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<368, col. a><sup>2</sup>*Qualis relatio in finem requiratur ad hanc bonitatem.*

Ratio dubii est, quia solent distingui variae <col. b> relationes, interpretativa habitualis tantum, id est, ex solo habitu procedens; habitualis procedens ex praecedenti actu solum  
 5 quia praecessit; virtualis, ex praecedenti actu media virtute relictā, et durante, ac influente; et actualis, quae est per actualem intentionem talis finis, seu actuale imperium, et de singulis sunt opiniones.

1. Opinio reicitur multipliciter.

Primo.

10 1. Prima ergo affirmat sufficere intentionem interpretativam, quae tunc esse censetur, quando homo est ita affectus, et dispositus, quod si talis finis in suam cogitationem veniret, actum suum in ullum referret. Sed hunc dicendi modum apud nullum scriptum invenio, neque habet fundamentum, aut probabilitatem, quia illa conditionalis nihil ponit in esse,  
 15 imo nec cognosci potest, nisi a solo Deo. Item quia similis dispositio non sufficit ad culpam, non enim, ut saepe apud Augustinum legitur, iudicabit nos Deus per ea quae faceremus, si hae, vel illae occasiones occurrerent, aut si tales cogitationes in nobis excitari permetteret, sed per ea, quae facimus, imo ad  
 20 magnam Dei gratiam pertinet, quando hominem praevenit, et non permittit in eam cogitationem incidere, cum qua scit fore peccatum: ergo multo minus sufficet illa dispositio ad bonitatem, quae perfectiorem voluntatem requirit. Denique actus ille ex vi illius dispositionis operantis non habet boni-

Tertio.

*What kind of relation to the end is required for this goodness.*<sup>3</sup>

The reason for doubt is that various relations are usually distinguished: the interpretative [that is] habitual only, that is, proceeding from a habit alone; the habitual, proceeding from a previous act only because it preceded; the virtual, resulting from a preceding act by means of a remaining, enduring, and influencing force; and the actual, which is by means of an actual intention of such an end or by means of an actual command. And there are opinions about each one.<sup>4</sup>

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1. The first, therefore, affirms that an interpretative intention is sufficient. Such an intention is thought to be when a human being is in such a condition and so disposed that if such an end were to come into his thought he would refer his act to it. But I do not find this way of speaking in any writing nor does it have any foundation or probability, because that conditional places nothing in being and cannot even be cognized except by God alone. Also, because a similar disposition does not suffice for blame, for, as is often read in Augustine, God will not judge us for the things which we would have done if these or those occasions had occurred or if such and such thoughts had been allowed to be stirred up in us. Rather, he will judge us for those things which we did. Indeed, it belongs to the great grace of God that when God forestalls a human being and does not permit him to fall into that thought by which, God knows, he will sin. Therefore, much less will that disposition suffice for goodness, which requires a more perfect willing. Finally, that act does not have intrinsic goodness from the end as a result of the force of that

The first opinion is rejected multiply.

First.

Second.

Thirdly.

<sup>1</sup>Latin text by and large follows the 1628 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition. Emendations not supported by any of these editions are enclosed in square brackets. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1628 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup>Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

<sup>3</sup>Jacques Channeville borrows heavily from this section when he deals with the question 'Quae relatio actus in finem requiratur, ad bonitatem' in *Ethica seu philosophia moralis juxta principia Aristotelis* ([Parisiis: apud Edmundum Martinum, 1666], 497).

<sup>4</sup>On these four kinds of intention, compare *De fine hominis* 2.4.

