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DE ANIMA DISP. 12, Q. 2¹
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Whether the will is free in its acts.

1. After what was said about its object and acts, we should next talk about the power, about which (as I noted in previous disputations) it is already clear that it is a spiritual power apart from a bodily organ. One can, nevertheless, ask whether it is really distinct from the intellect or not. For many think that intellect and will are distinguished only formally, as Durandus,² Scotus,³ and others say in I, dist. 3, q. 7. And Augustine in *De Trinitate* X⁴ seems to place no stronger distinction between intellect and will than between memory and intellect.

Nevertheless, we think along with St. Thomas that they are really distinguished. Aristotle also seems to say this in *De anima* III, text. 29.⁵ And, of course, having supposed that they are really distinguished from the essence [of the soul], it is much more probable that they are also [really] distinguished from each other. Nothing disagreeable results from positing this distinction, but all those things pertaining to these powers are understood much more easily.

2. Assuming this, therefore, only the question about the freedom of the will remains of those that can be discussed about the power itself. And this question most strongly depends on theology, for a perfect division of it requires knowing how God can firmly cognize free

¹The *De anima* has a complicated textual history that I will not go into here. Suffice to say that the main text translated here is that found in Salvador Castellote's edition, volume 3 (Madrid: Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1991), pp. 380–406. Most of the footnotes are based on the footnotes in Castellote's edition.

Earlier editions as edited posthumously by Alvarez omit most of this text on grounds that Suárez has better treatments of the subject in other works. The corresponding section as found, for example, in the Vivès edition is lib. V, cap. 8 (*Opera Omnia*, vol. 3, pp. 773–74). I have appended at the end of this document a translation of the note with which Alvarez replaces the original text in lib. v, cap. 8.

²*Sent.* I, dist. 2, q. 4.

³*Sent.* II, dist. 16, q. 1, n. 18.

⁴Cap. 11, n. 18.

⁵Cf. *De anima* 414a31, 432b3, and 433a9. Cf. Aquinas, *ST* Ia.79.1 ad 2.

operations without taking away freedom. Also, how the providence and concursus of God and, especially, how his prevenient grace stands with freewill.⁶ Also, how predestination and confirmation in grace does not destroy freedom. Nevertheless, refraining from all these matters, we should briefly discuss the question according to its proper principles alone. Nor can I entirely omit it, since it is proper to the matter that St. Thomas discusses here.⁷

3. It seems, therefore, that the negative answer to the question is true.

First, because a power which deliberates towards one [object] is not free. But the will is terminated in one [object], namely, the good. Therefore.

Second, that the same power act both freely and necessarily is contradictory. But our will acts necessarily in many things, for it necessarily loves happiness and the clear vision of God. Therefore.

Third, a free power for acting is one which, once all the requisites for acting are in place, can either act or not act. But the will is not like this. Therefore. The minor premise is proven: for the will requires the concursus of the divine will so that it can issue an act. But once the will of God is posited, our will cannot not act. Therefore.

Fourth, for either God knows that I will do this thing or he does not know it. If the former, then I will infallibly do it. If the latter, then I will infallibly not do it. Therefore, in neither case is there the freedom to act or not to act.

Fifth, if our power is free, then either [it is free] while it acts or before it actually acts. But not the latter, for in that case it has not yet acted [at all] and therefore has not acted freely. But neither when it is acting, since then it acts necessarily. For it is necessary that a thing be when it is. And when it is acting, it is necessary that it be acting.

Sixth, because our soul is the form of the body. Therefore, it follows the condition of the body in its operations. Therefore, just as other forms depend on the heavens in their operations and follow influence from it, so also our soul and will. But the heavens' influence operates naturally. Therefore, our will, which follows it, also operates naturally.

Seventh, will and sensitive appetite are powers rooted in the same

⁶I take '*liberum arbitrii*' as a technical term naming the item under dispute. The equivalent term in contemporary philosophy might be 'freedom of the will', though it has the disadvantage of already suggesting a theory as to which faculty would provide us with this freedom. I will translate '*liberum arbitrii*' with 'freewill' as a single word and reserve 'freedom of the will' for '*libertas voluntatis*' where it is clear that it is the *will's* freedom that is being considered.

