad for  
 another.

*Goodness absolutely does not consist in a real perfection of  
 being.*

9. There is, then, the fourth view that goodness expresses  
 nothing other than the intrinsic perfection of a thing, a  
 perfection that is absolute in absolute things and relative  
 in relative things. From this it seems to follow that good is  
 nothing other than the being itself insofar as it has something  
 5R of perfection in itself. This opinion is attributed to Hervaeus  
 in *Quodlibets* III, q. 2. Nevertheless, in that [text] he thinks  
 that goodness expresses entity insofar as it is perfective of  
 something else or insofar as it is ordered to the perfection  
 10R of something else rather than that it has some perfection in  
 itself. I shall talk about this sense below.

This opinion can also be explained in a different way: the  
 goodness of each thing is that perfection by which each thing

perfecta est: unde si sit ens simpliciter, erit in se  
 15 habens tantam perfectionem, ratione cuius in se  
 etiam erit quoddam bonum: si vero sit ens secun-  
 dum quid, seu entis ens, ut pars totius, vel accidens  
 subiecti, sic erit bonum illius, cuius est ens, et ra-  
 20 tione perfectionis entitativae, quam habet, dicitur  
 in se quoddam bonum: ea vero ratione, qua illa  
 perfectio, vel instituta est, vel apta ad perficiendum  
 aliud, dicitur bonum alterius. Unde, sicut acci-  
 dens eadem entitate est in se ens, et ens alterius,  
 25 ita eadem perfectione est in se, id est, intrinsece  
 quoddam bonum, et bonum alterius. Sic ergo recte  
 intelligitur et explicatur, bonitatem in unaquaque  
 re, nihil esse praeter uniuscuiusque perfectionem.

10. Probatio autem huius sententiae sic ex-  
 positae imprimis sumi potest ex dictis, a sufficienti  
 30 enumeratione: quia bonitas non est relatio ratio-  
 nis nec realis, neque absolutum quid additum enti:  
 nihil ergo aliud superest, quod esse possit nisi rei  
 perfectio. Deinde, quia bonum et perfectum idem  
 sunt, ut docet D. Thomas 1. p. q. 5. art. 1. 3. et  
 35 5. et infra declarabimus: ergo et bonitas et per-  
 fectio sunt idem: nam bonum et perfectum non  
 materialiter tantum, sed formaliter idem sunt: quia  
 unumquodque in tantum bonum est, in quantum  
 est perfectum. Denique hoc modo facile concipi et  
 40 declarari potest ratio bonitatis, et nulla ratio est,  
 quae cogat ad aliquid aliud addendum, neque quid  
 illud sit, facile potest explicari, vel intelligi, ergo  
 signum est in hoc consistere rationem bonitatis.

11. Sed licet haec sententia videatur per se fa-  
 45 cilis ac perspicua, et magna ex parte rem declaret,  
 non tamen omnino, et ideo aliquid aliud addere  
 oportet, propter duo. Primo, quia iuxta hanc expo-  
 sitionem, bonum non est passio entis realis, sed  
 essentia eius. Unde bonum et ens potius tamquam  
 50R

is perfect in its own entity. Hence, if it is a being *simpliciter*,  
 it will hold in itself such perfection by reason of which it will  
 in itself also be a kind of good. But if it is a being *secundum*  
*quid* or a being of a being, either as a part of a whole or as  
 an accident of a subject, then it will be the good of that for  
 which it is a being. By reason of the entitative perfection that  
 20R it has, it will be called a kind of good in itself. But by reason  
 of the fact that this perfection is either instituted for or apt  
 to perfect something else, it will be called good for another.  
 Hence, just as an accident by the same entity is a being in  
 itself and a being of another, so also by the same perfection  
 25R it is a kind of intrinsic good or good in itself and also the  
 good of another. In this way, then, it is rightly understood  
 and explained that the goodness in each thing is nothing  
 other than the perfection of each thing.

10. Moreover, the proof for this view explained in this  
 way can in the first place be taken from what was said by a  
 sufficient enumeration. For goodness is neither a relation,  
 whether conceptual or real, nor something absolute that is  
 added to being. Nothing, then, is left for it to be other than  
 the perfection of the thing. Furthermore, since the good  
 and the perfect are the same—as St. Thomas teaches in *ST*  
 Ia.5.1, 3, and 5, and as we will show below<sup>8</sup>—goodness and  
 perfection, therefore, are also the same. For the good and the  
 perfect are not only materially but also formally the same,  
 since any given thing is good to the same degree that it is  
 perfect. Finally, in this way the *ratio* of goodness can easily  
 be conceived and explained. And there is no reason that  
 compels adding anything further, nor can one easily explain  
 or understand what that would be. This is a sign, then, that  
 the *ratio* of goodness consists in this.

11. Yet, although this view may in itself seem easy and  
 perspicuous and may seem to explain the matter for the  
 most part, it does not, however, entirely [explain the matter]  
 and so it is necessary to add something further for two  
 reasons. First, because according to this exposition, good is  
 not an attribute of real being but is its essence. As a result,

<sup>8</sup>See n. 15.



