PREFACE

Jacob Brucker (1696–1770), called ‘the father of the history of philosophy’ by Victor Cousin,¹ has this to say about scholastic philosophy in his famous Historia critica philosophiae:

Finally, around the eleventh century, a new kind of philosopher arose, which is usually called ‘scholastic’. It vowed obedience even to the words in Aristotle, yet perverted every sound argument, both philosophical and theological. And as a result of all the vain worship of clevernesses, it trapped their souls in an demented mode of philosophizing.²

Brucker divides the history of philosophy into three periods. The first period runs from the beginning of the world to the rise of the Roman Empire in the first century BCE. The second period begins with Jewish and other philosophies just before the coming of Christ and ends with demented scholasticism. The third period runs from the earliest humanist revival of learning—perhaps marked more by satire of the scholastic Aristotelians than by the building of new philosophical systems—to Brucker’s own day. The first period receives extraordinarily


thorough coverage from Brucker. Not surprisingly, given his assessment of scholasticism’s merits, the second period receives short shrift, at least relatively speaking. Here is what William Enfield, who regretted that ‘so valuable a fund of information should be accessible only to those, who had learning, leisure, and perseverance sufficient, to read in Latin six closely printed quarto volumes, containing on the average about a thousand pages each’, has to say in his charming eighteenth-century paraphrase of Brucker’s work when defending the rather cursory treatment of scholastic philosophers:

To follow the Scholastics in detail, through the mazes of their subtle speculations, would be to lose the reader in a labyrinth of words. We must refer those who wish for this kind of entertainment to the writings of Albert, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and Occam; where they will soon discover, that these wonderful doctors amused themselves and their followers by raising up phantoms of abstraction in the field of truth, the pursuit of which would be as fruitless a labour, as that of tracing elves and fairies in their midnight gambols. A brief review of their method of philosophising is all that is practicable, and all that the intelligent reader will desire, in this part of our work.

Enfield clearly had little sympathy himself for the subtleties of scholastic philosophy. Despite needing to pare down Brucker's six large Latin volumes into two much smaller English volumes, he has the space to

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3 The History of Philosophy, from the Earliest Times to the Beginnings of the Present Century Drawn up from Brucker's ‘Historia Critica Philosophiae’ (London, 1791), vol. 1, v.

entertain his readers in the above vein at some length.\textsuperscript{5}

But with the revival of learning championed by the humanists, especially with their emphasis on a proper learning of Greek and Latin, philosophy was restored: ‘Finally, after the great darkness in which all erudition and philosophy, having been buried, lay, a new light came forth and its splendour was restored to the sciences.’\textsuperscript{6} Brucker identifies Bruno, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and Leibniz—among others—as especially bright stars in the firmament of modern, true philosophy.

Brucker’s narrative, of course, has origins in the self-serving historiographical narrative spun by Renaissance humanists, who presented the medieval period as centuries of a slumbering human spirit after the culture and learning of the Greek and Roman civilizations and who gave themselves leading roles in the Renaissance that burst forth, throwing off the veil of medieval Christianity and arid scholastic Aristotelianism. Religion was reformed, painting received perspective, literature was eloquent again, and, not least, philosophy was purged of scholastic accretions so that the true wisdom of Plato and Aristotle could shine again.\textsuperscript{7}

This narrative was widely adopted. The cursory treatment of scholastic philosophy, whether accompanied by explicit dismissals or not, in well-


\textsuperscript{6}Brucker, \textit{Historia critica philosophiæ}, tom. 1, 44: ‘Tandem post graues tenebras, quibus omnis eruditio et philosophia sepulta tacuit noua lux exorta, et scientiis nitor suus restitutus est.’

\textsuperscript{7}This picture of the Renaissance thinkers as making a radical break from medieval barbarism and finding true learning by recovering a lost classical tradition goes back at least to Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374) and his \textit{De sui ipsius et multorum aliorum ignorantia} (English translation by David Marsh in \textit{Invectives} [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003]). Figures as diverse as Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) and Martin Luther (1483–1546) may be consulted for particularly choice quotations about the worthlessness of scholastic philosophy.
nigh countless histories of philosophy or ethics from Brucker’s time to the present could readily be adduced as evidence. The very term ‘medieval’ linguistically enshrines this tendentious historiography.

