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Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, S. J.  
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ON CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL  
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<283, col. a><sup>1</sup>

DISPUTATION 10.

*On the First Cause.*

SECTION 4.

*Whether the First Cause determines the individuation of effects.*

The question is what it is in a cause that explains why, once numerically these causes, this time, this place, and other conjoined [conditions] have been applied, why—I ask—does this rather than another effect arise? Gregory of Rimini in I, dist. 17, q. 4, art. 2, ad 7, and dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, teaches that the degrees of intensity are entirely the same, but this is first, that second, and another third, all these happening according to the will of God, who wishes that this be produced later when it could have been produced earlier. Gregory, therefore, plainly teaches that the individuation of those effects here and now from these causes arises not from the nature of the causes and effects, but only from the will of God willing to concur with this effect rather than that one. He clearly teaches the same thing in II, dist. 37, showing that God gives an immediate influx to an action of sin because he determines his concurrence to numerically this action. Father Salas is also moved by this reasoning in *On Sins* disp. 13, sect. 10. For this reason, it strikes me as surprising that this method of philosophizing seems new to Father Vazquez.

Father Suárez followed it in *DM* 5, sect. 3, n. 34, asserting §60.

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<sup>1</sup>Translation is based on the 1624 Lyons edition and numbers in angle brackets are to the page numbers of that edition.

that many learned men found the opposing view difficult to believe, since the determination of individuals seems to be reduced to only the circumstance of time. And in sect. 6, n. 6 ff., he says the same thing about the rational soul, namely, that its individuation cannot be taken from a relation to some determinate parts of matter. Toletus supports this view in *On the Soul* III, q. 18, concl. 2 and 3. Father Suárez himself clearly teaches this about the other forms in the same sect. 6, n. 9 ff. While, however, Father Suárez in part follows Gregory's view here, he nevertheless departs from him in the opinion about the priority and posteriority of the degrees of quality. For he thinks that they are dissimilar and that one is placed before the other by its nature. Nor can an exception to the inference be argued here by Father Vazquez, since Gregory renders the argument common to all intrinsically similar effects, which Father Suárez freely admits. He, however, denies that the first and second degree of qualities are similar. There is in this no exception to the inference. The same opinion is universally followed by the Coimbra College in [*on the Soul*] II, ch. 7, q. 15, art. 2, and in *On Generation and Corruption* II,<sup>2</sup> ch. 11, q. 1, art. 3, and by many more recent philosophers who are not unlearned. As I seem to remember, Father Leonard Lessius defends [this opinion] in the disputation on the predestination of angels and human beings, which I had noticed but afterwards, when I looked for the place, I did not find it. Father [Jean] de Lorin propounds the same opinion in his commentary on Acts, ch. 17, v. 27, 'Profecto'. This opinion I judge to be more true and I explain it as follows.

The created cause fire, for example, is applied to this hand in this place at this time and with all the other things antecedently required for heating in place. I say that that very fire of itself <col. b> in all those circumstances has the power to heat to eight, yet of itself in those circumstances it does not connote numerically this particular heating to eight or that one. Rather, of itself it is indifferent to all the heatings to eight that are contained in the power of it and its subject. I do not say 'to all' collectively such that it could exercise them simultaneously in that subject, neither many nor two. For it cannot then elicit but one alone. But it is indifferent to all divisively such that it does not seek any one in particular, but seeks all indifferently, not this one more than that one. For its power applied here and now connaturally will elicit this rather than that, if God wills to concur with it. I say,

§61.

<sup>2</sup>The Latin text erroneously cites book I.

furthermore, that this determination of the indifference must be removed by the will of the first cause providing concurrence to this heating but not to that.

You will say that the first cause is determined to a species of act by the secondary cause. Therefore, it does not determine the secondary cause with respect to individuation, since the individuation contains the species and so in that way the first cause would determine the secondary cause to a species. §62.

Notice that determination is explained by a causal proposition. For example, God and fire concur for heating. God's concurrence of itself in first act is indifferent to heating and cooling. Hence, with respect to God alone insofar as he is precisely a universal cause, we cannot understand why his action must be one of heating rather than of cooling. As a result, we cannot say that this action is one of heating because it arises from God, since cooling also arises from God. Fire, on the other hand, is of itself determinate towards heating, for it is not indifferent to cooling. And as long as we conceive of fire as seeking God's concurrence for acting, we understand his concurrence to be directed towards heating. See, then, this true causal [proposition]: this action is one of heating because it arises from fire. In that way, God's will is determined through heat so that he wills to concur with it for heating. But this individual heating here and now does not arise from some determinate concept of fire, but from God's will providing for this one but not for the others. Hence, as far as this argument is concerned, I deny the inference.