20 mam sententiam, optime salvantur posita praedicta  
 connotatione: nam illa sufficit ut sit nonnulla dis-  
 tinctio rationis fundata in rebus inter bonum et  
 25 ens, ut sic possit bonum attribui enti tamquam  
 proprietas, et non esse synonymum cum illo: quia  
 formaliter aliud est esse seu habere entitatem, al-  
 iud vero ratione entitatis habere semper aliquam  
 convenientiam, quam ratio boni declarat. Deinde  
 hoc satis est, ut eadem res, retinens eandem per-  
 fectionem, sit bona uni, et mala alteri: nam cum  
 30 dicitur bona uni, praeter perfectionem eius, quae  
 bona dicitur, connotatur in altera cui bona dicitur,  
 inclinatio seu capacitas connaturalis alterius, in  
 alia vero cui mala dicitur, connotatur carentia talis  
 capacitatis, seu inclinationis, vel potius contraria  
 35 inclinatio: ergo hoc modo salvantur omnia, quae in  
 bonitate inveniuntur absque <col. b> alia relatione  
 adiuncta, ut in simili dictum etiam est de veritate.  
 Tandem hoc potest declarari inductione in omnibus  
 bonis: nam bonum honestum ex omnium sententia  
 dicit bonum quod per se est conveniens naturae ra-  
 40 tionali ut sic, bonum item delectabile nihil aliud est,  
 quam bonum habens convenientiam cum natura  
 sensibili, ut Caietanus late tractat 1.2. q. 32. art.  
 1. explicans quomodo id non sit relatio, sed ipsa  
 res ut accommodata tali naturae, quod nihil aliud  
 45 dicere potest, quam mutuam rerum connexionem,  
 et fundamentalem proportionem: idemque reperitur  
 suo modo in bono utili, quod solum dicit bonum  
 aptum et accommodatum ad finem intentum. Recte  
 50 igitur convenientia, quam dicit bonum, praedicto  
 modo declaratur.

Obiectio.

13. Una tantum superest difficultas, quia hoc  
 modo non adaequate, sed tantum ex parte ratio  
 boni explicatur: nam, ut supra dicebam, bonum  
 dupliciter de rebus dici solet, scilicet vel quia res  
 55 in se bona est, vel quia est bona alteri, quae di-  
 visio sumpta est ex Augustino 8. *De Trinitate* cap.

Augustinus.  
D. Thomas.

20R are best resolved through the positing of the aforementioned  
 connotation. For it is sufficient for there to be some distinc-  
 tion of reason founded in reality between good and being in  
 such a way that good can be attributed to being as a property  
 without being synonymous with it. Formally it is one thing  
 25R to be or to have entity, but another thing always in virtue  
 of entity to have some agreeability on account of which the  
*ratio* of good is shown. Furthermore, this is sufficient for  
 the same thing, retaining the same perfection, to be good for  
 one thing and bad for another. For when a thing, beyond  
 its perfection that is said to be good, is said to be good for  
 30R one thing, there is connoted in the other thing for which it  
 is said to be good a connatural inclination or capacity for  
 something else. But in the other thing for which it is said  
 to be bad, there is connoted the absence of such a capacity  
 or inclination, or, rather, a contrary inclination. In this way,  
 35R therefore, all the things that are found in goodness apart  
 from any adjoining relation are saved, just as was also said  
 about truth.

Finally, this can also be shown by induction from every  
 [kind of] good. For good that in itself is agreeable to rational  
 nature as such is called the fine (*bonum honestum*), accord-  
 40R ing to everyone's view. Likewise, pleasurable good is nothing  
 other than good having agreeability with sensible nature, as  
 Cajetan discusses more widely in *ST IaIIae.32.1*, explain-  
 ing how that is not a relation but the very thing itself as  
 accommodated to such a nature, which can express nothing  
 other than a mutual connection of things and a fundamental  
 proportion. The same thing is found in its way in the case of  
 useful good, which the good that is apt and accommodated  
 to an intended end is called. Therefore, the agreeability that  
 45R good expresses is rightly explained in the stated way.

13. Just one difficulty remains: for in this way the *ratio*  
 of good is explained only partially, not adequately. For, as I  
 said above, good is customarily said of things in two ways:  
 namely, because the thing is good in itself or because it is  
 good for another. This division is taken from Augustine, *On*  
 50R *the Trinity* VIII, ch. 3, and from St. Thomas, II, dist. 27, q.

Objection.

Augustine.  
St. Thomas.