⁷*ST* I.82.1–2 and I.83.

soul. Therefore, whatever one of these powers desires, the other also desires. For it is the same soul desiring in either case. Moreover, the same soul cannot at the same time desire contraries. But the sensitive appetite operates naturally. Therefore, etc.

Eighth, if our will were free by its nature, it could not be necessitated by God. The consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is obvious, both because God cannot change the nature of things and because God cannot bring it about that a power act freely that is not free by its nature. Therefore, neither can God bring it about that a free power act necessarily. The catholic faith is to the contrary.

4. All the ancient pagans who asserted that our soul is material and mortal especially erred in this question. And it is descended from the error of the Stoics who said that all our operations are subject to the necessity of fate, as is seen in Cicero, *De fato*,⁸ Plutarch, *De placitis philosophorum* I, cap. 28 and 29; and Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, cap. 8 and 9, and *De haeresibus* cap. 70. Almost the same error was followed by the Priscillians, who said that we necessarily operate according to the influence of the stars, as is gathered from St. Leo, Letter 93;⁹ Jerome, Letter to Ctesiphon;¹⁰ and the Council of Braga, cap. 9.¹¹ The error of the Manichaeans was similar to this. Just as they posited two gods, one the principle of goods, the other of bads, so also they posited two souls in us, one which necessitates to good, the other to bad.

These three errors completely remove freedom from the will as a result of its intrinsic nature.

Other heretics remove freedom as a result of other extrinsic causes.

Some say that the foreknowledge and providence of God remove our freedom. Abelard held this view, whom Wycliffe—condemned in the Council of Constance, sess. 8¹²—followed. And the same view is followed in part by Luther.

Others remove freewill, especially in the baptized, on account of God's grace necessitating them. Jovinian, against whom Jerome¹³ and Augustine¹⁴ often disputed, held this error.

Others say that freewill was removed on account of original sin, after which human beings are necessitated to sinning. Luther erred in

⁸VI–XVII.

⁹Letter 15 (numbered 93 prior to Quesnell's edition), cap. 11.14.

¹⁰Letter 133, v-x.

¹¹Denzinger 239.

¹²Denzinger 607.

¹³Cf. *Adversus Iovinianum*.

¹⁴*De haeres.*

this way, saying in art. 36 to Leo X¹⁵ that ‘freewill after sin is a matter of title only’ and is imagined in things.

Many saints have already been cited against these heretics. Also: Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*; St. Bernard;¹⁶ Anselm;¹⁷ Origen;¹⁸ and Tertullian,¹⁹ under the same title. And especially against Luther: John Fisher (c. 1469–1535), cap. 36.²⁰ Merit is said to be the gift of grace and freedom: Albert Pighius;²¹ John Eck, *Enchiridion locorum communium adversus Lutherum*, cap. 30; Soto, *De natura et gratia*, cap. 15; and Castro, *De haeresibus*, s.v. ‘liberum arbitrium’.²²

5. It should be known, nevertheless, that freedom is in one way opposed to slavery, according to the passages John 8[:36] ‘If, therefore, the son shall make you free ...’ and Romans 6[:20] ‘When you were slaves to sin, you were free [of justice]’. In another way it is opposed to necessity. 1 Corinthians 7[:37]: ‘For he who stands steadfast, not having necessity, but having the power of his own will’. And it is also opposed to compulsion, for he who is compelled is necessitated. And we are asking about this freedom here, for freewill, as Soto, above, in cap. 15, lib. 5, noted, with the word ‘*libet*’ having been said, he is said to be free, as it were, who by his own will (*sponte*) does whatever pleases him. Moreover, this freedom consists in this, namely, that a power can issue an act or not issue the act, once all the requisites for acting have been posited. For example, if an eye was able both to see and not to see with a visible object in place and the eyelid open, it would be free. The phrase ‘once all the requisites ...’ is included because failing to do an action because of a lack of the object or some other impediment where something is lacking is also not freedom.

