

<365, col. b>²*Quid sit bonitas accidentalis ex fine in actu interiori voluntatis.**What the accidental goodness from the end in an interior act of the will is.*1. Opinio in
hac
quaestione.

5 1. Duo possunt esse modi dicendi. Prior est hanc bonitatem esse rem aliquam, vel realem modum intrinsece superadditum actui bono ex obiecto, ratione cuius tendit in finem. Cui sententiae favere videtur D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 18. art. 4. ad 2. dicens, quod licet finis sit <366> causa extrinseca, tamen relatio in finem inhaeret actioni, et potest suaderi primo,

Suadetur 1.

10 Quia actus voluntatis sic bonus, vere, ac proprie est propter finem illum, a quo sumit hanc bonitatem; ergo revera tendit in illum; ergo ab illo accipit aliquem modum, vel specificationem intrinsecam, et realem respectu cuius ille finis se habet, ut ratio formalis specificans. Secundo, quia omnis bonitas voluntatis oportet, ut sit aliquid reale, alioqui vel nihil erit, nisi denominatio extrinseca, vel relatio rationis: haec autem non possunt habere rationem formalis bonitatis, quia per haec non efficitur boni,

Confirmatur.

20 sed realibus actibus, quibus aliquid volumus. Et confirmatur, nam si haec bonitas solum esset denominatio quaedam, nihil magis referret ad virtutem, vel meritum, quam bonitas exterioris actus; hoc autem videtur esse contra rationem bonitatis interioris voluntatis, quia bonitas voluntatis debet esse intrinseca, et in hoc differt ab aliis exterioribus actibus. Ter-

5R

10R

15R

20R

25R

1. There can be two ways of speaking. The first one is that this good is some thing or real mode intrinsically superadded to a good act from its object, by reason of which it tends to the end. St. Thomas appears to favour this view in *ST IaIIae.18.4 ad 2*, saying that although the end is an extrinsic cause, the relation to the end, nonetheless, inheres in the action. [This view] can be argued for, first, because an act of the will is good in such a way that it truly and properly is for the sake of that end from which it takes up this goodness. Therefore, it really tends to that end. Therefore, it receives some real and intrinsic mode or specification from it, as a result of which it is related to that end as to a formal specifying *ratio*. Second, because every goodness of the will requires [that] in order to be something real. Otherwise it would be nothing other than an extrinsic denomination or a relation of reason. But these cannot have the formal *ratio* of goodness, since we do not bring about good things through these but by real acts by which we will something. It is confirmed: for if this goodness were only a kind of denomination, it would no more relate to virtue or merit than the goodness of an exterior act would. But this seems to be contrary to the *ratio* of the goodness of an interior act, since the goodness of the will must be intrinsic, and it differs in this from other, exterior acts.

The first
opinion on
this question.First
argument.

Second.

It is confirmed.

¹Latin text by and large follows the 1628 edition, with most abbreviations expanded and spellings modernized. Punctuation kept as is. I checked the text against the Vivès edition for significant variations. For recorded variants, A = 1628 edition and V = Vivès edition. Emendations not supported by either of these editions are enclosed in square brackets. Note that the Vivès edition does not have marginal notes; many, though not all, of the marginal notes from the 1628 edition are included in the Vivès edition as italicised text at the head of paragraphs.

²Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is the most widely used edition.

Tertio. tio; nam si haec bonitas est denominatio, peto a quo actu sumenda sit; aut enim ab intentione ipsius finis, et hoc non, alioqui eadem ratione dicendum esset
 30 omnem electionem esse bonam tantum per denominationem extrinsecam ab intentione finis, quia ab illa manat, et imperatur eodem modo; aut ab actu imperante, qui respiciat directe actum imperatum interiorum, et obiectum. Et hoc etiam non videtur dici
 35 posse, alias numquam haec bonitas ex fine reperiretur in actu voluntatis, nisi quando voluntas reflectitur per unum actum supra alium, quod videtur falsum; nam si quis velit dare eleemosynam propter satisfactionem, ibi bonitas est accidentaliter ex fine, et
 40 tamen nulla est reflexio actus interioris supra alium, sed tendentia directa in exteriorum actum.