2. Opinio de relatione habituali.	25 tatem intrinsecam ex fine, quia non tendit in illum per se ipsum, et suam intrinsecam entitatem, neque etiam habet bonitatem extrinsecam, quia nullo modo refertur in talem finem ab aliquo extrinseco principio; ergo nullo modo.	25R disposition, because it does not tend to the end of itself and through its intrinsic entity. Nor does it have extrinsic goodness, because it is in no way referred to such an end by any extrinsic principle. Therefore, it does not have goodness in any way.	
	30 2. Secunda sententia est; sufficere relationem habituaalem, id est, quae censetur esse in operante per solum habitum virtutis, a quo censetur intrinsece informari virtutis actus, praesertim a gratia, et charitate, pro hac opinione referri potest Soto, lib. 3. <i>De natura et gratia</i> cap. 4. concl. 2. qui citat Caietanum 1. 2. q. 109. art. 9. videtur favere q. 21. art. 4. et aliqui ex Scholasticis infra citandis.	30R 2. The second view is that a habitual relation suffices. That is, [the relation] which is thought to be in someone acting through the habit of virtue alone, by which the act is thought to be informed intrinsically with virtue, especially by grace and charity. For this opinion one can be referred to Soto, <i>De natura et gratia</i> , lib. 3, cap. 4, concl. 2. He cites Cajetan, IaIIae.106.9, [who] seems to favour 21.4, and others from the scholastics to be cited below. <sup>5</sup>	The second opinion concerning a habitual relation.
Probabilis est, sed non in sensu hic intento.	35 3. Sed oportet advertere aliud esse loqui de bonitate propria sumpta; aliud de ratione meriti. Item aliud esse loqui de circumstantia, seu dignitate personae operantis; aliud vero de circumstantia finis, de qua nunc agimus; quod autem attinet ad meritum, probabilis sententia est habituaalem dignitatem personae operantis, praesertim illam, quae est per gra- <369> tiam, et charitatem, multum conferre ad rationem, vel augmentum meriti, praesertim si ex parte actus sit sufficiens bonitas; tunc autem non concurrat habitus, ut principium dans actui bonitatem ex fine, sed ut circumstantia personae dignificans illam, et consequenter conferens ad valorem moralem actus, ut supra dictum est.	35R 3. But it is necessary to note that it is one thing to speak about goodness taken properly and another to speak about the <i>ratio</i> of merit. Also, it is one thing to speak about the circumstance or dignity of the person who is acting, but another to speak about the circumstance of the end, which we are dealing with now. As far as merit is concerned, however, the probable view is that the habitual dignity of the person who is acting, especially that which comes through grace and charity, bestows much to the <i>ratio</i> or increase of merit, especially if the goodness on the part of the act is sufficient. But a habit does not concur in that case as a principle giving goodness from the end to the act, but as a circumstance of the person dignifying the person and consequently adding to the moral value of the act, as was said above.	It is probable, but not in the sense intended here.
In sensu nunc intento improbatum.	40 4. At vero agendo proprie de bonitate, quae ex fine operantis redundat in actum eius, dicendum est sine dubio ad illam non sufficere habitum virtutis, ut plane docet D. Thomas in 2. dist. 38. q. 1. art. 1. ad 4. et dist. 40. q. 1. art. 5. ad 6. et idem sentit Caietanus 1. p. q. 63. art. 6. et idem Durandus dist. 40. q. 2. n. 11. Scotus dist. 41. Adrianus <i>Quodlibeto</i> 10. art. 3. ad 4. et probatur, quia habitus non confert bonitatem, nisi aut eliciendo, aut imperando; ergo si neutro modo concurrat, nullam confert bonitatem; ergo sola existentia, seu concomitantia eius in subiecto non satis est, ut det bonitatem, quia potest illi adesse, et neutro ex dictis modis concurrere. Antecedens patet, quia habitus tantum est causa extrinseca actus;	40R 4. But, on the other hand, when dealing strictly with the goodness which overflows from the end of the one acting to his act, it should be said that there is no doubt but that a habit of virtue is not sufficient for it, as St. Thomas plainly teaches in <i>Sent.</i> II, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4, and dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 6. And Cajetan thinks the same in <i>ST</i> Ia.63.6, as well as Durandus in dist. 40, q. 2, n. 11, Scotus in dist. 41, and Adrian in <i>Quodlibet</i> 10, art. 3, ad 4. And it is proven because a habit does not bestow goodness, except by eliciting or commanding [an act]. Therefore, if it does not concur in either of those ways, it does not bestow any goodness. Therefore, its existence or concomitance alone in the subject is not enough to give goodness, because it can be present in him but not concur in either of the stated ways. The antecedent is clear since a habit	In the sense intended here it is rejected.
1. Argumentum contra hanc opinionem.	55	55R	First argument against this opinion.

<sup>5</sup>The sense of the Latin sentence is unclear; it may be missing a word or two.