In electing to write on the scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez, S. J. (1548–1617), I am betraying that I have a taste for ‘this kind of entertainment’, as Enfield put it. But I do not bring up Brucker merely to indicate that I have different tastes. Rather, I think a historiographical narrative like Brucker’s, in broad outline at least, is still prevalent today and, I also think, the story of the dissemination and reception of Suárez’s works is a useful antidote to such a narrative.8

Suárez was born into a prosperous family in the Andalusian city of Granada on January 5, 1548, a mere half-century after Ferdinand and Isabella finally wrested the city from eight centuries of Moorish control. In 1564, as a student at the University of Salamanca, he asked to join the vibrant, rapidly expanding Society for Jesus. He was initially rejected on grounds of deficient health and intelligence. He was persistent, however, and was eventually admitted as an ‘indifferent’, meaning that his superiors would decide later whether he had the capacity for the study leading to the priesthood. There seems to have been little doubt later on, since, despite the initial worries about his intelligence, he rapidly rose in prominence. During his career he taught at the schools in Segovia, Valladolid, Tome, Alcalá, Salamanca, and, finally, at Philip II’s insistence, in Coimbra.9 He wrote prolifically; his published works

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8Suárez, incidentally, receives a part of a paragraph in Brucker’s six large volumes (Historia critica philosophiae, vol. 4, 137–38).

9Suárez was reluctant to accept the post at Coimbra, although a highly prestigious post, because of political dangers. The Portuguese were less than welcoming of a Spanish Jesuit appointed by a Spanish king, even if the Spanish king was also Philip I of Portugal after having successfully claimed Portugal during the 1580 Portuguese succession crisis. One wonders, too, if the Portuguese may also have had
fill twenty-six large volumes. His unpublished manuscripts would no
doubt fill several more. Suárez died on September 25, 1617, in Lis-
bon.¹⁰

It is worth pausing to take note of Suárez’s dates. He is often re-
garded as one more medieval scholastic, albeit one of the later ones.
But seeing him as a medieval scholastic is misleading at best, as his
dates should suggest. Anyone born in 1548 is clearly not part of the


To get a sense for the Renaissance philosophical context in which Suárez was work-
ing, see Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For more on the Jesuit order in which
Suárez was a prominent figure, see John W. O’Malley et al., eds., The Jesuits: Cul-
tures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) and The Jesuits II: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). For Suárez’s Spanish context, see the works cited in footnote 18 on page xix.
age of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. Much has happened in Europe in the centuries separating them from Suárez. He comes after the Reformation, after the rise of humanism, after the Europeans’ rediscovery of the Americas, and after their recognition of the great number of non-Christian cultures in other parts of the world.\footnote{Readers of Suárez will soon discover traces of these events in his writings.} Much in the world is going to look different to an educated person in Suárez’s day than it would have in Aquinas’s day. It is difficult to see what sense it could make to consider Suárez’s era as medieval rather than early modern.

Of course, Suárez might be a citizen of the early modern era and yet be firmly rooted in the scholastic tradition and so justifiably called a scholastic (at least if we divorce the term ‘scholastic’ from temporal connotations). I think this is fair. It seems clear that Suárez is part of the scholastic tradition, though one might wonder whether he is a ‘strictly scholastic thinker’, as Carlos Noreña calls him.\footnote{‘Suárez and the Jesuits’, 278.} Suárez was, after all, a Jesuit rather than a Dominican, and, as Noreña himself indicates, their conservative opponents saw the Jesuits as dangerous in part because of their reliance on humanist education.\footnote{Ibid., 271.} There were many humanists in the Jesuit order.\footnote{For some examples, see Robert A. Maryks, \textit{Saint Cicero and the Jesuits: The Influence of the Liberal Arts on the Adoption of Moral Probabilism} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).} It is also worth noting that Suárez seems to have gotten into trouble because he objected to the traditional form of scholastic teaching and so made a point of lecturing in a different manner.\footnote{Hunter Guthrie, ‘The Metaphysics of Francis Suarez’, \textit{Thought: Fordham University Quarterly} 16 (1941): 298–99.} The divergence in form of the \textit{Disputationes metaphysicæ} from most earlier scholastic literature has also often been noted. Finally, in case one is
tempted to think that the difference between scholastics and humanists is the difference between barbaric, mangled Latin and elegant, Ciceronian Latin, we have testimony from Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) that Suárez ‘stands out by his incomparable eloquence’.\(^{16}\) I will leave it to the readers to make their own judgements on that score.

Still, there is ample reason to think of Suárez as belonging to the scholastic tradition. He predominantly cites medieval scholastics such as Aquinas, Scotus, Biel, and Durandus (and Aristotle, of course); more importantly, he discusses them as colleagues engaged in a common project rather than as objects of ridicule as becomes fashionable among all too many early modern philosophers. He adopts the classic scholastic practice of organizing his texts into clearly delineated sections, each addressing one question. He cites the authorities on either side of an issue—exhaustively—before attempting to reach a resolution. Finally, he himself explicitly says in the introduction to one of his works that he will not depart from the scholastic method since it is familiar to him and especially suitable for finding truth and combatting error.\(^{17}\) His defence of the scholastic method is significant; if we keep his dates in mind, we


recognize that he is not a scholastic merely by default. Rather, he chose to remain in the scholastic tradition.