3. et ex D. Thoma in 2. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 2. ad  
 1. et q. 1. *De virtutibus* art. 2. ad 1. et 1.2. q. 26.  
 art. 4. Ubi etiam addit id quod in se bonum est,  
 60 esse absolute et simpliciter bonum: quod autem est  
 bonum alteri, tantum est bonum secundum quid.  
 Quo sensu dicere solet idem D. Thomas accidens  
 non esse bonum ut habens bonitatem, sed quia  
 cedit in bonitatem subiecti, ut videre licet in 3. p.  
 65 q. 11. art. 5. ad 3. Et 1.2. q. 55. art. 4. ad 1. dicit  
 virtutes, non tam esse bona quaedam, quam boni-  
 tates quasdam, quod dictum est, non quia in se non  
 habeant perfectionem, sed quia eam habent accom-  
 modatam ad perficiendum aliud. Sicut accidentia  
 70 dicuntur esse entis entia potius, quam entia, quia  
 tantum habet unaquaeque res de bonitate, quan-  
 tum habet de esse, ut idem D. Thomas ait 1.2. q.  
 18. art. 1. Eadem distinctionem boni secundum  
 se, seu respectu alterius habet Scotus *Quodlibet* 18.  
 75 At vero praedicta ratio boni, ut a nobis explicata est,  
 solum convenit rei, ut dicitur bonum alterius: sub  
 hac enim ratione optime explicatur, quod rem esse  
 bonam dicat perfectionem talis rei, connotando in  
 altera capacitatem, inclinationem, vel aliam similem  
 80 connexionem: hoc autem non potest convenire illi  
 bonitati, qua res dicitur in se bona, quia haec boni-  
 tas omnino absolute dicitur, et absque ullo respectu  
 ad aliud, etiam fundamentali seu secundum dici:  
 ergo illo modo <333> non explicatur adaequata,  
 85 nec praecipua ratio boni.

1. Responsio.

14. Ad hanc difficultatem responderi potest  
 primo, nos hic describere bonitatem, quae est pas-  
 sio entis: bonum autem solum esse passionem entis  
 prout dicit convenientiam ad alterum seu prout est  
 90 bonum alteri: hoc enim modo distinguitur bonum  
 aliquo modo ab ente, et convenit omni enti, etiam  
 perfectissimo: Deus enim, qui summe bonus est,  
 etiam est bonum aliorum: nam Deus clare visus est

1, art. 2, ad 1, *On the Virtues* q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, and *ST*  
 IaIIae.26.4, where he also adds that the good in itself is  
 good absolutely and without qualification, but the good for  
 another is only good with qualification. In same sense, St.  
 Thomas usually says that an accident is not good insofar as  
 it has goodness but because it yields goodness to the subject,  
 as may be seen in *ST* III.11.5 ad 3. And in *ST* IaIIae.55.4  
 ad 1, he says that the virtues are not so much certain goods  
 as certain goodnesses. This was said not because they do  
 not have perfection in themselves, but because that have it  
 accommodated in order to perfect something else. [This is]  
 just like accidents being called beings of beings rather than  
 beings, because any given thing only has goodness insofar as  
 it has being, as the same St. Thomas says in *ST* IaIIae.18.1.  
 Scotus makes the same distinction between good according  
 to itself and good with respect to another in *Quodlibet* 18.

On the other hand, the aforementioned *ratio* of goodness  
 as explained by us only applies to a thing insofar as it is  
 said to be good for another. For that a thing's being good  
 expresses a perfection of such a thing connoting a capacity,  
 inclination or some other similar connection to another thing  
 is best explained under this *ratio*. But this cannot apply to  
 that goodness by which a thing is said to be good in itself,  
 since this goodness is said completely absolutely and without  
 any respect to something else, even a respect according to  
 being said or [only] in foundation. Therefore, neither the  
 adequate nor the principal *ratio* of good can be explained in  
 this way.

14. To this difficulty can be responded, first, that we  
 are describing here the goodness that is an attribute of  
 being. But good can only be an attribute of being insofar  
 as it expresses agreeability to another thing or insofar as  
 it is good for something else. For in this way good is in  
 some way distinguished from being and [yet] applies to every  
 being, even the most perfect being. For God, who is the  
 highest good, is also the good for other things. For God

1st response.

95 summum bonum obiectivum creaturae rationalis, et  
 Verbum Divinum est maximum bonum humanitatis  
 Christi. Bonum autem absolute sumptum, scilicet, 95R  
 prout est bonum in se, non videtur pertinere ad pas-  
 sionem entis, sed potius ad essentiam seu entitatem  
 eius, ut supra argumentabar, quia bonum hoc modo  
 100 idem est, quod perfectum, ut D. Thomas saepe dicit  
 1. p. q. 5. perfectum autem includitur in essentiali 100R  
 conceptu entis realis, quia non potest concipi ens  
 cum entitate, quin concipiatur cum perfectione es-  
 sentiali. Tum quia ipsum esse est perfectio, tum  
 105 etiam, quia perfectio essentialis convenit enti per  
 se primo, et in hoc differt a perfectione acciden- 105R  
 tali sive sit extrinseca, sive intrinseca ad modum  
 propriae passionis. Unde per hanc perfectionem  
 essentialem unaquaeque res constituitur in certo  
 110 gradu entis, et per eandem inter se distinguuntur  
 et ordinantur entia. Sic enim (ut supra dicebamus) 110R  
 primo distinguitur ens in infinitum et finitum se-  
 cundum perfectionem essentialem: ergo huiusmodi  
 perfectio essentialis non addit aliquid supra ens et  
 115 essentialiam: ergo bonum sub hac ratione non vide-  
 tur proprie esse passio entis, sed ipsum ens. Et 115R  
 hoc modo dixit Scotus *Quodlibet* 6. magnitudinem  
 perfectionis essentialis non esse aliud ab essen-  
 tia, etiam in creaturis. Quod caeteri omnes docent.  
 120 Et potest hoc a simili explicari ex his quae supra  
 dicebamus de veritate, scilicet, quod quatenus dicit 120R  
 absolutam rationem verae entitatis, id est, non fic-  
 tae, sed ratae, ut sic non dicit passionem entis, sed  
 declarat solum ipsam realis entis rationem, ideoque  
 125 solum est passio ut connotat aliquo modo conveni-  
 entiam ad intellectum: sic ergo videtur dicendum 125R  
 de bono, servata proportione.