Confirmatur 1.	60	ergo solum media sua causalitate potest concurrere ad bonitatem eius. Et confirmatur, quia habitibus, ut sic, nec mere-	60R	is only an extrinsic cause of an act. Therefore, it can concur with the act's goodness only by means of its causality. And it is confirmed because we neither gain nor lose merit by habits as such, unless they influence us to works. Moreover, no other way of influx beyond the ones stated can be thought of. It is confirmed, secondly, because otherwise any act of virtue whatever in a just human being would have the goodness of every virtue or at least of most, since all the virtues are habitually in that human being and any act whatever of virtue is referable to the end of all [the virtues] or at least of most. Finally, although an infidel and sinner lacks virtues and has many vicious habits, he does not thereby refer his acts—even evil or indifferent acts—to the end or object of such vices, nor do all his works thereby receive some badness. Therefore, the same is true <i>a fortiori</i> concerning good acts.	First confirmation.
Confirmatur 2.	65	haberet bonitatem omnium virtutum, vel saltem plurimarum, quia in illo homine sunt habitualiter omnes virtutes, et quilibet actus virtutis, est referibilis in finem omnium, vel saltem plurimarum. Tandem quamvis infidelis, et peccator careat virtutibus, et habeat plures habitus vitiorum, non propterea refert actus suos etiam malos, vel indifferentes ad finem, seu obiecta talium vitiorum, neque inde accipiunt opera eius aliquam malitiam; ergo idem est a fortiori de actibus bonis.	65R	is only an extrinsic cause of an act. Therefore, it can concur with the act's goodness only by means of its causality. And it is confirmed because we neither gain nor lose merit by habits as such, unless they influence us to works. Moreover, no other way of influx beyond the ones stated can be thought of. It is confirmed, secondly, because otherwise any act of virtue whatever in a just human being would have the goodness of every virtue or at least of most, since all the virtues are habitually in that human being and any act whatever of virtue is referable to the end of all [the virtues] or at least of most. Finally, although an infidel and sinner lacks virtues and has many vicious habits, he does not thereby refer his acts—even evil or indifferent acts—to the end or object of such vices, nor do all his works thereby receive some badness. Therefore, the same is true <i>a fortiori</i> concerning good acts.	Second confirmation.
2. Argumentum.	70	5. Tertia sententia est sufficere ad hanc bonitatem relationem habitualement relictam moraliter ex aliquo actu praeterito, etiamsi postea nihil influat in actum, sed moraliter illum denominet. Quam sententiam videntur interdum insinuare Scholastici in 2. dist. 41. praesertim D. Bonaventura art. 1. q. 3. et Gabriel q. unica art. 3. dub. 2. Fundamentum esse potest, quia si prior relatio talis <col. b> fuit, quae subsequentem actum comprehenderet, plane censetur perseverare quamdiu non datur retractatio, quod erit quotiescumque subsequens opus non repugnat priori fini, sed est illi consentaneum. Confirmatur, quia in omni bono opere ex obiecte, operatur homo propter se ipsum proxime, quia operatur propter convenientiam ad rationem, seu naturam rationalem; ergo si prius se ipsum, et omnia sua retulit in Deum, id satis erit, ut caetera opera virtute referantur in ipsum. Et idem argumentum fieri potest de actibus indifferentibus, in quibus speciale esset inconveniens hoc non admittere, quia alias quamplurimi male fierent ex defectu relationis in finem.	70R	5. The third view is that a habitual relation remaining morally from some previous act is sufficient for this goodness, even if afterwards it does not inflow anything into the act, but [only] denominates it morally. Scholastics sometimes seem to suggest this view in <i>Sent.</i> II, dist. 41, especially St. Bonaventure in art. 1, q. 3, and Gabriel in the first question, art. 3, dub. 2. The foundation can be that if the prior relation was of such a kind that it would include the subsequent act, it is clearly thought to persist as long as no retraction is given (which will be whenever the subsequent action is not repugnant to the former end but is in harmony with it). It is confirmed since in every action good from the object, the human being acts for the sake of himself proximately, since he acts for the sake of the agreeability to reason or rational nature. Therefore, if he first referred himself and all his [actions] to God, that will be sufficient for all his remaining actions to be referred virtually to God. And the same argument can be made concerning indifferent acts, in which this particular disagreeability is not admitted because otherwise very many acts would be performed badly as a result of a defect of the relation to the end.	Second argument.