6. Second, it should be noted that this question can have two senses. The first: whether our will is absolutely free. The second: whether, given this, our will exercises this freedom in all its acts or only in some and which ones those are.

7. With respect to the first, the first conclusion is that the will has freedom and dominion of its operations or actions.

This conclusion is one from the foundations of our faith. For Hebrews 11[:6] says that ‘he who comes to God must believe that he is

¹⁵*De servo arbitrio*. Cf. Leo X’s bull *Exsurge Domine*, error 36.

¹⁶*De gratia et libero arbitrio* and *Sermo 81 in Cantica*.

¹⁷*Dialogus de libero arbitrio*.

¹⁸Cf. *De principiis*.

¹⁹Cf. *De anima* XX.5 and *Adversus Marcionem* II.6.6.

²⁰*Confutatio* cap. 36.

²¹Cf. *De libero hominis arbitrio et divina gratia, libri decem*, lib. 1, cap. 2.

²²*Adversus haereses* lib. 9, s.v. ‘libertas’.

and that is a rewarder of those who come to him'. But there is no reward where there is not freedom. For necessary actions, moreover—Augustine says it well—we neither give credit nor take away credit.²³ Genesis 4[:7] says 'If you do well, will you not receive? But if you do ill, will sin not be at the door at once?' And the same is gathered from Deuteronomy 30[:11–20]. And Sirach 15[:14] says that '[God] left him in the hand of his own counsel'. And Sirach 31[:10]: 'He that could have transgressed and did not transgress; and could do bad things and did not.' And 1 Corinthians 7[:37]: 'having power of his own will ...'

In addition, Holy Scripture is full of precepts, exhortations, warnings, and promises, none of which can be understood without freedom, as St. Augustine well describes in Letter 46.²⁴ Also, God punishes the wicked—Matthew 25[:41–46]—but if they were not free, they would be punished without cause. This is a most certain matter of the faith, for the testimony brought up speaks generally. And this truth was established against the Lutherans in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 5 and 6.

8. This conclusion is also evident to natural reason, which Epictetus followed, who—as Agostino Steuco reports in cap. 16²⁵—says: 'Not only did God give these faculties to us, by which we endure all adversities with dignity ... But because it was of a good king and true father, he give this to us free and unencumbered, not coerced, and he planted and placed each one in us and did not wish any remaining force that could be an impediment.'

Furthermore, experience supports the conclusion: for we ourselves see that we act and we cease from that activity when we wish. And in this human beings differ from brute animals and the judicious from the insane.

Furthermore, according to the sense of every human being, human operations are deserving of praise and blame, reward and punishment. And this is, as it were, a first principle of rational nature. Therefore, we are free.

Also, human beings are by their nature fit for counsel, admonition, and precepts. [If we were not free], counsel would be vain and laws superfluous, which is against the inclination of nature. Moreover, if human beings are not free, they are not useful, for human beings would always act necessarily, as if counsel were given to brute animals or law imposed on them. Hence, to remove freewill is to destroy the order of the state, of religion, and of piety.

²³ Cf. *De libero arbitrio* III I 1.4 and III I 3.13.

²⁴ Now numbered 214.

²⁵ *De perenni philosophia* lib. 9.

Furthermore, it is obvious according to the light of nature that human beings often sin and do evil. Therefore, they act necessarily and are necessitated by nature itself and consequently by the author of that nature to doing evil. The consequent is absurd.

Furthermore, human beings by their nature are lord of their actions. This lordship consists in being able by their freedom to exercise or not to exercise those actions. Therefore, they are free. The antecedent is proven, for human beings are lords of other things, for every natural reason dictates that human beings are capable of lordship and that it is evil to take away from someone what is his. But that lordship consists in being free to use his things. And lordship over his actions consists in human beings being made in the image of God, as was noted by John Damascene in *Fideo* lib. II, cap. 12, and Augustine in *Psalms* 57. And for this reason after God said ‘let us make humankind in our image and in our likeness’, he added ‘and may he rule’.²⁶ All these are a posteriori demonstrations.