Quomodo  
bonum et  
perfectum  
comparentur.

15. Quae responsio fiet verisimilior, si exacte  
intelligatur, quomodo se habeant ratio boni, et ra-

95 bonum] *om.* V.

having been seen clearly is the highest objective good of rational creatures and the divine Word is the greatest good for Christ's humanity.

Moreover, good taken absolutely—that is, insofar as it is good in itself—does not seem to pertain to the attribute of being but rather to the its essence or entity, as was argued earlier. For the good in this way is the same as the perfect, as St. Thomas often says in *ST* Ia.5. But the perfect is included in the essential concept of real being, since a being cannot be conceived with entity without conceiving it with essential perfection. [This is so] not only because to be is itself a perfection, but also because essential perfection applies to being primarily through itself. In this it differs from accidental perfection, whether it be extrinsic or intrinsic in the matter of a proper attribute.

Hence, through this essential perfection each thing is constituted in a certain grade of being. The beings are distinguished from each other and ordered to each other through the same [essential perfection]. For in this way, as I was saying above, being is first divided into infinite and finite being according to essential perfection. Therefore, essential perfection of this kind does not add anything beyond being and essence. Therefore, good under this *ratio* does not seem properly to be an attribute of beings or being itself. In this way, Scotus says in *Quodlibet* 6 that the greatness of essential perfection cannot be anything other than essence even in created things. All the others teach this [as well].

This can be explained similarly from the things we said above concerning truth: namely, that insofar as it expresses an absolute *ratio* of true being—that is not as constructed but as reckoned—as such it does not express an attribute of being. Rather it shows only the very *ratio* of real being. For this reason, truth is only an attribute insofar as it in some way connotes an agreeability to intellect. It seems that the same should be said about good, preserving proportion.

15. This response will be made truer if it is understood precisely how the *ratio* of good and the *ratio* of perfect are

How the good  
and the  
perfect are  
related.

130 tio perfecti: dicit enim Aristoteles 5. lib. *Metaphys-* 130R  
*icae* cap. 16. *perfectum dici, extra quod non* <col.  
*b> est ullam partem accipere, seu cui nihil deest.*  
 Quo sensu non omne bonum perfectum est, ut per  
 se constat, neque etiam omne ens est perfectum,  
 135 licet sit bonum: puer enim ens est et homo, non- 135R  
 dum tamen perfectus: et homo habens perfectam  
 quantitatem, non vero qualitates, vel habitus suae  
 naturae consentaneos, licet bonus aliquo modo sit,  
 non tamen perfectus. Hoc ergo sensu perfectum  
 140 dicitur non quodcumque bonum, sed illud quod 140R  
 omni ex parte consummatum est, quod est sim-  
 pliciter bonum. Alio tamen modo potest perfectum  
 dici quidquid sub aliqua ratione entis, habet per-  
 fectionem simpliciter necessariam et essentialem,  
 145 quomodo puer potest dici perfectus homo quoad 145R  
 essentiam, et similiter dicunt Theologi charitatem  
 remissam, licet dicatur imperfecta respectu inten-  
 sae, tamen simpliciter et quoad essentiam esse per-  
 fectam, quomodo ait Ioannes 1. Canon. cap. 2: *Qui*  
 150 *servat verbum eius, vere in hoc charitas Dei perfecta* 150R  
*est.* Atque hoc modo bonum et perfectum conver-  
 tuntur, immo sunt omnino idem prout bonum dicit  
 id, quod in se bonum est, seu quod habet boni-  
 tatem, id est perfectionem sibi debitam: hoc autem  
 155 nihil aliud est, quam habere essentiam vel enti- 155R  
 tatem sibi debitam: igitur bonum sub hac ratione  
 nihil aliud essentialiter, ac formaliter dicit, quam  
 ens, esse enim charitatem perfectam dicto modo, ni-  
 hil aliud revera est, quam esse charitatem, et sic de  
 160 aliis. Immo etiam esse perfectum priori modo, seu 160R  
 bonum simpliciter, nihil aliud est, quam esse ens  
 habens totam entitatem, quae ad complementum  
 eius requiritur.