To the proof I respond that a species can be taken as it is contracted by singularity to the composition of an individual either in its breadth confusedly containing every individual or the common nature (*ratio*). The first cause determines the concept of the species as it is contracted to a singularity, because every higher grade is *a parte rei* identical with individuation, yet does not formally determine the species under a common concept. For, since God wills to concur by a general concurrence with fire, he is bound to concur with some heating in general, such that that action cannot be something other than heating. That is, God is determined by the fire with respect to the species. On the other hand, that it is this heating rather than another heating cannot be compelled by the fire, but is whichever is pleasing to God. The fire is determined by God with respect to individuation. That which I said about causes operating necessarily, I say about free created causes in relation to their actions that are done without §63.

being chosen, as will become clear in the discussion.

So, having explained the conclusion in that way, I prove it, **§64.** first: for fire in itself has the power for multiple heatings. For its essence considered according to itself expresses an equal relation to them. For those things that the fire can successively exercise are essentially contained in its power. Likewise, the hand to which it is applied, considered according to itself, is indifferent to multiple heatings received from the same fire, heatings which it can receive successively. The place <284, col. a> also does not determine the active cause or the passive cause to some heat rather than another, both because place neither is operative of heat nor confers the active power on the fire and also because there can be multiple heats in the same place. Moreover, time does not determine the causes to this effect, both because time is very much extrinsic and does not impress anything of a cause and because it is not operative. Finally, because if another heat were produced in it, what of time would intervene? For of itself it does not respect heat nor heat time, since it can exist in different [times]. Therefore, there is nothing created that determines secondary causes to numerically this action. I judge the inference evident, since if no individual cause demands the effect in a determinate way but is indifferent to all of them, then where does this determination of the whole collection come from? Moreover, the antecedent seems sufficiently proven.

You will say that time is required for the production of the effects of secondary causes, which depends on the motion of the heavens as on a universal cause. But this part of the motion cannot concur except with this action. To the contrary, first: time formally consists in the motion of the heavens, but the motion is not a principle giving influx to the effects of other causes. Therefore, that effect is not an effect of time. Therefore, insofar as it itself is concerned, it does not demand this part of time more than another. **§65.**

It is confirmed: numerically this action could be produced by these causes in another time, at least with respect to absolute power. Therefore, there is no dependency of the effect on this time, since except in that case, it would not belong to absolute power. The antecedent is clear in the case of Christ, whose soul, hypostatic union, and essential union were decreed by God in abstraction from this time, because any circumstance of time agreed with the merits of the fathers had by grace through Christ, **§66.**

as I showed in [*Disputationes de Deo homine*], disp. 29,<sup>3</sup> sect. 2. Therefore, an action of itself does not demand one time more than another. The motion is an application of the heavenly bodies, which by the fact that they go around through different spaces respond to different parts of earth. On the other hand, lower actions do essentially depend on the qualities of the heavens, but on motion as on application. And just as this heat here and now does not produce a different action if it is applied to the wood by the right hand or by the left hand, so also the light of the heavens [does not produce a different action] if it is applied to a subject in this or that part of time.

To the contrary, third: many human actions depend on the heavens remotely and indirectly, but directly only on God and the soul. How then are they diverse from diverse times? Furthermore, the understanding of an angel does not depend on the influx or motion of the heavens. So where, I ask, does that determination with respect to individuation arise? In addition, why do the heavens want numerically this motion here and now? . . . <col. b>

Second, I argue with respect to prime matter, which in the first fashioning of the world was created under the form of the elements and not under the form of living things. The form of water was no more connatural to prime matter during the first production than the form of lion [was to prime matter]. For as God made a lion from the same matter on another day, what would he have done against matter if he had made it in the first instant? Especially since the same matter perseveres under different forms. I deem it ridiculous to think that prime matter depends on this form in coming to be but depends on another form in being conserved, when production and conservation are the same action and matter equally respects all forms.