9. But in order to demonstrate it a priori, it is necessary to explain in what freedom formally and at root consists. In what was said above:²⁷

First, this freedom is fitting for human beings in accordance with their being rational, which in no way is fitting for any other animal. This is evidence, therefore, that it is fitting for human beings by reason of that power in which they supersede other animals.

The same thing is evident by experience, for human beings do not experience freedom in themselves except insofar as they use reason.

Also, since this part is spiritual, freedom belongs to the spiritual part. Hence, St. Thomas in *ST* IaIIae.1.1 and the Teacher in *Sent.* II, dist. 24, cap. 5, say that freewill in its proper signification refers to a certain act, yet the term is carried over to signifying the principle of the act. Hence, it now signifies a power, as St. Thomas noted in *ST* Ia.83.2. And therefore it is called a faculty, namely, natural. For natural faculties are powers. Still, ‘of the will and of reason’ is added, because freedom consists partly in reason and partly in will; in reason as in a root and in will as in a formally free subject.

Each claim is proven. For freedom consists formally in the will for it consists formally in indifference of election. A human being is free for the reason that he can elect either this or that. It also consists in a free use of his own operations. But to elect and to use other powers belongs to the will, as is obvious. Therefore, freedom formally belongs to the will. And every operation is thought free only insofar as it is subjected to the

²⁶Genesis 1:26.

²⁷Cf. disp. 2, q. 3, n. 18.

will.

But that this freedom arises from reason is obvious in the first place, because desire arises from cognition, as was shown above.²⁸ Therefore, the mode of desire and of that will also arise from the mode and properties of the cognized.

10. But it is necessary to explain in particular how freedom in the will arises from reason.

The Thomists commonly explain that the freedom of the will arises from the indifference of the intellect. For that reason—they say—the will can love some thing or not love it, because the intellect is not necessitated to judging that thing to be better. Rather, the intellect can find some aspect of good and some aspect of bad in the object. St. Thomas seems to teach this view in *ST* Ia.83.1, where he says that brute animals do not have freedom because they do not act by the judgement of reason. But human beings have freewill, because they act by the judgement of reason because it has the power for opposites.

It is also proven by reason, for freedom of the will consists in being able to love and not to love an object once proposed as good. But it cannot do this as it pleases. Rather, it can only love it insofar as it finds some aspect of good and it can only not love it insofar as it finds some aspect of bad. Therefore, freedom consists in this, namely, that both aspects of good and of bad can be found in the same object.

It is confirmed: for if the intellect were to cognize some good in the love for which it could find no aspect of bad, the will would not be able not to love it. Therefore.

Francis Sylvester of Ferrara holds this view in *SCG* III, the last chapter, as does Soncinas in *Metaphysics* IX, q. 14. And from this they infer that the will ought always to elect that which the intellect judges to be better and more agreeable, since it cannot reject something except because it found in it some aspect of bad or of lesser good.

Their argument seems to be that the freedom of the will ought to be within the latitude of its object, which is the good.

But that way has a difficulty, for if this is true, the will is not more free than the intellect. For just as the intellect necessarily assents to the true, so also the will loves the good to which no bad is communicated. And just as the will can fail to love the good because it finds an aspect of bad, so also the intellect can fail to assent if the true does not appear certain but is mixed with falsity in a certain way.

Furthermore, it follows that, absolutely speaking, the will is not free, for it always follows the judgement of the intellect and must elect

²⁸Disp. 10, q. 1, nn. 2–3.

what the intellect judges to be better. But the intellect is not free. Therefore, neither is the will free.

Furthermore, this opinion is soaked in the opinion of Durandus, which almost all theologians disprove, namely, that freedom is formally in the intellect. For insofar as freedom in the will arises from the indifference and freedom of the intellect's judgement, freedom will be prior and more perfect in the intellect.