16. Et hoc modo intelligendus est D. Thomas  
 165 cum dicere solet (ut videre licet 1. p. q. 5. art. 1. ad  
 1.) aliter inter se comparari in creaturis ens sim-  
 pliciter et secundum quid, quam bonum simpliciter

relate to each other. For Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 16 that ‘that is called perfect outside of which there is no part or that which lacks nothing’. In this sense not every good is perfect, as is evident in itself, nor is every being perfect even if it is good. For a boy is being and a man, but not yet perfect. A man who has perfect quantity but does not have the qualities or habits suitable to his nature, although he may be good in some way, is, nevertheless, not perfect. In this sense, then, not just any good is called perfect, but only the good that is completed in every way. This is the good *simpliciter*.

Nevertheless, in another way anything can be said to be perfect which under some *ratio* of being has the necessary and essential perfection, in the way that a boy can be said to be a perfect man with respect to essence. Likewise theologians say that although remiss charity may be called imperfect with respect to intensity, it is, nevertheless, perfect speaking strictly and with respect to its essence. As John says in 1 John 2[:5]: ‘In him who keeps his word, the charity of God is truly perfected in him.’ And in this way good and perfect are convertible. Indeed, they are entirely the same insofar as good expresses that which is good in itself or which has goodness, that is, which has the perfection it ought to have. But this is nothing other than to have the essence or entity that it ought to have. Therefore, good under this *ratio* essentially and formally expresses nothing other than being. For to be perfect charity in the stated way really is nothing other than to be charity. Likewise for the other cases. In fact, to be perfect in the former way or to be good *simpliciter* is nothing other than to be a being having the whole entity required for its fulfillment.

16. This is the way that St. Thomas should be understood when he usually says (as may be seen in *ST* I.5.1 ad 1) that being *simpliciter* and being *secundum quid* are related differently in created things than good *simpliciter* and

et secundum quid: nam res habet, quod sit ens simpliciter per esse substantiale, secundum quid vero  
 170 per esse accidentale: habet autem quod sit bona secundum quid per esse substantiale, simpliciter autem per esse accidentale. Hoc tamen ultimum intelligendum est non praecise de esse accidentali,  
 175 sed ut coniuncto esse substantiali: non esset enim bonus homo per accidentales virtutes, nisi supponeretur homo, et consequenter substantialiter, et naturaliter bonus. Unde in illis vocibus *secundum quid*, et *simpliciter*, videtur esse aequivocatio: nam  
 180 cum dicuntur de ente, videntur dici de substantia et accidente praecise comparatis, cum <334> autem dicuntur de bono, dicuntur de substantia creata aut solitarie sumpta, aut ut affecta dispositionibus, et facultatibus sibi connaturalibus. Quo fit, ut licet  
 185 in modo loquendi sit diversitas, in re tamen nulla videatur esse differentia, quia etiam bonitas, vel perfectio, quam confert accidens, si praecise comparetur ad eam bonitatem, quam confert substantia, est secundum quid. Sic enim in universum verum est,  
 190 quod ex D. Thoma supra retulimus, unumquodque quantum habet de esse, tantum habere de bonitate, et quod etiam retulimus ex Augustino, quod in quantum sumus, boni sumus.

17 [16b].<sup>9</sup> Atque ita tandem fit, quod bonum absolute dictum nihil aliud sit, quam ens ipsum, quo  
 195 modo dicuntur res naturaliter bonae, vel perfectae, si in sua entitate sint consummatae, et homo dicitur moraliter bonus, si habeat morales virtutes seu perfectiones, quae non sunt, nisi reales quaedam formae et entitates: sic etiam Deus dicitur summe  
 200 bonus et perfectus ratione suae entitatis, etiamsi ad nihil aliud comparetur, et sic de aliis. Haec igitur doctrina et responsio hoc modo exposita probabilis est, et claritatem ac facilitatem quamdam prae se

good *secundum quid*. For a thing has that it is a being *simpliciter* through substantial being, but being *secundum quid* through accidental being. A thing is good *secundum quid*, however, through substantial being, but good *simpliciter* through accidental being. But this last claim should be understood not precisely of accidental being but of accidental being conjoined to substantial being. For a human being would not be good through accidental virtues unless presupposed to be a human being and consequently substantially and naturally good. Hence, there seems to be an equivocation in these words '*secundum quid*' and '*simpliciter*'. For when they are said of being they seem to be said about the substance and of accident compared precisely, but when they are said of good they are said about the created substance either taken alone or as affected by dispositions and faculties connatural to it. The result is that although there is a difference in the way of speaking, in reality, however, there seems to be no difference, because even the goodness or perfection that an accident confers is *secundum quid* if compared precisely to the goodness that a substance confers. In this way what we quoted from St. Thomas above is generally true: that each thing has goodness to the extent that it has being. And what we quoted Augustine—that we are good insofar as we are—is also true.