2. Opinio verior. 2. Secundus modus dicendi est actum interiorum voluntatis solum dici bonum ab extrinseco fine per denominationem extrinsecam ab alio actu eiusdem voluntatis, a quo aliquo modo imperatur; loquor autem de actu alias bono ex obiecto, nam solum respectu illius est proprie hic finis extrinsecus, et bonitas ex illo sumpta accidentaliter est. Haec sententia mihi verior videtur, quam indicavit Caietanus 2. 2. q. 44. art. 4. dicens hanc bonitatem esse extrinsecum modum actus; sumitur etiam ex eodem Caietano 1. 2. q. 20. tribus primis articulis iuncta doctrina eiusdem in 1. 2. q. 18. art. 6. nam ibi dicit omnem bonitatem ex fine per se primo esse in interiori actu, in exteriori vero per denominationem ab illo; hic autem dicit
 45 <col. b> actus imperatos a voluntate, ut sic, quoad hoc numerandos esse inter actus exteriores, quamvis alioqui sint eliciti, potest etiam haec sententia sumi ex eodem D. Thoma 1. 2. q. 13. art. 1. Clarius ex q.
 50 2. *De malo* art. 4. ad 9. Item ex omnibus locis, in quibus docet huiusmodi finem non esse obiectum,

36 actu] actus V.
 49 2. 2.] 1. 2. V.

Third: for if this goodness is a denomination, I ask from what act it is taken. It might be [i] from the intention for the end itself. But not from this. Otherwise, it should for the same reason be said that every choice is good only through an extrinsic denomination from the intention for the end, because it flows from that and is commanded in the same way. Or it might be [ii] from a commanded act that directly respects the commanded interior act and object. But it seems that this cannot be said either. Otherwise this goodness from an end would never be found in an act of will except when the will through one act reflects on another act. That seems false. For if someone wishes to give alms in order to make satisfaction, the goodness in this case is accidental from the end and yet there is no reflection of one interior act over another but a direct tending to an exterior act.

2. The second way of speaking is that an interior act of the will is called good from an extrinsic end only through an extrinsic denomination from some other act of the same will by which it is in some way commanded. Moreover, I am speaking about an act otherwise good from its object, for only with respect to it is this end properly extrinsic and the goodness taken from it accidental. This view seems truer to me. Cajetan declares this view in *ST IIaIIae.44.4*, saying that this goodness is an extrinsic mode of the act. It can also be taken from the first three articles of *IaIIae.20* in the same work in conjunction with the teaching in *IaIIae.18.6*. For there he says that all goodness from an end is *per se* first in the interior act, but in the exterior act through a denomination from the interior act. But in the latter place he says that acts commanded by the will, as such, with respect to this should be numbered among the exterior acts, although in another way they are elicited. This view can also be taken from St. Thomas, *ST IaIIae.13.1*, and more clearly from *De malo* q. 2, art. 4, ad 9. The same thing [can be gathered] in all the places in which he teaches that an

Third.

The second, truer, opinion.

sed circumstantiam etiam respectu interioris actus voluntatis.

Eius 1. ratio a priori. 65 3. Atque hinc sumi potest ratio a priori huius sententiae, quia huiusmodi finis nullo modo est obiectum nec materiale, nec formale illius actus, qui denominatur accidentaliter bonus ex tali fine; ergo in illo actu nulla est intrinseca tendentia, vel habitudo ad talem finem. Patet consequentia; quia interior 70R actus solum habet intrinsecam habitudinem, et tendentiam ad obiectum; item quia si hoc modo tenderet in illum finem, esset volendo illum, vel propter illum tanquam ad rationem obiectivam: si ergo ille finis non est obiectum, neque in actu esse potest 75R intrinseca tendentia in illum: ergo bonitas illa ex fine non potest esse aliquid intrinsecum in tali actu, quia necessario dicere deberet habitudinem, et tendentiam in illum finem. Superest probandum primum antecedens, quod primo declaratur exemplo. Nam 80R quando aliquis vult amare Deum propter meritum; licet illa voluntas prior habeat pro obiecto amorem Dei, tamen ipse amor, qui ex vi illius exercetur, solum habet Deum pro materiali obiecto, quia solum Dei amor est: similiter, quamvis bonitas meriti ut sic, sit 85R formalis ratio obiectiva prioris voluntatis, non tamen ipsius amoris Dei; nam si est verus amor charitatis, solum amat Deum propter bonitatem ipsius: ergo respectu huius actus ille finis non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut causa movens remote, ut significavit D. 90R Thomas 1. 2. q. 18. art. 4. Ratio autem est, quia unus actus unum tantum habet materiale obiectum, et formale; quando ergo hoc est intrinsecum, totum id, quod extrinsecum est, non habet rationem formalis obiecti.