Whether scholastic or otherwise, intellectual and cultural life flourished in Spain during Suárez’s time. This is the Siglo de Oro of Spain.²⁸ The magnificent Complutensian Polyglot—the first printed polyglot of the complete Bible—was published just before Suárez’s birth. The painter El Greco (1541–1614), the author of Don Quijote Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616), and the composer Tomás Luis de Victoria (1548–1611) were all born in the same decade as Suárez. Lope de Vega, ‘the Spanish Shakespeare’, was born when Suárez was fourteen years old. Most relevant for our purposes, philosophy flourished in Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is when the famous Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle’s texts, combining the philological scholarship of the humanists with the philosophical exegesis of the scholastics, were prepared.²⁹ That the names of most of the prominent figures of the Iberian scholasticism of the time sound relatively unfamiliar to us—Francisco de Vitoria (1483/1486–1546), Domingo de Soto (c. 1494–1560), Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599), Domingo Báñez (1528–1604), Luis de Molina (1535–1600), and Gabriel Vásquez (c. 1551–1604) are some others in addition to Suárez—says

²⁸A highly readable, authoritative account of the period may be found in J. H. Elliott’s Imperial Spain, 1469–1716, with revised foreword. (London: Penguin Books, 2002). See also Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, The Golden Age of Spain, 1516–1659, translated by James Casey (New York: Basic Books, 1971), and Henry Kamen, Golden Age Spain, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). The Iberian peninsula more generally flourished during this time, although Portugal’s fortunes started to decline earlier.

more about our ignorance than about the importance of this later scholasticism.

But this revival of scholastic philosophy should surprise us if we are inclined to accept the narrative we have been considering. Recall the bright light with which early modern philosophers reputedly shone after the darkness of the medieval scholastics. If Renaissance humanism was such a welcome awakening, why did so many so quickly want to slumber again? Perhaps because scholasticism never actually was so moribund.

Francisco Suárez is undoubtedly a preeminent figure in Iberian scholasticism and his Disputationes metaphysicæ is likely his most influential work. A brief look at the history of this work should lay to rest any suggestion that Iberian scholasticism was merely a quaint relic in a conservative—and Catholic—outpost of Europe. It was first published in Spain in 1597, well after Renaissance ideals had time to permeate all of European thought. The book was extraordinarily well-received. Within several decades it went through almost twenty editions. These editions were not restricted to the Iberian peninsula: by 1620, for example, there

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20 Jeremy Robbins, a scholar of Spanish literature, argues against the view that Spain was intellectually backward during the seventeenth century in Arts of Perception: The Epistemological Mentality of the Spanish Baroque, 1580–1720 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). He actually makes the case too hard for himself, since he fails adequately to recognize how the scholastics themselves might be examples of intellectual vigour rather than moribundity.

had been six editions in Germany. It quickly became widely used not only in Jesuit-run schools, but also in Protestant universities in northern continental Europe, especially in Germany. These facts become even more remarkable when one notes what sort of work the *Disputationes metaphysicæ* is. Written in true scholastic fashion, it exhaustively catalogues the views from Hellenistic, Patristic, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian scholastic sources on whatever question is at hand before arguing that one view is more probable than another. Combining this thorough scholarship with a comprehensive discussion of metaphysical questions results in a forbidding work. The fifty-four disputationes, each covering numerous questions, fill two large volumes of the *Opera Omnia* in Latin. That such a work should receive such a remarkable reception throughout Europe suggests that scholasticism had more vigour left than the aforementioned historiographical narrative allowed.

The editions of Suárez’s works, numerous as they are, fail to account fully for the dissemination of his thought. Numerous handbooks were compiled by other philosophers that to a large extent relied on Suárez’s work. For example, Franco Burgersdijk (1590–1635) summarized many of Suárez’s views in textbooks that were widely used in seventeenth-century Holland.²² Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653), ‘the Protestant Suárez’, played a similar role in Germany. One historian, Karl Eschweiler, in a study of Spanish scholasticism’s influence in German universities, deems Scheibler’s *Opus Metaphysicum* the most widely-used textbook in Germany. Eschweiler eventually concludes that for most

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of the seventeenth-century, Suárez’s metaphysics provided the received philosophy in German Protestant universities.23

Besides noting the widespread dissemination of Suárez’s work, one can easily collect statements lauding the philosophical merit of Suárez. The Dutch student of natural law, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), considered Suárez to be a philosopher and theologian of such sharpness that he hardly has any equal.24 The Dutch philosopher Adriaan Heereboord (1614–1659), a student of Burgersdijk, calls Suárez ‘the pope and chief of all the metaphysicians’.25 Among the German philosophers, Christian Wolff (1679–1754) says that Suárez is the scholastic who ‘pondered metaphysical questions with particular penetration’.26 Leaving the continent, Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651), clearly inspired by Suárez, describes him as ‘acute’ at least twice.27 It is clear that Suárez was not merely an inspiration for textbooks.