3. Opinio de alio modo relationis habitualis.	75	5. Tertia sententia est sufficere ad hanc bonitatem relationem habitualement relictam moraliter ex aliquo actu praeterito, etiamsi postea nihil influat in actum, sed moraliter illum denominet. Quam sententiam videntur interdum insinuare Scholastici in 2. dist. 41. praesertim D. Bonaventura art. 1. q. 3. et Gabriel q. unica art. 3. dub. 2. Fundamentum esse potest, quia si prior relatio talis <col. b> fuit, quae subsequentem actum comprehenderet, plane censetur perseverare quamdiu non datur retractatio, quod erit quotiescumque subsequens opus non repugnat priori fini, sed est illi consentaneum. Confirmatur, quia in omni bono opere ex obiecte, operatur homo propter se ipsum proxime, quia operatur propter convenientiam ad rationem, seu naturam rationalem; ergo si prius se ipsum, et omnia sua retulit in Deum, id satis erit, ut caetera opera virtute referantur in ipsum. Et idem argumentum fieri potest de actibus indifferentibus, in quibus speciale esset inconveniens hoc non admittere, quia alias quamplurimi male fierent ex defectu relationis in finem.	75R	5. The third view is that a habitual relation remaining morally from some previous act is sufficient for this goodness, even if afterwards it does not inflow anything into the act, but [only] denominates it morally. Scholastics sometimes seem to suggest this view in <i>Sent.</i> II, dist. 41, especially St. Bonaventure in art. 1, q. 3, and Gabriel in the first question, art. 3, dub. 2. The foundation can be that if the prior relation was of such a kind that it would include the subsequent act, it is clearly thought to persist as long as no retraction is given (which will be whenever the subsequent action is not repugnant to the former end but is in harmony with it). It is confirmed since in every action good from the object, the human being acts for the sake of himself proximately, since he acts for the sake of the agreeability to reason or rational nature. Therefore, if he first referred himself and all his [actions] to God, that will be sufficient for all his remaining actions to be referred virtually to God. And the same argument can be made concerning indifferent acts, in which this particular disagreeability is not admitted because otherwise very many acts would be performed badly as a result of a defect of the relation to the end.	The third opinion concerning another mode of habitual relation.
Eius fundamentum.	80	6. Sed nihilominus haec sententia mihi non probatur, sicut neque aliis Theologis dicta dist. 41. praesertim Aegidio q. 1. art. 2. et Scoto q. 1. et <i>Quodlibeto</i> 17. art. 2. nec Bonaventura et Gabriel aperte contradicunt, sed confuse loquuntur de relatione virtuali, quod in Caietano et aliis auctoribus notandum est. Probatur autem illam relationem non sufficere,	80R	6. But, nevertheless, this view is not accepted by me, just as it is also not accepted by other theologians in the mentioned dist. 41, especially Aegidius, q. 1, art. 2, and Scotus, q. 1 and <i>Quodlibet</i> 17, art. 2. Nor do Bonaventure and Gabriel clearly contradict it, but they speak confusedly about a virtual relation, which should be noted in Cajetan and other authors. But it is shown that that relation does not suffice since it is	Its foundation.
Confirmatur.	85	6. Sed nihilominus haec sententia mihi non probatur, sicut neque aliis Theologis dicta dist. 41. praesertim Aegidio q. 1. art. 2. et Scoto q. 1. et <i>Quodlibeto</i> 17. art. 2. nec Bonaventura et Gabriel aperte contradicunt, sed confuse loquuntur de relatione virtuali, quod in Caietano et aliis auctoribus notandum est. Probatur autem illam relationem non sufficere,	85R	6. But, nevertheless, this view is not accepted by me, just as it is also not accepted by other theologians in the mentioned dist. 41, especially Aegidius, q. 1, art. 2, and Scotus, q. 1 and <i>Quodlibet</i> 17, art. 2. Nor do Bonaventure and Gabriel clearly contradict it, but they speak confusedly about a virtual relation, which should be noted in Cajetan and other authors. But it is shown that that relation does not suffice since it is	Confirmation.
Displicet dicta opinio.	90	6. Sed nihilominus haec sententia mihi non probatur, sicut neque aliis Theologis dicta dist. 41. praesertim Aegidio q. 1. art. 2. et Scoto q. 1. et <i>Quodlibeto</i> 17. art. 2. nec Bonaventura et Gabriel aperte contradicunt, sed confuse loquuntur de relatione virtuali, quod in Caietano et aliis auctoribus notandum est. Probatur autem illam relationem non sufficere,	90R	6. But, nevertheless, this view is not accepted by me, just as it is also not accepted by other theologians in the mentioned dist. 41, especially Aegidius, q. 1, art. 2, and Scotus, q. 1 and <i>Quodlibet</i> 17, art. 2. Nor do Bonaventure and Gabriel clearly contradict it, but they speak confusedly about a virtual relation, which should be noted in Cajetan and other authors. But it is shown that that relation does not suffice since it is	The stated opinion is displeasing.
Impugnatur.	95	6. Sed nihilominus haec sententia mihi non probatur, sicut neque aliis Theologis dicta dist. 41. praesertim Aegidio q. 1. art. 2. et Scoto q. 1. et <i>Quodlibeto</i> 17. art. 2. nec Bonaventura et Gabriel aperte contradicunt, sed confuse loquuntur de relatione virtuali, quod in Caietano et aliis auctoribus notandum est. Probatur autem illam relationem non sufficere,	95R	6. But, nevertheless, this view is not accepted by me, just as it is also not accepted by other theologians in the mentioned dist. 41, especially Aegidius, q. 1, art. 2, and Scotus, q. 1 and <i>Quodlibet</i> 17, art. 2. Nor do Bonaventure and Gabriel clearly contradict it, but they speak confusedly about a virtual relation, which should be noted in Cajetan and other authors. But it is shown that that relation does not suffice since it is	It is attacked.