2. Ratio, seu dilemma. 95 4. Secunda principalis ratio confici posset ex longo discursu supra posito disp. 4. sect. 3. de specificatione ex obiecto, et de pura electione, quia id, quod dicitur intrinsece addi actui ex fine, non potest

end of this kind is not the object but the circumstance even with respect to the interior act of the will.

65R 3. And an a priori argument for this view can be taken from here, since an end of this kind is in no way the object—neither material nor formal—of the act that is accidentally denominated good from such an end. Therefore, there is no intrinsic tendency or disposition to such an end in that act. The consequence is clear, because an interior act only has an intrinsic disposition and tendency to the object. [It is clear] also because if it were to tend to that end in this way, it would be by willing it or [by willing something] for the sake of it as an objective *ratio*. Therefore, if that end is not the object, then there also cannot be an intrinsic tendency to it in the act. Therefore, that goodness from the end cannot be something intrinsic in such an act, because it would necessarily express a disposition or tendency to that end.

70R 80R What remains is to prove the first antecedent. This is shown first by example. For when someone wills to love God for the sake of merit, even though the willing first has for its object love for God, that love, nevertheless, which is exercised from the force of that [willing], only has God for its material object, since the love is only for God. Likewise, although the goodness of merit as such is the formal objective *ratio* of the former willing, it is not, however, [the object] of that love for God. For if it is true charity love, it only loves God for the sake of his goodness. Therefore, that end is not related to this act as its object but as a remote moving cause, as St. Thomas indicates in *ST IaIIae*.18.4. The reason is because one act only has one material and formal object. Therefore, when this is intrinsic, that whole, which is extrinsic, does not have the formal *ratio* of object.

85R 95R 4. The second principal argument can be made from the long discussion placed above in disp. 4, sect. 3, about specification by the object and about pure choice. For that which is said to be intrinsically added to the act from the

The first, a priori, argument for this view.

The second argument, or dilemma.

86 ipsius] *om.* V.

Eius prior excluditur.	100	esse partialis entitas, nec modus realis intrinsece illi inhaerens. Primum constat ex rationibus supra factis, quae hic breviter urgeri possunt. Nam si ibi sunt duae entitates. Una est, verbi gratia poeniten- tia; alia est misericordiae elicientis, quia suppono obiectum, et finem ad virtutes diver-	100R	end cannot be a partial entity nor a real mode intrinsically inhering in it. The first is clear from the arguments given above, which can be pressed briefly here. For if there are two entities here—for example, one is penitence and the other is eliciting mercy, since I assume that the object and the end belong to different virtues—then there will not be two partial entities but two distinct acts. For why or in what would they be united? Or why would they not generate one habit likewise composed of two virtues? Also, in reality the entity that would be specified by the end of penitence would not be commanded but would be elicited by the virtue of penitence. Therefore, that act would be elicited by two virtues according to different parts, which is all absurd.	The first part is ruled out.
	105	tinere; ergo non erunt duae partiales entitates, sed duo actus distincti. Cur enim, aut in quo unirentur? aut cur non generarent unum habitum similiter com- positum ex duplici virtute? Item revera illa entitas, quae specificaretur ex fine poenitentiae, non esset	105R		
	110	imperata, sed elicita a virtute poenitentiae; esset ergo ille actus elicitus a duplici virtute secundum partes diversas, quae omnia absurda sunt.	110R		
Posterior pars excluditur etiam. Primo.	115	5. Altera vero pars de modo intrinseco, facile etiam excluditur ratione proxime facta, et quia si daretur talis modus, ille haberet propriam speciem a fine, quem respiceret ut obiectum proprium, fi- nis autem, qui ita habet rationem obiecti, est per se sufficiens ad constituendum proprium actum distinc- tum ab omni alio; numquam ergo dat accidentalem	115R	5. But the other part about the intrinsic mode is also easily ruled out by the argument just made and also be- cause, if there were such a mode, it would have a proper species from the end that it respects as its proper object. But an end that in that way has the <i>ratio</i> of a proper object is <i>per se</i> sufficient for constituting a proper act distinct from all others. Therefore, it would never give an accidental mode to another act. This can also be understood in the following way, because if it were an intrinsic and accidental mode of the act, it would assume the substance of the act and supervene on it. But this cannot be the case with respect to the end, because every intrinsic tendency of the will to the end is prior to any act commanded as a result of such an end. The last is a sufficient argument for me, because this denomination suffices for everything that can apply to this act. And from the force of the command of the will, as such, nothing else is necessarily added to the commanded act beyond its substance, which it has from its proper faculty and object. Therefore, nothing else is necessary or can be imagined. The major is clear, because by the fact that it is understood that the act is good from its object and is commanded by another [act] also good that is tending to a good extrinsic end and ordering the	The latter part is also ruled out. First.
Secundo.	120	modum alteri actui. Quod ita potest etiam intelligi, quia si ille esset modus intrinsecus accidentalisque actus, supponeret substantiam eius, et superveniret illi; hoc autem esse non potest respectu finis, quia omnis tendentia intrinseca voluntatis in finem est	120R		Second.
Tertio.	125	prior quocumque actu imperato ex tali fine. Ultimo est apud me sufficiens ratio, quia haec denomina- tio sufficit ad omnia quae possunt convenire huic actui; et ex vi imperii voluntatis, ut sic, nihil aliud necessario additur actui imperato praeter substan- tiam eius, quam habet ex propria facultate, et obiecto	125R		Third.
	130	eius; ergo nihil aliud fingendum est, neque est nec- essarium. Maior patet, quia hoc ipso quod intelligi- tur actus ex obiecto bonus, et imperatus ab alio etiam bono tendente in bonum finem extrinsecum,	130R		
	135	et ordinante actum imperatum in illum, intelligitur	135R		