Another way of speaking is that the freedom of the will arises from the intellect, yet not from its indifference but from its perfection and universality. For the intellect surpasses the other sensitive powers in this, namely, that it not just cognizes confusedly that this thing is agreeable, but that it distinctly perceives the aspect of agreeability, by separating it from all the other aspects with which it is conjoined and considering it insofar as it is desirable. And from this perfection of cognition arises the perfection in the desire of the will. For just as the intellect perceives in each thing how much goodness or badness it has, so the will can love it according to the goodness examined in it. And for this reason those things which appear good are not loved necessarily but freely. And all the particular things which occur in this life are of this sort. For particular things are never apprehended as necessary [goods], either because happiness is not placed in that in which it should be placed, because it is not actually considered, or, at least, because numerically these acts and this object are not deemed necessary.²⁹ From here, therefore, arises the freedom of the will. And therefore whatever particular good is proposed to the will, it can love the good for the sake of the goodness that it has and it can fail to love it because it is not deemed necessary for happiness, at least here and now.

But it should be responded that it is one thing [not] to love and another to pursue hatred.³⁰ Not to love implies freedom with respect to exercise. And it is not necessary to find an aspect of bad in the object for this; rather, it is sufficient not to find a necessary aspect of good.³¹ But for hatred it is necessary to find some aspect of bad. And the first view—which should be explained rather than wholly repudiated—points in this direction.

11. From all of this, an a priori argument for the conclusion: for the

²⁹This sentence makes as little sense to me in the Latin as in this English version.

³⁰Latin text does not have the negation, but sense requires it (and Castellote's Spanish translation includes it without comment).

³¹This is an awkward way to say that it is sufficient to fail to find an aspect of good necessary for happiness; the point is not about whether the goodness is a necessary property of the object.

will follows the rational and discursive power. Therefore it is free. The conclusion holds because freewill follows on the intellect and reason, for, as is proven from what was said, the intellect apprehends the aspects of good and bad and of each thing it judges by what aspect and way it is desirable and good. Therefore, appetite, which follows such cognition, will be able to love each cognized good by that aspect and way by which it is desirable and therefore [it will be able to love] freely.

It is confirmed: for desire follows cognition. Therefore, an appetitive power in the highest grade follows the cognoscitive power existing in the highest grade, and, therefore, freely. But the intellect is such a power among the cognoscitive powers; therefore, the will among appetitive powers.

12. *Whether the will and freewill are really distinguished.* From which it is also proven that the will and freewill are the same in thing and nature. They are distinguished just like intellect and reason. For just as intellect is called intellect first and absolutely, insofar as it understands or insofar as it understands (*intuetur*) a thing, strictly speaking, but is called reason insofar as it reasons discursively, so also the will is called such either insofar as it wills or insofar as it tends in a simple way to the end, but is called freewill insofar as it turns to means by free election.

13. *In which acts or concerning which objects the will is free.* But concerning this conclusion we still need to explain in which acts and concerning which objects the will is free. But this cannot be explained without discussing multiple theological questions at the same time. And for that reason I say briefly that willing with respect to exercise is one thing (it consists in being able to have an act and to cease from that act) and willing with respect to specification is another (it consists in being able to have this act or its contrary, either love or hatred, or in being able to love either this thing or its opposite).

I say, therefore, that the will is determined with respect to specification to the good and happiness in general, but not with respect to exercise.

The first part is proven: for no aspect of bad appears in happiness or in the good in general so that the will could pursue hatred of it.