85 prius se ] prius per se V

100 quia aliud est relationem in finem obiective cadere in aliqua  
 opera, aliud effective, seu imperative; illa autem relatio, quae  
 praecessit, quamvis cadat obiective in sequentia opera, non  
 sufficit, quia fieri potest, ut omnia illa respiciat, ut materiale  
 obiectum, ut cum aliquis in principio dici aut vitae opera  
 illius temporis refert in Deum; tamen hoc non est satis, ut  
 talia opera sint effective, seu imperative ab illa relatione, quia  
 ad priorem respectum sufficit, quod illa opera aliquo modo  
 105 repraesententur obiective in intellectu, quando fit illa relatio,  
 ad posteriorem autem oportet, ut quando fit ipsum opus, ad  
 illud excitetur operans aliquo modo ex vi illius relationis, quia  
 efficientia, neque potest intelligi sine aliquo influxu; hic autem  
 totus influxus consistit in hac excitatione, seu applicatione ad  
 110 opus: ut autem intentio det operi bonitatem aliquam, non  
 sufficit habitudo ad aliud, ut ad obiectum, ut per se notum  
 est, quia actus nec physice, nec moraliter informat obiectum,  
 ut obiectum, sed potius e contrario; unde etiam alienos ac-  
 tus possumus, ut obiectum respicere, et referre in Deum, et  
 115 non inde accipiunt bonitatem; requiritur ergo causalis relatio,  
 quae aliquo modo sit per modum imperii: actus autem, qui  
 praecessit omnino, et neque in actu, neque in memoria, neque  
 alio simili modo manet, nullo modo concurrat causaliter, ad  
 praesentem actum, sed ita operatur homo, ac si nullo modo  
 120 illum habuisset; ergo <370> ex illa relatione praeterita nul-  
 lam bonitatem habet praesens actio. Atque hoc confirmat  
 vulgatum exemplum de eo, qui retulit omnia opera sua in  
 pravum aliquem finem, ut in idolum, quia non est necesse  
 malitiam illius relationis redundare in omnia opera sequentia,  
 etiamsi retractata non sit.

125 4. Opinio de relatione actuali. 7. Propter haec, est quarta sententia, quae requirit ac-  
 tualem relationem ad hanc bonitatem per formalem inten-  
 tionem, vel actum imperatum, quam significat Durandus in  
 2. dist. 40. q. 2. n. 7. et 11. quanquam non satis rem explicet.  
 Eius probatio. 130 Probatur autem, quia secluso actu, et relatione praeterita, ac  
 ipso habitu, nihil remanet, quod possit sufficere. Dices sat  
 esse virtutem aliquam ex priori actu relictam, sed inquiri,

101 dici ] Dei V

123 idolum ] dolum V

100R one thing for a relation to an end to fall objectively on some actions  
 but another to fall effectively or imperatively. But that relation which  
 preceded, although it falls objectively on subsequent actions, does not  
 suffice because it can happen that it respects all things as material object,  
 as when someone in the beginning is said to refer all the actions of life  
 or of that time to God. Nevertheless, this is not enough so that such  
 actions are effectively or imperatively from that relation, because for the  
 former respect it is enough that those actions in some way are represented  
 105R objectively in the intellect when that relation happened. But for the latter  
 it is necessary that when the action itself takes place the one acting is in  
 some way excited to it by the force of that relation because of efficiency.  
 Nor can it be understood without some influx. But this entire influx  
 consists in this excitation or application to action. But in order for the  
 intention to give some goodness to the action, a habitudo to something  
 110R else as to an object does not suffice, as is *notum per se*, since an act neither  
 physically nor morally informs an object as object, but rather conversely.  
 Hence, we can refer even alien acts to God and have them respect him as  
 an object and they do not thereby receive goodness. Therefore, a causal  
 relation is required which is in some way in the mode of a command.  
 115R But an act which entirely precedes and remains neither in act nor in  
 memory nor in some other similar way in no way concurs causally with  
 the present act; rather, the human being acts just as if he in no way had  
 had it. Therefore, the present action has no goodness from that previous  
 relation. And this is confirmed by the common example of him who  
 120R referred all his actions to some corrupt end, e.g., to an idol, since it is not  
 necessarily the case that the badness of that relation overflows to all his  
 subsequent actions, even if it was not retracted.

Confirmation.

125R 7. On account of this, there is a fourth view which requires for this  
 goodness an actual relation through a formal intention or commanded  
 act. Durandus indicates this view in *Sent.* II, dist. 40, q. 2, n. 7 and 11,  
 although he does not explain the matter sufficiently. But it is proven  
 since, having set aside the act, past relation, and the habit itself, nothing  
 remains that can suffice. You may say that some force remaining from  
 a previous act is enough, but I ask what this force is. For either it is

The fourth  
 opinion  
 concerning an  
 actual relation.  
 Its proof.This proof is  
 weakened.

135 quid sit illa virtus, aut enim est aliquid in voluntate, vel in  
intellectu; non primum, quia in voluntate tantum sunt aut  
habitus, aut actus; sed non est habitus, ut dictum est: si autem  
140 est actus, erit actualis, et non virtualis relatio, atque eodem  
argumento probari potest non esse in intellectu, quia neque  
135R potest esse habitus, neque actus, praesertim, quia haec virtus  
debet movere voluntatem quoad exercitium ex parte ipsius  
140 potentiae: intellectus autem nunquam movet nisi ex parte  
obiecti quoad specificationem.