sufficienter bonitas intrinseca utriusque actus, et extrinseca informatio, vel denominatio unius ab alio. Minor vero patet in actibus externis a voluntate imperatis, quia ab illo imperio denominantur boni, etsi nihil in eis ponat praeter substantiam eorum, et ratio est, quia hoc imperium non consistit nisi in quadam efficientia, fortasse non physica, sed moraliter per consensionem et subordinationem potentiarum eiusdem animae: haec ergo ratio imperii nihil ponit in actu imperato, nisi dependentiam quamdam, quasi applicationem ad opus, ratione cuius unus actus denominatur ab alio, et refertur in finem suum; ergo idem est iudicium de bonitate solum fundata in hoc imperio.

Ad 1.
argumentum
in n. 1.

140
145
150
155
160
165
170R

6. Ad primum argumentum in principio factum, respondetur finem extrinsecum respectu actus <col. b> imperati, et extrinsecus ordinati in ipsum non habere rationem obiecti, nec materialis, nec formalis, sed circumstantiae, seu causae remotae moventis, et applicantis voluntatem ad talem actum medio actu intentionis, seu electionis, ut satis significavit D. Thomas 1. 2. q. 18. art. 4. distinguens finem ab obiecto, et dicens a fine sumi bonitatem, ut a causa bonitatis, et q. 19. art. 2. ad 1. dicens respectu actus voluntatis, finem habere rationem obiecti, praeterquam *cum finis ordinatur ad finem, et intentio ad intentionem*; quapropter in actu sic ordinato non oportet intelligere intrinsecam tendentiam in talem finem, sed solum dependentiam ab alio actu respiciente illum finem; et hoc modo dicitur esse propter finem denominatione extrinseca, sicut actus exterior; quapropter ille actus non proprie habet rationem electionis, sed potius medii eliciti, et quasi usus passivi.

Ad 2. *ibidem*. 170

7. Ad secundum respondetur ex actu imperante,

152 imperati] imperari A.
152 ordinati] ordinari A.

commanded act to it, the intrinsic goodness of each act is sufficiently understood, as well as the extrinsic informing or denomination of one by the other. But the minor is clear in the case of external acts commanded by the will, because they are denominated good from that command, even if it places nothing in them beyond their substance. The reason is because this command does not consist in anything other than a certain efficiency, perhaps not physical, but morally through the accord and subordination of the powers of the same soul. Therefore, this *ratio* of command places nothing in the commanded act except a certain dependency, an application as it were to the work, by reason of which one act is denominated by another and referred to its end. The judgement is the same, therefore, about the goodness that is grounded only in this command.