The second part is proven: for a love of this good or of happiness is never offered in this life as strictly speaking necessary and therefore the will is not necessitated to exercising it. On the other hand, the will is not necessitated to any particular good in this life, neither with respect to exercise (because one does not plainly and clearly see a complete and necessary aspect of good in it) nor with respect to specification (because there is no good in this life which is not mixed up with bads and diffi-

culties). Hence, the will differs in this respect from the intellect, for the intellect is not free in itself with respect to exercise, but depends on the motion of the will, as was shown above.³² But with respect to specification, if the object appears evidently true, the intellect is necessitated to assenting. But the will is not necessitated to loving something even if it appears evidently good. This is because the aspect of truth is only one in kind and so, if a thing has truth, all falsity is excluded. On the other hand, the aspect of goodness is not only one and so one goodness can be mixed up with other aspect of bad. After this life, however, if a human being attains the vision of God, it will be necessitated to a love for God both with respect to exercise and with respect to specification. For there no aspect of bad can be found, but always the most supreme and necessary aspect of good. But in all other acts the will is free, as much in election as in intention for the end, although in different ways. For concerning means it acts not only freely but with deliberation and counsel. But concerning the end it acts without deliberation. But about all these things one should talk about *ST* IaIIae, some of q. 1 and some of qq. 9, 10, and 13.

14. *Response to the first and second arguments.* From here the solution to the first and second arguments is proven. I respond that the same power which operates freely concerning some objects can operate naturally and necessarily concerning other objects. This is because it is a higher power and operates according to the exigency of the objects, just as the will of God necessarily loves his essence because that object is worthy of being loved that way but loves creatures freely because they are also worthy of being loved in this way. So also our will proportionately.

15. *Response to the third. How God concurs with our will.* The third argument begs for a long treatise about the way in which God concurs with our will in exercising acts, natural as well as supernatural, while preserving our will's freedom. Many theologians speak about this matter, which can be seen in *ST* Ia.19, 22, and 23 and IaIIae.109. Nevertheless, I briefly say, along with St. Thomas in the mentioned places as well as IaI-Iae.10.3, that since the will is free by its nature, God, since he is infinite in wisdom and power, adjusts himself to the causes of things and concurs with each one in that way which its nature requires. And thus he works with the will without necessitating it but leaving it to determine itself to what it wished and offering assistance and counsel to it.

Therefore, I respond to the argument in form, that once everything required has been posited in the first act, the will can issue and not issue a second act. For God, for his part, is prepared to concur with the will

³²Disp. 12, q. 1, n. 7.

for the act which it wishes to effect. It is in my power whether God concurs with me or does not concur. And therefore, there is freedom in election. Hence, when it is said that once the divine will is posited, the will cannot not act, it still carries through, nevertheless, that the will acts freely. For that proposition has a compound sense and only posits a conditional necessity.

16. *Response to the fourth.* I respond to the fourth argument that the will, when it acts, acts freely strictly speaking. And when it does not act, it freely does not act. For in that same instant in which it could act as far as it is concerned it could also not act. In order to understand this the will should be considered in that instant in which it elicits an act as a nature prior to the act itself. And this power as such freely determines itself to eliciting this act. And after it is already understood under the act, it necessarily is under that act which then is, because the composite has been made. And that is only the necessity of the consequence rather than the necessity of the consequent, since with that the freedom stands strictly speaking.³³ This argument is discussed more extensively in *ST* Ia.14.13 and 19.7. And in this way freedom also remains.

17. *Response to the fifth.* [I respond to] the fifth argument: for God does not know my free acts except insofar as they are in some way present to his eternity. And in that way he knows them to be future, as they are, and his knowledge does not imply necessity except conditionally.

18. *Response to the sixth.* The sixth argument introduces another difficulty: in what way the heavens have dominion over the operations of our will. Concerning this matter, [see] *ST* IaIIae.9.5. But this is not the place for discussing it in its entirety. Nevertheless, I say briefly that the heavens have an influence over the bodies of human being and over all corporeal powers, which intrinsically in their dispositions depend on the dispositions of the bodies. But, on the other hand, the heavens do not directly have an influence or dominion over the acts of the intellect and will. For these powers are spiritual and of a higher order, for although our soul is the form of the body it, nevertheless, is not wholly immersed in the body but is raised from the body in some of its acts. Indirectly and, as it were, by consequence, insofar as reason follows sense and will follows appetite, the heavens, influencing these material powers, indirectly and, as it were, by consequence, draw the will, not directly but by inclining it. Nevertheless, the will can through its freedom resist the influence

