

## COMMENTARY ON ST IAIIE.1.6<sup>1</sup>

There is one thing in the sixth article that must always hold before the eye so that we are not deceived, namely, the distinction between the ultimate end of a human formally and materially, which is expressed in the seventh article. For the ultimate end formally is nothing other than the perfect good of whomever, as is said in the fifth article. And this sixth article is principally verified concerning the ultimate end formally. But it is verified secondarily concerning the ultimate end materially, as, namely, it is clothed in this formal nature. For it is necessary that whatever a human wills, he wills it for the sake of his perfection, because, as is said in the eight [book] of the *Ethics*: ‘lovable indeed is the good proper to each one’.

In sexto articulo unum oportet prae oculis semper habere, ut non fallamur, scilicet distinctionem inter ultimum finem hominis formaliter, vel materialiter, quae in articulo septimo exprimuntur. Ultimus enim finis formaliter nihil aliud est quam bonum perfectum cuiusque, ut in quinto dicitur articulo. Et de ultimo fine formaliter hic sextus articulus verificatur primo. De ultimo autem fine materialiter verificatur secundario, ut scilicet induit illius rationem formalem: oportet enim quaecumque homo vult, quod velit propter suam perfectionem; quoniam, it in Octavo dicitur *Ethic.*, *amabile quidem bonum, unicuique autem proprium*.

Cap. II, n. 2. -  
S. Th. lect. II.

II. And if Scotus had directed his attention to this, perhaps he would not have said what he wrote in [*Sent.*] IV, dist. 49, in the question *Whether everything which a human desires, he desires for the sake of happiness*. For he holds the negative part: because a human being can with a free desire will not for the sake of happiness, negatively just as contrarily. Negatively, certainly, because the intellect can think of something else than happiness and consequently the will can will [something else than happiness]. Also, because the intellect can consider some good as good in itself while not considering it as good for an end. Therefore, the will also can will that. But, contrariwise, because, while standing with assurance of happiness in God and so forth and the wickedness of fornication, a human being can will to fornicate.

II. Et si hoc advertisset Scotus, non dixisset forte quod scripsit in Quarto, dist. XLIX, illa quaestione, *Utrum omnia quae appetit homo, appetat propter beatitudinem*. Tenet enim partem negativam: quia homo potest libero appetitu velle non propter beatitudinem, tam negative quam contrarie. Negative quidem, tum quia intellectus potest aliud quam beatitudinem cogitare, et consequenter voluntas velle. Tum quia intellectus potest aliquod bonum considerare ut bonum in se, non considerando ut bonum ad finem: ergo et voluntas potest velle illud. Contrarie vero, quia, stante certitudine de beatitudine in Deo etc., et malitia fornicationis, potest homo velle fornicari.

Qu. x. - Cf. Part. I,  
qu. LXXXII, art. 2,  
Comment. n. v sqq.

But these easily yield, if happiness (which this discussion is not about except insofar as the nature of the ultimate end of a human and [the nature] of happiness are formally the same,

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<sup>1</sup>Text from Leonine edition of Aquinas.

until this difficulty) is rightly considered. For we speak of the ultimate end formally. And we say that nothing can be desired except it itself or [something] for the sake of it and that neither negatively nor contrariwise can be desired otherwise.

Sed haec facillime cedunt, si beatitudo (de qua hic sermo non esset, nisi ratio ultimi finis hominis et beatitudinis formaliter esset eadem, quoad hanc difficultatem) recte consideretur. Nos enim loquimur de ultimo fine formaliter: et dicimus quod nihil potest appeti nisi ipse aut propter ipsum; et quod nec negative nec contrarie potest aliter appeti.

And to the first motive of Scotus the solution is clear in the account, in ad 3 of this article, where he says that when the intellect thinks of something else the will wills for the sake of the ultimate end virtually, even if not actually. And this suffices.

But to the second, the response is clear from what was said in the same article ad 1 and ad 2. For from there it is held that whatever partial good may be desired is at least as good for the one desiring and consequently for the sake of the ultimate end. For, as is said in the body of the same article, ‘the beginning of anything is ordered to its consummation.

Moreover to the motive about the desirable contrariwise, the response is manifest. Because nothing can desire the contrary of its full perfection. Because whatever he desires, he desires as it has some perfection, although he may desire in opposition to such a thing as is the ultimate end, as is clear in the case of one sinning mortally; and [he may desire it] in preference to [the ultimate end], as is clear in the case of one sinning venially.

Et ad primum motivum Scoti patet solutio in littera, in responsione ad 3 in hoc articulo, ubi dicitur quod, intellectu aliud cogitante, voluntas vult propter ultimum finem virtualiter, etsi non actualiter; et hoc sufficit.

Ad secundum vero patet responsio ex dictis in eodem articulo ad 1 et ad 2. Inde enim habetur quod quodcumque partiale bonum appetatur, appetitur saltem ut bonum appetentis: et consequenter propter ultimum finem. Nam, ut in eodem corpore dicitur, *inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem eius*.

Ad motivum autem de contrarie appetibili, manifesta est responsio: quoniam nullus potest appetere contrarium suae plenae perfectionis. Quoniam quidquid appetit, appetit ut perfectionem habeat aliquam; quamvis appetat contra talem rem quae est ultimus finis, ut patet in peccante mortaliter; et praeter illam, ut patet in peccante venialiter.

Nor does it move you that we also love speculative acts for the sake of the end. Because, as you can learn here and below in q. 13, art. 3 ad 1, they are expressed not for the sake of something else nor through a negation of the ultimate end, but through a negation of another proximate and proper end. And similarly they express the ends of another, not through the affirmation of an ultimate end, but in that order, etc.

There is nothing that needs to be written about in the seventh and eighth articles.

Nec te moveat quod etiam actus speculativos diligimus propter finem. Quoniam, ut hic et inferius in quaest. XIII, art. 3, ad 1, discere potes, dicuntur non propter aliud, non per negationem ultimi finis, sed per negationem alterius proximi et proprii finis. Et similiter dicuntur fines aliorum, non per affirmationem ultimi finis, sed in illo ordine, etc.

In articulis septimo et octavo nihil occurrit scribendum.