5. Opinio  
auctoris de  
relatione virtuali.

8. Nihilominus dicendum est sufficere relationem vir-  
140 tualem ex vi intensionis, seu imperii relictī; et virtute per-  
manentis, ut ex fine habeat operatio humana aliquam moral-  
145 itatem, et laudabilitatem; est enim haec expressa sententia  
D. Thomae 3. *Summae contra gentiles* cap. 138. rat. [8]. ubi  
dicit. *Voluntas praecedens actum virtute manet in tota consecu-*  
*tione actus, et ipsum laudabilem reddit etiam cum de proposito*  
*voluntatis propter quod, actus inceperit in executione operis non*  
150 *cogitatur*; idem q. 2. *De malo* art. 8. arg. 11. cum solutione, et  
q. 2 *De virtutibus* art. 11. ad 2. et sumitur etiam ex 2. 2. q. 83.  
art. 13. Ubi agens de [oratione] dicit posse [impetrationem]  
esse, et meritoriam sine intentione actuali, quando fit sine  
150R culpa, et revera Bonaventura, Gabriel, Aegidius, et fere alii  
antiqui Scholastici hoc in sensu loquuntur.

Probat hanc  
relationem esse  
frequentem.

9. Ratio autem est, quia imprimis negari non potest, quin  
hic modus operandi non solum sit homini possibilis, etiam  
valde frequens, sic enim mercenarius tota die dicitur operari  
155R pro mercede, et si non semper cogitet de mer- <col. b> cede;  
160 et qui iter agit, vere dicitur deambulare, ut ad terminum viae  
perveniat. Similiter in materia de Sacramentis nihil est certius,  
quam intentionem virtuaalem sufficere ad conficiendum Sacra-  
mentum, etiamsi formalis non adsit. Item quia quando unus  
160R homo per alium operatur, praebendo illi suum consensum,  
165 et mandatum, quamdiu non retractat dicitur virtute operari,  
quidquid alius operatur, quia virtus prioris consensus cense-

something in the will or something in the intellect. It is not the first since  
anything in the will is either a habit or an act. But it is not a habit, as was  
said. But if it is an act, it will be an actual relation rather than a virtual  
relation. And by the same argument it can be proven that it is not in the  
135R intellect, since it cannot be either a habit or an act, especially since this  
force must move the will with respect to exercise on the part of its own  
power. But the intellect never moves [something] except on the part of  
the object with respect to specification.

8. Nevertheless, it should be said that a virtual relation resulting  
from the force of an aiming or of a remaining command and from the  
force of something remaining is enough so that a human action has some  
morality and praiseworthiness from an end. For this is the express view  
of St. Thomas in *SCG* III, cap. 138, rat. 8, where he says: ‘The willing  
preceding the act remains virtually in the entire performance of the act  
and the same praiseworthiness is rendered even when the proposed thing  
of the will for the sake of which the action was begun is not thought  
about in the execution of the action.’ [He says] the same thing in *De*  
*malo*, q. 2, art. 8, arg. 11, with the solution; *De virtutibus*, q. 2, art. 11, ad  
2; and it is also taken from *IlaIae*.83.13, where in talking about prayer  
he says that there can be entreaty and merit without an actual intention  
when it happens without sin. And, in reality, Bonaventure, Gabriel,  
Aegidius, and most of the other old scholastics speak in this sense.

The fifth, and the  
author’s, opinion  
concerning the  
virtual relation.

9. Moreover, the reason is that, first of all, it cannot be denied but  
that this mode of acting not only is possible for a human being but that  
it occurs very frequently. For in this way a labourer is said to work all  
day for his wages even if he does not always think about his wages and he  
who goes on a journey is truly said to walk in order to arrive at the end of  
the way. Similarly, in the case of the sacraments nothing is more certain  
than that a virtual intention suffices for consecrating the sacrament even  
160R if no formal intention is present.<sup>6</sup> Also, because when one human being  
acts through another by having given a consent and mandate to him, as  
long as he does not retract it, he is said to do virtually whatever the other  
one does, because the force of the former consent is thought to remain in

It is shown that  
this relation is  
frequent.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. *De sacramentis in genere* 13.3.