17. And so it also follows that good said absolutely is nothing other than the being itself. This is the way in which things that are fulfilled in their entity are called naturally good or perfect, and a human being who has the moral virtues or perfections (which are nothing by certain real forms and entities) is called morally good. Likewise, even God is called supremely good and perfect by reason of his own entity, even if related to nothing else. And the same is true in other cases. This doctrine and response explained in this way, then is probable and shows a certain clarity and facility, as Henry of Ghent indicated in the place cited above.

<sup>9</sup>From this point on the paragraph numbering diverges between the first edition and the Vivès edition. Numbers in square brackets indicate the numbering from the 1597 first edition.

fert, eamque indicavit Henricus in loco supra citato.  
 205 18 [17]. Verumtamen propter usum vocum 200R  
 potest adhiberi alia responsio. Nam licet prior in  
 hoc habeat verum, quod bonum sub ea ratione in  
 re non differt ab ente, nihilominus possunt ratione  
 distingui, quod satis est ut bonum assignetur ut  
 210 proprietatis entis, ad modum aliorum transcenden- 205R  
 tium. Est itaque quoad impositionem, vel signifi-  
 cationem nominis advertendum, ens solum dici ab  
 esse aut entitate ut supra exposuimus, perfectum  
 autem clarius exprimere entis perfectionem: in quo  
 215 negationem quamdam includit, vel saltem sine illa 210R  
 non potest a nobis eius significatum explicari, scilicet,  
 quod nihil ei desit secundum eam rationem  
 secundum quam perfectum dicitur. Bonum vero  
 dicere convenientiam aliquam ratione cuius habet  
 220 res quod appetibilis sit: nam bonum per ordinem 215R  
 aliquem ad appetitum dictum est, ut D. Thomas  
 docuit 1. p. q. 5. art. 1. ex illo Aristotele 1. *Ethico-*  
*rum: Bonum est, quod omnia appetunt*, et statim  
 225 quae absolutae et secundum se dicuntur bonae, sic 220R  
 denominari: quia habent perfectionem sibi conve-  
 nientem et appetibilem, et ita etiam fit, ut bonum  
 hoc modo de formali significet perfectionem exis-  
 <col. b> tentem in tali re, connotando in eadem  
 230 re capacitatem, inclinationem, seu naturalem con- 225R  
 nexionem cum tali perfectione. Quod clarius patet,  
 quando talis perfectio est distincta ab ipsa re, quae  
 ab illa bona denominatur; nam quando homo dicitur  
 bonus ratione virtutis, de formali significatur virtus,  
 235 non utcumque sed ut bonitas quaedam, in quo im- 230R  
 portatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam  
 convenientia, quam habet cum humana natura con-  
 notando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem, vel  
 propensionem ad talem perfectionem. In his vero re-  
 240 bus, in quibus non est distinctio inter perfectionem, 235R

18. Nevertheless, another response can be given on account of the use of the word. For, although the previous answer is true in that good under this *ratio* does not differ from being, nevertheless, they can be distinguished conceptually. That is enough for good to be assigned as a property of being in the way of the other transcendentals. For this reason, it should be noted that with respect to the imposition or signification of the name, being is only said from being or entity, as we explained above. Perfect, however, more clearly expresses the perfection of being, in which a certain negation is included or at least we cannot explain without that what it signifies, namely, that that [the perfect thing] lacks nothing with respect to that *ratio* according to which it is said to be perfect. But good expresses some agreeability by reason of which the thing is desirable. For the good is so-called through some relation to appetite, as St. Thomas taught in *ST Ia.5.1*, following Aristotle in *NE I*: ‘the good is what all desire.’ (This will be explained in more detail shortly.<sup>13</sup>) Hence, it is necessary that things—even those which are called good absolutely and according to themselves—be denominated good because they have the perfection agreeable and desirable to themselves. As a result it also happens that good in this way formally signifies an existing perfection in such a thing, connoting in the same thing a capacity, inclination, or natural connection to such perfection.

This is more clearly evident when such a perfection is distinct from the thing itself that is denominated good through that perfection. For when a human being is called good by reason of virtue, virtue is not formally signified in any other way than as a certain goodness that includes not only the perfection of virtue but also the agreeability that it has to human nature, connoting on the part of the nature itself a capacity or propensity to such perfection. But in those things in which there is no distinction between the perfection and the thing which is called perfect, it seems to be more difficult to explain this agreeability or connotation. Nevertheless, it

<sup>13</sup>In mn. 19–21.

et rem quae perfecta dicitur, difficilius videtur explicari haec convenientia, vel connotatio: dicendum est tamen, quamvis in re non sit distinctio, a nobis tamen concipi ac significari ad modum distincto-  
 245 rum, id est, per modum formae denominantis, et rei denominatae, et ideo significari illam formam ut perfectionem accommodatam ei, in quo existit, in quo computatur naturalis connexio eius cum tali forma, et ita distingui tale bonum ab ente, saltem  
 250 ratione.