6. To the first argument made in the beginning, I respond that an extrinsic end with respect to an act that is commanded and extrinsically ordered to it does not have the *ratio* of an object, whether material or formal, but rather [has the *ratio*] of circumstance or of a remote cause moving and applying the will to such an act by means of an act of intention or of choice. St. Thomas indicates this in *ST IaIIae*.18.4 when he distinguishes the end from the object and says that goodness is taken from an end as from a cause of goodness, and in 19.2 ad 1 when he says that an end has the *ratio* of an object with respect to an act of will except 'when an end is ordered to an end and an intention to an intention'. For this reason, one should not understand there to be an intrinsic tendency to such an end in an act ordered in this way, but only a dependency on another act that respects that end. In this way it is said to be for the sake of the end by an extrinsic denomination, just as an exterior act. For this reason, that act does not properly have the *ratio* of choice but rather of an elicited means and, as it were, a passive use.

7. To the second argument, I respond that out of a

To the 1st
argument
in n. 1.

To the 2nd
argument in
the same
place.

et imperato, ut sic, quodammodo componi actum moraliter unum, sicut ex actu interiori, et exteriori, et hoc modo dicitur ille actus meritorius, et formaliter bonus, et efficere hominem bonum; sed hoc totum
 175 habet ratione actus imperantis, actui tamen imperato, ut sic conveniunt haec per denominationem extrinsecam, seclusa bonitate, quam talis actus potest habere ex suo obiecto, nam ut sic, habet rationem actus interioris eliciti a voluntate, et in hoc est differentia inter illum, et exteriorem, per quod responsum est ad confirmationem.

Ad confirm. 180
ibidem.

Unus modus
 quo satis fit
 argumento 3.
 in eodem n. 1.

185

8. Tertium argumentum petit, quis sit actus voluntatis, a quo sumitur haec denominatio, ad quod respondetur denominationem hanc posse sumi duobus modis in argumento insinuatis. Primus, et clarior est, quando intercedit formale imperium unius actus voluntatis ab alio scilicet, quia unus actus cadit in obiectum formaliter volitum sua propria ratione, et motivo, qui modus operandi facilius contingit quando actus imperatus est vere interior, ut cum volo amare, dolere, etc. Et tunc facilis est responsio ad argumentum, nec difficultatem ullam habet, quod voluntas huiusmodi reflexionem facile faciat; quando autem actus imperatus est exterior, ut eleemosyna, ieiunia, etc., tunc frequenter potest accidere, ut ab eodem actu electionis efficacis, quae immediate fit propter finem operantis, imperetur etiam talis actus exterior, et tunc in actu interiori nulla erit bonitas sumpta ab alio <368> actu exteriori, ut ab obiecte, ut supra dictum est, et consequenter neque actus exterior, ut actus est, denominabitur bonus, nisi bonitate sumpta ex fine media electione; aliquando vero potest actus exterior, et propter se, et propter extrinsecum finem imperari immediate, et tunc erunt in voluntate duo actus sese concomitantes, et eumdem exteriorem actum dupliciter denominantes; tandem potest interdum voluntas per electionem factam ob finem extrinsecum imperare totum actum alterius virtutis,

175R

180R

185R

190R

195R

200R

205R

commanding act and a commanded act, as such, an act that is morally one is composed in a certain way, as from an interior act and an exterior act. In this way that act is meritorious and formally good, and makes the human being good. But the whole has this by reason of the commanding act. Nevertheless, they apply to the commanded act as such through an extrinsic denomination, apart from the goodness that such an act can have from its object. For, as such, it has the *ratio* of an interior act elicited from the will. In this lies the difference between it and an exterior act. This addresses the confirmation.

8. The third argument asks what the act of the will is from which this denomination is taken. I respond that this denomination can be taken in two ways in the suggested argument. The first and clearer way is when a formal command of one act of the will by another stands in between: namely, because one act falls under a formally willed object by its own reason and motive. This way of operating happens easily when the commanded act is truly interior, as when I will to love, to suffer, etc. In this case the response to the argument is easy, and there is no difficulty in a willing of this kind easily making a reflection.