146 8] 3 AV

152 oratione] ratione AV

152 impetrationem] imperatoriam AV

		tur manere in scriptura, vel mandato; sic ergo fieri potest in his, quae homo per seipsum operatur ex vi prioris consensus. Praeterea est huius rei argumentum quod homo operetur ex vi prioris intentionis, quia statim, ac illam mutat, cessat ab operando; ergo signum est operari ex aliquo influxu praecedentis voluntatis: quo modo autem hoc sit possibile, statim explicabo.	165R	the writing or mandate. The same thing can be true in those cases where a human being acts through himself by the force of a former consent. In addition, there is the argument about this matter that a human being acts by the force of a former intention because [otherwise] he immediately ceases from acting and changes it. Therefore, this is evidence that he acts from some influx from the preceding willing. Moreover, I will explain at once how this is possible.	
Deinde probatur sufficere. Primo.	175	10. Quod autem hic modus operandi sufficiat ad dictam moralitatem patet imprimis ex communi sentiendi modo omnium hominum, et quia plus ab homine exigere est plusquam humanum. Item quia longe diverso modo moraliter operatur, qui ex intentione honesta se applicuit ad opus de se indifferens, et postea in illo perseverat cessante actuali cogitatione illius finis, quam alius, qui per voluntatem omnino indifferentem ad idem opus se applicuit, nam hic saepe censebitur otiose loqui, et operari, ille autem studiose, ut homo. Denique ad hanc denominationem sufficit dependentia moralis, et causalitas unius actus ab alio, ut dictum est: haec autem tunc intercedit mediate, vel immediate, quia operatio vere procedit aliquo modo ex influxu prioris intentionis; unde etiam refertur aliquo qualiter in finem eius, et ex hac parte habet aliquam bonam circumstantiam, scilicet <i>finis</i> , quae sufficit ad praedictam denominationem, si aliunde nulla sit malitia.	170R	10. Moreover, that this way of acting is sufficient for the morality under consideration is clear, first of all, from everyone's common way of thinking and because to demand more from a human being is more than human. Also, because someone who from a fine ( <i>honesta</i> ) intention applied himself to an action of itself indifferent and afterwards perseveres in it although ceasing from actual thought about that end acts morally in a very different way than someone else who applies himself to the same work through a willing that is wholly indifferent. For the latter will often be thought to speak and act idly, but the former ardently, as a human being. Finally, moral dependence and the causality of one act from another suffices for this denomination, as was said. But this then intercedes mediately or immediately, since the action truly proceeds in some way from the influx of the prior intention. Hence, it is also referred in some way to its end and has some good circumstance from this side—namely, from the end—which is sufficient for the denomination under discussion if there is no badness from another source.	Next, it is proven to suffice. First.
Secundo.	180		175R		Second.
Tertio.	185		180R		Third.
1. Modus explicandi relationem virtuales.	190	11. Ut autem ad difficultatem propositam in n. 7. respondeatur, addendum est tribus modis posse accidere, et applicari hanc relationem. Primus est si duret idem numero actus imperatus, et actus interior imperans interruptus sit, ut, verbi gratia, in oratione vocali, si quis coepit orare intentione implendi praeceptum, et in discursu orationis naturaliter distrahitur; nihilominus implet praeceptum, et tota illa oratio dicitur esse virtute a priori intentione, cuius virtus manet in ipso opere; et potentia exequens semper manet applicata ex vi illius prioris intentionis, sive haec applicatio consistat in sola actione exterioris potestatis, sive etiam in aliquo interiori usu voluntatis, et consequenter in aliqua etiam at-	185R	11. But with respect to the difficulty proposed in n. 7, it is responded that it should be added that this relation can occur and be applied in three ways. First: if numerically the same commanded act endures and the commanding interior act is interrupted, as, for example, in a case of vocal prayer, if someone begins to pray with the intention of satisfying a precept and in the course of the prayer is naturally distracted, he, nevertheless, satisfies the precept and that whole prayer is said to be virtually by the prior intention the force of which remains in the work itself. And an executing power always remains applied by the force of that former intention, whether this application consists in act of an exterior power alone or also in some interior use of the will and consequently also with some attention of the intellect although so plain and diminished that it is	The first way of explaining the virtual relation.
	195		190R		
	200		195R		

178 qui ] quia V  
 186 etiam ] om. V  
 193 ut ] om. V  
 194 coepit ] caepit A

tentione intellectus, quamvis adeo simplici, et remissa, ut sit imperceptibilis, sic enim saepe homo attendit, et tamen si postea reflectatur, non potest iudicare, nec cognoscere se attendisse.

200R

2. Modus.

12. Secundus modus est, quando est varietas in ipsis actionibus, et in voluntatibus etiam, seu electionibus, tamen sine totali cessatione, sed immediate transeundo ab una electione, seu intentione ad aliam, ut quando aliquis intentione dicendi sacrum, se praeparat, domo exit, incipit indui, etc. Et tunc etiam est facile intelligere quomodo maneat virtus prioris intentionis; manet enim in proxima voluntate, seu electione, et per illam imperat aliam, et sic consequenter, et hos duos modos explicui latius in materia de Sacramentis.

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3. Modus.