³³Take a sentence of the form ‘if p, then p’. The sentence is necessarily true, but the necessity attaches to the entire conditional (i.e., consequence), rather than to the consequent. In other words, it is ‘necessarily(if p, then p)’ rather than ‘if p, then necessarily p’.

of the heavens and have dominion over it. As it is said: ‘A wise person will have dominion over the stars’.³⁴

19. In response to the seventh argument, so that we may oppose the impiety of Luther’s assertion that the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite is always a mortal sin and the will is always necessitated by the disordering of the appetite that remains after sin. But the theologians provoke this and therefore it should be said briefly that appetite and will are two distinct powers following different cognitions. And for this reason they are inclined to different things. And one draws the other after itself not by necessitating the other power but by inclining it in some way. Nor is it repugnant that the same soul desire contraries through different powers, especially if it constrains the inclination of one power through the other power. Concerning this matter, see *ST* IaIIae.9.2.

20. The eighth argument raises another difficulty, namely, whether God necessitates or compels the will. Concerning this matter, [see] St. Thomas, *ST* Ia.89.1 and IaIIae.6.4.³⁵ I answer briefly—for it is a theological matter—that although the will of itself is free, it can, nevertheless, be necessitated by God, for ‘the heart of the king is in the hand of God and he can turn it wherever he wishes’.³⁶ For God is omnipotent and has dominion over the will. Nor is what is brought up in the argument similar. For a thing which operates necessarily is material and of a lower order and for that reason it is incapable of freedom of itself by its own nature. For that reason, freedom cannot be conferred on it by God, for freedom has to be from something intrinsic. For freedom expresses a certain intrinsic dominion over one’s own acts and for that reason it is unintelligible that freedom be attributed to something by an extrinsic thing. But, on the other hand, necessity is from something extrinsic and therefore God can impose necessity on a thing that is free according to its own nature. Nevertheless, God cannot impose violence on the will. For violence express what is contrary to the will and inclination. But the will cannot will something contrary to its own willing, for by the fact that it wills, it already has a willing and inclination to that. And for that reason compulsion in the will implies a contradiction. But there is more to be said about these matters in their places.

³⁴This quotation appears to have been popular in seventeenth-century Spain and can be traced back to Ptolemy. See Herbert W. Greene, ‘“Sapiens Dominabitur Astris”’, *Notes and Queries* s12-IX, no. 193 (1921): 509, and Edward Bensly, ‘“Sapiens Dominabitur Astris”’, *Notes and Queries* s12-X, no. 195 (1922): 12–13.

³⁵Cf. IaIIae.10.4.

³⁶Proverbs 21:1.

DE ANIMA LIB. V, CAP. 8
(AS FOUND IN VIVÈS EDITION)

WHETHER THE WILL IS A FREE POWER IN ALL ITS ACTS.

We omitted this whole chapter that was in the autograph, because [the subject] is discussed more extensively in the *De gratia*, tom. I, proleg. 1, and in *Disputatio metaphysica XIX*, from sect. 2 onwards. Also because not just a few of the arguments can be seen as the same as in the fourth *Opusculum*, *De libertate divinae voluntatis*.

But one might ask for more about whether the rational appetite or will is a species of the lowest level or whether instead it is distinguished into different species in human beings and in angels. Recent theologians dispute about this question in *ST* Ia.59.1, where Cumelius [discusses it]. Franciscus de Herrera also discusses it in *Sent.* II, dist. 13, q. 1, as well as the present author himself in *De angelis* III, cap. 1. Secondly, one might ask whether the will or rational appetite is distinguished in human beings into concupiscible and irascible just as the sensitive appetite is usually distinguished by many. About this matter, one should see the present author in *De angelis* III, cap. 1, after Scotus and Gabriel in *Sent.* III, dist. 26 and 34, and Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8, q. 15.