So, contrary to what the narrative of Brucker and others might have led us to expect, the story of Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicæ appears to reveal a thriving scholastic tradition of philosophy in early


25’omnium metaphysicorum papa atque princeps’. This commendation is frequently quoted but all the instances I have seen rely on the same handful of secondary sources instead of citing the original. But the quotation is not apocryphal: it can be found as ‘omnium Metaphysicorum Principis ac Papæ’ in Heereboord’s Meletemata philosophica (Amsterdam, 1680), 27. See Eschweiler, ‘Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik’, 266–68, for more on the presence of Suárez in Dutch schools.


modern Europe. Yet present-day philosophers, at least in the analytic tradition, know very little about either Suárez in particular or about late scholasticism in general. Analytic philosophers, of course, have not always been known as appreciative of earlier traditions of philosophy. But scholars in this tradition have by now made great strides in recovering and analyzing earlier traditions. The ancient and modern periods in particular have been the subject of more-than-competent studies that have not only revealed the wealth of philosophical thought to be found there to specialist communities but to the broader philosophical community.

Medieval philosophy has lagged in this regard. While there have been an increasing number of insightful studies of particular figures of the medieval period, we still cannot claim to have a comprehensive picture of the medieval philosophical tradition. Nor can medieval philosophical thought claim to be part of broader philosophical discussion to anything like the extent that ancient and modern philosophy can. A lamentable tendency to think of the history of philosophy as starting with Plato and Aristotle and then continuing with Descartes is still evident rather too frequently. Remaining ignorant of the wealth of medieval philosophical discussion is not the only danger. As Terence Irwin has pointed out with respect to the history of ethics, ancient ethical thought can look more alien to modern concerns than it really is if we are unaware of medieval

28 There is a variant narrative that is also put into question by this story, namely, the narrative that recognizes a golden age of scholasticism around the time of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Bonaventure (1221–1274), but judges subsequent scholasticism to have rapidly devolved into arid subtleties such that the criticism of the Renaissance humanists were well-deserved by the time they were around to make the criticisms. Many works could be cited that accept this narrative, but see the critical overview provided by Kent Emery, Jr., in his editorial in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 51 (2009): v–ix. Also cf. Marcia L. Colish, Remapping Scholasticism (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2000).
developments.\textsuperscript{29} We risk misunderstanding the \textit{termini} of a tradition by neglecting the development in between.

What scholarship there has been on medieval philosophy has tended to focus on a handful of prominent figures of the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-centuries. Aquinas, Scotus (c. 1266–1308), and Ockham (c. 1287–1347) have received significant, competent attention, though there is still a great deal more to say even about them. But how much do we know about, for example, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1275–1332/1334) and Gabriel Biel (c. 1425–1495)? Yet both were considered significant enough in the early modern period to have chairs for the teaching of their thought in the universities. Or how much do we know about John Buridan (c. 1295–c. 1358), who wrote an influential commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} in addition to a great deal of work in what we would call philosophy of language? Numerous other similar examples could be cited.

Perhaps the best indication of the extent of our neglect of Suárez in particular is noticed when looking for editions and translations of his works. The vast majority of his work is not currently in print. There is a nineteenth-century \textit{Opera Omnia} that includes all of his works that were published either in his lifetime or shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{30} Good academic libraries will usually have a copy but acquiring it is difficult. Nor does the \textit{Opera Omnia} quite live up to its billing, since it does not include any of the numerous unpublished manuscripts to be found in various European libraries. Most of these manuscripts are no doubt of limited philosophical interest, but at least some, e.g., his commentaries


\textsuperscript{30}Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–1866.
on some of Aristotle’s works, would be of interest.\textsuperscript{31} The situation with critical editions is even worse. While there has long been talk among Spanish scholars of preparing a critical edition of his works, only several works have critical editions to date. Many of the works most in need of a critical edition in the sense of there being questions about the reliability of the available editions do not have one. Even fewer of his works are available in English translation. Approximately a third of the fifty-four disputations that make up his \textit{Disputationes metaphysicae} are available in English. The translations vary in quality. Significant excerpts from several other works are available in a mid-twentieth-century volume.\textsuperscript{32} But most of his works do not have even excerpts translated. None of his works are available in their entirety.

So the state of scholarship on the history of philosophy is this: flourishing scholarship on ancient and modern philosophy, reasonably good progress on the early and middle periods of medieval philosophy, and mostly ignorance on late medieval and early modern philosophy up to Descartes. Seen from this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that we know so little about Suárez, despite the influence he had in seventeenth-century Europe. We know hardly anything about his contemporaries and immediate predecessors either. This ignorance has


perils for our understanding of modern philosophers as well parallel to the perils resulting from ignorance of the medieval period generally. Recent scholarship on modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Leibniz, has increasingly recognized the extent of their indebtedness to scholastic philosophy. But these modern philosophers were as likely to be reading Suárez as Aquinas. Assuming that when Descartes uses scholastic terminology he is using it in the same way that Aquinas uses it fails to recognize that the terminology has been developed and refined for several centuries by the time it reaches Descartes.33 In order to fully understand modern philosophy, we need to understand the late scholasticism that preceded it.