13. Tertius videtur difficilior, quando omnino interruptitur formalis intentio, et omnis actus, vel voluntas ab illo manans, ut quando intercedit somnus, et postea incipit de novo operari, ut est vulgatum exemplum in eo, qui intentione implendi votum, multis diebus peregrinatur; qui tamen non quotiescumque evigilat, recordatur voti sui, nec repetit intentionem implendi illud, et in hoc casu, et similibus existimo virtutem prioris intentionis applicari media apprehensione, et iudicio intellectus, nam in praedicto casu statim, ac homo evigilat, apprehendit, et iudicat sibi esse inter agendum, neque inquit rationem bonitatis, aut convenientiae, sed ex vi prioris deliberationis iudicat hoc sibi expedire, et esse agendum, et inde statim movetur ad electiones, vel actiones, quae statim occurrunt, et tunc merito dicitur operari virtute prioris intentionis, quia tota efficacia inde oritur, nam licet intellectus ex se non possit voluntatem movere nisi obiective, et quoad specificationem; tamen virtute prioris voluntatis potest movere efficaciter, et quoad exercitium; haec autem motio tanto erit melior, et moraliter laudabilior, quanto in obiecto, seu actu proposito considerata, vel iudicata fuerit aliqua ratio boni magis accedens ad bonitatem prioris intentionis, fieri enim interdum potest, ut illa prima apprehensio, per quam incipit progredi in opere interrupto, sit tantum de aliquo obiecto

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imperceptible. For a human being often attends in such a way and yet afterwards if he reflects he cannot judge or recognize that he did attend.

12. The second way is when there is variety in the actions themselves and even in the willings or elections, yet without a complete cessation but immediately passing from one election or intention to another, as when someone with the intention of speaking the sacred rites prepares himself, leaves the house, begins to dress, etc. And in this case, also, it is easy to understand how the force of the prior intention remains. For it remains in the proximate willing or election and through that commands another and so on further on. And I explained these two ways in more detail in the material on the sacraments.

13. The third way seems more difficult, when the formal intention is entirely interrupted, as well as every act or willing that remains from it, as when sleep intervenes and afterwards one begins to work anew. [This is the case] in the standard example of him who with the intention of fulfilling a vow travels for many days, yet does not stay awake at every moment, nor call to mind his vow, nor repeat the intention to fulfill it. And in this case and other similar cases, I think that the force from the prior intention is applied by means of an apprehension and judgement of the intellect. For in the case under discussion, he immediately as soon as he is awake apprehends and judges to himself that he is in the middle of something to be done. Nor does he inquire into the nature of the goodness or agreeability, but from the force of the prior deliberation he decides to accomplish the thing to be done. And thereupon he immediately is moved to elections or actions, which occur at once. And then he is rightly said to act by the force of the former intention, because all the efficacy stems from it. For although the intellect of itself cannot move the will except objectively and with respect to specification, nevertheless, by the force of a prior willing it can move efficaciously and with respect to exercise. But this motion will be so much the better and morally more praiseworthy, as there was considered or judged to be some greater aspect of good added to the goodness of the prior intention in the proposed object or action. For sometimes it can happen that that first apprehension through which he begins to proceed to some interrupted work is only

Second way.

Third way.

203 imperceptibilis ] interceptibilis V

235 accedens ] accidens V

240 agendo sub communi ratione convenientis, aut expedientis,  
 seu iam deliberati, vel simpliciter agendi, et tunc formalis in-  
 tentio est valde indifferens intrinsece, solumque per <col. b> 235R  
 denominationem extrinsecam potest ita bona denominari, ut  
 neque censeatur otiosa, interdum vero potest illud primum  
 obiectum repraesentari saltem, ut honestum, vel prudenter  
 deliberatum, aut sub alia ratione magis speciali, scilicet, ut  
 245 pertinens ad cultum Dei, vel quid simile, et tunc intrinsece 240R  
 habebit aliquam bonitatem non ex fine, sed ex obiecto, quod  
 actu proponitur; per denominationem autem ex fine habebit  
 speciem ad illum pertinentem, quale est implere votum, vel  
 quid simile, et ita satis responsum est ad difficultatem positam  
 250 in n. 7.

about some object in acting under a general *ratio* of agreeability or procur-  
 ability or of already having been deliberated or simply of something to  
 be done, and then the formal intention is entirely indifferent intrinsically  
 and it can thus be denominated good only through an extrinsic denomi-  
 nation so that it is not thought idle. But sometimes that first object can  
 be represented at least as fine or prudently deliberated or under another  
 more particular aspect, namely, as belonging to the worship of God or  
 something similar. And then it will intrinsically have some goodness  
 240R not from the end but from the object which actually is proposed. But  
 through the denomination from the end it will have the species belonging  
 to it (what sort of vow to fulfill or something similar). And in this way  
 there is a sufficient response to the difficulty posed in n. 7.