The same argument can be made about the rational soul, which when first created informs a tiny body, [yet] the same soul is conserved as the body grows. Moreover, let us suppose there are two corpuscles equally disposed in the same real instant and two souls created by God. Why would this soul demand this body rather than another, given that either is suitable for it? Moreover, let us suppose a hunch-backed body or a snub-nosed one. Would there be some soul that according to itself demands that body, such that the right body would be contrary to its inclination? Nothing is missing except as constituting hunch-backed, snub-

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<sup>3</sup>Latin text says disp. 16.

nosed, and one-eyed souls. Therefore, when defective bodies lack natural perfection, souls cannot be determined to those of themselves. Hence if the bodies are larger or smaller with the matter required for the perfection of the organs, the souls would be better infused into the former. When a body in the first conception is three spans, for example, if in that instant it were either smaller or larger, the same rational soul (*animus*) could inform it. If larger, this is obvious because it happens at a later time. If smaller, because I do not posit the minimum possible quantity.

The same thing can be confirmed in the case of Adam's soul, which, since it is of the same nature as ours, does not by its nature demand a body disposed in such a way outside the womb, but [a body] organized in the womb. And as God created Adam, he could also create me, and as I was born, so Adam could have been born.

The same thing is clear in the case of freewill, which is unable to freely prefer this action to another, because it does not cognize it. In fact, once the object is represented to it, the will can either love or hate it. But that does not require a reflexive cognition of love and of hate, but only the direct cognition of goodness and of badness. §70.

Likewise, it intensely or mildly loves or hates within the latitude of intensity that the cognition bears. For just as the whole love is in its power, so also any determinate part of the same intensity of the act [is in its power]. For the goodness alone of the object with the mode of indifferently representing it is sufficient for that. On the other hand, by what principle can it be moved to preferring this act of love over another act of love of the same species? Since, therefore, the will is determined by something to this act here and now, I say that this comes from the will of God. God's will seeing the will here and now indifferent to love and to hate prepares a general concurrence to this love and not another and to this hate and not another. In this way, it is in the will's power to exercise this love and this hate or not. But it is not [in the will's power] to prefer this love to other loves. Rather, on the assumption that it loves, it will be with this love.

You will say: God, then, is the cause of sin, since he himself is the cause why this sin comes about rather than another one. And just as heat is the cause from which heating arises formally, because there is the determinative concurrence <285> of God to heating, so also the will of God will be the cause of this wicked- §71.

ness, since it determines the human will to this wickedness. And this is a good causal [proposition]: *this wickedness arises now because God wills it.*

I deny the inference. I respond to the proof that the general concurrence to some wicked action of this species is prepared by God according to the law of free created causes. Once that is posited, what does it matter that the concurrence is prepared for this one rather than that one? For [the concurrence] is always prepared indifferently for [the action] with a dependency on consent from it on whether it wishes to use that concurrence, and also with an exhortation not to use it badly.

I respond to the proof that God is not the cause of formally this wickedness arising, but rather [the cause] that this very act arises *on the assumption* that the human being wills to act wickedly. And just as God does not concur formally with wickedness, but only with the material entity of the wicked act, so also he does not concur formally with *this* wickedness but only materially prepares a general concurrence that is conditioned to the entity itself of the act. And just as hatred of God as such, for example, does not take its wickedness from God's concurrence but from our freewill, so also *this* hatred does not take its wickedness [from God's concurrence]. Rather, in this individual hatred are found both this vital individual and incomplete entity of the act and this singular wickedness, just as this animal and this rationality are found in Peter. Moreover, God concurs with this entity, but does not formally prepare a concurrence or concur with this wickedness. Rather, it is taken from a relation to our will. But how this happens pertains to theology. For I do not want physics by opening its cells to cross theological boundaries, nor 'the cobbler [to go] beyond his last'.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, note disp. 9, sect. 5, where I said concerning **§72.** the attribution of formality: from this you will learn that sin is not formally from God but from us. For 'sin as sin' reduplicates the way in which what is sinful arises from its cause, as 'vitality' formally reduplicates the way of being vitally produced. But sin does not arise from God in a sinful way, just as also not in a vital way. Therefore, sin does not formally arise from God. The minor is clear, because it arises from God according to the laws of his wisdom and of our freewill seeking to be completed in order to operate freely. Also, God's concurrence is indifferent, but is determined by our freewill, just as it is determined by heat to

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<sup>4</sup>Italicization added.

heating. Therefore, just as heating is formally attributed to heat and not to God's indifferent concurrence, so also sin is formally attributed to our freewill and not to God's general concurrence.