But when the commanded act is exterior—for example, giving alms, fasting, etc.—then it can often happen that such an exterior act is also commanded by the very same act of efficacious choice that is immediately made for the sake of the agent's end. In this case there will be no goodness in the interior act that is taken from another, exterior act as from an object, as was said above. Consequently, neither will the exterior act, insofar as it is an act, be denominated good, except by the goodness taken from the end by means of the choice. But sometimes an exterior act can be commanded immediately both for its own sake and for the sake of an extrinsic end. In that case there will be two concomitant acts in the will, and the same exterior act will be denominated twice. Finally, now and then the will can command a whole act as composed of an exterior and an interior act of another power through a choice made on

To the confirmation in the same place.

One way in which the 3rd argument in the same place is satisfied.

210 ut compositum ex exteriori, et interiori, ut quando ex
 intentione merendi impero mihi actum misericordiae,
 non tantum externum, sed etiam voluntatem mis-
 erendi, quia etiam illa est aptum medium ad talem
 finem; et tunc eadem est ratio de tali actu, quae de
 medio interiori: quando autem voluntas operetur uno,
 215 vel alio modo, non potest facile discerni, nisi in his,
 qui magna animadversione, et reflexione operantur;
 potest autem coniectura sumi considerata ratione fi-
 nis, et mediorum, seu actuum, et proportione eorum
 inter se. 220R

Alter modus. 220

9. Alter modus, quo potest hoc imperium, seu
 relatio in finem excogitari est ex vi solius intentionis
 immediate transeundo ad eliciendum actum alterius
 virtutis, ommissa formali electione media: ut si quis
 habeat intentionem bene merendi coram Deo, et con-
 225 sultat de mediis, seu modo, et iudicet amorem Dei
 propter se ipsum et super omnia esse aptissimum
 ad illum finem consequendum, potest, ut videtur,
 voluntas pro libertate sua statim elicere amorem Dei
 propter seipsum, in quo apparet magna differentia in-
 230 ter actum exteriorem et interiorem, nam exterior pen-
 det omnino a formali applicatione voluntatis, et ideo
 quamvis voluntas intendat finem, et intellectus iu-
 dicet motionem manus esse aptum medium ad illum
 finem, nunquam manus movebitur, donec voluntas
 235 eligat, et utatur illa: at vero voluntas potest se ipsam
 determinare immediate ad actus suos, et acciden-
 tarium est, quod per unum actum determinetur ad
 alium quoad exercitium, et ideo si ex parte intellectus
 sit obiectum sufficienter propositum, potest imme-
 240 diate exire in actum elicatum ante actum formaliter
 imperantem, et forte hic operandi modus frequentis-
 simus est. 240R

account of an extrinsic end, as when from an intention for
 meriting I command to myself an act of mercy, not only
 the external act but also the willing of having compassion,
 which is also an apt means towards such an end. And in
 this case the reasoning is the same for such an act as for
 interior means. But when the will operates in one or the
 other way, matters may not be easy to discern, except in
 those cases where things are done with great attention and
 reflection. But a reasonable inference can be drawn once
 the *ratio* of the end, the means or acts, and the proportion
 between them has been considered.

9. The second way in which this command or relation
 to the end can be thought about is as from the force of
 the intention alone immediately passing to eliciting the act
 of another power, having omitted the means by a formal
 choice. For example, if someone has the intention to merit
 well before the face of God, consults about means or about
 the way, and judges that loving God for his own sake and
 above all other things is most apt for attaining that end,
 the will can, it seems, through its freedom choose at once
 the love of God for his own sake. A great difference appears
 here between the exterior act and the interior act, for the
 exterior act depends entirely on the formal application of
 the will. For this reason, although the will intends the
 end and the intellect judges a motion of the hand to be
 an apt means for that end, nevertheless, the hand will be
 moved for as long as the will chooses and uses it. The will,
 however, can determine itself immediately to its acts, and
 it is accidental that it is determined through one act to
 another act with respect to exercise. For this reason, if the
 object is sufficiently proposed on the part of the intellect,
 [the will] can immediately issue an elicited act before a
 formally commanding act. In fact, perhaps this way of
 operating is most frequent.

The second
way.

210 impero] imperio V.

212 aptum] actum V.