*Bonum et appetibile quomodo comparentur.*

19 [18]. Ex his, quae de ratione boni dicta sunt, intelligere licet, quomodo se habeant bonum, et appetibile. Aliqui enim existimant, idem formaliter et synonyme his vocibus significari, et consequenter aiunt, bonum supra ens addere respectum ad appetibile: quibus favere videtur D. Thomas dicta q. 5. 1. dicens, *Ratio boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile*, et art. 3. ad 1. dicit expresse, *Bonum non addit aliquid supra ens, sed rationem tantum appetibilis*, et art. 4. ad 1. *Bonum* (inquit) *respicit appetitum*. Similia habet 1. p. q. 16. art. 1. et 3. et lib. 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 4. rat. 3. favet Aristoteles 1. *Ethicorum* cap. 1. definiens, *Bonum esse quod omnia appetunt*. Et potest confirmari sumpto proportionali argumento ex his, quae de  
 5 vero dicta sunt: nam ita comparatur bonum ad appetitum, sicut verum ad intellectum, sed verum non addit supra ens nisi conformitatem ad intellectum: ergo bonum non addit nisi convenientiam ad appetitum. Alii distinguunt inter bonum et appetibile, ut  
 10 Caietanus 1. p. q. 5. art. 1. ubi ait, appetibile sumi dupliciter, scilicet fundamentaliter et formaliter. Priori modo ait esse idem bonum et appetibile, et ita exponit D. Thomam ibi, nam proxima ratio ob quam

should be said that although the perfection is not distinct in reality, we, however, conceive and signify it in the way we do distinct things, that is, in the way of a denominating form and a denominated thing. For this reason, that form is signified as a perfection accommodated to the thing in which it exists, in which a natural connection between it and such a form is reckoned. In this way, such good is distinguished from being, at least conceptually.

*How the good and the desirable are related.*

19. From the things that have been said about the *ratio* of good, one may understand how the good and the desirable are related. For some think that the same thing is formally and synonymously signified by these words and they say, consequently, that good adds to being a respect to the desirable. St. Thomas seems to favour these claims in the already mentioned *ST* Ia.5.1, saying: ‘the *ratio* of good consists in this, that something be desirable’. And in art. 3, ad 1, he says explicitly: ‘good does not add anything to being except a *ratio* of desirable’. And in art. 4, ad 1, he says: ‘good looks to desire’. He holds similar views in *ST* Ia.16.1 and 3 and in *SCG* I, ch. 4, arg. 3. Aristotle favours [this view] in *NE* 1, ch. 1, where he defines ‘good to be what all desire’.

Moreover, this can be confirmed by proportionally applying an argument from what was said about the true. For good is related to appetite in the same way that the true is related to the intellect. But true does not add anything to being except a conformity to intellect. Therefore, good does not add anything except an agreeability to appetite.

Others distinguish between the good and the desirable, as Cajetan does in *ST* I.5.1, where he says that desirable is taken in two ways: namely, fundamentally and formally. Taken in the former way, he says that the good and the desirable are the same, and he explains St. Thomas here

25 res habet ut possit movere ap- <335> petitem, est  
 25R bonitas eius, quam habet respectu appetentis, in  
 qua includitur non sola entitas, et perfectio rei se-  
 30 cundum se, sed prout habet aliquam convenientiam  
 cum appetente. Posteriori autem modo dicit dis-  
 30R tinguui bonum ab appetibili saltem ratione seu de-  
 nominatione, quia appetibile ut sic importat respec-  
 tum ad appetitum, et denominationem extrinsecam  
 provenientem ab illo, seu consurgentem ex conve-  
 35 nientia et proportione inter bonum et appetitum:  
 aliquid ergo formaliter explicat appetibile, quod non  
 35R dicit bonum ut sic, ratione cuius haec causalis vera  
 est, quia res est bona, ideo est appetibilis, sicut  
 haec etiam causalis est vera, quia res est lucida et  
 40 colorata, ideo est visibilis: ita enim comparatur ap-  
 petibile ad bonum, sicut visibile ad lucidum. Unde  
 D. Thomas 1. *Ethicorum* cap. 1. declarans illam  
 descriptionem Aristotelis, *Bonum est, quod omnia*  
*appetunt*, ait sumptam esse a posteriori: quia ratio  
 appetibilis posterior est, quam ratio boni. Et haec  
 45 sententia vera est, quam prius docuerat Capreolus  
 in 2. dist. 2. q. 3. Et postea Ferrariensis 1. *Summae*  
*contra gentiles* cap. 3.

Discrimen  
inter bonum et  
verum.