A perceptive reader may have noticed that I have provided little evidence so far of the influence of Suárez on prominent philosophers of the modern period. Works on Suárez usually go through a standard laundry list that is intended to show that the modern philosophers are heavily indebted to Suárez: Descartes received schooling with Suárezian textbooks at La Flèche; Leibniz says in his autobiography that he read Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* as if it were a novel when he was a boy; and Schopenhauer lauded Suárez’s work as the storehouse of scholastic wisdom.34 Even the road to Kant may not be too long; we already noted Christian Wolff’s praise of Suárez. These claims are tantalizing, to be sure, but it is not clear to me of how much consequence

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33 I have in mind here works such as John Carriero’s *Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’ Meditations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Carriero is to be lauded for the careful attention he pays to Aquinas when reading Descartes and I think the result is illuminating. But I think there are places where reading Suárez instead of Aquinas would have been even more illuminating and would have prevented misleading contrasts.

34 These claims can be found in many places; two will serve as representatives: Riedl, ‘Suarez and the Organization of Learning’, 5–6 and Doyle, ‘Suárez—The Man, his Work, and his Influence’, 13–15.
they are. Showing that someone read Suárez is not the same thing as showing that he or she was influenced by Suárez in any interesting way. Unfortunately, there are almost no detailed comparisons of the philosophical positions of Suárez and philosophers who were allegedly influenced by him of the sort that would convincingly establish influence.\footnote{Perhaps the most substantive work of this nature has been done with respect to Descartes. Two examples of work helpfully informed by attention to Suárez are Tad Schmaltz, \textit{Descartes on Causation} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), and Alison Simmons, ‘Sensible Ends: Latent Teleology in Descartes’ Account of Sensation’, \textit{Journal of the History of Philosophy} 39 (2001): 49–75. Roger Ariew tackles the question of influence head-on in ‘Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez’, in \textit{The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez}, edited by Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Whether Descartes was significantly influenced by Suárez and, if so, to what extent is a matter of some controversy. For example, David Clemenson argues in \textit{Descartes’ Theory of Ideas} (London: Continuum, 2007) that Suárez’s influence on Descartes is usually overstated and that Descartes’ primary late medieval sources are Pedro da Fonseca, Antonio Rubio, Francisco Toletus, and the Coimbran commentators. Suppose that Clemenson is right about the lines of influence; one might still think it somewhat unseemly to quibble already about which late scholastics were really the most influential ones, given that we know so little about \textit{any} of them.} Given the reception that Suárez’s works received in the seventeenth-century, some significant influence seems likely. Still, there is clearly a great deal of work left to be done in order to reveal the lines of influence. But perhaps it is premature to hope for such work before we even have a solid understanding of Suárez’s work itself.

The historical rationale for a study of Suárez is clear, then. The reception of his work in the century or two after his life at least suggests that his philosophical thought is of a caliber such that we can profit from engaging it. There is another reason to think that Suárez’s work might be especially interesting. One of the most sophisticated alternatives to Aquinas in medieval thought is provided by Scotus. His penchant for denying the philosophical doctrines of Aquinas is well-captured in the old phrase ‘\textit{Ait Thomas, negat Scotus}’. So an obvious reason to be in-
interested in Suárez is to see how he navigates the Thomist and Scotist traditions. Which positions does he adopt? When does he try to forge a middle path? Why? By the time of Suárez, philosophers in the respective traditions have had several centuries both to sharpen the criticisms and to formulate responses; insofar as Suárez is a sympathetic heir to these traditions, we might expect to find especially sophisticated positions in his work.

It is possible, I suppose, that we will be disappointed and will find that Suárez’s earlier reputation was unmerited. But we know so little about his thought that we are certainly not in a position at present to make that judgement. And even if it should turn out that there is little to be found in Suárez that would not have been easier to find elsewhere, studying his thought will help give us a fuller picture of the Western philosophical tradition. Studying his work is especially rewarding in this regard because of his treatment of his predecessors. He is known both for how exhaustively he surveys all the different positions that have been taken on an issue and for how judiciously he presents the arguments for those positions. Suárez is more likely to be faulted for failing to dismiss a position where he should than for failing to give it its due. Given that Suárez frequently engages with the thought of other figures of whom we are ignorant, studying his work is especially useful in filling out our picture of the medieval philosophical tradition.