There is, however, a difference: heat is directly intended by God, but not so the perverse action. A clearer example of this is a vital act. For although its individuation is determined by God, nevertheless this vitality insofar as it is this vitality does not arise from God but from this vital power. For God prepares his concurrence with that act taken materially, but not as arising from God in a vital way. But because that act arises from [our] freewill it is a vital act. Thus, God prepares a concurrence indifferent of itself and conditioned to the entity of this act. Moreover, its wickedness is formally from the creature, since it is performed contrary to the law through the creature. But theology [deals] with these matters. Let us, moreover, consider the weight of the opposite view.

Father [Benet] Perera in [*De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principijs*], book 8, ch. 15, seems to return to the nature of causes. He is not actually asking whether numerically this cause here and now applied is indifferent to this or that effect. Rather [he is asking] whether one effect of this cause can be produced by another [cause]. He subscribes to the denying opinion, and what he says about action I think is evident. Hence, it cannot <col. b> be adduced for one or the other part. Father Vazquez in the first volume of [*ST*] part 3, disp. 74, ch. 8, says that once this cause here and now has been posited, this effect and not another is produced *ex natura rei*. No *a priori* argument is given. This is no surprise, since there is none. But with all his strength he hurls some darts from the absurd. §73.

First: because no argument could be given for why a natural cause would be indifferent to one effect and to another rather than determined to one. It is confirmed: for if a cause is indifferent to one effect, it will also be indifferent to infinite effects, for also to two, also to three, and so on. But this is absurd, since created causes are finite in power. Nor is it plausible that the will by one cognition is constituted indifferent to infinite acts of the same intensity. §74.

I respond, nevertheless, that many arguments are available to us, which I already gave. The confirmation is feeble. For what is posited in the cause is not indifference to many or to two effects collectively, but divisively. For it is indifferent to infinite effects divisively, that is, to producing one of the infinite number. That §75.



is, anyone of the whole infinity, but not two or three at once. For example, I can ride on one horse from an infinity [of horses] so that I can ride on any horse whichever. Yet I cannot ride two horses at once, since if I climb on one, I cannot climb another at the same time. In the same way, if a cause produces one effect, it cannot at the same time produce another one. For being able to effect a thousand effects at the same time is very different from being able to effect any one effect out of a thousand (not with another at the same time, but one only). I do not see what this has to do with infinite common power.

It is put forth, second: for if the cause had the power for numerically multiple effects, it could also produce an effect already made once more.<sup>5</sup> For it has a power of itself indifferent to all of them. But it is determined to this individual [effect] only by the will of the first cause. From this it follows that the same man could deposit the same semen and dispose the matter to a union with the soul of his deceased son, and cooperate by a native power with his raising. But everyone thinks that is absurd. §76.

I respond, first, that the inference can be denied. For a cause of itself is indifferent to the effects that in and of themselves do not have any condition repugnant *ex natura rei* to production. But if an effect includes such a condition, the cause already does not naturally respect it, since a cause and a natural effect connote each other. Moreover someone could say that an effect already corrupted cannot return *ex natura rei*, not because a defect comes from the cause but because it comes from the effect itself, just as God cannot make a chimera as a result of a defect in the chimera itself. Moreover, the repugnancy arises because nature directly intends the conservation of the species through a multiplicity of individuals, since the fecundity of nature itself is demonstrated. A repetition of the same individual is *per accidens* less beautiful and agreeable, just as when someone always wears the same clothing or if a commander had very few soldiers and presented the same ones for repeated reviews. But a review of many troops is more beautiful and more decorative. Finally, the repugnance should be looked for in the effect, not in the cause. §77.

I respond, second, that an applied cause can of its nature reproduce an effect already produced if God furnishes his concurrence for it. Moreover, I showed in disp. 2, sect. 3, that matter has an appetite for forms that are already corrupted. This is no more difficult than to have a power for multiple effects that §78.

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<sup>5</sup>Cf. Suárez, *DM* 5.9.

God does not will to produce. Nevertheless, this reproduction is impossible, not strictly speaking by inspection of precisely the aptitude of the causes and the effects, but <286, col. a> by inspecting the decree of God about not reproducing those effects. Other effects are also impossible in this way, effects with which God does not will to concur, because this will of God is absolutely necessary, it is not in our power, and it is not given according to ordinary power. Therefore, with respect to ordinary power a natural cause cannot produce the same effect again. See the Coimbran fathers in *On Generation and Corruption* II, ch. 11, q. 1, art. 3, responding in this way: the resurrection of the dead is miraculous in a thousand ways. For God breaks a general law, the union happens without coitus and without coagulum and giving birth, and, finally, the bodies are drawn out of the fish, earth, and other composites where they will then be.