20 [19]. Ex quo intelligitur, aliter comparari  
 bonum ad appetitum, quam verum ad intellectum:  
 50 nam verum transcendens (de hoc enim loquimur) in-  
 cludit in sua ratione et denominatione aliquam con-  
 formitatem ad intellectum, bonum autem formaliter  
 in ratione et denominatione sua non includit confor-  
 mitatem ad appetitum, quamvis haec ad rationem  
 55 boni consequatur. Unde ratio veri transcendentis  
 non supponitur proprie in obiecto, ut formaliter at-  
 tingatur ab intellectu, sed est denominatio sumpta  
 ex proportione vel conformitate inter ipsum obiec-  
 tum et potentiam seu actum eius, et ideo dici solet  
 60 illa veritas conditio consequens vel concomitans  
 obiectum intellectus, potius quam formaliter illud

25R in this way. For the immediate *ratio* on account of which a  
 thing can move appetite is its goodness, which it has with  
 respect to what desires. In this is included not only the entity  
 and perfection of the thing in itself, but also as having some  
 agreeability with what desires. But taken in the second way,  
 30R he says that the good can be distinguished from the desirable  
 at least conceptually or by denomination, because the desir-  
 able as such brings in a respect to appetite and an extrinsic  
 denomination arising from it or arising from the agreeability  
 and proportion between the good and the appetite. Therefore,  
 35R the desirable formally explains something that good as such  
 does not express, by reason of which this causal claim—a  
 thing is desirable because it is good—is true, just as this  
 causal claim—a thing is visible because it is illuminated and  
 coloured—is also true. For the desirable is related to the  
 40R good just as the visible is related to the illuminated. Hence,  
 when St. Thomas comments on Aristotle’s description in *NE*  
 I, ch. 1, that ‘good is what all desire’, he says that it is taken  
*a posteriori*, because the *ratio* of desirable is posterior to the  
*ratio* of good. And this view is true. It has also been taught  
 45R earlier by Capreolus in II, dist. 2, q. 3, and later by Ferrara,  
 in *SCG* I, ch. 3.

20. From this it is understood that the good is related  
 differently to appetite than the true to intellect. For the  
 transcendent true (for this is what we are talking about)  
 50R includes in its *ratio* and denomination a certain conformity  
 to the intellect. But the good does not formally include in its  
*ratio* and denomination a conformity to appetite, although  
 this may follow from the *ratio* of good. Hence, the *ratio* of  
 the transcendental true is not properly presupposed in the  
 55R object as formally attained by the intellect, but is a denomi-  
 nation taken from the proportion or conformity between the  
 object itself and its power or act. For this reason, truth is  
 usually said to be a condition that follows or accompanies  
 the object of the intellect, rather than a condition formally  
 60R constituting it. But goodness is presupposed in the object of

A difference  
between the  
good and the  
true.

constituens, bonitas autem supponitur in obiecto appetitus, et est ratio formalis attingendi illud: appetibilitas autem dicit denominationem sumptam ex  
 65 proportione talis obiecti cum tali potentia: unde non dicit formalem rationem obiecti, sed conditionem concomitantem. 65R

*Quomodo se habeat bonum ad rationem finis.*

21 [2.pr.].<sup>14</sup> Ex his etiam constat, quomodo ratio finis ad bonum comparetur. Ait enim D. Thomas 1. p. q. 5. art. 2. ad 1. bonum, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importare habitudinem causae finalis. Et  
 5 in eodem sensu ait 1. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 38. rat. 3. Bonum habere rationem finis, eo scilicet modo quo habet rationem appetibilis. Etenim si formaliter sumatur habitudo, ac denominatio finis, illa non est de ratione boni, sed ad illam  
 10 consequi potest. Nam finis ut sic dicit rationem causae in ordine ad media, vel ad aliquam actionem quae propter finem fiat: quam habitudinem non dicit bonum, sed solam rationem convenientis. Si  
 15 autem sumatur finis fundamentaliter, sic attribuitur bono, quia ratione bonitatis habet finis vim causandi finaliter. Hoc autem intelligendum est de bono simpliciter, quale est per se bonum, nam si  
 15R sumatur bonum in tota sua latitudine, non tantum finem, sed etiam media complectitur, ut ex sequenti  
 20 sectione constabit.

the appetite and is the formal reason for attaining it. Desirability, however, expresses a denomination taken from the proportion between such an object and such a power. Hence, it does not express a formal *ratio* of the object, but rather a concomitant condition.

*How the good is related to the ratio of end.*

21. From these things it is also clear how the *ratio* of end is related to the good. For St. Thomas says in *ST* Ia.5.2 ad 1 that the good, since it has the *ratio* of desirable, introduces a habitudo to the final cause. In the same sense he says  
 5R in *SCG* I, ch. 38, arg. 3, that the good has the *ratio* of end in virtue of the fact that it has the *ratio* of desirable. For if the *habitudo* and denomination of end is taken formally, it does not belong to the *ratio* of good but can follow from it. For an end as such expresses the *ratio* of cause with  
 10R respect to the means or with respect to some action that is done for the sake of the end. Good does not express that *habitudo*, but only a *ratio* of agreeability. But if the end is taken fundamentally, it is attributed to the good in this way, because the has the power to final-cause by reason of  
 15R goodness. Moreover, this should be understood about the good *simpliciter*, of the kind that is good in itself. For if the good is taken in its whole breadth, it includes not only the end but also means, as will become clear in the following section.

<sup>14</sup>Instead of being the final paragraph of sect. 1, in the 1597 edition this paragraph opens sect. 2. The 1597 edition also includes an out-of-place marginal note: '*Prima divisio.*'

15 quia] qua V.