A Jesuit historian has compiled a list of the citations in *Disputationes metaphysicae* and found that 245 different authors were cited.36 Seeing

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the most frequently cited authors, excluding citations of himself, is revealing:

Table 1: Citations in *Disputationes metaphysicae*

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<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Aristotle</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>14. Albert the Great</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>2. Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>15. Henry of Ghent</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>4. Augustine</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>17. Gabriel Biel</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>5. Cajetan</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>18. Avicenna</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>6. Soncinas</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>19. Ægidius</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Averroes</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>20. Hervæus Natalis</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Iavellus</td>
<td>97</td>
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That Aristotle and Aquinas easily head the list is not surprising. That Duns Scotus is third is of some interest. As we will see, Suárez thinks of himself as a student of Aquinas yet frequently finds himself in sympathy with Scotus’s criticisms of Aquinas. But what is most revealing about this list is that we know hardly anything about any of the philosophers.
listed from the fifth position down. While Suárez’s lengthy discussions of the views of others often makes it more difficult and more tedious to figure out what his views are, they are also rewarding in that one can learn a great deal about other relatively-unknown philosophers while working through his writings.

Leaving aside the perspective to the past, a good understanding of Suárez will put us in a position where we can meaningfully answer the question of whether modern philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz were influenced by the thought of Suárez, and—if they are, as seems likely—the question of where the lines of influence run. Doing so should provide us with a better understanding of the subsequent modern tradition. Reason for further study of Suárez is not lacking.

Goals of this study

The obvious goal of this study is to fill part of the just-discussed lacuna in scholarship by providing a critical discussion of Suárez’s philosophical views. Of course, since Suárez wrote voluminously in numerous areas of philosophy and theology, my study will of necessity have to focus on only a small part of that work. There are several reasons that make his eudaemonist account of practical reason and action an apt focus point. First, even by the standards of Suárez scholarship, it is an area of his thought that has received little attention. What study has been done on Suárez has mostly been in either metaphysics, usually

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37 It is also noteworthy how many authors Suárez cites much more frequently than ones that we might have thought of as the prominent medieval figures, e.g., Ockham or Anselm.

38 The 1856 *Opera omnia* runs to twenty-six large volumes.
relying on his *Disputationes metaphysicæ*, or in political philosophy, relying on his *De legibus*. Both works include material that is relevant to a study of practical reason and action, but this material has received less attention. Other works by Suárez in this area have received practically no attention at all.

Secondly, it is an area of great philosophical interest. Questions about practical reason and action are frequent subjects of debate in contemporary philosophy and, furthermore, these debates often draw in perspectives from earlier traditions. There is enough dissatisfaction with modern alternatives to fuel an interest in earlier alternatives with the result that much work has been done to recover the views of philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas.

Thirdly, Suárez fits into a long, vibrant tradition of reflection on the subject such that this is a natural place to start in a project of fleshing out our picture of the development of philosophical reflection in late scholasticism. Suárez belongs, first and foremost, to the Aristotelian tradition of ethical theorizing that is rooted in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As we saw, Suárez cites Aristotle far more often than any other philosopher. It is a tradition marked by the claims that all the actions of a rational agent are done for the sake of her ultimate end, i.e., her happiness, and that the content in which the formal concept of happiness is realized is identified through a theory of human nature. That is, an understanding of the essence of human beings, i.e., of human nature, reveals what the function of a human being is. Happiness results from acting such that one fulfills one’s function.

More specifically, Suárez thinks of himself as continuing to work in
this Aristotelian tradition as it was shaped by Aquinas. Here is how Suárez himself describes his relationship to Aquinas:

Since in my other lucubrations and theological disputations I always had St. Thomas as my first guide and teacher and I tried with strength to understand, defend, and follow his teaching, I will attempt to surpass that in the present work with even greater eagerness and affection. And I hope, with divine aid, to achieve that so that I will not depart from his true mind and view in any matter that is important and of some significance, drawing out his view not from my own head but from his classic expositors and defenders and, where they fail him, from the various passages collected among them themselves.39

Suárez is undoubtedly right in identifying Aquinas as his ‘first guide and teacher’. Most of his works are clearly conceived as broadly following themes set forth in Aquinas’s *Summa Theologæ* and Aquinas earns far more citations than any other medieval philosopher. Suárez’s work is best seen as an attempt to further this tradition by spelling out further details and by responding to challenges raised against it.

We might, however, reasonably doubt whether Suárez is quite as faithful a disciple as he portrays himself to be here. He clearly con-

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39 *De gratia*, Prolegemenum VI, cap. 6, n. 28 (= OO 7:322): *...cum in aliis lucubrationibus nostris ac theologis disputationibus, D. Thomam semper tanquam primarium ducem et magistrum habuerimus, ejusque doctrinam pro viribus intelligere, defendere ac sequi conati fuerimus, in praesenti opere, multo majori studio et affectu id praestare cupabimus; speramusque cum divino auxilio consecuturos esse, ut a vera ejus mente atque sententia, in nulla re gravi aut alicujus momenti discedamus; non ex nostro capite, sed ex antiquis ejus expositioribus ac sectatoribus, et ubi illi defuerint, ex variis ejusdem locis inter se collatis eam eliciendo.* On this passage, cf. Elisabeth Gemmeke, *Die Metaphysik des sittlich Guten bei Franz Suarez* (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), 18–19. All translations of Suárez are mine.