Something else that is said about the union of the separated soul poses a special difficulty, since the soul essentially seeks to be in the last state to be merited after separation from the body. But if the physical aptitude for union is precisely considered, if God were to furnish a concurrence to it again being united, it could become as it in fact was before. . . . **§79.**

It is moved, third, because freedom is damaged in free causes, which is not only with respect to exercise and to the species of the act, but also with respect to individuation. For not only are we free to love and not to love and to have hatred, but we are also free to love with this love and so intensely. We will be punished or given a reward not only because we loved but because [we loved] with such an act. It is confirmed: for if the will is not free with respect to which individual action, then it is determined to it by God alone. But that seems absurd in the case of depraved actions. **§80.**

This argument presents no difficulty, for the cause is not determined by the will of God to an individual action any more than according to the opposing view the cause is determined by it itself and by the other circumstances in which it here and now operates. For our opponents say that freewill cannot reproduce an act already past. Consequently, it already is not free with respect to that act. They also say that it cannot exercise two acts of the same species entirely similar to each other concerning one and the same object. Or at least it cannot have [them] at the same time except certain acts and not multiple ones. They also say the freewill is not indifferent to all the acts of this species. For if they **§81.**

admitted that indifference, they would already be in agreement with us, and the will for its own choice could reproduce past acts (which I deny), and they differ in assigning the cause by removing that indifference. What is left, then, is as they say that the necessary cause here and now is determinate to the exercise of this effect. But a free [cause] <col. b> can exercise this act and can cease from it. On the other hand, once it is assumed that it acts, it is not in its power to elect this individual [act] in preference to the others, as was proven. Therefore, the freewill is determined by the circumstances to the individual act. Therefore, God does not deprive it of freedom with respect to individuation, since it did not have any. But what our opponents attribute to circumstances, we attribute to God. Therefore, just as those do not remove freedom, so neither does God.

Therefore, in response to the argument from n. 80, I deny **§82.** the antecedent. To the proof I respond that with respect to an individual action we have the freedom to exercise it or not, but not the freedom to elect this individual [act] rather than another act of the same species. And accordingly we are free to love with this love, since we love through it in such a way that we could have not had it. But we cannot thus love through it that by freely omitting it we could exercise another act of the same species concerning the same object here and now, as our opponents also say about determination by circumstances. Nor will we affect reward or punishment because we preferred this individual to others of the same species. For that would not happen according to any view. But [we will affect reward or punishment] because we exercised it while having the power not to exercise it and having obligations according to the law. Also, freedom with respect to the species of the act (since we can love and hate) is one thing, while freedom with respect to exercise is another (since we love by this act and not love). But a freedom with respect to individuation by which we would elect this rather than that [individual act] is not posited. Neither do you grant it, so it is not removed by God.

I respond to the confirmation that we are not determined **§83.** antecedently by God, but a concurrence with this action and with an action of the opposite species is furnished by God, yet not to other [acts] of the same species. This determination is not through giving influx but through denying concurrence to the other acts beyond these two. According to you this happens as a result of the circumstances, on account of which God does not furnish concurrence except to this act, but not to another act.

Therefore, God on his own makes the same thing that according to you he makes on account of the circumstances. This concurrence, nevertheless, in the first act is not different from the concurrence which according to your view God furnishes for this action at this time, which concurrence does not compel [the secondary cause] to make use of it. It is as if you could write with two reeds, and I holding one reed forbid you from writing with it but permit you to write with the other one. But this permission does not compel you to write. Rather, you are free to do either. But if you write, it will be by the second reed that I left rather than by the one that I am holding. For the same reason, God does not determine [the secondary cause] to the wickedness of the act but to the entity. Nor do the circumstances determine,<sup>6</sup> but God makes what it [is] precisely. Therefore.

Finally, you will object that it is in the power of the will to choose an action. Therefore. I prove the antecedent: for it is in the power of the will to love by this or that intensity and mildness, since there is no need to cognize the act or intensity. I respond that the antecedent is false according to every view. For in the opposing view the will is determined to this individual by extrinsic circumstances. To the proof I respond that in order to love nothing is demanded except a cognition of the object. The intensity and mildness is in the same genus as the act. But this is not why numerically these grades are exercised according to choice alone. Therefore, the determination comes from elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> §84.

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<sup>6</sup>I dropped a negation from this clause, following the 1619 edition here.

<sup>7</sup>This last paragraph is an addition to the 1619 edition.