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ceives of himself as following Aristotle and Aquinas rather than, say, Scotus or Ockham. But his temperament is that of a harmonist. When he sees Scotus apparently rejecting a Thomistic position he is as likely to try to find a *via media* that will give some semblance of reconciling both views as he is to defend Aquinas by rejecting Scotus’s arguments. In some cases Suárez adopts positions that look suspiciously like Scotus’s positions but then claims that Aquinas also holds these positions if he is just properly interpreted, as we will see. In these cases, we might well doubt whether Suárez correctly interprets Aquinas.⁴⁰

So a subsidiary goal in this study is to keep an eye on Suárez’s relation to the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition, that is, to see how he further develops that tradition. An example of such development can be seen in Suárez’s discussion of the different ways of acting for the sake of an end. Given the crucial claim in an Aristotelian account that all rational actions are done for the sake of the agent’s ultimate end, one needs to know something about what is necessary for an action to count as having been done for the sake of the ultimate end in order to evaluate the plausibility of the claim. Aquinas made explicit the thought that in order for an action to be done for the sake of an end the agent need not be consciously attending to an end while acting. Aristotle quite plausibly thought this as well, but he does not explicitly say so. Aquinas uses the example of a traveller to make his point. The traveller’s steps enroute

⁴⁰In some cases, Suárez finds support for his favoured readings of Aquinas in texts that he mistakenly thinks are Aquinas’s. For example, Suárez’s account of the metaphysics of relations looks much more like Ockham’s account than Aquinas’s, but Suárez thinks he finds Thomistic support for it in a text spuriously attributed to Aquinas but that is probably by Hervæus Natalis. See *Disputationes metaphysicae* XLVII.2.13 (= OO 26:789). For more on Suárez’s relation to Aquinas, see Marco Forlivesi, ‘Francisco Suárez and the “Rationes Studiorum” of the Society of Jesus’, in *Francisco Suárez and His Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy*, ed. M. Sgarbi (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010), 77–90.
to the destination are all taken for the sake of getting to the destination even if the traveller does not think about the goal at every step. This seems plausible enough as far as it goes, but Aquinas does not make clear exactly what is required for an action to count as having been done for the sake of an end. Suárez develops this thought further. He distinguishes four ways of intending an end: actually, habitually, virtually, and interpretatively. Actual intention is the paradigmatic case of intention, i.e., where the agent thinks of the end at the time of deliberation and action, and uncontrovertially suffices for providing the needed relation between an action and end. Suárez sketches two accounts of habitual intention but finds both lacking and suggests that habitual intention is insufficient to relate an action to the end in the needed way. He does think that virtual intention suffices. On his account, virtual intention requires that some force (virtus) remain from a prior actual intention (perhaps via the memory). He also discusses interpretative intention. But here matters become trickier, both with respect to what the account of interpretative intention is supposed to be and what kind of work it is supposed to do. Those details will have to wait for Chapter 3.

What is clear is that these distinctions between different ways of acting for the sake of an end provide for a more sophisticated evaluation of the Aristotelian claim that all rational actions are done for the sake of the agent’s ultimate end.

It is perhaps also worth noting that this study will spend less time disputing alternative interpretations in the secondary literature than is customary in treatments of, say, ancient and early modern philosophy. This is explained by the rather limited scholarship on Suárez to date.
Primarily engaging in argumentation over the plausibility of Suárez’s doctrines is premature. We first need to engage in the exegetical work requisite for understanding what his doctrines are.

**Outline of the study**

I will begin by outlining Suárez’s account of practical reasoning in broad strokes. My primary purpose—in addition to introducing what I take to be core features of his account—is to sketch an alternative to the picture that has recently been drawn according to which Suárez abandons talk of ends in favour of a theoretical grasp of rules commanded by God which agents ought to obey. I argue that Suárez in fact accepts a teleological account of practical reasoning. More specifically, he accepts eudaemonism in both its rational and psychological flavours.

Reflection on ultimate ends is, of course, a prominent part of ethical theorizing for eudaemonists, since acting well requires aiming at the right ends and properly deliberating about the means to such ends. As could be expected, then, Suárez devotes many pages to considering the ultimate end or happiness. In Chapter 2 I follow suit and examine his account of the ultimate end in more detail, starting with a survey of his taxonomy of different kinds of ultimate ends. One key question motivating my discussion is how mid-level ends such as good health, pleasure, and virtuous action fit into Suárez’s scheme. Mid-level ends are ends that are desirable for their own sake but that are not the truly ultimate end that happiness is. The question of their status is especially pressing for Suárez, since it looks like he rejects the inclusivist strategy of—to put it rather simplistically—identifying happiness with an aggregate of
mid-level ends.

As noted earlier, the question of what is required for an action to count as being for the sake of an end is especially relevant for eudemonists. It is also, however, of independent interest. In Chapter 3 I discuss the four different kinds of intention for ends that Suárez distinguishes: actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. The first three kinds are clearly distinguished by Scotus and quickly became part of the scholastic conceptual toolbox. The last kind, however, is of later origin. Understanding just what it is also turns out to be problematic since Suárez appears to present multiple incompatible accounts of it.

Building on the distinctions examined in earlier chapters, in Chapter 4 I look at a sequence of questions that Suárez considers about whether agents have to intend an ultimate end when acting, whether they can intend more than one ultimate end, and whether they have to intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end and, if so, with what sort of intention. In the course of answering these questions it becomes clear that Suárez is wary of strong forms of psychological eudaemonism that might turn out to be implausible. He ends up denying that agents always properly intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end when acting; rather, they may only interpretatively intend such an end. It is, unfortunately, not entirely clear how strong of a claim is left, given the unclarity about what Suárez takes interpretative intention to be. It is, however, quite clear that Suárez thinks that agents ought properly to intend their unqualifiedly ultimate end.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I look at Suárez’s account of the will as a free and rational power. Here he arguably departs from Aristotle and Aquinas for a view that is closer to that of Scotus. Suárez argues that
we can only choose options that we have judged as conducive to our ends, but he insists that the will is free in a libertarian sense and so we need not choose the option judged to be most conducive to our ends. We cannot choose something purely bad but we can choose a lesser good. This emphasis on freedom is part of the reason why Suárez can only commit to an attenuated psychological eudaemonism.

**Texts**

Since Suárez’s writings are not widely familiar, I will make a few remarks about the texts that I will rely on. This is by no means a discussion of all of his works, though such a discussion would be useful since no fully satisfactory bibliography of Suárez’s work is to be found. The 1856 *Opera omnia* with its twenty-six volumes presumably provides ample material for most scholars starting to take an interest in Suárez. But we do know of a significant amount of writing by Suárez that is not included in the edition. Much of this additional material has never been published and is generally not even included in bibliographies of his work.\(^{41}\)

The main texts for my purposes will be *De fine hominis* and *De voluntario et involuntario*, the first two of five treatises that correspond to sections of the *Prima secundae* of Aquinas’s *Summa Theologæ*. These

treatises are not commentaries in a strict sense, but are based on lectures that Suárez gave in Rome on Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae* relatively early in his career. There are two reasons for focusing on these texts: (1) they contain the bulk of Suárez’s discussion of some of the core material of this study and (2) they have received very little attention from scholars so far. There are also some potential problems to be aware of in using these texts. First, they come from earlier in his career than his better-known works do. Insofar as they are used in conjunction with those later texts, one needs to remember that his views may have evolved in the intervening period. I am not aware of any drastic shifts, but there is some evidence that he changed his mind on at least some details.\(^{42}\) Second, they were not published during Suárez’s lifetime but were published posthumously by his literary executor, Baltasar Alvarez (1561–1630), in 1628. Alvarez was not the most meticulously scholarly of editors and so there is some reason for caution with these texts. Again, I am not aware of any places where Alvarez’s editing resulted in egregiously false representations of Suárez’s views. But, for example, he is notorious for deleting sections from the text where he thinks that the same material has been covered in Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* and inserting references to the latter discussions. But given the possibility that Suárez changed his views by the time of the latter discussions, this practice threatens the internal integrity of the earlier works. Fortunately, this particular editing practice is readily spotted. Third, given that these texts are based on Suárez’s lectures and that we do not have evidence that he edited them, we should not rule out errors even apart

\(^{42}\)Josephine Burns argues to this effect in her dissertation ‘The Early Theory of Human Choice in the Philosophy of Francisco Suárez’ (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1968).
from Alvarez’s editing. All three of these problems are reason for some caution, but I am not aware of any reason to think that their effects are serious enough to call into question the usefulness of these texts for Suárez scholarship.

Suárez’s best-known work is the *Disputationes metaphysicæ*, It was published during his lifetime and can safely be taken to accurately represent his views. It also has the distinction of being one of the first systematic, comprehensive treatises on metaphysics that is not a commentary. Most of the material in this work will not be relevant for a study of action, but there are several sections that will be. One of the disputations on efficient causality, XIX, has a fairly lengthy, interesting discussion of the causality exercised by the will. Two disputations, XXIII and XXIV, deal with the metaphysics of final causality and hence will be relevant for my purposes.

After the *Disputationes metaphysicæ*, the *De legibus seu de Deo legislatore* is Suárez’s best-known work. This is also based on earlier lectures on the *Prima secundæ*, but was edited by Suárez and published in 1612. It represents the latest of his work that I will make use of in this study. Much of it is more relevant to political philosophy, but parts of it are relevant to the ethical issues under discussion here.